CARIBBEANIZATION OF BLACK POLITICS
SHARON D. WRIGHT AUSTIN, GUEST EDITOR

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Invitation to the Scholarly Community
Editor’s Note

Through sheer courage and incredible grit this wonderful new volume of the National Political Science Review has been produced. Comprising vitally important research on the intersection of forms of racial blackness, political coalitions, ethnic and pan-ethnic interest politics, solidarity politics, and group consciousness, on the one hand, and regional, organizational, and youth politics framings of new research on political economy and economic justice, on the other, the scholars herein offer contributions to the most critical questions of the day. This scholarship has much to say about the black freedom struggle and about the Trump Administration’s politics of racial-state making through the bodies of racialized immigrants, particularly Afro-Latinos/Latinos, Asians, Black Ethnics, Afro-Caribbeans, and minoritized religious groups. Empirical data about political affiliations and interests can go a very long way in terms of advancing the struggle of people in this country to lay bare the short and long term effects of this particularly dangerous contemporary political realignment in the presidency. While communities that were vulnerable before face forms of state and vigilante violence and extremism that had been on the decline over the past two generations, the opportunities for mass movements and coordinated electoral campaigns have opened up significantly. Our book reviews offer a range of cutting edge new scholarship in the field on the historiography and political theory of emancipation, antiracist feminist activism in the United Nations, the politics of racial integration in military towns, the study of race as international affairs, revolutionary political movements, African Diaspora approaches to sound and literature, and the ongoing struggle for educational justice and rights to equal employment.

Tiffany Willoughby-Herard
University of California, Irvine
Guest Editor’s Note

This special issue of the National Political Science Review examines the political assimilation, behavior, candidacies, coalitions, development, identification, and ideologies of African American and Caribbean immigrants and citizens. It includes articles that discuss the political alliances that black ethnics, also referred to as Afro Caribbeans, have formed with African Americans and other citizens, the racial consciousness. These articles also explore the concept of group consciousness, the racial identity of Afro Latinos, black immigrant incorporation, black ethnic partisanship, and black ethnic political mobilization, and black ethnic/African American voting participation. In addition, the research in this special issue will add to the growing body of literature that enhances our understanding of African American, Afro-Latino, and black Caribbean political and social relations.

Moreover, this issue includes three scholarly articles that examine issues concerning political economy and socioeconomic mobility. One examines the perspectives of African American college students. Another provides an extensive qualitative and quantitative analysis of African American perceptions of socioeconomic mobility. The third article in the trends section examines the contribution of the Universal Negro Improvement Association African Communities League’s (U.N.I.A-A.C.L) contribution to the field of business ethics. Finally, we include reviews of nine scholarly books.

Sharon D. Wright Austin  
The University of Florida
The Group Consciousness of
African Americans, Black Ethnics, and Afro Latinos

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Abstract
A body of political science literature discovers that African Americans often vote at higher rates than whites and other racial and ethnic group members because of their group solidarity. Their desires to benefit themselves as individuals, and as members of the larger African American group, influences their political behavior. In more recent years, scholars have questioned whether the presence or absence of group consciousness influences Caribbean-born blacks, and Afro Latinos in the same way that it influences native-born African Americans. This chapter summarizes the group consciousness literature that examines the political experiences and solidarity among native-born blacks, Caribbean-born blacks and Afro-Latinos.

Keywords: group consciousness, black political participation, Afro Caribbean politics, Afro Latino politics, minority political incorporation

Introduction

The term “Caribbeanization” refers to the increasing impact of Caribbean immigrants and citizens on the political scene of urban cities. After a 1965 federal immigration law removed several restrictions on immigration, an increasing number of immigrants of color moved to American cities. Because the Caribbean population has grown substantially since then, a black Caribbean constituency is impacting the political and economic status of several cities.

African Americans interpret this political growth with both support and suspicion. In some cities, tensions arise between African American and Caribbean citizens as the latter group develops an electoral constituency that is separate and apart from African Americans. In this research, I use the term “black ethnic” to refer to people of African descent who also have a Caribbean lineage and the term “Afro Latino” to refer to individuals with both African and Latin heritages. Other analyses have referred to black ethnics as Afro Caribbeans. I also use the term black ethnics because the word “ethnic” has been frequently used to describe the identity of immigrant populations. It remains unclear whether black immigrants should be called “black” because of their skin color or “ethnic” because of their cultural background (Cornell and Hartman 2007, 23; Glick, Schiller and Fouron 1990, 330). Therefore, I use the term black ethnics to denote that they are members of both racial and ethnic groups.

In this article, I provide a summary of the group consciousness literature that has examined the absence or existence of a consciousness among native-born blacks, Caribbean-born blacks, and Afro-Latinos. These studies are important because of the linkage between group consciousness and coalitions. In order to develop coalitions with other groups and therefore enhance their political power, racial and ethnic groups must have solidarity with the other members of their group. In addition, group consciousness has been cited as a major contributor to minority political participation.

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The Concept of Group Consciousness

Over the years, academic literature has tried to ascertain the factors that stimulate higher African American participatory rates and attributes group consciousness as a major contributor. After the overt barriers to African American suffrage were removed with the ratification of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, scholars inquired about the factors that propelled black participation. The group consciousness framework surfaced after it was found that African Americans frequently vote at higher rates than whites when socio-economic variables are controlled for because of their strong feelings of group consciousness (Shingles 1981, 76-91; Verba and Nie 1972, 158-161). The group consciousness concept, also referred to as the ethnic community model, argues that African Americans who have strong beliefs in racial solidarity are more likely to participate in politics. Their memberships in disadvantaged minority communities result in them having strong feelings of group attachment and group consciousness (Olsen 1970, 682-696). This group consciousness, belief in racial solidarity, and acknowledgment of their racial group as a disadvantaged one encourages them to use politics as a means to uplift themselves (Guterbock and London 1983, 440).

Racial group consciousness has been defined in several different ways, but usually consists of one or more of the following four components: group identification (the individual identifies as a member of a racial minority group), polar affect (prefers interactions with the members of his/her racial group), polar power (compares the group’s status and resources to that of other racial groups), and systemic blame (primarily blames a discriminatory system for his/her racial group’s position) (Miller et al 1981, 500). Black individuals with stronger group consciousness levels usually: (1) identify a racial identity as “black”; (2) acknowledge that their racial/ethnic group is disadvantaged; and (3) support coalitions among people of African descent (Austin 2017, 37).

Consistently, this consciousness influences African Americans to engage in political activities that are beneficial to the group as a whole and to them as individuals. African Americans with lower levels of racial group consciousness have participated in political activities to a lesser extent than those with higher levels (Olsen 1970, 682-696; Shingles 1981, 86; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978). Also, African Americans with significant group consciousness levels (regardless of their socio-economic status) utilize the political process as a way to address discrimination and at times have higher participatory rates than whites (Dawson 1992; Henry and Munoz 1991, 325; Miller et al. 1981, 500).

In Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality, Sidney Verba and Norman Nie (1972) were among the first scholars to examine the group consciousness concept. They find that individuals with higher socioeconomic statuses engage in political activities at far higher rates than those with lower socioeconomic status. They referred individuals with a lower socioeconomic status as having “lower levels of education, lower status occupations, and inadequate income” (Verba and Nie 1972, 150). They reasoned that these citizens must participate in politics at a higher than expected rate considering their education, income, and occupation status” (Verba and Nie 1972, 150).

Whereas socioeconomic status is the major contributor to white political participation, group consciousness can stimulate high rates of black participation. In particular, it can serve as a “mobilization impetus for black political activities” (Verba and Nie 1972, 150). They attribute black group consciousness to their awareness of their disadvantaged status as a group. Verba and Nie conclude, “If blacks participate more than one would expect of a group with a similar
socioeconomic status (SES), the explanation may lie in the fact that they have, over time, developed an awareness of their own status as a deprived group, and this self-consciousness has led them to be more politically active than members of the society who have similar socioeconomic levels but do not share the group identity” (Verba and Nie 1972, 157).

In addition, African Americans engage in political participation as a way to address the racial inequities in American society (Verba and Nie 1972, 150). When asked about various political issues, African Americans who mentioned “race” more frequently when asked about “the problems the faced in personal life, in the community, and in the nation” were also found to have higher participatory rates than those who failed to mention race (Verba and Nie 1972, 158). Verba and Nie find, “The consciousness of race as a problem or a basis of conflict appears to bring those blacks who are conscious up to a level of participation equivalent to that of whites” (Verba and Nie 1972, 158).

According to the authors, group consciousness has a direct linkage with campaign and cooperative activities. While campaign activities are those that are geared toward the elections of candidates, cooperative activities are designed to address specific problems through “citizen mobilization” (Verba and Nie 1972, 48). Blacks who exhibit higher levels of race consciousness are more likely to participate in campaign activities or cooperative activities than whites. Those who mention race when answering survey questions vote at rates that are equal to whites (Verba and Nie 1972, 163). However, even when controlling for social class, African Americans are less likely to contact a government official than are whites (Verba and Nie 1972, 163). More recent research discovers that group consciousness has less of an influenced on black participation than in the past (Smith 2013, 199-220).

In “Black Consciousness and Political Participation: The Missing Link,” Richard D. Shingles sought to ascertain the reasons why group consciousness has such a significantly positive impact on African American participation. His critique of the Verba and Nie study asked three questions. First, why do African Americans have higher participatory rates in some activities, but not others? Second, why does group consciousness impact black participation, but not that of poor whites? Third, what motivates poor whites to become politically active (Shingles 1981, 78)? Shingles finds that African Americans are cynical about the ability or willingness of government to respond to them, but nevertheless are confident of their ability to bring about change by working in the political process (Shingles 1981, 84). Both native and foreign-born blacks continue to have a lack of trust in the government because of the racism they experience (Nunnally 2012). In addition, because of their group consciousness, African Americans (both poor and middle-class) take more actions to influence public policy than poor whites (Shingles 1981, 78).

Other scholarly research clarified the linkage between group consciousness and political participation. Miller et al. find that a common racial identification alone is not enough to impel political participation. This identification must be combined with “feelings of power deprivation, relative dislike for the “outgroup,” or with the belief that social barriers explain the disadvantaged positons of the poor, blacks, and women” in order to influence participation (Miller et al. 1981, 500).

Some research discovers a weak or nonexistent correlation between group consciousness and political participation (Leighley and Vedlitz 1999, 1092-1114; Verba et al. 1993, 453-497). Katherine L. Tate’s analysis of data from the 1984 National Black Election Study (NBES) discovers that group consciousness has a weak effect on voting and campaigning (Tate 1993). In
“Race, Ethnicity, and Political Participation: Competing Models and Contrasting Explanations,” Jan E. Leighley and Arnold Vedlitz find that group consciousness has no impact on the political participation of whites, blacks, Mexican Americans or Asian Americans. While “group closeness” has an insignificant correlation with political participation, “intergroup distance” significantly impacts the participation of African Americans and Asian Americans. Therefore, groups with less solidarity are more politically active than those with more solidarity (Leighley and Vedlitz 1999, 1104).

The research of Chong and Rogers observes that group consciousness has a greater, rather than lesser, impact on participation. Their analysis of data from the 1984 National Black Election Study examined the impact of the four components of the definition of consciousness on various forms of participation. These components are: dissatisfaction with the influences blacks and other disadvantaged groups possess; a belief that societal ills faced by blacks are the result of discrimination; support for collaborative efforts to correct these ills; and a belief that political empowerment can be gained by group efforts (Chong and Rogers 2005, 354).

To some degree, certain aspects of group consciousness has an impact on voting. Two aspects, the desire to uplift the group’s status and dissatisfaction with the group’s status, are positively and significantly correlated (Chong and Rogers 2005, 361). Consciousness, especially the desire for “black autonomy,” influences voting as well as campaigning for black candidates (Chong and Rogers 2005, 361). Lastly, the belief in linked fate is the aspect of group consciousness that significantly influences an individual’s willingness to donate funds to candidates and group consciousness influences petitioning (Chong and Rogers 2005, 361). Thus, group consciousness influences some types of participation, but not others.

**Black Ethnic Group Consciousness**

Because of the finding of a group consciousness among African Americans, scholars began to inquire about a similar sense of solidarity among other people of African descent. Because black ethnics experience many of the same societal problems as African Americans, they are expected to have a similar consciousness level. In addition, their “black” skin color will result in a common racial identity and a sense of solidarity among them. The minority group thesis argues that people of African descent will have a common racial group identification and consciousness because of their skin color, similar experiences with discrimination, and other shared life experiences. For example, African Americans and black ethnics both endure police abuse disproportionately than other racial groups and are more likely to reside in racially segregated neighborhoods, experience housing discrimination, and have inferior schools in their communities (Foner 2001, 1-22; Kasinitz et al. 2008, 32; Jennings 1997, 10-12).

In recent years, scholars such as Candis Watts Smith and Christina Greer have examined updated data on the linkage between racial identity and politics. Both authored books examining the extent to which native and foreign-born blacks translate their racial group identities and consciousness into political actions. Smith developed the theory of diasporic consciousness defined as “the mental tightrope that people of African descent who live in the United States walk as they try to balance their superordinate racial identity (and the political interests associated with it) with their subgroup or ethnic identity and its closely associated political interests” (Smith 2014, 7). The theory can also be interpreted to mean that African Americans and black ethnics both use their racial identities as a basis for their political behavior.

In Black Ethnics, Race, Immigration, and the Pursuit of the American Dream, Professor
Christina Greer argues that African and Caribbean-born blacks have an “elevated minority status” over native-born African Americans (Greer 2013, 23). Many Americans perceive black ethnics as having a stronger work ethic than native-born blacks and thus hold them in higher regard than African Americans (Greer 2013, 7). In *Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics* (1994), Professor Michael C. Dawson examines the effect of group consciousness among African Americans from lower, middle, and upper class backgrounds and finds a sense of consciousness and “politically homogenous” beliefs among them (Dawson 1992, 6, 87). According to the theory of the “black utility heuristic,” individual African American citizens support certain political and economic policies out of the belief that they benefit from policies that advantage African Americans as a group (Dawson 2001, 61). Dawson characterizes this solidarity among African Americans as “linked fate” which implies that “one’s fate is linked to that of the race” (Dawson 1992, 148). This theory has been used to explain African American class divisions, gender relationships, racial attitudes, and support for Black Nationalism (Block 2010, 1-25; Brown and Shaw 2002, 22-44; Cohen 1999; Gay 2004, 547-562; Simien 2006).

When examining the racial group identity and consciousness of black ethnics, evidence of a group consciousness among them emerged. Professor Candis Watts Smith (2013) examined data from the *National Survey of American Life* which included a sample of over 3,000 African American and 1,600 Afro-Caribbean respondents. Surveys that included questions about racial identity, group consciousness, political and public policy opinions, etc. were distributed between 2001 and 2003 by the University of Michigan Research Center. While West Indian and African immigrants have a sense of linked fate with African Americans, Haitians do not. Moreover, second generation black immigrants have even higher levels of group consciousness than African Americans (Smith 2013, 199-220). These findings are significant considering the fact that most of the research on African American and Black ethnic consciousness was conducted before the 2000s.

Austin (2017) also discovers stronger levels of group consciousness among second-generation black ethnic citizens. *The Caribbeanization of Black Politics: Race, Group Consciousness, and Political Participation in America* contains interviews with over 2,000 native and Caribbean-born people of African descent in Boston, Chicago, Miami, and New York City. Most of the first and second-generation African Americans and black ethnics possess common group consciousness levels with other blacks because of their belief in linked fate, the discrimination they have experienced from whites, the fact that they have experienced more discrimination from whites than from other blacks, and they believe that collective action will benefit all of them (Austin 2017; Austin, Middleton and Yon 2012, 629).

While some scholars found a sense of consciousness among black ethnics, others came to an opposite conclusion. Rather than collaborating with African Americans, black ethnics disassociate themselves from them. First generation black ethnics, in particular, harbor negative stereotypical images about African Americans (Bryce-LaPorte 1972, 29-56; Vickerman 1994, 83-128). However, second and third generation citizens are more likely to have a common consciousness with them (Rogers 2001).

Some studies discovered tensions among Haitians and African Americans. The research of Woldemikael (1989) finds that Haitians in the Chicago metropolitan area reject a black identity, but instead emphasize their Haitian identity. He observes, “They are neither socially nor psychologically ready nor willing to see themselves through the eyes of black and white racial categories and prejudice. Instead, they find it both rewarding and less demanding to reject
racial categories and assert their Haitian identity” (Woldemikael 1989).

According to Zephir (1996), many Haitians believe that they already have negative stereotypes to overcome because of their Haitian racial identity and do not desire to experience more racial prejudice as both Haitians and African Americans (Zephir 1996). They refuse to assimilate with African Americans and other black groups (whether native-born or black ethnic), emphasize that their Haitian ethnicity so that they will not be categorized as African Americans or as black immigrants (Zephir 1996). While they identify as black, for them black does not mean black American (Zephir 1996, 52). Thus, they are black, but associate a different meaning to blackness than African Americans.

In City on the Edge: The Transformation of Miami, Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick also characterized the relationship among African Americans and Haitians as a conflictual one. Beginning in the 1980s when a large influx of Haitian immigrants moved to South Florida, African Americans and Haitians competed for jobs and “became increasingly ambivalent toward each other” (Portes and Stepick 1993, 178). Other previous research, mostly conducted in the 1990s emphasizes that job competition and class divisions among African Americans and Haitians results in friction and discord rather than cooperation. In a 1993 study, Stepick observed, “Rather than considering Haitians as brothers and sisters in solidarity fighting against racism and seeking equality with whites, many black Americans regarded Haitians as unwanted, immigrant competitors for jobs [who are] unaware and unappreciative of the peculiar plight of black Americans” (Stepick 1992, 62). In an analysis of black, white, and Cuban politics in Miami, Grenier and Castro (1999) argue, “African Americans do not share a specific linguistic, cultural, or religious background with Haitians, the second-largest black community in Miami, nor do African Americans share the immigrant world view of Haitians and other Caribbean newcomers. Thus, black solidarity in Miami is a difficult proposition” (Grenier and Castro 1999, 276).

Many West Indians who have a strong racial identity with African Americans, but nevertheless emphasize the fact that they are West Indian rather than black. According to Mary C. Waters’ research, Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities (1999), some West Indian New Yorkers believe that they are superior to African Americans because of negative cultural traits they attribute to them. As a result, they do not want to be seen as “black Americans” because they believe “assimilation to black America is downward mobility” (Waters 1999, 65).

More recently-written analyses of African American and black ethnic race relations have also discovered the tendency of West Indians and other black citizens of Caribbean descent to adopt a black racial identity because of their skin color while also heavily emphasizing their ethnic identity (Butterfield 2004, 75-102; Rogers 2001, 175). Greer (2013) finds that they emphasize both their racial and ethnic identities for the following reasons. First, they have not fully assimilated into American life. Second, American society classifies them as black. Third, by emphasizing both their race and ethnicity, they are also acknowledging their linked fate with other blacks. Finally, they are taking advantage of the “elevated minority status” they receive from whites (Greer 2013, 139).

A key question concerns whether group consciousness propels the political participation of black ethnics in the same way that it does African Americans. Studies examining this questions have found that racial group consciousness affects people of African descent in a different manner. Rogers (2006) discovers that black ethnics have a consciousness, but it fails
to spur their political participation in the same manner as it does African Americans. Rather than causing cooperation among African Americans and black ethnics, race often makes their differing opinions about policy issues more apparent (Rogers 2006, 114).

Smith has a similar finding. Racial group consciousness affects the political attitudes of black ethnics on some policy issues that involve race, but not others (Smith 2014). For example, those with a sense of consciousness support the idea of reparations for African Americans, but not the creation of majority minority districts and some governmental initiatives designed to improve the status of blacks in the U.S. Black ethnics are also less likely to have a feeling of linked fate than African Americans.

Afro Latinos: The Politics of Racial Classifications and Group Consciousness

Because of strict racial categories in America, Afro-Latinos have been classified as either black or Latino rather than as both or neither (Benson 2006, 219-247; Jensen et al. 2006, 1088-1099). It has been found that some Afro Latino immigrants in the United States identify as Hispanic or “other” as a way to distinguish themselves from black Americans (Duany 1998, 147-172; Itzigsohn and Dore-Cabral 2000, 225-247; Denton and Massey 1989, 790-808). In addition, Hispanics with multiracial backgrounds generally use the Hispanic racial designation as a way to distinguish themselves from blacks and establish connections with white Hispanics (Denton and Massey 1989, 806).

Many do so because of the manner in which race is conceptualized in the Caribbean and in Latin America. Whereas the hypodescent rule categorizes many biracial and multiracial individuals as African American in the U.S., a “pigmentocracy” exists in Latin American and Caribbean countries. There, individuals are not restricted to a few rigid racial classifications. Instead, they may define their races or ethnicities according to a broad number of categories (Landale and Oropesa 2002, 231-254; Middleton 2008, 568-569; Rodriguez 2000).

Therefore, individuals with darker skin who would automatically be classified as black in America may not choose to be classified as such in Latin America or the Caribbean. In these regions, individuals may identify themselves as “[translated in English] white, coffee, chocolate, cinnamon, wheat, brown, and indigenous/Indian” (Howard 2001; Duany 1998, 147-172; Itzigsohn and Dore-Cabral 2000, 225-247; Simmons 2012, 79). Whites are at the top of the racial hierarchy and blacks are at the bottom (Itzigsohn and Dore-Cabral 2000, 226). The terms - “mulatto,” “jabao,” “trigueño,” and “indios” - typically define racially mixed individuals in the Dominican Republic (Itzigsohn and Dore-Cabral 2000, 226). Most Dominicans define themselves as “indio claro” (light Indian) or “indio oscuro (dark Indian).

Because “blackness” – i.e. belonging to black or brown racial categories – denotes inferiority, individuals try to classify themselves in the white or racially-mixed categories. On the island of Hispaniola where the Dominican Republic and Haiti are located, Dominicans categorize in the black category and classify themselves in alternative categories (Duany 1998, 147-172; Itzigsohn and Dore-Cabral 2000, 225-247; Torres-Saillant 1998, 126-146). Dominicans attribute anything pertaining to Africanness to Haitians because they are socialized to believe that blackness carries a negative connotation (Simmons 2012, 74).

The negative perceptions Dominicans have of Haitians, and the anti-black identity that they have, result in large part from the actions of former President Rafael Leonidas Trujillo. Under his administration, a “whitening” of the nation occurred and Dominicans were subjugated. Trujillo had a blatant disdain for “Negroes,” especially those with darker skin and coarser hair.
Although he had African ancestry, Trujillo attempted to legally classify all Dominicans as either "Indio" or "Mestizo" as opposed to "Negro" (Howard 2001; Middleton 2008, 568-569).

Not only do more diverse racial categories exist, but some Caribbean countries classify individuals on the basis of other characteristics like socio-economic status. Concerning the former, an individual with a light brown skin tone and an affluent background is still categorized as black in America because of their color. However, the same person is white or mestizo in the Caribbean or Latin America because of his or her socio-economic status (Rodriguez and Cordero-Guzman 1992, 532-541; Waters 1999). In addition, an individual’s race is defined by factors such as nationality, birthplace, hair texture, language, and physical features (Rodriguez 2000). Thus, the “one drop rule,” that classifies any American with even the slightest trace of African ancestry as black, is totally different from Caribbean and Latin American classifications (Rodriguez 2000). After arriving in America, dark-skinned Afro Latinos are sometimes perplexed and offended when they are referred to as blacks. Some also object to the Hispanic/Latino classification that includes individuals of “Spanish-speaking origin or ancestry” (Rodriguez 2000).

Cuba also disparages black culture and darker skin colors. After the deaths of prominent Afro Cubans, statues commemorating their contributions portrayed them with white features (Gates 2011, 196). In addition, early 1900 caricatures of blacks portrayed them “as cannibals, eager to eat the white government. Blacks were compared to rats, which had recently caused an outbreak of bubonic plague on the island. . . and of course, all the blacks look like monkeys. The climate was so hostile . . . that blacks hid in their homes at night afraid of being attacked or even lynched” (Gates 2011, 196).

By the late 1950s, Cuba had a prosperous economy based on the high per-capita incomes of many of its residents. However, like most countries, large gaps existed between conditions for the rich and poor because “the rich kept getting richer, and richer and richer, while the poor suffered bitterly. There were two Cubas . . . . One was wealthy, urban, and primarily white. The other was desperately poor, both urban and rural, and almost entirely black” (Gates 2011, 205). Although Cuban had no laws mandating racial segregation, the country had a tradition of segregating Afro Cubans in many public places. Because of the negative perceptions of blackness if some Latin American and Caribbean countries, the relationships among African Americans, black ethnics, and Afro Latinos have been strained in some cities (McClain et al. 2006). These groups have lacked solidarity with each other, but do Afro-Latinos have solidarity with the members of their own group?

Few studies have examined the racial group consciousness of Afro Latinos. Some studies of Latinos, generally, have examined their racial identities and linked fate perceptions. These analyses have found that many Latinos believe their fates are linked because of their disadvantaged economic status, common experiences as immigrants, and other factors (Sanchez 2006, 427-450; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010, 519; Stokes 2003, 361-378). Southern Latino immigrants lack a heightened level of group consciousness with African Americans in urban cities, but nevertheless believe that their fate is linked to that of other Latinos (McClain et al. 2006, 571).

However, the existence of numerous subgroups within the Latino community make it difficult for them to have a common identity and consciousness (Jones-Correa 1998; Stokes 2003, 361-378). Latinos have a stronger group consciousness when they consider themselves to be minorities, experience discrimination, and believe that their racial group(s) lack opportunities
in America (Kaufmann 2003, 199-210; Sanchez 2008, 428-444). Moreover, group consciousness is an impetus to Latino participation (Stokes 2003, 361-378).

**Conclusion**

The aforementioned research results in several revelations about the group consciousness of African Americans, black ethnics, and Afro Latinos. First, African Americans consistently possess strong feelings of group consciousness with the members of their racial group. This consciousness positively impacts their voter turnout rates and several other measures of political participation. The correlations between group consciousness and political participation among Black ethnics and Afro Latinos is less clear, however, because scholarly findings are mixed. It is important to understand the correlation between group consciousness and political participation because of the increasing diversification of America. Minorities have become the majority population in many cities. In addition, large numbers of black, Asian, and Latin immigrants have settled in both larger and smaller cities. Inevitably, many of them will become naturalized and politically-active citizens. Despite this population growth, the members of minority groups will more easily experience political successes if they establish multiracial coalitions. It is easier to develop coalitions with other racial and ethnic groups if there is group solidarity with the members of one’s own racial group. This is why the presence of a cohesive level of group consciousness is so important.

**References**


Hart-Celler and the Effects on African American and Immigrant Incorporation

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Abstract
It has been exactly fifty years since the passage of the Hart-Celler Immigration Act of 1965. This Act opened the proverbial gates for increased immigration opportunities for individuals from far and wide, including the Caribbean and African continent. So what have been the effects of the 1965 Immigration Act on Black ethnic inclusion, incorporation, and ideas pertaining to citizenship and expanding civil rights and liberties? As the growing waves of voluntary Black immigrants sought a new life and economic advancement in the U.S., how did their growing numbers affect the ways in which Black Americans conceptualized their citizenship statuses? This paper explores the effects of the 1965 Immigration Act in conjunction with the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 1965 Voting Rights Act on Blacks in America, both native-born and foreign-. Chronicling the growing numbers of Black voluntary immigrants and the increased Black diversity across the U.S., I find that the 1965 Immigration forever changed the way Blacks saw themselves and their ethnic counterparts in an increasingly diverse Black ethnic space.

Keywords: Immigration, Hart-Celler Act, Black ethnics, Lyndon Johnson, Incorporation

Introduction: Reflections on the 50 Year Passage
When scholars and political scientists analyze the importance of the 1965 Hart-Celler Immigration Act signed by Democratic president Lyndon Baines Johnson, they often remark on Johnson’s reputation as a Master of the Senate – a man who was able to pass such significant legislation during racially turbulent times in America (Caro 2002). What many scholars often neglect to mention is that the 1965 Immigration Act should be seen as a triumvirate of legislative successes for the president. In that the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1965 Voting Rights Act and 1965 Immigration Act should be viewed as tri-part successes that incorporate people of color more solidly into the promise of the American dream and the American electorate.

Questions surrounding immigration are not new. Certainly, the 1965 Immigration Act is responsible for increased migration patterns of a more racially and ethnically diverse immigrant pool. So what have been the effects of the 1965 Immigration Act on Black ethnic inclusion, incorporation, and ideas pertaining to citizenship and expanding civil rights and liberties? America as a young nation built its foundation on the principle of patriarchy, white supremacy, and anti-Black-racism. That is, the initial subjugation of Black bodies from across Africa for the purposes of free labor and capital for a segment of the white population, then quickly translated into a racial hierarchy system to substantiate and legitimize these behaviors. In order to better understand mid-Twentieth Century immigration, one must understand what Omi and Winant (1987) explain as the ethnicity, class, and nation based theories of American

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race relations in need of a “racial formation perspective”. They argue that the racial formation perspective operates on micro (individual) and macro (collective social structure) levels. The most poignant contribution of Omi and Winant’s argument is the articulation of ethnicity as a political phenomenon.

Therefore, observing Black immigrants to the U.S. in the twentieth century, as the first voluntary Black immigrants, expands our collective understanding of Black immigrants and their subsequent regionally diverse migration once in the U.S. It is important to note that voluntary Black immigration from Africa and the Caribbean, in contrast to the centuries of non-voluntary importation of Black Americans has significant repercussions for our collective understanding of race, ethnicity, and belief in the promise of America and what the polity can and will actually provide to its citizens with Black skin (Greer 2013).

Expanding Civil Rights for Blacks

The passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act signaled a mid-twentieth century commitment to uphold equal protections of all citizens as outlined in the Fourteenth Amendment that addresses citizenship rights and equal protection of the laws1. The landmark legislation outlawed discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Obviously, these principles and tenants are still a work in progress. However, the establishment of the Civil Rights Act set the stage for many of the modern day civil rights gains today. In addition, the 1965 Voting Rights Act also expanded rights and liberties of African Americans and other non-white groups living in the U.S. Indeed these rights were laid out in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the constitution.2 However, LBJ’s maneuvering with Congress secured (at least on paper) voting rights for racial minorities, especially in the U.S. South. The Voting Rights Act is often heralded by the Department of Justice as the most significant and effective piece of legislation ever enacted. However, one must view the successful passage of all three acts as building blocks toward the collective legislative progress and increased incorporation for Blacks and other racial minorities living in the U.S.3

Although these three Acts passed in the mid-1960s, all three remain relevant in the twenty-first century largely because the equal protections, franchise, and robust and equitable immigration practices have yet to be fully realized for many people of color currently living in the U.S. During the 1960s, LBJ was cognizant of the precarious and multifaceted relationships he needed to establish and maintain with groups as diverse as CORE, SNCC, SCLC, NAACP, and the National Urban League.4 These elite relationships were separate from LBJ’s awareness of more radical individuals and groups, for example Malcolm X as well as the Black Panther Party, who were also advocating on behalf of Black American freedom and equitable incorporation into the polity. LBJ was cognizant that the passage of legislation that would be perceived as assisting African Americans and other marginalized groups could signal the exit of Southern Democrats from the party, possibly forever. In many ways, LBJ’s fears were realized. Currently, there are no Democratic U.S. Senators representing Southern states and Southern state houses are solidly Republican.

Plainly put, as LBJ sought legislative advancement for Blacks and people of color, he lost members of his own party. His mastery of the U.S. Senate and his ability to get substantive legislation passed domestically is often overshadowed by his failures internationally, most specifically pertaining to the Vietnam War. However, Johnson was keenly aware that his domestic policies were being observed by an international audience. Each police beating at a
lunch counter, fire hose sprayed on young children, and police dog piercing Black flesh was a reminder to LBJ that the world was watching in the new media age. He once stated that “the whole world is watching” (Gitlin 1980). Future immigrants from around the world were also witnessing these acts committed against Black citizens.

The entry of Black immigrants from Africa and the Caribbean after the passage of the 1965 Immigration Act was not the first time America had experienced voluntary immigration by Black groups. During the earlier Twentieth Century, from 1900 through the 1940s, small scale immigrations of Blacks occurred from the Caribbean countries such as Jamaica, the Bahamas, and Barbados. Many of the earliest Black immigrants worked in the agricultural sectors and in seasonal occupations then returned to their home countries (Watkins-Owens 1996).

Smaller numbers of African immigrants moved to the U.S., primarily from the 1930s to the early 1960s, before the passage of the Hart-Celler Act. Many African migrants came to the U.S. and attended Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) along the eastern seaboard. Several returned to their respective home countries to assist with independence efforts. For example, future Nigerian president Nnamdi Azikiwe attended Lincoln College, a historically black college in Chester County, Pennsylvania, west of Philadelphia. After meeting the future Ghanaian president Kwame Nkrumah in the U.S., Azikiwe persuaded Nkrumah to attend Lincoln College as well. Additionally, another segment of African scholars entered the U.S. in the late 1950s due to the efforts of a young Senator from Massachusetts. U.S. Senator John F. Kennedy formed the African American Student Foundation (AASF) in which 81 African students entered the U.S. in 1959, with an additional 250 students from Kenya and eastern African nations receiving airfare and scholarships.5

**Brief History of the Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act) and the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (The McCarran-Walter Act)**

In 1924 Congress passed the Johnson-Reed Act which allowed a limited the number of immigrants entry into the U.S. through a national origins quota. The Act primarily assisted Southern and Eastern Europeans through a quota providing immigration visas to two percent of the total number of people of each nationality in the United States as of the 1890 national census.6 Therefore, this new Act skewed toward European immigration and explicitly and deliberately excluded immigrants from Asia, Africa, and “Arabs”. The purpose of the 1924 Act was “to preserve the ideal of American homogeneity,” therefore, the explicit exclusion of “Asiatic” people in particular. More specifically, Japanese individuals who had migrated to the U.S. before the 1924 Act was passed would find their relatives no longer eligible for entry into the U.S.7

Congress then revised the 1924 Act in 1952 by passing the Immigration and Nationality Act (also known as The McCarran-Walter Act). It revised the laws relating to immigration, naturalization, and nationality and discontinued the practice of excluding immigrants based simply upon country of origin. However, the 1952 Act was focused upon denying immigrants who were unlawful, immoral, diseased in any way, and/or politically radical. The U.S. was forced to revisit past immigration practices and exclusions after two world wars and widespread famine and poverty in Europe. The 1952 Act was amended to accept those who were willing and able to assimilate into the US economic, social, and political structures, which restructured how immigration law was handled. This bill was vetoed by President Harry Truman who regarded it as “un-American” and discriminatory, but it nevertheless became law after winning passage in Congress.
The Immigration Act of 1965 (The Hart-Celler Act)

“This bill we sign today is not a revolutionary bill. It does not affect the lives of millions. It will not restructure the shape of our daily lives, or really add importantly to either our wealth or our power.”

-President L.B. Johnson signing the 1965 Immigration Act at the steps of the Statue of Liberty in New York, N.Y.

Because LBJ was a veteran of Washington, D.C.’s political establishment, he was able to understand, and manipulate, all levels of Congressional leadership after becoming president. These abilities assisted him in gaining passage of Hart-Celler. This Act also became law during a time in the U.S. when European immigrants were slowly and steadily “becoming white” (Ignatiev 1995). That is, due to the unfolding civil rights struggles, many European immigrants were being incorporated into a tent of whiteness to: 1) secure their status as Americans, 2) further protect the dominance of white homogeneity in America, and 3) further differentiate themselves from “non-whites”, namely Asians, Africans, “Arabs”, and those from Latin America.

Under previous iterations of U.S. immigration Acts, admission to America was largely based on an immigrant’s country of birth, largely from Southern and Eastern European nations. Previously, seventy percent of all immigrant slots were allotted to natives of just three countries — United Kingdom, Ireland and Germany — and went mostly unused. Leading up to the passage of the 1965 Act, the waiting lists for the small number of visas available to those born in Italy, Greece, Poland, Portugal, and elsewhere in Eastern and Southern Europe were limited. In post War America, Congress’ interest in shutting its borders was an appealing enterprise for many white elites who feared the ills – economic, public health, moral – that would presumably arrive with “lesser” immigrants. That is, immigrants who had no possibility of ever “becoming white”.

Somehow, LBJ and his emissaries were able to persuade their colleagues that the passage of the 1965 Immigration Act would change little concerning immigration, specifically the racial and ethnic make-up of the nation, and most pointedly, the labor force. LBJ states at the signing, “For it does repair a very deep and painful flaw in the fabric of American justice. It corrects a cruel and enduring wrong in the conduct of the American Nation”. His use of vague historic language implies that the passage of this bill is to atone for past inequitable immigration practices, such as the 1924 and 1952 Acts, not necessarily forward thinking immigration and inclusion policies. For the first time, the 1965 Immigration Act gave higher preference to the relatives of American citizens and permanent resident aliens than to applicants with special job skills. He stated, “This is a simple test, and it is a fair test. Those who can contribute most to this country--to its growth, to its strength, to its spirit--will be the first that are admitted to this land”.

The new preference system for visa admissions detailed in the law was as follows: Unmarried adult sons and daughters of U.S. citizens; spouses and children and unmarried sons and daughters of permanent resident aliens; members of the professions and scientists and artists of exceptional ability; married children of U.S. citizens; brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens over age twenty-one; skilled and unskilled workers in occupations for which there is insufficient labor supply; refugees given conditional entry or adjustment — chiefly people from Communist countries and the Middle East. The last and most vague of the preferences is possibly the most
telling: Applicants not entitled to preceding preferences. Essentially, admission is being extended to everyone else who had previously been excluded. This last clause assisted Afro-Caribbeans and a small percentage of African immigrants gain entry into the U.S. following its passage.

**Immigration Act False Predictions**

The passage of the 1965 Immigration Act presented several quandaries for members of Congress. Johnson stated at the bill’s signing, “This measure that we will sign today will really make us truer to ourselves both as a country and as a people. It will strengthen us in a hundred unseen ways.” Although Johnson was adamant that the passage of this law would not change the racial composition of America or create competition for jobs [for white Americans], several members of Congress were skeptical. Therefore, Johnson asked several Democratic Senators to persuade their colleagues and the American public that little to nothing would change with the passage of this Act. Rep. Emanuel Celler (D-NY), a sponsor of the bill argued, “With the end of discrimination due to place of birth, there will be shifts in countries other than those of northern and western Europe. Immigrants from Asia and Africa will have to compete and qualify in order to get in, quantitatively and qualitatively, which, itself will hold the numbers down. There will not be, comparatively, many Asians or Africans entering this country.... Since the people of Africa and Asia have very few relatives here, comparatively few could immigrate from those countries because they have no family ties in the U.S.” Essentially, Celler argued that the racial composition of the country would not change because there were not enough Asians and Africans currently residing in the U.S. to even make the request to have relatives immigrate.

Similarly, U.S. Senate immigration subcommittee chairman Edward Kennedy (D-MA.) stated, “The bill will not flood our cities with immigrants. It will not upset the ethnic mix of our society. It will not relax the standards of admission. It will not cause American workers to lose their jobs”. Despite this assurance, many Americans feared the loss of jobs and livelihood with an influx of new immigrants. Many of their fears were ultimately confirmed because of a large influx of immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean. In particular, Caribbean immigration greatly increased due to the Immigration Act provision which argued for the entrée of “skilled and unskilled workers in occupations for which there is insufficient labor supply” (Wong 2006). Earlier immigration laws allowed Afro-Caribbeans to enter the U.S. as domestics, nurses, teachers, etc. (Migration Policy Institute). However, the 1965 Immigration Act allowed for Black immigration based on relative’s citizenship and not necessarily professional skill and need.

Although the vast majority of Caribbean migrants sought their economic fortunes in Central America (and the Panama Canal more specifically), those who did decide to migrate to the U.S. in the first three decades of the twentieth century provide a steady stream of migrants. The foreign-born Black population increased from 20,000 in 1900 to roughly 100,000 by 1930. Restrictive migration laws in 1917, 1921, and 1924 slowed Caribbean migration, as did the Great Depression. However, over 140,000 Afro-Caribbeans migrated through U.S. ports between 1899 and 1937, and largely settled in Northeastern cities. After WWII began, roughly 50,000 Caribbeans migrated between 1941 and 1950. Approximately 123,000 Caribbean immigrants came to the U.S. in the 1950s. However, after the passage of the 1965 Immigration Act, the number of Caribbeans increased to 470,000 immigrants by the late 1960s. For example, before the Immigration Act passage approximately 9,000 Jamaicans resided in the U.S., after the bill’s passage, the number increased to 75,000. In the subsequent decade, the number of Jamaicans
increased to 140,000 by 1980, and the number further increased to 208,000 migrants by 1990. Essentially, 25 years after the passage of the Immigration Act, 872,000 people had migrated from the Caribbean to the U.S.

According to the Migration Policy Institute, the Caribbean population in the U.S. has increased more than 17-fold over the past half-century. Yet, three-quarters of Caribbeans currently residing in the country arrived from 1980-2000. This influx is a direct result of the passage and subsequent implementation of Hart-Celler. Today there are roughly three million self-identified Afro-Caribbeans in the U.S. and almost 1.5 million African immigrants. People of Caribbean and African immigrant descent represent roughly 10 percent of the total Black population in the U.S. Since 2000, Caribbean migration has decreased compared to immigration from African countries. Yet, the Caribbean population in the U.S. still outnumbers those of African populations, despite the severe increase in African migration in the past twenty years.

Then and Now: 1965-2005

The numbers of both native-born and foreign-born blacks have increased over the past several decades in the U.S. In 1950, the U.S. Census estimated 15,042,286 people of African descent. By 2005, Census estimates placed people of African descent at roughly 34,962,569 (See Appendix A). Not only has Black ethnic diversity increased, but geographic diversity as well because of the settlement of these new Blacks residents in a number of areas. No longer are Blacks concentrated in large urban cities. African immigrant populations can be found in diverse locales from small towns in Maine, mid-sized cities in Minnesota, and major cities in Arizona, to name just a few. These settlement patterns result from strong preexisting social networks of immigrants, refugee placement by the U.S. government, and previous knowledge of locations where Black economic success is plausible. Consequently, due to changing urban employment prospects, Black immigrants and citizens have moved to rural and suburban areas throughout the U.S. Although Black immigration has steadily increased over the last forty years, people of African descent, that is native-born and foreign-born blacks, have become the third largest group in America. Latino populations have replaced African Americans as the second largest group in the country. Unsurprisingly, tension have arisen between newly arriving Latino immigrant populations as they settle and set-up political and economic pursuits in urban centers which have been historically Black-dominated cities (Carter 2007).

Changing Race Relations

How does the migration of “new Blacks” alter perceptions of inclusion, incorporation, and black-white relations? That is, as new Blacks migrate to diverse locales throughout the U.S., how do their incorporation and assimilation processes differ from those of their native born Black counterparts? First, the relationships Black immigrants have with their white counterparts can differ from native-born black Americans quite substantially depending on geographic locale, percentage of Black Americans living in the respective community, or white perceptions of Blacks, of immigrants and of African and Caribbean nations (Greer 2013; Smith 2014; Gooding 2014).

Black relationships with whites can directly affect the ways in which Black Americans interact with Black immigrants. Further complicating this narrative are the relationships native-born Blacks and Black immigrants establish with other non-Blacks. Historically, as immigrants were excluded from the protected whiteness category, Black and other non-white immigrants
found themselves on the outside of the power structure looking in. However, as race relations and racism have evolved in American democracy, one may argue that the protected “white versus non-white” category has mutated into a form of “black versus non-black” category whereby Black immigrants seek to remain outside of what they perceive is last place. Not surprisingly, this strategy for assimilation and success by black immigrants has created tensions and distrust between Black groups. Many Black Americans believe that Black immigrants are receiving “all of the benefits and none of the burdens” (Greer 2013). During the large waves of Afro-Caribbean migration to the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s and in the 1970s and 1980s for African immigrants, Black Americans had been actively organizing and fighting for civil rights for nearly a century. Therefore, the possibility that Black immigrants would select a category separate from that of their Black American counterparts has led to levels of distrust and competition (Greer 2013; Smith 2014).

Because of weakened coalitions, ethnically diverse Black groups have selected their elected officials in a different manner than in previous years. No longer is there an assumption of racial homogeneity, especially in local elections (Rogers 2009; Gooding 2014). Many Black ethnic groups have begun to select officials who reflect their ethnic backgrounds and specific policy and issue areas. These nuanced distinctions have ushered in a new twenty-first century Black politics that scholars are beginning to dissect (Austin et al 2011; Gooding 2014; Greer 2013; Rogers 2009; Smith 2014). With the increased migration of African and Afro-Caribbean groups to and throughout the U.S., how do race relations within and between groups change, alter, or adapt in these new settings? Ideally, descriptive and substantive politics would intersect in choosing elected leaders, but realistically, that is not always possible.

As Black immigrant populations increase, what happens to political relationships between “old Blacks” and “new Black immigrant” groups? Because of increased Caribbean and African immigration, the face of Black leadership has changed as well, which in some communities has created a perceived advantage for Black immigrant candidates who can claim a “both/and” identity. That is, these candidates can claim both a Black racial identity as well as a particular ethnic identity in order to gain the maximum number of votes and support. Most recently in communities in Miami and New York, both historically Caribbean and Black American political districts, candidates have explicitly used their ethnic identity to garner support within their district, especially if running against a Black American (Greer 2013; Austin et al. 2011). They have also used their Black racial identity within the district, especially if running against a white opponent. For example, Yvette Clark’s use of a racial and ethnic identity to win her Brooklyn Congressional seat, in an area once led by openly proud Afro-Caribbean (Bajan) Shirley Chisholm.

The success stories for African elected officials are just now beginning. Recently in Minnesota, Democratic candidate Ilhan Omar became the first Somali American Muslim to win election to Congress. In 2016, she was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives. In many communities, aspiring African politicos have yet to decide exactly who should appear on the ballot. Therefore, for example, in City Council elections in Brooklyn and the Bronx, there have been almost a dozen individuals from the same ethnic enclave all running for the same seat. Since no one abdicates before Election Day, a non-African has handedly won the seat in what are now increasingly growing African electoral districts. However, it is only a matter of time before African candidates begin to coordinate their efforts, social networks, and financial resources in order to successful win political districts with growing African populations.
Conclusion

The mystery of Lyndon Johnson and his support for passage of the Civil Rights Act, Voting Rights Act of 1965, and Hart-Celler Immigration Act continues to stump scholars of political science and racial politics. When evaluating the passage of the 1965 Immigration Act and Johnson’s argument that passage of this bill would result in no real changes in the American political, economic, and social landscapes, one is left to wonder whether he and his allies truly believed this sentiment. When signing the bill, did Johnson truly believe that no immigrants would come to the U.S., especially those from Asia and Africa? Over fifty years after the passage of the Act, does it really matter whether or not Johnson genuinely believed he was passing an innocuous act or whether he was (yet again) duping his fellow colleagues in Congress, especially those within his own party.

For many the question remains, “Did the Master of the Senate dupe Congress on purpose for the passage of the 1965 Immigration Act?” Does it really matter what the real answer is? When reviewing the Congressional debates, U.S. Senators are clear to point out to their colleagues that this bill will have no substantive or long lasting effects. They are also adamant that this bill will not change the racial composition of the country. However, LBJ had already worked with Civil Rights leaders from across the country to successfully pass the Civil Right Act a year prior and had spent copious amounts of political capital to assist the passage of the Voting Rights Act. Therefore, to accept that the Immigration Act was merely a symbolic piece of legislation would have taken some serious suspension of belief and reality for Democrats and Republicans alike. Southern Democrats exhibited regional distinctions from their Northern counterparts. However, ultimately their votes assisted in the passage of a bill that would usher in widespread Afro-Caribbean, African, Asian, and Latin American migration for decades to come. The partisan distinctions were apparent as well, in that Republicans initially expressed hesitation toward the plans of U.S. Senators Hart and Celler. However, the power of persuasion by Lyndon Johnson ultimately won in the end.

Ultimately, the most long-standing effect of the passage of the Immigration Act, beyond the widespread immigration of individuals from non-European countries, was the civil war that erupted within the Democratic Party. Johnson correctly believed that the passage of this act (in conjunction with the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act) would lose Southern Democrats for a generation, if not forever. History has shown that he was absolutely correct because Southern Democrats viewed this triumvirate of legislation (as well as LBJ’s impending housing legislation) as a burden for the Democratic Party and its constituencies. Southern Democrats could no longer disregard the actions of their Texas president. If they were to consider their own re-election prospects, after the passage of these civil rights laws largely due to Johnson’s bullying and pressure, the Democrats witnessed splinters within the party that continue to have rippling effects today.

As Black immigrants have continued to navigate the economic, social, and political landscapes in the U.S., the partisanship of Black ethnics has been relatively homogenous. The vast majority of Blacks in the U.S., both native-born and immigrant, identify with the Democratic Party (Rigueur 2014). This may be because the Republican Party on the national level has largely ceded their political interests to the Democratic Party.21 Thus far, any movement toward the Republican Party has been incremental and largely within the African population. There are several reasons why the Republican Party may look slightly more attractive to the newest immigrants. First, many conservative Republican policies are more in line with policies
from individual’s home countries. Republicans have not been able to capture African votes more fully because many Africans perceive the Republican party as racist and anti-Black. Although some Africans reject the assignment of a Black racial identity to them in the U.S., many are not willing to cast their lot with a party that is perceived as racist, anti-immigrant, and anti-Black, even if they agree with some of the Party’s policy positions. Second, for those who do choose to align themselves with the Republican party and/or have aspirations for elected office, aligning oneself with the Republican party is an almost guaranteed shortcut for a particular lower level office. It is on this level that Black immigrants use the GOP for their individual political advancement. However, the presidential election of 2016 and the overt racialized rhetoric of Republican nominee and eventual winner, Donald Trump, may alter the willingness for African and other Black groups to align themselves with the party for quite some time.

Ultimately, the demographics of Blacks living in the U.S. has been changing for several decades. These “new” Black groups raise interesting questions for political representatives and elite level politics and representation. However, increased Black diversity also raises larger questions surrounding descriptive versus substantive representation for Black ethnics. No longer do communities just have the choice of choosing a Black representative, in ethnically diverse Black neighborhoods. Black voters often have the choice between both racial and ethnic representatives. These new demographics bring interesting questions pertaining to substantive representation for Black communities and what type of Black representative will be best for an ethnically diverse community.

Therefore, in the current century, we must rethink our understanding of race and identity politics and coalitions. What are some possibilities for substantive coalition building among Black ethnic groups, locally and nationally? How will the field of political science continue to interrogate the significance of the Immigration Act for Black groups then and now? Ultimately, the study of the increased Black ethnic diversity post 1965 is just the beginning of an important conversation that will affect local, state, and national politics for generations to come. I wonder what Lyndon Johnson would think of this.
Appendix A

U. S. Black Population 1950-2005

Notes

1. The Fourteenth Amendment (Amendment XIV) to the United States Constitution was adopted on July 9, 1868, as one of the Reconstruction Amendments proposed in response to issues related to former slaves following the American Civil War.

2. The Fifteenth Amendment (Amendment XV) prohibits the federal and state governments from denying a citizen the right to vote based on that citizen’s “race, color, or previous condition of servitude”.

3. Some scholars also include LBJ’s passage of the Housing Act and elements of his War on Poverty as elements that further secured Black inclusion into the polity.

4. CORE: Congress on Racial Equality; SNCC: Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee; SCLC: Southern Christian Leadership Conference; NAACP: National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.


7. It should be noted that Ellis Island is one of the nation’s oldest immigration prisons largely for unaccompanied Asian women who dared to enter the U.S.


9. LBJ entered public office in 1937. He served 12 years as a member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Texas (10th District), 12 years as a U.S. Senator from Texas in which two of those years he was the Senate Majority Whip and for six years he was the Senate Majority Leader. He then served as Vice President for roughly two years before ascending to the presidency. Essentially, LBJ was well versed in the idiosyncrasies of Washington, D.C. politics.

10. Initially migrants from Greece, Poland, Portugal, and elsewhere weren’t eligible for acceptance into an American whiteness. However, as immigration from Africa, the Caribbean, Asia, and Latin America continued to increase, incorporation of European immigrants from particular countries were steadily included in America’s definition of whiteness and were slowly afforded the privileges – economic, social, and political – that American whiteness affords.


12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.


17. In 1980, the earlier 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act was amended in the form of the 1980 Migration and Refugee Assistance Act (Public Law 96-212). This Act was created to provide a permanent and systematic procedure for the admission to the United States for refugees of special humanitarian concern to the U.S., and to provide comprehensive and uniform provisions for the effective resettlement and absorption of those refugees who are admitted. It was a provision that assisted African passage to the U.S. This Act also helps explain the diverse locales throughout the U.S. in which African migrants settled. Many Africans were either placed in states or towns which would be able to absorb an increase in population. In other circumstances, African immigrants settled in non-traditional urban centers due to pre-existing
social or ethnic-group networks established either in their home country or during multi-stage migration sojourns.


19. The increased competition between Black American and Black immigrants has increased misunderstandings in particular communities and parts of the country. For example, in struggling post-industrial cities which have been “dormant” for many years due to white flight and middle class flight are now experiencing a desire to reemerge and reinvest. Many of these cities – Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Detroit – are looking to immigrants to assist in these rejuvenation efforts. However, many of these abandoned cities have had disproportionate Black American populations who either chose to stick it out or had nowhere else to migrate to. Either way, the resentment between the old and new Blacks has led to mistrust and greater misunderstandings that have at times prevented necessary coalition building efforts.

20. To a lesser extent, Republican Mia Love (Utah) was able to use her racial and ethnic identity to secure her U.S. Congressional seat in 2014. She successfully argues that she was not like the larger Black racial group due to her ethnicity as a Haitian American and a child of Afro-Caribbean immigrants.

21. There is a more candidate-centered politic for Black voters on the local level whereby we see a bit more willingness to vote for a Republican candidate for lower office. However, the willingness for Blacks to vote for a Republican candidate at the presidential level on average for the past twenty years has been roughly 9%.

References


Afro-Latinos and the Black-Hispanic Identity: Evaluating the Potential for Intra-Group Conflict and Cohesion

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Abstract

With ethnic and racial minorities projected to comprise a majority of the U.S. population by 2042, current trends in political science scholarship have begun to assess the ways in which intra-group diversity can create opportunities for cooperation, but also contribute to conflict within the context of domestic politics and policy preferences. Research on the diversity of the Latino population in the United States has been predominate. Thus, it is widely regarded that the Latin American identity is not monolithic, and as a consequence, neither is Latino political behavior, as evidenced by the divergent political trajectories of Mexican Americans and Cuban Americans in U.S. politics (Desipio 1996; Claassen 2004; Newton 2000; de la Garza and Yetim 2003). Yet, despite the existing research, which highlights the diversity of the Latino ethnic identity, contemporary societal norms have led to the erroneous conflation of race and ethnicity, resulting in the explicit racialization of the Hispanic-Latino ethnic identity. As a result, Afro-Latinos are either forced to choose between their two member groups or identify themselves according to ambiguous alternatives, which, has resulted in Afro-Latino invisibility, and the subsequent underreporting of this group in national statistics.1 It is this orientation that provides the framework for this study, which indicates that in comparison to other Latin origin groups, Afro-Latinos face unique challenges with respect to the formation of their personal and social identity given the demarcations of race and ethnicity in the United States. The findings of this research explore the political implications of this dynamic.

Keywords: Afro-Latino, Black-Hispanic, Identity, Politics, Group Conflict

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**Introduction**

With ethnic and racial minorities projected to comprise a majority of the U.S. population by 2042, current trends in political science scholarship have begun to assess the ways in which intra-group diversity can create opportunities for cooperation but also contribute to conflict within the context of domestic politics and policy preferences. Research on the diversity of the Latino population in the United States has been predominate; thus, it is widely regarded that the Latin American identity is not monolithic, and as a consequence, neither is Latino political behavior, as evidenced by the divergent political trajectories of Mexican Americans and Cuban Americans in U.S. politics (de la Garza 1992; Desipio 1996; Hill and Moreno 1996; Claassen 2004; Newton 2000; de la Garza and Yetim 2003; Stokes-Brown 2006). Additionally, contemporary research on Asian Americans reveals similar trends with respect to the diversity of political opinion and behavior despite a (perceived) shared national origin identity or ancestry. For instance, with regard to party acquisition and voting patterns, there are notable differences between Asian Indians and Vietnamese Americans. Therefore, despite having the highest median household incomes among Asian Americans, the majority of Asian Indians are affiliated with the Democratic Party, while Vietnamese Americans, who reportedly have the lowest median household income levels, are predominately Republican (Lee 2004; Christoff 2012; Lee 2014; Waring 2014).

In comparison to Latino and Asian Americans, the African American identity has largely remained resistant to stratification. For some time, the African American identity could be articulated as one that was rooted in slavery, the South, and the Baptist tradition—and for the most part that identity is salient to the majority of African Americans in the U.S. today (Greer 2013). However, with the arrival of a sizeable number of African and Afro-Caribbean immigrants in the 1980s, the African American identity had to be re-examined (Gibson and Lennon 1999; McCabe 2011; Terrazas 2010; Capps et al. 2012).

The contribution this vein of research has made to the scholarship on race, identity politics and immigration cannot be understated. Yet, the marginal presence of the Afro-Latino in political science discourse offers up a unique set of questions surrounding identity formation, and intra-group cohesion and conflict that have not been fully explored in the literature. Consequently, using data from the Latino National Survey (2006, 2009, and 2011) and multinomial logit analysis, this study evaluates those factors, which I assert are most relevant to the racial-identification process for Afro-Latinos in the United States. The objective of this research is to determine if Afro-Latinos who racially self-identify as “black” do so at the expense of their Latino ethnic identity. To elaborate, do Afro-Latinos who racially self-identify as “black” report that they feel a sense of ethnic unity with other Latinos, or do they feel divided from other Latinos? This study evaluates these research questions with the goal of identifying the implications for Latino politics and political mobilization if Afro-Latinos view themselves as black, and not Latino, in America.

**Afro-Latinos’ Invisibility**

According to the 2010 U.S. Census, of the 38.9 million African Americans living in the United States, the vast majority descended from ancestors who were brought from Africa to North America between 1619 and 1859 during the Atlantic slave trade (Greer 2013). However, 3.3 million or 8.5% of that figure are comprised of individuals who were identified as “foreign blacks”—which represent first and second generation immigrants of African ancestry (Capp et
al. 2011; Greer 2013; Arthur 2014; Waters et al. 2014). This figure includes a diverse array of immigrants (and their children), primarily from Africa and the English speaking Caribbean, but a sizeable number are also from Europe, Canada and Latin America. Individuals from Latin America of African ancestry are grossly underrepresented in these statistics because “many of the migrants from the Spanish-speaking Caribbean, who are also of African ancestry, [often do not] describe themselves as ‘Black’ on the U.S. Census. [Instead], most select ‘Other’ on the race question and choose a specific nationality on the Hispanic origin question” (Waters et al. 2014, 371). While the official census data estimates that 0.5% of the U.S population is Afro-Latino, other sources suggest this figure is closer to 6%, which would make this group comparable in size to the Asian American population, which is also the fastest growing minority group in the United States (Golash-Boza and Darity 2008; Pew Research Center 2013; Hernandez 2012; Schwede and Terry 2013; Guadalupe and Gamboa 2014; Telles 2014).

That implication alone—that Afro-Latinos are underrepresented by U.S. Census data—has important socio-political ramifications that have been overlooked as a result of the innate desire to ascribe individuals to discrete and exclusive categories, despite the amorphous identities inherent to persons living in a multi-ethnic, multi-racial nation. In addition, black immigrants from Spanish-speaking countries tend to be poorer than black immigrants from English-speaking nations (Waldinger 2001; Newby and Dowling 2007; Stokes-Brown 2009; Hamilton 2014). They also settle in homogenous neighborhoods that are not only segregated from other black immigrants, but Latino immigrants as well (Massey and Denton 1988, 1993; Argeros 2013; Scopilliti and Iceland, 2008). Because of this, it becomes increasingly evident that Afro-Latinos are quite distinct from their racial and ethnic member groups, and yet there has been a tendency to classify them as either black or Latino, thus, ignoring the significance of their dual identity and the role it plays in how they are acculturated and politically socialized into U.S. society (Benson 2006; Scopilliti and Iceland 2008; Araujo Dawson and Quiros 2014; Hernandez 2012; Jensen et al. 2006).

**Black-Hispanic Identity, Afro-Latino Politics**

Suarez-Orozco et al. (2004) best articulate the concept of identity, describing it as a subjective feeling that is shared amongst members of a certain group given their perceptions of a common origin, as well as a sense of shared values, beliefs, and goals. Similarly, Dawson’s “black utility heuristic” is equally salient within this context, as it demonstrates that intra-group cohesion is driven by the concept of “linked fate” (1994). Collectively, Suarez-Orozco et al. (2004) and Dawson (1994) illustrate that the sense of unity within a given group is shaped by two primary tenets—the external factor of racial prejudice and discrimination, which is an extension of how society views the individual and is defined as social identity; as well as the internal factor that is constructed around the desire for belonging which is an extension of how the individual views him or herself, and is defined as personal identity.

Ultimately an individual’s identity is formed out of the intersection of one’s personal and social identity, but this process is not always fluid or harmonious, and this is especially true for new immigrants to the highly racialized United States. Recent studies on Latino self-identification indicate that there is increasing tension between these two facets of identity for members of the Latino/Hispanic ethnic group (Itzigsohn 2004; Araujo-Dawson 2015; Golash and Darity 2008; Frank et. al. 2010; Rodriguez 2000; Rodriguez et al. 2013; Stokes-Brown 2009, 2012a, 2012b; Wilkinson and Earle 2013). In 1980, 63.7% of Latinos identified their
race as “White” only, while 33.7% identified themselves as “Some other race” (Logan, 2003; US Census Data, 1980). Compare that to 2010 Census data, where 53% identified their race as “White” only, and 42.7% identified themselves as “Some other race” or “Two or more races,” (US Census Data, 2010). Wiley (2013) attributes this decrease in the number of Latinos who self-identify their race as “White” to what he describes as “disidentification” with the majority national group. He argues that “disidentification” occurs “when people are rejected because of a group they belong to, [therefore] identification with that group can increase, [which is referred to] as rejection-identification” (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey 1999; Wiley 2013). He argues that rejection of the group serves to heighten inter-group conflict and social cleavages, and is the catalyst for intra-group identification and solidarity (Wiley 2013).

Similarly, Stokes-Brown finds that there have been discernable shifts in the racial self-identification of Latinos over the past decade (2009). And, while she does not echo Wiley’s sentiment of rejection-identification, she does point out “that Latinos often describe their race as equivalent to their nationality, culture, familial socialization, birthplace, skin color, ethnicity, or a combination of these” (Stokes-Brown 2009, 1284). That is because, for Latinos, racial boundaries are fluid given the interracial composition of Latin American nations (Montalvo and Codina 2001; Rodriguez 2000; Marrow 2003). Consequently, upon migrating to the U.S., Latinos are confronted with a bi-polar racial structure, thus forcing them to modify their racial and ethnic identity (personal identity) according to how others perceive and treat them, given their phenotype (social identity) (Itzigsohn, Giorguli, and Vazquez 2005).

As a sub-group within the pan-Latino/Hispanic identity, one would expect the experiences of Afro-Latinos to mirror that of their non-black counterparts; however, the extant literature reveals that for Afro-Latinos, racial self-identification is a complex and intricate exercise in balancing their personal and social identities. To fully appreciate the conflictual process of Afro-Latinos’ racial self-identification, one need only examine the mutable, arbitrary and ambiguous classifications of race and ethnicity in American society.

There is no biological definition of race or ethnicity, instead these terms and classifications are defined by society and social interaction. There is nothing within the category and classification of race that is immutable. Furthermore, beyond “certain morphological similarities, there is no gene or organization of genes that determines race,” (Oshige-McGowan 1996, 130; See also Cavalli-Sforza et al. 1994). Consequently, the categorical definition of race is simply a manifestation of the artificial and constructed biases influenced by the evolution of society and the passing of time. Also, given that racial categories are socially constructed, they are left up to interpretation, which means some disagreement will always remain regarding where and how to draw the proper racial lines.

Defining ethnicity fares no better than defining race. Classifications constructed according to ethnicity are typically viewed as “divisions among groupings of people within a given race, based more on cultural similarities among people than on perceived physical differences between the groups and others” (Oshige-McGowan 1996, 130). By definition, ethnicity is tied to culture; and culture is not inherited but rather constructed as a combination of rituals, language, practices, and traditions that are learned and interpreted with each generation. As a consequence, there remains confusion regarding the definition of ethnicity, even for the sole government body responsible for ethnic and racial classification—the U.S. Census. To illustrate, the 2010 United States Census establishes a racial category for Asians but an ethnic category for Hispanics, despite that both categories define a group of people
according to the geographic origins of themselves or their ancestors. In this case, it is easy to see why the nature of these categories provides no meaningful distinction between race and ethnicity; which typically leads to the erroneous conflation of race and ethnicity, ultimately forcing Afro-Latinos to choose between the two.

In the Portes and Rumbaut study of second-generation immigrants living in the United States, the authors find that “there was an obvious convergence of race and ethnicity in the way they [second generation immigrants] define their [own] identities” (2001, 177). Of those second generation immigrants who identified ethnically as Asian, 92% identified Asian as their race; of those second generation immigrants, who ethnically identified as black, 85% identified black as their race; and finally of those second generation immigrants who ethnically identified as Hispanic or Latino, 58% identified Hispanic or Latino as their race (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). The findings of the authors indicate that the majority of second generation immigrants in their sample view ethnicity and race as synonymous identities; and “the explicit racialization of the Hispanic-Latino category, as well as the substantial proportion of [second generation immigrants] who conceived of their nationality of origin as a fixed racial category illustrates the arbitrariness of racial constructions” (Portes and Rumbaut 2001, 177).

Undoubtedly, every immigrant experience is different. Consequently, it is not surprising that in contrast to the experiences of Latinos in Portes and Rumbaut’s study (2001), research on black immigrants to the United States, reveals that for this group, race and ethnicity are not synonymous. This is logical given the phenotypic similarities between black immigrants and African Americans, and the racial labeling indicative of the U.S. Subsequently, Waters finds that for second generation black immigrants living in New York City, those who assumed a racial identity viewed themselves as blacks in the United States (1999). Yet, those second generation Haitian and West Indian immigrants who assumed an ethnic and/or immigrant identity viewed themselves as distinct from blacks in the United States and identified themselves as Haitian-American and West Indian-American (ethnic identity), or as Haitian and West Indian (immigrant identity) (Waters 1999).

More recent work on Afro-Latinos indicates that this group ascribes to labels similar to those noted by Waters (1999), or more frequently “they use a number of skin color categories that are also dependent on an individual’s social class” (Newby and Dowling 2007, 346). Therefore, because the U.S. process of racial labeling is incongruent with the historic origins and racial designations most familiar to Afro-Latino immigrants, this group often rejects the singular label “black” (Benson 2006; Bailey 2001; Itzigsohn, Giorguli, and Vazquez 2005; Rodriguez 2000; Itzigsohn and Dore-Cabral 2000). At the same time, there are indications that while Afro-Latinos may reject the labeling of “black” because it is not a sufficient descriptive of their identity they do not appear to reject the substance of their racial identity (Araujo-Dawson and Quiros 2014; Araujo-Dawson 2015). Benson (2006) and Araujo-Dawson and Quiros (2014) find that Afro-Latinos form a black racial consciousness given their experiences with discrimination in the U.S. In addition, Stokes-Brown’s work suggests Afro-Latinos are potentially more likely to identify with African Americans as opposed to Latino Americans (2009). Although Stokes-Brown does not test the strength of intra-group unity among African Americans and Afro-Latinos in her study, she does find that Latinos who racially self-identified as black were less likely to trust the government, when compared to other Latinos. She argues that this face could support “claims that with respect to political attitudes black Latinos are more closely aligned to African Americans” (Stokes-Brown 2009, 1298; Logan 2003). Some
studies have even gone so far as to argue that the commonalities between Afro-Latinos and African Americans provide a justifiable basis to singularly label Afro-Latinos as “black” (Gans 1999; Logan 2003; Gomez 2000). Despite the fact that Afro-Latinos have higher levels of education than other Latino racial groups, lower incomes, and higher rates of poverty, Afro-Latinos and African Americans have comparable socio-economic outcomes; and it is for that reason alone that Gans (1999), Gomez (2000), and Logan (2003) affirm that the grouping of Afro-Latinos and African Americans into a single racial identity is both permissible and pragmatic.

On the other end of the spectrum, there are those who challenge the assertions of Gans (1999), Gomez (2000), and Logan (2003) by noting the potential for intra-group conflicts between Afro-Latinos and African Americans; as such they argue against conflating the two groups (Davis 1991; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Whitten and Torres 1998; Hunt 2002; Greenbaum 2002; Poe 2003; Sansone 2003; Jackson and Cothran 2003; Dzidzienyo and Oboler 2005; Sawyer and Paschel 2007; Johnson 2008; Greer 2013). These scholars maintain that Afro-Latinos and African Americans are not indistinguishable, and to claim otherwise would not only be problematic, but it would also be based upon the erroneous assumption that shared conditions presuppose a shared identity. When interacting with African Americans, Afro-Latinos often find themselves having to defend their “blackness,” since there is the absence of a shared history, culture and even language (Waters 1999; Newby and Dowling 2007). Consequently, Afro-Latinos “face both a biological definition (personal identity) and a cultural association (social identity) linked with blackness that may seem contradictory. [Thus, while the United States] defines them [Afro-Latinos] as black, this categorization may be rejected by African Americans” (Newby and Dowling 2007, 346; Davis 1991; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Whitten and Torres 1998; Hunt 2002; Greenbaum 2002; Poe 2003; Sansone 2003; Jackson and Cothran 2003; Dzidzienyo and Oboler 2005; Sawyer and Paschel 2007; Johnson 2008; Greer 2013).

Afro-Latino Partisanship and Political Behavior

Although certain studies reveal there are some consistencies between Afro-Latinos and other black immigrants as far as also utilizing their ethnic and national origin identities to distinguish themselves from African Americans (Itzigsohn 2000, 2004; Dzidzienyo and Oboler 2005; Sawyer and Paschel 2007; Jackson and Cothran 2003; Lopez 2012); a contending body of empirical research notes that Afro-Latinos appear to have stronger and closer ties to African Americans than any other black immigrant group (Stokes-Brown 2006, 2009, 2012a, 2012b). In addition, Afro-Latinos appear to have closer and stronger ties to African Americans than they do to other Latin origin immigrant groups, suggesting that in comparison to other Latinos, Afro-Latinos may face additional challenges with respect to the formation of their personal and social identity given the demarcations of race and ethnicity in the United States (Stokes-Brown 2012a, 2012b; Massey and Denton 1988, 1993; Argeros 2013; Scopilliti and Iceland 2008).

In this study, I examine the factors that influence the racial self-identification of Afro-Latinos, and then evaluate the impact of these factors on the racial self-identification of other Latino Americans (i.e. those who racially self-identify as white, multiracial, or some other race). This is important because it has been demonstrated that Latino racial identity does have an influence on the political attitudes and voting behavior of Latinos (File 2013; Stokes-Brown 2012a, 2012b; Howard 2011; Claassen 2004). An investigation of the factors that are most
salient to the racial self-identification of Afro-Latinos is essential in order to better understand the process of racial identity assumption among Afro-Latinos, and the implications of this process for Afro-Latino political choices. More importantly, however, it is crucial to this analysis to closely examine the context in which Afro-Latinos racially self-identify as “black” and if they do so from a position where they reject ethnic commonalities with other Latinos, which would suggest Afro-Latinos in this group frame their political choices and public opinion around their black racial identity, and not their Latino ethnic identity.

Table 1
Racial Self-Identification Distribution of Afro-Latinos and Latinos/Hispanics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Latino</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2006</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample %</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample N</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>1066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2009</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample %</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample N</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2011</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample %</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample N</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>634</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: *Black category includes respondents who identified Latino/Hispanic as their ethnicity and Black as their race. **Latino category includes respondents who self-identified as either Latino/Hispanic or according to their national origin identity which was coded as “Some Other Race.” *** 2006, 2009, 2011 are the only years for which respondents report on “Race” and “Ethnicity” allowing for the observation of black Hispanics in the National Survey of Latinos.

Data, Measures and Methodology

To evaluate the racial self-identification process of Afro-Latinos in relation to other Latinos, I utilize data from the National Survey of Latinos (NSL) for the years, 2006, 2009, and 2011 (See Table 1). The National Survey of Latinos is an annual survey conducted by the Pew Research Center. The sample design utilizes a stratified, disproportionate random digit-dialing sample of the forty-eight contiguous states. The National Survey of Latinos collects data on the social, economic, and political conditions and experiences of Latinos living in the United States. The selected NSL datasets for the years 2006, 2009, and 2011 are used in this study because unlike other NSL versions (i.e. 2012 and 2013) they feature questions regarding race and phenotype. In addition, the selected NSL data contain questions regarding ethnic unity, ethnic tensions and experiences of discrimination, as well as a measure of immigrant generation. Finally, the use
of multi-year, independent samples, allows me to observe substantive variations and patterns related to racial identification and group attitudes over time.

The 2006 National Survey of Latinos (NSL) was conducted by telephone from June 5, 2006 to July 3, 2006 and yielded data from a nationally representative sample of 2,000 Latino Americans, of which 896 were registered voters. The 2009 NSL was conducted by telephone from August 5, 2009 to September 16, 2009 and yielded data from a nationally representative sample of 2,228 Latino Americans. While the 2009 NSL questionnaire includes a measure of partisanship, it does not include a question indicating if the respondent is registered to vote. Finally, the 2011 NSL was conducted by telephone from November 9, 2011 to December 7, 2011 and yielded responses from a nationally representative sample of 1,220 Latino Americans, of which 615 were registered voters. The analyses are based upon weighted data to control for the unequal probability of selection and survey nonresponse.

The dependent variable operationalized in the model measures racial self-identification among Latino Americans, specifically focusing on distinctions between Afro-Latinos and other Latin origin groups. The NSL survey questionnaires feature a measure of individual racial self-identification that is based upon the question: “What race do you consider yourself to be? White, Black or African-American, Asian, Multiracial or Some Other Race?” Because this study is most interested in the attitudes of those Latinos who self-identify as black in relation to Latinos who self-identify as white, Latino/Hispanic (as their race), multiracial, or some other race, the racial categories are transformed into a categorical variable, where 1=Black, 2=Hispanic/Latino, 3=Some Other Race, 4=Multiracial, and “0” reflects the reference category, which is White Latino. All other values are coded as missing.

The independent variables are organized into three categories: 1) Acculturation Factors; 2) Immigrant Generation; and 3) Demographic Factors. The measurement of the variables is discussed below.

The variables in the acculturation category are included in the analysis given the assertion that certain factors such as English language fluency, Spanish language fluency, and strength of racial/ethnic group identity all influence an immigrant’s ability to successfully acculturate into society. To measure English language fluency, I utilize the following question from the NSL questionnaire: “Indicate your language proficiency?” The response categories are 1=English dominant, 2=bilingual, and 3=Spanish dominant. For the purposes of this analysis, the responses are recoded to indicate the level of English proficiency in comparison to Spanish proficiency. Therefore, two binary variables are constructed where 1=English dominant and 0=Spanish dominant to measure English proficiency. The second dichotomous variable is constructed where 1=Bilingual and 0=Spanish dominant to measure proficiency in both languages. The third measure of acculturation is an ordinal measure that asks respondents the following: “Would you say you can carry on a conversation in English, both understanding and speaking, very well, pretty well, just a little, or not at all?” The response categories are recoded to reflect an increasing level of proficiency in English so 1=not at all, 2=just a little, 3=pretty well, 4=very well. All other values are coded as missing. With respect to English language fluency, as earlier studies note, Afro-Latinos have higher levels of English proficiency when compared to other Latin origin groups. Therefore, the belief is that Afro-Latinos with English proficiency are more likely to self-identify as black.

The fourth measure of acculturation is a variable that represents group identity; and it is designed to capture the strength of intra-group cohesion for Afro-Latinos in relation to other
Latino racial groups. I argue that Afro-Latinos who report weak levels of Latino group unity, are more likely to racially self-identify as black. This variable is based upon the NSL question (for all selected years), which asks respondents to indicate whether or not they believe Hispanics/Latinos in the U.S. share a common culture or do they believe Hispanics/Latinos in the U.S. have many different cultures. “1” reflects the belief that Latinos share a common culture, while “0” reflects the belief that Latinos have many different cultures. The remaining categories are coded as missing.

The fifth measure of acculturation captures Afro-Latinos’ opinions regarding intra-group conflict in relation to other Latinos. This variable is based upon the following question from the NSL questionnaire (all selected years): “How well do Latinos from different countries of origin get along?” The response categories are 1=well, 2=pretty well, 3=not too well, and 4=Not at all well. For the purpose of this analysis the ordinal measure is transformed into a binary variable where response categories “1” and “2” are recoded as “1” to reflect a generally positive view while “3” and “4” are recoded as “0” to reflect a generally negative view. The expectation is that Afro-Latinos who believe intra-group conflict is prevalent among Latinos, possibly due to race and class divisions, are more likely to racially self-identify as black.

Given that we wish to know the impact the racial structure in the U.S. has on Afro-Latinos in particular, this study includes a sixth acculturation measure, that is taken from the 2009 NSL questionnaire, where, respondents are asked: “Have you experienced discrimination in the past five years?” Responses are reflected in a binary variable where 1=yes and 0=no. All other values are reported as missing. I include this variable in the analysis because of the belief that Afro-Latinos who report experiences of discrimination, especially when controlling for income, education, and English proficiency, are more likely to self-identify as black.

A measure of immigrant generation is included in the analysis given the literature which finds that generational effects are salient among Latino immigrants and can explain variations in political participation as well as identity construction between first and second generation immigrants (Nahirny and Fishman, 1965; Kellstedt, 1974; Lamare, 1982; Chui, et al., 1991, 2001). More specifically, I argue that second generation Afro-Latinos are more likely to self-identify as black, than first generation Afro-Latinos. To capture first generation immigrants, a binary variable coded as “1” is included in the analysis if a respondent indicates they were born in another country or in Puerto Rico, and “0” if they were born in the United States. All other values are reported as missing. To measure second-generation immigrants a binary variable coded as “1” is included in the analysis if a respondent indicates that both parents were born outside the U.S. or in Puerto Rico, and “0” if the respondent indicates that both parents were not born outside the U.S. or in Puerto Rico. All other values are then coded as missing.

The demographic variables operationalized in the analysis, include highest level of education, income, age, gender, marital status and religiosity. These measures are included in the analysis to control for their influence on the relationship between racial self-identification and the explanatory variables of interest. Education and income are measured according to a rising ordinal scale, where lower values correspond to low levels of income and education and higher values correspond to high levels of income and education. Age is a continuous variable, beginning at age 18. Gender is a binary variable, where 0=male and 1=female. Similarly, marital status is a binary variable, where 0=Single, never married, divorced, or widowed, and 1=Married or separated. Religiosity is also a dichotomous variable where 1=religion is important and attends services regularly, and 0=religion is not important and/or does not attend services regularly.
The 2006 NSL offers a unique opportunity to focus specifically on important measures of discrimination among Latinos, because of the belief that Afro-Latinos who report discrimination based upon their skin color are more likely to self-identify as black, as well as report lower levels of Latino unity and higher levels of intra-(ethnic) group conflict. The questionnaire asks respondents to indicate whether one’s skin color, socio-economic class, immigration status, or English language proficiency are a major, minor, or no cause for discrimination. The variable responses are coded as follows: 1=no cause, 2=minor cause, 3=major cause. These variables are included in the estimation of the 2006 equation.

This study examines several factors to determine the predictors of racial self-identification for Afro-Latinos in comparison to other Latinos. Multinomial logistic regression is used to estimate the model given that the dependent variable is comprised of multiple discrete categories. Multinomial logit is most appropriate for unordered categorical response dependent variables, where each category is unique in comparison to the other categories (Powers and Xie 2008). In this case, each racial category is distinct, and the ordering between the categories is equivalent, indicating the dependent variable is not based upon an ordinal scale; therefore, ordinal logit is not applicable. Further, because there are more than two distinct categories binary logistic regression or logit is not suitable to this analysis. Tests for multicollinearity among the independent variables reveal weak correlations between the explanatory measures included in the models.

Empirical Findings

Tables 2 and 3 report the multinomial logit results for the predictors of racial self-identification among Latinos for the survey years of 2006, 2009, and 2012. For the ease of interpretation, the main explanatory variables of interest are presented in Table 2, while the demographic controls are presented in Table 3.

**Group Unity**—For Afro-Latinos, the expectation is that lower levels of Latino group cohesion would contribute to the racial identification of Afro-Latinos as black; however, the findings do not support this assertion. Instead, the results indicate that Afro-Latinos who report that there is a shared sense of unity among Latinos, are more likely to self-identify as black. Where this variable is significant, the same holds true for the comparison groups. Individuals who self-identify as Hispanic/Latino and multi-racial, respectively are more likely to indicate there is a sense of unity among Latinos.

**Group Conflict**—The findings for group conflict are consistent with our expectations for Afro-Latinos, meaning, those Afro-Latinos who report intra-group conflict among Latinos are more likely to racially identify as black. In the case where this measure is significant, the results are consistent with our expectations for the comparison groups. Those individuals who believe relations between Latinos are good are more likely to racially self-identify as white as opposed to Hispanic/Latino.

**Discrimination (2009 Only)**—The findings for the measure of discrimination are consistent with our expectations for Afro-Latinos, meaning, those Afro-Latinos who report having experienced discrimination within the past year are more likely to racially self-identify as black. In the case where this measure is significant, the results are consistent with our expectations for the comparison groups. Those individuals who report having experienced discrimination within the past year, are more likely to self-identify as Hispanic/Latino and Some Other Race, respectively, as opposed to white.

**English Proficiency**—The findings for the variable, English proficiency support our
argument that Afro-Latinos who possess English fluency are more likely to self-identify as black. Where this variable is significant, the results are inconsistent for the comparison groups Hispanic/Latinos and Some Other Race. In 2009, individuals who possess English proficiency are more likely to self-identify as their selected racial group and not white, which is counter to our expectations. Whereas, in 2011, those who report English proficiency are more likely to identify as white, a finding that is consistent with our expectations.

**Immigrant Generation**—Consistent with our hypotheses for Afro-Latinos, second-generation immigrants are more likely to self-identify as black. The results for second-generation immigrants are inconsistent across survey years for the comparison groups, Some Other Race and Multiracial, and the variable is only significant in 2006. However, it is important to note that the findings for first-generation immigrants (Some other race and multi-racial) indicate these two groups are more likely to self-identify as white than their second-generation immigrant counterparts, which is consistent with earlier research on race selection and generational differences (Portes and Rumbaut 2001).

**Afro-Latino Demographic Factors**—Turning now to the results for the demographic control variables presented in Table 3. With respect to Afro-Latinos, the results for the variables education, income, religiosity, and marital status are consistent across the survey years, for which the variables are significant. In sum, the findings suggest that Afro-Latinos who racially self-identify as black, are of low income, possess low education levels, low levels of religiosity, and they are married. The coefficient results for gender and age are either not consistent across the survey years for Afro-Latinos (age) or fails to achieve statistical significance in any of the Afro-Latino equations (gender).

**Hispanic/Latino Demographic Factors**—With respect to the first comparison group, for those individuals who racially self-identify as Hispanic/Latino, the results when significant across survey years indicate this group is of low income, low education, young and not religious. The coefficient results for gender and marital status fail to achieve significance for this group in any of the equations.

**SOR and Multiracial Demographic Factors**—I discuss the findings of the remaining two groups, Some Other Race and Multiracial together because the results are weak and inconsistent, which is likely the result of the composition of the two groups, meaning there are multiple ethnicities and identities represented under the umbrella of these two categories. Therefore, salient patterns fail to emerge, to the extent that I would not reliably say the findings observed would also be observed in future studies.

**2006 Discrimination Variables**—As mentioned in the previous section, the 2006 NSL includes measures that indicate whether respondents feel they have been discriminated against on the basis of their skin color, socioeconomic class, English language proficiency, or their immigration status. In my discussion of the results, I am specifically focusing on these four variables, and the two main groups for comparison, which are Afro-Latinos and Hispanics/Latinos. The findings reported in Table 4 support my assertion that for Afro-Latinos who self-identify as black, discrimination based upon their skin color is a major issue, whereas socioeconomic class is not an issue upon which they feel they have experienced discrimination. The variables English proficiency and immigration status are not significant for this group. In contrast, individuals who racially self-identify as Hispanic/Latino report that discrimination based upon their socio-economic class and immigration status is a major issue. The variables skin color and English proficiency are not significant for this group.
<table>
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<th>MR</th>
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<td>08 (.26)</td>
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Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  
*Significant at .10 level, **Significant at .05 level, ***Significant at .01 level.
Discussion

The main objective of this study has been to examine the factors that influence the racial self-identification of Afro-Latinos and evaluate these findings in relation to those observed for other Latin origin ethnic groups who self-identify as Hispanic/Latino, as well as Some Other Race and Multiracial. Beyond that, this research specifically focuses on those individuals who racially self-identify as black to determine which factors are important to the racial identity assumption process for Afro-Latinos.

The findings in the preceding section provide support for the arguments posed at the onset of this study—that Afro-Latinos who racially self-identify as black report feelings of intra-group conflict with other Latin origin groups, and indicate recent experiences of discrimination in the U.S. based upon their race. At the same time; however, despite the presence of feelings of intra-group conflict, Afro-Latinos still believe that there is a shared sense of identity among Latin Americans. The latter finding runs counter to the arguments made in this study, but given the actual survey question, which more accurately captures Latino group identity than group unity, the results echo the positions advanced by Suarez-Orozco et al. (2004) and Dawson (1994) regarding linked fate.

Apparently, Afro-Latinos believe their ethnic identity as a Latino American is embodied within a common culture shared by all Latinos. Additionally, second-generation Afro-Latinos and those with English language proficiency are also more likely to racially-self-identify as black. These collective findings suggest that while Afro-Latinos who racially self-identify as black may feel they share a common culture with other Latin origin groups, their experiences with racism and conflicts with other Latinos indicate that they feel more closely aligned with their racial group (African Americans) than their ethnic group (Latino Americans).

To further deconstruct the empirical results, the inferences emerging from this study support the findings of earlier work (Golash-Boza and Darity 2008; Stokes-Brown 2012a, 2012b) with respect to the influence of discrimination on Latino racial choice. However, the Golash-Boza and Darity (2008) study was specifically interested in the racial choices of Latinos within the context of ‘Latino social whitening’. The authors were not, however, focused on those individuals who identify their ethnicity as Latino/Hispanic, but then make specific racial choices, whether they be black, white or Hispanic/Latino. Similarly, this study extends the work of Stokes-Brown (2012a, 2012b), but not by making further contributions to research that highlights the various motivations as to why Afro-Latinos reject the racial labeling of black, but instead it examines the motivations behind why Afro-Latinos embrace a black racial identity, beyond that of prior experiences of racial discrimination.

Thus, the main contribution this study makes to the literature is that it explores those factors that influence the process of black racial self-identification among Afro-Latinos and finds that while these individuals believe in a shared ethnic Latino identity, intra-group conflicts with other Latinos is equally salient to Afro-Latinos. The take away from that is Afro-Latinos who racially identify as black, do not reject their Latino identity and cultural ties, but they do not feel their Latino racial identity unifies them with other Latinos on issues of social experiences in the United States. I would argue this dynamic translates into political behavior and attitudes as well. Further, this assertion is supported by the findings among the comparison groups—individuals who view intra-group relations as positive are more likely to racially self-identify as white. With the inclusion of the discrimination factors in the 2006 model, the findings reveal a similar trend. Afro-Latinos who self-identify as black believe skin color is the cause for
personal discrimination, while those individuals who racially self-identify as Hispanic/Latino attribute discrimination, not to color, but to socioeconomic status and immigrant status, which they view as the two barriers to upward social mobility (Gabbacia 2003).

To conclude this discussion, I argue that this study challenges scholars to reframe their theoretical orientation in future research on Afro-Latinos. Instead of identifying why Afro-Latinos decide not to racially identify as black, a more substantive perspective would be to focus on why Afro-Latinos who racially identify as black choose to do so. More specifically, as politics become increasingly racialized, how does this dynamic translate into political efficacy and voter mobilization? Beyond the impact on politics and policymaking, what other factors play a role in the process of racial identity assumption for Afro-Latinos who self-identify as black? And are there better ways to capture racial intra-group identity and unity, as I did here with Latino identity, that more accurately reflect this unique relationship than what has been done in previous studies and surveys? Consequently, regardless of ethnic identity (Latino, African, Caribbean, etc.), the goal for future research is to more closely examine the unifying factors for those individuals of immigrant background who racially identify as black, in an effort to develop strategies for improving relations both within and between groups in what has become an increasingly diverse society.

**Conclusion**

Given that nationwide population increases have primarily been driven by foreign-born residents of Latin origin, which has also correlated with the rise in inter-ethnic tensions between blacks and Latinos, and co-ethnic citizens in states with growing immigrant populations, a better understanding of the social position of Afro-Latinos is especially timely and relevant (Buchanan 2005; Kaufmann 2003; Meier et al. 2004; Gay 2006; McClain et al. 2006). Latino Americans and African Americans represent the two largest minority groups in the United States, and while their policy and political preferences at times coalesce (Howard 2011; Hajnal and Baldassare 2001; Hero and Preuhs 2010; Lenoir 2010), there are several instances where they diverge, and even conflict (Howard 2011; Kaufmann 2003; Gay 2006; McClain et al. 2006). Within this context, the invisibility of the Afro-Latino identity in the United States challenges scholars to re-evaluate how we consider race, ethnicity, and identity in society, as well as the impact these factors have on group relations and domestic politics.
Table 2

Predictors of Racial Self-Identification—Acculturation and Immigration Factors

<table>
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</table>

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
*Significant at .10 level, **Significant at .05 level, ***Significant at .01 level.

N=690
Pseudo R²=.1358
Prob > χ²=0.000
Log Pseudo Likelihood=−809.11

N=584
Pseudo R²=.1587
Prob > χ²=0.000
Log Pseudo Likelihood=−263.6

N=695
Pseudo R²=.2139
Prob > χ²=0.000
Log Pseudo Likelihood=−893.5
Table 3
Predictors of Racial Self-Identification-Demographic Factors

|        | AL  | HL  | SOR | MR  | AL  | HL  | SOR | MR  | AL  | HL  | SOR | MR  |
|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
|        | 2006 |     |     |     | 2009 |     |     |     | 2011 |     |     |     |     |
| Educ   | -.14** (0.05) | -.22** (0.10) | -.01 (0.06) | -.11 (0.07) | -.09 (0.28) | -.18** (0.08) | -.14 (0.09) | .18 (0.19) | -.36*** (0.09) | -.46** (0.17) | -.04 (0.24) | 2.2*** (0.58) |
| Income | -.22*** (0.09) | -.03 (0.24) | -.11 (0.15) | .15 (0.19) | -.88** (0.18) | -.35* (0.20) | -.42** (0.19) | .57 (0.43) | -.89** (0.43) | .09 (0.24) | .04* (0.09) | .05 (0.09) |
| Gender | -.28 (0.19) | -.34 (0.35) | -.38* (0.23) | .08 (0.28) | -.90 (0.88) | -.15 (0.24) | -.27 (0.24) | -.25 (0.50) | .89 (1.2) | .28 (0.21) | .04* (0.02) | -.09 (0.05) |
| Marital Status | 27** (0.13) | -.04 (0.16) | .01 (0.11) | -.08 (0.13) | 1.7** (0.93) | -.30 (0.32) | -.03 (0.29) | -.2.2** (0.89) | 2.4** (1.3) | -.04 (0.38) | -.11 (0.68) | -.11 (0.33) |
| Age    | -.03*** (0.006) | -.03* (0.01) | -.02** (0.008) | -.02** (0.009) | .15 (0.17) | -.04 (0.04) | -.05 (0.04) | -.12 (0.08) | .06* (0.04) | -.02** (0.01) | .04** (0.01) | -.03** (0.01) |
| Religion | -1.53* (0.91) | -1.4** (0.78) | .31 (0.44) | -.71* (0.43) | .22 (0.26) | -.02 (0.08) | -.07 (0.08) | .12 (0.17) | -1.6*** (0.54) | .09 (0.10) | .02 (0.18) | .21** (0.10) |

N=690 N=584 N=695
Pseudo R²=.1358 Pseudo R²=.1587 Pseudo R²=.2139
Prob >χ²=0.000 Prob >χ²=0.000 Prob >χ²=0.000
Log Pseudo Likelihood≈809.11 Log Pseudo Likelihood≈263.6 Log Pseudo Likelihood≈893.5

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
*Significant at .10 level, **Significant at .05 level, ***Significant at .01 level.
Notes
1. If Afro-Latinos do not select the Black racial category, research indicates that when available they select ‘Two or More Races’ or the ‘Other’ category on surveys.

2. 6.0% of the U.S. population report that they are ‘Some other race’. 6.2% of the U.S. population report that they are ‘Some other Hispanic’. See Mary C. Waters, Philip Kasinitz, and Asad L. Asad. (2014). “Immigrants and African Americans.” The Annual Review of Sociology 40: 369–90.


5. NSL 2009 and 2011.

6. The bilingual variable is not estimated in the models due to collinearity.

7. NSL 2006.

8. Within the timeframe of at least one year prior to the administration of the survey.

References


Marrow, Helen. 2003. “To Be or Not to Be (Hispanic or Latino).” Ethnicities 3(4): 427–64.


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University of Utah

Abstract

The recent political change in the South as a result of immigration from Latin America has drawn increasing attention from scholars of racial relations (McClain, et al., 2008). One remaining vital political question is about the future of racial coalition among black and Latino voters in the South, which undoubtedly will impact presidential elections due to the critical role of states such as Florida, the partisan makeup of Southern state legislatures and local governance (Liu, 2010). This paper focuses on South Florida where the Haitian immigrant community has been increasingly influential and Cuban Americans are historically conservative. Recent survey data, however, showed that Cuban Americans, especially the younger generation, have become more Democratic, and there has been an increase in Latino Democratic registered voters in South Florida (Pew Hispanic Research Center, 2012). It is thus important to examine the extent to which minority candidates have been able to build a racial coalition among the Haitian and Cuban American communities in South Florida.

This study examines the racial votes in ten federal, state and local elections between 2008 and 2014. The racial vote estimates in these elections were based on King’s EI method (King 1997), and the findings show that the racial polarization ran deeper in South Florida. Surprisingly, the only biracial coalition that was built by a minority candidate in South Florida was in a 2014 Commissioner of Agriculture’s election, a race with very low publicity. Overall, in South Florida the racial coalition among the Haitian community and Cuban Americans is, therefore, unlikely to be successful, even for viable minority candidates, in near future.

Keywords: Black immigrants, Black and Hispanic polarization, Electoral coalition, Candidate name recognition, Minority partisanship

Introduction

At the national level, the electoral coalition among Black and Latino voters played a key role in President Barack Obama’s two successful campaigns (Liu, 2014 and 2010). But questions remain about the viability of such coalitions at the local level, especially in places with large concentrations of both Black and Latino populations. South Florida, for instance, is such a place.

The historical racial and ethnic divisions in local elections in South Florida have been well documented by political scientists. Hill, Moreno, and Cue (2001) examined the 1996 Dade County mayoral election, in which Alex Penelas, a Cuban American Democrat competed against Arthur “Art” Teele, an African American Republican. Penelas defeated Teele in the runoff election with more than 95% of the Hispanic vote, while Teele’s black support was also more

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than 95% (Hill et al., 2001, 303). The racial polarization in these vote choices was reflected by the “air war” among the Spanish language and “Black-oriented" radio stations before the election. The Cuban American community tuned into Cuban stations, which asked them to deal with “a problem of race", while African Americans were warned by Black radio programs of “Spanish becoming the official language of Dade” and a “master plan by Cubans to take over” (Hill et al., 2001, 303).

Hill et al. also note that “most Dade County Hispanics are Republicans, and nearly all Blacks in the county are Democrats” (Hill, et al. 2001, 303). Yet, the partisan divide among black and Latino voters in the 1996 election was less apparent than the racial fissure. Two recent changes in South Florida, however, would cause one to question whether Hill et al.’s observations about a substantial partisan and racial division among Hispanic and Black voters still holds true.

First, there has been somewhat of a shift in partisan affiliations. A recent Pew Research Center reported that Republican Hispanic registered voters still outnumber Democratic Hispanic voters in Miami-Dade County (where 46% of the nation’s Cuban-American population resides) (Krogstad et al., 2016). However, the number of Republican voters has declined. In 2016, there were 260,000 Republicans and 213,000 Democrats, both decreases of about 5,000 from 2014. But even in this Cuban Republican stronghold, more of the county’s voters registered for the Democratic Party than the Republican Party. Among Hispanic registered voters among 2006 and 2016, the number of Democrats increased 62% while the number of Republican registered voters was flat” (Krogstad et al., 2016). These numbers reflect a decrease in registered voters in a county with a substantial Hispanic population. One can infer that more Hispanic voters are registering as Democrats rather than as Republicans.

The second change in South Florida is related to the Black community. The immigration from Central America and the Caribbean, especially Haiti, has transformed the composition of the Black community. According to a Pew Research Center report, “The Miami metro area has the largest share of black immigrants. Thirty-four percent of the black population in Miami are immigrants compared to 28% in New York and 15% in Washington” (Ordonez, 2012). The report also indicates that “Perhaps not surprising, most of the black migration in Miami and across the country has come from the Caribbean” (Ordonez, 2012). Thus, the Black community now consists of African Americans and a large number of black immigrants.

Although the recent increase in the Cuban American Democratic registration and the greater share of Black immigrants from Central America in South Florida have drawn attention from the media, few scholars have examined relationships among Black and Latino voters in South Florida. These voters will undoubtedly impact presidential elections (due to the critical role of Florida) as well as the partisan makeup of the state legislature and local governments (Liu, 2010).

Based on racial coalition theories that emphasize voter-centered, candidate-centered, and contextual factors, this study proposes three hypotheses to empirically examine the racial voting patterns in South Florida. I also examine the racial voting patterns in ten biracial and multiracial federal, state and local elections in South Florida between 2008 and 2014. The racial voting estimates in these elections were based on Gary King’s EI method and the findings show that the racial polarization was more evident in South Florida (King 1997). Surprisingly, only one South Florida minority candidate developed successful biracial coalition in the elections under review. This occurred in a 2014 Commissioner of Agriculture election. In essence, this
examination of these South Florida elections confirms the unlikelihood of future Haitian-Cuban electoral coalitions.

Theory and Hypotheses

The winner-take-all feature of the American electoral politics requires candidates to build successful coalitions (Walton, 1975). Historically, it has been imperative for minority candidates to develop biracial and multiracial electoral coalitions because of a number of elements such as low black voter turnout, institutional factors, and other barriers to their electoral success (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, 2003). Scholars have attributed the success or failure of minority candidates in building racial coalitions according to voter-related, candidate-related, and contextual factors (Liu, 2010).

Voter-related factors are those concerning the characteristics of voters, such as their shared group interests, ideology, or historical experiences. In their influential study of political incorporation, Browning et al. (1984) argued that racial coalitions and liberal ideologies directly influence minority political empowerment in urban America. As discussed above, the Latino community of South Florida has become more liberal in the last decade in spite of the Cuban American Republican tradition. In addition, Democratic Party registration has increased in the Miami metropolitan area. The first hypothesis, therefore, can be stated as:

(H1) The level of biracial cooperation among Latino and Black electorates in South Florida has been greater in the most recent elections of this study.

Candidate-related factors discuss the characteristics of candidates, their choice of certain campaign strategies, and the manner in which they use their resources to win support from various groups. Raphael Sonenshein (2003; 1993), for example, indicated that the successful biracial coalition among White and Black voters in Los Angeles during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s was based on the effective leadership of the six-term Mayor Tom Bradley, in addition to their shared group interests, and liberal ideology. A successful coalition among White and Black voters was also created by Chicago Mayor Harold Washington in 1983 and 1987. Therefore, the second hypothesis argues:

(H2) The level of biracial coalition among the Latino and Black electorates in South Florida is higher for minority candidates with greater name recognition.

Contextual factors involve the conditions under which the elections take place. For example, the way the electoral district is drawn, the timing of the election, the level of electoral office, and external political events may all determine who is elected in a given election. The most significant political event in the last decade has been the election of Barack Obama whose unprecedented multiracial coalition allowed him to win the presidency twice. While Obama’s deracialized campaign strategy helped him gather a respectable amount of white voter support, his success occurred during a time when demographic changes offered a greater opportunity for a minority candidate to win a national election (Liu, 2014 and 2010). The third hypothesis states that:

(H3) Minority candidates were more likely to establish successful biracial coalitions among Latino and Black voters in 2008 and 2012 (the presidential election years that Barack Obama was on the ballot) than in other years.

Data and Methods

This paper examines the biracial or multiracial elections involving candidates from different racial groups in South Florida among 2008 and 2014. Since voters cast their votes
secretly, one has to develop estimates of racial voting behavior. In particular, I used the ecological inference (EI) method and software. Unlike ecological regression (also called Goodman regression), EI does not make unrealistic assumptions about voters (such as the assumption that voters from the same racial group voted exactly the same way across precincts). Another major reason to use the EI method, rather than Goodman or double regression methods, concerns the limitation of these latter regression procedures. For example, they sometimes produce erroneous estimates (e.g., white support for a black candidate is less than 0%). EI offer more reliable estimates because of its “method of bounds feature” (see Liu (2007) which compares all available statistical methods that estimate racial voting and then provides detailed reasons about the superiority of the EI method.

This paper analyzes a total of 10 elections that took place among 2008 and 2014. All of these are biracial and/or multiracial elections in which minority candidates compete against one another. Among the 10 elections analyzed, five are statewide elections. The results provided in this paper were based on the EI estimates for those voters who are located in South Florida only, rather than the estimates of votes in the whole state because our focus is on South Florida voting patterns. Four of the statewide elections are general elections—the 2010 US Senate election, the 2008 and 2012 Presidential elections, and the 2014 Agriculture Commissioner election. In addition, this study examines one statewide primary election—the 2014 State Attorney General Democratic primary.

Furthermore, regional biracial and/or multiracial elections are also very important because they indicate the way in which Hispanics and African Americans voted in South Florida. Four of these elections are general elections. They are: The 2012 State Senate District 35 election; the 2012 Broward County Judge Group 10 election; the 2012 Circuit Judge 17, Group 45 election; and the 2014 Dade County Judge 19 election. Finally, this paper analyzes a regional primary election in South Florida-- the 2014 US Congressional District 26 Republican Primary.

Findings
In the 2012 Broward County Judge Group 10 election, the black candidate, Roshawn Banks, was defeated by the Hispanic opponent, Robert Diaz. According to Table 1, Banks received 78.16% of the black vote and only 32.88% of the Hispanic vote. Thus, racial polarization, rather than racial cooperation, was more apparent among Hispanic and African American voters (see Column 7 of Table 1) in this election. It is clear, therefore, that the racial divide among Hispanics and Blacks in South Florida was a major reason for Banks’ defeat.
Table 1
Black Candidates’ Racial Group Support in South Florida Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>% of White Votes</th>
<th>% of Black Votes</th>
<th>% of Hispanic Votes</th>
<th>Racial Polarization among Whites and Hispanics</th>
<th>Racial Coalition among Blacks and Hispanics</th>
<th>Black Candidate Defeated in South Florida</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012 Broward County Judge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks**</td>
<td>22.52</td>
<td>78.16</td>
<td>32.88</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Denotes an election where the Hispanic candidate(s) ran against a black candidate.

Table 2 further reveals more details about the manner in which Banks’ Hispanic opponent, Robert Diaz, won the 2012 Broward County Judge election. His success did not result from a biracial coalition among Hispanics and Blacks, but rather from a biracial coalition among Hispanics and Whites (see Column 6 of Table 2).

Table 2 also shows the other four South Florida regional elections which involved at least one Hispanic candidate. In the 2012 State Senate District 35 election, the Hispanic Republican candidate, John Daniel Couriel, was defeated by his white Democratic opponent, Gwen Margolis. This was a non-traditional election because white voters cast the majority votes for the Hispanic candidate, but he failed to win the majority votes of Hispanics.

For the other three South Florida elections reported in Table 2, none of the Hispanic candidates in the respective elections established successful biracial coalitions among Hispanics and Blacks (again, see Column 7). In fact, racial polarization among Hispanics and Blacks was the norm, which directly led to the defeat of Bocanegra in the 2014 Dade County Judge 19 election despite his receipt of 64.06% of Hispanic votes. In the 2012 Circuit Judge 17, Group 45 election, Julio E. Gonzalez, Jr., won the race because of the white support and strong backing of Hispanic voters. In comparison, Carlos Curbelo won the 2014 Congressional District 26 Republican primary as a result of his appeal to the Hispanic constituency. White voters provided only 21.01% of their vote for Curbelo while the Black vote was as low as around 1.5%.

In sum, all the South Florida regional elections indicate that the racial polarization among Hispanic and Black voters was the norm. As shown in Tables 1 and 2, five out of six times Black and Hispanic voters preferred different candidates. Neither Black nor Hispanic candidate won an election due to a successful coalition among Black and Hispanic voters.

Concerning Florida’s statewide elections, the 2012 U.S. Senate Election in Florida involved one white candidate, one black candidate, and one Hispanic candidate. Charlie Crist, the white candidate and then Florida Governor, ran as an independent. The Democratic Party nominated Kendrick Meek, the Black candidate, to run against the Republican nominee, Marco
Rubio, the Cuban American candidate and winner of the race.

As shown in Table 3, there was a very high level of racially polarized voting for Meek’s candidacy. He won 92% of the votes from African American voters, yet only 10.45% of support from Hispanic voters. Table 3 also reveals that Rubio was able to win 71.7% Hispanic votes in South Florida.

Table 3 also shows the results of racial estimates for the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections, in which Barack Obama, a Black candidate, ran against white candidates John McCain and Mitt Romney, respectively. A very high level of racial polarization occurred in these two elections in South Florida. The white voters voted as a bloc against Obama and so did the Hispanic voters. However, his Black voter support was almost unanimous in both presidential elections.

The 2014 State Attorney General Democratic Primary election provides a unique opportunity to examine whether a successful biracial coalition among Black and Hispanic voters can be established. Based on this election, we see in the table below that Blacks and Hispanics inside the Democratic Party did not vote along the same lines. Perry Thurston, an African-American candidate, was able to receive only 20% of the Hispanic vote while his Black support was more than 71%. Again the racial divide among Hispanic and Black voters was very evident inside the Democratic Party in South Florida.

The 2014 Agriculture Commissioner election featured Thad Hamilton, an African-American Democratic candidate, against Adam Putnam, a White Republican. As shown in Table 3, Hamilton was the only minority candidate who successfully built a biracial coalition among Hispanics and Blacks in South Florida. However, when the final result was announced in the whole State of Florida, Hamilton still lost to his White opponent with only a 41.3% vote total.
Table 2
Hispanic Candidates’ Racial Group Support in South Florida Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Election</td>
<td>Hispanic Candidate</td>
<td>% of</td>
<td>% of</td>
<td>% of</td>
<td>Racial Polarization</td>
<td>Racial Coalition</td>
<td>Hispanic Candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>among Whites and Hispanics</td>
<td>among Blacks and Hispanics</td>
<td>Defeated in South Florida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Broward County Judge Group 10</td>
<td>Diaz** (non-partisan)</td>
<td>77.55</td>
<td>21.84</td>
<td>67.27</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 State Senate District 35</td>
<td>Couriel (Republican)</td>
<td>56.50</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Circuit Judge 17, Group 45</td>
<td>Gonzalez, Jr (non-partisan)</td>
<td>50.70</td>
<td>42.35</td>
<td>64.64</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014 Dade County Judge 19</td>
<td>Bocanegra (non-partisan)</td>
<td>32.92</td>
<td>15.14</td>
<td>64.06</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014 US Congressional District 26 Republican Primary</td>
<td>Curbelo (Republican)</td>
<td>21.01</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>60.73</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Denotes “non-traditional racial polarization” where the white voters cast the majority votes for the minority candidate who failed to receive the majority votes of his/her own racial group.

** Denotes an election where the Hispanic candidate(s) ran against a black candidate.
Table 3
Minority Candidates’ Racial Support in Florida Statewide Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Minority Candidate</th>
<th>% of White Votes</th>
<th>% of Black Votes</th>
<th>% of Hispanic Votes</th>
<th>Racial Polarization among Whites and Hispanics</th>
<th>Racial Coalition among Blacks and Hispanics</th>
<th>Minority candidate defeated in South Florida</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010 U.S. Senate</td>
<td>Rubio** (Hispanic Republican)</td>
<td>46.33</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 U.S. Senate</td>
<td>Meek** (Black Democrat)</td>
<td>10.19</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td>10.45</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 U.S. President</td>
<td>Obama (Black Democrat)</td>
<td>49.11</td>
<td>99.58</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 U.S. President</td>
<td>Obama (Black Democrat)</td>
<td>42.92</td>
<td>99.51</td>
<td>48.17</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014 State Attorney</td>
<td>Thurston (Black Democrat)</td>
<td>34.04</td>
<td>71.01</td>
<td>20.01</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014 Agriculture Election</td>
<td>Hamilton*** (Black Democrat)</td>
<td>17.55</td>
<td>98.32</td>
<td>88.45</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Denotes an election where the Hispanic candidate(s) ran against a black candidate.

*** Denotes an electoral success due to the coalition among Hispanic and Black voters.
Overall, there is no clear sign that the Latino and Black electorates are increasingly cooperative in the electoral arena. The success of Hamilton in 2014, however, provides a partial support for our first hypothesis, which suggested an increasing likelihood of building a biracial coalition overtime among Cuban Americans, who are increasingly liberal and Democratic, and Haitian immigrants in South Florida. At the same time, our second hypothesis is rejected because highly visible and effective minority candidates at the national and/or state levels did not succeed in building the biracial coalition among the Black and Latino electorates. Both Obama and Rubio received large amounts support from their own racial group, but not from white voters. Finally, the third hypothesis is also rejected because there is no evidence for the coattail effect of the presidential year (2012 and 2008) on the minority candidates’ success in biracial coalitions among the Latino and Black voters.

Conclusion

Writing in 2008, political scientist Paula McClain and her colleagues discussed the need for additional research about the effects of new immigrant groups on racial politics. McClain et al. (2008, 163) indicated that “[t]he phenomenon of Latino immigration to the American South is such as recent phenomenon that it is difficult to capture not only its dynamics but also the possible effects new immigrants are having on race relations.” As reported by the Pew Research Center, Democratic registration has grown and there have been demographic changes in South Florida, especially the increase of Black immigrants from Haiti and other Central American areas. These partisan and demographic changes have provided a valuable opportunity to test whether minority candidates have been able to build more successful biracial coalitions among Latino and Black immigrant voters to win electoral offices in recent elections.

This paper focused on ten South Florida regional and state elections of the last decade in which both Latino and Black candidates had to compete against candidates of other racial groups. Based on the extant literature, we derived three hypotheses concerning voter characteristics, candidate strengths and electoral contexts. The empirical findings provided partial support for the first hypothesis which suggests that the shared history as immigrants from Latin America leads to more political cooperation among Latino and Black voters in South Florida more recently than in the past. However, only one minority candidate in 2014 was able to establish a biracial coalition among Black and Latino voters. Moreover, the findings failed to confirm the second and third hypotheses, which suggest that with a higher level of name recognition politicians such as Barack Obama and Marco Rubio have more opportunities and resources to build successful biracial coalitions among Latino and Black immigrant voters in South Florida than other minority candidates with much lower level of name recognition.

In sum, the above analysis shows that the racial polarization, instead of the racial coalition, among Hispanic and Black voters in South Florida has been the norm, which further leads to additional conclusions. First, Blacks as a group are cohesive in voting for candidates from their racial group in South Florida. Hispanics also favor Hispanic candidates, though their cohesion level is not as high as Black voters; Hispanic voters show especially strong support for viable Hispanic and Republican candidates in South Florida.

Second, the racial polarization among Hispanic and Black voters has taken place in both primaries and general elections, partisan and non-partisan elections, regional or statewide elections, legislative and judicial elections. Indeed, there is very limited, if any, opportunity in the future to take advantage of the racial coalition among Hispanic and Black voters in South
Florida to win competitive biracial and/or multiracial elections. Confirming Hill et al. (2001), this paper provides new empirical evidence for the sustaining effect of race, despite the increase in the Hispanic Democratic registration and Black immigrants from Haiti and other Central American areas.

References
Assimilation and Black Immigrants: Comparing the Racial Identity and Racial Consciousness of Caribbeans and African Americans

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Abstract

We evaluate the extent to which Caribbeans and African Americans share racial identity and racial consciousness. Our argument states Caribbeans will assimilate with African Americans depending on whether they were born in the U.S. and if they mostly lived in the United States while growing up. We also contend that society treats Caribbeans as if they are African Americans, and therefore, Caribbeans align themselves with African Americans. Using the 2004 National Politics Study, we find that self-reported U.S.-born Caribbeans are more like African Americans in terms of racial identity and racial consciousness than Caribbeans not born in the United States. Self-identified Caribbeans who lived in the United States during their developmental years are more like African Americans than Caribbeans who resided elsewhere. Caribbeans reporting they were both born in the U.S. and lived in the U.S. during their formative years are more like African Americans than any other Caribbean group.

Keywords: Assimilation; Racial Identity; Racial Consciousness; Caribbeans; African Americans

Introduction

A familiar global refrain is “the United States is a nation of immigrants.” People from foreign lands come to the United States in hopes of achieving the American dream. They come expecting better lives for themselves and their families. They come to experience freedom, economic security and safety. For some, this means assimilation, the process undertaken by immigrants to replace their original heritage and culture with the culture of the majority of the host country (Alba 1999). When immigrants assimilate, they become more like the mainstream and less distinctive culturally. Ethnic origin is less relevant to the immigrant when compared to the ethnicity of the majority (Alba 2006). Assimilation is successful when immigrant groups acquire equal opportunity and upward mobility to the degree that their social and economic standing are indistinct from the majority (Metzger 1971).

In this research, we address the question, “What is the assimilation process for Black immigrants and how does it affect their identity and consciousness going forward?” In order to answer this question, we must address two additional questions concerning what and whom to compare. As far as what to compare, we suggest it should be racial identity and racial consciousness. Comparing socioeconomic status is fraught with far too many options to use for

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measures. In addition, socioeconomic status is affected by so many more factors than immigrant status and race that it makes assessing cultural and economic assimilation problematic. Therefore, we examine racial identity and racial consciousness.

As far as whom to compare, analyses that focus on assimilation should compare immigrants with U.S. citizens of the same racial group. More precisely, analyses should compare Black immigrants with African Americans. As Butcher (1994) states, Black immigrants are an obvious and natural comparison group to African Americans. According to Bryce-Laporte (1972), Black immigrants are “invisible” because they are compared to African Americans rather than with other immigrants. Moreover, Black immigrants from the Caribbean experience pressure in the United States to identify themselves as “Black” and discard their national and ethnic origins (Kasinitz 1992). Hence, we compare Caribbeans with African Americans. More specifically, we compare the racial identity and racial consciousness of Caribbeans to the racial identity and racial consciousness of African Americans.

Examining Caribbeans offers several interesting factors worthy of study. As Kalmijn (1996) states, they have dual statuses. They are both Black and immigrant. Some scholars portray them as success stories (Glazer and Moynihan 1964; Sowell 1978) and others contend that they face the double burden of racism and xenophobia (Bryce-Laporte 1972). The question we pose is whether these dual statuses and double burdens have racial implications. We assert that they do.

**Literature Review**

According to Gordon (1964), Lieberson (1980), and Hirschman (1994), the standard immigration process is one of intergenerational progress. The first-generation of immigrants experience the most difficult time in assimilating. A deficiency of essential skills, including education, and the need to learn a new culture and perhaps a new language thwart their ability to climb the social and economic ladders.

Subsequent generations receive dual socialization and education. They learn the culture, language, and mores of the United States as well as the culture, language, and mores of their parents’ native land (Hirschman 1994). Over time, subsequent generations acquire the requisite education and obtain the necessary skills to compete with U.S.-born citizens for jobs, educational opportunities, and other resources. Indeed, the classic model of assimilation is one of “Americanization” whereby the longer the immigrant lives in the country, the more likely she or he will experience social, economic, and political success that nears parity with citizens who are native to the country (Hirschman 1994).

Immigrants also experience prejudice and hostility (Hirschman 1994). The welcoming nature of the United States is not always obvious to all groups of immigrants. The road to assimilation is not uniform across immigrant groups and acceptance depends heavily on the race of the immigrant. Based on European immigrants, this is the straight-line theory of assimilation (Warner and Srole 1945). It predicts that the longer the duration that immigrants and their children live in the United States, exposing themselves to American culture and identity, the more they become American, losing their ethnic identity and shared culture with their parents.

The straight-line theory of assimilation does not adequately depict the history of Black immigrants. European immigrants tend to be White. The theory seems to assume that race relations and racism are not relevant. The reality for Black immigrants is much different than it is for White immigrants. Black immigrants are not able to assimilate into being just Americans, but most often assimilate into being African Americans (Waters 1994). In other words, Black immigrants cannot simply discard their ethnic identity and still blend into mainstream society.
When it comes to scholarly coverage of the political behavior of Black immigrants, Caribbeans in particular, the cupboard is rather bare. Most of the works focus on race and pluralist theory, Caribbean group consciousness, and the prospects of building coalitions. Professor Dianne Pinderhughes (1987) provides a good starting point. She highlights the boundaries of the pluralist theory for explaining the Black experience in the United States, discussed above as the straight-line assimilation theory. Like others who point out the flaws of assimilation theory or pluralist theory, Pinderhughes argues that the race of Black immigrants serves as an impediment to their assimilation progress and asserts that experiences with discrimination leads Blacks (natives and immigrants) to be more liberal on public policy.

Professor Shayla Nunnally (2010) scrutinized the links between African Americans and Caribbeans/West Indians and African Americans and Africans in the United States. The work assesses the conditions under which African Americans exhibit a linked fate with others in the African diaspora. Professor Nunnally inspects whether African Americans possess linked fate with West Indians and Africans in the United States. The findings are, a majority of African Americans do have a Black linked fate, but its connection to West Indians and Africans in the United States is fragile. The work further indicates that African Americans who have experienced discrimination have a stronger connection to other Blacks. The findings also show that the connection between African Americans and West Indians or Caribbeans and Africans in the United States is weak. She concludes that there is Black linked fate, but not necessarily a healthy dose of diasporic linked fate. However, while the (2010) study focus is on African Americans, this study emphasis is the worldview of Caribbeans. Therefore, we will focus on a few pertinent studies.

The question posed by Austin, Middleton, and Yon (2012) is whether African Americans and Black ethnics (Haitians, Africans, Afro-Cuban Americans, and Afro-Caribbean Americans) share group consciousness. They also seek to understand why they share a group consciousness to the extent that one exists and whether it influences political participation. Austin et al. find that the aforementioned Blacks do share a group consciousness. They share a group consciousness based on race, similarities in experiencing discrimination, comparable political interests, shared ideological views, and preferences in leadership. Lastly, they find that group consciousness does spur political participation, especially among African Americans, but it is a considerably weak stimulant for the Black ethnics.

Professor Reuel Rogers (2004) embarks on a case study analysis of African Americans and Afro-Caribbean immigrants in New York City. His aim is to determine why Afro-Caribbean immigrants and African Americans did not form a political coalition. Based on the minority group hypothesis, he expected them to forge such an alliance. According to this perspective, because Afro-Caribbean immigrants and African Americans have the same racial commonality and racial divisions separate them from Whites, they should have forged a political coalition. Such a coalition, Afro-Caribbean immigrants and African Americans, never came to fruition (Rogers 2004) because the relationship was one of conflict and not cooperation.

The literature ignores the effects of assimilation on the opinions of Caribbeans. While there is some focus on their ethnic identity, linked fate, and political participation, scholars have not assessed the impact of assimilation on the racial identity and racial consciousness of Caribbeans in comparison to African Americans. We find this to be an unfortunate oversight, for Black immigrants make up a significant percentage of legal immigration to the United States racially.
since 1965 (Butcher 1994). Also, Caribbeans and African Americans share so much including race, history, and experiences with racism and discrimination. This scholarship seeks to fill this void. Not only do we examine racial identity and racial consciousness of Caribbeans through an assimilation lens, but we also compare them to African Americans.

While most studies on immigration seek to understand its impact on the United States, we reverse this focus to learn how migration to the United States has affected the immigrant. We aim to learn whether Caribbeans migrating to the United States adopt the racial identity and racial consciousness of African Americans, the U.S. racial group most resembling Caribbeans.

**Theoretical Perspectives**

According to Model (1991), the Caribbean offers a less racially hostile, and discriminatory environment than the United States. Denton and Massey (1989) tell us that Caribbean race relations are rather open and tolerant. To the extent that prejudice exists, it is along the lines of social class. Experiencing racism and racial discrimination in the United States must be traumatic to Caribbeans. They leave a region where racism, discrimination, and prejudice are mild and migrate to a country where race is central, and racism, discrimination, and prejudice are quite prevalent. Additionally, they leave a predominantly Black society where Blacks are the majority and wield political power in favor of a country where Blacks are in the minority and hold very little political influence.

After 1965, U.S. immigration policy changed and the majority of immigrants have not been White (Butcher 1994; Deaux et al. 2007; Portes and Zhou 1993; Rogers 2004; Butcher 1994). This new wave of immigrants included a large number of Black immigrants. According to Portes and Zhou (1993), many of these contemporary immigrants may not have experienced racism or discrimination in their native countries. However, after migrating to the United States their physical appearance often becomes a handicap. The race of the immigrant now becomes a salient feature, not just the immigrant’s ethnicity. Therefore, analyses of assimilation must take into account the race of the immigrant.

Alba (1999) contends that assimilation is a two-step process. The first step is that immigrants must strive for access to social spaces that the majority occupies. The second step is that the majority must deem their entry acceptable. Many Caribbeans outward appearance precludes their acceptance as members of the majority. The Caribbean immigrants’ exclusion from the majority leads to the relegation of them receiving the same treatment as African Americans and not White Americans. Therefore, there is a limit to the ability of Black Caribbeans to assimilate in the United States.

Additionally, society imposes its own set of racial boundaries onto those who are not members of the White race (Alba 2006). A Caribbean immigrant might see themselves one way while the majority of Americans may race impose upon that individual an identity they find to be accurate and treat the immigrant accordingly. Therefore, there are limits to racial identification. Given few options or no choices as to how to identify oneself, one easily adopts the racial identity imposed on them by society. Hence, Caribbeans, as Blacks, are African Americans in the United States. Caribbeans are not able to engage in the conventional notion of assimilation where individuals shed themselves of identification with one social group and take on a new one (Gordon 1964). They are not able to become White Americans. Because Caribbeans are mostly Black and not White immigrants, they will receive the same treatment as if they are African Americans (Portes and Zhou, 1993). With the latter description, Caribbeans will receive the
full potency of racism and discrimination. As a result, they acquire an African American racial consciousness.

The immigrant’s place of birth and place of residence during their developmental or formative years directly impact their development and assimilation. That is, if socialization is to take place, the what kind and when of it matters. If a self-identified Caribbean was born in the United States, then we presume that she or he will experience similar socialization as any other American. We suspect that they will be aware of the racial climate in the United States and either have experienced racism and discrimination first-hand or know someone who has experienced them.

Hirschman (1994) addresses the critical factor of the timing of years spent living in the United States. The influence of socializing agents (family, friends, school, media, etc.) depends on the age of the immigrant at the time of immigration and residence in the new country. He states that youths learning new languages at an older age will have accents, while younger youth immigrants will not. Also, older youth immigrants who are educated in a new country will have a harder time adjusting than younger youth immigrants. The younger youth immigrants experience more conflict because they will be subject to peer pressure that conflicts with family socialization. Thus, one’s age at the time of arrival (particularly during the developmental or formative years) to the United States is an extremely important consideration.

The crux of this study examines immigrant views over time with respect to racial identity and racial consciousness, which we describe as the “assimilation continuum” (see figure 1 below). The variables along the continuum depict a subset of self-identified Caribbean/West Indians and indicators of both racial identity and racial consciousness. For a description of all variables in the study, see the appendix at the end of the article. We expect strong and weak correlations, depending on which end of the continuum the respondent is located compared to African Americans. Generally, the assimilation continuum depicts comparative relationships in respect to how groups align or associate with the responses of African Americans. A generalized continuum will look at the emigrating individual over time and conclude with that individual as an assimilated immigrant. The continuum accounts for the notion that assimilation may not be the standard straight line, but as we propose an actualization of racial and cultural nuances over time based on the immigrant’s place of birth and where raised.
We offer the following hypotheses. First, Caribbeans who are born and bred in the United States will be more like African Americans in terms of racial identity and racial consciousness than Caribbeans in any other category along the assimilation continuum. We expect that the other four categories of Caribbeans—(1) not bred in the United States, (2) not born in the United States, (3) born in the United States, (4) bred in the United States—to vary somewhat, but become increasingly like African Americans as we move across the categories. That is, we hypothesize that Caribbeans who were “bred” in the United States are more like African Americans than Caribbeans who were “born” in the United States.

In addition, the final two hypotheses further demonstrate the relationship of Caribbean categories along the assimilation continuum and African Americans. We hypothesize that Caribbeans who were only born in the United States are more like African Americans than Caribbeans who were not born in the United States and finally, that Caribbeans who were not “born” in the United States are more like African Americans than Caribbeans who were not “bred” in the United States.

The distances between the responses given by Caribbeans and African Americans operationalize likeness, closeness, and similarities between groups. Distance is the absolute difference from the responses given by the different types of Caribbeans from the responses given by African Americans. After obtaining crosstabs, we subtract each set of responses from the categories of Caribbeans from African Americans. A shorter distance or smaller number indicates that the category of Caribbeans is close while a longer distance or larger number suggests that the category of Caribbeans is not close to African Americans. Therefore, we hypothesize that Caribbeans who are U.S. born and U.S. bred are more like or closer to African Americans than Caribbeans who are not U.S. born or not U.S. bred. From the latter, we expect that the former category of Caribbeans will have survey responses that are shorter in distance from the survey responses given by African Americans.

We must make one caveat as to the omission of evaluating generational effects. We do not find it is necessary to breakdown Caribbeans by generations because we believe we capture those effects. Furthermore, we would be making a distinction without a difference. That is, as more generations of Caribbeans are born and/or reside in the U.S., they will not be any more Americanized or less African Americanized than previous generations. To the contrary, we believe that as one goes from first-generation to second-generation, to subsequent generations, one is arguably more African Americanized as the previous generations. Creating distinctions based on generations does not add to our analysis. We assert that the generations of Caribbeans will be like African Americans, but the difference might only be a matter of degrees. Therefore, we do not assess whether generations of Caribbeans are more like African Americans because as long as they share the physical appearance of race, then it matters little whether they are first-
generation, second-generation, or any other generation of Caribbean or West Indian.

**Data, Methods, and Terminology**

Our contention is that Black immigrants may lose some of their culture and heritage and assimilate into the majority culture of the United States, but not fully assimilate. Because of their race, they experience racism and discrimination like other racial minorities in the United States. As a result, over time, they come to reject the ethnocentrism of the majority that relegated them to an inferior status. The so-called welcoming nature of the United States is more accurate for immigrants who look more like the majority so Caribbeans cannot fully assimilate or adopt the culture of the majority. Black immigrants, Caribbeans in this investigation, will adopt the culture of the race that most closely approximates their own, not the culture of the majority. Caribbeans will assimilate more closely to African Americans. The end-result is a convergence of racial identity and racial consciousness where, over time, Caribbeans come to share the same views on racial identity and racial consciousness as African Americans.

We must address our use of the term “immigrants.” In this study, immigrants are Caribbeans or West Indians who were not born in the United States, but live in the United States. We do not use “immigrant” as a technical term. We use it to account for one end of the assimilation continuum. At one end of the assimilation continuum are respondents who report that they are Caribbeans or West Indians who were not born and not bred in the United States. The other end of the assimilation continuum is respondents who state that they are of Caribbean or West Indian descent who were born and bred in the United States. Comparing several groups of Caribbeans with African Americans is our focus, but chiefly, we are comparing these polar ends of the assimilation continuum of Caribbeans with African Americans.

Given self-reporting, we are not overly concerned with immigrant status because race is the common denominator among these Caribbeans and African Americans. Also, place of birth and residence during the developmental or formative years (where they lived mostly while growing up) are the differences of interest. Therefore, we also examine Caribbeans and/or persons of West Indian descent who were not born in the United States, those who were born in the United States, those not bred in the United States, and those bred in the United States.

In the end, it matters little whether these Caribbeans self-reported accurately because they will assimilate as African Americans and not White Americans. In the United States, race glosses over citizenship. Unlike supposition of the straight-line theory, Caribbeans will not be “Americanized,” but they will be “African Americanized.” The starkest differences, then, are between those Caribbeans who were not born or bred in the United States and those Caribbeans who were born and bred in the United States. We portend the differences between Caribbeans and African Americans are masked or diminished because of a shared race, shared history with slavery, and shared experiences with living in the United States. In other words, Caribbeans will receive the same treatment as African Americans and, as such, they adopt an identity and consciousness accordingly. Specifically, they acquire a matching racial identity and racial consciousness to African Americans.

Using pre-existing data taken from the 2004 National Politics Study, we create crosstabs of opinions according to the respondents’ self-reporting as being of “Caribbean or West Indian descent.” We compare various groupings of Caribbeans (classifying based on their birthplace and where s/he lived mostly while growing up) with African Americans on matters of racial identity and racial consciousness. According to the findings, one’s birthplace and place of
residence during their formative or developmental years matter. Generally, we find that self-reported U.S.-born Caribbeans are more like African Americans concerning racial identity and racial consciousness than Caribbeans not born in the United States. We also find that self-identified Caribbeans who lived in the United States while growing up are more like African Americans regarding racial identity and racial consciousness than those who did not. Lastly, Caribbeans born in the U.S. and mostly residing in the U.S. while growing up are more like African Americans than any Caribbean group. This finding is true on all measures of racial identity and racial consciousness.

This investigation uses the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson, Hutchings, Brown, and Wong 2004). This survey collected responses from September 2004 to February 2005. Its total sample size is 3,339 with a response rate of 30.6%.

We use this survey for two reasons. First, it has a significant number of respondents who are of Caribbean or West Indian descent by which we can test our theory. Most surveys do not account for Caribbean or West Indian descent, making this data set very valuable. Therefore, we can compare Black immigrants with African Americans and evaluate whether Caribbeans assimilate in the United States by taking on the racial identity and racial consciousness of African Americans.

The sample sizes for both African Americans and Caribbeans/West Indians make this a very valuable data set. The sample size for African Americans is 756 and the number of Caribbeans/West Indians is 528. Of these Caribbeans/West Indians, a crosstab analysis reveals that 314 were not born in the U.S. and not bred in the U.S., 310 reported that were not bred in the U.S., and 212 stated they were not born in the U.S. The crosstab analysis also show that 214 Caribbeans/West Indians said they were born in the U.S., 205 stated that they were bred in the U.S., and 203 reported they were born and bred in the U.S. One caveat about the crosstabs. It is conceivable, and very likely, that some of the responses to “where born” and “where bred” are inaccurate. We did what we could to isolate the cases appropriately.

Second, this survey includes a comprehensive battery of questions that offer the opportunity to operationalize the key concepts addressed in our analyses. Namely, it allows us to compare the racial identity and racial consciousness responses of different types of Caribbeans with African Americans. Specifically, we are able to test our contention that where one was bred has a greater impact on assimilation than where one was born. Therefore, we anticipate that Caribbeans who are born and bred in the United States are more like African Americans while Caribbeans who were not born or bred in the United States are most dissimilar to African Americans.

**Empirical Analysis**

To test our assimilation theory, we embark a series of calculations. First, we proceed by observation through cross tabulation. Table 1 and Table 2 depict the cross-tabulated results. The tabulated data depict the responses of the respective Caribbean groups based on the expectations that each group of Caribbeans along the Assimilation Continuum, moving from left to right, will look more like African Americans. In the tables, there are two numbers for each cell. The top number represents the responses to the survey questions by each group of Caribbeans. The bottom number in each cell reflects the distance from the Caribbean responses from the African American responses. African Americans are the reference group, therefore, there is only one number in their cell, and it is the responses to the survey questions.
## Table 1

### Racial Identity

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<tr>
<th></th>
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Source: National Politics Study, 2004
Second, we examine the differences in responses. Figure 2 (Decomposed Variables of Racial Identity) and Figure 3 (Decomposed Variables of Racial Consciousness) illustrate the distance of each Caribbean group response from that of the responses of African Americans for the racial identity and racial consciousness questions. Each line shows the differences of responses among the Caribbean groups compared to African Americans. By subtracting each Caribbean subgroup response from the African American response and then plotting that information along the Y-axis with the Caribbean group plotted on the X-axis we establish a measure of distance. The downward sloping of the line indicates closeness to African American responses and support the thesis portrayed by the assimilation continuum. Overall, 85% of the graphics are indicative of closeness to African Americans and overall support of the assimilation continuum.

### Table 2

Racial Consciousness

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<tr>
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</table>

Source: National Politics Study, 2004
Figure 2
Decomposed Variables of Racial Identity
Figure 3
Decomposed Variables of Racial Consciousness
Third, we are interested in determining whether there is a correlation between Caribbeans and African Americans. The analysis addresses both association and the strength of association based on the calculated correlation between zero and one. The strength of the correlation between Caribbeans and “Closer to” is closeness to African Americans. It is measured as the closer one is to African Americans the more one is like African Americans while the closer to zero is less like African Americans in respect to the two groups of variables (racial identity and racial consciousness). Figure 4 presents the correlation values. Larger effects are on the right with numbers greater than .5, while lesser effects move towards the left with values progressively diminishing. According to Field (2009), when using a correlation coefficient, we are looking for numbers closest to positive or negative one, which is indicative of a correlation and its direction.

Finally, we test for statistically significant correlations with African Americans on the Y-axis and the Caribbean categories on the X-axis. The African American responses are constant in employing the test for statistically significant correlation. In all cases, we use a null hypothesis that there is no difference between groups. In respect to statistically significant correlation, we expect the right side, and not the left side, of the assimilation continuum to show strong statistically significant correlations with African Americans.

Recall that we advanced three hypotheses that focused on the racial identity and racial consciousness of Caribbeans in relation to African Americans. Hypothesis 1 holds that Caribbeans who are born and bred in the United States will be closer to African Americans.
than Caribbeans who were not born and not bred in the United States. Hypothesis 2 contends that Caribbeans who were only bred in the United States are more like African Americans than Caribbeans who were only born in the United States. Hypothesis 3 proposes that Caribbeans who were only born in the United States are more like African Americans than Caribbeans who were not born in the United States. We test these hypotheses by regressing the responses of African Americans on the responses of the various groups of Caribbeans.

Findings

Hypothesis 1 receives support in terms of both racial identity and racial consciousness. The results of the regression test indicates a statistically significant positive correlation with responses concerning racial identity and racial consciousness between Caribbean that are U.S. born and U.S. bred and African Americans. The analysis for racial identity shows $r = .81$, ($p < .05$ used for statistical significance with a 95% confidence interval). The analysis for racial consciousness results show $r = .88$, ($p < .05$ with the actual $p = .008$ indicative of the strength of the correlation).

With respect to Hypothesis 2, the contention states that where one is bred is more influential than where one is born. As such, Caribbeans who were only bred in the United States should be more like African Americans than Caribbeans who were only born in the United States. The corresponding null hypothesis is that Caribbeans born in the United States are no different than Caribbeans bred in the United States compared to African Americans. The results of the test for statistically significant correlation using United States Born only, and United States Bred only did not support the hypothesis. Instead, the outcomes indicated statistically strong and significant correlations for each group with African Americans as it pertains to Racial Identity and Racial Consciousness so the null was accepted. The calculated outcomes are as follows: $r = .97$, ($p_{U.S. \text{ born}} = < .05$ and actual $p_{U.S. \text{ born}} = .000171$ (very strong statistically significant correlation)); and, $r = .97$, ($p_{U.S. \text{ Bred}} = < .05$ and actual $p_{U.S. \text{ Bred}} = .000171$ (again very strong statistically significant correlation)).

With respect to Hypothesis 3, we test whether Caribbeans who were only born in the United States are more like African Americans than Caribbeans who were not born in the United States. The corresponding null hypothesis is Caribbeans born in the Unites States are no different from Caribbeans not born in the United States compared to African Americans. Again, to test the null we use the regression test to measure for significance. The result of the test showed a statistically positive correlation with Caribbean is reporting they were born in the U.S. with African Americans in both categories racial identity and racial consciousness. The results for racial identity for Caribbeans born in the United States are as follows: $r = .80$, $p = .05$; compared to Caribbeans reporting they were not born in the United States whose results indicate $r = .20$ and $p = .70$. The differences of the p values are indicative of the polar ends of the assimilation continuum. As for racial consciousness, the results are similar and as follows: $r = .86$, $p = .05$; compared to Caribbeans reporting they were not born in the U.S. whose results are $r = .59$ and $p = .15$ which is demonstrative of no statically significant correlation.

Overall, all hypotheses provide a compelling case for differences, distance, and statically significant correlation between Caribbean groups and closeness to African Americans. Even though Hypothesis 2 did not receive support, the foundation of the assimilation continuum remains in tack since the statistically significant correlation adheres to the major contention of the continuum with the left side observations, distances, differences, and correlation is farther
away from African Americans while the right side closeness to African Americans increases.

**Conclusion**

The driving idea behind this study is that we believe that the scholarly understanding of assimilation is too rigid, limited, and one-dimensional. This work embarks on a deeper understanding of the dynamics of immigrants, immigration, and assimilation. It strays from the straight line thinking of assimilation and instead considers the assimilation continuum, which entails ebbs and flows and recognizes the duality of the American society in respect to race and racial bias.

The work opens the door for further study of American racial dynamic as something uniquely peculiar to North America. In addition, the notion of the Caribbean as a people group needs further exploration in respect to their cultural norms and whether or not the assimilation continuum has effects in both directions. The importation of social change and the host community adopting some of the thinking of the emigrant who previously had been the majority but due to racial bias has joined the ranks of the African American ‘minority.’

We submit that assimilation is in part a result of internal forces inherent in the immigrant population, but also, external forces. One assimilates to the degree that their outward appearance allows and consistent with racial norms of the host country. Some immigrants cannot assimilate and blend in with the majority culture. What they must do is blend in with a culture that most matches their outward appearances. In the case of Black immigrants, it is to blend in with African Americans. Hence, Caribbeans assimilate inasmuch as they are successful at being indistinct from African Americans. The end-result is that Caribbeans align themselves with African Americans in that they share racial identity and racial consciousness.

Indeed, we contend that the assimilation theory we advance is generalizable to other Blacks. Blacks, including Africans and Black immigrants who come to the United States from all over the world adapt their racial identity and racial consciousness to be more in line with those of African Americans. This is the case because the United States is a racialized environment whereby society treats people as members of a race based on color rather than as individuals.

**References**


American Academy of Political and Social Science 641: 220-246.

Appendix
Description of Variables Used in Analyses

Caribbean Social Groups

Caribbeans
“Do you consider yourself of Caribbean or West Indian descent?” Yes.

Not U.S. Born and Bred
Caribbeans who were born outside the U.S. and mostly lived outside the U.S. while growing up.

Not U.S. Bred
Caribbeans who mostly lived outside the U.S. while growing up.

Not U.S. Born
Caribbeans who were born outside the U.S.

U.S. Born
Caribbeans who were born in the U.S.

U.S. Bred
Caribbeans who mostly lived in the U.S. while growing up.

U.S. Born and Bred
Caribbeans who were born in the U.S. and mostly lived in the U.S. while growing up.

African Americans
Respondent identified race as African American.

Racial Identity

Linked Fate
“Do you think what happens generally to [Respondent’s Race] people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?” Yes.

Close to… African Americans, Caribbeans, White People, Hispanics, Asian Americans
“How close do you feel to each of the following groups of people in your ideas, interests, and feelings about things?” “Very close” plus “fairly close.”
Racial Consciousness

Blame Minorities
“If racial and ethnic minorities don’t do well in life they have no one to blame but themselves.” “Somewhat agree” plus “strongly agree.”

Blacks Deserve
“Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve.” “Somewhat agree” plus “strongly agree.”

Bootstraps
“Irish, Italians, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.” “Somewhat agree” plus “strongly agree.”

Fair Treatment
“How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements? ‘American society just hasn’t dealt fairly with people from my background.’” “Somewhat agree” plus “strongly agree.”

Racism
“On the whole, do you think that most White people want to see [Respondent’s Race] get a better break, do they want to keep [Respondent’s Race] down, or don’t they care or way or the other?” “Keep down” or “get a better break.”

African American Discrimination
“Now I would like to ask you about how much discrimination or unfair treatment you think different groups face in the U.S. Do you think the following groups face a lot of discrimination, some, a little, or no discrimination at all? How about African Americans?” “A lot,” plus “some,” plus “a little.”

Caribbean Discrimination
“Now I would like to ask you about how much discrimination or unfair treatment you think different groups face in the U.S. Do you think the following groups face a lot of discrimination, some, a little, or no discrimination at all? How about Caribbeans?” “A lot,” plus “some,” plus “a little.”
Black, Foreign-Born and Elected: 
West Indians in New Jersey’s Political Offices

Hyacinth Miller*
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, Newark

Abstract
This study seeks to gain an understanding of how West Indian-born elected officials access elected office and examined their candidate profiles. After exploring various facets of their lives including their immigration to the U.S., education, employment, desire to run for office and the political structure of New Jersey, I find that the typical West Indian-born elected official is a well-educated, oftentimes entrepreneurial, middle-aged community activist. More often than not, they gain the confidence and support of key local political actors who help them to win elected office in both majority white and majority co-ethnic communities.

Keywords: West Indians, Caribbean Americans, New Jersey, elected officials

Introduction
When I began my research, I was directed to the quaint town of South Toms River, in Ocean County, along the coast of the Jersey Shore, to find a potential respondent. It is here that I would make outreach to the newly elected Mayor Joseph M. Champagne. I called the City Hall offices to locate him, but first asked if in fact, the town elected a Caribbean or West Indian man? The woman on the receiving end of my call enthusiastically replied, “Yes. We have a Haitian-American as our Mayor” and gave me his contact information.

Not only does Mayor Champagne serve his community with the same enthusiasm and drive that brought him on a journey from Haiti through New York, Italy, and Vermont to South Toms River, but he has not forgotten his roots. When visitors and residents enter City Hall to access or inquire about services, or participate in the legislative process, they see the flags of the United States, Ocean County and Haiti. In a town with about 3,600 residents, 70% white, a non-existent West Indian population and a majority of unaffiliated voters, how did a West Indian come to be elected Mayor?

This is the first research project in New Jersey to examine West Indian elected officials and how they have accessed elected office. I trace the path of eight elected officials in local office. These case studies reveal important and surprising findings, some of which stand in contrast to extant studies on candidate profiles and minority candidate recruitment.

Immigrant political incorporation has multiple dimensions including naturalization, voting, advocacy and social organization participation. I focus on elected leadership asking how West Indians come to run for local office and what underpins their success. I seek to add to the literature of immigrant political incorporation, expand the scope of research on Caribbean-
born elected officials to include those outside of New York City and other large urban areas, ultimately, to consider the feasibility of undertaking a more extensive comparative study to include Caribbean-born elected officials in other states across the country.

This study uses a comparative case study design rooted in qualitative research methods. I employed snowball sampling to learn the names of West Indian candidates and elected officials within New Jersey. I conducted eight semi-structured interviews of eight municipal office holders with open-ended questions that sought to discuss the subjects’ immigrant background and motivations for seeking elective office.

This paper analyzes the background of these elected officials, their districts and campaigns to determine what salient factors led them to run for office and why. This paper has four sections. Section one provides a historical description of New Jersey’s immigrant population, section two provides a review of New Jersey’s unique political structure and section three provides a description of the respondents, their initial political engagement and pathways to elective office. Lastly, section four provides an analysis and conclusion. The ensuing research will discuss how these eight Caribbean-born elected officials have created a space for themselves within the local government and have convinced voters of their shared values.

Candidate Emergence and Candidate Profiles

West Indian migration to the United States began in the early part of the twentieth century because of the development of the banana industry by the United Fruit Company (UFC) (Palmer 1995). Palmer argues that Caribbean men migrated to other parts of the Caribbean, especially Panama, to seek employment in the construction and agricultural trades. However, once boats began delivering UFC bananas to ports along the Atlantic, most notably New York, the inter-Caribbean migration shifted to the United States. Upon arriving, most West-Indian immigrants settled in African-American neighborhoods most notably Harlem, New York (Reid 1939). They soon assimilated into African-American and the larger American cultures (Bryce-Laporte 1972, 1984). The migrants, mostly men, came with education and skills that enabled them to adjust quickly to the mixed classes of the Harlem community by securing jobs, housing and becoming involved in social activities (Reid 1939).

During this adaptation process, West Indians joined established local political organizations such as the United Democratic Club and the newly created African Blood Brotherhood, a radical black liberation organization, optimistic about gaining political, economic and social power. However, as Bryce-Laporte notes, the many achievements of West Indians have gone relatively unnoticed thus causing them to suffer a dual invisibility (Bryce-Laporte 1972). Because of the complexion of the majority of West Indians at this time, they were phenotypically indistinguishable from Black Americans. Outside observers subsumed their “West Indianness” under the native Black umbrella. Forty years later, and for the purposes of this paper, are Bryce-Laporte’s conclusions still accurate in New Jersey? Who are these candidates? What has inspired them to run for elected office? Do they conform to the normative standards for a political candidate? I take up some of these questions in this study.

The largest concentrations of Caribbean immigrants in the United States live in New York City and although dispersed throughout the boroughs, most reside in Brooklyn (U.S. Census 2000). Thus, much of the research and scholarship about West Indians has focused on New York City (Kasinitz 1992; Mollenkopf 2001; Foner 1998; Waters 1999; Rogers 2006). Outside of New York, New Jersey and Florida have the largest populations of Caribbean immigrants, yet
these populations remain under-studied. This research project is among the first to research the political involvement of Caribbean-born West Indian immigrants in New Jersey and how they have secured elective office.

There are numerous bodies of literature in which to situate this research. For this project, I focus on two key categories: West Indian migration and political incorporation in the U.S. and candidate emergence and profiles.

Research on who chooses to run for local office in the U.S. offers several insights that inform my work. In *Who Runs for the Legislature*, Moncrief and colleagues argue that though there are anywhere between 5,000 and 6,000 state legislative elections in a two-year period, the majority of literature written about campaigns focus on national campaigns for president and the Congress (Moncrief et al. 2001, xi). While my research focuses on municipal elected officials, I argue that this research on non-incumbents who run for office will provide some useful parallels and as Lawless (2012) argues, “career ladder politics tends to characterize candidate emergence in the United States.” Descriptive representation is important and Lawless (2012) posits that research on candidate emergence is useful in that “particular socio-demographic groups are best able to represent the policy preferences of that group.”

Moncrief et al. (2001) interview 600 candidates in eight states and focus on key questions, such as why are they willing to run and how did they come to the decision. These researchers conclude that the majority of incumbents run unopposed and that campaigning requires a significant investment of time and personal resources. They also determined that most of the candidates who ran were middle-class, middle-aged empty nesters, business owners or employees, or retirees. They found that only 10% were attorneys (Moncrief, et al. 2001). The candidates also tended to be active in local politics, which includes volunteer work on other campaigns, or to the local party and the most common recruitment agents were political party or elected officials (Moncrief et al. 2001). Prior to running for a state seat, many held school board, city council or county commission seats and ran as open-seat challengers rather than challenging an incumbent (Moncrief et al. 2001).

Moncrief et al. determine that “state legislatures have always been bastions of middle-aged, white males” and devoted a chapter to researching the recruitment patterns that bring women and minorities to run for the legislature (Moncrief 2001, 95). They conclude that three-quarters of the women candidates are in their 40’s or 50’s because women postpone running for political office while their children are young, more than half have a college or post-graduate degree and more women than men are comfortable running for office without the support of a spouse (Moncrief et al. 2001).

With respect to minority candidates, Moncrief, et al (2001,105) conclude that where there are few minorities, virtually none are found in the state legislature and where minorities constitute a substantial portion of the electorate, far more are elected to office. African-American candidates tend to be somewhat younger than their white counterparts, with very little difference between the groups on education and income levels, and there are a higher percentage of African American women candidates than white women candidates (Moncrief et al. 2001). Interestingly, they find that party agents are not important recruiters in bringing African Americans to run for state legislature and that they are more likely to be urged to run by people from their churches, neighborhoods and families. They conclude, “traditional recruitment mechanisms may be slow to find people from underrepresented groups to run for office” (Moncrief et al. 2001, 114).

Lawless (2012) finds four factors outside the traditional political opportunity structures
(such as open seats, term-limited incumbents, or politically congruent constituencies), that influence a candidate to run for office: minority status, family dynamics, professional experiences and political attitudes and recruitment. Of interest to this research, in her summary of findings regarding evidence of the effects of minority status in the candidate emergence process, Lawless (2012) posits that the gender gap in nascent ambition exists among white, black and Latino eligible candidates. She further contends that women are less likely to consider running for office and are less likely to be recruited to run for office. In addition, African Americans are more likely than their white counterparts to be recruited to run for office and to consider themselves qualified to run for office. In both these discussions about minority candidates, it is unclear if any of the subjects are foreign-born and would have responded differently if their ethnicity were also a salient factor.

These studies help to frame expectations about the decision-making process West Indian candidates employ when deciding to run for office and to some extent, their qualifications as candidates, though they did not focus on immigrants or ethnic identity. My research contributes to filling this gap.

New Jersey – Its People, Places, and Politics

The state of New Jersey is nicknamed the Garden State because of its production of various fruits and vegetables on its more than 10,000 farms (State of New Jersey website). New Jersey, nestled between New York to the north and both Pennsylvania and Delaware to its South and West is a densely populated compact state (only about 130 miles in length). Its top three largest cities are Newark, Jersey City and Paterson with its capital Trenton, as the tenth largest (American Community Survey, U.S. Census). In 1950, one in four New Jerseyans lived in one of the “big six” cities, Camden, Elizabeth, Jersey City, Newark, Paterson and Trenton.

New Jersey has 21 counties, and unlike any other state, has 565 towns, cities, boroughs, townships and villages. Almost one third of the municipalities, 177, are less than two square miles, more than 100 have populations with less than 2,000 residents and approximately 200 are almost exclusively supported by state funding (Karcher 1998). To provide perspective, Rhode Island is another small, dense state; however, it has only 39 municipalities that average 30 square miles (Karcher 1998). New Jersey is also the nation’s most suburban state because many workers now commute from homes in one fringe suburb to jobs in another and never need to enter a city (Salmore and Salmore 2013).

Based on the U.S. Census estimates as of July 2011, New Jersey has approximately 8.8 million residents of which 1.8 million, or 20%, are foreign born. This state has always been a multicultural state and is on track to becoming a majority-minority state (Salmore and Salmore 2013). On average, immigrants to New Jersey tend to be more highly educated than those living elsewhere and data from the National Science Foundation show that almost half (48%) of state residents with master’s degrees and 41% of those with doctorates in scientific fields are immigrants (Gang and Piehl 2008).

According to a Pew Research Center 2014 Study, the state of New Jersey currently ranks third in the country, behind New York and California, as an immigrant receiving state. For 100 years, 1870 through 1970, the majority of New Jersey’s immigrants came from eight European countries: Italy, Germany, Russia, England, Scotland, France, Ireland and Poland (Fine et al. 2014). As of the 1980 Census count, approximately 68,000 Cuban immigrants resided in New Jersey (Fine et al. 2014). As of the 1990 Census, most continued to emigrate
from Italy; however, with the 2000 and 2010 Census, immigrants from Asia and Latin America comprise the majority of immigrants to the state (ibid). Many of New Jersey’s newest waves of immigrants come from India, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Philippines, Columbia, China and Korea (Fine et al. 2014).

New Jersey’s immigrants reside in all of New Jersey’s 21 counties; however, six counties have more than 100,000 foreign-born residents and of those six, three have upwards of 200,000 foreign-born residents (see Table 1 below). Bergen County has the highest number with approximately 260,000, followed by Hudson, Middlesex, Essex, Union and Passaic. The largest numbers of West Indian immigrants live in Essex County followed by Union, Hudson, Bergen and Middlesex showing some overlap.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County Name</th>
<th>Foreign-Born Population</th>
<th>West Indian Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey (State)</td>
<td>1,804,834</td>
<td>127,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bergen</td>
<td>260,657</td>
<td>8,903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hudson</td>
<td>254,080</td>
<td>9,785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middlesex</td>
<td>239,862</td>
<td>8,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essex</td>
<td>188,390</td>
<td>42,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union</td>
<td>153,485</td>
<td>15,832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passaic</td>
<td>137,541</td>
<td>8,329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morris</td>
<td>91,747</td>
<td>2,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monmouth</td>
<td>82,405</td>
<td>5,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somerset</td>
<td>73,454</td>
<td>3,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercer</td>
<td>73,022</td>
<td>6,386</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: US Census 2007-2011 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimate

New Jersey is home to almost 20%, or one-fifth, of the country’s Caribbean population. Immigrants from the Caribbean basin region make up about 3% of New Jersey’s population with 270,187 residents. West Indians, as described in this study, account for 49%, almost half, of the Caribbean basin population in New Jersey with approximately 128,000 residents. The largest numbers of West Indian immigrants in New Jersey hail from Jamaica and Haiti with approximately 40,000 each, Guyana with 20,000, Trinidad and Tobago with 13,000, Dominica 5,900, Panama 3,200, and Barbados with 3,000 (see Table 2).
Table 2
The Caribbean Population in the U.S. and New Jersey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Caribbean Born</td>
<td>1,461,033</td>
<td>270,187</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>684,268</td>
<td>40,217</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>591,572</td>
<td>40,125</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>262,403</td>
<td>20,478</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>231,582</td>
<td>13,222</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>27,079</td>
<td>5,894</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>52,368</td>
<td>3,080</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>30,519</td>
<td>1,356</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
<td>23,096</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>32,149</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>47,579</td>
<td>1,052</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>103,098</td>
<td>3,283</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**West Indies** 21,876 2,157 9.9%

Source: US Census 2007-2011 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimate

** - Those with ancestry in the region who did not select a specific country

New Jersey’s Political Structure

Political experts consider New Jersey a “blue state” – i.e. a state where voters predominantly support the Democratic Party. Democrats also comprise the majority of its voting electorate. Despite Democrats controlling both Houses of the state legislature, a Republican currently serves as governor.

The state has been politically characterized by strong “home rule,” which is the power of a local city or county to set up its own system of self-government, strong local political machines and weak statewide institutions (Salmore and Salmore 2013). For much of New Jersey’s history, county governing politics was the equivalent of state governing politics meaning county political structures were the nucleus from which municipalities self-governed (Salmore and Salmore 2013). Along with the ability for relatively small entities to practice self-governance and make determinations on lucrative contracts, New Jersey has also had its fair share of political corruption as documented in books about New Jersey politics, including Ingle and McClure’s The Soprano State: New Jersey’s Culture of Corruption (2008). Salmore and Salmore (2013) also detail the rich history of New Jersey political corruption with elected
officials from U.S. Senators to county bosses and city mayors including Enoch “Nucky” Johnson, the Atlantic City political boss and the HBO series Boardwalk Empire fame through the recent 2013 conviction of Trenton Mayor, Tony Mack, for extortion and bribery.

New Jersey’s county structure is also unique in that a Board of Chosen Freeholders governs each of the 21 counties. New Jersey’s 565 municipalities fall under the jurisdiction of county government and practice 12 forms of government (Salmore and Salmore 2013). The majority forms of government are Mayor-Council, where the Mayor is the chief executive with veto power and the legislative serves purely as a legislative body and Council – Manager, where the group of popularly elected Council Members select a Mayor, whose duties are limited to presiding over council meetings (Salmore and Salmore 2013).

Salmore and Salmore (2013) argue that suburban politics is distinct in style and substance in that suburban politics is candidate-centered, with promises of a good quality of life, protection of private space, is less intrusive and has a strong moralist strain. Karcher (1998) cites reasons for the strength of local government including a level of accountability to its constituency, candidate intimacy with voters and a high-level of responsiveness to individual problems. Karcher (1998) also notes that local governments provide a testing ground for aspiring leaders of both parties, wean out those unsuitable for elevation to higher office and that local governments allow ethnic, racial and religious minorities to acquire some semblance of political power.

With respect to the utility of local government, Karcher (1998), a former New Jersey Majority Leader of the Assembly argues that local government provides experiences to minorities who would otherwise have no opportunity to prepare themselves for participation in county or state politics. Salmore and Salmore argue that the “American political debate has always been a dialogue about how best to assimilate newly arriving ethnic, religious and racial groups who demand a place in the political universe” (Salmore and Salmore 2013, 369). In their discussion about suburban voters, Salmore and Salmore (2013) argue that they prefer candidates that they can relate to, are like them, and share their values.

Tables 4a and 4b present basic data about the towns. The towns are geographically dispersed - Passaic is located in the north central part of the state, both Essex and Union counties are northeast, with Middlesex, as the name suggests, in central New Jersey. Burlington and Ocean counties are located in southwest and southeast New Jersey, respectively.

As Table 4a shows, of the seven towns studied, Paterson has the largest number of residents and largest foreign-born population and South Toms River, the smallest in both categories. Essex County has the second largest population and its town, Irvington, has the largest number of West Indians with the majority being Haitian-born. Highland Park has the largest White population with 68% and Irvington the largest Black population with 85%.

As Table 4b shows, two towns, South Toms River and Westampton have unaffiliated voters registered as the majority, the other towns have Democrats in the majority. The majority of the towns have a Mayor-Council form of government, but Westampton has a Mayor-Township Committee governing body, where Committee members select the Mayor from its group. Some of the towns have ward systems and others elect At-Large Council members.

New Jersey is politically unique in many ways with its abundance of municipalities, county governing structure and multiple forms of local government. The towns that the elected officials represent also serve as a microcosm of the state, with a range of income, education and diversity of ethnicities. It is with this setting that I move into an introduction of the elected officials.
### Table 4a

Elected Officials’ Towns’ Demographics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charnette Fredric</td>
<td>Irvington</td>
<td>Essex</td>
<td>789,565</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>54,000</td>
<td>16,775</td>
<td>9,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Champagne</td>
<td>South Toms River</td>
<td>Ocean</td>
<td>583,414</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yves Aubourg</td>
<td>Roselle</td>
<td>Union</td>
<td>548,256</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>6,800</td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adrian Mapp &amp;</td>
<td>Plainfield</td>
<td>Union</td>
<td>548,256</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>17,800</td>
<td>2,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vera Greaves</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsie Foster-Dublin</td>
<td>Highland Park</td>
<td>Middlesex</td>
<td>828,919</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>14,300</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William McKoy</td>
<td>Paterson</td>
<td>Passaic</td>
<td>505,672</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>8,300</td>
<td>145,219</td>
<td>43,322</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carolyn Chang</td>
<td>Westampton</td>
<td>Burlington</td>
<td>450,838</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>8,700</td>
<td>1,032</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Elected Officials

Of the eight subjects included in this study, half attended high school in the US, all but one has a college degree, and half have advanced degrees. Mayor Chang and Mayor Champagne are practicing attorneys. All the subjects are married with children. Three, Councilman McKoy, Mayor Mapp and Council President Aubourg work in the financial sector. Six have or had their own businesses and one, Councilwoman Fredric, is a scientist (see Table 5).
Table 5
Biographic Data of West Indian Elected Officials in NJ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elected Official</th>
<th>Year of Arrival</th>
<th>Age of Arrival</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Degree(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charnette Fredric</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Senior Scientist MHA</td>
<td>MHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Champagne</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Attorney JD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yves Aubourg</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Economic Development Director BS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adrian Mapp</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Director of Finance and Qualified Person Agent MBA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsie Foster-Dublin</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Owner, Elsie's Home Stay BA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William McKoy</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Chief Auditor BA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carolyn Chang</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Attorney JD</td>
<td>JD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vera Greaves</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Real Estate Agent ---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These immigrants’ stories are traditional in that they immigrated to rejoin parents or spouses, navigated terrain in an unfamiliar educational or work environments to achieve a modicum of success and forged lasting relationships with those on whose help they relied at some point in their journey. Some cite particular circumstances that helped them to become who they are today, while others attribute a level of familial expectations and cultural upbringing to explain their achievements.

The road to elected office for each of the respondents started with a sense of wanting to become involved in the direction of the community. For example, both McKoy and Aubourg were inspired by the work of their parents in their native countries Jamaica and Haiti. Champagne’s activism began during his college years. Chang, Foster-Dublin and Fredric were drawn to activism mostly because of their children’s engagement with the public education system. The excitement of the 2008 presidential campaign of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton inspired Greaves to political activism. Table 6 provides an outline of the respondents’ political engagement including offices held, recruitment, whether they ran an explicitly ethnic campaign and whether opponents, media outlets, community residents, and/or party actors acknowledged their ethnicity.
In analyzing the paths to office for these officials, I establish whether they mirrored the literature’s findings of who generally runs for office. Moncrief et al. (2001) argue that most of the candidates who run for state office are well-educated, middle-aged, middle-class, empty nesters that were business owners, employees or retirees with few attorneys represented. My study presents different findings when it comes to occupation, age and whether children still reside at the homes of the officials. While attorneys remain in the minority (Champagne and Chang), the majority are, or were, business owners, many self-employed. Greaves and Mapp were the only empty nesters and all of the respondents had full-time employment. The youngest elected officials in the sample, Fredric and Champagne, are not yet middle-aged.

My findings are consistent with the research when it comes to the path to office, in that almost all of these elected officials served as PTA or school board members or were active with local party politics and ran for or were initially appointed to fill vacancies (see Table 6). Foster-Dublin decided to become actively engaged in a community issue and developed a relationship with then Mayor Frank to work toward a solution. Through this process, Mayor Frank appointed her the Mayor’s designee to the Planning Board. Shortly thereafter, the Mayor appointed Foster-Dublin to fill an unexpired City Council vacancy and then she ran for her first full term. Greaves volunteered on a political committee to work for the 2008 Clinton presidential campaign. The

### Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elected Official</th>
<th>Office(s) Held</th>
<th>Initially Recruited By</th>
<th>Ethnic Campaign</th>
<th>Ethnicity Acknowledged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charnette Fredric</td>
<td>Councilwoman</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Champagne</td>
<td>Mayor City Council</td>
<td>Party Members</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yves Aubourg</td>
<td>Council President Board of Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adrian Mapp</td>
<td>Mayor Freeholder City Council</td>
<td>Party Leadership Self</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsie Foster-Dublin</td>
<td>Council President Deputy Mayor Board of Education</td>
<td>Party Leadership</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William McKoy</td>
<td>Council Member Board of Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carolyn Chang</td>
<td>Mayor Council Member</td>
<td>Party Leadership</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vera Greaves</td>
<td>Council Member</td>
<td>Party Leadership</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In analyzing the paths to office for these officials, I establish whether they mirrored the literature’s findings of who generally runs for office. Moncrief et al. (2001) argue that most of the candidates who run for state office are well-educated, middle-aged, middle-class, empty nesters that were business owners, employees or retirees with few attorneys represented. My study presents different findings when it comes to occupation, age and whether children still reside at the homes of the officials. While attorneys remain in the minority (Champagne and Chang), the majority are, or were, business owners, many self-employed. Greaves and Mapp were the only empty nesters and all of the respondents had full-time employment. The youngest elected officials in the sample, Fredric and Champagne, are not yet middle-aged.

My findings are consistent with the research when it comes to the path to office, in that almost all of these elected officials served as PTA or school board members or were active with local party politics and ran for or were initially appointed to fill vacancies (see Table 6). Foster-Dublin decided to become actively engaged in a community issue and developed a relationship with then Mayor Frank to work toward a solution. Through this process, Mayor Frank appointed her the Mayor’s designee to the Planning Board. Shortly thereafter, the Mayor appointed Foster-Dublin to fill an unexpired City Council vacancy and then she ran for her first full term. Greaves volunteered on a political committee to work for the 2008 Clinton presidential campaign. The
town party chair, impressed with her work, got her more involved in local politics. When the Councilperson that represented her ward vacated the position to become Freeholder, the chair appointed Greaves to fill the vacancy. She served one year and then ran for a full term. McKoy began his political career with his election as “the first and only man to serve as PTA President to date.” While he served in this capacity, some members of the community encouraged him to run for the school board. He not only won the election, but also served as Board President for two consecutive years.

With respect to recruitment and minority representation, researchers conclude that African Americans were more likely urged to run by people from their churches, neighborhoods and families and not by “traditional recruitment mechanisms” (Moncrief et al. 2001,108). My findings concluded otherwise. Party members or party leadership recruited the majority of these officials to run, or appointed them to fulfill vacant terms. For example, with Council President Aubourg, a church friend and Board of Education member asked Aubourg to run for a seat on the Board of Education. This example comports with both the literature and findings. Aubourg is a very active member of his church; however, the church friend who made the overture also sat on the Board of Education. Aubourg consented, won the seat and became the first Haitian-American elected to the school board. Party officials, on the other hand, exclusively, recruited Chang. She began to receive inquiries from the Burlington County Democratic Party about her interests in becoming a candidate for a State Senate seat. She ultimately declined the offer because of child-care responsibilities, but ten years later, the party approached Chang again to run for a local town seat. She successfully ran for office and won all five districts in the town, including her overwhelmingly Republican district.

There has been a long and documented body of work that consistently argues that women are less likely to run for office for a number of reasons (Carroll 1983; Sanmonbatsu 2006; Lawless and Fox 2008; Hawkesworth 2012; Dittmar 2014 et al.); however, my research shows an equal number of women and men who successfully ran for office. Are West Indian and other foreign-born women more likely to run for office? Do support structures enabling West Indian and other foreign-born women to access local-level political office more easily than native-born women differ? Are Afro-Caribbean women displacing African American women in elective office? I do not address these questions here, but look to scholars who study candidate emergence and immigrant political representation to consider future research around these issues.

Pathways to Elective Office

These elected officials fit the mold of a typical candidate for office in that they are well-educated slightly older professionals. How then does running for office translate into winning said office? In this section, I delve more deeply into their electoral campaigns. Specifically, I examine whether their ethnicity played a role in their campaigns and if so, in what ways. I also note from where they received their support and how they funded their campaigns.

Before I proceed with a discussion on whether these elected officials used an overtly ethnic campaign to help them win office, I will outline some patterns or behaviors used by past candidates (in New York City and elsewhere), which the literature has suggested, qualifies as an ethnic campaign. In addition to visual displays, such as flags or native language access, an ethnicity-focused campaign seeks to unlock the “ethnic infrastructure” by tapping into home country and voluntary associations to access mailing lists, volunteers and other networks (Kasinitz 1992, 244). The West Indian leadership should converge to visibly support the campaign and the
candidate should make overt appeals to the group explaining the need for political influence while highlighting the non-responsiveness of other potential representatives to their unique needs (Kasinitz 1992). Maintaining an equal balance of support for American issues as well as bringing forth homeland issues that concern the electorate are also important strategies to employ (Laguerre 2006).

Some of the research suggests that when large concentrations of West Indians reside in a neighborhood, neighborhood-based descriptive representation emerges thereby creating *ethnicity entrepreneurs* who serve as powerbrokers to help the community access resources (Kasinitz 1992). Others argue that non-neighborhood-based electoral systems encourage West Indians to downplay their ethnicity (Rogers 2000). Some of the towns in this study, Irvington, Plainfield, Paterson and Roselle have high concentrations of West Indians, but only one respondent from these towns reported using an explicit ethnic strategy. Aubourg (Roselle) touted his Haitian identity as part of his campaign. During campaign outreach meetings, Aubourg urged the Haitian residents “that they needed a place at the table, because without that seat, no one would prioritize their concerns.” He also impressed upon them of the importance of representation and their need to keep abreast of the goings on in town. Aubourg also made himself available as both a translator and go-between for residents interfacing with the town on various issues.

Interestingly, in Plainfield, Mapp notes that during his first campaign for Mayor, he took the West Indian community for granted, in that he assumed they would vote for him because of a shared ethnicity, regardless of his outreach level. He had always been engaged with the community, especially as a member of the Barbadian Organization of New Jersey and as a self-appointed Ambassador for Barbados. After his loss, he learned that he needed to maintain his engagement with the community to attract continued support.

Chang, Champagne and Foster-Dublin represent areas that have few West Indian residents, so an ethnic campaign targeted toward members in these communities may not have yielded overwhelming electoral support because they who did not represent a large voting bloc. However, they proudly acknowledge that the at-large West Indian community contributed to their success. New Jersey-based West Indian and Caribbean organizations such as the Caribbean Association of Southern New Jersey, the Caribbean Bar Association, the Jamaican Organization of New Jersey and other Jamaican-born elected officials within and outside of the state supported the campaigns of both Foster-Dublin and Chang. Members of these groups volunteered during the campaign and/or on Election Day, provided financial contributions, distributed campaign literature and worked in other campaign-related capacities.

Champagne, likewise, received support from the Caribbean Bar Association. The National Haitian American Elected Officials Network, the Haitian American Leadership Council and members of the Haitian community as far away as Connecticut and Florida also worked to support his election. While West Indian constituents in the district may have lacked the ability to provide substantial support, these officials received support from regional associations, which proved beneficial to their campaigns.

McKoy argued that in a community as diverse as Paterson, an ethnocentric campaign strategy would not have worked because as he contends, “you cannot get all of the people to vote for you if you only focus on one ethnicity.” McKoy states that his campaign has, and should he run again, will, continue to focus on his years of service to the community and residents of Paterson. In a recent bid for reelection, he faced a Dominican Republic-born challenger who appeared to spend, as McKoy recalls, large sums of money and time on outreach to only
Dominican residents. McKoy won the election and argued that his opponents’ faulty strategy appeared to court Dominican residents at the exclusion of others in the community, which potentially left voters apprehensive about his candidacy and may have moved them closer to his. McKoy concedes that a “good number of residents in the community are either Jamaican or West Indian” and that he may have received their support because they know he is a co-ethnic. He has had Jamaican-themed and Caribbean-related events recently in his tenure, but argues that for quite some time, very few people in the town knew of his ancestry. He also acknowledges receiving support from West Indian organizations throughout New Jersey and notably, from a Jamaican-born elected official from New York City. Similarly, Fredric acknowledges receiving support from the Haitian community in Irvington, Haitian organizations within and outside of New Jersey as well as Haitian elected officials, including Aubourg and Champagne, which have helped in her campaign for office.

Other support for their campaigns came, more often than not, from the local party machine that helped to recruit them. In the cases when the candidate chose to run unsupported or against the party candidate, they often used their personal monies to support their campaigns. The findings suggest that whether the candidate used an ethnic outreach strategy or displayed demonstrable ethnic self-identity, the West Indian community and the home-country community inside and outside of the state rallied to support the candidate either through financial means or as volunteers. These resources combined with local support and name recognition accumulated through their prior activism helped them to achieve victory.

Findings Revisited, Future Plans and Future Research

After exploring various facets of their lives including their immigration to the U.S., education, employment, desire to run for office and the political structure of New Jersey, I find that the typical West Indian elected official is a well-educated, oftentimes entrepreneurial, middle-aged community activist who shares strong ethnic ties in the States and back home.

Despite the findings, this study is not without its limitations. The research focused solely on those officials currently in office which begs the question, would the research results differ if the research included those candidates who lost their bids for office? In addition, I did not gain access to a few candidates who no longer serve. Would their experiences have altered the findings? For example, perhaps given the unique structure of New Jersey politics and the numbers of municipalities that exist and its east coast tristate area, would the results differ in a red or purple state, or in a state with fewer West Indian or other immigrants?

Conclusion

A successful democracy has the full participation of its citizenry – those eligible to run for office are allowed to run and institutions make provisions to enable those eligible to vote many opportunities. If history serves as a guide, immigrants will continue to come to the U.S. for a plethora of reasons and be simultaneously absorbed into and change the political culture of the host country. In South Toms River, because Mayor Champagne flies the Haitian flag at City Hall, he cites an increased awareness of Haitian and Caribbean peoples. Although none of the officials cited specific ways that their policy-making has helped co-ethnic or other immigrant groups in their community, they did cite an increased awareness and sensitivity about the broader issues of housing, education and quality of life.

It is also interesting to document the ways in which these elected officials have informally
helped one another campaign for office. Aubourg and Mapp have recruited co-ethnics to run for office and various forms of co-ethnic support have come from outside of New Jersey. I see this trend continuing, especially as immigrants continue to see the suburbs as the new gateway destination.

Local party politics and local party support play a critical role in successfully seeking elected office in New Jersey and local party actors facilitated the initial foray into the political arena for the majority of the respondents. Once they commit to running for office, several key questions emerge that warrant further examination. In what ways do these new immigrants approach representation? If they maintain ties to ethnic communities/enclaves, does this impact how they seek to govern? In what ways do they seek to represent the concerns of their immigrant and ethnic constituents, if at all? Does their representation in local, state and federal offices have the potential to influence future immigration policies in New Jersey and/or U.S. foreign policies toward their home countries? Does this group mirror other minority ethnic groups in how they have accessed political office and advocated for favorable home country treatment by the U.S. government?

I predict scholars of ethnic politics, black politics and West Indian incorporation will exploit the interdisciplinary and multi-faceted subject areas of immigrant political incorporation in the U.S. because of increased interest immigrant political behavior, to discover and create a robust body of literature that seeks to answer many of the questions posed.

Notes
1. In this study, West Indians will refer to those persons born in the Anglophone, Francophone and Dutch speaking areas of the Caribbean. I also include those from Guyana as well as those from the countries of Belize, Costa Rica, Guyana, Honduras and Panama. These countries share similar social and cultural practices as their Anglophone Caribbean neighbors and the majority of the Afro-Costa Ricans and Hondurans are creole-English speaking descendants of black Jamaican immigrant workers. For the purposes of this research, I will use Caribbean–born and West Indian interchangeably.

2. It should be noted that all the elected officials are Democrats.

References


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The (Additional) Determinants of Black Pan-Ethnic Partisanship

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Abstract

Traditional models and theories of partisanship assume that American partisans are socialized in the U.S. or at least have a good deal of knowledge of the two major political parties. These models center socioeconomic status as an important determinant of partisanship, and they assume there will be a match between voters’ and candidates’ parties with voters’ and candidates’ ideological leanings. Here, we center Blacks to gain more insight into the determinants of partisanship of the members of this pan-ethnic group.

Using data from the National Politics Survey, 2004, our results reveal that developing a fully specified model of Black partisanship requires scholars to reconsider a number of these assumptions. Specifically, the results show that identity and racial group interests influence African Americans’ and Black immigrants’ partisan affiliation; Blacks’ ideology does not neatly map onto the two-party system; and socioeconomic status provides no additional information about partisanship for native- or foreign-born Blacks. These findings add to the larger body of literature that asserts political scientists must consider the unique experiences and identities of underrepresented groups when developing theories and models of political attitudes and behaviors.

Keywords: Black immigrants, partisanship, linked fate, foreign-born, racial identity

Introduction

The attitudes that people have about political parties shape one of the most important political orientations: partisanship. As described by V.O. Key, partisanship is a “psychological attachment” of “remarkable durability” (Key 1958, 233). Key explains that “even if the party member is an unfaithful attendant at party functions and an infrequent contributor to its finances, he is likely to have a strong attachment to the heroes of the party, to its principles as he interprets them, and to its candidates on election day” (Key 1964, 233). An emerging consensus among political scientists is that partisanship is “the most important single influence on political opinions and voting behavior. Many other influences are at work on voters in our society, but none compare in significance with partisanship” (Flanigan 1972, 37). Partisanship plays a central role in “individual vote choice, evaluations of governmental performance, perception of political events and agendas, and judgments of political leaders and groups” (Green and Palmquist 1990, 872). Partisanship serves as a mental rule of thumb to simplify the complex world of American politics, and if a person chooses the “wrong” party, their interests (however defined) may not be met.

This is well known knowledge among political representatives as well, which is why parties try to attract new groups and grow their constituency from time to time. As the U.S.

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becomes more racially and ethnically diverse, parties may attempt to gain the support of new groups, particularly those that are replenished by immigrants (Frymer 2010; Philpot 2004; Uhlener and Garcia 2005; Rodolfo and Cortina 2007). Moreover, in the effort toward earning the loyalty of new constituents, any good politician knows that he cannot use the same tactics to court all members of pan-ethnic groups. For example, although Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Cuban Americans are subsumed under a shared pan-ethnic category, Hispanic or Latino, members of each group prioritize different policy issues, and they have vastly different relationships with the two major American political parties (McClain and Joseph Stewart Jr. 2010; Uhlener and Garcia 2005). Research shows that, on average, each national origin group has different motivations to join a political party, or rather, to identify as Independent (Hajnal and Lee 2011). Considering the fact that Blacks are also not simply an ethnically monolithic racial group, but rather a diverse pan-ethnic group, can the same be said for Black immigrants? That is, do the determinants of partisanship differ for African Americans and Black immigrants, particularly those who identify as Caribbean?

Since the 1960s, the great majority of Black Americans have identified with the Democratic Party, but an increasing number of Blacks are identifying as Republicans or as Independents (Hajnal and Lee 2011; Haynie and Watts 2010). Such partisan shifts suggest that the factors that have traditionally influenced African Americans’ partisan identity may have changed or evolved over the past half century. At the same time, an increasing number of Blacks are newcomers to the United States (Brown 2015; Farris 2012; Kent 2007). Demographic shifts in the Black population mean that we may also see that the factors that help us understand African American partisanship may or may not be helpful to predict and explain Black immigrants’ partisanship. Here, we seek to gain an understanding of the factors that influence Black immigrants’ partisan identity and to compare them to the factors that shape African Americans’ partisanship.

We begin by briefly describing the frequently cited, applied and debated theories of partisan identity. However, these oft-cited theories were developed with data that primarily considered the majority, White population; consequently, we also present a critique of these theories and highlight the literature that outlines a different set of expectations for African Americans and for immigrant-replenished groups. With both the traditional theories and critiques in mind, we develop a series of hypotheses concerning the determinants of partisan identity for an immigrant group that is ascribed a Black racial identity but may or may not identify as such: Afro-Caribbean immigrants. Next, we turn to the core of our analysis, which centers an updated theory on non-White partisan preference and political ideology, to guide our assessment of the factors that influence African Americans’ and Black immigrants’ partisan identity. We end the article by discussing the implications of the findings for understanding Americans’ political attitudes, behaviors, and identities in the face of dynamic demographic change in the United States.

Theories of (White) American Partisanship

There are two major schools of thought concerning the development and stability of partisanship. The first is often referred to as the Michigan school, which was pioneered and is best represented by Campbell and his colleagues’ seminal text, *The American Voter* (1960). Campbell et al. (1960) assert that partisanship, or a psychological identification with a political party, develops due to political socialization and is learned early in life, often during a pre-political age, from one’s parents; this is evidenced by the fact that nearly 75% of Americans
share the same party affiliation as the people who raised them (Campbell et al. 1960, 147). From this perspective, partisanship is characterized as a highly stable orientation, where a shift is only likely to result from major changes in one’s life, such as marriage, or a political shock, like a Civil War; however, since these are rare events, those in this camp view partisanship as “an enduring underlying trait.” (Green and Palmquist 1990, 874; Abramson and Ostrom 1991; Miller 1991).

Meanwhile, revisionists have claimed that party identification is not as stable as those in the previous group have asserted. Scholars in this group have provided evidence that party identification is dynamic. Morris Fiorina, for example, argues that partisanship is influenced by retrospective political evaluations; he views partisanship as “the difference between an individual’s past political experiences with the two political parties, perturbed by a factor… that represents effects not included in an individual’s political experiences,” such as political socialization (Fiorina 1981, 89).

Other scholars in this group include Markus and Converse (1979), who suggest that past votes influence partisan identification. Relatedly, Franklin and Jackson (1983) argue that partisan identification is best understood as a function of policy perspectives, which do change. In all, these accounts “present a tidy alternative explanation for the bedrock empirical relationship between party identification and voting behavior. The direction and strengths of voters’ partisanship predict their likely vote choice, presumably because the match between voters’ and candidates’ parties reflect a match between voters’ and candidates’ ideological preferences;” or in other words, this research implies that we should expect those who are liberal to identify as and vote for Democrats while those who characterize themselves as conservative should identify as and vote for Republicans (Hajnal and Lee 2011, 55).

These extant, traditional theories must be read in a particular context. While these theories of partisanship do well to describe White Americans’ political attitudes and behaviors, they do not necessarily capture the complexity presented by Blacks, Latinos, Asian Americans, and immigrants. These theories and their extensions were developed using data such as the American National Election Studies, Gallup, and the General Social Survey; such data rarely include a sample of racial minorities large enough to make accurate statistical inferences. Indeed in many of the most important texts in this literature, people of color are excluded from the analysis or simply not mentioned (e.g. Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Keith et al. 1992).

Relatedly, these models assume that all American partisans are citizens or at least individuals who were socialized in the United States; as such, these models do not necessarily account for the ways in which newcomers learn about American politics and political parties, particularly if they come to the U.S. as adults or after a “pre-political” age (Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner 1991; Uhlaner and Garcia 2005). Finally, these theories do not account for the fact that many racial minority groups incorporate their own identity and group well-being into their political decision-making calculus (Allen, Dawson, and Brown 1989; Chong and Rogers 2005; Johnson and Gordon 2005; Lee 2005; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010).

In an elegant critique of these two major theoretical perspectives, Hajnal and Lee (2011) show that standard models of partisanship do not accurately predict Black, Latino, and Asian American partisan identity. Instead, they argue that scholars should be more cognizant about the differences in information, ideology and identity that exist across racial and ethnic groups. They note that newcomers have less information about the parties, and further that language can be a barrier to better understanding the policy platforms of the parties. People of color, especially...
Blacks, have lower levels of education than Whites, and further that there are a greater number of people of color who live in “extremely poor, socially isolated communities where their ability to interact with and learn about mainstream political institutions is severely curtailed” (Hajnal and Lee 2011, 82).

Second, they note that the extant literature assumes that all Americans’ ideological preferences will neatly overlay onto the two-party system. However, it is unclear which and whether either of the parties sufficiently represent the political interests of people of color. For example, Latinos tend to be socially conservative but have an array of different preferences on the issue of immigration across sub-ethnic groups. Which party is best for those who are socially conservative but prefer less restrictive immigration policies? While Blacks in the U.S. have largely given their votes to the Democratic Party, there has been an increased disillusionment with the party. Blacks are a captured constituency, where the alternatives (not voting, or shifting support to the Republican party) are sub-optimal (Frymer 2010; Haynie and Watts 2010).

Finally, Hajnal and Lee (2011, 83) assert that it is important to consider the extent to which partisan choice may be influenced by individuals’ knowledge of how race and ethnicity are lived in the U.S. Linked fate and group consciousness are often factors in Blacks’ (and to some extent Latinos’ and Asian Americans’) political decision-making calculus (Allen, Dawson, and Brown 1989; Capers and Smith 2015; Dawson 1994; Masuoka 2006; Masuoka and Junn 2013; Sanchez 2006b; Sanchez 2006a; Tate 1994; Austin, Middleton, and Yon 2012). Experiences with discrimination as well as sense of “groupness” may influence how people of color perceive the parties, especially if a party’s stance includes policies to prevent discriminatory behavior or if they incorporate racist rhetoric to garner Whites’ support (Pedraza 2014; Philpot 2004). In all, “traditional” theories and models of American partisanship may not capture the major mechanisms of partisan affiliation for people of color and immigrants.

The Foundations of Black Partisanship

African Americans

Historically, African Americans have tended to identify with and be loyal to the party that they believe would lead to optimal policy outcomes for members of their racial group (Bobo and Franklin D. Gilliam 1990; Tate 1991). For example, after the Civil War, African Americans tended to identify as Republicans, professing allegiance to the Party of Lincoln. President Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation, and during Reconstruction, the Republican Party supported Blacks’ interest, best illustrated by the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1871 and 1875 as well as through the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution. However, the presidential election of 1876 led to the Compromise of 1877, which called for the removal of all federal troops from the Confederate states; the Compromise effectively allowed White supremacy to flourish and “a new period of lily-white Republicanism in the South” gained momentum (Walton 1972, 24). Over time, Blacks became increasingly alienated from the Republican Party.

The support of the Democratic Party by African Americans that we see today occurred only when the party made clear it would serve the interests of the racial group. African Americans began to convert to the Democratic Party in response to Roosevelt’s New Deal. Walton (1972, 27) explains, “Roosevelt’s social policies were an attractive lure for politically rootless Black voters searching for a viable party: his welfare programs, his appointment of a “Black Cabinet,” and his creation of the Fair Employment Practices Commission captured the imagination of the
majority of Blacks and set the stage for their strong swing to the Democratic Party.”

By 1956, the greater majority of African Americans identified as Democrat (61.3%). By the mid-1960s, it had become clear that the Democratic Party would carry the mantel of the Civil Rights movement while the GOP would be the racially conservative party (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 2007). Consequently, the proportion of Blacks who identify as Democrats has not dropped below 55% in six decades, although it should be noted that an increasing number of Blacks are no longer identifying with either party (Haynie and Watts 2010; Hajnal and Lee 2011; Luks and Elms 2005).

While the political socialization model of partisanship does help to explain some aspects of Black partisan identification (Luks and Elms 2005), an emerging consensus in the literature is that this group’s partisanship is best understood as a function of group identity and solidarity. Political scientist Dianne Pinderhughes explains, “Loyalty occurs among black voters because they consistently, almost uniformly, commit themselves to the party, faction, or individual that is most supportive of racial reform” (1987, 113). Tate (1994) shows that racial identification, gender and age are the most prominent predictors of Black partisanship. Meanwhile, Dawson (1994) shows that unlike traditional models of partisanship, socioeconomic status has no relationship to Black party identification, and more importantly, he finds that much of Black political behavior is shaped by what he calls the “black utility heuristic.” This theory suggests that because Blacks historically have been treated as group members and that race continues to be an important determinant of Blacks’ life chances, Blacks evaluate the group’s well-being and use this evaluation as a proxy for the individual’s well-being in their political decision-making calculus (Dawson 1994).

Overall, traditional models of partisanship may not necessarily serve as fully and well-specified models that are able explain African American political behavior. Instead, Black racial identity and a sense of “linked fate” are likely to influence African Americans’ partisanship, and the liberal-to-conservative continuum is not likely to be neatly superimposed on the two-party system for this group. Many African Americans are socially conservative, but economically liberal, supporting an “activist welfare state as a form of redress” (Tate 2010, 5).

Black Immigrants

Since the passage of the Hart-Cellar Act in 1965, the demographics of the United States have changed significantly. Although President Lyndon B. Johnson (1965) predicted that this law would “not be a revolutionary bill” and that it would “not reshape the structure of our daily lives, or be really important to either our wealth or our power,” the policy did lead to a dramatic change in the demographic characteristics of American society. It allowed for a greater number of immigrants from Asia and Latin America. But this policy also diversified the Black racial population due to the increase in immigrants from Africa and the Caribbean. Although these groups tend to be racialized as Black, the extent to which they have behaved similar to African Americans in the political realm has waxed and waned over time (Kasnitz 1992; Smith 2014).

Black immigrants, like others, do not come to the United States as blank slates. In the early twentieth century Black immigrants were either less likely to participate in American politics or, conversely, they were known to have a more radical politics than their American-born counterparts. To the first characterization, Harold Cruse, in *The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual*, noted that immigrants from the West Indies and Africa were less likely to have a sense of racial group consciousness, and criticized them for taking part in Black culture while distancing themselves from the difficult aspects of Black life in the U.S., asserting, “on American Negro
experiences on the social, political, economic, and civil rights fronts, he [the Black immigrant] often refuses to commit himself” (Cruse 1967, 424). This distancing behavior is still common today, where Black immigrants are able to cope with the ramifications of the U.S. racialized social structure by keeping in mind (or imagining) an “exit option,” being cognizant of the ability to return to their country of origin (Rogers 2006). Greer (2013) contends that they also engage in this distancing to maintain an “elevated minority status” over African Americans as they sometimes harbor harsh stereotypes about African Americans.

To the second characterization of a more radical political tradition: historically, when Black immigrants, particularly Afro-Caribbeans, dove into America politics, they had a reputation for being more radical than African Americans. An underlying but important point to note here is that Black immigrants do not have the same relationship to either of the American political parties as African Americans. John Walter, in his examination of Black immigrants in the U.S., explains, “confronted with even deeper racism than they had left at home and uncertain of the easy rewards rumored to be found in America, a significant percentage found release of their frustrations in radical quasi-political and political behavior” (Walter 1977, 131). Relatedly, many West Indian immigrants joined the Democratic party long before African Americans did, and they were likely to join other political parties, such as the Socialist Party (Kasinitz 1992; Walter 1977).

Although there is a nascent but growing literature on the consequences of increased ethnic diversity on Black politics (Capers and Smith 2015, 2016; Greer 2013; Nunnally 2010), there is very little knowledge about what drives Black immigrants’ partisan identification. These historical accounts suggest that Black immigrants’ relationship with the two major political parties will neither map on nicely with traditional models of partisanship nor mimic models developed specifically for African Americans. Instead, we might rely on an intersection of what we know about African Americans and other, more well-studied immigrant replenished groups, such as Latinos and Asians. The latter body of literature suggests that acculturation (e.g. time in the U.S., citizenship status, generational cohort) and feelings about how the parties deal with issues of importance to them influence partisan affiliation for these groups (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003; Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlmaner 1991; Hajnal and Lee 2011).

**Empirical Expectations**

Taking what we have learned from the research on traditional models of partisanship and critiques of these theories as well as African American politics and Latino and Asian American partisan identification, we have developed a series of testable hypotheses. At the most basic level, we expect Black immigrants to be more likely to identify as Democrats rather than as Republicans or as Independents. The Democratic Party’s platform has been more liberal on issues of racial egalitarianism and, generally, more open to immigration and immigrant rights. However, we should also consider the research that suggests that while Black immigrants understand the plight of African Americans, they do not necessarily rely on the notion that race and racism are major explanatory factors in the disparities between Blacks and Whites; this is especially true for those in the first generation. (Rogers 2004; Portes and Zhou 1993; Waters 1990). In the early 2000s, the Republican party did make an attempt to sway Blacks into the party (Philpot 2004). Although Blacks, generally, were not convinced by these attempts, Professor Tasha Philpot reveals that those who were less politically sophisticated were likely to be persuaded; given that Black immigrants are relatively new to the American political system
and not necessarily devoted to the Democratic party, as of yet, we can expect to find that Black immigrants are more likely than African Americans to identify as Republican. Stated simply, 

\[ H_1: \text{The majority of both Black immigrants and African Americans are more likely to identify as Democrats, but Black immigrants are more likely to identify as Republicans than African Americans.} \]

In efforts to understand the mechanisms that undergird Black partisanship, we first consider the role of ideology. We have noted that the linear liberal-to-conservative spectrum does not necessarily help us to understand the partisan affiliation of people of color. For example, when African Americans think about what conservative means to them, they do not necessarily conceive of the same set of associations that Whites do (Philpot 2012). While Professor Philpot does not necessarily differentiate between native- and foreign-born Blacks, we feel safe to predict that a similar conclusion can be made for immigrants, more generally. As mentioned, immigrants have their own understanding of what liberal and conservative mean. Additionally, we find that even though many immigrant groups are socially conservative, they tend to prioritize other issues, such as immigration, in their partisan calculus (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003; Phan and Garcia 2009). With this in consideration, we expect to find that those who identify as liberal will certainly identify with the Democratic Party, while those who identify as conservative will not necessarily identify with the Republican Party. In other words,

\[ H_{2A}: \text{Black immigrants and African Americans who characterize themselves as liberal will be more likely to identify with the Democratic Party.} \]

\[ H_{2B}: \text{Characterizing oneself as conservative will not lead Black immigrants or African Americans to identify as Republican.} \]

In recognizing that a well-specified model for non-Whites’ partisanship should also account for identity and information (Allen, Dawson, and Brown 1989; Capers and Smith 2015, 2016; Dawson 1994; Hajnal and Lee 2011; Tate 1994), we develop corollary hypotheses. We expect the racial identity of Black immigrants as well as African Americans to influence partisanship. Although some historical accounts of Black immigrants suggest that they have do not have a sense of racial group consciousness (Cruse 1967), more recent scholarship suggests otherwise (Austin, Middleton, and Yon 2012; Rogers 2006; Smith 2013, 2014). To be clear, this scholarship shows that while Black immigrants do have a sense of racial group consciousness, the role it plays differs between African Americans and Black immigrants. Nonetheless, racial identity and a sense of group consciousness does influence the political attitudes and behaviors of Black immigrants; as such, we would be remiss to not include helpful measures of identity in the following analyses.

\[ H_3: \text{The racial identity of Black immigrants and African Americans—as measured by closeness and a sense of linked fate—will influence their partisan identity.} \]

Finally, we expect that factors of specific import to Black immigrants will influence their partisan behavior. Just as we are likely to see that the extent to which African Americans’ partisanship is shaped by their perception of which party has their racial group’s interests in mind, we expect to see that Black immigrants will care not only about the extent to which the parties cater to the political interests of Blacks, generally, but also Black immigrants, more specifically. The perceived information that Blacks have about the parties, particularly in relation to how the parties will influence their racial or ethnic group, is very likely to influence
their partisan identity.

$H_{4A}$: Blacks—African Americans and Black immigrants—who believe the Democratic Party is working toward their racial groups’ interests are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party, while those who believe this to be true about the Republican Party will identify as Republican.

$H_{4B}$: Black immigrants who believe the Democratic Party is working toward their ethnic groups’ interests are more likely to identify as Democrats, whereas those who believe this to be true about the Republican Party are more likely to identify as Republicans.

Data, Variables and Modeling Strategy

We rely on the National Politics Survey, 2004 to test our hypotheses. These data are cross-sectional survey data collected through telephone interviews between September 2004 and February 2005. The survey was developed to measure respondents’ voting preferences and political attitudes, such as their preferences toward immigration, affirmative action, education and the death penalty. Additionally, the survey includes questions about party affiliation, political ideology, and acculturation. The survey includes responses from 3,339 individuals, of which 756 identified as African American and 404 identified as Afro-Caribbean. We recognize that the age of the survey may limit our understanding of more recent shifts in African Americans and Afro-Caribbeans’ partisanship or ideology; however, the intentional inclusion and differentiation of adult Black immigrants makes the NPS 2004 the best data source for investigating the determining factors of both foreign- and native-born Blacks’ partisan identities. The dataset is also more recent than those used in similar studies examining Black partisanship (see Chong and Rogers 2005; Hajnal and Lee 2011).

We examine the determinants of African American and Black immigrants’ partisan identification. Following Hajnal and Lee (2011), we incorporate measures of ideology, identity and information into our models of partisanship. First, because the liberal-to-conservative ideological spectrum may not neatly align with the two major parties, we include (dummy) variables for each point of the ideological spectrum separately, with the middle category serving as the baseline.

Second, we capture the role of identity as a determinant of Black partisanship. In keeping with traditional Black politics literature, we include measures of closeness and also linked fate. Closeness measures the extent to which respondents feel close to both their own racial group and various other racial groups in ideas, interests, and feelings on a scale from (1) not close at all to (4) very close. This measure “emphasize[s] the facet of black identity that most closely resembles classic definitions of group identity” (Harris 1995). Meanwhile, linked fate is a parsimonious way to capture the multidimensional construct of group consciousness (McClain et al. 2009). Here, respondents are asked to indicate the extent to which they agree (1=yes, agree, 0=no) that the happenings of others in their racial group in the U.S. have an effect on their individual lives. We also include respondents’ perception of discrimination, an important component of group consciousness (Gurin, Miller, and Gurin 1980; McClain and Stewart 2010; Miller et al. 1981).

Finally, we make an effort to capture the “information” Blacks have about the American party system. We do this in two ways. First, we include a measure of whether respondents believe that the two major political parties represent the interests of Blacks (in both sets of analyses) as well as Afro-Caribbeans (in respective models). Respondents were asked if they believed
Democrats represent Blacks’ interests or if the Republican Party represents Black interests (1= believe Democrats/Republicans represent group, 0=no). Because we are also interested in an immigrant-replenished group, we include whether respondents are first or second generation and if they are citizens, particularly for models of Afro-Caribbean partisanship. These variables are proxies for acculturation; those who have lived in the U.S. for longer periods of time (or for a greater proportion of their lives) are likely to have more information about the American political system.

In addition to these three major categories—identity, ideology, and information—we also control for a number of important demographic factors that are likely to influence one’s partisan identity, namely socioeconomic status (i.e. homeownership, education, income), gender, age and marital status. We also control for whether the respondents live in the South.

The dependent variable is a measure from Strongly Democrat (1) to Strongly Republican (7). Respondents were asked, “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or something else,” and then were asked to indicate the strength of their partisan identification. Respondents who either identified as “an Independent,” as “something else,” or who failed to initially identify with a partisan group were asked, “Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican party or to the Democratic party,” to gauge their position on the partisanship spectrum. We combine the three questions to create a seven-point partisanship scale.

Even though we are concerned with Black respondents, we separate African Americans from Afro-Carribeans in our analysis. By employing dummy variables for one group or the other, we would only be able to tell a difference in the y-intercept, which indicates that African Americans and Black immigrants differ in their baseline partisanship. Using such a method of “controlling for” ethnicity does not explain whether and where we should expect differential relationships between and among the predictors for each group (Masuoka and Junn 2013; Lee 2008). As such, examining the groups separately allows us to explore the structurally different relationships between our key explanatory variables and individuals’ partisanship. Ideology, racial identity, or any of the control variables may have an entirely different effect for each group, given their unique group identities and experiences. We employ what Masuoka and Junn (2013) call a comparative relational analysis to examine and compare the determinants of partisanship for African Americans and Black immigrants.

**Descriptive Statistics**

We begin by sharing a set of basic descriptive statistics of African Americans’ and Black immigrants’ partisan affiliation. Respondents were asked, “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or something else?” Table 1 shows how African Americans and Black immigrants identified, and these data provide support for our first hypothesis.

First, we find that Black immigrants, like African Americans, largely identify as Democrats. The majority of African Americans (65.4%) and Caribbean Blacks (60.3%) identify as Democrat. Table 1 also reveals that Black immigrants are significantly more likely to identify as Republicans in comparison to African Americans; Black immigrants are nearly twice as likely to identify with the GOP. It should also be noted that nearly one in four African Americans and Black immigrants consciously do not identify with either major party, a trend that has been increasing over time although it remains to be seen if Black immigrants’ and African Americans’ partisan identities are driven by different mechanisms.
Before we move to our multivariate analysis that allows us to gain a better understanding of the determinants of Black partisan identification, we briefly examine the policy preferences of Black immigrants and African Americans. This will allow us to get a sense of where they stand on various salient policy issues, on average. Respondents were asked to what degree they support civil rights policies, liberalizing immigration policy, U.S. foreign-policy strategies, and increasing federal spending on a number of issues. (The exact wording of each policy is presented in the Appendix at the end of the article.) Table 2 presents broad strokes of the differences and similarities between African American and Black immigrant respondents’ policy preferences.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Issue</th>
<th>Black Immigrants (Mean)</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>African Americans (Mean)</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil Rights Policies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferential Hiring</td>
<td>2.108</td>
<td>.0510</td>
<td>2.468**</td>
<td>.0371</td>
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<tr>
<td>Death Penalty</td>
<td>2.336</td>
<td>.0582</td>
<td>2.348</td>
<td>.0417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Equality</td>
<td>3.783</td>
<td>.0351</td>
<td>3.818</td>
<td>.0230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage Equality</td>
<td>2.915</td>
<td>.1010</td>
<td>2.845</td>
<td>.0750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Immigration Policy</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase Immigration</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>.0315</td>
<td>1.764**</td>
<td>.0230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Affairs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention in Iraq</td>
<td>1.568</td>
<td>.0465</td>
<td>1.321**</td>
<td>.0275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government Spending</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Spending</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>.0174</td>
<td>2.933</td>
<td>.0104</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defense Spending</td>
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<td>.0405</td>
<td>1.990*</td>
<td>.0298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Security</td>
<td>2.848</td>
<td>.0205</td>
<td>2.849</td>
<td>.0146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrolling the Border against Illegal Immigrants</td>
<td>2.354</td>
<td>.0369</td>
<td>2.445*</td>
<td>.0258</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Significant differences between ethnic groups are denoted by *p-value<.05; **p-value<.01
Black immigrants and African Americans agree on a number of issues, but the policy issues that they disagree on are worth noting. To begin, while Blacks across ethnic groups tend to have similar attitudes on the death penalty and issues of equality, African Americans are more supportive of employment affirmative action than Black immigrants, a policy that is typically viewed by African Americans as one that will ameliorate racial disparities. Secondly, Black immigrants tend to have more hawkish foreign policy stances. Finally, Black immigrants and African Americans have very different attitudes concerning immigrants. Extant research shows that African Americans tend to be very ambivalent on the issue of immigration, but that on the whole, immigration is an important policy issue for Black immigrants (Capers and Smith 2015).

Again, existing research does not shed a great deal of light on the contemporary partisan preferences of Black immigrants. The results here show that Black immigrants are just as likely to be Democrats as African Americans, but their policy preferences, on some important issues, are quite different. Moreover, it is unclear whether Black immigrants will pivot toward the GOP due to their foreign-policy preferences (as seen by some Asian American groups and Cubans) or toward the Democratic party, due in part to the perception that that party has their interests on some other issues in mind.

**Determinants of Black Partisanship**

*Results: African Americans*

We test the determinants of African American partisanship first; the results are presented in Table 3. Model 1 is a simple model that provides information about the effect of ideology on partisanship. Rather than using a traditional seven-point measure of ideology, ranging from very liberal to very conservative, we use a series of dummy variables, where identifying as “moderate” is the baseline category. We consistently find that being liberal influences individuals to identify as Democrats. The first model of Table 3 shows that extreme liberals are 76 percent more likely to identify as a strong Democrat and 10 percent more likely to identify as a weak Democrat than moderates. Similarly, extreme liberals are only 3 percent likely to identify as a pure Independent and less than one percent likely to identify as a weak or strong Republican, as one might expect, and as our hypothesis asserted (H2A). Relatedly, we find that identifying as conservative does not lead African Americans to identify as Republicans; in fact, it does not influence their partisanship one way or the other (H2B).
### Table 3
African American Partisanship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(Standard Error) (1)</th>
<th>(Standard Error) (2)</th>
<th>(Standard Error) (3)</th>
<th>(Standard Error) (4)</th>
<th>(Standard Error) (5)</th>
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</thead>
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<td><strong>Ideology</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme Liberal</td>
<td>0.279***</td>
<td>0.286***</td>
<td>0.346***</td>
<td>0.332***</td>
<td>0.502*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0896)</td>
<td>(0.0933)</td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
<td>(0.114)</td>
<td>(0.179)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slightly Liberal</td>
<td>0.661*</td>
<td>0.628**</td>
<td>0.735</td>
<td>0.751</td>
<td>0.918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.151)</td>
<td>(0.147)</td>
<td>(0.178)</td>
<td>(0.186)</td>
<td>(0.237)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme Conservative</td>
<td>0.977</td>
<td>0.988</td>
<td>1.128</td>
<td>1.220</td>
<td>1.158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.304)</td>
<td>(0.314)</td>
<td>(0.368)</td>
<td>(0.404)</td>
<td>(0.399)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slightly Conservative</td>
<td>0.975</td>
<td>0.939</td>
<td>1.025</td>
<td>1.060</td>
<td>0.790</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.236)</td>
<td>(0.234)</td>
<td>(0.263)</td>
<td>(0.279)</td>
<td>(0.217)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Racial Identity</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked Fate</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.781</td>
<td>0.857</td>
<td>0.844</td>
<td>0.778</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
<td>(0.149)</td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closeness to Blacks</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.733***</td>
<td>0.753***</td>
<td>0.847</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0775)</td>
<td>(0.0828)</td>
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<td>(0.0956)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exposure to Discrimination</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1.024</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0916)</td>
<td>(0.0914)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats Represent Blacks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.147***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0345)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans Represent Blacks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16.95***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(6.983)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeownership</td>
<td>1.025</td>
<td>1.060</td>
<td>1.019</td>
<td>0.971</td>
<td>0.923</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.161)</td>
<td>(0.169)</td>
<td>(0.164)</td>
<td>(0.160)</td>
<td>(0.157)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Education</td>
<td>1.025</td>
<td>1.034</td>
<td>1.050</td>
<td>1.035</td>
<td>1.011</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.0369)</td>
<td>(0.0382)</td>
<td>(0.0394)</td>
<td>(0.0402)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>1.251</td>
<td>1.184</td>
<td>1.114</td>
<td>1.141</td>
<td>0.930</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.221)</td>
<td>(0.217)</td>
<td>(0.208)</td>
<td>(0.219)</td>
<td>(0.186)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Male=1)</td>
<td>2.187***</td>
<td>2.383***</td>
<td>2.443***</td>
<td>2.439***</td>
<td>2.439***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.333)</td>
<td>(0.373)</td>
<td>(0.385)</td>
<td>(0.406)</td>
<td>(0.412)</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Models 2, 3 and 4 in Table 3 aim to test the hypothesis concerning the role of identity on African American partisanship ($H_3)$. We find that although neither “linked fate” nor exposure to discrimination seem to influence African Americans’ partisan identity, a sense of closeness to group members consistently influences African Americans’ partisan identity. There has been quite a bit of debate concerning the role of group consciousness on African Americans’ political behavior; part of this debate stems from the fact that political scientists have used multiple measures of group consciousness (see McClain et al. 2009 for a full explanation of this debate). However, even some of the most rigorous analyses of the role of identity on Black partisanship and political behavior rely on dated data or lower standards of statistical significance (Chong and Rogers 2005; Hajnal and Lee 2011). Even Hajnal and Lee (2011)’s measure of group consciousness is significant at the less traditional and lower standard of $<0.1$. Here, we use a relatively large dataset from 2004 and find that some aspects of racial identity influence African Americans political identity. African Americans who feel “very close” to other Blacks are nearly 50 percent more likely to identify as strong Democrats and 19 percent more likely to identify as weak Democrats than those who do not feel as close to other Blacks.

The final model, 5, adds on the last layer of potential determinants: information. We find that the way African Americans perceive the parties’ attention to the interests of African Americans plays an influential role in this group’s partisan identity. African Americans who believe that Democrats best represent African Americans have consistently lower odds of identifying as a strong Republican. They are 55 percent more likely to identify as a strong Democrat and 18 percent more likely to identify as a weak Democrat than Blacks who do not believe in the Democratic Party’s representation of Blacks. On the other hand, African Americans who believe that the Republican Party best represents African Americans and their interests have statistically higher odds of identifying as a strong Republican than those who do not hold such a stance. Interestingly, however, many of the African Americans who believe the Republican Party best represents Blacks’ interests also identify as pure Independents (27 percent)—rather than weak or strong Republicans. African Americans who hold this belief actually identify as weak and strong Republicans at three and five percent respectively. Overall, these findings are consistent with our expectations ($H_{4A}$).

Aside from ideology, identity, and information influencing African Americans’ partisan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income ($10,000s)</th>
<th>1.001</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.941</td>
<td>0.981</td>
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<td>(0.163)</td>
<td>(0.164)</td>
<td>(0.182)</td>
<td>(0.194)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.985***</td>
<td>0.984***</td>
<td>0.983***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00480)</td>
<td>(0.00491)</td>
<td>(0.00498)</td>
<td>(0.00516)</td>
<td>(0.00529)</td>
</tr>
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<td>1.012</td>
<td>1.006</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.0822)</td>
<td>(0.0856)</td>
<td>(0.0865)</td>
<td>(0.0879)</td>
<td>(0.0930)</td>
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<td>Observations</td>
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<td>679</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-970.4</td>
<td>-934</td>
<td>-915.1</td>
<td>-874.8</td>
<td>-764.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi2</td>
<td>65.94</td>
<td>72.67</td>
<td>77.49</td>
<td>76.15</td>
<td>296.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>0.0329</td>
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<td>0.0406</td>
<td>0.0417</td>
<td>0.162</td>
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</table>
affiliation, we also find two control variables that play a role here. First, we find that African American men are more likely to identify as Republican. Secondly, older African Americans are more likely to identify as Democrats than young members of this group; this is consistent with the research that shows that young people are more likely to identify as Independents, refusing to give their loyalty to a party that they may see as taking advantage of their groups’ historical partisan loyalty (Haynie and Watts 2010). Finally, we should point out that none of the variables that measure aspects of socioeconomic status influence partisanship, which is also consistent with extant literature (Dawson 1994; Johnson and Gordon 2005). Dawson (1994), writing nearly two decades ago, explained that we should expect Blacks’ political attitudes and behaviors to be shaped by their socioeconomic status when they begin to feel that their racial identity does not influence their opportunity structure; these results suggest that that time has not yet come.

Results: Black Immigrants

We turn to our final set of results in Table 4, which outline the determinants of Black immigrants’ partisanship. Model 1 reveals that ideology, especially for those who identify as “extreme” liberals are moved toward the Democratic Party. According this model, Black immigrants are 63 percent more likely to identify as a strong Democrat and 16 percent more likely to identify as a weak Democrat than as moderates, and they are much less likely to identify as strong or weak Republicans. Those who identify as extremely liberal are only about one percent likely to also identify as strong or weak Republicans. The role of ideology holds until we get to our fully specified model, which we will elaborate on below.
Table 4
Black Immigrant Partisan Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Odds Ratio</th>
<th>Odds Ratio</th>
<th>Odds Ratio</th>
<th>Odds Ratio</th>
<th>Odds Ratio</th>
<th>Odds Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Standard Error)</td>
<td>(Standard Error)</td>
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<td>(6)</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

**Ideology**

<p>| | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
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<td>0.344***</td>
<td>0.359**</td>
<td>0.381**</td>
<td>0.431*</td>
<td>0.507</td>
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<td></td>
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**Racial Identity**

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**Information**

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<td>Republicans Represent</td>
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<td>Blacks</td>
<td>(4.193)</td>
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**Controls**

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<tr>
<td>Homeownership</td>
<td>1.261</td>
<td>1.325</td>
<td>1.320</td>
<td>1.188</td>
<td>1.016</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.256)</td>
<td>(0.273)</td>
<td>(0.275)</td>
<td>(0.254)</td>
<td>(0.221)</td>
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The second determinant of concern is identity. Similar to African Americans, we find
that while linked fate does not lend additional predictive value to Afro-Caribbeans’ partisanship,
feelings of closeness do influence this group. Models 3 through 6 reveal that those who feel
close in their ideas and feelings to other Blacks are more likely to identify as Democrats. In fact,
Black immigrants who feel “very close” to other Blacks are 48 percent more likely to identify
as strong Democrats and 20 percent more likely to identify as weak Democrats than those who
do not feel as close to other Blacks. Existing research shows that while Black immigrants do
share similar levels of attachment to their racial identity group, this identity does not necessarily
influence their political attitudes (e.g. policy preferences) or behaviors (e.g. voting, protesting)
in the way that it does for African Americans; here, we find a sense of closeness similarly affects
Blacks’ partisanship across ethnic lines.

Finally, we examine the extent to which information about the parties and American
society influences first and second generation Black immigrants’ party affiliation. Model 5
incorporates respondents’ feelings of whether they believe each of the parties represent the
interests of Black immigrants; model 6 adds on perceptions about whether the two parties reflect
Black interests, more generally. In Model 5, we find that those who believe the Democrats
represent Black immigrants’ interests are more likely to identify with that party; meanwhile,
those who perceive that Republicans are better representatives are more likely to feel an attachment to the GOP.

Model 6 adds an additional layer of information. This final model reveals that Black immigrants consider how parties represent both their ethnic group as well as the broader racial group when making political decisions. Black immigrants who believe that Democrats best represent Blacks are 41 percent more likely to identify as a strong Democrat and 26 percent more likely to identify as a weak Democrat than Black immigrants who do not believe this to be true. Similar to African Americans, Black immigrants who believe in the GOP’s ability to best represent Blacks do not necessarily identify as Republican; they are 20 percent more likely to identify as a pure Independent and only 3 percent more likely to identify as weak or strong Republicans than non-believing Black immigrants. The final model also shows that generational status and citizenship, two measures of socialization to American political culture, do not provide additional information about Black immigrants’ partisanship.

**Conclusion**

Traditional models of partisanship assume that partisans are socialized in the U.S. or at least have a great deal of history with the parties, such that they can make informed choices about which party will best represent their individual interests. These models also assume that Americans have a similar understanding of where the two major parties as well as the individuals themselves stand on a liberal-to-conservative ideological spectrum. Finally, these models tend to rely on socioeconomic status as an important predictive variable. Our results reveal that developing a fully specified model of Black partisanship requires us to reconsider a number of these assumptions.

For example, Black immigrants are, on average, more educated than African Americans, and thus tend to have greater incomes. Traditional models of partisanship would lead us to predict that this higher socioeconomic status would lead Black immigrants to become Republicans. While we do find that Afro-Caribbeans are slightly more likely to be Republicans than African Americans, the results here show that the asymmetry in partisan affiliation that we see among African Americans is mimicked by Black immigrants. Additionally, we find that measures of socioeconomic status do not provide much information about partisan identity for either group in the way that we see this for White Americans. Similarly, the results show that Black immigrants and African Americans disagree on some policy issues; there were a number of policy domains where Black immigrants’ attitudes lean toward the sentiments of Republicans more—especially foreign-policy issues—but these policy preferences do not appear to be the deciding factor in their partisan affiliation. Instead, the data reveal that both African Americans and Black immigrants have found their way to the Democratic Party.

Another break in the partisanship literature is revealed in the analysis of the role of ideology. While traditional theories of partisanship predict that liberals and conservatives will shift toward the Democratic and Republican parties, respectively, the results here challenge that assumption. We found that while African Americans and Black immigrants who identify as (very) liberal tend to identify as Democrats, characterizing oneself as conservative does not necessarily lead to Blacks identifying as Republican. As shown, there were very few respondents who identified as Republicans to begin with, but what we find is that political ideology does not neatly overlap with the two-party system for African Americans or Black immigrants. Instead, we find that Blacks who characterize themselves as conservative are more likely to identify as Independents or even as Democrats rather than as Republicans; we found evidence for this across ethnic groups.
Although our models do not consistently show that traditional measures of racial identity and group consciousness influence African Americans’ and Black immigrants’ partisanship, they have revealed that both groups do consider the well-being of their group members in their decision about the party with which they want to closely identify. Members of both groups rely on information about which party will best represent the interests of their group members in order to make a determination about which party to rely on.

One implication that underlies all of our findings is that partisanship may not necessarily be a matter of habit or a matter of the heart for Blacks, but rather a strategic calculation about what is best for the group. Black immigrants, who are relatively new to the U.S., have shown that they are very cognizant of the differences between the two parties, and they support the party which they feel best represents their group’s interests, much in the way that we have seen this play out for African Americans. What this might also mean is that if the Republican Party plays its cards right on an issue like immigration, there exists the potential for an ethnic split in the Black vote.

Notes
1. A note on nomenclature: We use “Black” to describe all individuals who are ascribed a Black racial identity despite their ethnicity. We use “African American” to refer to those people whose ancestors have been in the U.S. for several generations. Finally, we use “Black immigrant” and “foreign-born Blacks” interchangeably to describe those who are relatively new to the US; this article focuses on Afro-Caribbean immigrants.

2. In 1965, about 125,000 foreign-born Blacks resided in the U.S.; this number rose to 816,000 within a decade and a half. Today, there are more than 3 million foreign-born Blacks in the US, which constitutes nearly 9% of the Black population. Experts predict that by 2060, this number will double (Brown 2015).

3. The National Politics Survey was also administered in 2008, but the survey only included 97 Caribbean and 329 African American respondents.

References


Appendix

Question Wording

Ideology
• We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. When it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as liberal or conservative?
  o If you had to choose, would you consider yourself as extremely conservative or slightly conservative?
  o If you had to choose, would you consider yourself as extremely liberal or slightly liberal?

Partisanship
• Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a republican, a democrat, an independent, or something else?
• Would you call yourself a strong [democrat/republican] or a not very strong [democrat/republican]?
• Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican party or to the Democratic party? [Independent, Other party, no preference, or “don’t know” respondents only.] (1) strong democrat, (2) not very strong democrat, (3) democrat leaning independent, (4) pure independent, (5) republican leaning independent, (6) not very strong republican, (7) strong republican

Racial Identity, Group Consciousness and Racial Socialization
• How close do you feel to [African Americans] in your ideas, interests and feelings about things? (1) not close at all, (2) not too close, (3) fairly close, (4) very close.
• Do you think what happens to [Black] people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life? (1) yes, (0) no.
• How much discrimination or unfair treatment do you think you have faced in the U.S. because of your ethnicity or race? (1) none, (2) a little, (3) some, (4) a lot.

Party Information
• Next I would like to know which political party you think would do a better job representing the interests of different groups in society. Do you think the Democratic Party or the Republican Party would do a better job representing the interest of…
  o Black people? (1) Democratic/Republican Party, (0) not
  o Caribbeans like people from Jamaica, Bermuda, or Haiti? (1) Democratic/Republican Party, (0) not
Civil Rights Policy Preferences

- Some people say that because of past discrimination, some groups in society should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion is wrong because it gives some groups advantages they haven’t earned. How strongly do you favor or oppose preferential hiring and promotion? Are you (1) strongly opposed, (2) somewhat opposed, (3) somewhat in favor, or (4) strongly in favor to it?
- How strongly do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder? Are you (1) strongly opposed, (2) somewhat opposed (3) somewhat in favor or (4) strongly in favor of it?
- Recently there has been a lot of talk about women’s rights. Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry, and government. Others feel that a woman’s place is in the home. Which is closer to the way you feel: men and women should have equal roles, or a woman’s place is in the home?
  - Do you feel (1) strongly that a woman’s place is in the home, (2) not strongly that a woman’s place is in the home, (3) not strongly that men and women should have equal roles, or (4) strongly that men and women should have equal roles?
- I’m going to read you three statements. Which of the following statements comes closest to your view concerning same-sex couples? Should they: not be allowed to marry or form civil unions, be allowed to legally form civil unions, but not to marry, or be allowed to legally marry.
  - Would you say you (1) very strongly believe they should not be allowed to marry or form civil unions, you (2) not so strongly believe they should not be allowed to marry or form civil unions, you (3) not so strongly believe that they should be allowed to legally form civil unions, but not marry, you (4) very strongly believe that they should be allowed to legally form civil unions, but not marry, you (5) not so strongly believe that they should be allowed to legally marry, or you (6) very strongly believe they should be allowed to legally marry.

Immigrant Policy Preferences

- Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be (1) decreased, left the (2) same as it is now, or (3) increased?

U.S. Foreign Policy Strategies

- Do you think the U.S. did the right thing in sending military forces to Iraq or should the U.S. have stayed out? (1) Should have stayed out, (2) it depends, or it (3) did the right thing?

Government Spending

- Now I would like to ask about various types of government programs. As I read each one, tell me if you would like to see spending for it (1) decreased, left the (2) same or (3) increased. How about:
  - public education: (1) decreased, left the (2) same or (3) increased.
  - Defense spending: (1) decreased, left the (2) same or (3) increased.
  - Social Security spending: (1) decreased, left the (2) same or (3) increased.
  - Patrolling the border against illegal immigrants: (1) decreased, left the (2) same or (3) increased.
Trends: Political Economy and Socioeconomic Mobility
Deliberating Politics and the Economy: Perspectives of African American College Students

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Spelman College

Melvinia Turner King
Morehouse College

Marionette Holmes
Spelman College

Charles Moses
Austin Peay State University

Abstract
This research focuses on measuring the attitudes of African American college students regarding their student loan debt, the 2012 presidential election, and President Obama’s political obligations to African Americans. Through convenience sampling, the political and economic perspectives of African American college students from three private, historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs) in the southeastern United States were measured during a public deliberation based on the National Issues Forum model. Results revealed that 1) African American college students attending HBCUs remained apprehensive about the availability of financial aid and the long term impact of their loan debt on their post-graduate lives and 2) African American college students did not believe that President Obama was politically obligated to African American concerns, even though they expressed enthusiasm regarding the 2012 presidential election.

Keywords: Deliberative Dialogues, Civic Engagement, Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs), Participatory Democracy

Introduction
Increasingly, African American youth are unable to afford college. Parental job loss due to the 2007 economic recession and the fact that many African American college students are the first in their families to seek a higher degree are two prominent reasons college has become inaccessible for African Americans (The National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education 2011). First-generation students are often among those who must work to fund their education (Saenz 2007). In addition to obtaining and maintaining employment, African American college students and their families often seek government loans to finance their education (Bozick 2007).

Studies show that African American college students increasingly and disproportionately obtain loans as opposed to European descended, Latino, Asian and Native American college students.
students because the majority of African American students come from low-income families (Jackson and Reynolds 2013; Trent, Lee and Owens-Nicholson 2006; Price 2004). The financial strain increases when African American students are first generation students since limited family financial assistance is available to most first generation students.

African American college students who persist through graduation often face enormous student loan debt, which becomes a formidable factor when trying to manage household finances. The debt amount is especially high when both persons in a household are encumbered with repaying student loans. In fact, a household hampered by debt is disproportionately present among African Americans (Baum and Steele 2010). For example, in 2013 more than 40 percent of African American families bore student loan debt compared to 28 percent of white families (Berman 2015).

Such financial strains are exacerbated by more stringent application rules for loans, such as those governing the PLUS Loan (Parent Loan for Undergraduate Students). In 2010, for example, the federal government implemented a five-year credit review of parents applying for the loan instead of the previous ninety-day review. As a result, more African American parents were ineligible to receive the PLUS Loan. Consequently, African American college students and the HBCUs that relied on their enrollment were severely affected by the new guidelines. In 2014, President Obama proposed that the Department of Education reduce the number of credit review years from five to two and exempted up to $2,085 in delinquent debt, thereby eliminating another potential strike against applicants. The new guidelines went into effect July 1, 2015 (U.S. Department of Education 2014; Stratford 2014). Unfortunately, the adjustments were too late to prevent the predicted devastation on HBCUs and their students (Thurgood Marshall College Fund 2015).

Saddled with debt amidst the economic recession and the rising costs of a higher education, African American college students, like most college students in the U.S., voted in the 2012 presidential election with the economy and their education in mind (Hart Research Associates 2012). They were cognizant that the next president’s (Romney or Obama) economic outlook and direction for the country would support or hinder their pursuit of a degree, as well as impact their post-graduate lives. Hence, youth voter turnout was chronicled in racial, gender, age, and regional statistics, which included African American college students. Similarly, the majority of what is known about the impact of the economic crisis on African American college students exists in the form of statistics from federal entities such as the National Center for Education Statistics (Baum and Steele 2010, Marchand 2010). However, narratives to provide context to those statistics are visibly absent. Knowing why African American college students voted provides critical background information that renders a more comprehensive analysis of the numbers. More importantly, documenting the political and economic attitudes of African American college students strengthens their contributions to the democratic decision making process.

Literature Review

Public deliberation is the application of deliberative democracy (Carpini, Cooks and Jacobs 2004), a political theory that expands representative and direct democracy by including citizens in the public policy-making process through rational, reasonable deliberations (Carpini, Cooks and Jacobs 2004, 318). Mathews and McAfee (2003) argue that deliberations are different from debates by stating, “[p]ublic deliberation is a means by which citizens make tough choices about basic purposes and directions for their communities and their country” (Mathews and
McAfee 2003, 10). Debates present opposing arguments to elucidate theories and justifications for each position. Competitiveness and firmness of beliefs give way to connecting and open-mindedness in public deliberations and deliberative dialogues. Public deliberation focuses on the process of communally listening to each other and collectively thinking through issues, often toward collective agreed upon solutions (Bonnemann 2007a). Deliberative dialogues provide opportunities for communal discussions on issues from varying viewpoints, which may provide catalysts for deliberations Bonnemann 2007b). The benefit of public deliberations and deliberative dialogues is the mutual, inclusiveness and collective agreement to “hear” various opinions.

Deliberative dialogues are effective ways of connecting students to communities, as well as introducing, explaining, training, and equipping students for life as engaged citizens who participate in their democracy. Increasingly, predominantly white colleges and universities are incorporating deliberative dialogues in pedagogy, course syllabi, co-curricular, and administrative areas to develop civically engaged citizens, which attests to the import of the strategy (Diaz and Gilchrist 2010). Olivos (2008) emphasizes the need for colleges and universities to create spaces where the campus community deliberates on the importance of diversity. For many scholars of diverse backgrounds who teach students from various heritages or from groups whose voices are faint or unheard in society, deliberations provide “a chance to be heard and to hear others” (Olivos 2008). As Peterson (2014) states, “[s]uch spaces and opportunities provide experiences for students (and all campus constituents) to embrace and actualize ‘the practice of deliberation,’ civic responsibility and professional practice of ‘public work’” (Peterson 2014, 77).

Literature explaining incorporating public deliberations into higher education is vast. As extensive as it is, scholars maintain that colleges and universities are prolific arenas to further civically engage students (Dewey 1916; Gutman 1987; O’Connell and McKenzie 2002). Because studies that report the impact of public deliberations on students are less voluminous, campuses provide an opportunity to determine their impact. Academia is a fitting arena to teach, motivate, and equip students in the classroom for public work in the community and traditional spaces of political participation, especially since public deliberations foster the same civic mindedness and community connection found in the missions of most institutions of higher education. Along with service learning, Gibson (2008 in Grattan, Dedrick, Dienstfrey,) includes civic education, youth development and political action as academia’s four methods of cultivating civic engagement (Gibson 2008, 5).

Public deliberations have proven to be student-centered pedagogical approaches that result in civically engaged, empowered students (Boyte 2002). In the Journal of Public Deliberation’s Special Issue on Higher Education (2010), colleges and universities are asked to consider how academic programs could revive democracy. The issue’s essays discuss how concepts in disciplines such as political science, communications, philosophy, education and library sciences connect to deliberative democracy, and how training professors, assignments, readings and certain campus spaces-such as the library- are ideal opportunities to address civic engagement. Not surprisingly, political science is particularly acknowledged as a discipline where the traditional definition and practices of democracy might be challenged while connecting students to avenues of civic engagement (Harriger 2010; O’Connell and McKenzie 2002). Public deliberations also connect students and higher education with communities (Longo 2006; Harriger and McMillan 2007; Shaffer 2014; Thomas 2010).
Deliberations are also held in classrooms transformed into political training grounds (Brookfield and Preskill 2005). Students often emerge from deliberations more knowledgeable of the public policy making process as well as gain confidence in the exercise of deliberation and advocacy (Cole 2013). Many deliberations are held in first-year experiences or programs to promote civic engagement. After deliberations, students believe they are better-informed citizens after hearing other students’ opinions and expressing their own (Ervin 1997). In a first-year writing course, deliberations empowered students by equipping them with skills of reasoned arguments, logic and concern for others—all skills necessary for citizen participation in a democracy.

Campus-wide deliberations have been used to address broader issues. For example, Joni Doherty at Franklin Pierce University helped infuse deliberations into classrooms and the campus at the predominantly white institution (PWI) by introducing topics centered on diversity to address numerous racial incidents. Beginning in 1999, deliberations in classes were held with first-year students (who were also majority first-generation students) via the Diversity Community Project under The New England Center for Civic Life at Franklin Pierce University. Students emerged from class and campus forums better equipped to acknowledge and respect various life experiences. Doherty makes it clear that her forum’s objectives are not geared towards a specific outcome, but rather to “foster the acquisition of knowledge and skills needed to make well-reasoned judgments about ethical issues…” (2008, 79).

Katy J. Harriger and Jill J. McMillan (2007) conducted a pivotal study to empirically verify the impact of public deliberations on the civic engagement of college students. With a cohort of thirty first-year students (eight minorities, fifteen females, fifteen males, over half from the Southeast), Harriger and McMillan tested the viability of public deliberations in the classroom, on campus and in the community. After four years of exposing students to public deliberations and providing training to conduct them, they found that these students were more civically engaged, critical of political processes, involved in traditional political activities, and aware of the broader impacts of deliberations (Harriger and McMillan 2007, 32).

Introducing and applying deliberative dialogues in higher education curricula and administration stimulate civic mindedness among college students. Studies show deliberation provides a powerful foundation and/or conduit for civic engagement during students’ college or university years and beyond (Ibid). Through experiential learning, active learning, and cooperative learning, students are empowered to create and participate in their own educational journey (Perrin 2014, 1; Millis 2002, 8; Bonwell and Eison 1991). These pedagogies have consistently proven to reach students more effectively than traditional teacher-centered approaches. Although deliberative democracy is a student-centered pedagogy befitting professors and institutions attempting to engage Millennials—who tend to be more visual and action oriented in their learning—occurrences and documentation of public deliberations at HBCUs are limited (Kiesa, Orlowski et al. 2007).

Due to cultural differences, histories, life experiences, and privilege, deliberations that occur on the campuses of PWIs may focus on different concerns or approach similar issues from a different perspective and objective than deliberations held at HBCUs. For example, African American college students, particularly those attending HBCUs, are already aware of de jure and de facto prejudices and discrimination, which means they may not benefit as much by stepping into others’ shoes as Howell (2002) suggests based on race. They may, however, benefit from gaining an understanding of other students based on differences in socio-economic
status, life experiences, career goals, and other information disclosed during deliberations. Studies to verify the impact of public deliberations held at HBCUs are also necessary, especially since African American college students enrolled in HBCUs may identify different issues for deliberations. Financial aid to fund their higher education is one such issue.

African American college students, unlike majority students, are more concerned about student loan debt, future financial statuses and political leadership. Accordingly, deliberations are appropriate spaces to allow them to voice their concerns as they have a stake in U.S. political and economic policies that are related to their education. Since deliberations are connected to a more inclusive democracy through citizen participation, African American college students’ interests and concerns must also be included in policy discussions and decisions (Setälä 2014, 150).

Yet, African American college students as well as faculty and administrators at HBCUs are underrepresented in public deliberations in academe. As a result, HBCUs and the primarily African American students enrolled in HBCUs are underrepresented in public deliberations in higher education literature. Consequently, African American college student voices are faint in public deliberation conversations and outcomes, especially on issues that directly affect financing their education.

The educational journeys and experiences of African American college students, particularly those attending HBCUs, encompass multiple historically oppressed groups in the U.S. The very existence of HBCUs exemplifies the need for the inclusion of excluded groups in public deliberations. Additionally, African American college students attending these bedrock institutions of higher education are keenly aware of the debates on the viability of their HBCU as well as the expense of their education. Politics, the economy, and education are present in seminars, classes, administrative meetings and social conversations on HBCU campuses. Providing college students of color space to discuss and offer solutions to political and economic issues that may alter their (and their families’) life situation is necessary, yet limited.

Joffrey T. Whisenton and Associates have provided the greatest opportunities for faculty and administrators serving HBCUs to participate in deliberations through their long partnership with the Kettering Foundation. Over the past eighteen years, cohorts of African American, Native American and Latino/a Public Scholars have introduced and implemented deliberations to their respective institutions and communities. Authors of this work are members of the 2010-2012 and 2012-2014 cohorts. The 2012 presidential election forum discussed later in this article was featured in a Kettering publication highlighting deliberations by the Whisenten Public Scholars (Knutson and Marin 2015).

Gary Paul’s (2002, 205) call for more public deliberations in HBCU classrooms as well as connecting deliberations with civic engagement at a historically black institution was addressed when Lee Ingham (2008, 41) successfully introduced public deliberation to first-year students at Central State University, thereby achieving the desired outcome of civically engaged students on global, national, local, and campus issues. Preparing to implement public deliberations, Marshalita Peterson (2014) trained students attending Spelman College to conduct public deliberations based on the National Issues Forums (NIF) that also produced civically engaged students as organizers, moderators and participants. She also reports that students emerged from the training prepared to fulfill leadership roles as moderators in NIF. Although public deliberations have occurred at HBCUs, such as Central State University, Clark Atlanta University, Florida A & M University, Morehouse College, and Spelman College, more
are encouraged. This gap in literature also speaks to the opportunity available to HBCUs to train students for civic engagement through public deliberations on their campuses. Further, the limited number of public deliberation forums held at HBCUs affects the impact of their representation in the democratic process. This dearth may be due to a lack of awareness of public deliberations, particularly by faculty outside the social sciences, preoccupation with other institutional goals, budget constraints or time and faculty interests—all of which are necessary to train faculty, staff or students to organize and implement an NIF.

This research fills gaps in public deliberation literature by expanding the research on public deliberations held at HBCUs as well as public deliberation literature focused solely on African American college students. Research on public deliberations at HBCUs is advanced through this study’s NIF, which often occur in collaboration with the Kettering Foundation.

Deliberations are essential to a more participatory democracy. David Mathews, President of the Kettering Foundation, provides an astute observation about the purpose of deliberation: “Although not resulting in total agreement, deliberation helps people find enough common ground to act together. By doing this, it enables citizens to become effective political actors” (Mathews 2009, 101). NIF also supports public deliberations in higher education as noted below:

Deliberative learning is an approach to education that emphasizes dialogue, inquiry, and choice making. Deliberative learners explore complex topics in-depth, consider diverse perspectives on these topics, identify and work through tensions inherent to those views, and attempt to arrive at reasoned judgment. When used to support students’ development as citizens, deliberative learning takes on a public dimension: students grapple with issues of public significance in order to arrive at a shared decision (NIF Educator’s Center 2014).

An NIF Issue Guide provides an overview and framework for addressing issues, such as the national debt, immigration, healthcare, racism, and other domestic issues. Problems are presented in the guidebook in a non-partisan manner. Three different approaches to addressing the issue are provided objectively to avoid persuading participants or invoking biases. Participants then deliberate on the costs and consequences of following each option with an outcome of developing their own approach to the issue (NIF 2014; NIF 2003).

Limited resources and overcommitted faculty may make it difficult for HBCUs to offer student centered forums. Despite these challenges, the authors of this analysis agree with Long and Meyer (2006) who state “…we believe that updated research with college students could be timely, contributing an important element to the efforts for democratic revitalization: the voices of the youngest generation” (Meyer 2006, 3).

Methodology

The conceptual framework for this study is civic agency. Participatory democracy calls for citizens from all backgrounds to work together towards solutions to problems that benefit the common good (Levine 2013). Boyte (2007) argues that it is necessary to include the creativity, skills and talents of minorities, youth, those of a lower socio-economic status, and others on the margins of society to bring a citizen-centered democracy to fruition. Public deliberation is a medium by which this process can be achieved, for it provides 1) space for African American college students to voice their opinions on the 2012 presidential election, President Obama’s political performance, and the impact of the economic recession on their educational journeys; 2)
an opportunity to document their perspectives, thereby providing a more nuanced understanding of quantitative data and 3) augmentation of African American college student participation in public deliberations and deliberative democracy.

To measure African American college students’ attitudes on President Obama’s political obligation toward African Americans, the 2012 Presidential election and student loan debt, a mixed methods approach was used, which included an NIF modeled forum (Franklin 2012). The public deliberation forum provided space for African American college students to share their political opinions and have those opinions documented. The forum was held on November 1, 2012. Convenience sampling was used to invite students from three private HBCUs using verbal class presentations by the authors and institutional email. The forum was held on one of the participating HBCU campuses. In an NIF forum, trained scribes are called recorders. Recorders capture themes and direct quotes, if possible, from the comments of each participant who speaks, while they are speaking. For this study, four students were selected and trained by the authors to serve as Recorders. The authors were trained by the Kettering Foundation to serve as moderators. All participants for this study were only identified by gender-Female and Male- and a number assigned to them as they entered the dialogue.

In addition to the forum, participants completed a written 18 question survey comprised of open-ended and closed-ended questions that included a Likert Item (Henry and Sears, 2002; Likert 1932). Likert scales were originally intended to measure the attitude of “agreement to disagreement.” Likert items are single questions that use the same attitudinal scale to measure attitudes other than the level of agreement (Brown 2011; Uebersax 2010). The survey obtained information on demographics as well as African American college students’ thoughts on President Obama’s political performance, the 2012 Presidential election, and student loan debt (See Appendix). Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to analyze qualitative and quantitative data rendered from the questionnaire responses. Using content analysis, open-ended questions were read and the responses were coded. Each code then received a numerical value. Closed-ended question responses also received numerical values. Subsequently, nominal and ordinal data was transposed into SPSS.

For the public deliberation forum, an information packet modeled after the earlier described NIF Issue Guides was created to inform and guide this analysis in the absence of an existing NIF Issue Guide on African American college students’ political and economic perspectives. The authors researched and compiled voting statistics on youth, college students, women and African Americans, as well as various African American perspectives on President Obama’s political attention to African American concerns. Also based on NIF Issue Guides, the information packets presented participants with three possible solutions to the question of whether or not President Obama had an obligation to implement an African American political agenda.

**Participants**

A total of 67 students attended the forum. All participants, except a female economics major, completed the survey that provided demographic information. Based on the questionnaire responses, all 66 respondents identified as African Americans. Their ages ranged between 18 and 23 years with economics, physics and political science majors having the highest representation, respectively. Eighty-four percent of the respondents identified as Democrats. This percentage is not surprising as most African Americans typically identify with the Democratic Party, especially in the South (Black 2004). In fact, amid demographics shown in Table 1 below, participants from four of the seven states represented were from southern states. The classification of the students varied. The only first-year student was a female economics major. The majority of the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age (years)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physics</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychology</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Home State</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party Identification</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Party</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libertarian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Party</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

females were sophomores and seniors, while slightly more males were juniors.

**Results**

**Excitement for the 2012 Presidential Election**

Ninety-seven percent of the African American college students in attendance were registered to vote, a clear indication of their civic mindedness. When asked if they were going to vote in the 2012 Presidential election, 95 percent said yes. Thirty-six percent of the respondents were not 18 in 2008. Understandably, meeting the voting age requirement for the 2012 election was a motivating factor that contributed to the excitement of the 2012 election. The dominant feeling of excitement as well as apprehensions and non-excitement regarding the 2012 presidential election are illustrated in Table 2.

**Table 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very Excited</th>
<th>Somewhat Excited</th>
<th>A Little Excited</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Not Excited</th>
<th>No Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=66


When asked to explain their level of excitement, students made statements such as, “I’m extremely excited about the election being that it’s my first time in college [HBCU at that] and seeing the candidates run [first incumbent of African descent],” “I feel that I am actually now a contributing member of American society,” and “Now that I have the power to vote and [am]about to enter working America, I feel the issues I’m voting on have a real impact.” A few expressed their excitement by responding with, “My first time voting!” In fact, 38 percent said they were excited because the 2012 election would mark the beginning of their inclusion in the electorate.

African American college students attending the NIF were also concerned about the outcome of the 2012 election. Figure 1 shows that although some were pessimistic, others were outright fearful of anticipated hardships a Republican president would inflict upon their lives as students, African Americans, and most especially African American college students attending an HBCU. Consequently, voting for President Obama was necessary in order to repel the pending doom feared as expressed in casual conversations by the students.
Although the majority of students indicated that they were very excited about the 2012 election, the following statements seem to sum up attitudes of individuals who responded with somewhat, little, or no excitement about the election: “I’m not the most politically inspired individual, so my involvement in the Presidential campaign was at a minimum,” “I have not been keeping up with politics preceding this election,” and “Lack of knowledge creates lack of excitement. How can you get excited about something you know nothing about?” These statements express the challenges HBCUs face in encouraging civic engagement amongst their predominantly African American student population amidst the prevalence of apathy, frustration, and distrust (Paul 2002). Political engagement is, however, an objective and proven outcome of public deliberations, which is why introducing more of them to HBCU campuses is necessary. Because students were aware of the impact the outcome of the 2012 presidential election would have on the economy and their lives as college students, the excitement about the 2012 presidential election and President Obama’s proposed agenda were connected to the economy, particularly to students’ anticipation of how the next president would address their higher education financial burdens.

**Issues That Concern African American College Students**

The survey of African American college students’ perspectives on their current financial status and their economic future was comprised of respondents (n=66) who were full-time students, 70 percent of whom held student loans. Table 3 shows that over half of the participants were enrolled in college because they received financial aid. The high percentage of participants with loans, especially African American college students who attend HBCUs, is documented in literature on college student loan debt (College Scholarships. 2016; Lanza 2016; UNCF 2016). Due to limited family assistance, many African American college students typically turn to government loans to finance their education.
Table 3
Financial Status for All Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full Time Students</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=66


When asked why the economy was important to them, one participant wrote, “[a]s a college student, I need as much aid as possible, so if the economy is not thriving, the cost of tuition will go up and aid will go down.” Similarly, another student said, “student loans, equal opportunity for education, job security, and affordable homes” were important issues. African American college students not only expressed concern regarding the impact of the economy on their lives as college students, but also as graduates. While seniors expressed concern with their quality of life post-graduation, first year students, sophomores and juniors were more apprehensive about attaining financial funding to continue their matriculation toward graduation. Figure 2 illustrates the comparison between graduating seniors and students with one to three years remaining.

Figure 2
Classification of African American Students Who Responded to the Survey


As Figure 3 illustrates, they expressed four general economic concerns—financing their education, repaying the national debt, obtaining post-graduate employment and most importantly, maintaining their quality of life.
In addition to the economy, African American college students were also concerned about issues directly related to marginalized groups, such as healthcare, poverty, and employment as indicated in Table 4. Women’s rights, the gender pay gap, women’s healthcare, and elderly healthcare were reoccurring issues among female responders.

Table 4
Issues of Concern in Addition to the Economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy Is Not Only an African American Issue</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Additionally, participants wanted President Obama to address issues that affect African Americans disproportionately, such as poverty. Two of the primary issues African American college student participants desired President Obama to address were equality and education. After all, literature and history bear witness as to how crucial they are to the advancement of African Americans. Also, a small number of participants indicated the economic recession was a national issue affecting all Americans.

In their comments, the majority of African American college students identified specific concerns they wanted President Obama to address: “I would like President Obama to address
issues that are related to welfare. Although this isn’t necessarily an AA [African American] issue. I feel that many AA in the inner city areas will be affected by it;” and “the glass ceiling that is present in corporate America regarding racial and gender discrimination.” Another student mentioned the educational system disparities. This same student continued “We need more Black doctors and scientists.”

A few survey responses echoed other inclusive sentiments expressed in the public deliberation. For example, one participant stated, “Issues aren’t African-American, they are universal and apply to everyone.” One respondent even stated, “African Americans look too much to President Obama and the government to address our issues, instead of tackling them from within. I don’t think that he stresses enough to citizens that they have a duty to uphold their government. He seems to focus on what the government has to offer us.” Another student called for more community accountability by noting President Obama should address “African American social and economic responsibility.”

President Obama’s Obligations to an African American Political Agenda

In responding to the three forum proposed solutions to the question of President Obama’s political obligation to African Americans, students expressed that President Obama was just as obligated to other communities as he was to African Americans. They stated the President’s agenda should be neutral and unbiased, thus representative of all constituents of the country. However, one student did state that African Americans should take advantage of the position of a black President since he is the “face” of African Americans. Another student stated that African Americans should have a distinct political agenda for the president to address, but that the African American communities needed to be more engaged prior to the creation of that agenda. Still, another participant saw African Americans as too small of a segment of the U.S.’s population to strive for change as a singular group. This student suggested African Americans collaborate with other constituents with similar interests to promote change by numbers. Although generally in favor of building political coalitions with like-minded constituent communities or groups, some attendees were skeptical of collaboration as a means for effecting progress. Inequality and the lack of resources were identified as obstacles as evident in these two statements: “American infrastructures are not built for non-whites to hold long term power/wealth,” and “We need to be brought to equality before we can progress.”

Discussion

Economically, African American college students were focused primarily on identifying and attaining funds to remain in college. The fact that 97 percent of them held loans and all were full-time students supports existing data on African American college students and their dependency on financial aid, particularly students attending HBCUs. Consequently, African American college students viewed voting as a direct means of addressing their economic concerns not only as students but also as graduates seeking employment and citizens coping with the national debt.

The survey also sought to determine African American students’ enthusiasm for the 2012 presidential election. African American college students who participated in the public deliberation forum and completed the questionnaire reported that they were excited about the 2012 election, as were other college students in the U.S. Yet, in casual conversations before and after the forum, attendees expressed concern about a Republican president’s economic policy’s impact on their economic and educational future.
The deliberative dialogue provided a forum for African American college students to express their economic and political concerns and share their thoughts on how financing their education might be addressed on campus, in the community and through government. They exchanged ideas on working with established student organizations, college administrators, elected officials and community leaders to include African American college students in decision-making processes. The deliberation also provided some African American college students an opportunity to think critically about how and why they should become civically engaged. In casual conversations, students revealed an appreciation of their peers’ varying viewpoints on President Obama’s obligation to an African American political agenda as well as diverse opinions on addressing crime and other issues in the community. African American college students also exchanged contact information with participants who invited them to join existing student and civic organizations, such as the NAACP.

When participants returned to their respective classes in the days following the deliberation forum, they inquired about the scheduling of the next forum, according to all authors. Some motivations driving the interests were 1) students reflected on their peers’ comments and appreciated hearing multiple perspectives; 2) the deliberation forced them to critically evaluate their own viewpoints; and 3) students left the forum invigorated by new ideas and excited to collaborate with students at other HBCUs to address similar community issues. The findings support Gary Paul’s (2002) belief that “HBCUs were established to serve the community, produce leaders, develop responsible citizens, and to strengthen civil and democratic society” (Paul 2002, 205).

Additionally, African American college students’ responses from this study should inform economic policy decisions by elected officials and HBCU administrators. Their voices provide unique perspectives on the effects of increases in student loan debt as well as the escalating costs of a college education. African American college students who recognize the political attacks on and economic challenges of their institutions may facilitate political engagement and activism to increase community and national awareness, thereby fostering positive change.

The public deliberation forum provided a much needed space for African American college students and HBCUs to increase African American youth participation and viewpoints in the democratic process while exposing students to civic engagement possibilities. Data revealed that African American college students, like most college students, were concerned about their financial stability during and after graduating from college in the midst of the economic recession and slow recovery. They also felt issues other than the economy loomed large in the African American community. Issues such as education, employment, healthcare, crime, and poverty were identified as being national issues that President Obama should have addressed. A point of contention, however, was whether African American concerns should have been presented to President Obama as a separate black political agenda or alongside those of other groups who were grappling with the same concerns. While African Americans joining coalitions to address African American issues was considered as a viable option, there was apprehension over the potential for the obliteration of African American concerns during larger political conversations or marginalization in favor of other coalitions’ political agendas.

The HBCU public deliberation forum revealed the potential effect deliberations have in addressing African American college students’ concerns. Although living under a discriminatory system has tempered their optimism, African American college students are keenly aware of their situations and are more than capable of identifying problems as well as working through
deliberations toward solutions. What they lack are opportunities to express those views, have them documented, and included as part of deliberative democracy literature, applications, and policies.

HBCU student participants’ voices provide a glimpse into the realities of African American college students enrolled in HBCUs. Although responses from the present study are not representative of all African American college students nor of all African American college students attending HBCUs, they do provide a human voice to voting and political demographic statistics about African American college students as reported by research groups, political organizations, and the media; yet, they remain underrepresented in public deliberation scholarship.

**Conclusion**

To answer the question of African American college students’ attitudes regarding President Obama’s political performance, the 2012 presidential election and student loan debt, African American college students attending three HBCU’s gathered in early November 2012 to hold an NIF modeled public deliberation forum. Participants’ comments during the forum as well findings from an 18 question survey administered in addition to the forum augment scant studies and applications of public deliberations at HBCUs, while increasing diversity in the broader literature on public deliberations in higher education. Public deliberations also expose students to a more inclusive approach to democracy.

Responses from African American college students in this study emphasize the need for HBCUs to cultivate an environment of civic engagement that occurs in the classroom or campus wide. Findings from this study concurred with scholars who cite HBCUs as ideal spaces to nurture and develop civically engaged citizens. Moreover, African American college students from HBCUs provide diversity and represent marginalized viewpoints in public deliberations and the democratic process. To that end, students, faculty and staff require training in planning, organizing, implementing, and evaluating NIF public deliberation forums to expose students to avenues of civic engagement.

NIF public deliberation forums provide opportunities for African American college students attending HBCUs to address issues mentioned by participants in this work, such as equality, crime, healthcare, education, employment. Discussing marginalized communities prepares civic engaged citizens to seek solutions to issues prevalent in African American communities that may not receive mainstream attention or adequate resources to address them. Therefore, it is important to democratic theory and practice that African American college students from HBCUs increase their presence in public deliberations, which will increase the visibility of HBCUs as well. The move towards including more deliberation pedagogy in HBCUs may begin in the classroom. Political science courses offer ideal opportunities for introducing concepts, training students and implementing public deliberations. A multi- and inter-disciplinary approach, public deliberation forums allow political science faculty to reach their students by re-envisioning/reconstructing concepts, structures and implementations of democracy.

Following another historic election—the outgoing of the first African American U.S. president, and the first nomination of a female presidential candidate by one of the two dominant political parties—African American college students continue to grapple with insurmountable student loan debt, and they may have the same, if not more intense, apprehensions about all Republicans seeking office on all levels following the election of Donald Trump as president. Capturing African American college students’ political perspectives on their student loan debt,
the 2016 presidential election, and salient issues to them as a new administration enters the presidency remains critical to post-election policy trajectories and electorate reconciliations with government and politicians. Public deliberations held at HBCUs would provide spaces to gather those thoughts, foster future research with HBCUs and African American college students, and render results that may be compared and contrasted with this study’s findings.

Notes
1. This work identifies first generation minority students as those not of European descent, from a family of lower socio-economic status, and are the first in their family to pursue a higher education degree (Blackwell and Pinder 2014).

2. Enrollment at HBCUs steadily declined as a result of fewer families qualifying for federal financial aid, such as the PLUS Loan (Johnson, Bruch and Gill 2015). Just as important, are the financial challenges HBCUs continue to face in order to remain operational (Coupet and Barnum 2010).

3. Deliberative democracy’s roots in western society are traceable as far back as Aristotle (Wilson 2011) and has evolved through two different phases to reach the third, and current phase (Elstub 2010). The initial theory was proposed by German philosopher Jurgen Habermas who extended the idea of participatory democracy into modern times with his theory of communicative action in 1981 (1984). For Habermas, language is used by participants to voice their opinions—all valid, with acknowledgment and acceptance of disagreement—to understand all sides of an issue, and reach agreement on solutions to identified concerns. John Rawls (Rawls 1995) contributes the notion that in a liberal society, every person is equal and free, which means they are obligated to abide by the principles of justice. If persons are fair, regardless of their political, religious or other differences, they would participate in public deliberations on proposed legislation arriving at a consensus. Joshua Cohen (2003) contributes the idea of deliberative democracy legitimizing public policy (Cohen, Joshua. 2003. “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy.” In Debates in Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology, edited by Derek Matravers and Jon Pike, 342-360. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group).


5. Joffrey T. Whisenton & Associates, Inc. enjoys a long standing personal and professional relationship with Dr. David Matthews and the Charles F. Kettering Foundation. The Kettering Foundation was founded in 1921 and has been instrumental in informing public policymaking through deliberative democratic means. Dr. David Matthews, along with Dr. Joffrey T. Whisenton have ensured the inclusion of marginalized American communities in deliberation efforts and outcomes. Historically black colleges and universities have benefited tremendously. Over fifteen HBCU faculty have participated as Public Policy Scholars through this collaboration. As a result, African American college students have benefited from Public Policy Scholars’ training and participation as Kettering scholars.
6. National Issues Forums are opportunities for citizens to gather and deliberate on issues, such as the economy, education, crime, healthcare, immigration, and other issues of concern to their communities. With trained moderators, citizens deliberative toward collective action on the identified issue(s). National Issues Forums facilitate public deliberations, which are components of a participatory democracy that benefits from informed and engaged citizens (National Issues Forums, 2016a; National Issues Forums, 2016b).

7. The questionnaire would have benefited from a practice run to identify confusing questions. The short time frame to coordinate the author’s schedules in order to plan, announce and implement the forum did not allow time to pilot the survey. If the survey is replicated, a pilot will be administered.

8. The concept “enthusiasm” is operationalized as eagerness to express civic engagement by voting.

9. Noting the identification of race is important because HBCU enrollments are not exclusively African American.

10. Opinions expressed prior to, during, and following the public deliberation are important although they occur outside the guided structure, timeframe, and entry area of the forum. Side-bar conversations may be just as revealing as guided conversations within the deliberation forum.

References


Peterson Sims, Marshalita. 2014. “Public Deliberation and Practical Application of Civic Engagement Through a ‘Train the Trainer’ Process at a Historically Black College.” *The*


Please print clearly. Thank you.

1. Your school:  Spelman College □  Morehouse College □  Clark Atlanta University □

2. Your major______________________________

3. Are you a freshman, sophomore, junior, senior, or graduate student? (Circle one)

4. Your race______________________________

5. Your age_________________

6. Your gender________________

7. Your home city & state______________________________

8. Are you a full time or part time student?  Full time □  Part Time □

9. Are you registered to vote?   Yes □  No □

10. If you are 18 or older and registered to vote, will you?  Yes □  No □
    Please explain your response.

11. Which political party do you identify with?
    Democrat □
    Republican □
    Independent □
    Libertarian □
    Green Party □
    Other □
    None □

12. If you voted for President Obama in 2008, will you do so in November?  Yes □  No □
    Please explain why or why not.

13. How would you describe your enthusiasm for the 2012 presidential election?
    (please check one box only)

    Not excited at all □  A little excited □  Neutral □  Somewhat excited □  Very excited □

    Please explain your response.
14. Do you think President Obama’s campaign has reached out to African American youth? Why or Why not.

15. If the economy is an important issue for you, please explain why.

16. Are other issues besides the economy important to you for this election? Yes □ No □ If yes, what are they?

17. Do you have student loans? Yes □ No □

18. Which African American issues do you wish President Obama would address? Thank you for your time!
Regional Blackness: Diverging African American Views on Racial Progress and Government Assistance

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Abstract
Colorblind conservatism, growing intra-racial socioeconomic inequality, and use of varying reference points are three perspectives used to explain divided African-American racial progress attitudes (Bonilla-Silva 2006; Spence 2012; Wilson 1987; Wodtke 2012; Dawson 1994; Hochschild et al. 2012; Eibach and Ehrlinger 2006). These three theories fail to fully address regional differences in perceptions of racial progress. Specifically, the lingering effects of nationwide economic restructuring during the 1970s and 1980s on public opinion at the regional level have yet to be addressed. Regional variation persists in African-American homeownership rates, access to quality education, experiences of discrimination, and poverty levels (Karnig and McClain 1985; Iceland, Sharp and Timberlake 2013; Robinson 2014; Moore and Pinderhughes 1993). Rarely are geo-economical variations in racial progress attitudes studied beyond a South non-South dichotomy (Barrera 1979; Pendergrass 2013; Gay 2004; Valentino and Sears 2005).

The empirical goal of this study is to determine if region, defined in broad categories like Northeast, South, Midwest, and West, matters when it comes to changes in African-American racial progress attitudes over time? I argue African-American racial progress attitudes experience spurts of regionalism due to fluctuating regional differences in opportunities for socioeconomic mobility. Using American National Election Survey data from 1964 to 2012, with over 4,000 African-American respondents, racial progress views are measured using two survey questions addressing improvement in Black’s socioeconomic position and government responsibility. I find there are periods where African-Americans residing in the Midwest and the South have significantly different perceptions of improvement in the socioeconomic position of the Black community. There are also significant regional effects on African-American perceptions of the government’s responsibility in alleviating racial inequalities. Consistent with my hypothesis, the region in which an African-American resides influences their perception of Black progress. African-Americans residing in the Midwest in particular have a distinct set of racial progress attitudes perhaps given the intense effects of economic restructuring in major Midwestern cities (Moretti 2012). I conclude with a brief discussion of future research on regional Black public opinion and the challenges regionalism poses for the development of a national Black political agenda.

Keywords: Black politics, public opinion, regionalism, racial progress, government assistance

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“If you stick a knife in my back nine inches and pull it out six inches, there’s no progress. If you pull it all the way out that’s not progress. Progress is healing the wound that the blow made.”

Malcolm X

Introduction

Going into the 1990s, through the systematic analysis of polling data, scholars began noticing peculiar changes in African-American public opinion (Dawson 1994; Wilson 1987; Hochschild 1995). It was clear that since the culmination of the Civil Rights Movement, African-American political attitudes had become more divided and a racial progress puzzle had emerged (Dawson 2001; Shelby 2005; Tate 2010; Hochschild et al. 2012). The racial progress puzzle stems from two seemingly contradictory public opinion trends. First, over time African-Americans have grown more disillusioned with American racial progress, believing not much improvement has been made in the position of African-Americans over time. In 1964, 58% of African-Americans believed the community’s position had improved a lot, by 1994 only 24% held that view. The second trend is African-Americans’ declining support for government assistance post-Civil Rights Movement (Tate 2010). In 1970, only 6% of African-Americans agreed the government should not assist with improving their socioeconomic position. By 2008, 23% of African-Americans agreed they should help themselves (ANES 2012). In short, since the culmination of the Civil Rights Movement Blacks have become less likely to support the principle of government assistance and more divided in their assessments of American racial progress. In light of an increasing wealth gap between Blacks and non-Blacks, in addition to persisting health, income, education, and housing disparities, a pessimistic view of American racial equality is understandable (U.S. Census 2010). Yet, given the government’s historical role in creating those disparities and institutionalized barriers, a lingering racial progress question for current public opinion scholars remains. Why, after recognizing lackluster improvement in socioeconomic mobility, would it appear as though more and more African-Americans are gradually rejecting the principle of government assistance?

Leading explanations for why African-Americans have become more divided in their racial progress attitudes include increasing intra-group socioeconomic inequality, a generational gap, and the growing influence of neo-liberal colorblind conservatism (Dawson 2011; Taylor 2011; Tate 2010; Spence 2012). However, scholars rarely provide explanations that speak to both the shift in racial progress assessments and policy positions at the individual or national level, with sensitivity to regional developments. Due to significant economic restructuring over the past 40 years, collective memories, opportunities for socioeconomic advancement, and dominant sociopolitical ideologies all vary by place, now more than ever (Key 1949; Pendergrass 2013; Parks 2011; Gay 2004; Iceland 2004; Moretti 2012; Iceland, Sharp and Timberlake 2013). Traditional theories of racial attitudes have yet to evolve to accommodate emerging racial, spatial, and socioeconomic complexities, such as economic restructuring and the reverse great migration.

This study expands the role of region in analyses of public opinion by exploring the extent to which differences in regional political economies shape African-American racial progress attitudes. I argue that individuals consider regional socioeconomic conditions when
assessing improvements in marginalized groups’ social position and strategies for achieving racial equality. In alignment with the effects of economic restructuring and interregional migration patterns, perceptions of American racial progress have become more regionally differentiated over time.

Empirically and theoretically, I notably depart from previous research on racial progress attitudes and contextual effects in two key ways. First, my research demonstrates that the notion that the South is more racially hostile than other parts of the county must be challenged. Using OLS regression models, I move beyond use of a South/non-South dummy variable and compare racial progress attitudes across all four regions. Second, using a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), I am able to pinpoint the mid-1970s as a specific timeframe when significant changes in African-American racial attitudes occurred. The findings presented in this paper show that region of residence, whether someone resides in the Northeast, Midwest, South, or West as designated by the U.S Census, is an important determinant of African-Americans’ views on racial progress. Overall, differences between the views of African-Americans residing in the Midwest and the views of those living in the South appear to be the most pronounced. The significance of this research lies in its use of political economy and geography to help explain growing divisions in African-American racial attitudes. The research design provides a foundation to build a comprehensive framework for contextual effects on racial attitudes at various levels of geographic segmentation overtime, within and across ethnic groups.

Within the remainder of this paper, I review pertinent literature related to African-American racial progress attitudes, divided into three schools of thought: neoliberal colorblind conservatism, intra-racial socioeconomic inequality, and reference-point theory. I also provide a theoretical framework for a regional progress theory and detailed research design. Following a description of the data sample and methodological approach, findings are presented, including descriptive statistics and regression analysis results. Lastly, the broader impact of regional African-American racial views is discussed. But first, I provide a brief background on how progress in America has always been a story of reform and retrenchment.

**Background: Reform, Retrenchment, and Migration**

African-American access to the American Dream accelerated in the 1940s following shifts in labor demand and government intervention that formally outlawed racial discrimination in select industries. However, scholars pinpoint the late 1960s to early 1970s as the period with the most pronounced African American employment growth, primarily due to collective political pressure (Eisinger 1982; Collins 1983; Carrington, McCue and Pierce 1996; Parks 2011). This was a time of increasing opportunities; a Black man did not necessarily need a college degree to make a decent living (*Los Angeles Times* 1988).

Gains made in the labor-based economy during the metropolis era led to considerable growth of the Black middle class. It appeared as though African-Americans were beginning to flourish politically and economically (Levy 1988; Baylor, 2011). Both public-sector employment and labor employment served as a pathway to intergenerational mobility for inner city African-Americans in a way that it did not for Whites, and to a lesser degree, Latinos. During this robust period of racial progress, African-American employment in the public sector increased at twice the rate of White American (Eisinger 1982; Collins 1983; Carrington, McCue and Pierce 1996; Parks 2011; Zipp 1994). These employment
gains played a crucial role in establishing and expanding the African-American middle class (Erie 1980; Eisinger 1982; Landry 1987; Katz, Stern and Fader 2005; Parks 2011). A manufacturing job or a good government job came with cultural, political, and economic perks of middle-class life previously only experienced by White Americans, such as homeownership, weekends off, unionization, and summer vacations (Parks 2011; Moretti 2012). The national conversation was focused on labor-supply resources and providing equal opportunity. Consequently, in the immediate post-Civil Rights era, a range of objective indicators of racial progress showed significant improvement (Parks 2011).

During the industrial age, America’s most prosperous cities were mostly located within the Midwest and Northeast (Moretti 2012; Levine and Ross 2000). Tales of a great economic boom in the North began circulating among the Black community, particularly in the South. Foundries and mills in the Northeast and Midwest recruited Black farmers in the South, while sharecropping was phasing out due to the mechanization of agriculture (Levine and Ross 2000). Mostly by rail, poor African Americans made a massive exodus from the South in search of a working man’s “promised land” in booming metros like Chicago, IL, Philadelphia, PA, Detroit MI., Cleveland, OH, Gary, IN and Pittsburgh, PA, New York, NY, all manufacturing hubs (Fey 2004, Hunt et al. 2013). During The Great Migration, Southern states experienced a loss of approximately 6 million African-Americans (Frey 2004; Pendergrass 2013). However, unforeseen to most, the period of dependable decently waged work for African-Americans in manufacturing and public service, was a fleeting bright spot in the history of capitalism.

In a report prepared by the research department of the National Urban League, Robert Hill (1978) warned of, the illusion of racial progress and was frustrated by “a continuous flow of pronouncements about the ‘significant’ economic progress of Blacks” (p. 18). Using Census data, he argued that despite a growing Black middle class, a sizable number of African-Americans remained in chronic poverty or “hidden unemployment.” In the late 1970s and 1980s, national political economy trends such as globalization, neoliberalism, and technological progress had varying and irreversible effects on each region, state, and metropolitan area (Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Hunt, Hunt, and Falk 2013). Prior political-economy norms and practices that facilitated African-American economic progress were abruptly abandoned, including severe cutbacks to manufacturing employment, public employment, low income housing, and funding for public schools (Landry 1987; Zipp 1994; Parks 2011).

Deindustrialization, compounded by the contraction of public sector employment, and suburban urbanization, sent many African-American communities in the Northeast and Midwest into a state of economic crisis (Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Parks 2011; Crowley, Lichter and Turner 2015; Moretti 2012). Suburban urbanization, the movement of firms, commerce, and select members of minority groups away from the central city to the suburbs, only increased the economic and political alienation of urban Black communities (Ross and Levine 2006). Thousands of African-American families across the Rust Belt lost their way of life, while being catapulted into poverty (Hill 1978; Ross and Levine 2006).

Making regional generalizations about Black progress becomes particularly complex during the post-industrial age given the uneven timing, causes, and consequences of nationwide economic restructuring. From 1970 to 1980, while major cities in the Northeast
and Midwest were experiencing economic decline, key areas in the South and West were experiencing long-term economic growth. The fastest growing areas included Las Vegas, NV, Phoenix AZ, Austin, TX, Dallas, TX, Houston, TX, Atlanta, GA, and Miami, FL, which were collectively labeled as the Sunbelt (Ross and Levine 2006). Most surprising was rapid economic growth in southern states, which were significantly poorer than the rest of the country in the 1960s (Ross and Levine 2006; Moretti 2012). Key local political economies in the New South appeared more conducive to African-American socioeconomic advancement than they were in previous decades (Karnig and McClain 1985). The New South was characterized by expanding work-related opportunities due to a striking increase in textile and other light industry jobs in addition to its lower costs of living, less congestion, entrepreneurship opportunities, and improving racial climate (Karnig and McClain 1985; Hunt et al. 2013; Pendergrass 2013). Between 1950 and 1980 defense spending, a potential source of employment for African-Americans, ballooned in the South, becoming more regionally concentrated (Ross and Levine 2006). Economic prosperity rarely made it to several small and midsized cities throughout the Sunbelt, where several pockets of poverty could be found. Yet, it was clear the Southern political economy, and most strikingly the quality of life for African-Americans living in the South, had changed in meaningful ways.

As earlier advantages of industrial areas disappeared, and disinvestment persisted, millions of African-Americans began abandoning heavily populated manufacturing cities and moving to the South. During the Reverse Great Migration, 1970 to 2000, the Northeast and Midwest experienced steady rates of net African-American out migration and the South gained a net of approximately 109,000 Blacks between 1975–1980, 180,000 Blacks between 1985–1990, and 347,000 Blacks between 1995–2000 (Frey 2004; Hunt et al. 2013; Iceland et al. 2013; Gay 2004). The Sunbelt bubble burst in the early 1990s due to a national recession coupled with a stall in lending, post-Cold War cutbacks in military spending, and low-wage competition from other countries. A few cities were able to adapt and become global cities, most notably, Atlanta for its long-standing African-American business elite and Houston for its growing multiculturalism. Interregional migration has slowed since 2000 but still continues (Iceland, Sharp and Timberlake 2013). Between 2000 and 2010, Detroit’s population declined 25% and Cleveland’s declined 17% (Moretti 2012). Today, the possibilities of buying a home, finding a decent job, and other economic pull factors continue to draw Blacks away from once booming Midwestern and Northeastern industrial centers and to big Southern cities (Tolnay 2003; Frey 2004; Gay 2004; Massey 2007; Hunt et al. 2013; Parks 2011). Many Northeastern and Midwestern big city governments chose to facilitate gentrification, displacing African-Americans, disinvesting in their communities, and exasperating urban dualism, while giving the illusion of city rebirth.

The history of African-American political economy development is steeped in regionalism and may be reflected in American public opinion data. Existing theories explaining changing Black attitudes on racial progress have largely failed to make a direct connection to a new opportunity map, a new racial geography, or induced inter-regional African-American migration.

**Understanding Racial Progress Attitudes: Three Perspectives**

Neoliberal color-blind conservatism theory stresses racist undertones in principled conservatism, while also drawing attention to the profound effects of neoliberalism on Blacks racial progress attitudes (Spence 2012; Bonilla-Silva 2006; Smith 2010; Tate 2010). It is best defined as a cohesive ideology where one sees racial prejudice as no longer an obstacle for minority economic advancement. Moreover, continuing disadvantage for African-
Americans is their own fault. Thus, claims of continuing discrimination and persistent calls for government intervention are unjustified (Henry and Sears 2002; Valentino and Sears 2005; Tolnay 2003; Tesler and Sears 2010, Tuch and Hughes 2011). In national political discourse, abstract liberalism is used to blur perceptions of oppressive racialized government projects, leading one to see the lack of racial progress as solely the responsibility of the individual (Spence 2012; Smith 2010; Harvey 2005). Rhetorically and politically, color-blindness is used to further embed institutional racism, amounting to a retreat of racial consciousness and the preservation of White privilege through policy and practices (Bonilla-Silva 2006). Tate (2010) using survey data, finds the gap between White and Black support for social welfare programs began narrowing in the 1990s. Tate concludes that, due to an increasingly conservative political context, African-American attitudes towards racialized social policies have shifted from a very strong liberal position to a moderately strong liberal position. Though I disagree that declining support for government assistance indicates an overall moderation in Black racial attitudes, there is a growing ideological split in Black racial progress attitudes. Black conservatives are more likely than liberals to have positive assessments of racial progress, believe racial discrimination is no longer problem, and reject government intervention as a strategy for achieving racial equality.

The second school of thought, intra-racial socioeconomic theory, suggests increased educational or economic diversification within the African-American community produces divergent racial progress attitudes (Wilson 1978; Jackman and Muha 1984; Allen and Farley 1986; Burns and Gimpel 2000). The underlying rationale is that when some members of a racial or ethnic group attain economic success and others do not, it distorts individual views of racial progress and persisting marginalization (Hochschild et al. 2012; Shelby 2005). Following a noticeable expansion of the Black middle class during the 1960s and early 1970s, Wilson (1978) claimed race was no longer the primary significant factor influencing African-American life chances and therefore Black public opinion.

Most recently, Santoro (2015) examined intra-racial differences in perceptions of the Civil Rights Movement and found that wealthier Blacks have a more positive view of racial progress than low income African-Americans. Intraracial socioeconomic theory aligns with traditional American political science notions of pocketbook evaluations; however, the debate is not settled. Several scholars continue to believe African-American racial attitudes are based on group related evaluations, across income and education levels. Racial identity rooted in shared experiences of marginalization operate as powerful constraints on class divisions in Black public opinion (Hochschild 1995; Dawson 1994, 2001; Gay 2004; Shelby 2005). Nevertheless, intra-racial socioeconomic inequality theory is useful for understanding how class divisions impact racial attitudes within and across racial groups. According to this school of thought, high income African-Americans are more likely than low income African-Americans to have positive assessments of racial progress and reject government intervention as a strategy for achieving racial equality.

The final school of thought stems from questions regarding how assessments are made with a focus on distance between endpoints, varying final goals, and starting positions. Reference point theorist hold that individuals and groups anchor their assessments of racial issues on varying reference points, which produces perceptual gaps (Eibach and Ehrlinger 2006). Present, past, and/or future conditions are typically used as proxies for reference points that influence social judgments and satisfaction with current social conditions.
(Pettigrew 1967; Sears and McConahay 1973; Quattrone and Tversky 1988; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Heyman et al. 2004). For example, when assessing current levels of racial discrimination, White Americans tend to compare current conditions to the past (i.e. slavery or the Jim Crow era). African-Americans tend to compare current conditions to where they believe society should be, equal opportunity for socioeconomic advancement (Heath et al. 1999; Smith 2014).

Going beyond perceptual gaps across races, within the reference point theory school of thought, the age-cohort model explains divided views on racial discrimination within ethnic groups based on generational differences. The underlying logic being that individuals born during the same time period use similar reference points/events when assessing racial progress. Collective memories of historical racial marginalization serve as reference points that fade as younger African-Americans become further removed from the civil rights and liberation movements of the 1960s and 1970s (Hochschild et al. 2012; Dawson 2011; Taylor 2011; Smith 2014). Young African-Americans, though aware of existing socioeconomic inequities, are less likely than older generations to connect current racial disparities to a legacy of racial marginalization and detrimental public policy (Hochschild et al. 2012). The age cohort model suggests a generational split within the Black community not only in assessments of racial progress, but also divided support for strategies associated with racial progress. Older African-Americans are more likely than younger African-Americans to have positive assessments of racial progress. Younger African-Americans are more likely than older African-Americans to reject government intervention as a strategy for achieving racial equality.

Existing theories offer minimal guidance for going beyond individual ideology, socioeconomic status, and demographics, to reach a broader understanding of the relationship between racial progress and place. Neoliberal color-blind conservatism theoretically overstates African-American and White elites’ capacity to shape mass opinion (Zaller 1992, 2012; Taylor 2011). Widespread neoliberal color-blind conservatism in the political arena can also lead to the development of an oppositional ideology. Thus, it remains unclear whether declining support for government intervention should be interpreted as color-blind conservatism or a version of Black nationalism (Bonilla-Silva 2006; Dawson 2011; Hochschild et al. 2012; Taylor 2011). More pertinent to this study, it also remains unknown whether the magnitude of change in support for government intervention is consistent across all four regions of the United States. Reference point theory fails to account for a persisting racial violence and involvement of young African-Americans in contemporary social justice movements such as the Black Lives Matter Movement. Today, young people continue to invoke the grievances of iconic social justice “radicals” like Malcolm X and members of The Black Panther Party. This points to a sustained awareness of racial discrimination across generations, regardless which set of collective memories are used as reference points (Taylor 2011). Similar to individual ideological and socioeconomic divides, it remains unclear if the magnitude generational divides within Black progress attitudes is consistent across all regions. Nevertheless, out of the three exiting schools of thought previously discussed, reference point theory provides the most useful approach for thinking about how context shapes racial discrimination attitudes when past conditions are compared to current conditions. How reference point theory fits into the theoretical foundation for a regional Black progress framework is explained in greater detail in the next section.
Theoretical Framework

Wilson’s (1987) *The Truly Disadvantaged* examines the effects of economic restructuring on the concentration of poverty and African-American neighborhoods in Chicago from 1970 to 1980. He found not just an increase in the number of poor Black people, but also an increase in the number of poor majority Black communities across the rustbelt. Political economy developments, particularly regional economic restructuring in the 1980s, changed the nature of American urban poverty. The feedback effects of regional economic restructuring facilitated by neoliberalization, including deindustrialization, outmigration of the Black middle class, and isolation from mainstream institutions, created a new paradigm.

Within this new paradigm economic racial subordination and widespread individual experiences of racial discrimination leads to deepening, more concentrated poverty, which alters community character and mass public opinion to create a regionally specific pathologies. Shortly after Wilson introduced this paradigm, Latino scholars questioned the applicability of his Chicago based economic restructuring framework to other communities nationwide and published a necessary complement to Wilson’s work entitled *In the Barrios* (Moore and Pinderhughes 1993). Each chapter examines a specific effect of economic restructuring in a specific metropolitan area, for example, Puerto-Rican versus African-American adaptation in Brooklyn (Sullivan 1993) and cultural isolation in Houston, TX. (Rodriguez 1993).

However, a recurring theme throughout the book is that the effects of economic restructuring are subtle, complex, and location matters. Though many minority communities have a similar character and conditions, there are always subtle geographical complexities, varying racial, socioeconomic, and political histories. Together, *The Truly Disadvantaged* and *In the Barrios* establish geographic variation in contemporary racial inequality as “a problem of American economic organization” (Wilson 1987) that influences mass public opinion, forming the theoretical foundation for a regional Black progress framework.

From these two anchors, my argument proceeds straightforwardly. The current socioeconomic position of African-Americans, their quality of life, and lived experiences, are shaped by the lingering consequences of economic restructuring beginning in the mid-1970s and 1980s. Poor African-American communities are increasingly left behind in economic development efforts, which increases the concentration of poverty and economic inequality. In addition to varying concentrations of poverty, economic restructuring has led to regional differences in several other key objective indicators of racial progress, most visibly home ownership and access to quality higher education. A number of spatial forces drive this pattern, including systemic housing discrimination, concentrations of Historically Black Colleges and Universities, and local investments in public resources (Iceland, Sharp and Timberlake 2013; Bader and Krysan 2015). Due to inequitable regional labor and housing markets, I believe racial progress attitudes are anchored in one’s region of residence. Regional socioeconomic context operates as reference and comparison point used in assessments of broader racial progress and corresponding social policy aimed at alleviating racial inequalities (McDermott 2011; Parks 2012; Pendergrass 2013).

Interregional migration patterns point to pockets of racial progress, shockingly, primarily in the South. Evidence has shown African-American Southern migrants are more likely to be married, young, educated, and female (Hunt et al. 2013; Robinson 2014). When upwardly mobile African-Americans leave former metropolitan epicenters, they often leave
behind relatively immobile (socially, politically and economically) disadvantaged communities (Iceland, Sharp and Timberlake 2013; Frey 2004). Blacks relocating to Sun Belt locations reap significant locational benefits, including living in integrated urban neighborhoods with lower Black unemployment and other meaningful indicators of regionalized racial progress (Iceland, Sharp and Timberlake 2013). Following Tiebout (1956) public choice model, increasing interregional migration reflects African-Americans’ search for a place that provides the optimal basket of public goods conducive to economic advancement for people of color. African-Americans are showing dissatisfaction with Midwestern and Northeastern racial progress by moving in mass to Southern cosmopolitans. According to Forbes Magazine, Southern metropolitan areas like Atlanta, GA, Raleigh-Durham, NC, Richmond, VA, and Houston, TX, provide greater opportunities for minority socioeconomic mobility (Forbes Magazine 2015). Pendergrass (2013), based on 127 narrative interviews, found recent African-American migrants to cosmopolitan hubs in the South, believed subtle discrimination, racial residential segregation, and constraints on their economic advancement were more prevalent in Northeastern and Midwestern cities. They preferred the South despite, “...more overt prejudice, paternalism, and exposure to racial symbols, such as the Confederate flag” (Pendergrass 2013, 2). These results highlight the impact of regional circumstances/conditions on individual residential choice and perceptions of a African-American upward mobility. Contemporary racial progress attitudes are polarized by regional racial histories (Sokol 2014), regional cultural norms (Robinson 2014), and regional socioeconomic context.

Methodologically, this paper moves the study of regional effects on African-American racial attitudes beyond a South/non-South binary, while also recognizing the influence of time on regional racial attitude divergence. The origins of the customary South/non-South dummy variable can be traced back to Key’s (1949) findings regarding the effect of socioeconomic conditions on Southern whites’ racial attitudes. However, little explanation exists for why a single regional dummy variable is customary in empirical Black public opinion studies.

This study rejects the assumption that the Black experience in the Northeast, the Midwest, the South, and the Midwest are homogeneous. Instead, my approach looks at regional specificities during key time periods of American political and economic developments which allows for meaningful within group comparisons of public opinion. Applying an understanding of economic restructuring, a new economic map, interregional migration to an empirical analysis of African-American racial progress attitudes is much needed intervention.

The choice of geographical units matters when studying racial progress attitudes and conventional assumptions must be continually interrogated. Assuming the South is the most racially hostile region in the United States, and making research design decisions based on that assumption, is misleading and not theoretically sound. Furthermore, this study rejects the assumption that the Black experience in the Northeast, the Midwest, the South, and the Midwest are homogeneous. Instead, my approach looks at regional specificities that allow for meaningful comparisons of racial progress attitudes within African-American community overtime.

Primary Hypothesis (a) African-Americans residing in the South and West are more likely to have positive assessments of racial progress than African-Americans residing in the Midwest and Northeast.
Primary Hypothesis (b) African-Americans residing in the South and West are more likely to reject government intervention as a strategy for achieving racial equality than African-Americans residing in the Midwest and Northeast.

Secondary Hypothesis Time period has a significant effect on regional divergence in African-American racial progress attitudes.

Data and Methods

In an effort to build on previous empirical studies of racial attitudes, political economy, and place, I will conduct a quantitative analysis of regional Black public opinion and socioeconomic conditions from 1964 to 2012 (Massey and Rothwell 2009; Lichter, Parisi and Taquino 2015; Rugh and Massey 2010; Bader and Krysan 2015; Gay 2004). My aim is to create a geographically inclusive analytic framework for studying racial progress attitudes intra-racially. The following research design acknowledges local neighborhoods, metropolitan areas, and states as being reflective of regional forces (Parks 2011). Though the primary unit of analysis is African-American racial progress views at the regional level, regions are just the starting point for a more complex spatialized racial progress views framework.

To adequately test competing theoretical models over a wide span of time, the American National Election Study (ANES) Time Series Cumulative Data File was chosen as the primary survey dataset. This analysis relies on subset of the full ANES dataset, consisting of 951 variables and a national sample of 4,940 Black respondents from 1964 to 2012. Time series measures of racial progress and racialized public policy views provided by ANES allow for assessment of relative differences in Black public opinion across space and over time. The ANES includes variation in key variables related to improvement in the position of Blacks, government aid, demographics, social context, political psychology, and geography to help investigate underlying causes of changes in Black public opinion.

Dependent Measures: Proxies for Racial Progress

Change in the position of Blacks serves as a dependent variable for regression analysis and is a proxy for racial progress. African-American views of racial progress are measured using responses to a ANES question that asks, “In the past few years we have heard a lot about civil rights groups working to improve the position of the Negro in this country. How much real change do you think there has been in the change do you think there has been in the position of Black people in the past few years: 3 = a lot, 2= some, or 3=not much at all?” First asked to African-American survey respondents in 1964, this question was and discontinued in 1998. It was reworded in 1984 to not include the phrase civil rights groups and the term Negro was replaced with Black people. In its immediate interpretation, survey participants are being asked to quantify progress towards achieving racial equality for African-Americans, “in the past few years.” By adding the “in the past few years” caveat, it is made clear respondents are not being asked to reflect on changes in Black’s position since slavery but rather the question limits respondents’ evaluation of racial progress to more modern developments. Nevertheless, the question is still considerably abstract in nature and allows for a range of interpretations.

The proxy for racial progress strategies is support for racialized/racially targeted public policy using the commonly referred to as aid to minorities question, which also
operates as a dependent variable. First asked to African-Americans in 1970, the question states, “Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every possible effort to improve the social and economic position of Blacks (1970: Negroes) and other minority groups (1980: even if it means giving them preferential treatment). Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help minorities because they should help themselves (1970: but they should be expected to help themselves).” In 1970 the word Blacks was substituted for Negroes. In 1980 ANES included a caveat for government aid with the wording, even if it means giving them preferential treatment and the 1996 version included the phrase, every possible effort. Responses to the aid metric were given along a 7-point scale, where 1 = Government should help minority groups/Blacks and 7 = Minority groups/Blacks should help themselves. Government’s assistance is assumed to refer to popularly discussed programs like food stamps, cash assistance, Medicaid or affirmative action (Tate 2012).

Region serves as the primary explanatory measure with a focus on making meaning comparisons of Black progress attitudes, across all regions. To avoid missing important regional trends, a dummy variable (coded 0,1) was created for each of the 4 major U.S regions as designated by the census; South (reference category) West, Midwest, and the Northeast. Individual level factors previously thought to influence racial progress attitudes are controlled for. Political ideology operates a proxy for neoliberal conservatism theory, measured 1 = conservative/ 0 = otherwise External political efficacy is measured using responses to the question, do government officials care what people like me think, where 1 = yes/ 0 = no. These three measures serve as proxies for socioeconomic status, homeownership, income, and education. Homeownership is measured whereas 1 = homeowner/ 0 = otherwise. Income is measured whereas 1 = family household incomes in the 0 to 16th percentile and 5 = family household income in the 96th to 100th percentile. Level of education is measured using a 4 point scale whereas 4 = A Bachelors or More and 1 = Less than a High School Diploma. Age cohort serves as a proxy for age cohort/reference point theory measured as a continuous variable 1-5, with 15 year increments. Lastly, gender is measured whereas 1 = female/ 0 = male.

To test the statistical significance of the explanatory variable, region of residence, while controlling for individual demographic and ideology, I employ a series of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models. To test whether regional divergence in racial progress attitudes fluctuates over time based on periods of significant economic restructuring, I will conduct a Regression Discontinuity (RD) analysis. The RD design has high validity and provides a quasi-experimental approach to my question of whether there are particular time periods during which shifts and regional divergence in African-American racial progress views occurs (Lees 2008). Comparisons are made between perceptions of upward mobility and support for government assistance leading up to 1976 versus post 1976. Though one might think 1980, with the election of Ronald Reagan, marking the official end of the New Deal Era and beginning of the Reagan Revolution serves as a natural cut point (Skowronek 1993). My suspicion is that the effects of neoliberalization, economic restructuring, and White backlash, causing regional divergence were apparent soon after the Civil Rights and Black Power movement had begun to fade from national prominence. I expect to see a discontinuous jump in the relationship between African-American racial progress attitudes (the causal variable of interest) and time (the forcing, or running variable), in
1975 (the cut-point). In a falsification test, 1980 is used as a placebo cut-point.

The primary underlying assumption is that there is no uniform causal dynamic, but rather the causal dynamic varies by region in the pre and post 1975 time periods. Regional effects on Black public opinion arise due to sociopolitical and socioeconomic interactions within a spatially defined environment. At particular moments in history, socioeconomic context has varied greatly from one region to another, deepening intra-group socioeconomic inequality, causing a divergence in collective memories and dominant ideologies. My argument requires and incorporates the importance of these factors, and my analytic approach, moves beyond a South non-South binary to examine regional effects while controlling for alternative explanations.

**Findings**

The following findings pinpoint regional differences in objective indicators of racial progress and racial progress attitudes. Table 1 compares key regional economic metrics from the 2009 to 2011 U.S census that highlight economic differences between the reality of Blacks in the Midwest and Blacks living in the South. Regional differences exist between African American poverty rates, homeownership levels, and TANF usage rates. Beginning with income, African-Americans residing in the Western region have the highest median family income at $50,518, while Blacks living in the Midwest have the lowest median family income at $35,876. There is a 10% difference in homeownership rates for African-Americans living in the South (49.1%) and those living in the Midwest (39.7%). The percentage of Southern Black cash aid recipients (3.7%) is considerably low compared to usage rates in the other regions, which is reflective of long-standing Southern political culture and public policy norms. Furthermore, geographical variation in the decline of Temporary Assistance for Needy Family (TANF) caseloads and cash aid expenditures has increased since welfare reform in 1996 (Danziger 2010). Overall according to these select key economic indicators, great regional difference in Black progress continue to exist between the rust-belt and the sun-belt.

**Table 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2009-2011 African-American Socioeconomic Indicators by Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northeast</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median family income (dollars)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families Living Below Poverty w/Small Children*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receiving Cash Aid (TANF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receiving Food Stamps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeowners</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source. U.S. Census American Community Survey (3-Year Estimates)

* Children under the age of 5.

Figure 1 shows perceptions of how much real change there has been in the position of Blacks, by region and by time period. It is clear that from the culmination of the Civil Rights Movement on through the 1990s there has was growing disillusionment with racial progress among African-Americans. In the 1960s and 1970s African-American respondents residing
in the South were the most positive in their assessments of improvement in the position of Blacks, with over 50% believing a lot of real change had been made. In the 1980s and 1990s only 23% of Southern Black respondents thought a lot of progress had been made. However, during the same time period, an even lower percentage of African-Americans residing in the Midwest (14%) and Northeast (12%) thought a lot of progress had been made.

**Figure 1**
African American Views on How Much Their Position Has Changed in the Past Few Years (1-not much, 2-some, 3-alot) (Black only sample)


Figure 2 shows a RD design with 1980 as the cut-point. In the scatterplot African-American views of improvement in their position is on the y-axis and year on the x-axis. As stated previously, 1= Northeast, 2= Midwest, 3= South, and 4= West. Discontinuity is not as evident as expected, however there are still some major takeaways. Positive assessments of racial progress declined more rapidly during the 1960s and 1970s and are more stable in the post-1980 period. Given this question was discontinued in 1994, more data is needed to try different cut-points to see if greater discontinuity in assessments of racial progress can be found between other key time periods. Regional effects do appear to be more pronounced during the 1960s and 1970s than in the post-1980 period.
To further test my hypothesis that Blacks in the Midwest are more disillusioned with racial progress than Blacks in other regions due to extreme cases of economic restructuring and disinvestment, Table 2 presents regression analysis results. Model (1) tests regional effects from 1964-1978, model (2) tests regional effects from 1980 to 1994, model 3 tests regional effects across all years. Controlling for individual socioeconomic and demographic factors, I find significant regional effects on perceptions of improvement in Black’s position. Compared to those in the South, African-Americans residing in the Midwest and Northeast are significantly more likely to have negative assessments of racial progress. Finding significant regional effects on African-American assessments of racial progress during the 1960s, 70s, 80s, and early 90s furthers understanding of the psychological underpinnings that triggered a Reverse Great Migration.
Table 2
Regional Effects on Views of Improvement in African-American’s Position
(Black only sample)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) 1960s &amp; 1970s</th>
<th>(2) 1980s &amp; 1990s</th>
<th>(3) All Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>-0.0184***</td>
<td>-0.017**</td>
<td>-0.0202***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00673)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.00199)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>-0.219***</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
<td>-0.133***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0710)</td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td>(0.0511)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>-0.212***</td>
<td>-0.202***</td>
<td>-0.194***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0702)</td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td>(0.0504)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>-0.253**</td>
<td>-0.045</td>
<td>-0.143**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0985)</td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td>(0.0686)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburb or Rural</td>
<td>-0.0454</td>
<td>-0.045</td>
<td>-0.0419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0540)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.0363)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeowner</td>
<td>0.00391</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.00700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0525)</td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
<td>(0.0388)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.00712</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>-0.0198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0264)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.0192)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.0464</td>
<td>-0.077**</td>
<td>-0.0619***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0356)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.0251)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>-0.0667</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td>-0.0466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0743)</td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
<td>(0.0469)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt. Cares</td>
<td>0.150***</td>
<td>0.090**</td>
<td>0.110***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0512)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.0303)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Cohort</td>
<td>0.0328</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.0350**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0253)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.0178)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.0972*</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
<td>-0.0874**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0504)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.0365)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>38.53***</td>
<td>36.585**</td>
<td>42.05***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13.31)</td>
<td>(16.525)</td>
<td>(3.987)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations 782 773 1,555
R-squared 0.073 0.048 0.153

Figure 3 shows a clear decline in African-American support for government assistance from 1970 to 2012, as other scholars have suggested. Given data for this measure is collected across a longer time-span, I was able to use a RD design with placebo cut-points to further validate my hypothesis that discontinuity occurs pre and post-1980.

**Figure 3**

African American Support for Government Assistance from 1970 to 2012

Source: American National Election Survey 2012 Time-series Cumulative Data File

Figure 4 shows a scatter plot with African-American views on government assistance on the y-axis and year on the x-axis. Overall, Black support for government assistance declined more rapidly between 1970 and 1980 than it did between 1980 and 1990. A RD design is used, with 1975 as the cut-point. Discontinuity is evident, with about a .5 difference in the local average treatment effect. Prior to 1975 African-American views on government assistance was fairly stable, then began changing, with more African-Americans rejecting the principle of government assistance after 1975. Regional averages are clustered closer together in the pre-1975 period and further apart in the post-1975 period. This finding confirms my suspicion that there was a shift in African-American views on government assistance brewing leading up to the election of republican president Ronald Reagan in 1980 and prior to welfare reform in 1996. The shift was driven by local political economy development in addition to the influence of political elites. For a falsification test, 1980 and 1995 were used as placebo cut-points, to see if there was similar discontinuity.
To further test my hypothesis that Blacks residing in the Midwest are more likely to support government assistance than Blacks in other regions due to extreme cases of economic restructuring and disinvestment, Table 3 presents OLS regression analysis results. Model (1) tests regional effects using a Midwest non-Midwest dummy variable, model (2) tests regional effects using the typical South non-South dummy variable, model (3) tests regional effects using 4 region dummy variable with the West as a reference category. All models include Black respondents only.

Controlling for year and individual socioeconomic and demographic factors, there are regional effects on support for government assistance. Black residing in the Midwest are more likely than Blacks living in other regions to support the principle of government assistance as a racial progress strategy. Southern African-Americans are more likely to reject the principle of government assistance as a racial progress strategy. Most interesting, there is minimal difference between the R squared for Model 1 and Model 2, which highlights the fact that little is gained but a lot is missed when relying on a South non-South dummy variable to account for regional effects on racial attitudes.
### Table 3

OLS Regression Results for Support for Govt. Assistance (Blacks only sample)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Midwest Dummy</th>
<th>(2) South Dummy</th>
<th>(3) 3 Regional Dummies w/ West as reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>0.0572***</td>
<td>0.057***</td>
<td>0.0571***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.00628)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.00628)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>0.00204</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.186)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.186)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>-0.374***</td>
<td>-0.325*</td>
<td>-0.325*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.118)</td>
<td>(0.187)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.187)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.202**</td>
<td>0.0764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.093)</td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburb or Rural</td>
<td>0.0221</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.0170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0935)</td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
<td>(0.0938)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeowner</td>
<td>0.00245</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.00495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0419)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.0421)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.0455</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.0475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0393)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.0394)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.0132</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>-0.0112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0585)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.0587)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology (1-7 scale)</td>
<td>0.241***</td>
<td>0.239***</td>
<td>0.239***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0314)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.0315)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td>0.0151</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.0149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0419)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.0419)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Cohort</td>
<td>0.112**</td>
<td>0.115***</td>
<td>0.112**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0445)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.0445)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.259***</td>
<td>-0.256***</td>
<td>-0.259***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0939)</td>
<td>(0.094)</td>
<td>(0.094)</td>
<td>(0.0941)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-111.7***</td>
<td>-112.511***</td>
<td>-111.7***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12.51)</td>
<td>(12.529)</td>
<td>(12.52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,641</td>
<td>1,641</td>
<td>1,641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Discussion

The results presented in this paper suggest that socioeconomic context and political culture of each region anchors African-American assessments of American racial progress and public policy. Statistically significant regional effects, measured using four dichotomous variables, points to the regionalization of African-American public opinion during key periods of American political history. Based on the findings presented starting in the 1970s, Black public opinion began showing signs of regionalization. Overtime regional divides in racial attitudes have developed so that a Black man residing in the Midwest is more likely to have a negative perception of racial progress than a Black man who lives in the South. Furthermore, a Black woman residing in the Midwest is more likely to be a strong supporter of government assistance than a Black woman who lives in the South. The contrast between the Midwest and the Southern region’s socioeconomic development post-1975 appears to cause the most salient divide in African-American racial progress attitudes.

Rethinking how the South/non-South binary is used in political science is necessary due to geographical differences in the effects of national economic restructuring, such as the varying impact of deindustrialization, Black flight, and urban renewal, on racial progress attitudes. A significant number of Black communities in the Midwest and Northeast are in a state of racial regression, and have been since the late 1970s. The collapse of manufacturing and other drastic changes in regional political economy devastated African-American families across the rust belt, making poverty more concentrated and embedded overtime. Objective metrics of progress for former manufacturing hubs over the past 40 years suggests economic restructuring has caused structural Black unemployment in the Midwest, thwarting racial progress in the region (Hill 1978). As former Midwestern epicenters for Black culture like Detroit, MI, Chicago, IL, and Gary, IN, continue to lose Black residents at a rapid rate, Southern cities continue to attract the “best and the brightest”; married, young, and educated (Frey 2004; Adelman, Morett, and Tolnay 2000; Hunt et al. 2013). Unfortunately, upwardly mobile Black Southern migrants who leave declining Midwestern and Northeastern inner cities take with them a great deal of social, economic, and political capital, speeding up the decline.

In many ways, today the new Midwest is reminiscent of the old South, declining economically, viewed as void of resources, and opportunities for socioeconomic mobility. According to Crain’s Chicago Business Magazine (2013), the Midwest is five decades into a bad century right now, with no quick turnaround in sight. The tendency of public opinion studies to distinguish Southern states methodologically is rooted in misguided claims of hyper-negative White Southern racial attitudes, abnormally high rates of Southern poverty, and racial violence (Key 1949; Valentino and Sears 2005; Preuhs 2006). Often ignored is the fact that American public opinion is becoming more nuanced geographically. Currently, the same political, social, and economic rationale that was previously used to justify a South/non-South binary, can now be used to justify a Midwest/non-Midwest binary in American public opinion.

The existence of statistically significant regional effects should not be seen as a substantive conclusion but rather as a starting point for further inquiry. Finding statistically significant regional effects means respondents with similar individual-level traits but with varying regional locations have different assessments of racial progress and levels of support for the principle of government assistance. Precise causal mechanisms behind
these differentials remain unclear (Baker 2009). More inter-disciplinary multi-method research on regional African-American political economies is needed. Further research on the geographic diversity of deindustrialization, declines in public sector employment, and interregional migration could help discover best practices, policies, and encourage diffusion efforts. As Midwestern business leaders and politicians start coming to terms with their entrenched economic conditions, it has yet to be seen whether devastation in African-American communities caused by decades of disinvestment will be addressed (Crain’s 2013). Discovering innovative ways to comprehensively measure racial progress and changes in African-American socioeconomic position would significantly elevate research on African-American racial progress attitudes and benefit to those in pursuit of regional economic advancement. Along with a method to more definitively pinpoint the timing of racial progress attitude shifts. Interesting intersections abound in regards to place, politics and changes in Black labor markets, levels of Black homeownership, overall quality of life, and historical context.

The Black progress puzzle, increasing disillusionment with racial progress coupled with declining support for government assistance ought to be explained with this history in mind. Shortly after the 1843 National Negro Convention, on the eve of the Civil War, former slaves Frederick Douglass and Shields Green disagreed over the appropriate strategy for freeing enslaved Blacks; the options being guerrilla warfare, a lightning raid, or the Republican Party (Dawson 2001). Almost 60 years later Booker T. Washington advocates for a self-responsibility, a pull one’s self up by the bootstrap approach. W.E.B. Dubois, while recognizing the need for self-reliance, wanted to ensure the government was held responsible for its role in the economic exploitation of African-Americans, which greatly hindered racial progress. Despite an enduring debate about the appropriate strategy to achieve liberation, among the majority of Black people the collective goal of equal opportunity for economic advancement has remained consistent for centuries. However, more and more African-Americans are losing faith in White America’s will to correct past racial injustices and foster meaningful improvement through policy interventions.

African-Americans have long been aware the fact that a significant portion of Whites continue to racialize social welfare programs and oppose affirmative action policies (Gilens 1999). According to Slack and Myers (2012) there is a cost associated with free assistance. The benefits of free government assistance often do not justify the perceived effort and psychological costs involved, particularly when centered around moral objections and racial tensions (Slack and Myers 2012). Picking up on systemic and symbolic racism ques compounded with the lack of effective policy solutions, more and more have African-Americans strategically concluded they must look out for themselves. Reflected in separatist Black nationalism ideology, is a heightened sense of distrust in existing economic and political establishments and the need look outside of American systems to find ways African-Americans can overcome their marginalized socioeconomic location (Carey Jr. 2013; Taylor 2011). Increasing disillusionment with racial progress and divided social policy preferences highlights growing political tension within the African-American community. Clashes over strategy loom between African-Americans who are committed to working within the existing system and those, mostly millennials, willing to embrace a “watered down version” of Black separatist nationalism (Shelby 2005, Dawson 2011, Taylor 2011). These intra-group divisions in ideology are further complicated by place, each U.S. region’s unique political culture, socioeconomic development, and current institutional barriers.
Conclusion

This paper shows evidence of regional divides in African-American views of Black progress that expand and contract over time. I present evidence of expanding and contracting regional divides in Black racial progress attitudes over time, and suggest these fluctuations are related to changes in regional political economies and local socioeconomic conditions. The central finding of this study is meant to be the first step in establishing how geography and economic restructuring has influenced African-American perceptions of Black progress. Shifts in regional political economies since the mid-1970s, including neo-liberalization of local governments and perpetual demonization of targeted race-specific policies used to address racial inequality, have changed Black public opinion. Geographic variation in continued structural inequalities have made Black voters more ideologically segmented by place. Southern Black voters tend to have more positive views of racial progress and are more socially and economically conservative than Blacks living elsewhere (Robinson 2014). One cannot negate the richness of Southern African-American political thought given its intimate connection to Black history. Southern Black political thought continues to lend itself to an acute modern day racial analysis deeply rooted in a nuanced relationship between Black Nationalism and Black conservative ideology. Yet, Midwestern Black political thought, Northeastern Black political thought, and Western Black political thought are less understood and less studied.

American racial attitudes, particularly public policy positions, are becoming more complex. The scholarly goal of this paper is to further complicate the study of American racial progress with a discussion of regional effects. Many African-Americans look around their city and see other neighborhoods improving economically, but based on the social and economic conditions of their neighborhoods and Black communities in neighboring cities, very little progress has been made. A large portion of African-Americans in the Midwest and the Northeast are fleeing to the South because they see very few opportunities for socioeconomic advancement given declining conditions. African-American voters born in the Midwest and the Northeast tend to have more negative views of racial progress and be more economic and socially liberal than Southern Black natives.

Growing regional divides in Black racial attitudes elicits new empirical and theoretical considerations. If Midwestern Black voters, African-Americans in Chicago, Gary, Detroit, Cleveland, etc. tend to have the most negative racial progress attitudes, what does that say about Midwestern white voters? What does that say about Midwestern Black politicians? How does geographical segmentation in African-American racial progress attitudes impact the notion of a national Black policy agenda? These are broader theoretical questions that future study studies of racial progress attitudes must wrestle with. A continuing trend of declining political, generational, and geographical cohesiveness amongst African-Americans has meaningful implication for Black political engagement and party alignment in future generations.
References


Living Garveyism in the Social Economies of the African Diaspora in Canada and in the West Indies

Caroline Shenaz Hossein
York University

Abstract

Marcus Garvey (1887-1940) should be acknowledged as a pioneer and innovator of the Black social economy, as a conscientious business person who developed mission-driven businesses: social enterprises. Garvey was a pan-Africanist entrepreneur who tied racial justice theory to business practice, and did so with a deliberate plan to bring social change. In today’s terms Garvey would be known as a “social entrepreneur” because he created socially conscientious businesses at a time in U.S. history when it was very dangerous. It was a violent era to be Black, let alone to be an outspoken critic of racism, inequality, and injustice, and to challenge the capitalist system with cooperative business models. The Black Star Line business, a cooperative shipping business, proves that Garvey was an entrepreneur-activist who used the concept of business to fight for Black liberation. This study draws on 375 interviews from focus groups and individual interviews in Jamaica, Guyana and Canada, with many of the subjects having strong West Indian cultural ties. Garvey redefined social norms from a liberation perspective and wedded racial pride and business for the sole purpose of uplifting the dismal state of African communities. He has contributed significantly to the field of social enterprises by creating collective enterprises for Black people, with a double bottom line, doing social good while recovering costs.

Keywords: Garvey, social enterprises, cooperatives, diaspora, black political economy,

“Marcus Garvey was the first man of color in the history of the United States to lead and develop a mass movement. He was the first man, on a mass scale, and level, to give millions of Negroes a sense of dignity and destiny, and make the Negro feel that he was somebody.”


Introduction

For the two hundred million persons of African descent living in the Americas, social and economic exclusion has long been an unfortunate way of life (U.N. Year of Persons of African Descent 2015). As a result, African people in the Americas have developed locally-run banking institutions (called rotating savings and credit associations, ROSCAs) and other forms of social economy to meet their everyday livelihood needs (Hossein 2014b; 2014c; 2016; Haynes

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The social economy (also known as the third sector) is defined as a separate sector from the state and private sectors (Bridge et al. 2009; Quarter et al. 2009) and is made up of community and civil society organizations. I have coined the term the “Black social economy” to refer to the social economy developed by historically oppressed people in their struggle to navigate enslavement and colonialization (Hossein 2013; 2016). Black people in the Americas continue to engage in the social economy to cope with violent and racist environments.2

The quote opening this paper by Martin Luther King attests to the extraordinary power of Garvey to reach a racially marginalized people in a new way – which is precisely what the social economy sector aims to do. In this paper, I argue that Marcus Garvey (1887-1940) should be acknowledged as a pioneer and innovator of the Black social economy, as a conscientious business person who developed mission-driven businesses: social enterprises.3 Garvey was a pan-Africanist entrepreneur who tied racial justice theory to business practice, and did so with a deliberate plan to bring social change. Significantly, Garvey’s philosophy and practice was rooted in an experiential education. He grew up poor in colonial Jamaica, where he experienced the racial prejudice of British colonials and witnessed the differential treatment between Blacks and mixed-raced Jamaicans (Lewis 1987; Clarke 1974). He labored side-by-side with his fellow West Indians in labor enclaves in Costa Rica and Panama, where he witnessed the ways in which markets disrupted the lives of African people (Jacques Garvey 1978; Clarke 1974). These experiences encouraged Garvey’s embrace of a collective model of economics that was conscious of the business exclusions leveled at Black people (Bandele 2010). His embrace of collective and social-purpose enterprises, in turn, aided his rise as a mass leader.

Critics have long derided Garvey’s and the UNIA’s business failures. Indeed, ambitious projects like the Black Star Line Steamship Company ended in insolvency, at great cost to its thousands of Black shareholders. But as Ramla Bandele has argued, to limit one’s assessment of Garvey’s business enterprises to profit margins alone is to overlook the broader aims of Garvey’s movement. In today’s terms Garvey would be known as a “social entrepreneur” because he created socially conscientious businesses at a time in US history when it was very dangerous. The white supremacist Ku Klux Klan was lynching Blacks and still Garvey continued in his mission (Campbell 2007). It was a violent era to be Black, let alone to be an outspoken critic of racism, inequality, and injustice, and to challenge the capitalist system with cooperative business models.4 The Black Star Line business, a cooperative business, proves that Garvey was an entrepreneur-activist who used the concept of business to fight for Black liberation. Garveyism was also movement that wedded racial pride and business for the sole purpose of uplifting the dismal state of African communities.5 He contributed significantly to the field of social economies by creating collective enterprises for Black people, with a double bottom line, doing social good while recovering costs.

In Hill and Bair’s Marcus Garvey: Life and Lessons (1987), Garvey’s lessons on the “economy” and on “self-initiative” are most illuminating in terms of understanding his approach to business for Black people. He did not want marginalized people to be indebted or subservient to their oppressors, and tried to create guidelines for people to follow. He theorized on business and self-employment from his own lived experience (K’adamwe et al. 2011; Lewis 1987; Martin 1983; Clarke 1974). As a result, his socially driven businesses, which were organized in a cooperative fashion, made enemies of state and business elites, capitalists, and intellectuals in Jamaica and the U.S. (Campbell 2007). Yet, his life’s work to make business inclusive and
just has impacted African people around the globe to this day. The kind of economics Garvey pushed for was grounded in ethics, and people joined the movement because they believed that the world’s economy and society could be changed.

This paper is organized into three parts. In the first part, I explain the methods and the empirical data collected from interviews in the Caribbean and Canada. Second, I analyze the field of social enterprises and Garvey’s social enterprises that were activist in their orientation and concerned about the upliftment of marginalized Black people. In the third part, I briefly highlight the ways in which Garveyism has influenced members of ROSCAs (peer-to-peer lending groups), making it clear the ties ordinary people have for Garvey in contemporary business and society. I would like to reiterate that this paper is not a historical paper on Garvey rather to show that what Garvey was doing in the 1900s is of relevance to the development of the social economy in the Americas.

Methods and Approach

Garvey’s role as a global thinker is obscured in academic arenas (Ewing 2014; Lewis 1987). Based on my data collection, I could not ignore Garvey’s influence among the people I interviewed about ROSCAs. I felt I had an obligation to explore the contribution of Garvey to the field of social economics. Canadian historian Marano (2010) also has found that West Indian immigrants in Toronto, Halifax, and Montreal have been impressed by Garvey’s ideas since 1919. My work shows that Black people in the Caribbean and Canada evoke Garvey as they create businesses focused on the collective.

I interviewed 375 people, most of them in Jamaica. Of the total sample, 64% were women. I also carried out focus groups in Jamaica, Guyana and Canada, and also conducted individual interviews in each country. The focus groups were held within the communities and ranged from 6 to 26 people, with many of the subjects having strong West Indian cultural ties. At least 40% of the 375 people interviewed over the years have cited Garvey or been influenced by Garvey’s business ideas (See Table 1 below). Garvey’s views help to define the Black experience in the social economy. I sifted through materials to reconstruct the notion of Garvey being one of the first social entrepreneurs. My close reading of the Garvey texts with this vantage has confirmed Garvey has a rightful place in the social sciences. Table 1 outlines the data, drawn from doctoral field work (2009-2012) as well as current research from 2013 to 2015 in the Caribbean and Canada.
Table 1
Interviews of Black people engaged in ROSCAs in Canada and the Caribbean

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Jamaica</th>
<th>Guyana</th>
<th>Grenada</th>
<th>Trinidad</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus groups</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual interviews</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(average 45 minutes)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women interviewed</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total interviews</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s data collection from 2009 to 2015.

A number of the interviewees, particularly in the Caribbean, identified as “Rastafarians,” meaning that they were part of this specific cultural group. However, many of the persons interviewed were low-income to lower middle class who were inspired by Garvey’s teaching in Canada. In the early interviews, subjects were not specifically asked about Garvey per se, but in their responses to questions, the life of Garvey seemed to come up often in discussions. Garvey’s views were most known in Jamaica, as well as among people, especially Rastafarians, in Guyana, Grenada, and Trinidad. The references to Garvey were so overwhelming that I visited Liberty Hall at 76 King Street in downtown Kingston, and also interviewed the then-director. In this Canadian-based research, Canadians of West Indians heritage were aware of Garveyism, and they were able to quote Garvey or relate their own experiences to his life as an immigrant abroad. Canadians from West Africa and Ethiopia were also familiar with Garveyism through their own cultural backgrounds and/or interactions with Caribbean friends.

The impact Garvey has had on the Black diaspora in building social enterprises is important. In the 6 August 2015 issue of the *Caribbean Times International*, a newspaper for the Caribbean diaspora in Canada, the feature story was on Garvey and his son. It quickly became apparent through my interviews with men and women in the Caribbean and Canada that Garveyism has influenced people who participate in ROSCAs. In particular, high-profile women like Amy Ashwood Garvey were engaged in political organizing which has resonated with Caribbean women (Reddock 2014). Marcus Garvey’s teachings on racial justice, self-help, and Black entrepreneurship with a community focus remain important. Despite this work of Garvey to challenge market fundamentalism, nowhere is his work mentioned in the standard texts on the social economy, nor is he defined as a social entrepreneur in works on the Garvey Movement.

The Relevance of Garvey’s Social Enterprises to the Social Economy

In Canada, the social economy is often analyzed without considering identity politics. Some important recent exceptions include Canadians Jean Fontan and Eric Shragge (2000) and Marguerite Mendell (2009), who give an international voice to the concept that the Quebec social economy experience is distinct from that of the English-speaking. However, these
works are focused on the white Canadian experience. Chris Southcott’s *Northern Communities Working Together: The Social Economy of Canada’s North* (2015) and Wanda Wuttunee’s *Living Rhythms: Lessons in Aboriginal Economic Resilience and Vision* (2004) do show the diverse economies of Aboriginal people in a white-settler environment. Garvey also spoke about how business can overcome racism and oppression for Blacks; yet, the philosophy of Garveyism is missing in the social economy and business ethics literature (Hossein and Russell no date).

Garvey understood that to achieve “mutual progress” for his racial group, Black people had to work together. Garvey set out to transform the racialized mind-sets in society and he found that education and business were the vehicles through which to, first, reach his own people with the message of Black love and, second, critique social and economic exclusion. Like most social entrepreneurs, Garvey was restless, driven by positive social outcomes in business (Yunus 2010). As a self-taught Black man in the Americas, he had no rich benefactors to support his cause. He was thus pragmatic and sought ventures that had a two-fold intent: to help people and to be self-sustaining. In this section of the paper, I examine three of Garvey’s business ventures, showing that the push for group business by an excluded group of people in a hostile era clearly marks Garvey as a social entrepreneur and his projects as social enterprises.9

Social entrepreneurs create a profit-making aspect of what they do because the idea they have is so new to a society that it often cannot get subsidies or grants. Garvey was engaging in Black liberation and economic development of racially marginalized people in the United States. In the United States, he first set up a U.N.I.A. branch in Harlem and then launched the A.C.L and Negro Factories Corporation (Sives 2010; Campbell 2007; Martin 1983; Lewis 1987; Black 1965). The businesses consisted of cooperative businesses, grocery stores, laundries, restaurants and schools that were focused on quality service to Black people (Lewis 1987; Stein 1986; Martin 1983).10

U.N.I.A. was to become the largest member-owned organization in the world. In 1920 U.N.I.A had a significant membership cited at 4 to 6 million members (Campbell 2007, 54; Blaisdell 2004, 7; Lewis 1987, 13). The U.N.I.A.’s core objectives were to restore the racial pride of African peoples, to help the needy, and to create industrial activities. Its core values tied business and morality together to assist African peoples. Garvey argued that the work of the U.N.I.A. was rooted in community, and that UNIA members were to feed, train, and assist the unemployed – this kind of attention being essential to the masses (*Selected Writings and Speeches of Marcus Garvey*).

**What is Social Entrepreneurship?**

If I refer to Bornstein’s (2004) *How to Change the World: Social Entrepreneurs and the Power of New Ideas*, it is evident that Garvey easily meets the requirements of what entails being a social entrepreneur; namely, he had no shortage of fresh and provocative ideas that the majority of the society were unaware of, and he was willing to take financial and social risks. Social entrepreneurs are people who have the foresight to envision a new society when no one thinks it is possible to do so. The concept of “social entrepreneurship” is recognized as part of the business environment. To paraphrase, social entrepreneurship is often defined as social innovation for dealing with complex human needs (Martin et al 2007; Thompson and Doherty 2006; Johnson 2000) and this is particularly true in an era of diminishing public funds. At the time Garvey was living, African peoples were excluded from formal subsidies and had to form mutual aid societies to assist one another (Gordon-Nembhard 2014). So they had to form their own social economies.
Scholars have paid close attention to Garvey’s careers as an organizer, orator and journalist (Lewis 1987; Martin 1987) but K’adamwe et al (2011) have also characterized Garvey as an entrepreneur. A bust of Garvey is displayed at the entrance of the Small Business Association of Jamaica, marking Jamaicans’ recognition of his contribution to business. The term “entrepreneur” comes from the French word to “entreprendre” (to undertake a challenging activity) (Peredo and MacLean 2006). Garvey’s activities clearly involved much risk for the greater good. Certainly Garvey’s successful development of business was difficult in and of itself, but Garvey added a social dimension to all of his business ideas. Garvey also carried out the unthinkable task, creating for-profit businesses to render a service in underserved communities with marginalized people.

Garvey was engaging in social enterprise development before the concept was known. Garvey’s social businesses antagonized racists, and he had to contend with constant harassment, police raids, sabotage by capitalists, and bans by political and business elites (Campbell 2007). Authorities would arrest Garvey on scant grounds in order to interfere with his social and business activities (Campbell 2007; Martin 1983). Ramla Bandele (2010) makes an important argument that the alleged financial corruption and mismanagement was uninformed. This makes perfect sense. The practice of social accounting is a modern phenomenon to assist social enterprises focused on the collective and well-being of people gets audited. None of this kind of social accounting was included in the audit of the A.C.L or the Negro Factories under the U.N.I.A. (Quarter et al. 2009).

In addition, the people who invested in Garvey’s social businesses were unlikely to be of the same class as typical “shareholders,” and thus they had a different perspective on why they were contributing. The clients of Garvey’s businesses were members, not shareholders in the sense of a capitalist corporation. Garvey’s social enterprises did not need to make profits, as he rightly argued because the focus was on developing an oppressed group of people (Bandele 2010; Martin 1983). However, the state chose to see these businesses in strictly capitalist terms as commercial entities, and the U.S. government eventually arrested Garvey because his businesses failed to make a profit for shareholders (as I shall elaborate on further below).

In my understanding of the Garveyites, self-help is a distinct concept and not to be confused with bootstrap development. Self-help means being able to provide for yourself and not being dependent on handouts from establishments that want to control you. In a Guyana-based study, Wilson et al. (2007) argue that Afro-Guyanese who are deliberately excluded from the economic opportunity to meet their basic needs endure emotional stress and poor well-being. Recent works of James et al. (2010) and Galabuzi (2006) also find that Black Canadians who are out of work or in poorly paid occupations have mental and health issues.

The notion of social enterprise under Garveyism was part and parcel of the self-help movement, wherein Black people should themselves work on development so that they could dictate the terms of improvement of their communities. Peredo and MacLean (2006, 57) hold that “social entrepreneurship is a promising instrument for addressing social needs.” In fact, Garvey was not a “minimalist social entrepreneur,” defined as an entrepreneur that does the least amount of social good to make a profit. For a minimalist, the social objectives are more or less “add-ons” to any business project. This was not Garvey. He was a social entrepreneur who made the “social” the main ingredient of the business. Business and entrepreneurship were thus tools to realize this overarching goal. In the next subsection, I examine how each of Garvey’s three businesses sell products and carry out services to educate, to raise racial consciousness of
oppression, and to put the welfare of people first.

**Garvey’s Socially-driven Businesses**

Examples of Garvey’s innovative enterprises are notably absent from the global social economy literature. Garvey’s social enterprises resemble that of 2006 Nobel Peace Prize winner Mohammed Yunus of Bangladesh, who defied the odds and created the world’s largest microfinance bank, Grameen Bank (Bengali name for village bank), reaching millions of low-income women. Yunus also developed a series of social enterprises, such as Grameen-Danone, which targeted children through its yogurt products in order to supplement their nutritional intake, and Grameen phone, which brought mobile telecommunications to poor people and created employment for “phone ladies” (Yunus 2010). Social entrepreneurs today, like Mohammed Yunus founder of the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh who created financial services for illiterate rural women, are rewarded for going against mainstream business (Yunus 2010). This was not an easy task for Yunus as political and business elites feared his movement among the rural poor. Garvey too threatened the white establishment, and his members were harassed, jailed and persecuted routinely because of the impact their cooperative work had on the mindsets of excluded people. See Photo 2 of Mohammed Yunus who created the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and won the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize.

Garvey was not interested in conducting capitalist businesses as the dominant ones of the day – he wanted to co-opt capitalist enterprise in a way that worked for marginalized people. It was on these very grounds that he was able to mobilize a massive membership from a cross-section of Black people from various countries and religions because they could see themselves included in the business project. At the large Garveyite membership meetings and U.N.I.A. conventions, members could voice criticism of colonialism and racism, and learn about other liberation struggles in the world (Lewis 1987). Ordinary people in the cities he visited gave him meals and lodgings because they believed in his mission. This connection to other racialized peoples’ struggles against oppression revealed U.N.I.A’s interest in solidarity and freedom. Business thus became a tool to develop the African human and social rights movement.

Garvey had a number of social businesses embedded into the U.N.I.A. He had social enterprises that fit with the cultural milieu and had meaning for the very people experiencing intense forms of racial hatred and social exclusion. This contextual thinking about what it means to be a socially conscious business person makes it clear that Garvey pursued social enterprises to speak out against social injustice of African people. The work of Garvey is a testimony of the collective enterprises that persist—especially among the African diaspora. The U.N.I.A, recorded as the largest member-owned organization in the world, filled a void for Black people, and this is an important fact for the social economy. The Negro Factories Corporations, the Negro World and the other papers, the Black Star Line, and U.N.I.A. were Black-focused social enterprises that had a double bottom line: to help Black people and to be self-sufficient. See photo 1 for an example of an advertisement in the Negro World to mobilize support
These social enterprises earned millions from the sales of goods and the membership fees collected from people committed to the social cause. Lewis (1987, 70) states, “Garvey’s enterprises had a political motive which corresponded to the struggle of colonial peoples for self-determination,” and he also makes the salient point that these were not Garvey’s personal businesses and he derived no gain from them (ibid., 70). It is likely that the goal for the membership was not to see a dividend or profits, but rather to be part of a cause. In *Negro with a Hat: The Rise and Fall of Marcus Garvey*, Grant (2009) suggests that followers did not request refunds, but instead the workers paid dues and donated their money because they believed in the movement and Black-owned businesses (Lewis 1987). Garvey’s social enterprises were secular and included both Muslims and Christians. The Nation of Islam under Malcolm X and Elijah Mohammed and the Rastafari movement also found his teachings of self-reliance helpful in restoring dignity to African peoples (Grant 2009; Essien-Udom 1994; Martin 1983; 1976). The notion of self-reliance united Black people across various cultures and religions in investing in businesses that wanted to relate to people in a new way.

The goal of the African Communities League (A.C.L), Negro Factories Corporation and the U.N.I.A. was to be financially self-sufficient so as not to depend on external subsides. For example, Black dolls were manufactured from within the community as a way to teach self-love to African-American children. Women were hired in the restaurants, laundry shops, and grocery stores to gain skills as well as to supplement their family income. The development of business in excluded communities such as Harlem brought in businesses to help African Americans acquire job skills while providing a service to people. Another major accomplishment by Garvey and the Black diaspora community was the Black Star Line Steamship Corporation from 1919 to 1921 (Bandele 2010). Martin (1976) explains that Black customers who had been subjected to racial indignities while travelling, such as being segregated or ignored at meal times, were most supportive of their very own shipping company. In 1919, the Black-owned steamship company, with three ships, was a symbol of racial pride and practical business that treated Black passengers with respect (K’adamwe et al. 2011; Campbell 2007; Lewis 1987; Martin 1983). By the 1920s, the U.N.I.A. and the A.C.L had thousands of employees and was a formidable organization with its own revenue base.

The U.N.I.A and its related business operations focused on the Black working class (Stein 1986; Cronon 1962). This focus on a group of people socially excluded in society is important to the work of social entrepreneurs nowadays (Yunus 2010). For example, an important feature of the U.N.I.A was to sell consumer goods and flowers to raise money for its social causes in the community. The U.N.I.A and the businesses in the A.C.L were clearly social enterprises owned by the community to earn revenue and to invest it back into social causes (Bandele 2010; Lewis 1987; Martin 1983).

Garvey’s social enterprises did not conform to mainstream commercial businesses. They came under attack because of the social aspect of the business, specifically their challenge to elites and the capitalist system. Garvey’s inclination toward the cooperative and the collective in business countered the individualized capitalism. Social entrepreneurs today, such as Yunus, are rewarded for going against mainstream business. But Garvey and his members were routinely harassed, jailed, and persecuted because of the social impact of cooperative and community-focused businesses on marginalized people.

The linking of financial independence with the social uplifting of Black communities
made the Garvey movement vulnerable to attacks and ridicule from the dominant racist powers. After years of harassment at international congresses, the U.S. government finally trumped up charges of mail fraud against Garvey. Further to this, the U.S. government claimed that members embezzled funds (Campbell 2007; Martin 1983). The arrest coincided with the campaign "GARVEY MUST GO HOME," in which disgruntled political rivals called for his deportation from the U.S. Garvey called the entire case a "frame-up" to close down the U.N.I.A. (Campbell 2007; Blaisdell 2004), but by 1925, he was arrested, jailed, and then eventually deported to Jamaica in 1927.

Garveyism in the Social Economy of the African Diaspora and ROSCAs

The perspectives in this study come mainly from Jamaica, and those participants from Canada are largely immigrants with a Caribbean linkage. While carrying out field work in the Caribbean and Toronto, Canada, I was impressed by the way ordinary people knew details about Garvey’s teachings and life. For many people in the diaspora, Garvey stands out for them as a leader who wanted to transform society for the better. In Jamaica he is one of the country’s national heroes. The people who rely on ROSCAs for their economic livelihoods have told me that they are inspired by the racial pride and business ethics of Garvey, and it seems that his philosophy has a rightful place in the social economy in Canada, the Caribbean, and beyond.

People involved in ROSCAs are aware of the deeply embedded cultural bias against them (Hossein 2014b; 2014c). One interviewee mentioned that Garvey would most likely have been influenced by Partner (a Jamaican name for ROSCA) growing up in St. Ann’s, Jamaica, as this was a mainstay activity for colonized people. The persons I interviewed reported that they joined ROSCAs because they had a race and class-consciousness and needed to counteract exclusionary economics (Hossein 2013). Business for Garvey was about transforming minds from within the Black community, but it was also a reaction to the politics of the white oppressors. Garvey’s businesses proved that Black people can boycott papers and services that disrespect them and start their own businesses. Garveyites approach business as a way to co-opt economic resources for the masses, which is radical—even dangerous—in the American context. The women who run ROSCAs pride themselves on being “activist bankers” based on the political philosophy of Garvey, who advocated for entrepreneurship to free marginalized people (Martin 1983). Black people have always had alternative banks based on peer-to-peer lending. Commercial bankers who reject people because of personal or political bias signal the elitist banking culture in society (Hossein 2016).

Racialized people, particularly those of African descent, are disproportionately excluded from economic opportunities (Galabuzi 2006). In recognition of this exclusion, it is also vital to note that persons of African descent are not sitting idly by, but are engaging in the social economy to help themselves and others. The systemic racism in Canadian and Caribbean society has made the ideas of Garvey very relevant among people who identify as “Black.”
Garvey’s dual idea of business combined with social agitation has seeped into the mindset of Black people all over the world. The women interviewed and who run ROSCAs also hold that self-help from within the community is how they are able to better their lives and insert an ethical program of business. The idea of “self-reliance” and “self-help” is one that Garvey strongly advocated for. The next section highlights how the African diaspora use self-managed money tools (formally known as ROSCAs) to carry out their business activities.

ROSCAs in Canada and the Caribbean

Africans and the African diaspora have had a profound influence on alternative economics (Hossein 2016). After slavery was abolished, British colonialists, planters, and bankers made it difficult for freed Africans to conduct business. In response, Africans pooled resources in money clubs to buy plots of lands and villages. Garvey grew up in Jamaica where he knew and saw women engage in Partner banks (a money pool) and realized their relevance in poor people’s lives. Partner banks are focused on the collective and coming together of low-income people to support each other’s projects.

The ROSCA bankers who organize money pools provide socially excluded Afro-Caribbean people a safe place to lodge their savings and access loans. Susus (the local name of ROSCA) in Grenada are based on a rotating system. Grenadians participated in susus and maroons (informal collectives) during the authoritarian regimes of Gairy (1967-1974; 1974-1979), the New Jewel Movement (1979-1983) and the U.S. invasion in 1983 (Sandford et al. 1984, 32). Susu are based on daily or weekly plans, each cycle spanning from six to twelve weeks, where the “banker lady” manages the money collected from participant and usually charges a small flat fee. Banker ladies usually run the businesses out of their home, allowing members to pass by to drop off their deposits. Once all the members agree on the rules and structure of the susu, then the banker lady launches the bank with the first in-take of deposits. The system of rotation can take a number of forms, and again this will vary depending on the group dynamics. Money can be allocated on a first-come, first-serve basis; according to need; or by lottery.

People trust the susu bankers. Small business people in Grenada and elsewhere cited and talked about Garveyism in casual conversation; Garvey was mentioned as someone they thought of as a great business leader. Garvey is often viewed as a philosopher and cultural icon, but many of the people I interviewed viewed him as a business man who injected a sense of integrity into commerce. “Mummy,” an elderly woman with lots of energy who has owned a mango and spice stall in the central market in St. George for more than 30 years, said that like Garvey she participated in business to get herself and her community. She explains:

Susu is di ting! [Susu is a good thing to have] You [can] get your money when you want it and nobody give you problem [referring to the susu banker]. You can say to the [susu] banker, give me a hand [lump sum of cash] and she will because she know you and what you will do [with the money]. We bind (we come together) . . . no one can change this way.

(Interview, 14 June 2013)

Susus allow excluded people to access a large lump sum of cash after saving for a few weeks. This would never be possible at a commercial bank, especially for poor persons of African heritage. “Mummy” tried several times to get a loan at a local bank, but it was a long drawn out process that was hard to follow—unlike the susu banks. In interviews, members of the ROSCAs were open about their difficulty in getting loans from banks, indicating that
focusing on the collective was the reason money pools were so important to them (Hossein 2013). This kind of focus on group economics and collective business was very much part of the Garvey business model.

Similar to Grenada, Trinidadians also have ROSCAs referred to as susu. In Trinidad, in which there were many U.N.I.A. branches and Garvey’s work helped the development of trade unions, persons of Black descent are still excluded from economic programs. “Rastaman Curtis” of Laventille, an east Port of Spain, Trinidad, influenced by self-help business approach of Garvey stated, “Government control money fi wi. As a Blackmon I can’t wait of dis or dat crab connection so I use susu (a name for ROSCA in Grenada and Trinidad and Tobago) to meet my needs” (Interview, 18 June 2013). Not only do ROSCAs provide people with ways to meet their livelihood needs, but they are a viable alternative to commercial banks (Hossein 2014b; 2013; Collins et al. 2009; Rutherford 2000). ROSCAs are able to restore people’s faith after they have experienced everyday indignities. In the statement below, “Nicey,” a Jamaican-Canadian single mother, connected the ideas of Garveyism to her Partner bank (a Jamaican name for ROSCA).

Wait a minute I tell you when I first really know Garvey. I was on a bus in New Orleans and I picked up Garvey’s book laying there on the next seat to me. Yeah, I know [knew of] Garvey growing up as a small chil’ and him [he] was a national hero back home [Jamaica] . . . I read the story and see all he do . . . to have a business in America. The famous one, he had was the Black Star [the shipping firm] but they [referring to white people] cause him too much trouble . . . it ended, folded. I don’t worry about them people [banks] . . . I done join my partner [peer-lending group] so [that] I [am] in charge of my own business.”

(Interview, 21 July 2015, Toronto)

“Nicey” made a link between Garvey and what she does to make a living in Toronto. Ordinary people read and think about Garvey in contemporary times because his viewpoints on life and the economy resonates with their current struggle. “Nicey” is aware of racism in the society but she is thinking about Garvey as she figures out how to do banking on her own terms through the community-driven banks called Partner. Jamaicans also know about the exclusion that exists in society and business, particularly Rastafarians who have felt extreme bias against them in conventional business. For this reason—as well as the desire to remain “not binded” (controlled) by local elites—they prefer to create their own businesses. An elderly woman, “Rasta Lady,” a pudding seller, in Kingston, Jamaica, reported to me that party activism is a requirement to receive loans and that the local politician penalizes citizens who are not active (e.g., who go to rallies) by refusing to refer them for loans.

Partner banks, by contrast, give people a choice of how they could bank. Several variants of the partner bank exist, and although all are saving plans, many are lending plans as well (Hossein 2014a; 2014b; Handa et al. 1999; Klak et al. 1992). Each person’s contribution to the partner bank is called a “hand” and it is “thrown” (deposited) for a designated period of time; the
pooled money is called a “draw.” Much of the attraction of partner is that these institutions are run by ordinary and uneducated non-bankers who know the day-to-day reality of the people in the community. Social exclusion from commercial banks has driven up the demand for informal banks (Hossein 2013; 2016). Tucked away behind her metal cage, Rickie, a 29-year-old bar owner, was thankful when I asked her about Jamaican partner banks:

Pardna . . . live for dat ting. Most people here [in his low income community] don’t have go to banks. Dem [the bankers] don’t know what’s going on here and wi na know what’s going on in their banks. Downtown know Pardna . . . it is the one ting here for wi.

(Interview, Kingston, 9 June 2009)

Bankers in Guyana are aware that people turn to ROSCAs. The patronage that is embedded in the formal lending processes excludes many people from access to small loans. The Indo-Guyanese male bankers who dominate the banking sector have a strong class and racial bias against Afro-Guyanese (Hossein 2014b; 2014c). In Allbouystown, one interviewee, a Rastafarian Afro-Guyanese fruit seller, who admired Garvey with the pin he wore stated,

The banks is der people, if you coolie [Indo-Guyanese] you get bigga loan and easy [. . .] Blackmon [Black person] gets pushed round [in the bank]” (Translation: The banks are made up of Indians and it is an Indian-run bank. If you are Indo-Guyanese, you can get bigger loans. An Afro-Guyanese loan applicant gets no help at the bank.

(Interview, 20 April 2010).

The Afro-Guyanese Rasta was adamant that his race has prevented him from accessing money at a bank. For him it was evident that there was a divide between those who make loans and those on the receiving end increases the potential for race, class, and gender biases (Hossein 2015). For many African Caribbean people Garvey linked identity politics to the marketplace and made sure that Black people were aware of this connection, and that there was nothing ‘neutral’ about business.

**Conclusion**

Marcus Garvey was a social entrepreneur who spotted a need to reform the way business is conducted in society. Garvey put forward a philosophy of racial self-reliance in business to counteract mainstream business practices that has resonated with the African diaspora (Hossein 2012; K’adamwe et al. 2011). Garvey was very much aware of what it takes to develop Black communities, and recognized that as long as Black people were constrained in terms of income they would not be able to agitate for their rights. According to Garveyism, business is a medium to improve the livelihoods of marginalized Black communities. What is key here is that Garvey has been wrongfully depicted as a petty capitalist or failed commercial business man. Garvey did not just theorize about mainstream business and entrepreneurship; rather, he was intent on developing cooperative businesses to help the Black community. This is a fundamental aspect of the Garveyism mandate to innovate and make business work to advance the well-being of Black lives.

Garvey’s social businesses were clearly aimed to increase the well-being of an oppressed group of people. And in everything he did he was never swayed by wealth and he died penniless. His life’s work was to achieve racial cooperation through humane forms of cooperative businesses. The people engaged in ROSCAs has appreciated that Garvey was not rooted in capitalist business and organized businesses in the community and through cooperation and collectives in nature and focused on empowering the Black people.
References


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NOTES

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2. I use the term Black Canadians to speak of the various cultural groups who identify as African descended peoples. Joseph Mensah (2010) also gives a good explanation of his use of the term in his book Black Canadians.

3. This perspective on Garvey is different from Stein’s (1986) view of Garvey as a petty capitalist or Cronon’s (1962) view of Garvey as a failed leader, both has shown there is quite a bit of controversy surround Garvey.


5. For a different interpretation of Garvey’s role in business, see Stein (1986) who argued that Garvey was a petty capitalist rather than an entrepreneur with a different way of doing business from the mainstream.


7. American Congressman Charles Rangel posted an op-ed “Marcus Garvey: A Rising Star,” where he states that Garvey was harassed by the state and wrongfully accused of fraud (February 2002).

8. In Huang’s World: Jamaica, Eddie Huang makes a video about Jamaican food but in this episode the owner of Africa Café reveals that Garvey was a political activist who inspired self-employment among the Black race (Viceland, Season 1, Episode 1, May 2016).
9. The term ‘alternative economics’ refers to a large body of literature that speaks to the direct challenge ordinary people take on to question neoliberal, commercial and individualized forms of business.
Moira Ferguson’s *A Human Necklace* analyzes the fiction of contemporary Barbadian-American author Paule Marshall, highlighting symbols of the African diaspora and the legacy of transatlantic slavery that resonate across her novels. Marshall was born in Brooklyn to Barbadian immigrant parents in 1929, and her books feature characters living in twentieth-century Brooklyn, the Caribbean, and Europe. Ferguson highlights the ways in which Marshall invokes the violence of transatlantic slavery, colonialism, and oppression faced by black immigrants to the U.S. in the twentieth century. Her readings focus on themes of migration and politics, particularly exploring the intergenerational relationships of her women protagonists. Ferguson proposes that Marshall’s novels constitute “a long, discontinuous, imaginative saga of African diasporic communities” (p.2). As evidence for this frame, Ferguson traces symbols and themes of diasporic experience that run throughout the novels, and she cites Marshall’s own commentary that “it is absolutely necessary for black people to effect [a] spiritual return” to Africa (p.1). Marshall sees her “task as a writer to initiate readers to the challenges this journey entails” (p.1).

Each chapter focuses on one novel (or a collection of novellas, in the case of *Soul Clap Hands and Sings*). Ferguson explicates the significance of characters, events, and descriptions, and their historical context. Things that people wear hold particular significance. Bangles represent shackles, but they also claim an aural, sonic presence for the women who wear them. Others wear helmets and styles connected to imperialism. Ferguson repeatedly notes the significance of names, pointing out suggestive homonyms of characters’ names, like Payne/pain (p.6), Silla/Scylla, the character from the Ulysses myth (p.18), and Lyle/l’île, the French word for island (p.41), as well as meaningful resonances, like Suggie Skeete, “named after sugar and therefore symbolically associated with slavery itself” (p.12); the “symbolically named Westminster Low Road” (p.38); the name Harbin “ironically linked to the keeper of a lodging house” (p.43); “Harriet’s own name, Shippen” which “bespeaks a horrific shipping over killing seas” (p.43); the “symbolically named North White Plains” (p.57); the “symbolically and Latinate/imperial-named liner Bianca Pride” (p.57); Great Aunt Cuney’s name, which “derives from the Latin *cuneus*, meaning wedge” and also related to *cuneiform* (p.62); Ursa, who is “symbolically named after a northern constellation,” (p.78); the Mile Trees Colony Hotel, which is “appropriately named for white tourists” (p.80); a “predictably named—a Ford Anglia car,” a gift from a man with neo-colonialist tendencies (p.89); and the a “tight-packed name, JoJo,” which refers to to Josephine Baker and Josephine, wife of Napoleon, who hailed from Martinique (p.99). In addition, Ferguson reads in descriptions of the environment, particularly bodies of water, commentary on the future and past: the “horseshoe shape of the pool—never ‘completed’—always suggests openness and possibility” (p.51); and “the Grand Anse beach—the great cup or handle,” signals that the protagonist is “about to grab that handle, so to speak, and climb into a new life” (p.66). Several novels include death by drowning, and descriptions
of the ocean often invoke the Middle Passage. The title of Ferguson’s chapter on *Praisesong for the Widow* highlights these two threads of analysis that run throughout *A Human Necklace*—“Water and Nomenclature.”

These close readings will be most compelling for those who have read the novels, and especially those who may be undertaking their own written analysis. For casual readers of Marshall or scholars of the Caribbean that would like to be acquainted with Marshall’s work and context, the book provides a sense of each novel’s plot and thematic scope in a readable, accessible style. However, particularly for readers who have not read the novels, the analysis sometimes lacks its own internal structure to forward a particular argument. The “post-slavery saga” offers a loose frame to hold Ferguson’s analysis, but the discussion of this concept feels somewhat underdeveloped (p.5). Ferguson proposes a symmetry between Marshall’s first novel and her latest: the saga “begins and ends in diasporic Brooklyn” (p.93). *The Fisher King* acts as “a symphony’s last movement” as it “recapitulates and synthesizes themes in earlier novels (p.93). However, this structure only lasts until Marshall writes another novel: Ferguson remarks that Marshall has “(temporarily) completed this fictional saga” (p.5). This remark to some extent suggests the superficiality of the saga framework. Ferguson establishes that Marshall’s novels collectively cross geography, time period, and generation, and circle around a number of shared themes that represent African diasporic experiences. While the chapter on *Brown Girl, Brownstones* delves more deeply into classical mythology, suggesting a reading of the novel as a retelling of the Odyssey, Ferguson does not provide specific analysis of what it means for the novels to collectively comprise a saga. Instead, the saga frame seems to serve a more generalized purpose to simply suggest, like the necklace metaphor of the title, relation and interconnection among Marshall’s novels.

Ferguson has a deep knowledge of Caribbean and colonial histories, having previously authored books on women writers from the Caribbean, including Mary Prince and Jamaica Kincaid, and white women whose writing engaged the rhetoric of slavery, the focus of *Subject to Others: British Women Writers And Colonial Slavery, 1670-1834* (1992). *A Human Necklace* benefits from this historical understanding, as Ferguson weaves discussion of specific historical moments and events into her literary analysis. For instance, Ferguson introduces the history of Barbados as a “launching pad” for migration within the Caribbean during and after slavery (p.7). She discusses the conditions that allowed for migration out of the Caribbean to places like Brooklyn and Europe in the twentieth-century, including the income and mobility gained from the Panama Canal construction project. Ferguson notes historical tensions between Barbadian and Jewish residents of Brooklyn in her discussion of *Brownstone, Brown Girl*, noting various characters’ attitudes to Jewish landlords and employers in Brooklyn in hand with their attitudes toward Hitler and the plight of Jews in Europe during World War II. *Soul Clap Hands and Sing* includes a character who has contact with the Guyanese nationalist and left-wing People’s Progressive Party, the colonial and post-colonial history of which Ferguson glosses. In her discussion of the novel *Daughters*, set on a fictional Caribbean island called Triunion, Ferguson comments on the complicity, compromise, and corruption that often marks politics (and particularly postcolonial politics). Scholars in Caribbean history, Caribbean studies, and American studies may find, through Ferguson’s analysis, interest in Marshall’s novels. To some extent, a deeper historical conversation remains submerged in the chapters’ rich footnotes, which engage widely with other scholars’ work. Lara Putnam’s *Radical Moves: Caribbean Migrants and the Politics of Race in the Jazz Age*, which came out in the same year
as *A Human Necklace*, would make a nice companion text for Ferguson’s literary analysis, as Putnam provides deep analysis of historical and cultural currents that appear in and contextualize Marshall’s novels. *A Human Necklace* considers the interplay between political movements and literary production; however, the discussions of the surrounding history and culture could have been further developed.

For instance, the book does not communicate a strong sense of where Marshall fits in a world of other literary, cultural, and historical figures. Marshall’s own comments from her memoir, *Triangular Road*, which Ferguson includes in the final chapter, indicate the role Langston Hughes played in supporting her writing and career, and indicate her presence at international Pan-African writing conferences—but the analysis does not consider how these experiences external to the novels inform our reading. Such considerations might have deepened the analysis. For instance, are the novels part of a larger cultural trend among Caribbean writers, or immigrant writers in the U.S., or black diasporic writers? Ferguson does not give us a sense of the cultural field from which these novels emerge—a sense of literary or cultural productions by Caribbean writers more broadly, whether in Barbados or Brooklyn, does not emerge. While deep readers of Marshall would always be the primary audience for this book, if the analysis had developed an argument that extended beyond the novels, it would have broader appeal for readers engaged with black politics, history, and culture.

Paule Marshall’s novels continue to sustain critical attention. Kelly Baker Josephs is editing a special issue of the Caribbean Studies journal *Anthurium* on Marshall this year. *A Human Necklace* joins a number of scholarly books that focus on Marshall’s writing, including Eugenia C. DeLamotte’s *Places of Silence, Journeys of Freedom: the Fiction of Paule Marshall* (1998), and Heather Hathaway’s *Caribbean Waves: Relocating Claude McKay and Paule Marshall* (1999). Ferguson’s literary criticism highlights themes in Marshall’s work that would be of interest to scholars working in American Studies, Caribbean Studies, and Africana Studies. Paule Marshall’s fiction focuses on black life and black politics, from housing associations in Brooklyn to electoral politics in the Caribbean. Her novels feature girls and women, sometimes in queer relationships, and therefore may also be of interest to gender and sexuality studies. Ferguson’s criticism—and her extensive bibliography of primary and secondary works by or about Marshall—contributes a collection of insights and interpretive resources that will aid further work on Paule Marshall.

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Music as a form of expression in the Black community is not a new phenomenon. However, Redmond offers new interpretations of this old paradigm. She depicts music as a diasporic weapon of resistance, ambitiously expanding the boundaries of Black politics by carefully towing the line between sonic manifestos, social movements, and solidarity. The author judiciously wades through literature from myriad disciplines, exposing inconsistent arguments and confronting the intersection of social movements and solidarity, while positioning music both as a repository for collective memory and mobilizing agent throughout the diaspora. Her work deftly illuminates the role of the communitive and communicative aspects of the performer and the performance.

Redmond’s subject is Black political thought in the performative state of anthems between 1920 and 1990, thus spanning the period between the Harlem Renaissance and the Post-Civil Rights Era. She analyzes six songs that point to global Black solidarity as a resistance to domination and oppression. Instead of examining the entire genealogy of Black music, she considers the diasporic usage of performance as collective memory, the transnational connection of sound as a response to struggle, Black counter publics, and interaction between artist and audience. Whereas Black movement literature traditionally focuses on the impact of organizations and leadership on the public, Redmond asks how anthems operate as a bridge between political public and sonic listeners.

Throughout the first part of the work, Redmond examines anthems of the early 1900’s through the lens of messianic leadership and specialized organizations. She posits that these organizations selected the anthems that would help activate racial identity and group mobilization. In the latter half of the work, Redmond identifies a steady change, which she correlates with the proliferation of Black social movements and the inclusion of advanced marginalized groups. Their entrance heralds a more youthful and personalized usage of anthems. In her view, political actors are no longer limited to organizational leadership positions, and she provides clear incidences wherein musicians deployed their own art as weapons of resistance. Although there is commonality between all six anthems, Redmond suggests that each song simultaneously signifies the individual struggle of the artist as well as the struggle of the listeners against a backdrop of state sanctioned oppression.

*Anthems: Social Movements and the Sound of Solidarity in the African Diaspora* is an impressive array of rebellious hymns which highlight both the strength and weaknesses of the organizations of that time. For Marcus Garvey and the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), the song “Ethiopia” became the sound of the organization and its tenets (Chapter 1). Sensing the need for a refrain to embody the organization’s mission, Garvey commissioned two members to co-author the anthem. The melody’s purpose was to sonically invoke the spirit of Pan Africanism. This song was not only a rallying cry of Black Nationalism, but also a counter to the American national anthem. Redmond observes that on the one hand, the
tune helped develop “a language of diaspora to identify the organization’s work and character through its global and political aims and diverse membership” (p. 25). On the other hand, one of the weaknesses of the organization was exposed through the exclusion of women from its mission and melodic tune. Similarly, “Lift Ev’ry Voice and Sing,” speaks to the pulse of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), even though the mission of the organization is divergent from that of the UNIA (Chapter 2). The NAACP sought to distance itself from the Black Nationalist themes and advocate for an integrational approach. This approach would fuel the class divisions within the organization and enforce domination pathologies. Redmond contends that this internal conflict is evident even within the tension between the leadership and the composers. Determining whether the tune should be considered anthem or hymn symbolizes a double consciousness within the organization. Notwithstanding, Redmond points out what is unmistakable about the hymn. From its meter and time signatures to the sonic historiography, this ballad personifies a new wave of Black political thought.

The latter half of the book shines a spotlight on how the artists’ experiences influenced their use of music as a weapon of resistance. More specifically, Redmond examines anthems that were not chosen by an organization but represent the ethos of the political actors during that time. Chapter 3, “Songs of Free Men: The Sound Migrations of ‘Old Man River,” highlights the life and activism of critically acclaimed singer Paul Robeson. Redmond reveals that Robeson served as father to the current art form of remixing, or sampling, by commandeering a show tune to speak to the struggles of “Blackness and Labor” (p. 17). She describes the translocal messaging carried by Robeson throughout the world. By repurposing a ditty that faced scathing backlash from Black audiences, Robeson essentially smuggled a message of resistance across color lines and throughout the diaspora. This exceptional analysis integrates vital new narratives about the lyrics and life of Robeson and presents a fascinating portrait of de facto leadership.

Chapters 4 and 5 chronicle the growing estrangement between women and the social movement alongside the seeming invisibility of their leadership and contributions and the inaccuracies surrounding the anthems of that time period. “We Shall Overcome,” is traditionally associated with Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and the Civil Rights movement, however Redmond contends that the roots of this medley can be traced back to negro spirituals and found its usage later in the mid-20th century labor movements of the southeast region of the United States. For instance, during the 1930’s, the term “I” was replaced with “We” by the women of the Food, Tobacco, Agricultural, and Allied Workers of America (FTA). Highlander Folk School (HFS) workers while on strike personalized the song by changing “we will overcome” to “we shall overcome. However, the revised anthem was as a counter to corporate propaganda during the 1945 tobacco labor strike. This strike was the product of a multiracial, women led, movement known as the Charleston Local of the Congress of Industrial Organizations. As the fight shifted from labor rights, to civil rights, and then to human rights, so too did the anthems chosen to symbolize those struggles. With the rise of the youthful energy of the Black Power Movement came such anthems as “To Be Young, Gifted and Black” by the “High Priestess of Soul,” Nina Simone. The impetus for this anthem was the result of the untimely death of close friend Lorraine Hansberry. Hansberry aided in Simone’s ideological refinement, ultimately leading to the creation of this anthem and many others such as “Four Women” and “Mississippi Goddamn.” This Black political contagion and sisterly bond would be passed from Simone to Miriam Makeba (Chapter 6). Similar to her comrades, Redmond asserts that, “Makeba used her platform as a performer to critique and destruct the apartheid apparatus from sites around
the world” (p. 222). Her anthem, “Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika” would be adopted by the African National Congress as a communicative device between those in exile, such as Makeda, and their Black American counterparts, as a flag of solidarity. Redmond masterfully weaves unknown narratives, ethnomusicology, and black identity to create the tapestry of Black sisterhood.

In her conclusion, Redmond forecasts the future characters of anthems to come by analyzing Public Enemy’s “Fight the Power.” The song was featured on the soundtrack for the Spike Lee’s Joint, “Do the Right Thing.” This anthem and its visuals spoke to the interracial tensions, gentrification, and unrelenting domination of state sanctioned police violence. *Anthems: Social Movements and the Sound of Solidarity in the African Diaspora* offers a compelling study of music as a weapon of resistance. Thus, the book clears important ground, linking politico-sonic tunes and black politics.

Redmond has done her homework and has masterfully woven years of research into a cogent narrative with jewels for academics, music lovers, and lovers of freedom alike. However, like any work of this magnitude, Redmond’s text does have delimitations. First, she points out the influence of the Harlem Renaissance while ignoring the enormous contribution of the Black Arts Movement. Next, she argues that the musical relationship is between the composer and audience, yet there is little to no discussion of how the music influenced the general listening audience. This study would have been all the more compelling to readers if she had demonstrated or addressed the music’s impact on attitudes and identity. This could have perhaps been accomplished by interviewing or finding recordings of some of the surviving Black leadership or artists of that time. Finally, Redmond defines an “anthemic event” as an occurrence that emphasizes hearing instead of seeing the struggle, however she overlooks how Public Enemy’s music and Spike Lee’s movie illuminates the equally important role of both audio and visual experiences of struggle.

In spite of the aforementioned critiques, Redmond’s study is innovative and groundbreaking. She expands the boundaries of interdisciplinary studies by intersecting ethnomusicology, America political development, and Black politics. Each song travails to tap into the spirit of resistance and unity, while functioning as a balm to the wounds of domination and oppression. She clearly illustrates that music functions as a refuge, allowing performers and listeners to safely wade through “translocal” forms of state sanctioned oppression as she demonstrates and demarcates a continuum of Black music as a form of resistance.
Left Behind: Urban High Schools and the Failure of Market Reform by authors Edward P. St. John, Victoria J. Milazzo Bigelow, Kim Callahan Lijana, and Johanna C. Massé joins a body of scholarship in Education Studies, Ethnic Studies, and Political Science concerned with the intersection of educational policy and the performance of underprivileged students in the American school system. By situating themes such as public investment in college readiness and failed American market policies, this work attributes our country’s failing of urban students to less-studied factors that do not just hinge on low-literacy rates, low-attention spans, or a family’s ill investment in school. Instead, the text highlights factors such as generational challenges and undocumented status, while it also disavows the “problematic” application of cause and effect theories in educational policy that have led us to underwhelming education reform that could increase college access for urban students (p. 7). The authors also examine the impacts of inadequate hiring that keep introductory teaching jobs in the K-12 system competitive. For instance, the authors examine foundations such as Teach for America (TFA), which recruit college-educated but culturally ill-equipped teachers (p. 151). Methodologically, Left Behind engages with a history of both political data and case studies from four New York City high schools that include district schools and market-niche schools. Their mathematical examination of “policy + practice” extracts unconsidered factors of establishing sustainable and universally-beneficial education policy nationwide.

Chapter 1, entitled, “Market Niches” provides background to the crux of the argument typified in the book’s title. Market niches are “the content or processes around which schools specialize so they can compete for students, for the money following students, and for other funding attracted through grants” (p. 36). Examining schools through this lens allows us to understand the gravitational pull toward specialty schools with vocational or specialty curriculums. This is seen especially in New York City public schools, where particular foci or curricular themes to attract both students and funds are especially competitive. Schools also compete with one another in providing the best access to college preparation, although the disparities between schools’ ability to prepare students for higher education is systemic and contingent on fiscal and educational policy. The correlation between mathematics curriculum standards and policy formation is a quintessential example of the way in which market niche schools “leave behind” students (although they attract so many). Furthermore, the college enrollment gap of underrepresented minorities corresponds with the decline of need-based grants, although the Reagan and Bush, Sr. presidencies did not release reports that focused on the decline of enrollment and its relation to the decline of federal student aid (p. 49-50). What the authors poignantly assert is that the eventual report that emerged focused solely on the connection between the less-significant factor of completing algebra in middle school and positive college outcomes. This erroneous publication was commissioned by the U.S. Department
of Education and could have easily avoided the modern problems that we know today as the market-niche and urban education opportunity gap, which the text centers on (p. 50). Put simply, the real factors attributed to students being “left behind” were left out of the report, permanently altering the trajectory of educational policy and the students it (under) served in the last thirty years. Because of political foibles like this, standards for mathematics were raised, and the real problems of access were left unaddressed.

A key example of a “real” factor that informs college preparation is illustrated in the standards for mathematics in high schools. Because standards are often raised for “college-preparedness” and curriculum rigor remains a major pull for enrollment (as falsely reported in the report mentioned above), students are required to meet said standards to graduate. These high standards, combined with a lack of support for homework and tutoring initiatives, results in students either dropping-out or falling behind in their studies, leaving their opportunities for college even harder when working on a fifth year of high school. The authors propose a need for policies that ensure students are both literate in the specific content taught by niche schools while also well prepared for college-level courses (p. 71). For instance, advanced literacy in mathematics must be first implemented in a cultural context where students are given the opportunity to reach the standards set before them. Again, cultural literacy comes into play when learning any specialty, whether it be vocational, STEM specific, or arts-related. In this sense, the high standards enacted by policy makes some students “college ready” but others “left behind” with only basic skills (p. 77). The authors argue that flexibility in standards should be aligned with content niches, and, ideally, there should be multiple standards for students in particular market niches or with different language abilities (p. 87). Simply put, the challenge of meeting standards and preparing students for tests is simply not conducive (p. 99). Another political prescriptive that the authors put forth is a commitment to teaching with pedagogies that work for students (p. 70). As educational scholars such as T. Sengupta-Irving and E. Redman have argued, working within contextual pedagogies is key. One of their focus schools, “Remus,” integrated an inquiry-based approach to working with math educators. This approach “encouraged thinking about context and gave teachers an opportunity to adapt with a history of local, centralized control of the curriculum” (p. 70).

However, college preparation extends beyond curricula and into a holistic set of knowledge called “college knowledge.” The authors argue that schools that develop particular preparedness including but not limited to financial literacy outside of just teaching about federal aid is essential to getting students “college ready.” What the text expertly intertwines is historical data with case studies to show an overwhelming amount of students who are first-generation college students and are overwhelmed with the idea of college, even after learning about federal student aid (p. 125). Many of the case study schools aid with college essay preparation and provide college credit, such as a CUNY bridge program was essential to assuaging anxiety about college costs and the daunting task of college completion (p. 125). Parental involvement is also integral to a comprehensive approach to family engagement and college planning by providing insight to parents who are invested in learning how to support their students through all four years of college (p. 121).

However, the authors’ critique of market niche schools and policy reform falls short when analyzing other important impact factors that affect urban youths’ access to college, such as the increasingly high rate of housing insecurity, especially among foster youth. These factors are also highly racialized and disproportionately affect black and brown youth. Educational scholars
increasingly assert that pedagogical paradigms that consider the cultural and institutional needs of youth must be considered in analyzing college preparedness. *Left Behind* only considers these factors marginally but concludes with ten “practical strategies” for educational policy to invest in the future of urban youth (p. 149). Lastly, although it goes acknowledged that the demographics of urban areas tend to be low-income, the glaring attribute of “urban” that was not expansively addressed in the text seems to be that the children being disserved in these urban markets are overwhelmingly black and brown. Race is an important factor, especially due to the modern segregation and gentrification of New York City where the case studies take place. It is important to note that although students of all backgrounds are impacted by the market-niche schools in New York City and other urban areas, the factor of race, intersecting with being low-income, first-generation, and living in multi-generational households are most negatively impacted.

*Left Behind* brings forth valuable research in analyzing the achievement gaps in urban high schools while illuminating the oft-ignored political scaffolding that upholds such inequities. St. John, Milazzo Bigelow, Callahan Lijana, and Massé urge for the creation of new common standards that mandate district changes to fulfill all students’ specific educational needs and help fulfill their wishes of attending college. But perhaps what underpins the authors’ argument for policy reform is that the urgency for change remains paradigmatic for those being educated, not just the political stakeholders. All urban, but specifically black, brown and low-income students are coming of age in a market-focused educational system that increasingly stresses “useful arts,” such as STEM (p. 76). As first-generation parents select schools for their students based on trends of earning potential for particular vocations, they must know that college access and life-time success is determined by a confluence of factors such as college preparedness in the classroom, appropriate standards for language learners and discipline-specific language, and financial and geographic access to schools with market niches, just to name a few. *Left Behind* perhaps most importantly situates education as a political problem that manifests itself in the lives of some of our most vulnerable students, while also focuses on the massive political power of our policymakers who determine the quality of life for generations of families to come.

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Historians over the past few years have begun to expand the historiography of Urban Studies to focus on race relations in military towns in Post-World War II America. Catherine Lutz in her book *Homefront* and Andrew H. Myers’ *Black, White and Olive Drab* each focus on the specifics of race relations in a military town after WWII. Carol Lynn McKibbon, the public historian for the city of Seaside, California has set out to go a step further than Lutz and Myers with her book *Racial Beachhead: Diversity and Democracy in a Military Town*. McKibbon’s goal in *Racial Beachhead* is to demonstrate how a town that is centered around a military installation found a way to peacefully integrate while the rest of the country reacted violently to racial integration. She asserts, “The story of Seaside, California is entwined in the history of how World War II and developments in the postwar decades transformed much of California and the West” (p. 2). The author situates Seaside into the larger economic and demographic context of the California coast. The northern California coast was more than just a tourist destination according to McKibbon; it became a testing ground for racial politics in the military and revealed how racial integration on military bases, and in the communities that surround them, would play out in the years after World War II. Ultimately, McKibbon argues that integration in Seaside was a success because of the presence of Fort Ord and the role of the federal government.

The story of Seaside, California becoming a minority-majority military town begins in 1911 when the city’s founder Dr. John L.D. Roberts convinced President Theodore Roosevelt to place Fort Ord in the county of Monterey. The early history of Seaside as discussed in chapter one delves into how this picturesque community of white middle class families rapidly became a multicultural subdivision of a predominately white county after the arrival of Fort Ord. One of the Buffalo Soldier regiments, the Ninth Cavalry, ended up being stationed at Ft. Ord and once they arrived so did the caravan of African Americans that followed them. The diversity of Seaside in the first part of the twentieth century was similar to the expansion of the black population of Salt Lake City, Utah at the end of the nineteenth century, when two Buffalo Soldier regiments were stationed at Ft. Douglass. The black community of Seaside rapidly expanded with the arrival of black soldiers. However, one of the fascinating aspects of McKibbon’s study is the discussion of how African Americans, Whites, Mexican-Americans, Asians, and other ethnic and racial groups all interacted and joined together in helping to create a multicultural town that built successful political coalitions not based solely on race or ethnicity.

In chapters three and four, the author delves into how the residents of Seaside respond and react to becoming a multiethnic military community. There were major post war developments in Seaside that helped to establish this multicultural coalition and made this community unique compared to the rest of Northern California. McKibbon makes excellent use of the local archives, local newspapers, oral interviews, and census records to help reconstruct and trace
the evolution of Seaside. The white community of Monterey county actively participated in the housing discrimination that was prevalent during the 1940s, 50s, and 60s. Almost all minority groups that were deemed non-white who attempted to live in Monterey County were only shown homes in Seaside. This is one of the reasons, according to the author, that this community was able to peacefully integrate—unlike cities such as San Francisco or San Diego, which also had military bases but more resistance to integration.

Once President Harry Truman issued Executive Order 9981 stating that, “there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin,” Ft. Ord—one of the “country’s largest and most vital training centers in the United States”—was the first to undergo complete integration (pp. 53-58). It is because of the military’s policy of integration in the 1940s that enables the diverse community of Seaside to peacefully integrate. After the city was incorporated in 1954, there were a series of political elections that resulted in the election of the first African American city councilman in 1956. The multiethnic coalition that helped to get Monroe Jones, the first black city councilman, elected included leaders from the black, white, Japanese, and Filipino community. The strongest sections of this study is when the author discusses the intricacies of Seaside’s local politics and explains how the people of this community were truly ahead of their time when dealing with racial politics.

The final two chapters of the book examine the decades of decline for Seaside the 1980s and 1990s. The United States was in a period of crisis, both economically and socially. The rise of crack cocaine affected nearly every community in America and Seaside did not escape its wrath. The rise of violent crimes in Seaside did not illicit the same kind of reactions to the crack epidemic in cities such as Chicago or Los Angeles. The community of Seaside did not isolate crack users and criminals in the black community, like they did in Chicago or Los Angeles. Instead, they focused on utilizing their multiethnic coalitions to build community watch groups to help combat the violent crack epidemic. While this community combated one issue they were hit with the loss of the one thing that helped keep this community thriving—the closure of Ft. Ord. This is a crucial part of the book. However, McKibbon’s discussions about the economic impact on Seaside after the base closes could have been more nuanced and less centered on the middle class community.

At times, the author overemphasizes the perspectives of black middle class residents, leaving the reader with questions about how the other half lived in Seaside. Moreover, there is a lack of discussion of the Black Panther Party for Self Defense, which was founded not far from Seaside—in Oakland, CA. The author mentions that Mel Mason, an active member of the Black Panther Party in Oakland, was elected to the Seaside city council in 1980 but offers few details on the matter. Despite these minor concerns, this book provides a much-needed analysis of race relations in a military town and sheds light on how the loss of large military and federal installations impact minority-majority communities. *Racial Beachhead* is a welcome addition to the growing literature in Urban Studies and provides a rare window into a world often ignored by scholars.


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The Spanish term *palante* is often referenced as a slogan for the Young Lords. *Palante* was the title of the Young Lords’ newspaper, their radio show, and also their book, *Palante: Young Lords*. A contraction of *para adelante* in Spanish, *palante* loosely means, “move forward” in English. However, *palante* signified much more than a slogan for the Young Lords and has greater meaning beyond “move forward.” *Palante* may also be understood as a rallying call to move beyond the limitations of coloniality and imperialism. Following the model of the Young Lords and evoking the work of Frantz Fanon, Walter Mignolo and Chela Sandoval, Darrel Wanzer-Serrano offers a rallying call of his own in *The New York Young Lords and the Struggle for Liberation*. Towards delinking from the colonial and disrupting inequities in the production of knowledge, Wanzer-Serrano contends and throughout the book models, that “scholars must first alter the intellectual terrain from which we as critics and theorists speak and listen” (p. 26). Consequently, one of the most significant contributions of this well-organized and thought-provoking book about the New York Young Lords is the centering of decolonial love as practice and praxis.

In the Introduction, Wanzer-Serrano grounds his methodology in transparency about the relationships between his life experiences and his research, which is an important and useful choice in a project that questions patterns of coloniality and repression in modes of knowing (p. 77). Wanzer-Serrano explains, “I became Boricua” as a result of professors (all women, mostly of color) who jump-started “the process of getting me to think from a position rooted in Puerto Ricaness and *latinidad*...the kind of thing usually relegated to a book’s preface... [which] is central to how I approach the Young Lords and to the place from which I write as a scholar committed to decoloniality” (p. 9). This theoretical framework of reflexivity continues throughout the text. In Chapter Three, in reference to interviews he conducts with women in the New York Young Lords Party about sexism, Wanzer-Serrano confronts what it means for him to be a man asking women questions about gender inequality. He acknowledges, “I am suspect” (p. 93), commits “to avoid speaking for these women” and instead tries his “best to speak with them” (p. 94).

*The New York Young Lords and the Struggle for Liberation* is divided into five chapters. Chapter One introduces the reader to the New York Young Lords and maps their evolution from the Young Lords Organization to the Young Lords Party. There is brief attention paid to the Chicago division from which the New York group emerged and eventually separated. Wanzer-Serrano explores how the New York Young Lords experience four modes of documenting their history: recovery, correction, reclamation, and connection (p. 77). As they navigate their history, he positions them as a diasporic group tracing connections and continuities between inequalities in El Barrio, New York and Puerto Rico.

Ultimately, by emphasizing how the Young Lords imagine and reconstruct their own history while addressing the structural obstacles they experienced, Wanzer-Serrano situates a
lens on critical genealogies within the lives of people of color on a global scale, including marginalization by the state, migration for greater stability, and the development of local organizations to provide social services and emphasize self-reliance. Furthermore, Wanzer-Serrano acknowledges and credits the influence of Black Power organizations that existed before the New York Young Lords and outlines many points of connection. However, he also provides a nuanced analysis of evolutions particular to the New York Young Lords.

Chapter Two offers a compelling analysis of the New York Young Lords’ platform on revolutionary nationalism. Although Wanzer-Serrano addresses some of the complications that arise with revolutionary nationalism (and transnational activism), he argues that for the New York Young Lords, nationalism produced norms in a shifting context and provided an alternate path where diasporas could engage (p. 74). He explores an important tension for the New York Young Lords as nationalism implies love for one’s country, whereas revolution speaks to uprooting. In the end, he documents how the New York Young Lords navigate differential consciousness where a sense of double consciousness is evoked, again speaking to critical genealogies within the lives of people of color.

In Chapter Three, Wanzer-Serrano praises the New York Young Lords for advancing a project of decoloniality by confronting sexism within the organization. He simultaneously highlights their “sometimes contradictory ideology” towards gender and sexual orientation, thereby providing a balanced critique (p.7). With rich ethnography, much from Kelly Oliver, the first woman to become a member of the New York Young Lords Central Committee, Wanzer-Serrano illustrates how women in the New York Young Lords experienced significant repression from within the organization while they worked to counter gender hierarchy. As a result of efforts by women such as Oliver, women were integrated into the New York Young Lords Central Committee. Additionally, previous New York Young Lords language in the *Palante* newspaper such as “revolutionary machismo,” which Oliver and others argued could not be revolutionary, was corrected (p. 103). Oliver recalls physical “discipline” by male members due to their pioneering work to create space for the voices of women within the organization. Wanzer-Serrano admits these were difficult stories for the interviewees to recount. However, to his credit, he concludes that it is important to bring to the center perspectives that had been marginalized, which may also serve future movements. The quantity and depth of the ethnography provided by the women and men in this chapter provide a valuable window into the New York Young Lords. Although ethnography is used throughout *The New York Young Lords and the Struggle for Liberation*, the overall text could have benefitted from the level of detail found in the ethnography featured in Chapter Three.

In Chapter Four, Wanzer-Serrano analyzes the garbage offensive as an act of civil disobedience and decolonial love that enabled the Young Lords to “call into question the logic of the system (coloniality) in such a way to open up a discursive space” (p.135). Frustrated with the filth in their neighborhoods, the New York Young Lords collected garbage as an act of self-reliance and as a critique of colonialism and capitalism. They also obstructed traffic with it when consistent and supportive services were denied by the city’s Sanitation Department. Wanzer-Serrano highlights the value of working neither at the margins nor the center in their negotiations with the Sanitation Department. Although the original goal of more consistent and supportive sanitation services was not attained, Wanzer-Serrano positions the garbage offensive as a success because of the critiques they offered and the new spaces that opened as a result. His emphasis on the success of the offensive provides a valuable intervention, especially in a
context where coloniality (or other such schemas) often work to define the standards.

Chapter Five extends an examination of the church offensive that took place about three months after the garbage offensive. At this point, the New Young Lords took a look inward and criticized spaces within the community, such as churches including the First Spanish Church, for not providing needed services (hosting free breakfast, etc). The New Young Lords took over the church for 11 days and labeled it “a liberated zone” that became a “political, social, artistic refuge for ‘the people’” (p. 154). Although short lived, Wanzer-Serrano analyzes the Young Lords elevation of “the people” as an act that privileged collectivism and interconnectedness that had a lasting impact. Given the hierarchical taxonomies of colonialism and capitalism, Wanzer-Serrano’s study of the church take-over and the new meaning given to “the people” highlights an important approach towards reclamation, resistance and resilience. The annotated bibliography in the Notes section at the end also provides a solid and engaging interdisciplinary resource.

Wanzer-Serrano states, “No scholarly monograph to date has focused sustained attention” on the New York Young Lords (p. 6). Toward this end, this text offers a significant contribution. Beyond filling a gap, however, Wanzer-Serrano succeeds in providing a model that works to “augment contemporary scholarly discussions of colonialism, nationalism, and vernacular discourse by mobilizing the Young Lords’ discourse and activism” (p.7).

In conclusion, Wanzer-Serrano contends that the historical recovery of stories of resistance continues to “remain useful and significant today, especially for Puerto Ricans and other Latino/as who continue to be politically disenfranchised” (p. 6). I agree. The stories told and lessons emphasized about United States hegemony and imperialism, transnational activism, cross-racial/ethnic/class alliances, gender inequality, delinking and decoloniality, are relevant beyond El Barrio in New York or the island of Puerto Rico, especially given Black Lives Matters and other movements that are creating new possibilities and spaces for activism and questioning what democracy means, within a “context of contemporary racial neoliberalism” (p. 175). In fact, the potential dialogues sparked from the text serve to connect El Barrio and the island to others in a critical and timely way. As such, *The New York Young Lords and the Struggle for Liberation* offers a tremendous contribution as an informative, cautionary, and inspirational text that would be beneficial to anyone interrogating and/or contesting various forms of coloniality.
One effect of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent American military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa was an increased amount of attention paid by academics and activists to the question of how the United States has historically operated as an imperial power and continues to do so. Studies such as Frederick Cooper and Craig Calhoun’s *Lessons of Empire*, Greg Grandin’s *Empire’s Workshop*, and Leo Panitch and Sam Gandin’s *The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire* have explicitly used the lens of empire to explain how the United States has deployed political, military and economic power to maintain its dominant global position. Meanwhile, activist movements like Ferguson to Palestine and Black-Palestinian Solidarity have drawn public attention to the links between America’s domestic racism and its support for imperialist policies abroad.

Students of African-American intellectual history might see a parallel between the centering of American imperialism and a linking of United States imperialism to American racism in present-day scholarly and activist circles with critiques that emerged during the Black Power era of the late 1960s and early 1970s. During this time, groups like the Black Panthers and activist intellectuals such as Stokely Carmichael and Martin Luther King voiced opposition to the Vietnam war in terms that linked, as King put it in his landmark 1967 speech “Why I Am Opposed to the War in Vietnam,” “the violence of the oppressed in the ghettos” with the United States’ history as “the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today.” Recent scholarly contributions such as Joshua Bloom and Waldo Martin’s history of the Black Panthers, *Black against Empire* and Peniel Joseph’s *Stokely: A Life* have contributed to demonstrating how Black radicals of the 1960s often saw American racism and American foreign aggression as two sides of the same coin, and how resistance to racism and imperialism often took shape within transnational networks.

In *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations*, Robert Vitalis, Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, makes a two-pronged argument about the relationship between racism and imperialism in American academia, specifically the scholarly field of international relations as it took shape in the first decades of the twentieth century. The first argument that Vitalis makes is that the field of international relations was, from its inception, driven by racist and imperialist conceptions that framed Blacks and other people of color, both in the United States and abroad, as a threat to a system of global white supremacy who needed to be correctly “managed.” The second argument is that a core group of Black intellectuals working in the discipline during its foundational period drew on ideas that circulated within the transnational intellectual and activist networks created by resistance to white supremacy and imperialism to challenge the core assumptions at the base of international relations scholarship. Both arguments draw attention to a blurring of the line between domestic and international manifestations of racism and how resistance to that racism was itself an inherently transnational phenomenon.

As an academic discipline, international relations came into being in the wake of the
peak of European imperialism, notably in Africa, and of American expansion in the Caribbean and the Philippines. Scholars, based in a variety of fields at leading universities and working in departments that had “evolutionary theory, social Darwinism and racial anthropology” as conceptual touchstones, saw the need for a “unique approach to the development of colonial administration and race subjugation.” International relations was the product of that need. A developmentalist approach to the management of colonized people would offer “the prospect of a more peaceful and prosperous white hegemony” and reduce the looming threat of “race war” that “preoccupied self-identified white elites” through the first half of the twentieth century (p.8).

Meanwhile, at Howard University, a group of scholars that Vitalis groups together as the “Howard School,” including Alain Locke, Ralph Bunche, E. Franklin Frazier, Rayford Logan, Eric Williams, and Merze Tate were the primary locus of dissent within the developing discipline. Working within and against a field predicated on ensuring the successful “tutelage” of “underdeveloped” people, these scholars stand out for their “early and relentless critiques of the supposed truths of racial science and the role racism played in sustaining imperialism” (p.12). The story of Tate, the first Black woman to earn a Ph.D. in international relations, is of particular importance. While Vitalis does not extensively discuss the ways in which gender operated as a unit of analysis within the discipline of international relations (recent scholarship on imperialism has focused on how gender, sexuality and reproduction were important concerns of the kind of colonial management that Vitalis puts at the center of his study), his account of Tate’s experiences reveals the gendered discrimination at work within academia, including on the part of rebel scholars like those of the Howard School.

Vitalis highlights how the ideas that developed within international relations and the intellectual challenges that the Howard School mounted against them took shape in response to and drawing upon the transnational networks developed by Black activists and intellectuals. In the years between the world wars, Harlem was home to a diverse group of Black activists, writers, musicians and artists that included both African-Americans and migrants from the Caribbean. Their intellectual, political and cultural work blurred the lines between America’s domestic racism and European imperialism in the West Indies and Africa. Scholars concerned about an impending “race war” that would threaten white hegemony saw Harlem and its vibrant Black communities as “the epicenter of [a] global biological threat” (p.1). International relations as a scholarly field thus emerged as a response to both overseas and domestic racial dynamics. Meanwhile, the Howard School academics fostered connections with anti-imperialist thinkers in Africa and its diaspora, creating what Vitalis calls a “critical counter-network to the networks forged by white intellectuals that supported institutions dedicating to upholding a world order based on white supremacy” (p.12).

White World Order, Black Power Politics is a valuable contribution to both the institutional history of political science and the intellectual history of the African diaspora. Vitalis’s meticulous research and clear argumentation should encourage scholars of political science to critically examine the intellectual foundations of their enterprise. Starting with the rise of Black Studies as an academic discipline in the late 1960s, scholars in literature, history, and anthropology departments have tentatively begun the work of modifying canons and syllabi in ways that incorporate the work of historically excluded groups like women and people of color and to tell their own histories in ways that account for academia’s historical role in reproducing racist concepts and practices both on and off campus. The continuing struggles of women and people of color in academia reveal that this is no easy task; as Vitalis writes, if he has “identified a weak point or two in the intellectual bulwark” of international relations scholarship it will
take a sustained “cooperative effort of critics on the periphery of the discipline and potential allies within the humanities” (p.180). The book stands out for how it critiques how institutions reproduce, often in an unconscious manner, the foundational assumptions of an academic discipline. Contemporary international relations scholars have done little to interrogate the imperialistic nature of American foreign policy or the racist foundations upon which their discipline was built (a situation that Vitalis blames in part on the lack of a critical mass of Black scholars in the field, especially as it grew during the Cold War era). This failure on the part of the discipline to address its racist history matters because academia reproduces core concepts – hidden as they may be – in succeeding generations of textbooks, lecture notes, and syllabi, and because the ideas emerging from the intellectuals and institutions of international relations play a dominant role outside the ivory tower in terms of shaping foreign policy.

Vitalis has also contributed to the vibrant and expanding scholarly study of radical Black transnational intellectual history by engaging with a largely-overlooked dimension of the work of important figures in the history of Black radical thought such as Locke, Williams and Bunche, showing how those thinkers worked within and against formal academic structures to criticize the racist and imperialist dynamics of international relations scholarship. In recent years, scholars including Martha Biondi (The Black Revolution on Campus) and Fabio Rojas (From Black Power to Black Studies) have drawn attention to how the incorporation of Black Studies programs into American universities in response to grassroots efforts by Black students was a critical legacy of the Black Power movement. Black Power, as a transnational intellectual, political and cultural movement, had part of its roots in the work of the scholars that Vitalis writes about (one example is the regular discussion of Eric Williams’s theory about the links between capitalism and slavery in the West Indian Black radical press in the 1960s and 1970s). White World Order, Black Power Politics shows how Black intellectuals’ critiques of the links between American racism, imperialism and academia have a long history with crucial implications for contemporary scholars and policy-makers.
Neil Roberts’ new book *Freedom as Marronage* seeks to answer two central questions: What concepts of freedom emerge out of a study of slavery, and what insights can contemporary political theorists glean from such an analysis of freedom and slavery? Roberts answers these questions by taking an analytical look at how enslaved persons in revolutionary Haiti used flight or *marronage* to successfully achieve freedom and independence.

The author begins by defining *marronage* as a group of persons who isolate themselves from a surrounding society to create a fully autonomous community or a community of freedom. Defining *marronage* in this way helps readers to understand that it was not just fugitive slaves who take flight from domination. In fact, modern day *marrons* such as Rastafarians also flee in order to build communities of freedom separate and apart from their Jamaican (Babylon) society. Roberts removes the idea of *marronage* from its historical prism by explaining how immigrants and refugees who are most often impoverished and politically, religiously and racially oppressed respond to top down repression by taking flight even today. He correctly concludes that immigrants often “…take flight to regimes of unfreedom” (p. 170). His analysis of flight and modern day maroons is also applicable to marginalized groups in other industrialized nations such as African Americans or Aborigines in Australia who use both psychological and physical flight to escape the top down oppression in their lives. In the author’s words it is by unlocking *marronage* from “…the grammar of historicism…” (p. 12) that past ideals about maroons and flight may be used to explain a trans-national political theory of freedom.

To best explain this new political theory of freedom, Roberts offers a new and exciting analysis of the relationship of slavery to freedom. He reviews the extant literature to reject the idea that slavery and freedom are inherently inert conditions enjoyed separate and apart from the other. Roberts finds that the well renowned historian John Hope Franklin, as well as the respected fathers of modern philosophy such as Hobbs, Berlin and Kant, all viewed slavery and freedom as inertia since they ignore flight in their theories on slavery and slave agency.

Thus, the author devotes substantial discussion to the ideas of Hannah Arendt and Frederick Douglass in order to highlight the significance of human agency in achieving freedom. He sees value in Arendt’s analysis of the American Revolution as the best example of non-sovereign humans successfully rejecting sovereignty as a result of a revolution. What Roberts has a problem with is her disavowal of American slavery during this period of political upheaval. That is, Arendt failed to address the over 400,000 enslaved African Americans who remained locked in American slavery despite the American Revolution. Some discussion of how enslaved persons in the southern colonies utilized flight in their quest for freedom during the American Revolution would have added to Roberts’ discussion of Arendt’s vision. He does a good job explaining why the American Revolution failed to build a foundation of freedom for all of citizens in the new nation. Clearly, the new republic took shape from a protracted vision of democracy which ignored the “…violence, blood, injury and terror” (p. 36) experienced by those held in racial slavery.

It appears that the ideas of Frederick Douglass, which are examined through the
teachings of Angela Davis, are more in line with Roberts’ theories about flight and freedom. Thus, he finds value in how Douglass, the slave, detailed his psychological and physical experiences in slavery including the violent encounter with a temporary master, Mr. Covey, known for his ability to break slaves (p. 74). According to Roberts, Douglass acknowledges feeling comparatively free after successfully whipping Covey, though not totally free because he was still someone’s property. The author contends that Douglass’ literary work remained too focused on the treatment of slaves as property and the state constitutional doctrines needed to abolish slavery for him to expand on how his own flight brought him closer to freedom.

Recognizing the dearth of scholarship on what occurs when slave fugitives like Douglass run away, Roberts explains that flight involves directional movement across a spatial distance to a new location such as moving from the plantation to the hills. By taking flight across a geographical landscape, slave fugitives begin the work of building communities that will protect them from violent and pursuing masters. It is in maroon communities where the actual transformational work of freedom must be done. Taking note of the theories of Frantz Fanon that the unfree exist in a state of non-being, Roberts explains that those who take flight remain suspended in a liminal and transitional social space between slavery and freedom. Just taking flight does not achieve immediate freedom for the runaway. Running to a new location offers freedom of movement and freedom of speech, as well as opportunities to engage in social and political activities unavailable within the confines of enslavement. Away from the violence and terror of plantation life, maroons will continue to struggle and assert their freedom. It is only in this isolated social space between slavery and freedom where natality, or new birth, takes place.

Importantly, it is this experience of natality and new birth in marronage that Roberts offers to challenge Orlando Patterson’s long respected theory of social death. He contends that since Patterson’s ideas about slavery and freedom are too Eurocentric and are grounded in elements of powerlessness, social dishonor and natal alienation they leave enslaved persons as socially irrelevant and excommunicated from culture and kinship connections. Unlike Patterson, Roberts is of the opinion that enslaved persons are able to use their psychological faculties to run from a place of negative domination to a sphere of positive activity and transformation called freedom.

Therefore, Robert finds it important to study and understand the life experience of those who take flight from slavery because it is in these socially isolated communities that the work of total liberation takes place. Simply put, just running away from slavery does not free a slave or those held in oppression because only the work of societal transformation makes one totally free and independent. It is not surprising that Roberts finds that the nation’s policies during Reconstruction fell short of extricating formerly enslaved persons from their enslaving colonizers. His discussion of W.E.B. Du Bois’ classic Black Reconstruction does recognize how the course of the Civil War was changed by enslaved blacks refusing to work and fleeing by the thousands to Union camps.

However, Roberts makes clear that the exercise of slave agency alone could not establish equality and political democracy for the millions of American slaves. More work needed to be done for emancipation. This is why Reconstruction remains an unfinished business or, in the words of Dubois, “the splendid failure” of the American nation (p. 48). In contrast, Roberts provides the example of the Le Maniel marron community under the leadership of Francois Makandal as the archetype of a socially isolated community where the work of liberation established an agricultural economy, defense, housing, legal codes, gender mores and modes
of governance. Such transformational work of this order resulted in Le Maniel being legally recognized as a maroon society apart from the slave society of Haiti, much like the well-known maroon communities that emerged in colonial Jamaica but, regrettably, are not given attention by the author.

On the other hand, Roberts centers his analysis of slavery and freedom on the Haitian Revolution, the only time in modern history when persons of African origin totally extricated themselves from slavery before building a free and independent nation. Roberts is clear that it was not the leadership of founding father Toussaint L’Ouverture that gave birth to an independent Haiti. In the chapter entitled *Sovereign Marronage*, Roberts explains how the sovereign leader’s vision fell short with an expectation that Haiti would become an assimilated colony of France. This, however, was not the political imaginary of the enslaved masses of Saint Dominque who took flight and violently destroyed the system of slavery. In the chapter *Sociogenic Marronage*, Roberts explains that it was the masses who envisioned a future free of chains. Remarkably, this small Caribbean island went about the business of nation building by first calling their nation “Haiti” (naming), announcing a new political order in the Haitian Declaration of Independence, and resisting sovereign leaders from Toussaint, Dessalines and Christophe who focused on returning Haitian peasants to the sugar fields (vèvè architectronics or the blueprint for freedom), to the writing of the 1805 Constitution (constitutionalism), and the organizing of Proto-constituent assemblies that allowed female citizens to participate (state of society). Roberts’ ideas on how the lived experience of marronage achieved political freedom are both new and refreshing. He does a superb job discussing how it was a non-sovereign imaginary of freedom that moved more than a half million African slaves to take flight from slavery and begin the business of building a new polity known as the nation of Haiti. In the words of Neil Roberts, the masses of Haiti dared to be free by themselves and for themselves.

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*Freedom’s Distant Shores* presents an intriguing collection of essays that address multiple transnational religious, cultural, and political connections between the U.S. and Africa. Chapters feature the work of religious studies scholars, theologians, missiologists, along with academics from communications and cultural studies. Collectively, the essays take churches in the postcolonial period as a category of analysis—one section of the book arranges churches in relation to democracy and another examines religious revival and expansion—and sets religious institutional bodies in relation to their political, social, and cultural contexts at once tracing historical developments after World War II and imagining possible futures. The book centers both the complex and contradictory convergences of religion and politics in America and in Africa.

The first section of chapters that address the question of democracy explore the role of print culture and politics, religious biography, and theology as a way to consider transnational religious life. Mark Hulsether’s chapter on the magazine *Christianity and Crisis* presents the various ways it addressed global inequality in theological and political fashions, at times paternalistically and in support of neoliberalism, while more recently it cast its lot with civil rights and antiwar campaigns, and even supported divestment measures in South Africa. Zeroing in on the life and impact of black Presbyterian clergy James H. Robinson, Sandra J. Sarkela and Patrick Mazzeo locate the Tennessee-born minister to a developed theology of African democratization that linked nationalism, a suffusion of Christianity and democracy, anticommunism, and transnational self-determination between African and American political actors. Robinson’s globetrotting travels, speeches, and sermons, the authors show, supported a global religious and political vision that inspired an international organization, Operation Crossroads Africa. Robinson’s organization fostered economic and racial equality both in the U.S. and across the African continent. In a parallel framework, Lewis Baldwin shows how Martin Luther King’s political theology related the black freedom struggle in the U.S. to the fight against apartheid in South Africa. In sermons and teachings, Baldwin documents how King attached inequality in Montgomery, Alabama, with racism in South Africa. Religious leaders across the world noted King’s global outlook and many religious and political elites united in a “coalition of conscience” (p. 53) under numerous institutional guises to proclaim connections between human dignity, economic opportunity, and political freedom. Importantly, Baldwin links the inspiration of contemporary South African liberation theology to King’s civil rights work and the political alliances he helped to form. Dwight Hopkins continues the volume’s focus on liberation theology. He traces a history between James Cone, one of North America’s foremost black theologians, and Allan A. Boesak, a counterpart liberation theologian in contemporary South Africa, along with the backstory of U.S.-South African theological alliances through several important theological consultations from the 1970s into the present. Hopkins shows that shared suffering at the hands of white, racist theology on the one hand, and “apartheid theology”
(p. 97) on the other, meant deep solidarity in transatlantic freedom struggles.

The latter essays that conclude the volume’s opening section center the intersection of gender equality and the Quaker tradition in Kenya, and Mennonite missionary endeavors in Angola. Stephen Angell uses the Quaker (also known as the Society of Friends) “testimony of equality” (111)—a sense of divine prompting as Friends teach it—to pursue concrete social and political change. Change came slowly, Angell documents, from 1902, when Quaker missions started in East Africa, and often conflicted with local Kenyan practices such as polygamy, ancestor veneration, and the dowry hampered the advancement of gender equality. Education, however, in concert with European and American participation, proved an important bridge in the realization of gender equality, and economic justice eventually strengthened the broader struggle for freedom in postcolonial Kenyan Quaker communities. While Mennonite missions began in Angola around the same time as Quaker activity in Kenya, Lutiniko Landu Miguel Pedro tracks a different historical trajectory of Angolan Mennonites by connecting their work to the nation’s independence struggles and civil wars, particularly in the 1970s and following. Although Mennonite work touched Burkino Faso, Ghana, and Nigeria in West Africa (and elsewhere on the continent), peace work and nation rebuilding most recently occupied Mennonite initiatives, along with “the spiritual and emotional reconstruction of the people” (p. 139).

Section two in many ways connects Pentecostal and Charismatic religious movements to the history of postcolonial Africa and post-Apartheid South Africa. One of R. Drew Smith’s two chapters narrates the posturing and politicking of American-based evangelists Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell, what he terms “opportunistic outreach” (p. 145), to postcolonial African regimes. American evangelists sought to advance televangelist ministries and economic investments, as in the case of Robertson in South Africa, Zaire, and Liberia, along with the conservative, anticommmunist ideology, which Falwell carried out in South Africa. Smith’s second chapter spotlights South Africa in particular to present the uneven history of denominational Christianity to both the support of colonial power, and in the postcolonial, post-Apartheid era ecclesiastical initiatives to broker racial and spiritual reconciliation despite a deep history of inequality. Finally, Matthews Ojo’s essay continues the volume’s transatlantic analysis with an investigation of U.S.-Nigerian ties in Pentecostal Christianity. He shows how Nigerian Pentecostals found U.S. Pentecostals important for theologies of prophecy, while American Pentecostals registered little political influence in Nigerian affairs. Other sources of Nigerian Pentecostal indigenous advancement included support for local, house-based congregations, massive megachurches, and far-reaching televangelist enterprises coupled with radio ministry that proffered a prosperity gospel that taught divine sanction for material accumulation. Collectively, Ojo links these trends to a wider attitude of “religious triumphalism” (p. 167) with decidedly social and political impacts throughout the nation as a whole.

The book’s final section contemplates future ecclesiastical relationships between the U.S. and Africa, and how the role of religion and politics might inform U.S.-South Africa relations. Marsha Snulligan Haney’s chapter covers a historical theory of missionary thought and various cultural approaches applied by Western missionary agencies and individuals in the quest to spread Christianity’s message. She concludes that the ideal approach both for today and in the future is the support of indigenous ideas and institutions, which are “best suited to provide the space to address current tensions and conflicts” in support of a “mission based on mutuality” (p. 196-197). Haney connects these perspectives to the foundational theoretical work on cultural and missionary history—studies by scholars such as Lamin Sanneh of Gambia—to emphasize
the multidisciplinary study and preparation necessary to pursue missionary engagement in the context of what she calls “cultural integrity of Christian partnerships” (p. 205) between U.S. and African religious groups. Nico Koopman’s chapter presents a U.S.-South Africa framework to consider the ways that “public theology” (p. 209) operates in both nations in the realms of churches, academic life, and broader social settings. Like the history of black theology in America, and liberation theology in Latin America, Koopman maintains that transatlantic linkages of public theology must address conjointly both economic and racial justice in the interest of “reciprocal learning” and full “existential participation” (p. 222) in society.

The essays in *Freedom’s Distant Shores* range from documentary based historical analysis to religious-based theological prescription. In this way, some essays are far more descriptive than analytical. This reflects different disciplinary aims between theology and history and political science, for example, more than it does the quality of the chapters. While the theological essays assume a transcendent reality, they remain readable without delving into impenetrable doctrinal minutia. Another aspect of the collection leading to an imbalanced feel is that nearly half of the essays deal with South Africa, to which the title does not adequately allude. At the same time, readers also learn about a diverse cast of Protestant groups, including Quakers, Mennonites, and Pentecostals. This volume captures key parts of a very broad and expansive story of U.S.-Africa relations in the realm of Protestant religion. Readers should note that *Freedom’s Distant Shores* appeared a decade ago, and therefore feels somewhat behind the scholarly times with respect to the massive amount of scholarship produced on world Christianity in recent years; however, this very accessible essay collection remains relevant for the important scholarship it both produced and anticipated. Although some historians, political scientists, and other social scientists may not find theology as a useful category of analysis, any scholar interested in contemporary African history and culture must be conversant with the religious and theological perspectives African actors find relevant in their social and political life to make sense of the continent’s broader historical totality.

In the decade since the appearance of Chandra Talpade Mohanty’s seminal intervention on feminist decolonization (*Feminism without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity* 2003), there has been a necessary and welcomed explosion of transnational feminist scholarship addressing women, gender, and human rights—recent studies which come to mind include AnaLouise Keating’s *Transformation Now!: Toward a Post-oppositional Politics of Change* 2013 and Leela Fernandes’ *Transnational Feminism in the United States: Knowledge, Ethics, Power* 2013. We can now add Sylvanna M. Falcón’s aptly titled *Power Interrupted: Antiracist and Feminist Activism inside the United Nations*, to the powerful voices advancing contemporary discourse(s) on transnational feminism and human rights. A most applauded addition and akin to Mohanty’s work, Falcón’s *Power Interrupted* contests the privileging of Western powers, epistemologies, and feminisms within the United Nations, especially concerning its work on human rights. *Power Interrupted* offers an historical analysis on the origins of the United Nations and its reluctance to include women in any significant way, paying special attention to women of color from the Americas. Primarily focused on the United Nations 2001 World Conference Against Racism, Durban (WCAR), Falcón’s text demonstrates the importance of Latina feminist activity in “advancing antiracist agenda at the UN” and how such a position is “diametrically opposed to the interests of the economically powerful” (p. 69). Falcón exposes what she calls the UN’s “paradoxical claims” by juxtaposing their promotion of peace with their practice of exclusion (p. 39). Ultimately, the book makes plain the ways in which feminists of color from the Americas not only interrupt power, but also validate alternative ways to practice power within the United Nations so as to not reify Western hegemony, imperialism, and Eurocentric (read white) feminism.

In the ardently thought-provoking and often stirring *Power Interrupted*, Falcón, a sociologist and assistant professor of Latin American and Latino Studies, sets out to reveal how feminist activists of color “advocate for a more comprehensive approach to understanding racism at the UN level” by offering a candid and, at times, caustic critique of Western feminism as practiced within the UN (p. 4). The book’s primary aim is to shift the “analytical lens” in order to make visible a “different set of women” whose antiracist activism alters our understandings of UN based feminism and the ways in which power may be exercised (p. 8). This shift is largely represented by transnational feminism. Analogous to AnaLoiuse Keating’s notion of post-oppositional theorizing, which is a multidirectional, multivoiced, and provocative dialogue used to enact transformation, transnational feminism encourages us to “[re]imagine human rights anew, then, requires the creation of new models of discursive production and practice” (p. 87). Broadly speaking, transnational feminism involves feminism across borders which decentralizes white Western feminism as *the* referential point and acknowledges differences regarding contexts, priorities, and positionalities in its feminist applications. *Power Interrupted*, for its expressed purpose, defines transnational feminism as a relational positionality and cross-border perspective practiced by a network of feminists who consider “the ways in which
movements and social actors denaturalize the nation-state by engaging in [global and local] activism” (p. 19-20). Under the umbrella of transnational feminism, the book presents three major assertions which help sustain and advance its critique regarding antiracist activism within the UN.

Falcón’s first assertion employs Cynthia Enloe’s concept of “reading power backwards and forwards,” which is a method for understanding the multidirectionality of power—paying special attention to the ways in which people resist hierarchical or top-down power practices. For example, Falcón’s demonstrates the importance of her notion of “reading power backward and forward” (p. 35, [sic]) by highlighting a “small group of feminists from Latin America who secured the legal rights of women to be represented and to participate at the UN” (p. 35). During the 1945 UN Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, the Latin American delegates proposed several amendments that were instrumental in guaranteeing that women would have equal representation, participation, and access to the United Nations (p. 48). Although led by this small group of feminists, the delegation was represented by women and men from Brazil, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, and Uruguay and such representation was itself considered radical at this time. The belief that women should have an equal voice in the UN’s decision making process represents reading power backward and forward by challenging the tradition notion that access to and the deployment of power are masculine endeavors. Furthermore, this transnational feminist intervention brings to light the critical contributions of Latina feminists not only in terms of gender but also in terms of race. By drawing attention to which women get to represent and voice UN agenda(s), these Latina feminists made visible the importance of race in in an attempt for more inclusion regarding feminist agenda (p. 48-50, p. 57-61).

Reading power backward and forward offers the book’s most powerful contribution and sets the groundwork for understanding transnational feminism’s influence in shaping human rights discourse in the United Nations. Once women gained equitable power within the UN, they were able to employ power backward and forward in a number of ways, including using their collective strength to resist “colonialist impulses” as represented by Western political dominance within the UN power structure. Moreover, the women contested the implementation and, later, the application of veto power by the permanent members of the UN Security Council, recognizing its very structure, much like the UN’s construction of citizenship, privileged the United States and other Western nations (p. 59). Furthermore, reading power backward and forward resulted in the UN’s public acknowledgement of the link between human rights and global political struggles in ways that were not possible prior to Latina feminists’ intervention (p. 54-55). Falcón’s adoption of reading power backward and forward signifies a paradigm shift within the United Nations and its relationship with its member nations.

While reading power backward and forward focuses on UN policies, laws, and amendments, Falcón’s second assertion, “constellations,” reminds us that the “ability of human rights to empower and give voice to the world’s racial minorities and colonial peoples depends on much more than the passage of laws and their enforcement by the courts” (p. 88). Reminiscent of Leela Fernandes’ argument on regimes of visibility (Transnational Feminism in the United States: Knowledge, Ethics, Power 2013), Falcón’s constellations continues her epistemological intervention and operates on three levels: first, as a legal apparatus which reveals how the UN promotes Western interests and the manner in which Latina feminists contests this privileging;
next, as a counterpart to create alternative knowledges based in feminists and antiracist politics; and finally, as a social praxis which reflects the practice of human rights in daily life (p. 82-83). Meanwhile, her final assertion, “new universalism of intersectionality,” champions a paradigm about racism which acknowledges “structural, institutional, systemic, geopolitical, and individual” differences when advocating human rights (p. 156). I find Falcón’s (re)introduction of intersectionality as the new universalism, rather than transnational feminism, a somewhat puzzling choice given that transnational feminism is inherently intersectional. Nevertheless, both of these assertions stress the importance of a multifarious approach to understanding human rights.

The only issue I would like to address is the study’s tendency toward romanticization of Latin American feminists and its hesitancy to criticize those feminists. For example, Falcón praises Brazilian feminist Bertha Lutz’s leadership regarding gender equity within the UN (p. 51); however, Lutz is largely decontextualized outside of her relationship to the UN. The text offers the reader very little Brazilian socio-historical and national context and this absence is especially noticeable given Brazil’s post-War World II Movimento Negro (Black Movement) and its black citizens’ quest for human rights. It would be interesting to know how these feminists reconciled their national quest for human rights with their global activism in the UN. For instance, how would Lutz reconcile her suffrage activism at home with the civil rights activities that were occurring simultaneously? This type of analysis is not offered nearly enough and when presented, it is far too brief. However, when Falcón does engage in this type of criticism, *Power Interrupted* elevates its argument and the reader is privy to a depth and complexity which only enhances the book’s overall outstanding critique. For instance, Falcón solidly contextualizes Minerva Bernardino of the Dominican Republic and addresses her participation in Rafael Trujillo’s dictatorship regime and his racist, anti-Haitian policies and practices (p. 59). Falcón castigates Bernardino’s decision to participate in racial discrimination rather than inclusive feminism at the UN. This criticism allows the text to extend its analysis beyond the UN’s noticeable exclusion of global black women (such as Falcón’s examination of Mary McLeod Bethune’s absence) and into a complex transnational feminist critique regarding which women’s bodies matter, as well as where and how they matter.

Nonetheless, *Power Interrupted* is a vital intervention and provides to be an impressive theoretical contribution to the discourses of women studies, transnational feminism, and intersectionality. Furthermore, it works perfectly as a reminder and an invitation to other scholars to re-read, re-think, and re-write the role of power in various feminist histories and arenas.
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Invitation to the Scholarly Community

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