Large-Scale Forced Migration and the Intensification and Increased Scale of Humanitarian Crises

21.3 m have fled their countries, making them refugees.

40.8 m people remain internally displaced

3.2 m are asylum-seekers

6.7 m refugees were in a protracted situation in 2015.

Key insights

1. By 2030, displaced people will become the fastest growing group with the most acute humanitarian needs.

2. The migration agenda will be increasingly securitized.

3. Humanitarian stakeholders will focus more on strengthening the resilience of host communities.

4. The legal framework for the protection of displaced communities will be outdated and unable to address the vulnerability of particular categories of people on the move.

Main trends

Longer wars and lasting violence are causing increased refugee flows.

The politicisation of refugee issues is likely to increase the duration of their exiles.

By 2030, the protracted nature of conflict and the increasingly severe consequences of climate change will drive flows of refugees to neighboring countries, likely concentrating needs in the countries surrounding conflicted and fragile states and in turn increasing instability in hosting countries.

Refugees are the targets of a complex global economy of people traffickers and smugglers.

Displaced populations are becoming increasingly urban. This trend is likely to continue and accelerate as conditions in camps fail to improve.

Uncertainties

Whether the legal structure created after the Second World War is still relevant with the modern dynamics of displacement will be clear by 2030.

Sources: UNHCR, IOM, UNICEF, UK Aid.

60% Refugees living in cities

80% IDPs living in cities
Terrorism

Key insights

1. Terror attacks will mainly affect the most fragile areas, deepening or prolonging insecurity.

2. The proliferation of counter-terror measures will have a significant impact on humanitarian actors—often risking non-compliance or loss of access.

Main trends

- There has been a dramatic increase in the number and fatality of terror attacks in recent years. This rise is projected to continue.

- Most of the attacks between 1975 and 2015 happened in three areas: Asia, the Middle East, and the African Lake Chad region. This concentration is likely to be sustained.

Uncertainties

- Attacks on aid workers are forcing NGOs to change their operating modalities.

- Terror attacks in industrialised countries have an impact on foreign policy and international aid—some countries have decided to increase their contributions abroad while others have decided to reduce theirs.

Sources: Wagner, Institute for Economics and Peace, IRIS, WEF, UNOCHA, NRC, The Aid Workers Security Database
Technology

By 2020 57% of world population is expected to be equipped with mobile broadband.

81% of developed countries and 15% of less developed countries have access to the internet. 75% of Africa's population is still offline.

2.9 m patent applications in 2015. Year on year these increase by 5-9%

Globalisation and the growth of young populations in developing and middle income countries have contributed to the current technology boom.

Key insights

1. The use of new technologies and their increasing availability will have major "transformative consequences" for the humanitarian sector – telemedicine, impact of social networking

Main trends

- Acceleration of technological change
- Inequalities in access to technology persist.
- There is a high global acceptance of new technologies. Mass adoption has been on the rise since the 1990s.

Uncertainties

- Nanotechnologies are expected to impact numerous sectors, including drug delivery, agriculture (through nanoseeds, for instance), energy, and even textiles, thus changing the way humanitarian assistance is provided and the way humanitarian actors interact with populations in need.

For humanitarian NGOs, the interaction between an ever-increasing range of technologies and natural hazards will pose ever more challenging strategic and operational issues.

Violent Conflict

There was a 20% decrease in interstate and societal violence between 2014 and 1991. Conflicts fell from 50 in 1991 to 40 in 2014.

Out of 53 conflicts in 1991, 48 were civil wars, whereas civil wars represented only 50% of the 20 ongoing wars in 1949. This is mostly due to the promotion of multilateral peace negotiations and the promotion of regional economic and industrial cooperation.

Key insights

1. The entrenched nature of conflict means humanitarian responses will need to be strategic in the long-term to reduce community vulnerability. Protracted conflict will need longer-term solutions.

Main trends

Though not at the 1990s peak, the number of civil wars is increasing. After a precipitous decline in the 1990s, there has been an inconsistent increase in the number of civil wars. There are currently six ongoing civil wars, in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Sudan. Civil wars are likely to remain the main type of conflict.

Conflicts are mostly protracted crises – have the possibility of permanently damaging country’s infrastructure.

Conflicts are increasingly concentrated in the world’s poorest regions.

Interstate conflicts, though rare, are still deemed likely and impactful.

Uncertainties

The risk of rising interstate tensions around issues such as the South China Sea could hold the potential for interstate conflict.

Sources: Centre for Systemic Peace, PRIO, Council on Foreign Relations, Coburn, Walter.
The Resurgence of Sovereignty and the Political Centrality of Crises

Among the 38 most environmentally vulnerable countries in 2015, 18 have a national disaster-management authority, including India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.

"While some crises attract considerable attention and thereafter large amounts of international humanitarian assistance, others remain persistently underfunded and 'forgotten.' Despite the level of vulnerability and humanitarian need, these crises are routinely missing from international media headlines and repeatedly absent from the list of countries receiving the most humanitarian assistance."

Key insights

1. Governments of humanitarian-crisis-affected states will be more inclined to resist external intervention and will prefer more localized approaches. A reluctance will manifest to allow INGOs to operate independently in-country, strengthening national NGOs.

2. Humanitarian crises will become increasingly political - impact of interconnectedness, media attention, government pressures.

Main trends

- The national capacity for and willingness of developing countries to respond to humanitarian crises is increasing.
- Humanitarian assistance is going to continue being used as a geopolitical instrument.
- Complex emergencies and humanitarian crises are gaining political centrality.
- Rising impediments against NGO and particularly INGO interventions is being witnessed, and a resurgence of state sovereignty is making NGO interventions more difficult.

Uncertainties

- There are deepening disparities between countries' points of view on humanitarian assistance in international institutions.
- How important is the safe and unhindered access of humanitarian aid to governments?

Sources: Development Initiatives, INFORM, Dany Harvey.
Political Instability

2 billion people live in countries affected by fragility, conflict, or violence. By 2030, this figure will rise to 46% of all people. A per capita purchasing power of $15,000 is considered a threshold for democratisation.

By 2030 global demand for food, water and energy will be up 30%, 40% and 50% respectively. Water is likely to be a source of tension and active conflict in the next 15 years.

Key insights

1. Political instability will be endemic in chronically fragile states.
2. The impact of demographic growth and climate change will compound political tensions resulting in a concentration in areas where multiple vulnerabilities intersect.
3. High-income countries could experience strong political tensions leading to humanitarian issues.

Key trends

- Political instability will result from social and demographic changes such as:
  - Growing youth populations
  - Political transitions following the death of a long standing authoritarian leader
  - Over-reliance on the energy sector
  - Growing middle classes demanding democratic transformation.

- Crises will become increasing regional or global in scope. Simultaneously supra-national structures will weaken as countries become increasingly protectionist.

- Natural resource conflicts will increase and intensify due to climate change.

- The West will face threats from the terrorism, ethno-nationalism, and Russian intervention.

Conflict, terrorism and regime instability will continue to destabilise the Middle East. East Africa will be faced with political violence and resource nationalism. Both of these regions will increase political risk globally.

Sources: World Bank, UNHCR, World Economic Forum, National Intelligence Council.
The Rise of Faith-Based NGOs and Local NGOs

Key insights

- Southern-based NGOs will be recognized as system leaders
- Increased importance will be placed on the role of faith-based organizations
- Humanitarian actors will become increasingly differentiated as local and faith-based NGOs dominate direct implementation of humanitarian programming.

Main trends

- The social, economic, and legal arguments in favor of using local organizations instead of INGOs as the primary implementers of humanitarian programming will continue to undercut the position of INGOs.
- Local and Faith-based NGOs have a large and stable funding base.

Uncertainties

- Will capacity building for local NGOs and the use of local partners become a condition of operating for INGOs, or will this trend be challenged by issues of transparency and efficacy?
- It remains unclear the how the increase in religiously motivated conflict will impact faith-based NGOs.

Common characteristics:

- Distinct from Western, secular INGOs and the traditional humanitarian model
- Access to different funding channels
- Easier access (physically and culturally) to beneficiaries
- Have different relationships with governments and local bodies than secular INGOs

Sources: GHA report, UN, INTRAC, ALNAP, OCHA, Pew Research Centre.
The Militarization of Aid

The militarization of aid refers to the use of humanitarian assistance to support military strategic goals and can take one of the following forms:

- Military actors directly delivering aid.
- Military actors collaborating with civil society to deliver aid (also known as Civ-Mil operations).
- Military actors providing protection to humanitarian actors delivering aid.

Key insights

1. Militaries will continue to be involved in humanitarian aid raising ethical and security dilemmas for traditional humanitarian actors.

2. Military involvement in humanitarian work will continue to raise ethical dilemmas and security concerns for the traditional humanitarian community. The perception of the neutrality of all agencies is likely to deteriorate, which could have a deleterious effect on aid worker security.

Main trends

- Militaries are becoming increasingly involved in humanitarian operations, especially in the context of natural disasters and disease outbreaks.
- The involvement of new actors such as Private Military Companies (PMCs) will continue raising ethical and legal questions.
- The blurring of lines between military and humanitarian actors has resulted in a perceived erosion of neutrality and a loss of access for NGOs, widespread abuses of the laws of war, and reduced protection of civilians in conflict settings.

Uncertainties

- Is militarization to blame for greater aid worker insecurity?

Sources: Maria Corsini, Andrej Zwitter, Vincent Bernard, Pierre Krahenbuhl.
Urbanization and its Stakes

In 2014, there were 488 cities with more than 1 million inhabitants and 28 megacities with more than 10 million inhabitants.

In 2030, there will be 600 cities with more than 1 million inhabitants and 40 megacities with more than 10 million inhabitants.

Key insights

1. Some megacities in proximity to protracted crises will become critical regional hubs — economically, politically, and logistically — for humanitarian actors.

2. The proliferation of shanty towns will become a major concern for humanitarian stakeholders.

Key trends

- The world is becoming more urban. Rural populations totals will remain relatively consistent, but urban populations will grow dramatically, particularly in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.

- Rapid urbanization will lead to a rise in slums. By 2025, 1.8 billion individuals should live in shanty towns accounting for approximately one in five people globally and one in three city dwellers.

- The largest cities will be the most economically active and technologically developed.

- Some cities will experience a decline in population especially in Asia and Europe.

- Coastal populations grow faster than inland areas. Coastal cities are extremely sensitive to economic, demographic, and climate changes. Hundreds of millions of people will be affected by coastal issues, especially in Asia.

Uncertainties

- The degree to which megacities take on state-like qualities is uncertain. If given autonomy megacities could lead the way in developing sustainable governance for cities worldwide.

Sources: UN, Julin Damon, James Mani, UNEP.
Food and Agriculture

By 2030, global food demand is expected to rise by 35%.

Global food demand should grow at a rate of 1.1% per year between 2006 and 2050.

The average per person consumption of animal products is expected to grow by 44% by 2030.

The total number of hungry people will decline from 687 million in 2015 to 543 million in 2030.

Key insights

1. There will be growth in global food production levels, but this will not necessarily translate to greater access to food.

Main trends

- Increases in global food production will mostly come from closing the yield gap in underperforming regions such as sub-Saharan Africa.
- The global dietary convergence will continue and the world’s population will consume less cereals and more meat, dairy, and sugar.
- Agricultural commodity price shocks will lead to instances of hunger and social unrest.
- Hunger will decrease globally but Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia will face the highest levels of undernourishment.

Uncertainties

- There is some debate about the reliability of yield growth projections.

Sources: FAO, UNSDA, Celine Laisney, IPCC, Anna Ratcliffe, Farming First.
Poverty Around the World

Key insights

1. By 2030, poverty will remain mainly concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia

Main trends

- Global poverty will continue to decline, however even with solid economic growth, about 5.4% of the global population will remain poor.
- Poverty will be concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Stable countries will see their poverty rates fall rapidly.
- Fragile states, particularly in Africa, will have the highest concentration of poverty.
- A rise in inequality and poverty in developed nations is expected. In the EU an additional 15-25 million people could be living in poverty by 2025.

Uncertainties

- The utility of a universal poverty line has been widely debated. The variety of tools, data, currencies, and models used inject a degree of uncertainty into projections.
- The lack of a definition of the 'middle class' makes it hard to predict how this group is likely to evolve in the decades to come. Projections for the size of the middle class in 2030 range from 1.15 billion to 4.9 billion people.

Sustainable Development

Goal #1: to 'end extreme poverty in all its forms everywhere by 2030' is unlikely to be achieved unless economic growth rates increase dramatically, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Sources: Bluhm, World Bank, Oxfam, OECD, Brookings.
Demography

Globally, life expectancy is projected to rise from 70 years to 77 years in 2050. Africans are projected to live 19 years longer in 2100.

7.3 billion Global population in 2015
8.5 billion Projected global population in 2030

2015 global age distribution:
- Under-15s: 26%
- 15-64: 65.8%
- 65+: 8.2%

Key insights
1. Least developed countries will continue to experience rapid population growth, which will exacerbate humanitarian situations.

Main trends
- Global population will continue to grow though the rate of growth will begin to decline.
- The 65+ age group will be the fastest growing demography in all major regions of the world. By 2050 in all regions except Africa, 1 out of 4 people will be aged 60 or over.
- Developing countries particularly in the Sub-Saharan region, will drive population growth.

Uncertainties
- Projections of increasing life expectancies have been criticized for being based on a Western development model that might not take into account the development challenges faced in other parts of the world.
- Regional disparities in fertility rates will remain until 2100, and the high rates in sub-Saharan Africa will drive global population growth for the coming century.

Sources: UN, Parant.
The Role of Private Companies and Foundations

Between 2006 and 2010 the Central Emergency Response Fund saw private sector donors rise from 2 to 22.

In 2015 private contributions amounted to US $6.2 billion, 22% of all donations.

In 2015, government donors increased their humanitarian assistance contributions by around 11%, and private donors increased theirs by 13% from the previous year.

Key insights

1. Delivering assistance to affected populations has become a multi-sectoral affair which involves NGOs, governments, small local businesses, and large multinational corporations before, during and after a crisis.

2. Private sector actors will take over more elements of the humanitarian value chain, becoming implementers in their own right, fully separate from (and in competition to) NGOs.

3. A humanitarian marketplace is created in which beneficiaries can choose their services — driving competition between private sector actors and NGOs.

Key trends

- Mutually beneficial partnerships between the private sector and humanitarian delivery organisations are likely to continue increasing, with private sector partners moving beyond funding to providing technical expertise and the supporting the active delivery of aid.

- Private companies will invest heavily in Disaster Risk Reduction efforts in support of humanitarian ends and to safeguard their economic interests.

- Local businesses in the Global South are playing a leading role in aid delivery.

Uncertainties

- While concerns about the dangers of the “privatization of aid” will persist, the increasing role of private actors in the space could change the narrative.

- The level of accountability and transparency required in aid delivery will challenge the operating principles of private actors.

Sources: Development Initiatives, GHA, OCHA, Heba Aly for IRIN news, Steven Zyck for ATHA, Joanne Burke & Randolph Kent,
Donors of Tomorrow

International humanitarian assistance for 2015 was the third yearly increase in a row (from US$18 billion in 2012 to US$28 billion).

97% of government funding comes from 20 states, primarily in the West, though the Middle East has seen a five-fold increase in funding over the past five years.

The bulk of funding for global humanitarian action has been provided by the governments of Western countries, who accounted for 88% ($19.2 billion) of reported international humanitarian assistance in 2015.

Key insights

1. The future of the humanitarian funding landscape will reflect the multi-polarity of the world, with non-traditional donors looking for their own space and voice in the humanitarian sector.

2. Non-traditional private donors will play an increasingly important role in humanitarian funding due to the creation of user-friendly donation technologies.

3. In a crowded sector ‘coopetition’ will force humanitarian actors to raise funds in new, non-traditional, creative ways.

Main trends

Funding requirements will increase, driven mainly by increasing displacements, violent conflicts, and natural hazard crisis.

The financial contribution of donors will remain far below the what is needed to respond.

New donors are mostly from the Middle East and North Africa, contributing $2.4b in 2015. Funding from new donors is likely to continue increasing through 2030.

Private donors, of which individuals make up the large majority (60%), will continue to contribute at a similar rate.

By 2025, non-DAC contributions could reach $50 billion with China and India as the greatest contributors and East Asia as the biggest recipient.

Sources: GHA, Development Initiatives, OCHA, The Asia Foundation, ICRC ICVA.
Acceleration Of Alliances: A Networked Way Of Working

By 2030, stakeholders in the aid sector will increasingly create alliances, integrating their structures for mutual benefit, building on shared interests and objectives.

Key insights

1. NGOs will have to be part of more diverse alliances to continue to be relevant and access resources.
2. Alliances will be between organizations with similar objectives though they are still likely to face the challenge of cultural tensions.
3. The types of partnerships and alliances will diversify; the importance of hybrid profit/non-profit systems will grow.

Main trends

1. The influence of non-Western organizations and donors will grow leading to more Western/non-Western alliances.
2. Partnerships between local NGOs and INGOs will go from transactional relationships to alliances.
3. Public/private partnerships will become increasingly strategic and innovative, but will increase competition.

Uncertainties

1. There is potential for cultural and normative clashes between Western and non-Western NGOs.
2. Alliances have thus far replicated existing power structures. Whether power could be more equally distributed between Northern and Southern NGOs by 2030 remains to be seen.

Sources: ODI, GHA 2016, HPN, ALNAP.
Decentralization of INGOs: Toward Federation

Key insights

1. International NGOs become more decentralized, transfer administrative responsibility and authority from the central headquarters closer to areas of operations.

2. The humanitarian sector will be "de-westernized" in a shift away from the historical western model.

Main trends

- Country and regional programming and advocacy will no longer be directed from Europe and North America.
- The Western cultural dominance of the civil society will wane as NGOs decentralize and transfer more power to decision makers in less developed countries.

Uncertainties

- It is not clear whether decentralization will just mean a shift in activities or a true shift in power to southern actors.

Sources: Wamai, Fowler, Micheletti, Moorhead & Clarke, Tim Smedley for the Guardian.
Humanitarian Workers

Within the humanitarian sector, there are an estimated 249,000 NGO personnel:

- **International**
- **National**

Key insights

1. The number of humanitarian workers is likely to continue increasing in the outlook.

2. Inequalities in the humanitarian workforce will persist.

Main trends

- The humanitarian sector has gone through an extensive phase of professionalisation, which will continue to shape its evolution through to 2030.

- Staff will remain two-tiered, between national and international, women and men, Western and non-Western.

Uncertainties

- Is professionalisation on the rise or on the decline?

- It remains to be seen whether unpaid work in the sector will continue rising or will face enough criticism to halt the practice.

Sources: OCHA, Stoddard, CHS, RelifeWeb.
New Waves of Nationalism

Global economic weakness, migration and a rise in inequality appear to be causing a disturbing growth in ethnic nationalism.

In ethnic nationalism, group membership is limited only to individuals who share the same ethnic, religious, linguistic, or similar cultural category.

Key insights

1. Nationalist parties and policies will be part of mainstream politics.
2. Nationalism will challenge the international order.

Main trends

Nationalism will gain in strength, fueled by economic stagnation, inequality, and demographic diversification.

Nations will seek to reassert their sovereignty by withdrawing from international organizations and treaties.

Nations will become more restrictive about international aid within their borders.

The growth of nationalism will spur separatist movements and ethnic conflict in developing as well as developed nations.

In the West a culture of intolerance will grow and could lead to ethnic cleansing, which in turn could pressure minorities to seek refuge abroad.

Uncertainties

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an ongoing debate about whether the world was moving towards greater globalism or factionalism. While the globalist view was dominant for the past three decades, many now question if the world is moving in the other direction. Is this growth in nationalism a temporary reaction to these crises or part of a longer trend?

Climate Change

2016 was the hottest year on record and a new high for the third year in a row. 16 of the 17 hottest years on record have been this century.

0.2°C Global surface temperatures are expected to keep rising at 0.2°C per decade.

By 2100, global temperatures are expected to increase by 0.3-4.8°C.

1 in 3 people lives in a water stressed country. By 2025, this figure will have risen from 1.8 billion to 5 billion.

50+ countries are acutely vulnerable to the impacts of climate change today.

Areas that are colder today will be more favourably affected than will warmer climates. In warmer areas there may be shortages of food and water, higher mortality rates, a greater susceptibility to natural disasters, and a higher likelihood for conflicts over resources to erupt.

Development will need to be climate-smart and sustainable to mitigate the effects of global warming.

Key insights

1. Climate change will become a new issue for human rights and justice.

2. Climate change will prevent people from escaping poverty and will push more than 100 million people into extreme poverty.

Main trends

By 2030, climate change will increase the occurrence of droughts and floods (resulting in reduced yields), destabilise ecosystems, accelerate species extinction and exacerbate water access tensions.

Low-lying coastal areas will be particularly vulnerable, especially in Asia.

By 2030, the number of lives threatened by desertification will double to reach 10 million. 40% of the world could face a water deficit in 2030.

Environmental migration is expected to rise. South to South migrations are likely to stay stable, whereas South to North migrations are likely to continue increasing.

Uncertainties

Though its occurrence is still relatively hard to predict, the effects of El Niño are well known, and they seem to be getting more extreme.

Sources: Damian Carrington for the Guardian, BBC News, WHO, IPCC, NOAA, UNEP, Oliver Milman for the Guardian, Per Krusell, DARA, IOM, UN.
Disasters Incurred by Natural Hazards

Since 2005, an average of 335 disasters have been reported each year. This is an increase of 14% over the 1995-2004 period and a doubling of the 1980-1989 statistics.

Low income countries are the most economically impacted with an average loss of 5% GDP per year.

Between 1994 and 2013, natural disasters claimed an average of 30,000 lives per year.

95% of all people displaced due to natural disasters live in developing countries.

Key insights

1. There will be a consistent increase in the impact of natural disasters and an exacerbation of the humanitarian consequences.

Main trends

- Increasing occurrence of natural disasters, particularly floods, storms, and drought.
- Inequalities are growing between countries facing natural disasters, especially floods and storms.
- Increase of the brittleness (less resilience, less variety) of human ecosystems, which increases the impact of natural disasters.
- Anticipatory planning and adaptive measures will continue to reduce the human impact of these disasters.
- Natural disasters will displace millions of people, particularly from storms and flooding in Asia. The number of people likely to be displaced could reach 22 million in China and 7 million per year in India.

Sources: CRED, IMDC
Epidemics are rapid increases in the incidence of disease.

Infectious diseases are responsible for 14 million deaths each year around the world. 90% of these deaths occur in less developed countries.

Key insights

1. Existant diseases will be compounded by new infections and diseases.

Main trends

- The likelihood of zoonotic diseases will increase in the next 15 to 30 years to come.
- Developing countries in the tropics will continue to be the most impacted by infectious diseases.
- By 2050, antimicrobial resistance will be the first cause of death responsible for 10 million deaths each year against 700,000 currently.
- Crops and livestock also face the threat of pandemics. The lack of biodiversity in production increases the risk of disease to the global food supply.

Uncertainties

- Climate change will disrupt ecosystems, the distribution of species and their interactions and so will facilitate the emergence and spread of infectious diseases.
- Antimicrobial research and development is underfunded, and a severe outbreak has the potential to set health systems back to the pre-antibiotic era.

Sources: WHO, ECDC, CDC.
Principled Humanitarian Action And Advocacy

Humanitarian principles helped shape international humanitarian law and were devised to guide the work of humanitarian actors. These principles are:

- **Humanity**
- **Neutrality**
- **Impartiality**
- **Independence**

**Key insights**

1. The applicability of Dunanist humanitarian principles are challenged by non-Western cultures, private sector actors, and militaries -- all of which are increasingly involved in aid delivery.

2. Country and regional programming and advocacy will no longer be directed from Europe/North America; there will be a decentralization of INGOs toward more federated structures organized through alliances.

3. Private sector actors and the militarization of humanitarian action will challenge the application of humanitarian principles.

**Main trends**

- The Dunantist principles of humanitarian action will no longer be universal as Solidaristic, Wilsonian, Confucian, and other approaches become more present in the sector.

- While relief organisations may be able to abide by Dunantist principles, organisations involved in long-term development may not.

- The increasing role of private actors will undermine classical humanitarian principles to make way for arguments of efficiency, scale and reach.

- Advocacy will be a prerogative of NGOs.

**Controversies**

As most humanitarian organizations today are not able to operate entirely under Dunantist principles of impartiality, independence, neutrality and humanity, it is worth asking whether there is a need to debate humanitarian principles at all.

Sources: GSDRC, Abby Stöddard, Hugo Slim, Stuart Gordon & Antonio Donini, ODI, Parker.
Recent evolutions in the international legal frame are making the operating environment increasingly challenging for the humanitarian sector.

Key insights

1. Increasing divergence in the behavior of states will undermine the customary nature of many international norms.

2. Private and informal international actors will develop new forms of rule making.

Main trends

International Humanitarian law is and continue to be increasingly violated.

International legal structures (laws of war, protection of civilians, rights of displaced communities) will struggle to evolve quickly enough to have continued relevance and applicability.

Global standards and guidelines issued from private networks and non-state actors is increasing while the development of public international law is stagnating.

States behavior regarding international norms is becoming more divergent. This is particularly marked in the dispute management system and in relations with International justice.

Controversies

While the number of people at risk of displacement is increasing, there are many people in involuntary large-scale migrations who are not offered protection under the existing international legal frame (including climate refugees) - their status will be a potential area of evolution in international law.