Prosocial behavior and reputation: When does doing good lead to looking good?
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Abstract
One reason people engage in prosocial behavior is to reap the reputational benefits associated with being seen as generous. Yet, there isn’t a direct connection between doing good deeds and being seen as a good person. Prosocial actors are often met with suspicion and sometimes castigated as disingenuous braggarts, empty virtue-signalers, or holier-than-thou hypocrites. In this article, we review recent research on how people evaluate those who engage in prosocial behavior and identify key factors that influence whether observers will praise or denigrate a prosocial actor for doing a good deed.

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Context
This article examines how people judge those who act generously, contribute to charity, or engage in prosocial behavior.¹ Historically, the study of selfless behavior has centered around what drives people to do good deeds at a cost to the self [1,3,4]. We diverge from this past debate by examining observer perceptions of those who act generously. What are the reputational consequences of doing good deeds?

At first blush, the answer might seem straightforward: Observers praise selflessness and generosity, and they confer respect, gratitude, trust, and status upon those who sacrifice to help others [4–7]. But a closer look reveals that reactions to good deeds are not universally positive. Do-gooders are often met with suspicion and are sometimes cast as disingenuous braggarts, empty virtue-signalers, or holier-than-thou hypocrites.

When are individuals praised for doing good deeds, and when are they denigrated? The present article addresses this question both by illustrating recent contributions made in the literature and highlighting areas for future research. In doing so, we focus our attention on ‘charitable credit’ — the extent to which good deeds earn (or fail to earn) praise and associated attributions of moral character. Our central argument is that individuals allocate charitable credit in accordance with the perceived purity of an actor’s motives. In the following sections, we outline the various factors that influence how motives are assessed, and consequentially, how reputation is afforded to those who do good deeds.

Motives matter
While actors are often praised for their good deeds, there isn’t a direct connection between doing a good deed and receiving credit for it. Rather, observers care deeply about a prosocial actor’s underlying motives: did the actor really care about helping others, or were they motivated — at least in part — by a desire to help themselves?

Theories of costly signaling argue that observers judge the motives of others by the extent to which they are willing to sacrifice to accomplish a goal [8,9]. Consistent with this notion, the more actors are seen as sacrificing when helping (e.g. by donating more money or exerting more effort), the more favorably they are evaluated [10–12].

However, even seemingly costly good deeds are sometimes met with suspicion. Observers typically assume that actors are ultimately motivated by self-interest [13] and will often re-construe ostensibly selfless actions as

¹ Although these terms have slightly different connotations, we use them interchangeably to signify situations in which actors incur a cost to the self to increase social welfare, regardless of if the actor were to subsequentially benefit from the action. Prototypical acts include volunteering, donations to charity, or engaging in prosocial behavior. We do not focus on acts of generosity within personal relationships (e.g. doing favors or giving gifts), in which there is an expectation or opportunity for the recipient to reciprocate [1,2].
having an underlying ulterior motive [14,15]. For instance, the longer individuals are given to contemplate why a philanthropist gave to charity, the more likely they are to spontaneously come up with reasons why the philanthropist was secretly self-interested [16].

This motive cynicism is often triggered when observers detect selfish incentives in an actor’s environment that could account for their choice to do good. Even the slightest hint that an actor was selfishly incentivized for helping can lead observers to discount their generosity [17]. For instance, observers may infer that an actor who accepts a thank-you gift in exchange for a donation was motivated to contribute to receive the gift rather than from a pure desire to help. In some cases, actors who seem to have ulterior motives are judged to be less moral than if they had not helped at all [18].

Although selfish rewards and charitable credit are typically at odds, emerging research suggests that extrinsic benefits and positive attributions can sometimes co-occur, particularly when selfish rewards appear to be incidental to the actor’s decision [19]. Those who seem like they would have performed a good deed regardless of if they were rewarded for it are still praised for their generosity [20]. Such judgments seem to be tied to counterfactual reasoning processes [21]. When assessing prosocial actors, observers often consider whether the actor would have performed a good deed if the incentive had not been present. The easier it is to imagine an actor doing good in the absence of an incentive, the more credit they receive. Similarly, when observers are reminded that prosocial actors with selfish motives could have chosen not to help at all, observers are more willing to give ‘partial credit’ to those actors [18].

Beyond accounting for incentives, observers also decipher motives from features of the actor’s decision-making process. For example, the more time actors spend considering whether to do a good deed, the more they are assumed to be conflicted and the less credit they receive [22].

Motive ambiguity and do-gooder derogation

Motives can also be inferred from social context. More original or unusual forms of prosocial behavior are considered more diagnostic of pure motives than those that are more socially normative or expected [23,24]. In addition, those who help higher-powered individuals are met with greater suspicion than those who help lower-powered ones [25].

Are emotions selfish?
The logic of altruism suggests that any selfish incentive should be sufficient to taint a selfless act. Is this true for emotional incentives such as feeling a ‘warm glow’ from performing a good deed?

Philosophers, psychologists, and economists have all argued that emotional reasons for giving are self-gratifying, and therefore ought to be met with suspicion [30–32]. However, laypeople hold a more positive view of the role of emotions in prosocial behavior. Whereas observers discount prosocial behavior motivated by material or reputational benefits, emotional reasons for giving do not provoke the same cynicism.

Rather, the more a prosocial actor shows positive emotions alongside doing good deeds (e.g. via facial expressions, verbally communicating emotions to others), the more altruistic that actor is perceived to be [12,33,34]. This is because emotions are seen as a direct signal of an actor’s underlying feelings about their desire to help [33,35–37]. In fact, those who are driven to help by emotional pull are thought to be more moral than those who decide to help through deliberation [38,39]. Still, questions pertaining to how actor emotions impact perceptions of charity are not fully settled, as research finds that emotions in certain situations (e.g. assuaging one’s guilt for doing bad deeds) can be associated with selfishness [40,41].

Generosity and self-promotion

Doing good can only improve an actor’s reputation if others know about it. Yet, advertising one’s generosity is a risky proposition. There exist strong norms that good deeds should be anonymous, and those who tell others about their generosity are often seen as disingenuous self-promoters [42–45].

Talking about one’s generosity sends two opposing signals. It communicates that a good deed has been
performed, which signals selflessness, but it also suggests the actor may want credit for their good deed, which signals self-interest. As a result, self-promotion can increase or decrease perceptions of generosity depending on observers’ prior knowledge about the good deed or the individual doing it. The less information that observers have about a prosocial actor, or the more they have previously assumed an actor to be selfish, the more self-promotion can help because it causes observers to update their beliefs about the actor’s tendency to do good deeds. However, if observers are already aware of an actor’s tendency to do good, self-promotion can backfire because it no longer communicates new information and simply raises skepticism that the actor had ulterior motives [42].

Still, there are ways for individuals to communicate their generosity while minimizing reputational risks. For one, prosocial actors can subtly signal generosity to select others, perhaps by telling just a few close acquaintances [46,47]. Such targeted communication can convey selflessness to key observers without provoking the inference that one wants to improve their reputation more generally. Moreover, these select others may, in turn, brag on behalf of the generous actor. Self-promoters can also invite others to help the cause, thereby providing an altruistic justification for their brag and decreasing suspicion regarding their motives [41].

The more normative it is to brag about one’s good deeds, the more others might feel social pressure to act in kind [47,48], so the distaste people show toward those who advertise their good deeds may ultimately do more social harm than good. Specifically, discouraging individuals from talking about their good deeds might inhibit the formation of a ‘culture of giving’ in which individuals proudly signal their generosity to encourage others to join the cause [49]. It may also prevent people from learning about worthy causes or ways to help.

One possible solution is for sufficiently high-status givers to visibly challenge or dare others to help as was done with the Giving Pledge, a campaign that encourages billionaires to publicly pledge most of their wealth to charity. In turn, those responding to such a challenge are given an excuse for communicating their good deeds publicly, both because they were publicly challenged to do so in the first place and because they can pass along the same challenge to others. However, such attempts to make donations more public may be met with resistance. People may not want to feel added pressure to explicitly compete with others over their generosity.

**Little credit for impact and effectiveness**

If the goal of donating to charity is to help others, then individuals should presumably receive more credit when their good deeds achieve more benefits. But, at least descriptively, this does not seem to be the case. Rather, charitable credit is much more sensitive to how much an actor gains or sacrifices while doing a good deed than how much the act benefits others [11,12,50,51]. Consistent with costly signaling theory, the sacrifices actors endure in the course of helping represent a more trustworthy indicator of underlying character than benefits achieved [11].

Another possible reason why observers do not give credit in accordance with impact is that social benefits are difficult to evaluate [53–57]. Such explanations draw on cognitive arguments that people are scope insensitive [56,57] or that they lack a frame of reference by which to evaluate how much good should result from any given good deed or donation to charity [53,54]. When benefits are easy to compare, individuals do judge others in accordance with the amount of good deed performed [12,58]. However, even when benefits are comparable, people still prioritize degree of sacrifice over benefits achieved [11].

Further evidence of impact-insensitivity can be seen in observer reactions to donations of money. Monetary donations are fungible and, therefore, particularly effective at delivering benefits [59]. Yet, observers give more credit to those who donate goods or volunteer time rather than those who give money, as these seem to signal greater emotional investment and communal intention [60,61]. Expenditures of time and effort are also considered a stronger indicator of strength of desire than expenditures of money [62].

Ultimately, what seems to matter most is whether an actor chose to do good at all [51]. While some work has found little difference in perceived generosity per dollar amount donated [12,51], other work has found that observers do care how much a donor gives when their wealth is known [63] or when differences in the amount given are large [11]. Thus, it appears that individuals primarily give credit in accordance whether someone chose to help, less so to how much that actor sacrificed while helping and even less so in accordance with benefits achieved.

**Obligations to personal relations**

One complicating factor that affects how actors are judged by others concerns whether they are donating to a cause that benefits a close personal relation. Recent theories of morality suggest that people see others as obligated to help close personal relations over distant strangers [64,65]. Despite these obligations, or perhaps because of them, prosocial actors are afforded less credit when they donate to causes that benefit close others,

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2 However, some work shows that the more social benefits that prosocial actors provide, the more competent they are perceived to be. In contrast, degree of personal sacrifice does not seem to impact perceived competence [52].
doing so is seen as relatively selfish compared to helping strangers [40,66]. At the same time, helping a stranger instead of helping a close other is seen as a violation of one’s commitments and obligations, which can also damage one’s reputation [66,67]. Understanding the role of relationship-specific obligations in judgments of selfless behavior is still nascent and represents an emerging area of research.

**Future directions: strengthening norms around giving?**

The research reviewed here examines how individual do-gooders are judged by observers. However, some of the most challenging questions concern how to use reputational incentives to strengthen norms around giving. Indeed, if one major reason why individuals do good deeds is to reap reputational rewards [51], then how can we use what we know about the psychology of moral credit to engender a ‘culture of giving’?

Currently, societal norms about how much people ought to sacrifice and which causes people ought to support are weak. Most people see charitable giving as an inherently personal and subjective decision, not one that should be dictated by external forces [58]. In this sense, prosocial behavior is often considered supererogatory (good to do, but optional) rather than obligatory in most contexts. Although people have some ideas about how much they and others should be contributing, these judgments are often vague and self-serving. For example, most people believe that they themselves are excused from donating anything beyond a trivial amount of money to charity, instead arguing that the burden ought to fall on those earning more money than themselves [68].

Strengthening norms around giving likely requires making prosocial behavior more visible so that people feel more social pressure to give and so that do-gooders feel some sense of competition over being generous [69,70]. But people may resist such changes. At present, many who do good deeds are hesitant to talk about them [48,71], and those who make their generosity public run the risk of being targeted as disingenuous [42–45]. Furthermore, people are generally resistant to being told they have costly obligations — such as taxes [72]. The introduction of stronger norms around giving may also affect the reputational dynamics associated with doing good deeds. For instance, in situations where there is a clear expectation for how much people ought to help, actors are not praised for going above and beyond [73,74].

Can observers be taught to credit impact instead of motives? What might encourage do-gooders to talk about their good deeds and call on others to join them?

How can we leverage social agreements like pledges, public challenges, and wagers to boost generosity? Answers to such questions will help identify steps to create a culture of giving and improve long-term welfare for the world at large.

**Conflict of interest statement**

Nothing declared.

**References**

Papers of particular interest, published within the period of review, have been highlighted as:

- of special interest
- **of outstanding interest**


Observers judge the moral character of prosocial actors much more in accordance with the amount that the actor sacrificed compared to how they should be contributing, these judgments are often vague and self-serving. For example, most people believe that they themselves are excused from donating anything beyond a trivial amount of money to charity, instead arguing that the burden ought to fall on those earning more money than themselves [68].


Judge actors less positively if they are motivated to reap material or emotional benefits when doing good deeds. In contrast, observers judge actors more positively if they are motivated to reap benefits.

Meat-eaters evaluate vegetarians negatively in part because they evaluate them negatively in part because they expect vegetarians to eat meat.

Observers give greater charitable credit to actors that are first to engage in a specific type of prosocial action. Prosocial followers are seen as less purely motivated and receive less credit for their good deeds.

In contrast, observers judge actors less positively if they are motivated to reap emotional benefits when doing good deeds. In contrast, observers judge actors less positively if they are motivated to reap material or reputational benefits when doing good deeds.

Socio-economically disadvantaged minorities are more likely to punish altruistic others in part because they feel that their reputation is afforded to those who commit good deeds.

When it pays to be kind: the pursuit of the greater good. On the other hand, they signal that they have done a good deed which increases perceptions of generosity.

Altruism does not always lead to a good outcome. Some people are more likely to punish those who do the good deed.

The desire to expel unselfish members from the group.


Actors who tell others about their good deeds send two conflicting signals regarding their generosity. On the one hand, they inform others that they have done a good deed which increases perceptions of generosity. On the other hand, they signal that they did the good deed in part to obtain reputational benefits which decrease perceptions of generosity.

The psychology of (in)authenticity aversion: moral reactivity toward tainted actors, actions, and objects. Connu Perspect Psychol 2021, 4:70–82.

Those who deliberate on which charity to donate to are afforded less charitable credit.

The authors argue that the reason why prosocial behavior is so often ineffective is because reputation is afforded to those who commit good deeds.

The life you can save: how to do your part to end world poverty. The Life You Can Save; 2009.

The psychology of (in)authenticity aversion: moral reactivity toward tainted actors, actions, and objects. Connu Perspect Psychol 2021, 4:70–82.


23. Kraft-Todd GT, Rand DG: Rare and costly prosocial behaviors are perceived as heroic. Front Psychol 2019, 10:234.


26. Meat-eaters evaluate vegetarians negatively in part because they expect vegetarians to eat meat.

27. Relatively selfish individuals are more likely to punish altruistic others in situations involving competitive partner selection compared to situations when competitive partner selection is absent.


Actors who help strangers are judged to be more moral than actors who help their kin. However, actors who prioritize their kin over strangers are deemed to be more moral than actors who prioritize strangers over their kin.


