

Being/Becoming an Undutiful Daughter: Thinking as a Practice of Freedom

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The undutiful daughter is a figure brought to life in the title of a recent edited volume (see Gunkel et al. 2012). In Rosi Braidotti's (2010) preface to *Undutiful Daughters* she describes her as one who rejects the logic of One, but is disloyal not only to one but to many. One way to see this is to say that the undutiful daughter rejects disciplinary boundaries; for instance, in *Patterns of Dissonance*, Braidotti (1991) refers to this figure to describe Luce Irigaray, whose body of work on sexual difference is disloyal to the Father figures of philosophy and psychoanalysis.

This chapter reads processes of defamiliarisation in the context of the South African university *beside* the rebellious actions of many young women who are students and activists at the University of the Witwatersrand. Elina Oinas (2015) offers three versions of “rebellious girls”: an HIV activist in South Africa, a young Finnish feminist and an online activist in post-revolution Tunisia, arguing that while the scenes of their protests differ, their actions and the ways that they are received share important qualities. The first is that “girly protest” is often not taken seriously. Oinas reads against this impulse to argue that these rebellious girls produce scenes of

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epistemic mutiny. Reading *beside* a group of rebellious girls at Wits, my intention is to reflect on the object or objective of the classroom.

Reading *beside* is my intuition in this task. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick describes the preposition as interesting because there is “nothing dualistic about it; a number of elements may lie alongside one another, though not an infinity of them. *Beside* permits a spacious agnosticism about several of the linear logics that enforce dualistic thinking [... whose interest] does not depend on a fantasy of metonymically egalitarian or even pacific relations, as any child knows who’s shared a bed with siblings. *Beside* comprises a wide range of desiring, identifying, representing, repelling, paralleling, differentiating, rivalling, leaning, twistiness, mimicking, withdrawing, attracting, aggressing, warping, and other relations”.

I read the undutiful daughter in relation to near-kin figures of rebellion in part with an interest in the productive work an oppositional or differential consciousness might offer. My reading of pedagogy is framed by the actions of these rebellious girls, in the context of an ongoing rebellion in South Africa and conditions of increasingly untenable contradictions for the university and its project across the world. It is not my conclusion that our pedagogy must act mimetically to these girls and simply “rebel,” although I am more broadly interested in mimesis. I am keen on thinking about the scene of protest and the university as an institution through the relation between the undutiful daughter and the feminist killjoy. Describing the feminist killjoy, Sara Ahmed (2010) refers us to the scene of a table, which we can imagine to be the university:

We begin with a table. Around this table, the family gathers, having polite conversations, where only certain things can be brought up. Someone says something you consider problematic. You are becoming tense; it is becoming tense. How hard to tell the difference between what is you and what is it! You respond, carefully, perhaps. You say why you think what they have said is problematic. You might be speaking quietly, but you are beginning to feel “wound up,” recognizing with frustration that you are being wound up by someone who is winding you up. In speaking up or speaking out, you upset the situation. That you have described what was said by another as a problem means you have created a problem. You become the problem you create.

We can think of the undutiful daughter as a figure of defamiliarisation. That is, in being or becoming an undutiful daughter, one becomes aware of the cartographies or relations of power that they participate in.

This practice of defamiliarisation is not purely a dialectical relation to power, where the politics of location such as race, sex or gender simply produces negative effects of difference. Difference here becomes a strategic site of complex, multiple and shifting consciousness. Braidotti (2012) describes defamiliarisation as an ethics of freedom, a way to think about difference as productive and creative. Defamiliarising “identity” offers us a lens to Stobie’s (2005) double valence of the rainbow. Rather than locking identity as solid, confirmed and complete, difference here offers a politics of location that is better characterised as estrangement or disidentification. José Esteban Muñoz offers a compelling definition of disidentification:

The process of disidentification scrambles and reconstructs the encoded message of a cultural text in a fashion that both exposes the encoded message’s universalizing and exclusionary machinations and recircuits its workings to account for, include, and empower minority identities and identifications. Thus, disidentification is a step further than cracking open the code of the majority; it proceeds to use this code as raw material for representing a disempowered politics or positionality that has been rendered unthinkable by the dominant culture. (1994, p. 31)

The undutiful daughter describes the figure around which feminist critique of patriarchy and other power structures can be instigated. The feminist killjoy is a figure who “ruins the atmosphere.” I would like to propose a fugitive relationship between the undutiful daughter and the killjoy. Fugitivity is a relation of defamiliarisation or disidentification described by Fred Moten and Stefano Harney in their book *The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study* (2013). The undercommons as the site or scene for fugitivity refers to experimentation, relation and antagonism in relation to institutional life framed by the continuing effects and affects of dislocation (also see Kelley 2016). When I suggest a reading beside “rebellious girls” as not simply mimetic, it is rather this set of relations that I wish to instigate.

Taking a cue from Oinas’ (2015) intuition about an epistemic mutiny, I enter a discussion of pedagogy that is followed by that of the undutiful daughter. I am interested in the relationship between the undutiful daughter and the “feminist killjoy.” Through a reading of this relation, I target institutionalised rape culture. The body as a site of difference threads the sections together, as I conclude with a section on joy as possibility for the

kinds of defamiliarisation I would like to instigate as a practice of the classroom. Defamiliarisation here would refer to a transformative process of decoding the political economy of the classroom, losing familiar habits that are universalising and exclusionary.

PEDAGOGY

Shose Kessi (2016) makes the case for a decolonised theory that guides my general optimism about teaching, writing that “academic freedom in our context is about the freedom to challenge racist ideas and oppressive policies and practices [. . .] when an institution keeps repeating or recycling old practices without dialogue and consultation, or without evaluating what it does, then colonial thinking will remain.” Kessi’s (2016) instigation for a consultative and dialogic approach to decolonising the university presents reiterative and citational practices that locate it within the politics of what Paulo Freire names as a “pedagogy of the oppressed.” In *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1972), Freire makes the case for a view of education as a site for liberatory agendas. Freire critiques the “banking” system of knowledge which refers to the university as a project, increasingly influenced (now) by neoliberal reforms where one attends university to acquire a degree whose excellence is measured as achieving its value by the extent to which the recipient of that degree can enter the labour market and subsequently, a process of embourgeoisement. This concept also refers to the relation between the teacher and the student: the teacher who feeds knowledge to the student, the student who receives knowledge from the teacher. A pedagogy of the oppressed emphasises dialogue to break apart this relation between the teacher and the student; dialogue is a generative process or a methodology that bears the potential of education as producing liberatory agendas.

In *Teaching to Transgress* bell hooks (1994) meditates on this very process. She wrote the book when she had recently received tenure and felt a sense of disappointment about this achievement. As a child, hooks always imagined a life where she wrote and taught, as this teaching was a job that “smart” black women could expect to end up doing. hooks writes “teaching was the place of ecstasy—pleasure and danger” (1994, p. 3) describing the segregated schools where black teachers taught black students. Unlike the unsegregated schools she would later attend where “knowledge was suddenly about information” (1994, p. 3), “almost all of our teachers [. . .] were black

women. They were committed to nurturing intellect so that we could become scholars, thinkers, and cultural workers—black folks who used our ‘minds.’ We learned early that our devotion to learning, to a life of the mind, was a counter-hegemonic act, a fundamental way to resist every strategy of white racist colonization. Though they did not define or articulate these practices in theoretical terms, my teachers were enacting a revolutionary pedagogy of resistance that was profoundly anticolonial” (1994, p. 2).

hooks’ reflections continue to her university life where she was made increasingly aware that education was structured by hierarchy, authority, control and obedience. There was no excitement, no pleasure; there was no arousal. hooks encountered the work of Freire and was densely guided by it in her now seminal book. She refers to an engaged pedagogy which she describes:

To educate as the practice of freedom is a way of teaching that anyone can learn. That learning process comes easiest to those of us who also believe that there is an aspect of our vocation that is sacred; who believe that our work is not merely to share information but to share in the intellectual and spiritual growth of our students. (1994, p. 13)

The classroom as a room with desks where students arrive for their lessons produces the possibility of egalitarian conditions. Yet we have observed the falseness of this assumption. Many poor students come to school hungry. Many students travel long distances every day. Many students do not have accommodation and are forced to sleep where they can manage a space. Many students will also arrive at the classroom having been educated in classrooms with limited resources and capacities. Even when students have had access to privileged resources, many of these students continue to experience a strong sense of alienation from the form and content of the classroom. The habitus of the classroom is something that is not simply given. It is an awareness of this set of relations that animates my own concerns for the classroom to be an object/objective that unconditions us from the baggage it often carries. So we ask about how we teach, what we teach, whose faces we look at, or remember when we teach, and how when in the mode of performance it perhaps feels most comforting to seek the gaze of the one who appears most engaged with our ideas, and then we stop this, perhaps recognising that it is most certainly possible that those most accustomed to being heard when they speak will be the most accustomed to

speaking. We might ask ourselves over and over again, “What and how do we measure the value produced here?”

Freedom is an optimistic object. I refer to freedom in this way, part in response to my own turn to it as the “answer” in the title of this chapter, projecting the idea as the thing that will be returned by an approach to knowledge, writing and teaching that foregrounds a rupture against the Logic of One. The Logic of One refers to the symbolic structures that frame or produce our language in the Name of the Father. This language is structured around the masculine or the phallus as the universal signifier so for women to take up a subject position, they can only do so as “little,” or imitation men. The figure of the “New South African Woman” described by Pumla Gqola is a good example. Gqola refers to the ways that images of “women’s empowerment” in post-apartheid South Africa lie constitutively beside ruling masculinity (2015, p. 65).

Freedom time in South Africa is signalled by the transition to democracy, marked by commitments for social transformation. Freedom time means that the categories of difference that once legislated constitutive forms of violence are no longer there, so they can now be capitulated into descriptive and occasionally celebrated categories. Freedom time is a troubling notion, and perhaps it is worth grappling also with the assumptions a liberatory agenda might carry as inheritance. The optimism for the classroom I speak of here carries the wish for the value of the classroom to produce an oppositional consciousness. I would like to describe this through Chela Sandoval’s (2000) notion, or practice as she refers, of a differential form.

Differential form in Sandoval (2000) captures technologies, processes and procedures of a methodology of the oppressed; there are endless genealogies and figurations that produce the vocabulary of this form that includes schizophrenia (see Deleuze and Guattari 1983), nomad thinking (see Braidotti 2006), *la mestiza* (see Anzaldúa 1987), *signifyin’* (see Gates 1988), trickster consciousness (see Lorde 1983, 1985), *différance* (see Derrida 1997), etc. These figurations are not meant to mean that we can produce a taxonomy of oppositional grammars and describe their geometries as being simply analogous. What I find useful in Sandoval is precisely the ways she instigates a geometric awareness, rather than the circular repetition that frames thinking in dialectics. Sandoval (2000) describes a topography of

“oppositional consciousness” through five oppositional sites: “equal rights,” “revolutionary,” “supremacist,” “separatist” and “differential.” There is no clear or pure temporal location for any one of these sites or grammars—and a differential form is one that demands code switching, constantly between them. My purpose is to test this possibility through the figure of the undutiful daughter as a particular kind of figure that produces sites of thinking, politics and action, or a line of flight. This figure is also a relation to disciplinary modes of thinking.

UNDUTIFUL

Quiet.

When a feminist is raped

It is the quietest that she has ever been.

(Godsell 2016, p. 51)

Early in 2016, students at Wits collected themselves to protest in support of students at the University Currently Known as Rhodes on the matter of the #RURferenceList. The #RURferenceList was released by a group of students with the aim of forcing the university to attend to its current sexual harassment policies (Pather 2016). The protest actions surrounding the release of the list included the circulation of statements like:

60% of RU students surveyed in 2015 did not know where to report sexual assault at the university.

Rhodes University hires rapists and abusers.

Victim: “I would like to report an assault.” RU Management: “Sorry, the person who handles that isn’t here, would you like to come back next week?”

“Girls shouldn’t get too drunk or else they will be raped”—RU Management¹

The intention of the #RURferenceList was to hold university management accountable for a general apathy to institutionalised rape culture. Students at other universities participated in recognition of the specific stakes articulated by students in Rhini, as well as the triggering conditions of their own institutions.

In *Notes Towards a Performative Theory of Assembly*, Judith Butler offers the argument that “acting in concert can be an embodied form of calling into question the inchoate and powerful dimensions of reigning notions of the political” (2015, p. 9). An assembly involves plural forms of action articulated through speech acts. The body carries expression through these forms of assembly not as action that takes its meaning from the acting of speaking in words, but that the body itself articulates a range of embodied and occupational gestures and practices. The body produces meanings, rather than being simply inscribed with words from which it takes meaning.

The bodies of women and the sexual meanings attached to them are a marked feature of university life. The display of the naked body to make claims in the political field has a long history in Africa (Kazeem 2013) and, in particular, in relation to the institutional life of the university. In April 2016, Stella Nyanzi a feminist scholar and activist at Makerere University stripped naked outside of the office of the director of the institute, Mahmood Mamdani, where she works as a researcher (Redden 2016), for example.

Bibi Bakare-Yusuf (2011) reads the connection between women’s bodies, nudity and university life. What makes the naked body on stage at university campuses a dense site for politics is attached to a set of prior assumptions that include the causal relation between nudity and sexuality; the assumption that women’s agency is formed or made in relation to men; that exposed flesh demands a response concerning morality; and that young women’s bodies are more generally sites where social anxieties get meted out.

Rape culture refers to the conditions around which rape is made to appear as not only normal, but necessary—it is a way of organising the world, or what some people would say is a way of keeping women in control. Rape culture makes it possible for us to be unable to even name what is rape and what is normal. When we talk about rape culture as institutionalised, we refer to the ways that rape forms part of the institutional culture itself. There are some difficult examples for us to work from or with. Say in the public cases at Wits where several male academics were eventually fired, they were described as “sex pests” (see Mtshali 2013). While I would not want to take away the intentionality that they displayed in their actions, this label makes their behaviour appear as though it is singular, out of the norm, and seeing them in this way requires thinking about some men as good and some

men as bad. I do not refuse this possibility: some people are good, others are bad; but rape culture, or thinking about the ways that it is institutionalised, demands something more from us. My thinking here is guided by what Pumla Gqola (2015) describes as “ruling violence” to refer to the relationship between rape culture and what I have described here as freedom time.

Figure 3.1 is an image of Simamkele Dlakavu at the #IamOneinThree protest with the words “revolt” on her bare chest. Dlakavu is a master’s student in the department of African Literature. She is also an activist, writer and regular columnist for the *City Press*. In the picture taken at the protest, Dlakavu’s body performs the gesture instigated in Sarah Godsell’s (2016) poem titled “When a Feminist is Raped,” along with the argument posed by Butler (2015) with regard to the power of assembly. That is, it is not necessarily the words “REVOLT” written on her chest that make the largest political claim, but rather it is the nudity of her body. Writing about her experience of being a student at Wits and this protest, Dlakavu states:

Many young women and rape survivors on my Twitter timeline were deeply triggered. We sent each other direct messages on Twitter, “Are you okay?”, knowing very well we were not. “I can’t stop crying,” came a reply. (2016a)

Along with Dlakavu, other women stood in various shades of nudity with various kinds of statements that read “not asking for it,” “my body, my choice,” etc. The rhetoric of these statements draws from a range of feminist protest traditions concerned with body politics. The body here is recorded as property of the person that speaks to the failures and contradictions that our present notions of freedom carry for black women in post-apartheid and post-colonial African states (see Ligaga 2014; Gqola 2016).

“Body politics” is described by Sophie Oldfield, Elaine Salo and Ann Schlyter as “the negotiation of power via the body, processes that operate sometimes directly (for instance, violently), but also processes that work as a symbolic and representational scale” (2009, p. 3). When we think through this lens, we understand relations as constituted in processes and institutions, negotiated in ordinary practices such as the classroom. This is the kind of thinking that informs Bakare Yusuf (2011) in her claims about the connection between nudity, morality and the university in Africa.



Fig. 3.1 Wits postgraduate student Simamkele Dlakavu at the #iamoneinthree protest, August 2016

Sara Ahmed (2006) describes institutional speech acts to refer to those acts that make claims on behalf of an institution, around which the institution acquires its attributes. We might consider the claim of “freedom” as such a claim, brought to life by the metaphor of the rainbow nation as an example to further elaborate Ahmed’s argument. The ‘rainbow nation’ is a term used to describe South Africa’s democratic project, where categories of racial difference marked by the different colours of a rainbow are offered as unified in their difference. Difference becomes something that is no longer harmful. Yet as Gqola would write 10 years into the democratic period, “diversity and a powerful expression of freedom are not in and of themselves automatically transformative” (2004, p. 7).

Ahmed demonstrates that not all speech acts can be considered to be performative, writing that “An utterance *is* performative when it does what it says: “the issuing of the utterance is the performance of an action” (2006, p. 104, citing Austen 1975, p. 6, my emphasis), and later reiterates the same point using Butler as her interlocutor to say that performativity does not refer to a single act, but instead refers to “reiterative and citational practice by which discourse *produces the effects that it names*” (Ahmed 2006, p. 105, citing Butler 1993, p. 2, emphasis added by Ahmed).

Adam Habib (1997) is also suspicious of the rainbow as a metaphor, arguing that it is used by elites and the acceptance of the metaphor relies on a non-interrogation of its underlying assumptions. Habib offers that socio-economic class is what is taken for granted in this metaphor and it is the non-consideration of class that makes the rainbow nation fail in consolidating democracy. Specifically referring to the state of higher education, Enver Motala and Salim Vally (2010) suggest that analyses that elide social class as an analytical category are impoverished by this blindness. Motala and Vally (2010) go further, to argue that “when social class is referred to in educational analyses it is all too often understood as a *descriptive term rather than an explanatory concept*” (2010, p. 87, my emphasis). Access, or inclusion to the university under the optimism of the rainbow nation, is understood to address past exclusions, but if we take Motala and Vally’s (2010) conclusions, a project aimed at inclusion misrecognises the university’s complicity in reproducing the very order of injustice that produces class difference in the first instance.

Habib’s (1997) view of the rainbow relies on an understanding of the categories of racial and sexual differences as descriptive, much in the ways

that Motala and Vally (2010) view the ways that class has been descriptively treated. This point of view informs some scholars who have described the recent student protests as rehearsing “identity politics”. In this view, “identity politics” appears to be understood to describe categories of difference, rather than revealing an understanding of race, class and gender as constitutive projects and processes that are sutured into the very constitution of the university’s project.

We can take Zethu Matebeni’s (2015) reflection on what it means for black queer women to inhabit university spaces to illustrate this point. Matebeni writes:

Countless women will tell you of the everyday pain they carry as they walk around campus, dodging men’s sexual advances, or even attempts to take over their bodies without consent. Routinely, they are reminded that certain spaces do not belong to women; that their bodies, or body parts, do not belong to them; and that the university is a hetero-patriarchal male space. Its aggressive masculinity colludes with its suffocating whiteness. For many women, speaking out is not an option. It is a must, even when their voices are shaking. [...] Escaping what everyone loosely terms “rape culture” becomes sheer luck. Rape, as culture, is made so palatable that it is even stripped off its gruesome harm and violence. Wounded bodies move around campus watching their backs, minimizing their risks to injury, and attending classes with their male perpetrators.

The “politics of admission” refers to acts when institutions “admit” to past injustices for example when a university defines institutional racism in order to admit to how the institution is structured by racism. Ahmed problematises this view writing, “we might wish to see racism as a form of doing or even a field of positive action, rather than as a form of inaction” (2006, p. 106). Ahmed makes this distinction in reference to the ways that an admission, like that to institutional racism makes its value in the admission “as if by saying that we ‘do it’ means that’s no longer what we do” (2006, p. 109).

Ahmed continues with a discussion on commitments to refer to documents that institutions produce committing to transformation, for instance. In the case of South African universities, these commitments are informed by a compliance to the law enshrined in the Constitution of South Africa and various laws concerning equity.

Read in Ahmed's terms, these commitments are "literally under the law" (2006, p. 110). For Ahmed, the declaration of a commitment blocks the recognition of the site of injury. That is, the university's recognition of rape culture might actually act to block the university's commitment against rape culture, or said another way "the failure, or nonperformativity, of antiracist speech acts is a mechanism for the reproduction of institutional authority, which conceals the ongoing reality of racism" (ibid.).

I think what goes wrong with "admissions" to institutionalised rape culture (or racism) rests with our inattentiveness to the relationship between the university and body politics. The university as a post-colonial project "of new men, for new men" cannot be seen "as static, gender-neutral spaces to which women have been benignly and invisibly added" (Barnes 2007, p. 12). Teresa Barnes (2007) points to the inheritances the African university carries that should be at the centre of our discussions of decolonisation and transformation:

The identification of men and masculinity with the labour of the mind and of women with the body, was also transmitted to Africa, along with senates, the vice-chancellors, the graduation robe, the funny flat hats and the rituals of examination. To Africa was transmitted the idea that learning is a combative and aggressive process; that the worthy candidate is one who survives attackers and bests his foes, and that the experience of intellectual combat is intrinsic to intellectual life and production. (2007, p. 8)

Barnes' (2007) analysis supports my retreat from thinking about racial and sexual differences as descriptive (also see Grosz 1994). Braidotti (2003) necessarily identifies the body, or embodiment of a subject, as *the* key site of struggle for redefining subjectivity, understood by her as "neither a biological nor a symbolic category, but rather as a point of overlay between the physical, the symbolic and the material social conditions" (2003, p. 44). That is, like in Barnes' (2007) reading, there is a dualism between the mind and the body that rests at the foundation of "the university." Braidotti recognises the "difference" that the body presents as being the very foundation of this "European history of philosophy and the 'metaphysical cannibalism' of European thought" (2003, p. 45; also see Magubane 2001).

JOY

rape trigger

It hurts so much
to be touched.
Like when fresh air hits you in the lungs
and you choke,
chest feels broken
And you are hoping not to make sound.
It hurts so much to be touched.

trigger warning

Breathing together like this
fills me with power.
Breathing together like this
fills me with pride.
Breathing together like this
hurts.
We breathe out of the wound,
feels like breaking
into speech
into pieces.
Breathing together like this
fills me to pieces.²

At the beginning of *Willful Subjects*, Sara Ahmed (2014) retells the story of the Grimm fairy tale of the wilful child. Being wilful, like the killjoy, kills the flow of happiness. The wilful child is disobedient and does not do what authority asks of her. Her wilfulness is compromising as she is punished. Her wilfulness compromises her so much that it eventually draws a passive death. Dlakavu (2016b) writes about wilfulness: “Soloko ndixilile, soloko ndiqhunyiwe Sima . . . Andiko right [I am always high and drunk Sima]”; these words were spoken to her by a fellow activist. Dlakavu seeks a vocabulary that resists romanticising what it means to possess an oppositional consciousness, much in the way that I read Henry Giroux when he speaks of nihilism in relation to critical pedagogy (1997; also see Luke 1996). bell hooks (1994) refers to the classroom as a site or a scene of joy, and by this she talks about the classroom as a scene for feeling. I want to conclude in thinking about making joy the subject/object/objective of the classroom, not as an exit from oppositional consciousness, but as added strategy, technique and response that demonstrates fugitivity, defamiliarisation or differential form that attends to this possible nihilism.

Carmen Luke (1996) outlines some useful ways to enter this discussion. Luke’s point of departure is in accounting for the contradictions that a feminist pedagogy poses. That is, feminist pedagogy is not a pure victory over phallogocentric models of pedagogy, but might also need to continue to contend with power and authority and the range of racialised and gendered embodiments constituted in and through pedagogical relations. Luke outlines some of

these contradictory dimensions, with the intention of revealing the limitations of “good girl” feminism, “feminist pedagogy, conceptualized as (maternal) nurture and distanced from claims of pedagogical authority and institutional power, [which] leaves itself wide open to the theoretical impossibility of having a ‘foundation’ from which to arbitrate knowledges, student voices and experiences, and the teacher’s own epistemological position” (1996, p. 284).

Sharing hooks’ (1994) intentions around joy, M. Jacqui Alexander (2006) speaks of this process of feeling as an object/objective in the classroom. Alexander describes this as a process, not a given; this kind of pedagogy intervenes in multiple spaces. What this involves is the practice of encountering pleasure along with danger, or as Michelle Rowley (2007) describes with regard to Alexander’s work, the erotic and the Sacred work against the mind/body dualism that we inherit from phallogocentric training:

The seduction here resides in the capacity and tools that we bring to bear on persuading students that knowledge, politics, and praxis matter. Learning, I would argue, is far from a purely cerebral exercise. Pedagogy as politics is not abstract; teaching for justice is a project that requires us to put our bodies in the fray, and this, of course, repositions our discussion of Alexander’s assertion of pedagogy as Sacred. (Rowley 2007, p. 148)

Pedagogy framed in intersubjectivity and relationality takes risk, without discounting the questions of power instigated by Luke (1996). I go to another example from Lauren Berlant who tells the story from the perspective of two lovers:

When in a romance someone has sex and then says to the lover, “You make me feel safe,” we understand that she means that there’s been an emotional compensation to neutralize how unsafe and close to the abject sex makes her feel. “You make me feel safe” means that I can relax and have fun where I am also not safe, where I am too close to the ridiculous, the disgusting, the merely weird, or—simply too close to having a desire. But some situations are riskier than others, as the meanings of unsafe sex change according to who’s having the sex (2009, p. 266). That’s where the politics comes in. (Berlant 2013, p. 13)

I would like to conclude with some thoughts on this politics as a mode or reparative reading and writing and a love letter to burnt out students and teachers who feel the risk of being “woke.” Reparative reading and writing, offered by Sedgwick (2003), speaks of the work of love that does not

seek repair. This kind of love is what Harney and Moten (2013) conclude with in their discussion of fugitive study.

Joy, love, risk and pleasure are some of the things that I inherit from the feminist teachers I have had who have shown me what it means to teach as vocation. Here, I would refer to Char Kunkel, Jyoti Grewal, Valerie Sigwalt, Kim Powell, Elaine Salo, Elina Oinas and Pumla Gqola to name a few. I am very drawn to the ways Alison Bartlett (1998) refers to her role as a feminist pedagogue, or what it means to be a woman and a teacher in a university. Bartlett begins with some thoughts about how we are taught to be girls, then women and the relation with what it means to be an academic woman as part of the consequence of how we in turn will teach. Another point of departure for her is pleasure.

On pleasure, Bartlett offers some interesting thoughts about women as teachers that we can place in the broader discussion of what it means for women to enter the university as I have proposed it here, through a discussion of breasts. Breasts are an interesting proposition as they present the maternal and the erotic at once. The university has some association with the figure of the mother, whom I have spoken quite a little of thus far, with my interest in thinking about the university as ordering the Law of the Father—placing myself and the student in the location of the daughter in this social/symbolic reading of education. “Alma Mater,” the Roman goddess of teaching, is one entry for thinking about the location of the maternal “translated variously as ‘bounteous mother,’ ‘foster mother,’ ‘soul mother,’” Bartlett writes; “this association between sexuality, maternity and teaching has been left behind in favour of the benign and self-less maternal teacher” (1998, p. 87). Breasts as maternal/erotic produce different kinds of desire outside of being “good” mothers or daughters, or “good or bad” teachers.

Sedgwick (2003) offers a sketch of paranoia, not as a diagnostic tool, but rather as a means of revealing differential practices. Her main headings are paranoia as “anticipatory,” “reflexive and mimetic,” “strong theory,” “a theory of negative affects” and “faith in exposure” (2003, p. 130). I focus here on paranoia as strong theory. For a definition of theory, first I turn to Rey Chow:

I use the term *theory* to mark the paradigm shift introduced by poststructuralism, whereby the study of language, literature, and cultural forms becomes irrevocably obligated to attend to the semiotic operations involved in the production of meanings, meanings can no longer be assumed to be natural [...] henceforth *meaning* is a term that occurs within scare quotes. (2002, p. 172)

Chow is concerned with the relation to theory that scholars who speak from minority discourses have. Theory, as she defines above, comes to characterise Western theory in a relation she wants to explore through the term “referentiality.” That is, often minority discourses enter the field of theory, and the reference to the conditions where that theory emerged as oppositional politics or practice produces or requires a temporal displacement. They are encountered via the references that students might already carry and often these references place these examples as specific, to be translated to be meaningful or “universal” through what is more recognisable as “theory.” Barbara Christian’s (1987) thinking on the same subject leads her to think about the relation between the object and the subject. Christian argues that “people of colour have always theorized—but in forms quite different from the Western form of abstract logic. And I am inclined to say that our theorizing (and I intentionally use the verb rather than the noun) is often in narrative forms” (1987, p. 52).

The “race for theory” (Christian 1987), or theory in Chow’s (2002) terms, relates to what Sedgwick (2003) critiques with reference to her description of paranoia as strong theory. Sedgwick’s concern is that this has become the only mode for us to think with, rather than one of many routes. She also worries that critical value, say in relation to social justice, is simply produced *as* or by the critique. That is, much like Ahmed’s (2006) critique of non-performative speech, “the powerfully ranging and reductive force of strong theory can make tautological thinking hard to identify even as it makes it compelling and near inevitable; the result is that both writers and readers can damagingly misrecognize whether and where real conceptual work is getting done, and precisely what that work might be” (Sedgwick 2003, p. 136).

This is where I want to assemble joy, or breasts, around the figure of the feminist killjoy who is an undutiful daughter. To settle on her body, no less the breasts, risks the accusation of prescribing an essentialist location. That is, in escaping phallogocentrism this definition potentially produces woman as other again in the logic of the Same. Mimesis refers to imitation, or mimicry, so for Irigaray, if *Woman* emerges out of patriarchal language, mimesis as a strategy would mean to speak from the location of woman as other to defamiliarise it, revealing it as a code (Braidotti 2003; also see Probyn 1991). Bakare-Yusuf (2003) refers to becoming woman then as thinking about the body as a situation.

Being/becoming as referred in the title of this chapter plays on thinking the body as a situation in such manner. As Ahmed (1998) reads it, becoming

woman as strong theory can do precisely what Chow relates in her reading of poststructuralism. That is, minority discourse becomes another route for reproducing racist phallogocentrism. With reference to the university, which privileges strong theory and its attendant dualism between mind/body, the questions of the relation between being/becoming woman require a retention of the body as the site of difference—as well as for us to read the points of enunciation. As Ahmed (1998) writes:

Woman signifies the very impossibility of women as referent, the very absence of figures to ground her meaning and de-limit the play of her difference. Although it is not a question of the woman's figure, the figure of "woman" nevertheless stalks the text as a figure for that which cannot be contained within philosophy; it is *through* her figure that masculine philosophy is speaking about the impossibility of speech. (86)

The fugitive relation between the undutiful daughter and the feminist killjoy might be in play through the girl as a repetitive scene of becoming, or entry into the social (or institutional) (see Mupotsa 2015), "constrained by the sexualizing male gaze, patriarchal limitations, or normative expectations [. . . which] underlie the agency of the girl who resists (Oinas 2015, p. 119; also see Gunkel 2010; Ekine and Abbas 2013). I return to the image of Sima again, for her "corporeal and social nakedness, vulnerability and exposed desire establishes the issues of sexuality and pleasure in such a way that a protest becomes a social one, not for self-determination, freedom, and autonomy alone" (Oinas 2015, p. 130). As a scene to orient our questions concerning a demand/desire for the university but also a larger frame for pedagogical questions, Oinas reminds us again that "the rebellious girl resists a scholarly agenda that solely seeks freedom because a child, by definition, is needy" (2015, p. 119).

This is perhaps the cause of my retention of freedom, but not freedom that reduces the materiality of difference to reference (Chow 2002), or trope (Magubane 2001), as it is this way of knowing and teaching that eternally reconstitutes the unmarkedness of the white male body (Ahmed 1998). When Fred Moten (2004) writes of the "Knowledge of Freedom," he begins by demonstrating the ways that race, or the raced figure, is the event, or instrument foundational to our current colonised philosophical fields. Moten also gives us various routes for being/becoming, such as intensity described as "that laughter out-from-outside of being" (2004, p. 277) and improvisation, that we can relate to reparative reading.

Reparative reading moves against an emphasis on academic distance and is less angst ridden and less aggressive as it is the work of love against cognition (see Love 2010). I offer “joy,” almost counter-intuitively. My own writing reflects just how much paranoid writing “sticks”; I am a killjoy after all, living endlessly, repetitively in proximity to a nerve. Yet in this mode and practice of defamiliarisation remains an optimism that I attach to the Sacred place I hold for the work of teaching. This is a way of teaching through the route of difference with the need to “still contrive to reduce things to the Transparent” (Glissant 2006, p. 189). So it then seems best to argue for joy as a “recursive potentiality” (see Nyong’o 2010).

NOTES

1. These posters were made by Chapter 212, a campaign at the University Currently Known as Rhodes to confront rape culture. They can be found at <https://www.facebook.com/Rhodes-University-Chapter-212-1559145351052501> (accessed August 18, 2016).
2. I wrote these twin poems in February 2016 during a closing session of a conference.

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