The word *prosocial* does not appear in most dictionaries; it was created by social scientists as an antonym for *antisocial*. *Prosocial behavior* covers the broad range of actions intended to benefit one or more people other than oneself—behaviors such as helping, comforting, sharing, and cooperating. The word *altruism* has at times been used to refer to a subset of these behaviors—for example, self-sacrificial helping or helping in the absence of obvious, external rewards. Such usage seems inappropriate, however, because altruism is a motivational concept. Altruism is the motivation to increase another person’s welfare; it is contrasted to *egoism*, the motivation to increase one’s own welfare (MacIntyre, 1967). There is no one-to-one correspondence between prosocial behavior and altruism. Prosocial behavior need not be motivated by altruism; altruistic motivation need not produce prosocial behavior.

**WHY DO—AND DON’T—PEOPLE ACT PROSOCIALY?**

Addressing the question of why people act prosocially may seem natural and necessary for social psychologists. Indeed, in the field’s first text William McDougall (1908) made this question focal: “The fundamental problem of social psychology is the moralization of the individual by the society into which he is born as a creature in which the non-moral and purely egoistic tendencies are so much stronger than any altruistic tendencies” (p. 16). When Kurt Lewin, his students, and his colleagues ushered in modern social psychology in the 1930s and 1940s, however, other questions took precedence. These were the pressing social-problem questions provoked by the rise of Nazism, two world wars, the Holocaust, the advent of the nuclear age, the Cold War, and racial injustice. Attention was directed to totalitarian and autocratic leadership, conformity and obedience to authority, aggression, prejudice, ethnocentrism, interpersonal and intergroup conflict, propaganda, persuasion, and attitude formation and change.

The 1960s brought the question of why people act prosocially to the fore once again. This question did not replace the social-problem questions; it was added to the list. Several shocking cases in which bystanders failed to help persons in desperate need raised concern about the breakdown of social structure and social decency, especially in urban environments. Best known is the case of Kitty Genovese, whose brutal stabbing and eventual death was witnessed by 38 of her neighbors in the Kew Gardens area of Queens, New York. Her murder took more than half an hour, and despite her
pleading screams, no one intervened; no one even called the police. More heartening were the courageous acts of Freedom Riders and other civil rights workers, Black and White, who suffered beatings, imprisonment, and in some cases death to further the cause of racial equality in the American South. Youth were in the streets to protest the Vietnam War and to proclaim the dawning of the Age of Aquarius. The times they were a-changin’. Social psychologists were asked, Why do—and don’t—people act prosocially?

Before attempting to offer an answer to this question, one should probably inquire of the questioner, “Why do you ask?” This response is necessary because the question has been asked for two very different reasons. Some have asked in order to reach the practical goal of encouraging prosocial behavior; others, in order to challenge currently dominant theories of social motivation. The dominant motivational theories in psychology, sociology, economics, and political science are firmly founded on assumptions of universal egoism (Mansbridge, 1990; Wallach & Wallach, 1983). Can one account for all prosocial behavior in terms of egoism, or must one make room for altruism as well? Might there be other forms of prosocial motivation besides egoism and altruism?

These two reasons for asking why people act prosocially beg for very different answers. So, if one is not clear which reason lies behind the question, the answer provided may appear irrelevant and the research on which it is based misguided. To avoid such confusion, this chapter addresses the two concerns in turn—first the practical, then the theoretical.

VARIANCE-ACCOUNTED-FOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Psychologists pursuing the practical concern of promoting prosocial behavior usually employ one of two strategies: (a) a variance-accounted-for empirical analysis or (b) application and extension of existing social psychological theory. One view of science that has long been popular among psychologists, especially psychologists with an applied orientation, is empirical prediction and control. From this perspective, promoting prosocial behavior requires, first, identification of its most powerful predictors. Then one can engage in social engineering, creating an environment that optimizes these predictors and, thereby, prosocial behavior. The logic seems straightforward. Its apparent simplicity has, however, proved deceptive.

Dispositional Versus Situational Determinants

Operating with an implicit variance-accounted-for model, several investigators around 1970 attempted to determine whether dispositional or situational factors were better predictors of prosocial behavior. The dispositional variables studied include anomie, authoritarianism, autonomy, deference, intelligence, Machiavellianism, nurturance, religiosity, self-esteem, social desirability, social responsibility, submissiveness, and succorance. Not one of these, by itself, was a clear predictor. In contrast, situational factors—ambiguity of need, severity of need, physical appearance of victim, similarity to victim, friendship, number of bystanders, location (urban vs. rural), cost of helping, and so on—seemed powerful. These results led several reviewers (e.g., Huston & Korte, 1976; J. A. Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner, & Clark, 1981) to conclude that situational variables are better predictors of prosocial behavior than are dispositional variables.

Soon, however, this conclusion was challenged as part of the general counterattack by personality researchers against situationist critiques. Staub (1974) found that an aggregate dispositional measure, a prosocial orientation index (combining measures of feelings of personal responsibility, social responsibility, moral reasoning, prosocial values, and a low level of Machiavellianism), was a reasonably good predictor of helping across several different measures. Rushton (1980) reanalyzed previous research (notably, the classic studies by Hartshorne and May in the late 1920s) by computing aggregate measures of prosocial behavior and found far better evidence of cross-situation consistency than had analyses based on individual measures.

Other researchers pointed to the greater predictive potential of dispositional factors for the higher cost, nonspontaneous, longer term helping that occurs in the natural stream of behavior outside the psychological laboratory. For example, Oliner and Oliner (1988) conducted a major study using interviews and questionnaires to identify predictors of acting to rescue Jews in Nazi Europe. They claimed evidence for the predictive power of three dispositional factors: (a) a proclivity to feel empathy for those in need, (b) sensitivity to normative pressure from social groups, and (c) adherence to inclusive, universal moral principles such as justice or care. Presumably, better prediction is possible outside the laboratory because the more reflective decision process involved in planned (nonspontaneous) helping permits more chance for personal values, attitudes, and dispositions to come into play.

Still other researchers argued that it was an oversimplification to expect a personality variable to relate to helping in all situations. Many pointed to the greater success of predicting prosocial behavior using disposition-situation interactions (e.g., Romer, Gruder, & Lazzaro, 1986). For example, self-confidence and independence seem to correlate with helping in emergency situations, especially dangerous ones, but not in response to a request to contribute to the United Way (Wilson, 1976). Snyder and Ickes (1985) suggested that
the predictive power of dispositional factors should be manifest only when situational pressure is weak, not when it is strong. Carlo, Eisenberg, Troyer, Switzer, and Speer (1991) claimed support for this distinction between weak and strong pressure when predicting prosocial behavior. Within these more recent studies, then, dispositional predictors have fared better than in earlier work. Still, correlations between personality measures and prosocial behavior—however measured—rarely rise above .30 to .40, leaving 85% to 90% of the variance unaccounted for.

At the same time that dispositional predictors were being revived, the health of situational predictors took a turn for the worse: Their ecological validity was questioned (Bar-Tal, 1984). Could one expect a situational predictor of single-act helping by college students in a controlled laboratory experiment to be equally powerful in predicting naturally occurring prosocial behavior outside the lab, such as volunteerism (Clary & Snyder, 1991)?

**Proliferating Predictors and Predictions**

Since 1970, proposed predictors of prosocial behavior have proliferated well beyond the initial dichotomy between dispositional and situational factors. Krebs and Miller (1985) presented an interlocking three-tier classification. Most distal from the specific prosocial behavior are biological and cultural predictors (see also Fiske, 1992). These predictors combine to produce enduring dispositional characteristics, which are more proximal. Dispositional factors then combine with situational factors to produce cognitive and affective reactions, which are considered the most proximal predictors of prosocial behavior. Within each of these broad classes, numerous specific variables can be identified.

In additions to proliferating predictors, there are also many different forms of prosocial behavior to be predicted, and the variables that predict one form may not predict another. For example, within the domain of helping are rescuing, donating, assisting, volunteering, and giving social support (Pearce & Amato, 1980). Moreover, each of these categories includes a wide range of specific behaviors. One can assist by holding a door, answering a request for directions, splinting a broken leg at the scene of an automobile accident, securing false papers for a Jew in Nazi Europe, or enabling a suicide. One can volunteer to serve on the board of directors for the local symphony, to call potential blood donors, to be a buddy for someone who has AIDS, or to join the rescue squad. Critics claim—and research supports the claim (Levine, Martinez, Brase, & Sorensen, 1994; Omoto & Snyder, 1995)—that variables accounting for variance in one form of prosocial behavior in one setting are not likely to account for the same amount of variance (if any) in other forms of behavior or in other settings. Talk of prediction based on interactions among person, situation, and behavior has become common (e.g., Bandura, 1991; Carlo et al., 1991).

One need not pursue this logic very far—adding predictors, behaviors to be predicted, situations in which prediction can be made, and populations for which predictions can be made—to realize that a general variance-accounted-for answer to the question of why people act prosocially is impossible. All one can hope for is the identification of predictors that account for a specific prosocial behavior in a specific situation for a specific population at a specific time (Snyder, 1993). Although useful to address some applied questions, such research is apt to become ideographic rather than nomothetic (Allport, 1961), with very little generalizability.

**APPLICATION AND EXTENSION OF EXISTING THEORY**

Well aware of the limited, ad hoc nature of a variance-accounted-for approach, Lewin (1951) reminded us, “There is nothing so practical as a good theory” (p. 169). In opposition to the Aristotelian approach to science that guides the variance-accounted-for strategy, in which the scientist’s goal is to identify essential features to predict outcomes, Lewin advocated a Galilean approach. Galileo’s goal was to identify underlying genotypic (conditional-genetic) constructs and the highly general—even universal—relations among them that account for observable phenotypic events. Lewin was convinced that explanatory theories developed and tested following Galileo are of far more practical value than are explanations developed following Aristotle, even though the Galilean model relies on contrived laboratory experiments rather than on direct, real-world observation.

Psychologists approaching the study of prosocial behavior from Lewin’s Galilean perspective are not likely to look to empirical research to identify predictors accounting for the most variance. They are likely instead to look to existing theory about genotypic psychological processes, using research to illustrate and document the relevance of these processes to understanding prosocial behavior. At least seven broad theoretical perspectives have been applied in this way: social learning, tension reduction, norms and roles, exchange or equity, attribution, esteem enhancement/maintenance, and moral reasoning. Let us briefly consider each of these.

**Social Learning**

Social learning theory suggests that if you want to know why people act prosocially, you should consider their learning history. You should consider not only the rewards and
punishments received following helping (or not), but also the relative rewards—the benefits minus the costs. You should consider observational learning or modeling that comes from watching the actions of others. You should consider self-rewards. Much research has supported a social learning explanation of prosocial behavior (for reviews, see Bandura, 1977; Rushton, 1980). Integrating and coordinating social learning principles, Cialdini, Baumann, and Kenrick (1981) proposed a three-step developmental sequence: (a) In the young child prosocial behavior is a product of material rewards and punishments; (b) in the preadolescent it is a product of social as well as material rewards and punishments; and (c) in the adolescent and adult it is a product of internalized self-reward, as well as social and material rewards and punishments.

Mood Effects

Building on the idea that helping can be a basis for self-reward, Cialdini, Darby, and Vincent (1973) proposed a negative-state relief hypothesis: that adults are more likely to help when they feel bad. The reason is that adults have learned that they can reward themselves for helping and so feel better.

Not only does helping have reward value for people who feel bad, but it also seems rewarding for people who feel good. Indeed, the effect is even clearer for good mood. Across a range of studies (e.g., Isen & Levin, 1972; Weyant, 1978), people induced to feel good have been more likely to give help to good causes.

What accounts for this pervasive reward value of helping for people in a good mood? One possibility is a desire to maintain the good mood. Seeing another person in need can throw a wet blanket on a good mood, so one may help in order to shed this blanket and maintain the mood (Wegener & Petty, 1994). Isen, Shalker, Clark, and Karp (1978) suggested a second possibility: Being in a good mood may bias one’s memories about and attention to the positive and negative aspects of various activities, including helping. When in a good mood, a person is more likely to recall and attend to positive rather than negative aspects of life. Applied to helping, a good mood makes people more likely to remember and attend to the positive, rewarding features and less likely to attend to the negative features, such as the costs involved.

General Assessment

Social learning theory finds itself in an awkward position in contemporary social psychology. There seems little doubt that the theory is in large measure correct. However, perhaps because of its relatively straightforward explanation of behavior, without the ironic twists and the revelations of subtle faux pas for which cognitive explanations have become renown, social learning theory generates little excitement. The direct focus on behavior and reinforcement history seems almost unpsychological in its lack of nuance. Even with the added emphasis on self-reward, cognitive self-regulation, and reciprocal determinism (Bandura, 1977, 1991), social learning theory seems bland. Still, were one forced to choose a single theory to explain why people do—and do not—act prosocially, social learning theory should almost certainly be the choice. “As Einstein has emphasized, the goal is to account for the most facts with the fewest principles” (Dollard & Miller, 1950, p. 6). Social learning theory has probably come closer to this goal than has any other theory in the history of social psychology.

Tension Reduction

Tension reduction has long been a popular explanation of why people help others in need, especially others in obvious pain or distress. The general idea is that people find it upsetting to see another person suffer and that preferring not to be upset, they relieve the other’s suffering.

Perhaps the best way to describe the relationship between tension reduction, which is a form of motivation, and social learning is to say that they are related by marriage. Social learning can exist without tension reduction, as in the pure operant theories descendant from Watson and Skinner. Tension reduction can exist without social learning, as in reactions to pain, extreme temperatures, hunger, thirst, and other physiological needs. Yet social learning and tension reduction lived together for many years in relative harmony, housed within Hull’s (1943) general learning theory and its descendants, including Dollard and Miller’s (1950) version of social learning theory. In response to the current cognitive zeitgeist, social learning theory has of late been less attached to tension reduction, which is a form of motivation, and social learning is to say that they are related by marriage. Whether this philandering is grounds for divorce is hard to say. In any case, tension reduction has also been seen stepping out without operant processes by its side, most notably in dissonance theory—at least as originally conceived by Festinger (1957).

Why should the suffering of others upset someone? Most straightforward is the answer proposed by J. A. Piliavin et al. (1981), among others. They suggested that witnessing another’s distress evokes vicarious distress that has much the same character as the victim’s distress, and the witness is motivated to escape his or her own distress. One way to escape is to help because helping terminates the stimulus causing the distress. Of course, running away may enable the witness to
escape just as well and at less cost, as long as the old adage “out of sight, out of mind” works.

Variations on the theme of aversive-arousal reduction have been provided by Hornstein (1982), Reykowski (1982), and Lerner (1982). Focusing on the self-other relationship, Hornstein suggested that when certain others are in need—specifically, those whom one cognitively links to self as “us” and “we” rather than “them” and “they”—one experiences a state of promotive tension in which one is “aroused by another’s needs almost as if they were one’s own” (Hornstein, 1982, p. 230). Once so aroused, one is motivated to reduce this tension by aiding the fellow “we-grouper.”

Reykowski’s (1982) proposed explanation, though quite different, also involves reduction of aversive tension: “The sheer discrepancy between information about the real or possible state of an object and standards of its normal or desirable state will evoke motivation” (p. 361). Reykowski applied this general principle to prosocial motivation as follows: If a person perceives a discrepancy between the current state and the expected or ideal state of another person (i.e., perceives the other to be in need), cognitive inconsistency and motivation to reduce this aversive inconsistency will result. Relieving the other’s need is one way to remove the inconsistency and escape the situation. Another, less prosocial way is to change one’s perception and decide that the other’s suffering is acceptable, even desirable.

Lerner’s (1980, 1982) just-world hypothesis led him to an explanation similar to but more specific than Reykowski’s. Lerner suggested that most people believe in a just world—a world in which people get what they deserve and deserve what they get. The existence of a victim of innocent suffering is inconsistent with this belief. In order to reduce the arousal produced by this inconsistency, a person may help another in need. Alternatively, the person may derogate the innocent victim, making the suffering appear deserved.

At first glance, Cialdini’s negative-state relief model may appear to be another example of aversive-arousal reduction. In fact, it is not. Although it too begins with the proposition that seeing someone in need evokes a negative affective state, from this common starting point the two explanations diverge. The negative-state relief explanation claims that the goal of helping is to obtain mood-enhancing self-rewards that one has learned are associated with helping; aversive-arousal reduction explanations claim that the goal of helping is to eliminate the mood-depressing stimulus. Negative-state relief is a social learning explanation that assumes that the increased need for some type—any type—of mood-enhancing reward motivates helping; aversive-arousal reduction explanations make no assumptions about prior learning history but focus instead on reduction of current tension.

Norms and Roles

Theories that seek to explain prosocial behavior in terms of norms and roles often make heavy use of social learning principles. Yet norm and role theories are not direct descendants of classic learning theory and behaviorism. Instead, they trace their ancestry to symbolic interactionism and its analysis of social behavior using a dramaturgical metaphor (cf. Goffman, 1959; Mead, 1934). Within this metaphor, norms provide the script of the social drama, specifying what should be done and said when; roles are the parts to be played. (More formally, norms are a group’s written or unwritten rules of appropriate behavior for those occupying particular roles; roles are behavior patterns that are characteristic, and expected, of a person who occupies a particular position in a social structure.)

In both developmental and social psychology, norms and roles have been adopted into the social learning family; it is assumed that people learn the norms and roles appropriate to a given situation through social reinforcement and modeling. At the same time that people are learning that acting prosocially can bring rewards, they are also learning the norms for prosocial behaviors that should be performed by individuals in various roles in different social situations. These norms dictate that one should help people in need—at least some people under some circumstances—to avoid social or self-administered sanctions.

Reciprocity

One prosocial norm that has been studied extensively is reciprocity. Gouldner (1960) suggested that this norm tells people both that they should help people who help them and that they should not injure these people. He believed that this norm was universal, an important part of the moral code of every culture. He also believed that the pressure on a person to comply with the norm of reciprocity depends on the circumstances under which the initial help was given—including (a) how badly one needed help, (b) one’s perception of how much the other person gave relative to his or her total resources, (c) one’s perception of the other person’s motives for helping (was it a bribe?), and (d) whether the other person helped voluntarily or was pressured into it. Much evidence supports the claim that people are motivated to comply with the norm of reciprocity (e.g., Wilke & Lanzetta, 1982).

Social Responsibility

A second norm that psychologists have suggested motivates helping is social responsibility. This norm dictates that one
person should help another in need when the latter is dependent on the former—that is, when others are not available to help and thus the second person is counting specifically on the first. Although this norm does seem to exist, its effect on helping has been surprisingly difficult to demonstrate. After more than a decade of research attempts to do so, Berkowitz (1972) concluded, “The findings do not provide any clear-cut support for the normative analysis of help-giving . . . The potency of the conjectured ‘social responsibility norm’ was greatly exaggerated” (pp. 68, 77).

Why has evidence that the norm of social responsibility leads to prosocial behavior been so elusive? Darley and Latané (1970) suggested that this norm may be at once too general and too specific. The norm may be too general in that everyone in our society adheres to it. If this is true, it cannot account for why one person helps and another does not. On the other hand, the norm may be too specific in that it comes with a complex pattern of exceptions, situations in which an individual may feel exempt from acting in accordance with the norm. The norm may be characterized not simply by a rule that says, “If someone is dependent on you for help, then help,” but by a more complex rule that says, “If someone is dependent on you for help, then help, except when . . .” There may be individual differences in readiness to accept exceptions—that is, to deny responsibility (Schwartz, 1977). Moreover, exceptions may vary for individuals in different roles and in different social situations. One advantage of remembering the dramaturgical roots of the concept of norms is that it makes explicit their role specificity.

Darley and Latané (1970) also pointed out that in addition to norms for helping, there are norms for not helping. A person may be taught, “Help those in need,” and at the same time, “Mind your own business.” Which norm is the one to follow? If the former, one may help; if the latter, probably not.

### Effects of Race and Sex

Exceptions to and conflicts among norms may account for the highly inconsistent effects on prosocial behavior of demographic variables such as race and sex. It has sometimes been found that same-race helping is more frequent (e.g., Gaertner & Bickman, 1971), sometimes that cross-race helping is more frequent (Katz, Cohen, & Glass, 1975), and sometimes that the race of the victim or helper makes no difference (Wispé & Freshley, 1971). Similarly, sometimes men help more than women (West, Whitney, & Schnedler, 1975), sometimes women help more than men (Wegner & Crano, 1975), and sometimes the sex of the helper makes no difference (J. A. Piliavin & Piliavin, 1972). It does appear, however, that women are generally more likely to be helped than are men (Gruder & Cook, 1971).

How can we account for these seemingly contradictory findings? One possibility is that given their different social roles in different situations, Blacks and Whites—and men and women—may feel more or less obligated to help a dependent other. For example, Black students on a predominantly White campus, acutely aware of their minority status, may feel strong responsibility for helping a fellow Black student but very little responsibility for helping a White student; White students may be more likely to help a Black student when failure to do so clearly violates norms proscribing racial prejudice. Helping may be more normative for men than for women in one situation—for example, intervening in a potentially dangerous emergency. Helping may be more normative for women than for men in another situation—for example, providing sympathy and support after a friend’s breakup with her fiancé (Eagly & Crowley, 1986). A role-sensitive normative analysis renders the apparent inconsistencies comprehensible.

### Norm Salience

Some researchers have suggested that the problem with social norms lies in norm salience and focus of attention. Only when attention is focused on the norm as a standard for behavior is concern about violating it likely to affect behavior (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991). Consistent with this suggestion, Gibbons and Wicklund (1982) found that if normative standards of helpfulness were salient and thus a focus of attention, then focusing on oneself increased helping. Presumably, being self-focused when the norm was salient highlighted the threat of sanctions for failing to act in line with personal standards. In the absence of salient standards for helpfulness, however, self-focus led to less helping; it seemed to inhibit attention to others’ needs (see also Karylowski, 1984).

### Personal Norms

Because broad social norms like social responsibility have limited ability to predict whether a person will help, Schwartz (1977) proposed a change of focus in thinking about norms. Rather than thinking about social norms, Schwartz suggested that we should think of more specific, personal norms. By personal norms he meant internalized rules of conduct that are socially learned, that vary among individuals within the same society, and that direct behavior in particular situations.

Applied to helping, a personal norm involves a sense of obligation to perform a specific helping act. For example, people may say (either publicly or to themselves), “I ought to give a pint of blood in the blood drive.” Such statements
appear to be far more predictive of whether a person will give blood than are statements of agreement with broad social norms like the norm of social responsibility—at least if the person in question is one who believes in acting responsibly (Schwartz & Howard, 1981). Specific statements like this are particularly powerful as predictors when one also takes into account extenuating circumstances, such as whether an individual was in town during the blood drive, had no major scheduling conflicts, and was physically able to give blood (Zuckerman & Reis, 1978). At this level of specificity, however, it is not clear whether the statement about giving blood reflects a sense of personal obligation stemming from an internalized rule of conduct (i.e., a personal norm) or simply an intention to act in a particular way.

Exchange or Equity

Perhaps the most direct extension of social learning principles into interpersonal relations is exchange or equity theory. When developing exchange theory, Homans (1961) explicitly and proudly declared his agenda to be the reduction of social relations—including cooperation, helping, and other prosocial behaviors—to reinforcement principles operating within the individual. Equity theorists were not so reductionist. They considered social relations to have emergent properties that were irreducible to the benefits and costs for the individuals involved. In their view, social learning teaches one to value equitable relations, in which the ratio of outcomes to inputs is equal for the relating individuals. Walster, Berscheid, and Walster (1973) claimed that equity theory was a general theory that subsumed social learning theory (and psychoanalytic theory). Although this may seem a myopic inversion, equity theory does add an important dimension to the understanding of prosocial behavior by introducing both social comparison and distributive justice. Needs and benefits are no longer defined by looking at the individual alone; the definition is broadened to include needs based on relative deprivation (Adams, 1965).

Homans (1961) pointed out that if a recipient of help cannot return the favor in a tangible way, then he or she must return esteem and deference. Otherwise, the relationship will not remain beneficial to both parties and thus will not continue. Walster et al. (1973) argued that not only the relatively underbenefited but also the relatively overbenefited are motivated to restore equity (although they acknowledged that inequity in one’s favor is more tolerable than the reverse). Acting prosocially to redistribute resources more fairly is one way to restore equity—but only one. Equity may also be restored psychologically by enhancing the perceived inputs of the advantaged or devaluing the inputs of the disadvantaged, thereby justifying the difference in outcomes.

Attribution

Attribution theory concerns inferences drawn about the causes of events (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965). Attributions can affect prosocial behavior in two major ways. First, attributions about why a person is in need are made not only by potential helpers and bystanders but also by the person in need, with consequences for each. Second, attributions about the character of a person who helps are made not only by the helpers themselves but also by the persons helped, again with consequences for each.

Attributing the Cause of Others’ Needs

People are far more likely to help innocent victims than to help those who bring their troubles on themselves (Weiner, 1980). Although this relationship is no surprise, the reason for it is not entirely clear. Perhaps causing one’s own need (or not working to prevent it) violates ingrained standards for self-sufficiency and prudence; perhaps causing one’s own need but not suffering the consequences violates our sense of justice; perhaps it seems inequitable to those who perceive themselves to have exerted effort to avoid need. In any case, people are less likely to help those who bring their troubles on themselves, even though the explanation for this behavior has never been carefully explored.

Attributing the Cause of One’s Own Need

People in need may be predisposed to attribute their need to situational causes, as something thrust upon them by unavoidable circumstances and carrying no implications about personal ability or worth. This attribution may, however, be hard to sustain when the need is produced by failure on a task that one expected to perform successfully, especially when comparable peers succeed (Fisher, Nadler, & Whitcheatcher-Alagna, 1982). To avoid an esteem-damaging dispositional attribution, the person in need may attempt to deny the failure and not seek or appreciate help (Nadler, 1991).

Attributing the Cause of Help

 Helpers make attributions about the nature and cause not only of others’ needs but also of their own helping. A helper may ask, “Why did I help in this situation?” Possible answers include the following: (a) because I am a kind, caring, helpful person—a dispositional attribution likely to be self-rewarding and encourage one to help in a range of situations in the future; (b) because I am the kind of person who helps in this particular situation (e.g., I am a blood donor; J. A. Piliavin, Callero, & Evans, 1982)—a dispositional attribution likely to
encourage one to help again in this situation; (c) because of situational pressure—a situational attribution not likely to increase helping in the future, at least not when situational pressure is absent; and (d) because I am a compliant schnook and a pushover who cannot say no—a dispositional attribution likely to be self-punishing and to discourage future helping. Grusvec (1991) traced the development and demonstrated the prosocial benefits of children attributing their helping to a broad disposition to be helpful.

An attributional analysis suggests a complicating limit on the effects of social learning. To the extent that subsequent helping is mediated by self-attributions of helpfulness, inducing help by providing material or social rewards in the form of incentives or salient models, norms, and so on may actually diminish rather than increase subsequent helping, much as providing extrinsic incentives can diminish activity based on intrinsic motivation (Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973). Consistent with this possibility, research suggests that providing incentives—whether money, models, or norms—reduces self-perceived altruism following helping (e.g., Thomas, Batson, & Coke, 1981).

These results reveal a dilemma. One important source of motivation to help, the external reward that comes from payment or praise for helping, actually undermines a second important source of motivation to help, the self-reward that comes from seeing oneself as a good, kind, caring person. Consider the long-term consequences. As self-reward is undermined, additional external pressure may be necessary to coerce the person to help. This additional external pressure further erodes the helper’s chances for self-reward. Over time, the result may be a slide toward a more and more cynical self-concept, in which personal kindness plays an increasingly minor role and help is offered only for a price.

The person helped is also likely to make attributions about why the helper acted. The most obvious and most frequently studied attributions for helping are that the helper acted (a) out of concern, with no strings attached, or (b) in order to indebted, control, or demean the recipient. Attributions of the second kind may be especially problematic when made by recipients of international aid. Research by Greenberg and his colleagues (e.g., Greenberg & Frisch, 1972) demonstrated, as expected, that aid is not appreciated to the degree that it is perceived as an attempt to control. In return, the benefactor is likely to receive hostility rather than gratitude (Tesser, Gatewood, & Driver, 1968).

**Esteem Enhancement/Maintenance**

Models of esteem enhancement/maintenance have been both popular and numerous in social psychology since about 1980. As an explanation for prosocial behavior, these models generally assume that people act prosocially to enhance or recover self-esteem (Brown & Smart, 1991).

One might expect perceptions of the esteem-enhancing potential of helping to follow the same three-step developmental sequence outlined by Cialdini et al. (1981). For the young child, gaining material rewards for doing good enhances esteem; for the middle child, social approval enhances esteem; by adolescence, self-directed and uncoerced—even anonymous—help may be necessary to feel good about oneself.

Not only benefactors, but also recipients, may act and react with an eye to their self-esteem. Fisher et al. (1982) proposed an esteem-loss explanation for recipients’ negative reactions to receiving aid. Consistent with the comparative aspects of self-esteem, Nadler, Fisher, and Ben-Itzhak (1983) found that when individuals were having trouble on a task that reflected on their abilities, receipt of help from a friend produced more negative self-evaluation than did receipt of help from a stranger.

DePaulo, Nadler, and Fisher (1983) pointed out that concern over loss of esteem both in others’ and in one’s own eyes may go a long way toward explaining reticence to seek help when in need. To seek help is to admit that you lack the competence, knowledge, or other valuable resources necessary to cope and, moreover, that the person from whom you seek help has these resources. Consistent with this analysis, people are less likely to seek help to the degree that they hold themselves in high esteem and do not anticipate a chance to reciprocate the help (Nadler, 1991).

This analysis must be qualified by roles and norms, however. For the young child, seeking help from his or her parents is not likely to be upsetting or damaging to self-esteem. For a middle-level executive who finds himself out of a job, the thought of applying for welfare assistance to feed his family may be devastating.

**Moral Reasoning**

Moral reasoning theories (also called cognitive developmental or rational developmental theories of morality) build on the classic work of Piaget. Typically, they accept his account of intellectual development as a process of adaptation through assimilation and accommodation proceeding in an invariant developmental sequence from sensorimotor to preoperational to concrete operational to formal operational thought (Piaget, 1926). They also accept Piaget’s (1932) application of this model of intellectual development to moral judgment. Moral reasoning theories, of which Kohlberg’s (1976) is the best known, treat situations in which one person
might act to benefit another as problems or puzzles to be solved, much like the problems in volume conservation that Piaget gave his children. The key to prosocial action is the level of moral reasoning used to solve the puzzle or dilemma. In Kohlberg’s (1976) words, “To act in a morally high way requires a high stage of moral reasoning... Moral stage is a good predictor of action” (p. 32).

Kohlberg claimed to have identified a universal and invariant sequence of six stages in moral reasoning, grouped in pairs into three levels: (a) preconventional (judgment based on immediate consequences for self), (b) conventional (judgment based on social norms, rules, and laws), and (c) postconventional (judgment based on universal moral principles that at once transcend and undergird the moral conventions of society). The moral principle that Kohlberg considered most important was a neo-Kantian principle of justice whereby each individual is accorded equal rights and dignity in a Kingdom of Ends.

Controversy has surrounded moral reasoning theories from the start. First, evidence that moral reasoning develops universally in the invariant sequence of stages that Kohlberg described is equivocal at best (Kurtines & Greif, 1974). Second, the link between level of moral reasoning and prosocial behavior is far less clear than one might expect (Blasi, 1980; Eisenberg, 1991). In defense, supporters of moral reasoning models have pointed out that (a) adequate measurement of moral reasoning is difficult and (b) in almost any moral dilemma one may justify a given course of action in different ways, using different levels of moral reasoning. Both points seem true, but they reduce the explanatory power of moral reasoning theories, casting doubt on Kohlberg’s claim that moral stage is a good predictor of prosocial action. Modified models of moral reasoning that incorporate social learning principles offer better explanatory power (e.g., Eisenberg, 1986). One must ask of these models, however, whether the social learning principles do all the explanatory work.

In addition to being challenged from outside by researchers who question the value of moral reasoning as a sufficient or even necessary explanation of prosocial behavior, Kohlberg’s focus on justice as the capstone of moral maturity has been challenged from inside the moral-reasoning camp. The most notable challenge has come from his former student and colleague Carol Gilligan. In addition to an ethic of justice and fairness, Gilligan (1982) called for recognition of an ethic of care. Although she believed that both men and women display reasoning based on justice and reasoning based on care, she claimed that the former is more characteristic of men and the latter more characteristic of women. She also claimed that Kohlberg’s exclusive focus on justice led to a perception that men are superior to women in moral reasoning. Finally, she claimed that this apparent superiority will disappear if one listens to the moral voice of women, who speak more of care than of justice.

Evidence for the claimed sex difference in use of perspectives of justice and care has been limited and weak (Walker, 1991). But research has supported Gilligan’s claim that moral dilemmas can be approached from a perspective of care rather than justice (Gilligan, Ward, & Taylor, 1988; Walker, 1991). It remains unclear, however, what a care perspective is. Is it (a) a reflection of Kohlberg’s conventional stage of morality, (b) an alternative mode of moral reasoning with its own developmental sequence, or (c) not a form of moral reasoning at all but an emotional reaction or bond? In sum, although the distinction between justice and care seems to have value, considerably more conceptual precision is needed to know the nature and significance of this distinction.

Amalgamated Models

One need not rely on just one of these seven theoretical perspectives to explain prosocial behavior. It is possible to invoke more than one in a given situation or to invoke one in one situation and another in a different situation. It is also possible to combine perspectives into an amalgamated model. Sometimes, such an amalgamation has been created by the integration of different theoretical perspectives (e.g., social learning and norm theories); more often, it has resulted from arranging perspectives in sequence, adding boxes and arrows to a flowchart of steps that lead ultimately to prosocial behavior. The impetus for creating amalgamated models seems to be the desire to be comprehensive, a desire that stems from the same aspirations for prediction and control that underlie the more ad hoc variance-accounted-for approach. But in amalgamated models, this desire takes advantage of existing theories to pull together and organize a range of explanations.

Perhaps the best known and most enduring amalgamated model is the arousal/cost-reward model originally proposed by I. M. Piliavin, Rodin, and Piliavin (1969) and developed and elaborated by J. A. Piliavin et al. (1981), Dovidio (1984), and Dovidio, Piliavin, Gaertner, Schroeder, and Clark (1991). Originally, this model combined a tension-reduction motivational component with a cost-reward assessment of the various behavioral means to reduce the tension. Over the years, norms, equity concerns, and attribution processes have been incorporated as well, producing a flowchart with 8 boxes and 17 arrows that is too complex to describe here. Other amalgamated models include those developed by Bar-Tal (1982), who relies most heavily on social
learning and moral-reasoning perspectives, and by Schwartz (1977), who relies most heavily on norms, especially personal norms.

Amalgamated models make three useful contributions. First, they remind us of the complexity of prosocial behavior and thereby caution against simplistic explanations. Second, they sketch a causal ordering of the various psychological processes assumed to be operating—although these orderings are rarely tested. Third, they provide a mnemonic for relevant psychological processes and theoretical perspectives.

Amalgamated models have potential liabilities too. First, the desire to be comprehensive exerts pressure toward proliferation of boxes and arrows. As more intervening steps are added and more arrows are drawn, multiple paths connect postulated antecedent and consequent variables. This makes achieving clear causal prediction increasingly difficult. The models become less explanatory and more purely descriptive. It seems to be a general and ironic rule in science that the greater the number of different explanatory models combined, the less the resulting explanatory power (recall Einstein’s admonition to account for the most facts with the fewest principles).

Second, having accepted the goal of making an amalgamated model comprehensive, one can expend much energy trying to make anomalous data fit. The breadth and complexity of these models make success almost inevitable. With effort, data can be made to fit even when they do not. The consequence is that opportunities for new insight and understanding are lost—or at least discouraged. This is a very serious liability if, as we wish to suggest in the next section of this chapter, the anomalous aspects of prosocial behavior are what have contributed the most to psychology.

The seven perspectives reviewed thus far reveal the scope and power of existing psychological theory available to explain why people act prosocially. Yet in spite of this scope and power, these existing theories sometimes seem inadequate. Even after hearing their explanations, one may experience a nagging sense of “yes, but” when faced with a dramatic display of concern for another’s welfare—or a dramatic display of callousness. Such displays have long intrigued and puzzled not only psychologists but also philosophers and other behavioral and social scientists. They call for a rethinking of our existing theories about why people do and do not act prosocially, even a rethinking of our assumptions about human nature.

By attending to these anomalies, researchers have extended and altered our theories of social motivation. Attempts to explain prosocial anomalies have not caused a total rewrite of our theories, of course, but they have caused some rewriting, and likely there will be more.

ANOMALOUS FAILURES TO ACT PROSOCIALLY

The anomalous aspects of prosocial behavior have been of particular interest to those concerned with the theoretical rather than practical implications of why people do—and don’t—act prosocially. At times, a failure to act prosocially can be baffling. How can individuals who were raised in caring and nurturing homes, whose parents rewarded them for showing concern, who become upset when they hear about suffering in remote corners of the world, who have a well-developed sense of duty, justice, and social responsibility, and who are highly sensitive to how they look in others’ eyes as well as in their own fail to respond to the needs of others, even when it would cost little to do so? Given all the pressure that society brings to bear, failures to act prosocially can seem quite anomalous, almost amazing. Yet they happen.

Let’s return to the murder of Kitty Genovese. At the time, explanations bandied about in the media focused on the breakdown in modern urban society of moral fiber, social norms, and sense of community. Her death was said to be a product of apathy, alienation, anomie, and angst.

Effect of Others on Decisions Under Pressure

Bibb Latané and John Darley (1970) came up with an ingenious alternative to these dispositional explanations. Their explanation was based in part on existing psychological theory and in part on new theoretical insights. They observed that once we notice a possible emergency situation, we must make several decisions in order to help. We must decide that an emergency exists, that it is our personal responsibility to act, and that there is something we can do to help. To complicate matters, these decisions must be made under pressure; emergencies involve threat, ambiguity, urgency, and stress. The presence of other bystanders can influence this pressure-packed decision sequence at each step, tipping the scales toward inaction.

Is a scream in the night a woman being attacked or harmless high-spirited play? Uncertain, bystanders may turn to others present, seeking cues to help them decide. No one wishes to appear foolishly excited over an event that is not an emergency, so each individual reacts initially with a calm outward demeanor, while looking at other people’s reactions. Others do the same. No one appears upset, creating a state of pluralistic ignorance (Miller & McFarland, 1987). Everyone decides that since no one else is upset, the event must not be an emergency (Latané & Darley, 1968; Latané & Rodin, 1969).

Even if one decides that the situation is an emergency and that someone is in dire need of help, the presence of others can
still discourage action. To explain how, Darley and Latané (1968) moved beyond existing theory and proposed a diffusion of responsibility. If others are available, each individual may feel less personal obligation to come forward and help. One call to the police is as helpful, if not more helpful, than 20 calls. In the Kitty Genovese case, her neighbors may have seen lights in other windows and assumed that other neighbors had heard the screams and that someone else had already called. Some may have thought, “Something should be done, but why should I be the one to do it?” Thoughts like these, made possible by awareness of other bystanders without knowing what the others are doing, diffuses the responsibility to help among all the bystanders present and makes it less likely that any one bystander will help.

Latané and Darley’s (1970) answer to the question of why none of the 38 witnesses to the murder of Kitty Genovese helped has stood up remarkably well to experimental test (see Latané & Nida, 1981). Still, the psychological process that underlies diffusion of responsibility remains unclear. Do the costs of helping lead to a motivated, optimistic redefinition of the situation (“I’m sure someone else has already helped, so there is no longer a need”)? Is there a recognition of continuing need but denial of personal responsibility, either by reasoning that others present are better qualified to act (“Somebody’s got to do something, but not me; they’re the ones who know what to do”) or shifting from a prescriptive to a descriptive norm (“I can’t be blamed; no one else is doing anything either”)? Might some people fail to act out of deference or modesty (“I’ll let someone else be the hero”)? Each of these processes involves the effect of others on decision making under pressure, and they are often confounded in research; yet these processes are distinct. Any or all could operate, suggesting that more research is needed.

Blaming the Victim

Another important theoretical development stimulated by reflection on bystander “apathy” was Melvin Lerner’s (1970, 1980) just-world hypothesis. The anomaly on which Lerner focused was not the failure to help victims of accidents, attacks, or other emergencies, but rather the more pervasive and pernicious tendency for the haves in society to be unresponsive to the needs of the have-nots. Lerner observed, as did Ryan (1971), that people often not only fail to notice need or to show concern for victims, but that they actively derogate and blame victims.

To explain this apparent anomaly, Lerner turned to the seemingly prosocial principle of justice. He reasoned as follows. If children are to delay gratification and pursue long-term goals, they must develop a belief that effort brings results. For most of us, this belief in contingency leads in turn to a belief in a just world, a sense of appropriateness—that people get what they deserve (and deserve what they get)—necessary for trust, hope, and confidence in our future. Witnessing the suffering of innocent victims violates the belief in a just world. In order to reduce the discomfort produced by this threat, we may help. But there is an alternative: We may derogate or blame the victims (if they have less, they must deserve less; that is, they must be less deserving). Lerner and his associates provided extensive evidence that witnessing an innocent victim suffer can lead to derogation (see Lerner, 1980, for a review). The insight that a natural—even noble—belief in justice, when carried into an unjust world, can itself become a source of injustice has proved major.

ANOMALOUS PROSOCIAL ACTS

In the 1960s, heightened social conscience focused attention on anomalous failures to act prosocially. In the broader sweep of Western thought, this focus is itself anomalous. Through the centuries, the puzzle that has intrigued those contemplating the human condition has not been why people fail to care for others in need; the puzzle has been why people care.

From Aristotle and Aquinas through Hobbes and Bentham to Nietzsche and Freud, the dominant view in Western thought has been that people are, at heart, exclusively self-interested. Given this view, what explains the enormous effort and energy directed toward benefiting others? At times, what people do for others can be spectacular. Soldiers have thrown themselves on live grenades to protect their comrades. Crews worked around the clock in extreme danger to free the trapped victims of the Oklahoma City bombing. Firemen died directing others to safety when the World Trade Center towers collapsed. Surviving an airline crash, Arland Williams lost his life in the icy waters of the Potomac because he repeatedly gave others his place in the rescue helicopter. Mother Teresa dedicated her life to the dying of Calcutta, the poorest of the poor, bringing care and comfort to thousands. Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe, such as Miep Gies (1987), who helped hide Anne Frank and her parents, and Oskar Schindler, risked their own lives—and often the lives of their loved ones—day after day for months, or even years.

How can we reconcile these actions with a view that people are exclusively self-interested? Could some people, to some degree, under some circumstances, be capable of having another person’s interest at heart? Is it possible for one person to have another person’s welfare as an ultimate goal (altruism), or is all helping simply an instrumental means of
obtaining one or another form of self-benefit (egoism)? This has been called the altruism question (Batson, 1991).

The Altruism Question

One easy answer to the altruism question that can quickly be laid to rest goes like this: Even if it were possible for a person to be motivated to increase another’s welfare, such a person would be pleased by attaining this desired goal, so even this apparent altruism would be a product of egoism. In the words of Tolman’s (1923) well-turned epithet, this argument is “more brilliant than cogent” (p. 203). Philosophers have shown it to be flawed by pointing out that it involves a confusion between two different forms of psychological hedonism. The strong form of hedonism asserts that the ultimate goal of human action is always the attainment of personal pleasure; the weak form asserts only that goal attainment always brings pleasure. The weak form is not inconsistent with the altruistic claim that the ultimate goal of some action is to benefit another rather than to benefit oneself; the pleasure obtained can be a consequence of reaching this goal without being the goal itself. The strong form of psychological hedonism is inconsistent with the possibility of altruism, but to affirm this form is simply to assert that altruism does not exist, an empirical assertion that may or may not be true (see MacIntyre, 1967, for discussion of these philosophical arguments).

More serious advocates of universal egoism argue that some specific self-benefit is always the ultimate goal of helping; benefiting the other is simply an instrumental goal on the way to one or another ultimately self-serving end. They point to all the self-benefits of helping: the material, social, and self-rewards received; the material, social, and self-punishments avoided; and aversive-arousal reduction. Advocates of altruism counter that simply because self-benefits follow from benefiting another, this does not prove that the self-benefits were the helper’s ultimate goal. These self-benefits may be unintended consequences of reaching the ultimate goal of benefiting the other. If so, the motivation would be altruistic, not egoistic.

Advocates of altruism claim more than possibility, of course. They claim that altruistic motivation exists, that at least some people under some circumstances act with the ultimate goal of increasing another person’s welfare.

The Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis

Over the centuries, the most frequently proposed source of altruistic motivation has been an other-oriented emotional response congruent with the perceived welfare of another person—today usually called empathy (Batson, 1987) or sympathy (Wispé, 1986). If another person is in need, these empathic emotions include sympathy, compassion, tenderness, and the like. The empathy-altruism hypothesis claims that these emotions evoke motivation with an ultimate goal of benefiting the person for whom the empathy is felt—that is, altruistic motivation. Various forms of this hypothesis have been espoused by Thomas Aquinas, David Hume, Adam Smith, Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer, and William McDougall, as well as in contemporary psychology by Hoffman (1975), Krebs (1975), and Batson (1987).

Considerable evidence supports the idea that feeling empathy for a person in need leads to increased helping of that person (see Batson, 1991; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987, for reviews). Observing an empathy-helping relationship, however, tells us nothing about the nature of the motivation that underlies this relationship. Increasing the other person’s welfare could be (a) an ultimate goal, producing self-benefits as unintended consequences; (b) an instrumental goal on the way to the ultimate goal of gaining one or more self-benefits; or (c) both. That is, the motivation could be altruistic, egoistic, or both.

Egoistic Alternatives to the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis

Three general classes of self-benefits can result from helping a person for whom one feels empathy. Such help can (a) reduce one’s empathic arousal, which may be experienced as aversive; (b) enable one to avoid possible social and self-punishments for failing to help; and (c) enable one to gain social and self-rewards for doing what is good and right. The empathy-altruism hypothesis does not deny that these self-benefits of empathy-induced helping exist. It claims that they are unintended consequences of the empathically aroused helper reaching the ultimate goal of reducing the other’s suffering. Proponents of egoistic alternatives to the empathy-altruism hypothesis disagree. They claim that one or more of these self-benefits are the ultimate goal of empathy-induced helping. In the past two decades more than 30 experiments have tested these three egoistic alternatives against the empathy-altruism hypothesis.

The most frequently proposed egoistic explanation of the empathy-helping relationship is aversive-arousal reduction. This explanation claims that feeling empathy for someone who is suffering is unpleasant, and empathically aroused individuals help in order to benefit themselves by eliminating their empathic feelings. Benefiting the victim is simply a means to this self-serving end.

Over half a dozen experiments have tested the aversive-arousal reduction explanation against the empathy-altruism hypothesis by varying the ease of escape from further exposure.
to the empathy-evoking need without helping. Because empathic arousal is a result of witnessing the need, either terminating this need by helping or terminating exposure to it by escaping should reduce one’s own empathic arousal. Escape does not, however, enable one to reach the altruistic goal of relieving the victim’s need. Therefore, the aversive-arousal explanation predicts elimination of the empathy-helping relationship when escape is easy; the empathy-altruism hypothesis does not. Results of these experiments have consistently patterned as predicted by the empathy-altruism hypothesis and not by the aversive-arousal reduction explanation, casting doubt on this popular egoistic account (see Batson, 1991, for a review).

A second egoistic explanation invokes empathy-specific punishment. It claims that people learn through socialization that additional obligation to help, and thus additional shame and guilt for failure to help, is attendant on feeling empathy for someone in need. As a result, when people feel empathy, they are faced with impending social or self-censure beyond any general punishment associated with not helping. They say to themselves, “What will others think—or what will I think of myself—if I don’t help when I feel like this?” and then they help out of an egoistic desire to avoid these empathy-specific punishments. Once again, experiments designed to test this explanation have failed to support it; the results have consistently supported the empathy-altruism hypothesis instead (Batson, 1991).

The third major egoistic explanation invokes empathy-specific reward. It claims that people learn through socialization that special rewards in the form of praise and pride are attendant on helping a person for whom they feel empathy. As a result, when people feel empathy, they think of these rewards and help out of an egoistic desire to gain them.

The general form of this explanation has been tested in several experiments and received no support (Batson et al., 1988, Studies 1 & 5; Batson & Weeks, 1996), but two variations have also been proposed. Best known is the negative-state-relief explanation proposed by Cialdini et al. (1987). Cialdini et al. suggested that the empathy experienced when witnessing another person’s suffering is a negative affective state—a state of temporary sadness or sorrow—and the person feeling empathy helps in order to gain self-rewards to counteract this negative state.

Although this egoistic alternative received some initial support (Cialdini et al., 1987; Schaller & Cialdini, 1988), subsequent research has revealed that this was likely due to procedural artifacts. Experiments avoiding these artifacts have instead supported the empathy-altruism hypothesis (Batson et al., 1989; Dovidio, Allen, & Schroeder, 1990; Schroeder, Dovidio, Sibicky, Matthews, & Allen, 1988). It now seems clear that the motivation to help evoked by empathy is not directed toward the egoistic goal of negative-state relief.

A second interesting variation on an empathy-specific reward explanation was proposed by Smith, Keating, and Stotland (1989). They claimed that rather than helping to gain the rewards of seeing oneself or being seen by others as a helpful person, empathically aroused individuals help in order to feel joy at the needy individual’s relief: “It is proposed that the prospect of empathic joy, conveyed by feedback from the help recipient, is essential to the special tendency of empathetic witnesses to help... The empathically concerned witness to the distress of others helps in order to be happy” (Smith et al., 1989, p. 641).

Some early self-report data were supportive, but more rigorous experimental evidence has failed to support this empathic-joy hypothesis. Instead, experimental results have once again consistently supported the empathy-altruism hypothesis (Batson et al., 1991; Smith et al., 1989). The empathic-joy hypothesis, like other versions of the empathy-specific reward explanation, seems unable to account for the empathy-helping relationship.

A Tentative Conclusion

Reviewing the empathy-altruism research, as well as related literature in sociology, economics, political science, and biology, J. A. Piliavin and Charnig (1990) concluded that

There appears to be a “paradigm shift” away from the earlier position that behavior that appears to be altruistic must, under closer scrutiny, be revealed as reflecting egoistic motives. Rather, theory and data now being advanced are more compatible with the view that true altruism—acting with the goal of benefiting another—does exist and is a part of human nature. (p. 27)

Pending new evidence or a plausible new egoistic explanation of the existing evidence, this conclusion seems correct. It appears that the empathy-altruism hypothesis should—tentatively—be accepted as true.

Implications of the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis

If the empathy-altruism hypothesis is true, the implications are wide ranging. Universal egoism—the assumption that all human behavior is ultimately directed toward self-benefit—has long dominated not only psychology but other social and behavioral sciences as well (Campbell, 1975; Mansbridge, 1990; Wallach & Wallach, 1983). If individuals feeling empathy act, at least in part, with an ultimate goal of increasing the welfare of another, then the assumption of universal
egoism must be replaced by a more complex view of motivation that allows for altruism as well as egoism. Such a shift in our view of motivation requires, in turn, a revision of our underlying assumptions about human nature and human potential. It implies that we humans may be more social than we have thought—that other people can be more to us than sources of information, stimulation, and reward as we each seek our own welfare. To some degree and under some circumstances, we can care about their welfare as an end in itself.

The evidence for the empathy-altruism hypothesis also forces us to face the question of why empathic feelings exist. What evolutionary function do they serve? Admittedly speculative, the most plausible answer relates empathic feelings to parenting among higher mammals, in which offspring live for some time in a very vulnerable state (de Waal, 1996; Hoffman, 1981; McDougall, 1908; Zahn-Waxler & Radke-Yarrow, 1990). Were parents not intensely interested in the welfare of their progeny, these species would quickly die out. Empathic feelings for offspring, and the resulting altruistic motivation, may promote one’s reproductive potential not by increasing the number of offspring but by increasing the chance of their survival.

Clearly, however, empathic feelings extend well beyond one’s own children. People can feel empathy for a wide range of individuals (including nonhumans) as long as there is no preexisting antipathy (Batson, 1991; Krebs, 1975; Shelton & Rogers, 1981). From an evolutionary perspective, this extension may be attributed to cognitive generalization whereby one “adopts” others, making it possible to evoke the primitive and fundamental impulse to care for progeny when these adopted others are in need (Batson, 1987; MacLean, 1973). Such cognitive generalization may be possible because of (a) human cognitive capacity, including symbolic thought, and (b) the lack of evolutionary advantage for sharp discrimination of empathic feelings in the small hunter-gatherer bands of early humans. In these bands, those in need were often one’s children or close kin, and one’s own welfare was tightly tied to the welfare even of those who were not close kin (Hoffman, 1981).

The empathy-altruism hypothesis also may have wide-ranging practical implications. Given the power of empathic feelings to evoke altruistic motivation, people may sometimes suppress or avoid these feelings. Loss of the capacity to feel empathy for clients may be a factor, possibly a central one, in the experience of burnout among case workers in the helping professions (Maslach, 1982). Aware of the extreme effort involved in helping or the impossibility of helping effectively, these case workers—as well as nurses caring for terminal patients, and even pedestrians confronted by the homeless—may try to avoid feeling empathy in order to avoid the resulting altruistic motivation (Shaw, Batson, & Todd, 1994; Stotland, Mathews, Sherman, Hansson, & Richardson, 1978). There seems to be, then, egoistic motivation to avoid altruistic motivation.

More positively, experiments have tested the possibility that empathy-induced altruism can be used to improve attitudes toward stigmatized out-groups. Thus far, results look quite encouraging. Inducing empathy has improved racial attitudes, as well as attitudes toward people with AIDS, the homeless, and even convicted murderers (Batson, Polycarpou, et al., 1997; Dovidio, Gaertner, & Johnson, 1999). Empathy-induced altruism has also been found to increase cooperation in a competitive situation (a prisoner’s dilemma), even when one knows that the person for whom one feels empathy has acted competitively (Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson & Moran, 1999).

**Other Possible Sources of Altruistic Motivation**

Might there be sources of altruistic motivation other than empathic emotion? Several have been proposed, including an altruistic personality (Oliver & Oliner, 1988), principled moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1976), and internalized prosocial values (Staub, 1974). There is some evidence that each of these potential sources is associated with increased prosocial motivation, but as yet, it is not clear whether this motivation is altruistic. It may instead be an instrumental means to the egoistic ultimate goals of (a) maintaining one’s positive self-concept or (b) avoiding guilt (Batson, 1991; Batson, Bolen, Cross, & Neuringer-Benefiel, 1986; Carlo et al., 1991; Eisenberg et al., 1989). More and better research exploring these possibilities is needed.

**Beyond the Egoism-Altruism Debate: Other Prosocial Motives**

Thinking more broadly, beyond the egoism-altruism debate that has been the focus of attention and contention for the past two decades, might there be other forms of prosocial motivation—forms in which the ultimate goal is neither to benefit oneself nor to benefit another individual? Two possibilities seem especially worthy of consideration: collectivism and principlism.

**Collectivism: Benefiting a Group**

Collectivism involves motivation to benefit a particular group as a whole. The ultimate goal is not to increase one’s own welfare or the welfare of the specific others who are benefited; the ultimate goal is to increase the welfare of the group. Robyn Dawes and his colleagues put it succinctly: “Not me or thee but we” (Dawes, van de Kragt, & Orbell, 1988). They also suggested that collectivist prosocial motivation is a product of

As with altruism, however, what looks like collectivism may actually be a subtle form of egoism. Perhaps attention to group welfare is simply an expression of enlightened self-interest. After all, if one recognizes that ignoring group needs and the common good in a headlong pursuit of self-benefit will only lead to less self-benefit in the long run, then one may decide to benefit the group as a means to maximize overall self-benefit. Appeals to enlightened self-interest are often used by politicians and social activists trying to encourage prosocial response to societal needs. They warn of the long-term consequences for oneself and one’s children of pollution and squandering natural resources. They remind that if the plight of the poor becomes too severe, those who are well off may face revolution. Such appeals seem to assume that collectivism is simply a form of egoism.

The most direct evidence that collectivism is independent of egoism comes from research by Dawes, van de Kragt, and Orbell (1990). They examined the responses of individuals who had been given a choice between allocating money to themselves or to a group. Allocation to oneself maximized individual but not group profit, whereas allocation to the group maximized collective but not individual profit.

Dawes et al. (1990) found that if individuals faced with this dilemma made their allocation after discussing it with other members of the group, they gave more to the group than if they had no prior discussion. Moreover, this effect was specific to the in-group with whom the discussion occurred; allocation to an out-group was not enhanced. Based on this research, Dawes et al. claimed evidence for collectivist motivation independent of egoism, arguing that their procedure ruled out the two most plausible egoistic explanations: (a) enlightened self-interest (by having no future contact and only one allocation round) and (b) socially instilled conscience (a norm to share, if evoked, should increase sharing with the out-group as well as the in-group). There is reason to doubt, however, that their procedure effectively ruled out self-rewards and self-punishments associated with conscience. The research on norms reviewed earlier suggests that norms can be more refined than Dawes and his coworkers allowed. We may have a norm that says “share with your buddies” rather than a norm that simply says “share.” So, although this research is important and suggestive, more and better evidence is needed to justify the conclusion that collectivist prosocial motivation is not reducible to egoism.

**Principlism: Upholding a Moral Principle**

Not only have most moral philosophers argued for the importance of a prosocial motive other than egoism, but most since Kant (1724–1804) have shunned altruism and collectivism as well. They reject appeals to altruism, especially empathy-induced altruism, because feelings of empathy, sympathy, and compassion are too fickle and too circumscribed. Empathy is not felt for everyone in need, at least not to the same degree. They reject appeals to collectivism because group interest is bounded by the limits of the group; it may even encourage doing harm to those outside the group. Given these problems with altruism and collectivism, moral philosophers have typically advocated prosocial motivation with an ultimate goal of upholding a universal and impartial moral principle, such as justice (Rawls, 1971). We shall call this moral motivation **principlism**.

Is acting with an ultimate goal of upholding a moral principle really possible? When Kant (1785/1898) briefly shifted from his analysis of what ought to be to what is, he was ready to admit that even when the concern we show for others appears to be prompted by duty to principle, it may actually be prompted by self-love (pp. 23–24). The goal of upholding a moral principle may be only an instrumental goal pursued as a means to reach the ultimate goal of self-benefit. If so, then principle-based motivation is actually egoistic.

The self-benefits of upholding a moral principle are conspicuous. One can gain the social and self-rewards of being seen and seeing oneself as a good person. One can also avoid the social and self-punishments of shame and guilt for failing to do the right thing. As Freud (1930) suggested, society may inculcate such principles in the young in order to bridle their antisocial impulses by making it in their best personal interest to act morally (see also Campbell, 1975). Alternatively, through internalization (Staub, 1989) or development of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1976), principles may come to be valued in their own right and not simply as instrumental means to self-serving ends.

The issue here is the same one faced with altruism and collectivism. We need to know the nature of the underlying motive. Is the desire to uphold justice (or some other moral principle) an instrumental goal on the way to the ultimate goal of self-benefit? If so, this desire is a form of egoism. Is upholding the principle an ultimate goal, and the ensuing self-benefits merely unintended consequences? If so, principlism is a fourth type of prosocial motivation, independent of egoism, altruism, and collectivism.

Recent research suggests that people often act so as to appear moral while, if possible, avoiding the cost of actually being moral (Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997; Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, & Strongman, 1999). This research also suggests that if moral motivation exists, it is easily overpowered by self-interest. Many of us are, it seems, quite adept at moral rationalization.
We are good at justifying to ourselves (if not to others) why a situation that benefits us or those we care about does not violate our moral principles—for example, why storing our nuclear waste in someone else’s backyard is fair, why terrorist attacks by our side are regrettable but necessary evils whereas terrorist attacks by the other side are atrocities, and why we must obey orders even if it means killing innocent people. The abstractness of most moral principles, and their multiplicity, makes rationalization all too easy (see Bandura, 1991; Bersoff, 1999; Staub, 1990).

But this may be only part of the story. Perhaps in some cases upholding a moral principle can serve as an ultimate goal, defining a form of motivation independent of egoism. If so, perhaps these principles can provide a basis for responding to the needs of others that transcends reliance on self-interest or on vested interest in and feeling for the welfare of certain other individuals or groups. Quite an “if,” but it seems well worth conducting research to find out.

**Conflict and Cooperation of Prosocial Motives**

To recognize the range of possible prosocial motives makes available more resources to those seeking to produce a more humane, caring society. At the same time, a multiplicity of prosocial motives complicates matters. These different motives for helping others do not always work in harmony. They can undercut or compete with one another.

Well-intentioned appeals to extended or enlightened self-interest can backfire by undermining other prosocial motives. Providing people with money or other tangible incentives for showing concern may lead people to interpret their motivation as egoistic even when it is not (Batson, Coke, Jasnoski, & Hanson, 1978). In this way, the assumption that there is only one answer to the question of why we act for the common good—egoism—may become a self-fulfilling prophecy (Batson, Fultz, Schoenrade, & Paduano, 1987) and may create a self-perpetuating norm of self-interest (Miller, 1999; Miller & Ratner, 1998).

Nor do the other three prosocial motives always work in harmony. They can conflict with one another. For example, altruism can—and often does—conflict with collectivism or principlism. We may ignore the larger social good, or we may compromise our principles, not only to benefit ourselves but also to benefit those individuals about whom we especially care (Batson, Batson, et al., 1995; Batson, Klein, Highbarger, & Shaw, 1995). Indeed, whereas there are clear social sanctions against unbridled self-interest, there are not clear sanctions against altruism. Batson, Ahmad, et al. (1999) found that altruism can at times be a greater threat to the common good than is egoism.

Each of the four possible prosocial motives that we have identified has its strengths. Each also has its weaknesses. The potential for the greatest good may come from strategies that orchestrate these motives so that the strengths of one can overcome the weaknesses of another. Strategies that combine appeals to either altruism or collectivism with appeals to principles seem especially promising. For example, think about the principle of justice. Upholding justice is a powerful motive, but it is vulnerable to rationalization. Empathy-induced altruism and collectivism are also powerful motives, but they are limited in scope. They produce partiality—special concern for a particular person or persons or for a particular group. If we can lead people to feel empathy for the victims of injustice or to perceive themselves in a common group with them, we may be able to get these motives working together rather than at odds. Desire for justice may provide perspective and reason; empathy-induced altruism or collectivism may provide emotional fire and a force directed specifically toward relief of the victims’ suffering, preventing rationalization.

Something of this sort occurred, we believe, in a number of rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe. A careful look at data collected by the Oliners and their colleagues (Oliner & Oliner, 1988) suggests that involvement in rescue activity frequently began with concern for a specific individual or individuals for whom compassion was felt—often individuals known previously. This initial involvement subsequently led to further contacts and rescue activity and to a concern for justice that extended well beyond the bound of the initial empathic concern. Something of this sort also lay at the heart of Gandhi’s and Martin Luther King’s practice of nonviolent protest. The sight on the TV news of a small Black child in Birmingham being literally rolled down the street by water from a fire hose under the direction of Police Chief Bull Connor, and the emotions this sight evoked, seemed to do more to arouse a concern for justice than did hours of reasoned argument and appeals for equal civil rights.

Something of this sort also can be found in the writing of Jonathan Kozol. Deeply concerned about the “savage inequalities” in public education between rich and poor communities in the United States, Kozol (1991) does not simply document the inequity. He takes us into the lives of individual children. We come to care deeply for them and, as a result, about the injustice.

**RESEARCH METHOD MATTERS**

Efforts to explain prosocial behavior, especially its seemingly anomalous aspects, have raised thorny issues about research methods that, though not specific to this area, flourish here.
Most of these issues are rooted in mire produced by two features. First, psychologists are not the only ones who care about prosocial behavior. Most research participants see themselves as good, kind, caring people, and they want to be seen that way by others. Second, although cool, cognitive analysis and inference are often involved, theory and research on prosocial behavior focuses on relatively hot, active processes—the interplay of values, emotions, motives, and behavior. These processes may not be accessible to cool introspection.

To reap a fruitful harvest from the mire that these two features create, researchers need to avoid the pitfalls of demand characteristics, evaluation apprehension, social desirability, self-presentation, and reactive measures. Consequently, research on prosocial behavior still relies heavily on high-impact deception procedures of the sort made famous in the social psychology of the 1960s (Aronson, Brewer, & Carlsmith, 1985). The currently popular procedure of presenting research participants with descriptions of hypothetical situations and asking them to report what they would do is of limited use when studying prosocial behavior. Commitment to actual behavior—if not the behavior itself—is almost always required (Lerner, 1987). Rather than relying heavily on self-reports, thought listing, or retrospective analysis to reveal mediating psychological processes, we must often study these processes indirectly by designing research that allows the effect of mediators to be inferred from observable behavior. Typically, this means one must successfully deceive participants, run the experiments on each participant individually, use between-group designs, and so on. Clearly, such research is difficult. Equally clearly, it requires careful sensitivity to and protection of the welfare and dignity of participants.

Deeming care and sensitivity insufficient, some universities have instituted a blanket prohibition on the use of high-impact deceptions of the kind needed to address key research questions concerning prosocial behavior. It is ironic that the study of prosocial, ethical behavior is one of the areas to suffer most from restrictions imposed in response to concerns about research ethics.

Few would disagree that society could benefit from increased prosocial behavior. Rage and hate crimes, terrorist attacks, child and spouse abuse, neglect of the homeless, the plight of people with AIDS, and the growing disparity between rich and poor (and smug callousness toward the latter) provide all-too-frequent reminders of crying need. Given the societal importance of understanding why people act to benefit others, given the apparent necessity of using high-impact deception research to provide this understanding, and given the dangers of obtaining misleading information using other methods, it is not the use of these methods, but rather a blanket prohibition of them, that seems unethical.

CONCLUSION

Over the past 30 years the practical concern to promote prosocial behavior has led to both a variance-accounted-for empirical approach and the application of existing psychological theories. In addition, existing theory has been challenged and new theoretical perspectives developed by a focus on anomalous aspects of why people do—and don’t—act prosocially. Research has challenged currently dominant theories of social motivation and even of human nature—views that limit the human capacity to care to self-interest. This research has raised the possibility of a multiplicity of social motives—altruism, collectivism, and principlism, as well as egoism. It also has raised important theoretical questions—as yet unanswered—about how these motives might be most effectively orchestrated to increase prosocial behavior. More broadly, research in this area takes exception to the currently dominant focus in social psychology on cognitive representation of the social environment and processing of social information, calling for increased attention to motives, emotions, and values.

Research on prosocial behavior provides evidence that in addition to our all-too-apparent failing and fallibilities, we humans are, at times, capable of caring, and caring deeply, for people and issues other than ourselves. This possibility has wide-ranging theoretical implications, suggesting that we are more social than even our most social theories have led us to believe. It also has wide-ranging practical implications, suggesting untapped resources for social change. At present, however, these theoretical and practical implications are only partly realized, providing a pressing—and daunting—agenda.

REFERENCES


Social Conflict, Harmony, and Integration

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Social Conflict and Integration

Humans are fundamentally social animals. Not only is group living of obvious contemporary importance (see Spears, Oakes, Ellemers, & Haslam, 1997), but also it represents the fundamental survival strategy that has likely characterized the human species from the beginning (see Simpson & Kenrick, 1997). The ways in which people understand their group membership thus play a critical role in social conflict and harmony and in intergroup integration. This chapter examines psychological perspectives on intergroup relations and their implications for reducing bias and conflict and for enhancing social integration. First, we review social psychological theories on the nature of individual and collective identities and their relation to social harmony and conflict. Then, we examine theoretical perspectives on reducing intergroup bias and promoting social harmony. Next, we explore the importance of considering majority and minority perspectives on intergroup relations, social conflict, and integration. The chapter concludes by considering future directions and practical implications.

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representations of group hierarchy. Social dominance theory (Pratto & Lemieux, 2001; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; see also Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) assumes that people who are strongly identified with high-status groups and who see intergroup relations in terms of group competition will be especially prejudiced and discriminatory toward out-groups. These biases occur spontaneously as a function of individual differences in social dominance orientation, in contexts in which in-group–out-group distinctions are salient (Pratto & Shih, 2000). Scales developed to measure social dominance orientation pit the values of group dominance and equality against each other (see Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). People high in social dominance orientation believe that group hierarchies are inevitable and desirable, and they may thus see the world as involving competition between groups for resources. They endorse items such as, “Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups” and “Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.” Individuals high in social dominance orientation believe that unequal social outcomes and social hierarchies are appropriate and therefore support an unequal distribution of resources among groups in ways that usually benefit their own group (see Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius, Levin, & Pratto, 1996). Individuals low in social dominance orientation, in contrast, are generally concerned about the welfare of others and are empathic and tolerant of other individuals and groups (Pratto et al., 1994). They tend to endorse items such as, “Group equality should be our ideal” and “We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.”

Sociological theories, in contrast, have frequently emphasized the role of large-scale social and structural dynamics in intergroup relations in general and in race relations in particular (Blauiner, 1972; Bonacich, 1972; Wilson, 1978). These theories have considered the dynamics of race relations largely in economic and class-based terms—and often to the exclusion of individual influences (see Bobo, 1999).

Despite the existence of such divergent views, both sociological and psychological approaches have converged to recognize the importance of understanding the impact of group functions and collective identities on race relations (see Bobo, 1999). In terms of group functions, Blumer (1958a, 1958b, 1965a, 1965b), for instance, offered a sociologically based approach focusing on defense of group position, in which group competition and threat were considered fundamental processes in the development and maintenance of social biases. With respect to race relations, Blumer (1958a) wrote, “Race prejudice is a defensive reaction to such challenging of the sense of group position. . . . As such, race prejudice is a protective device. It functions, however shortsightedly, to preserve the integrity and position of the dominant group” (p. 5).

From a psychological orientation, Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif (1961) similarly proposed that the functional relations between groups are critical in determining intergroup attitudes. According to this position, competition between groups produces prejudice and discrimination, whereas intergroup interdependence and cooperative interaction that result in successful outcomes reduce intergroup bias (see also Bobo, 1988; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Campbell, 1965; Sherif, 1966).

With respect to the importance of collective identity, psychological research has emphasized how the salience of group versus individual identity can influence the way in which people process social information. In particular, the operation of group-level processes has been hypothesized to be dynamically distinct from the influence of individual-level processes. Different modes of functioning are involved, and these modes critically influence how people perceive others and experience their own sense of identity. In terms of perceptions of others, for example, Brewer (1988) proposed a dual process model of impression formation (see also the continuum model; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; see also Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999). The primary distinction in Brewer’s model is between two types of processing: person-based and category-based. Person-based processing is bottom up and data driven, involving the piecemeal acquisition of information that begins “at the most concrete level and stops at the lowest level of abstraction required by the prevailing processing objectives” (Brewer, 1988, p. 6). Category-based processing, in contrast, proceeds from global to specific; it is top-down. In top-down processing, how the external reality is perceived and experienced is influenced by category-based, subjective impressions. According to Brewer, category-based processing is more likely to occur than is person-based processing because social information is typically organized around social categories.

With respect to one’s sense of identity, social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985; see also Onorato & Turner, 2001) view the distinction between personal identity and social identity as a critical one (see Spears, 2001). When personal identity is salient, a person’s individual needs, standards, beliefs, and motives primarily determine behavior. In contrast, when social identity is salient, “people come to perceive themselves as more interchangeable exemplars of a social category than as unique personalities defined by their individual differences from others” (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987, p. 50). Under these conditions, collective needs, goals, and standards are primary.

This perspective also proposes that a person defines or categorizes the self along a continuum that ranges at one extreme...
from the self as a separate individual with personal motives, goals, and achievements to the self as the embodiment of a social collective or group. At the individual level, one’s personal welfare and goals are most salient and important. At the group level, the goals and achievements of the group are merged with one’s own (see Brown & Turner, 1981), and the group’s welfare is paramount. At each extreme, self-interest fully is represented by the pronouns “I” and “We,” respectively. Intergroup relations begin when people think about themselves as group members rather than solely as distinct individuals.

Illustrating the dynamics of this distinction, Verkuyten and Hagendoorn (1998) found that when individual identity was primed, individual differences in authoritarianism were the major predictor of the prejudice of Dutch students toward Turkish migrants. In contrast, when social identity (i.e., national identity) was made salient, in-group stereotypes and standards primarily predicted prejudiced attitudes. Thus, whether personal or collective identity is more salient critically shapes how a person perceives, interprets, evaluates, and responds to situations and to others (Kawakami & Dion, 1993, 1995).

Although the categorization process may place the person at either extreme of the continuum from personal identity to social identity, people often seek an intermediate point to balance their need to be different from others and their need to belong and share a sense of similarity to others (Brewer, 1991). This balance enhances one’s feelings of connection to the group and increases group cohesiveness and social harmony (Hogg, 1996). However, social categorization into in-groups and out-groups also lays the foundation for the development of intergroup bias or ethnocentrism. In addition, intergroup relations tend to be less positive than interpersonal relations. Insko, Schopler, and their colleagues have demonstrated a fundamental individual-group discontinuity effect in which groups are greedier and less trustworthy than individuals (Insko et al., 2001; Schopler & Insko, 1992). As a consequence, relations between groups tend to be more competitive and less cooperative than those between individuals. In general, then, the social categorization of others and oneself plays a significant role in prejudice and discrimination.

Although social categorization generally leads to intergroup bias, the nature of that bias—whether it is based on in-group favoritism or extends to derogation and negative treatment of the out-group—depends on a number of factors, such as whether the structural relations between groups and associated social norms foster and justify hostility or contempt (Mummendey & Otten, 2001; Otten & Mummendey, 2000). However, different treatment of in-group versus out-group members, whether rooted in favoritism for one group or derogation of another, can lead to different expectations, perceptions, and behavior toward in-group versus out-group members that can ultimately create a self-fulfilling prophecy. Initial in-group favoritism can also provide a foundation for embracing more negative intergroup feelings and beliefs that result from intrapersonal, cultural, economic, and political factors. In the next section we describe alternative, and ultimately complementary, theoretical approaches to intergroup conflict and integration.

Perspectives on Intergroup Relations and Conflict

In general, research on social conflict, harmony, and integration has adopted one of two perspectives, one with an emphasis on the functional relations between groups and the other on the role of collective identities.

Functional Relations Between Groups

Theories based on functional relations often point to competition and consequent perceived threat as a fundamental cause of intergroup prejudice and conflict. Realistic group conflict theory (Campbell, 1965; Sherif, 1966), for example, posits that perceived group competition for resources produces efforts to reduce the access of other groups to the resources. This process was illustrated in classic work by Muzaffer Sherif and his colleagues (Sherif et al., 1961). In 1954 Sherif and his colleagues conducted a field study on intergroup conflict in an area adjacent to Robbers Cave State Park in Oklahoma. In this study 22 12-year-old boys attending summer camp were randomly assigned to two groups (who subsequently named themselves Eagles and Rattlers). Over a period of weeks they became aware of the other group’s existence, engaged in a series of competitive activities that generated overt intergroup conflict, and ultimately participated in a series of cooperative activities designed to ameliorate conflict and bias.

To permit time for group formation (e.g., norms and a leadership structure), the two groups were kept completely apart for one week. During the second week the investigators introduced competitive relations between the groups in the form of repeated competitive athletic activities centering around tug-of-war, baseball, and touch football, with the winning group receiving prizes. As expected, the introduction of competitive activities generated derogatory stereotypes and conflict among these groups. These boys, however, did not simply show in-group favoritism as we frequently see in laboratory studies. Rather, there was genuine hostility between these groups. Each group conducted raids on the other’s cabins that resulted in the destruction and theft of property. The boys carried sticks, baseball bats, and socks filled with rocks as potential weapons. Fistfights broke out between
members of the groups, and food and garbage fights erupted in the dinning hall. In addition, group members regularly exchanged verbal insults (e.g., “ladies first”) and name-calling (e.g., “sissies,” “stinkers,” “pigs,” “bums,” “cheaters,” and “communists”).

During the third week, Sherif and his colleagues arranged intergroup contact under neutral, noncompetitive conditions. These interventions did not calm the ferocity of the exchanges, however. Mere intergroup contact was not sufficient to change the nature of the relations between the groups. Only after the investigators altered the functional relations between the groups by introducing a series of superordinate goals—ones that could not be achieved without the full cooperation of both groups and which were successfully achieved—did the relations between the two groups become more harmonious.

Sherif et al. (1961) proposed that functional relations between groups are critical in determining intergroup attitudes. When groups are competitively interdependent, the interplay between the actions of each group results in positive outcomes for one group and negative outcomes for the other. Thus, in the attempt to obtain favorable outcomes for themselves, the actions of the members of each group are also realistically perceived to be calculated to frustrate the goals of the other group. Therefore, a win-lose, zero-sum competitive relation between groups can initiate mutually negative feelings and stereotypes toward the members of the other group. In contrast, a cooperatively interdependent relation between members of different groups can reduce bias (Worchel, 1986).

Functional relations do not have to involve explicit competition with members of other groups to generate biases. In the absence of any direct evidence, people typically presume that members of other groups are competitive and will hinder the attainment of one’s goals (Fiske & Ruscher, 1993). Moreover, feelings of interdependence on members of one’s own group may be sufficient to produce bias. Rabbie’s behavioral interaction model (see Rabbie & Lodewijks, 1996; Rabbie & Schot, 1990; cf. Bourhis, Turner, & Gagnon, 1997), for example, argues that either intragroup cooperation or intergroup competition can stimulate intergroup bias. Similarly, L. Gaertner and Insko (2000), who unconfounded the effects of categorization and outcome dependence, demonstrated that dependence on in-group members could independently generate intergroup bias among men. Perhaps as a consequence of feelings of outcome dependence, allowing opportunities for greater interaction among in-group members increases intergroup bias (L. Gaertner & Schopler, 1998), whereas increasing interaction between members of different groups (S. Gaertner et al., 1999) or even the anticipation of future interaction with other groups (Insko et al., 2001) decreases intergroup bias.

Recently, Esses and her colleagues (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001; Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998; Jackson & Esses, 2000) have integrated work on realistic group conflict theory (Campbell, 1965; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1966; see also Bobo, 1988) and social dominance theory (Pratto, 1999; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) within the framework of the instrumental model of group conflict. This model proposes that resource stress (the perception that access to a desired resource, such as wealth or political power, is limited) and the salience of a potentially competitive out-group lead to perceived group competition for resources. Several factors may determine the degree of perceived resource stress, with the primary ones including perceived scarcity of resources and individual or group support for an unequal distribution of resources, which is closely related to social dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 1994). Moreover, resource stress is likely to lead to perceived group competition when a relevant out-group is present. Some groups are more likely to be perceived as competitors than are others. Out-groups that are salient and distinct from one’s own group are especially likely to stand out as potential competitors. However, potential competitors must also be similar to the in-group on dimensions that make them likely to take resources. That is, they must be interested in similar resources and in a position to potentially take these resources.

The combination of resource stress and the presence of a potentially competitive out-group leads to perceived group competition. Such perceived group competition is likely to take the form of zero-sum beliefs: beliefs that the more the other group obtains, the less is available for one’s own group. There is a perception that any gains that the other group might make must be at the expense of one’s own group. The model is termed the instrumental model of group conflict because attitudes and behaviors toward the competitor out-group are hypothesized to reflect strategic attempts to remove the source of competition. Efforts to remove the other group from competition may include out-group derogation, discrimination, and avoidance of the other group. One may express negative attitudes and attributions about members of the other group in an attempt to convince both one’s own group and other groups of the competitors’ lack of worth. Attempts to eliminate the competition may also entail discrimination and opposition to policies and programs that may benefit the other group. Limiting the other group’s access to the resources also reduces competition. Consistent with this model, Esses and her colleagues have found that individuals in Canada and the United States perceive greater threat, are more biased against, and are more motivated to exclude immigrant groups that are seen as
involved in a zero-sum competition for resources with nonimmigrants (Esses et al., 1998, 2001; Jackson & Esses, 2000).

Discrimination can serve less tangible collective functions as well as concrete instrumental objectives. Blumer (1958a) acknowledged that the processes for establishing group position may involve goals such as gaining economic advantage, but they may also be associated with the acquisition of intangible resources such as prestige. Taylor (2000), in fact, suggested that symbolic, psychological factors are typically more important in intergroup bias than are tangible resources. Theoretical developments in social psychology, stimulated by social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), further highlight the role of group categorization, independent of actual realistic group conflict, in motivations to achieve favorable group identities (“positive distinctiveness”) and consequently on the arousal of intergroup bias and discrimination.

Collective Identity

Human activity is rooted in interdependence. Group systems involving greater mutual cooperation have substantial survival advantages for individual group members over those systems without reciprocally positive social relations (Trivers, 1971). However, the decision to cooperate with nonrelatives (i.e., to expend resources for another’s benefit) is a dilemma of trust because the ultimate benefit for the provider depends on others’ willingness to reciprocate. Indiscriminate trust and altruism that are not reciprocated are not effective survival strategies.

Social categorization and group boundaries provide a basis for achieving the benefits of cooperative interdependence without the risk of excessive costs. In-group membership is a form of contingent cooperation. By limiting aid to mutually acknowledged in-group members, total costs and risks of nonreciprocation can be contained. Thus, in-groups can be defined as bounded communities of mutual trust and obligation that delimit mutual interdependence and cooperation. The ways in which people understand their group membership thus play a critical role in social harmony and conflict.

Models of category-based processing (Brewer, 1988; see also Fiske et al., 1999) assume that “the mere presentation of a stimulus person activates certain classification processes that occur automatically and without conscious intent. . . . The process is one of ‘placing’ the individual social object along well-established stimulus dimensions such as age, gender, and skin color” (Brewer, 1988, pp. 5–6). We have further hypothesized that “a primitive type of categorization may also have a high probability of spontaneously occurring, perhaps in parallel process. This is the categorization of individuals as members of one’s ingroup or not” (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1993, p. 170). Because of the centrality of the self in social perception (Higgins & Bargh, 1987; Kihlstrom et al., 1988), we propose that social categorization involves most fundamentally a distinction between the group containing the self (the in-group) and other groups (the out-groups) between the “we’s” and the “they’s” (see also Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). This distinction has a profound influence on evaluations, cognitions, and behavior.

Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and, more recently, self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987) address the fundamental process of social categorization. From a social categorization perspective, when people or objects are categorized into groups, actual differences between members of the same category tend to be perceptually minimized (Tajfel, 1969) and often ignored in making decisions or forming impressions. Members of the same category seem to be more similar than they actually are, and more similar than they were before they were categorized together. In addition, although members of a social category may be different in some ways from members of other categories, these differences tend to become exaggerated and overgeneralized. Thus, categorization enhances perceptions of similarities within groups and differences between groups—emphasizing social difference and group distinctiveness. This process is not benign because these within- and between-group distortions have a tendency to generalize to additional dimensions (e.g., character traits) beyond those that differentiated the categories originally (Allport, 1954, 1958). Furthermore, as the salience of the categorization increases, the magnitude of these distortions also increases (Abrams, 1985; Brewer, 1979; Brewer & Miller, 1996; Dechamps & Doise, 1978; Dion, 1974; Doise, 1978; Skinner & Stephenson, 1981; Turner, 1981, 1985).

Moreover, in the process of categorizing people into two different groups, people typically classify themselves into one of the social categories and out of the other. The insertion of the self into the social categorization process increases the emotional significance of group differences and thus leads to further perceptual distortion and to evaluative biases that reflect favorably on the in-group (Sumner, 1906), and consequently on the self (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Tajfel and Turner (1979), in their social identity theory, proposed that a person’s need for positive identity may be satisfied by membership in prestigious social groups. This need also motivates social comparisons that favorably differentiate in-group from out-group members, particularly when self-esteem has been challenged (Hogg & Abrams, 1990). For example, Meindl and Lerner (1984) found that experiencing an esteem-lowering experience (committing an unintentional transgression) motivated people to reject an opportunity for equal status contact between the in-group and an out-group in favor of interaction.
that implied the more positive status of the in-group. Within social identity theory, successful intergroup discrimination is then presumed to restore, enhance, or elevate one’s self-esteem (see Rubin & Hewstone, 1998).

As we noted earlier, the social identity perspective (see also self-categorization theory; Turner et al., 1987) also proposes that a person defines or categorizes the self along a continuum that ranges at one extreme from the self as the embodiment of a social collective or group to the self as a separate individual with personal motives, goals, and achievements. Self-categorization in terms of collective identity, in turn, increases the likelihood of the development of intergroup biases and conflict (Schopler & Insko, 1992). As Sherif et al.’s (1961) initial observations revealed, intergroup relations begin to sour soon after people categorize others in terms of in-group and out-group members: “Discovery of another group of campers brought heightened awareness of ‘us’ and ‘ours’ as contrasted with ‘outsiders’ and ‘intruders,’ [and] an intense desire to compete with the other group in team games” (Sherif et al., 1961, p. 95). Thus, social categorization lays the foundation for intergroup bias and conflict that can lead to, and be further exacerbated by, competition between these groups.

Additional research has demonstrated just how powerfully mere social categorization can influence differential thinking, feeling and behaving toward in-group versus out-group members. Upon social categorization of individuals into in-groups and out-groups, people spontaneously experience more positive affect toward the in-group (Otten & Moskowitz, 2000; Otten & Wentura, 1999). They also favor in-group members directly in terms of evaluations and resource allocations (Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971), as well as indirectly in valuing the products of their work (Ferguson & Kelley, 1964). In addition, in-group membership increases the psychological bond and feelings of “oneness” that facilitate the arousal of promotive tension or empathy in response to others’ needs or problems (Hornstein, 1976). In part as a consequence, prosocial behavior is offered more readily to in-group than to out-group members (Dovidio et al., 1997; Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner, & Clark, 1981). People are also more likely to initiate “heroic” action on behalf of an in-group member than another person, for example by directly confronting a transgressor who insults the person (Meindl & Lerner, 1983). Moreover, people are more likely to be cooperative and exercise more personal restraint when using endangered common resources when these are shared with in-group members than with others (Kramer & Brewer, 1984), and they work harder for groups they identify more as their in-group (Worchel, Rothgerber, Day, Hart, & Butemeyer, 1998).

In terms of information processing, people retain more information in a more detailed fashion for in-group members than for out-group members (Park & Rothbart, 1982), have better memory for information about ways in which in-group members are similar and out-group members are dissimilar to the self (Wilder, 1981), and remember less positive information about out-group members (Howard & Rothbart, 1980). Perhaps because of the greater self-other overlap in representations for people defined as in-group members (E. R. Smith & Henry, 1996), people process information about and make attributions to in-group members more on the basis of self-congruency than they do for out-group members (Gramzow, Gaertner, & Sedikides, 2001).

People are also more generous and forgiving in their explanations for the behaviors of in-group relative to out-group members. Positive behaviors and successful outcomes are more likely to be attributed to internal, stable characteristics (the personality) of in-group than out-group members, whereas negative outcomes are more likely to be ascribed to the personalities of out-group members than of in-group members (Hewstone, 1990; Pettigrew, 1979). Observed behaviors of in-group and out-group members are encoded in memory at different levels of abstraction (Maass, Ceccarelli, & Rudin, 1996). Undesirable actions of out-group members are encoded at more abstract levels that presume intentionality and dispositional origin (e.g., she is hostile) than identical behaviors of in-group members (e.g., she slapped the girl). Desirable actions of out-group members, however, are encoded at more concrete levels (e.g., she walked across the street holding the old man’s hand) relative to the same behaviors of in-group members (e.g., she is helpful).

Language plays another role in intergroup bias through associations with collective pronouns. Collective pronouns such as “we” or “they” that are used to define people’s in-group or out-group status are frequently paired with stimuli having strong affective connotations. As a consequence, these pronouns may acquire powerful evaluative properties of their own. These words (we, they) can potentially increase the availability of positive or negative associations and thereby influence beliefs about, evaluations of, and behaviors toward other people—often automatically and unconsciously (Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990).

The process of social categorization, however, is not completely unalterable. Categories are hierarchically organized, and higher level categories (e.g., nations) are more inclusive of lower level ones (e.g., cities or towns). By modifying a perceiver’s goals, motives, past experiences, and expectations, as well as factors within the perceptual field and the situational context more broadly, there is opportunity to alter the level of
category inclusiveness that will be primary in a given situation. Although perceiving people in terms of a social category is easiest and most common in forming impressions, particularly during bitter intergroup conflict, appropriate goals, motivation, and effort can produce more individuated impressions of others (Brewer, 1988; Fiske et al., 1999). This malleability of the level at which impressions are formed—from broad to more specific categories to individuated responses—is important because of its implications for altering the way people think about members of other groups, and consequently about the nature of intergroup relations.

Although functional and social categorization theories of intergroup conflict and social harmony suggest different psychological mechanisms, these approaches may offer complementary rather than necessarily competing explanations. For instance, realistic threats and symbolic threats reflect different hypothesized causes of discrimination, but they can operate jointly to motivate discriminatory behavior. W. Stephan and his colleagues (Stephan, Diaz-Loving, & Duran, 2000; Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Stephan, Ybarra, Martinez, Schwarzwald, & Tur-Kaspa, 1998) have found that personal negative stereotypes, realistic group threat, and symbolic group threat all predict discrimination against other groups (e.g., immigrants), and each accounts for a unique portion of the effect. In addition, personal-level biases and collective biases may also have separate and additive influences. Bobo and his colleagues (see Bobo, 1999) have demonstrated that group threat and personal prejudice can contribute independently to discrimination against other groups. The independence of these effects points to the importance of considering each of these perspectives for a comprehensive understanding of social conflict and integration, while at the same time reinforcing the theoretical distinctions among the hypothesized underlying mechanisms.

Given the centrality and spontaneity of the social categorization of people into in-group and out-group members, and given the important role of functional relations between groups in a world of limited resources that depend on differentiation between in-group and out-group members, how can bias be reduced? Because categorization is a basic process that is fundamental to prejudice and intergroup conflict, some contemporary work has targeted this process as a place to begin to improve intergroup relations. This work also considers the functional relations among groups. In the next section we explore how the forces of categorization may be disarmed or redirected to promote more positive intergroup attitudes—and potentially begin to penetrate the barriers to reconciliation among groups with a history of antagonistic relations. One of the most influential strategies involves creating and structuring intergroup contact.

INTERGROUP CONTACT AND THE REDUCTION OF BIAS

For the past 50 years the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954; Amir, 1969; Cook, 1985; Watson, 1947; Williams, 1947; see also Pettigrew, 1998a; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000) has represented a promising and popular strategy for reducing intergroup bias and conflict. This hypothesis proposes that simple contact between groups is not automatically sufficient to improve intergroup relations. Rather, for contact between groups to reduce bias successfully, certain prerequisite features must be present. These characteristics of contact include equal status between the groups, cooperative (rather than competitive) intergroup interaction, opportunities for personal acquaintance between the members (especially with those whose personal characteristics do not support stereotypic expectations), and supportive norms by authorities within and outside of the contact situation (Cook, 1985; Pettigrew, 1998a). Research in laboratory and field settings generally supports the efficacy of the list of prerequisite conditions for achieving improved intergroup relations (see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000).

Contact and Functional Relations

Consistent with functional theories of intergroup relations, changing the nature of interdependence between members of different groups from perceived competition to cooperation significantly improves intergroup attitudes (Blanchard, Weigel, & Cook, 1975; Cook, 1985; Deutsch & Collins, 1951; Green, Adams, & Turner, 1988; Stephan, 1987; Weigel, Wiser, & Cook, 1975). Cooperative learning (Slavin, 1985), jigsaw classroom interventions in which students are interdependent on one another in problem-solving exercises (Aronson & Patnoe, 1997), and more comprehensive approaches in schools that involve establishing a cooperative community, resolving conflicts, and internalizing civic values (e.g., Peacekeepers; Johnson & Johnson, 2000) also support the fundamental principles outside of the laboratory. Although it is difficult to establish all of these conditions in intergroup contact situations, the formula is effective when these conditions are met (Cook, 1984; Johnson, Johnson, & Maruyama, 1983; Pettigrew, 1998a).

Structurally, however, the contact hypothesis has represented a list of loosely connected, diverse conditions rather than a unifying conceptual framework that explains how these
prerequisite features achieve their effects. This is problematic because political and socioeconomic circumstances (e.g., real or perceived competitive, zero-sum outcomes) often preclude introducing these features (e.g., cooperative interdependence, equal status) into many contact settings. Despite substantial documentation that intergroup cooperative interaction reduces bias (Allport, 1954; Aronson, Blaney, Stephan, Sikes, & Snapp, 1978; Cook, 1985; Deutsch, 1973; Johnson et al., 1983; Sherif et al., 1961; Slavin, 1985; Worchel, 1979), it is not clear how cooperation achieves this effect. One basic issue involves the psychological processes that mediate this change.

The classic functional relations perspective by Sherif et al. (1961) views cooperative interdependence as a direct mediator of attitudinal and behavioral changes. However, recent approaches have extended research on the contact hypothesis by attempting to understand the potential common processes and mechanisms that these diverse factors engage to reduce bias. Several additional explanations have been proposed (see Brewer & Miller, 1984; Miller & Davidson-Podgorny, 1987; Worchel, 1979, 1986). For example, cooperation may induce greater intergroup acceptance as a result of dissonance reduction serving to justify this type of interaction with the other group (Miller & Brewer, 1986). It is also possible that cooperation can have positive, reinforcing outcomes. When intergroup contact is favorable and has successful consequences, psychological processes that restore cognitive balance or reduce dissonance produce more favorable attitudes toward members of the other group and toward the group as a whole to be consistent with the positive nature of the interaction. In addition, the rewarding properties of achieving success may become associated with members of other groups (Lott & Lott, 1965), thereby increasing attraction (S. Gaertner et al., 1999). Also, cooperative experiences can reduce intergroup anxiety (Stephan & Stephan, 1984).

Intergroup contact can also influence how interactants conceive of the groups and how the members are socially categorized. Cooperative learning and jigsaw classroom interventions (Aronson & Patnoe, 1997), which are designed to increase interdependence between members of different groups and to enhance appreciation for the resources they bring to the task, may reduce bias in part by altering how interactants conceive of the group boundaries and memberships. In the next section we consider how the effects of intergroup contact can be mediated by changes in personal and collective identity.

Contact, Categorization, and Identity

From the social categorization perspective, the issue to be addressed is how intergroup contact can be structured to alter cognitive representations in ways that eliminate one or more of the basic features of the negative intergroup schema. Based on the premises of social identity theory, three alternative models for contact effects have been developed and tested in experimental and field settings: decategorization, recategorization, and mutual differentiation.

Each of these models can be described in terms of recommendations for how to structure cognitive representations of situations in which there is contact between the groups, the psychological processes that promote attitude change, and the mechanisms by which contact experiences are generalized to change attitudes toward the out-group as a whole. Each of these strategies targets the social categorization process as the place to begin to understand and to combat intergroup biases. Decategorization encourages members to deemphasize the original group boundaries and to conceive of themselves as separate individuals rather than as members of different groups. Mutual differentiation maintains the original group boundaries, maintaining perceptions as different groups, but in the context of intergroup cooperation during which similarities and differences between the memberships are recognized and valued. Recategorization encourages the members of both groups to regard themselves as belonging to a common, superordinate group—one group that is inclusive of both memberships.

Rather than viewing these as competing positions and arguing which one is correct, we suggest that these are complementary approaches and propose that it is more productive to consider when each strategy is most effective. To the extent that it is possible for these strategies, either singly or in concert, to alter perceptions of the “Us versus Them” that are reflected in conflictive intergroup relations, reductions in bias and social harmony may be accomplished. Moreover, decategorization and recategorization strategies may increase the willingness of group representatives to view the meaning of the intergroup conflict from the other group’s perspective and to offer solutions that recognize both groups’ needs and concerns.

Decategorization: The Personalization Model

The first model is essentially a formalization and elaboration of the assumptions implicit in Allport’s contact hypothesis (Brewer & Miller, 1984). A primary consequence of salient in-group–out-group categorization is the deindividuation of members of the out-group. Social behavior in category-based interactions is characterized by a tendency to treat individual members of the out-group as undifferentiated representatives of a unified social category, ignoring individual differences within the group. The personalization perspective on the contact situation implies that intergroup interactions should
be structured to reduce the salience of category distinctions and promote opportunities to get to know out-group members as individual persons, thereby disarming the forces of categorization.

The conditional specifications of the contact hypothesis (e.g., cooperative interaction) can be interpreted as features of the situation that reduce category salience and promote more differentiated and personalized representations of the participants in the contact setting. Interdependence typically motivates people to focus more on the individual characteristics of a person, with whom their outcomes are linked, than more general category representations (Fiske, 2000). Attending to personal characteristics of group members not only provides the opportunity to disconfirm category stereotypes, but it also breaks down the monolithic perception of the out-group as a homogeneous unit (Wilder, 1978). In this scheme, the contact situation encourages attention to information at the individual level that replaces category identity as the most useful basis for classifying participants.

With a more differentiated representation of out-group members, there is the recognition that there are different types of out-group members (e.g., sensitive as well as tough professional hockey players), thereby weakening the effects of categorization and the tendency to minimize and ignore differences between category members. When personalized interactions occur, in-group and out-group members slide even further toward the individual side of the self as individual versus group member continuum. Members “attend to information that replaces category identity as the most useful basis for classifying each other” (Brewer & Miller, 1984, p. 288) as they engage in personalized interactions. Repeated personalized contacts with a variety of out-group members should, over time, undermine the value and meaningfulness of the social category stereotype as a source of information about members of that group. This is the process by which contact experiences are expected to generalize—via reducing the salience and meaning of social categorization in the long run (Brewer & Miller, 1996).

A number of studies provide evidence supporting this perspective on contact effects (Bettencourt, Brewer, Croak, & Miller, 1992; Marcus-Newhall, Miller, Holtz, & Brewer, 1993). Miller, Brewer, and Edwards (1985), for instance, demonstrated that a cooperative task that required personalized interaction with members of the out-group resulted not only in more positive attitudes toward out-group members in the cooperative setting but also toward other out-group members shown on a videotape, compared to cooperative contact that was task focused rather than person focused.

During personalization, members focus on information about an out-group member that is relevant to the self (as an individual rather than as a group member). Repeated personalized interactions with a variety of out-group members should over time undermine the value of the category stereotype as a source of information about members of that group. Thus, the effects of personalization should generalize to new situations as well as to heretofore unfamiliar out-group members. For the benefits of personalization to generalize, however, it is of course necessary for the identities of out-group members to be salient—at least somewhat—during the interaction to allow the group stereotype to be weakened.

Further evidence of the value of personalized interactions for reducing intergroup bias comes from data on the effects of intergroup friendships (Hamberger & Hewstone, 1997; Pettigrew, 1997; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). For example, across samples in France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Germany, Europeans with out-group friends were lower on measures of prejudice, particularly affective prejudice (Pettigrew, 1998a). This positive relation did not hold for other types of acquaintance relationships in work or residential settings that did not involve formation of close interpersonal relationships with members of the out-group. In terms of the direction of causality, although having more positive intergroup attitudes can increase the willingness to have cross-group friendships, path analyses indicate that the path from friendship to reduction in prejudice is stronger than the other way around (Pettigrew, 1998a).

Other research reveals three valuable extensions of the personalized contact effect. One is evidence that personal friendships with members of one out-group may lead to tolerance toward out-groups in general and reduced nationalistic pride, a process that Pettigrew (1997) refers to as deprovincialization. Thus, decategorization based on developing cross-group friendships that decrease the relative attractiveness of a person’s in-group provides increased appreciation of the relative attractiveness of other out-groups more generally.

A second extension is represented by evidence that contact effects may operate indirectly or vicariously. Although interpersonal friendship across group lines leads to reduced prejudice, even knowledge that an in-group member has befriended an out-group member has the potential to reduce bias while the salience of group identities remains high for the observer (Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997). A third extension relates to interpersonal processes involving the arousal of empathic feelings for an out-group member, which can increase positive attitudes toward members of that group more widely (Batson et al., 1997). Thus, personalized interaction and interpersonal processes more generally can directly and indirectly increase positive feelings for out-group members through a variety of processes that can lead to more generalized types of harmony and integration at the group level.
Recategorization: The Common In-Group Identity Model

The second social categorization model of intergroup contact and conflict reduction is also based on the premise that reducing the salience of in-group–out-group category distinctions is key to positive effects. In contrast to the decategorization approaches described earlier, however, recategorization is not designed to reduce or eliminate categorization, but rather to structure a definition of group categorization at a higher level of category inclusiveness in ways that reduce intergroup bias and conflict (Allport, 1954, p. 43).

Allport (1954, 1958) was aware of the benefits of a common in-group identity, although he regarded it as a catalyst rather than as a product of the conditions of contact:

To be maximally effective, contact and acquaintance programs should lead to a sense of equality in social status, should occur in ordinary purposeful pursuits, avoid artificiality, and if possible enjoy the sanction of the community in which they occur. While it may help somewhat to place members of different ethnic groups side by side on a job, the gain is greater if these members regard themselves as part of a team [italics added]. (Allport, 1958, p. 489)

In contrast, the common in-group identity model (S. Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993; S. Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) proposes that group identity can be a critical mediating factor. According to this model, intergroup bias and conflict can be reduced by factors that transform participants’ representations of memberships from two groups to one, more inclusive group. With common in-group identity, the cognitive and motivational processes that initially produced in-group favoritism are redirected to benefit the common in-group, including former out-group members.

Allport’s (1954, 1958) description of widening circles of inclusion, hierarchically organized, depicts a person’s various in-group memberships from one’s family to one’s neighborhood, to one’s city, to one’s nation, to one’s race, to all of humankind. Recognizing that racial group identity had become the dominant allegiance among many White racists, Allport questioned the accuracy of the common belief that in-group loyalties always grow weaker the larger their circle of inclusion, which might prevent loyalty to a group more inclusive than race. Rather, Allport proposed the potential value of shifting the level of category inclusiveness from race to humankind. He recognized that the “clash between the idea of race and of One World . . . is shaping into an issue that may well be the most decisive in human history. The important question is, Can a loyalty to mankind be fashioned before interracial warfare breaks out?” (pp. 43–44). But is it too difficult and unrealistic for people to identify with humankind? Allport proposed that this level of common in-group identification is difficult for most people primarily because there are few symbols that make this more ephemeral in-group real or concrete. That is, groups such as nations have symbols that include flags, buildings, and holidays, but at the international level there are few icons that help serve as anchors for unity and world loyalty. Attempts to forge superordinate cooperative alliances, therefore, would more likely engage identification processes if symbols were adopted to affirm the joint venture.

Among the antecedent factors proposed by the common in-group identity model are the features of contact situations that are necessary for intergroup contact to be successful (e.g., interdependence between groups, equal status, egalitarian norms; Allport, 1954). From this perspective, intergroup cooperative interaction, for example, enhances positive evaluations of out-group members, at least in part, because cooperation transforms members’ representations of the memberships from “Us” versus “Them” to a more inclusive “We.” In a laboratory experiment, S. Gaertner, Mann, Dovidio, Murrell, and Pomare (1990) directly tested and found strong support for the hypotheses that the relation between intergroup cooperation and enhanced favorable evaluations of out-group members was mediated by the extent to which members of both groups perceived themselves as one group. In addition, the generalizability of this effect was supported by a series of survey studies conducted in natural settings across very different intergroup contexts: bankers experiencing corporate mergers, students in a multiethnic high school, and college students from blended families (see S. Gaertner, Dovidio, & Bachman, 1996). Moreover, appeals that emphasize the common group membership of nonimmigrants and immigrants have been shown to improve attitudes toward immigrants and to increase support for immigration among people in Canada and the United States, and particularly among those high in social dominance orientation for whom group hierarchy is important (Esses et al., 2001).

These effects of recategorization on behaviors, such as helping and self-disclosure (see Dovidio et al., 1997; Nier et al., 2001), as well as on attitudes, have some extended, practical implications. Recategorization can stimulate interactions among group members in the contact situation that can in turn activate other processes, which subsequently promote more positive intergroup behaviors and attitudes. For example, both self-disclosure and helping typically produce reciprocity. More intimate self-disclosure by one person normally encourages more intimate disclosure by the other (Archer & Berg, 1978; Derlega, Metts, Petronio, & Margulis, 1993). As we discussed earlier, the work of Miller, Brewer, and their colleagues (e.g., Brewer & Miller, 1984; Miller
et al., 1985) has demonstrated that personalized and self-disclosing interaction can be a significant factor in reducing intergroup bias.

Considerable cross-cultural evidence also indicates the powerful influence of the norm of reciprocity on helping (Schroeder, Penner, Dovidio & Piliavin, 1995). According to this norm, people should help those who have helped them, and they should not help those who have denied them help for no legitimate reason (Gouldner, 1960). Thus, the development of a common in-group identity can motivate interpersonal behaviors between members of initially different groups that can initiate reciprocal actions and concessions (see Deutsch, 1993; Osgood, 1962). These reciprocal actions and concessions not only will reduce immediate tensions but also can produce more harmonious intergroup relations beyond the contact situation.

Although finely differentiated impressions of out-group members may not be an automatic consequence of forming a common in-group identity, these more elaborated, differentiated, and personalized impressions can quickly develop because the newly formed positivity bias is likely to encourage more open communication (S. Gaertner et al., 1993). The development of a common in-group identity creates a motivational foundation for constructive intergroup relations that can act as a catalyst for positive reciprocal interpersonal actions. Thus, the recategorization strategy proposed in our model as well as decategorization strategies, such as individuating (Wilder, 1984) and personalizing (Brewer & Miller, 1984) interactions, can potentially operate complementarily and sequentially to improve intergroup relations in lasting and meaningful ways.

Challenges to the Decategorization and Recategorization Models

Although the structural representations of the contact situation advocated by the decategorization (personalization) and recategorization (common in-group identity) models are different, the two approaches share common assumptions about the need to reduce category differentiation and associated processes. Because both models rely on reducing or eliminating the salience of intergroup differentiation, they involve structuring contact in a way that will challenge or threaten existing social identities. However, both cognitive and motivational factors conspire to create resistance to the dissolution of category boundaries or to reestablish category distinctions over time. Although the salience of a common superordinate identity or personalized representations may be enhanced in the short run, then, these may be difficult to maintain across time and social situations.

Brewer’s (1991) *optimal distinctiveness model* of the motives underlying group identification provides one explanation for why category distinctions are difficult to change. The theory postulates that social identity is driven by two opposing social motives: the need for inclusion and the need for differentiation. Human beings strive to belong to groups that transcend their own personal identity, but at the same time they need to feel special and distinct from others. In order to satisfy both of these motives simultaneously, individuals seek inclusion in distinctive social groups where the boundaries between those who are members of the in-group category and those who are excluded can be drawn clearly. On the one hand, highly inclusive superordinate categories do not satisfy distinctiveness needs. Thus, inclusive identities, which may not be readily accepted, may be limited in their capacity to reduce bias (Horney & Hogg, 2000a, 2000b). On the other hand, high degrees of individuation fail to meet needs for belonging and for cognitive simplicity and uncertainty reduction (Hogg & Abrams, 1993). These motives are likely to make either personalization or common in-group identity temporally unstable solutions to intergroup discrimination and prejudice.

Preexisting social-structural relations between groups may also create strong forces of resistance to changes in category boundaries. Even in the absence of overt conflict, asymmetries between social groups in size, power, or status create additional sources of resistance. When one group is substantially smaller than the other in the contact situation, the minority category is especially salient, and minority group members may be particularly reluctant to accept a superordinate category identity that is dominated by the other group. Another major challenge is created by preexisting status differences between groups, where members of both high- and low-status groups may be threatened by contact and assimilation (Mottola, 1996).

The Mutual Differentiation Model

These challenges to processes of decategorization/recategorization led Hewstone and Brown (1986) to recommend an alternative approach to intergroup contact in which cooperative interactions between groups are introduced without degrading the original in-group–out-group categorization. More specifically, this model favors encouraging groups working together to perceive complementarity by recognizing and valuing mutual assets and weaknesses within the context of an interdependent cooperative task or common, superordinate goals. This strategy allows group members to maintain their social identities and positive distinctiveness while avoiding insidious intergroup comparisons. Thus, the
**m**u**tual intergroup differentiation model** does not seek to change the basic category structure of the intergroup contact situation, but to change the intergroup affect from negative to positive interdependence and evaluation.

In order to promote positive intergroup experience, Hewstone and Brown (1986) recommended that the contact situation be structured so that members of the respective groups have distinct but complementary roles to contribute toward common goals. In this way, both groups can maintain positive distinctiveness within a cooperative framework. Evidence in support of this approach comes from the results of an experiment by Brown and Wade (1987) in which work teams composed of students from two different faculties engaged in a cooperative effort to produce a two-page magazine article. When the representatives of the two groups were assigned separate roles in the team task (one group working on figures and layout, the other working on text), the contact experience had a more positive effect on intergroup attitudes than when the two groups were not provided with distinctive roles (see also Deschamps & Brown, 1983; Dovidio, Gaertner, & Validzic, 1998).

Hewstone and Brown (1986) argued that generalization of positive contact experiences is more likely when the contact situation is defined as an intergroup situation rather than as an interpersonal interaction. Generalization in this case is direct rather than requiring additional cognitive links between positive affect toward individuals and toward representations of the group as a whole. This position is supported by evidence, reviewed earlier, that cooperative contact with a member of an out-group leads to more favorable generalized attitudes toward the group as a whole when category membership is made salient during contact (e.g., Brown, Vivian, & Hewstone, 1999; van Oudenhoven, Groenewoud, & Hewstone, 1996).

Although in-group–out-group category salience is usually associated with in-group bias and the negative side of intergroup attitudes, cooperative interdependence is assumed to override the negative intergroup schema, particularly if the two groups have differentiated, complementary roles to play. Because it capitalizes on needs for distinctive social identities, the mutual intergroup differentiation model provides a solution that is highly stable in terms of the cognitive-structural aspects of the intergroup situation. The affective component of the model, however, is likely to be less stable. Salient intergroup boundaries are associated with mutual distrust (Schopler & Insko, 1992), which undermines the potential for cooperative interdependence and mutual liking over any length of time. By reinforcing perceptions of group differences, this differentiation model risks reinforcing negative beliefs about the out-group in the long run; intergroup anxiety (Greenland & Brown, 1999; Islam & Hewstone, 1993) and the potential for fission and conflict along group lines remain high.

In addition, theoretical approaches and interventions are often guided by the perspective of the majority group. Indeed, because the majority group typically possesses the resources, focusing strategies for reducing conflict and enhancing social harmony on the majority group have considerable potential. However, it is not enough, and without considering all of the groups involved, these strategies can be counterproductive. Intergroup relations need to be understood from the perspective of each of the groups involved. We consider the issue of multiple perspectives in the next section.

**HARMONY AND INTEGRATION: MAJORITY AND MINORITY PERSPECTIVES**

The perspectives that majority and minority group members take on particular interactions and on intergroup relations in general may differ in fundamental ways. The attributions and experiences of people in seemingly identical or comparable situations may be affected by ethnic or racial group membership (see Crocker & Quinn, 2001). In the United States, Blacks perceive less social and economic opportunity than do Whites (Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997). Cross-culturally, the generally nonstigmatized ethnic and racial majorities perceive intergroup contact more positively than do minorities (S. Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, & Anastasio, 1996; Islam & Hewstone, 1993). Distinctiveness, associated with numerical minority status or the salience of physical or social characteristics, can exacerbate feelings of stigmatization among members of traditionally disadvantaged groups (e.g., Kanter, 1977; Niemann & Dovidio, 1998).

More generally, group status has profound implications for the experience of individuals, their motivations and aspirations, and their orientations to members of their own group and of other groups. As Ellemers and Barreto (2001) outlined, responses to the status of one’s group depend on whether one is a member of a low- or high-status group, the importance of the group to the individual (i.e., strength of identification), the perceived legitimacy of the status differences, and the prospects for change at the individual or group level (see also Branscombe & Ellemers, 1998). Wright (2001; see also Tajfel & Turner, 1979) further proposed that people in low-status groups will be motivated to pursue collective action on behalf of their group, rather than seek personal mobility, when they identify strongly with the group or when possibilities for individual mobility are limited, when intergroup comparisons produce perceptions of disadvantage and that disadvantage is viewed as illegitimate, and when
people believe that the intergroup hierarchy can change and the in-group has the resources to change it. Although collective action may have long-term benefits in achieving justice and equality, in the short-term the conditions that facilitate collective action may intensify social categorization of members of the in-group and out-groups, temporarily increase conflict, and reduce the likelihood of harmony or integration between groups.

Racial and ethnic identities are unlikely to be readily abandoned because they are frequently fundamental aspects of individuals’ self-concepts and esteem and are often associated with perceptions of collective injustice. Moreover, when such identities are threatened, for example by attempts to produce a single superordinate identity at the expense of one’s racial or ethnic group identity, members of these groups may respond in ways that reassert the value of the group (e.g., with disassociation from the norms and values of the larger society; see Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Steele, 1997) and adversely affect social harmony.

In addition, efforts to incorporate minority groups within the context of a superordinate identity may also produce negative responses from the majority group. Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) argued that because the standards of the superordinate group will primarily reflect those of the majority subgroup, the minority out-group will tend to be viewed as nonnormative and inferior by those standards, which can exacerbate intergroup bias among majority group members and increase group conflict. In contrast, S. Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) have proposed that the simultaneous existence of superordinate and subordinate group representations (i.e., dual- or multiple-identities) may not only improve intergroup relations (see also Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a, 2000b) but also may contribute to the social adjustment, psychological adaptation, and overall well-being of minority group members (LaFromboise, Coleman, & Gerton, 1993). Therefore, identifying the conditions under which a dual identity serves to increase or diffuse intergroup conflict is an issue actively being pursued by contemporary researchers.

There is evidence that intergroup benefits of a strong superordinate identity can be achieved for both majority and minority group members when the strength of the subordinate identity is high, regardless of the strength of subordinate group identities. For example, in a survey study of White adults, H. J. Smith and Tyler (1996, Study 1) measured the strengths of respondents’ superordinate identity as “American” and also the strengths of their subordinate identification as “White.” Respondents with a strong American identity, independent of the degree to which they identified with being White, were more likely to base their support for affirmative action policies that would benefit Blacks and other minorities on relational concerns regarding the fairness of congressional representatives than on concerns about whether these policies would increase or decrease their own well-being. However, for those who had weak identification with being American and primarily identified themselves with being White, their position on affirmative action was determined more strongly by concerns regarding the instrumental value of these policies for themselves. This pattern of findings suggests that a strong superordinate identity (such as being American) allows individuals to support policies that would benefit members of other racial subgroups without giving primary consideration to their own instrumental needs.

Among minorities, even when racial or ethnic identity is strong, perceptions of a superordinate connection enhance interracial trust and acceptance of authority within an organization. Huo, Smith, Tyler, and Lind (1996) surveyed White, Black, Latino, and Asian employees of a public-sector organization. Identification with the organization (superordinate identity) and racial-ethnic identity (subgroup identity) were independently assessed. Regardless of the strength of racial-ethnic identity, respondents who had a strong organizational identity perceived that they were treated fairly within the organization, and consequently they had favorable attitudes toward authority. Huo et al. (1996) concluded that having a strong identification with a superordinate group can redirect people from focusing on their personal outcomes to concerns about “achieving the greater good and maintaining social stability” (pp. 44–45), while also maintaining important racial and ethnic identities.

S. Gaertner et al. (1996) found converging evidence in a survey of students in a multiethnic high school. In particular, they compared students who identified themselves on the survey using a dual identity (e.g., indicating they were Korean and American) with those who used only a single subgroup identity. (e.g., Korean). Supportive of the role of a dual identity, students who described themselves both as Americans and as members of their racial or ethnic group had less bias toward other groups in the school than did those who described themselves only in terms of their subgroup identity. Also, the minority students who identified themselves using a dual identity reported lower levels of intergroup bias in general relative to those who used only their ethnic or racial group identity.

Not only do Whites and racial and ethnic minorities bring different values, identities, and experiences to intergroup contact situations, but also these different perspectives can shape perceptions of and reactions to the nature of the contact. Blumer (1958a) proposed that group status is a fundamental factor in the extent of and type of threat that different groups experience. Recent surveys reveal, for example, that Blacks show higher levels of distrust and greater pessimism about
intergroup relations than do Whites (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998; Hochschild, 1995). Majority group members tend to perceive intergroup interactions as more harmonious and productive than do minority group members (S. Gaertner et al., 1996; Islam & Hewstone, 1993; see also the survey of college students discussed earlier), but they also tend to perceive subordinate and minority groups as encroaching on their rights and prerogatives (Bobo, 1999). In addition, majority and minority group members have different preferences for the ultimate outcomes of intergroup contact. Whereas minority group members often tend to want to retain their cultural identity, majority group members may favor the assimilation of minority groups into one single culture (a traditional melting pot orientation): the dominant culture (e.g., Horenczyk, 1996).

Berry (1984; Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 1992) presented four forms of cultural relations in pluralistic societies that represent the intersection of “yes–no” responses to two relevant questions: (a) Is cultural identity of value, and to be retained? (b) Are positive relations with the larger society of value, and to be sought? These combinations reflect four adaptation strategies for intergroup relations: (a) integration, when cultural identities are retained and positive relations with the larger society are sought; (b) separation, when cultural identities are retained but positive relations with the larger society are not sought; (c) assimilation, when cultural identities are abandoned and positive relations with the larger society are desired; and (d) marginalization, when cultural identities are abandoned and are not replaced by positive identification with the larger society.

Research in the area of immigration suggests that immigrant groups and majority groups have different preferences for these different types of group relations. Van Oudenhoven, Prins, and Buunk (1998) found in the Netherlands that Dutch majority group members preferred an assimilation of minority groups (in which minority group identity was abandoned and replaced by identification with the dominant Dutch culture), whereas Turkish and Moroccan immigrants most strongly endorsed integration (in which they would retain their own cultural identity while also valuing the dominant Dutch culture).

These preferences also apply to the preferences of Whites and minorities about racial and ethnic group relations in the United States. Dovidio, Gaertner, and Kafati (2000) have found that Whites prefer assimilation most, whereas racial and ethnic minorities favor pluralistic integration. Moreover, these preferred types of intergroup relations for majority and minority groups—a one-group representation (assimilation) for Whites and dual representation (pluralistic integration) for racial and ethnic minorities—differentially mediated the consequences of intergroup contact for the different groups. Specifically, for Whites, more positive perceptions of intergroup contact related to stronger superordinate (i.e., common group) representations, which in turn mediated more positive attitudes to their school and other groups at the school. In contrast, for minority students, a dual-identity (integration) representation—but not the one-group representation—predicted more positive attitudes toward their school and to other groups. In general, these effects were stronger for people higher in racial-ethnic identification, both for Whites and minorities.

These findings have practical as well as theoretical implications for reducing intergroup conflict and enhancing social harmony. Although correlational data should be interpreted cautiously, it appears that for both Whites and racial and ethnic minorities, favorable intergroup contact may contribute to their commitment to their institution. However, strategies and interventions designed to enhance satisfaction need to recognize that Whites and minorities may have different ideals and motivations. Because White values and culture have been the traditionally dominant ones in the United States, American Whites may see an assimilation model—in which members of other cultural groups are absorbed into the mainstream—as the most comfortable and effective strategy. For racial and ethnic minorities, this model, which denies the value of their culture and traditions, may be perceived not only as less desirable but also as threatening to their personal and social identity—particularly for people who strongly identify with their group. Thus, efforts to create a single superordinate identity, though well intentioned, may threaten one’s social identity, which in turn can intensify intergroup bias and conflict. As Bourhis, Moise, Perrault, and Sebecal (1997) argued with respect to the nature of immigrant and host community relations, conflict is likely to be minimized and social harmony fostered when these groups have consonant acculturation ideals and objectives.

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter we have examined the fundamental psychological processes related to intergroup relations, group conflict, social harmony, and intergroup integration. Intergroup bias and conflict are complex phenomena having historical, cultural, economic, and psychological roots. In addition, these are dynamic phenomena that can evolve to different forms and manifestations over time. A debate about whether a societal, institutional, intergroup, or individual level of analysis is most appropriate, or a concern about which model of bias or bias reduction accounts for the most variance, not only may thus be futile but may also distract scholars from a more
We propose that understanding how structural, social, and psychological mechanisms jointly shape intergroup relations can have both valuable theoretical and practical implications. Theoretically, individual difference (e.g., social dominance orientation; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), functional (e.g., Sherif & Sherif, 1969), and collective identity (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987) approaches can be viewed as complementary rather than competing explanations for social conflict and harmony (see Figure 20.1). Conceptually, intergroup relations are significantly influenced by structural factors as well as by individual orientations toward intergroup relations (e.g., social dominance orientation; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and toward group membership (e.g., strength of identification) and by the nature of collective identity. Functional relations within and between groups and social identity can influence perceptions of intra- and intergroup support or threat as well as the nature of group representations (see Figure 20.1). For instance, greater dependence on in-group members can strengthen the perceived boundaries, fostering representations as members of different groups and increasing perceptions of threat (L. Gaertner & Insko, 2000). Empirically, self-interest, realistic group threat, and identity threat have been shown independently to affect intergroup relations adversely (Bobo, 1999; Esses et al., 1998; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Perceptions of intergroup threat or support and group representations can also mutually influence one another. Perceptions of competition or threat increase the salience of different group representations and decrease the salience of superordinate group connections, whereas stronger inclusive representations of the groups can decrease perceptions of intergroup competition (S. L. Gaertner et al., 1990).

Similarly, within the social categorization approach, researchers have posited not only that decategorization, recategorization, and mutual intergroup differentiation processes can each play a role in the reduction of bias over time (Pettigrew, 1998a), but also that these processes can facilitate each other reciprocally (S. L. Gaertner et al., 2000; Hewstone, 1996). Within an alternating sequence of categorization processes, mutual differentiation may emerge initially to neutralize threats to original group identities posed by the recategorization and decategorization processes. Once established, mutual differentiation can facilitate the subsequent recognition and acceptance of a salient superordinate identity and recategorization, which would have previously stimulated threats to the distinctiveness of group identities (S. Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000).

Reductions in perceived threat, increased perceptions of intergroup support, and more inclusive representations (either as a superordinate group or as a dual identity), in turn, can activate group- and individual-level processes that can reduce intergroup conflict (see Figure 20.1). These processes may also operate sequentially. For example, once people identify with a common group identity, they may be more trusting of former out-group members and consequently be willing to engage in the type of personalized, self-disclosing interaction that can further promote social harmony (Brewer & Miller, 1984; Dovidio et al., 1997). Thus, factors related to structural and functional relations between groups and those associated with collective representations (e.g., involving mutual intergroup differentiation, recategorization, and decategorization

![Figure 20.1](image-url)  The roles of functional and identity relations in social conflict and integration.
processes) can operate in a complementary and reciprocal fashion.

Pragmatically, understanding the nature of bias and conflict can suggest ways in which these forces can be harnessed and redirected to promote social harmony. Given the different perspectives, needs, and motivations of majority (high status) and minority (low status) groups, interventions based on these principles need to be considered carefully. Nevertheless, understanding the multilevel nature of prejudice and discrimination is an essential step for finding solutions—which may need to be similarly multifaceted. These principles may be applied to reduce social conflict and facilitate the integration of groups as disparate as corporations and stepfamilies (S. Gaertner, Bachman, Dovidio, & Banker, 2001), to improve race relations in the workplace (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Bachman, 2001) and more generally (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998), and to meet the challenge of managing immigration successfully—in ways that facilitate the achievement and well-being of immigrants and that produce the cooperation and support of residents of the receiving country (Esses et al., 2001).

In addition, these approaches may be applied integratively to reduce international tensions and improve national relations (Pettigrew, 1998b). Rouhana and Kelman (1994), for example, described the activities and outcomes of a program of workshops designed to improve Palestinian-Israeli relations and to contribute to peace in the Middle East. These workshops required Palestinian and Israeli participants to search for solutions that satisfy the needs of both parties. Rouhana and Kelman (1994) explained that this enterprise “can contribute to a creative redefinition of the conflict, to joint discovery of win-win solutions, and to transformation of the relationship between the parties” (p. 160). Conceptually, this orientation changes the structural relations between the groups from competition to cooperation, facilitates the development of mutually differentiated national identities within a common workshop identity, and permits the type of personalized interaction that can enhance social harmony. Pettigrew (1998b) proposed that these workshops serve as a setting for direct interaction that provides opportunities for developing coalitions of peace-minded participants across conflict lines. Thus, a strategic and reflective application of basic social-psychological principles can have significant practical benefits in situations of long-standing conflict.

In conclusion, the issues related to social conflict, harmony, and integration are complex indeed. As a consequence, approaches to understanding these processes need to address the issues at different levels of analysis and to consider structural as well as psychological factors. This diversity of perspectives produces a complicated and sometimes apparently inconsistent picture of the nature of intergroup relations. However, rather than viewing these approaches as competing positions, we suggest that they often reflect different perspectives on a very large issue. No single position is definitive, but jointly they present a relatively comprehensive picture of the multifaceted nature of intergroup relations.

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