# Language and (not) Voting: 2017 Municipal Elections in Quebec

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In electoral contexts characterized by sociodemographic heterogeneity, or group identities, we know that such differences can have prominent effects on participation and vote choice. For instance, a range of comparative and cross-national work demonstrates that the presence of linguistic heterogeneity undermines turnout in elections (e.g. Anderson and Paskeviciute 2006; Kaniovski and Mueller 2006; Sandovici and Listhaug 2009). These findings demonstrate the importance of understanding the sociodemographic differences that exist in societies in order to best understand both electoral participation and choice.

We wish to extend the study of group heterogeneity and voter behaviour to the municipal level of government. In particular, we want to examine whether linguistic heterogeneity has a more or less prominent effect on turnout in a relatively less important, lower information electoral context. We address this question in the context of the 2017 municipal elections in Montreal and Quebec City using a two-wave survey that is part of the Canadian Municipal Election Study. Using objective indicators and subjective perceptions of linguistic heterogeneity, we estimate the effects on turnout in the mayoral and council elections. Given the greater media attention paid to mayoral candidates, examining both offices provides us with some leverage on the question of how information contexts affect the importance of sociodemographic cleavages for political behaviour.

A great deal of research examines how political behaviour is shaped by context. We, as individuals, do not make our choices in a vacuum; we are influenced by those around us and the circumstances in which we find ourselves. Early studies of vote choice (e.g., Lazarsfeld et al. 1948) found that our social characteristics were very important determinants of our vote choices. Others have found that our social interactions, or who we talk to about politics, has important implications for our attitudes and behaviours (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987; Huckfeldt 1984; Huckfeldt, Plutzer and Sprague 1993; Huckfeldt et al. 1995; Zuckerman and Kroh 2006; Zuckerman, Valentino and Zuckerman 1994; Zuckerman, Dasović and Fitzgerald 2007). Types of behaviours affected include political learning, tolerance, discussion and political activity.

Knowing that social context matters, many scholars have considered whether the composition of a community is relevant. Community heterogeneity can take many forms – from partisan attitudes to social class to ethnicity. Taking stock of the existing literature reveals that there is no simple answer to whether community heterogeneity has positive or negative effects on political engagement. The results suggest both, with important nuances for the type of heterogeneity. Indeed, on the one hand diversity can increase competition which can spur engagement (Cox and Munger 1989; Blais 2000), while on the other hand disagreement can introduce ambivalence and social accountability that depresses involvement (Mutz 2002; McClurg 2006).

In this paper we wish to focus on one type of heterogeneity and one type of behaviour. We examine linguistic diversity in the province of Quebec, Canada, a context in which language is very important and politicized, and turnout. We make use of Census data on linguistic diversity and municipal election surveys in two cities, Montreal and Quebec City, which have very different levels of linguistic diversity, to investigate the presence of mobilizing or marginalizing effects related to the linguistic heterogeneity of one's neighbourhood. Our analysis reveals that linguistic diversity matters, at the aggregate level, but does not have significantly different effects on different language groups. Given the importance of the language cleavage in Quebec, our results raise questions about the way that linguistic heterogeneity affects (or does not affect) societies.

## Theories of Heterogeneity and Political Participation

The literature that has examined the effect of heterogeneity on political participation has basically two (competing) tracts. On the one hand, there is an expectation that heterogeneity will have a positive, mobilizing effect on participation. The mobilization hypothesis can be traced to two different logics. One is competition. In a fight for scarce resources, such as political power, greater heterogeneity means that the groups are more evenly matched and there is greater chance of losing benefits if other groups mobilize effectively. In terms of partisan heterogeneity, this means that in communities that are evenly divided in party support there is an incentive for people to turn out to vote when the outcome is likely to be close because the chance of affecting that outcome is greater. Furthermore, in such situations there is likely to be increased campaigning as groups escalate their attempts to mobilize members. Therefore, heterogeneity can increase

participation because campaign resources mobilize more members. This view of the mobilization hypothesis can be found in Cox and Munger (1989) and Blais (2000).

The other logic that leads to a hypothesis of mobilization is one of increased information. In diverse communities there is a greater likelihood of being exposed to countervailing information. When confronted with new ideas, people can be spurred to learn more, pay attention and get involved. Scheufele et al. (2004) argue that disagreement in one's social network increases political engagement by promoting political learning and hard news media use. DeSante and Perry (2016) note that political knowledge increases when the size of the minority group increases, even for non-voters. Moving to political activities, Harell et al. (2009) find that political diversity promotes participation among young people, which they hypothesize is related to an increase in political knowledge, discussion and interest that comes from having a diverse social context. Similarly, Quintelier et al. (2012) finds that diversity is related to an increase in the participation of young people in Belgium.

On the other hand, some research argues that heterogeneity can decrease political participation. The literature on social networks suggests two important mechanisms: social desirability and ambivalence (Mutz 2002, 2006). Social desirability affects one's willingness to express political views in mixed company – that is, amongst those who do not necessarily agree. Ambivalence is related to the absorption of competing information that can lead citizens to be uncertain about their political stances, and in turn less likely to engage. Nir (2005) demonstrates that individual-level ambivalence is relevant for political participation.

There are also nuances to these arguments. First, there is the matter of social capital. Similar people tend to coalesce together and form communities. This increases social capital, understood as trust amongst individuals and cooperation, and in turn increases political participation (Putnam 1993; Nakhaie 2006). As voting is a social experience, when neighbours and household members participate they encourage participation amongst others (Buton et al. 2012). It has also been demonstrated that social pressure (or even threats thereof) can increase voter turnout (Gerber et al. 2008). Heterogeneity in a society works against these impulses. Putnam (2007) suggests that ethnic diversity, at least in the short run, leads groups to separate from each other or "hunker down." This is the marginalization hypothesis. The more isolated groups are from each other, the less likely they are to engage in community behaviours. Hill and Leighley (1999) suggest that the relationship between diversity and lower turnout in the US is related to weaker mobilization. Anderson and Paskeviciute (2006) find supportive evidence with data from 44 countries in terms of the quality of civil society being affected by heterogeneity, but that there is variation across measures. In particular, they find that linguistic heterogeneity is related to more organizational involvement but less trust, and that these values further vary by the type of democracy. Bellettini et al. (2016) find that ethnic and economic inequality depressed neighbourhood turnout in the 2004 and 2009 local elections in Italy, which they attribute to weaker social cohesion.

An important nuance to the idea of heterogeneity decreasing political capital and therefore participation is that the density of the group is very important. Fieldhouse and Cutts (2008) find that the population density of Asians in the UK matters for turnout, with the effect that Asian turnout increases while non-Asian turnout in the same communities decreases. Their work in 2010, comparing the US and the UK, similarly points to the importance of identifying both diversity and density. They also note, however, that standard influences on turnout, such as socioeconomic standing, remain relevant and need to be taken into account when looking at the effects of diversity. Marschall and Stolle (2004) further investigate the differential effects on majorities and minorities in communities. Looking at blacks and whites, they find that social trust is created differently in the two groups: whites tend to develop less generalized trust in low status neighbourhoods, whereas generalized trust increases for blacks when they live in contexts that provide close interactions with a broad sample of people.

The variation in findings in the literature, especially between groups, points to the need to look at the individual level to best understand the effects of heterogeneity. If some groups are mobilized and other marginalized, simply looking at aggregate turnout does not tell us much about the specific effects of heterogeneity. There is also the issue of related socioeconomic factors. If a community is highly diverse but there is significant poverty in one group, what looks like a negative effect of diversity on participation could actually be an effect of resources (Fieldhouse and Cutts 2010). Geys (2006) did a metanalysis of turnout studies and found significant variation in the results for heterogeneity. While he was able to point to a finding "on balance," by no means do the studies all agree and looking at the big picture misses some important variation.

The results reported above, and indeed the study of the effects of heterogeneity in the greater literature, has encompassed many different countries and groups. In this paper, we wish to add to this body of literature by focusing on Quebec, the only French-speaking province in Canada, a bilingual country, and considering the effects of diversity in two different communities – Montreal and Quebec City.

## Language Diversity in Quebec

Issues of diversity are important in the Quebec context. Most importantly, as a "distinct society" and "nation within a united Canada" (the latter declared in a parliamentary motion by former Prime Minister Stephen Harper in 2006), Quebec has a unique imperative to be concerned about heterogeneity in society. In order to protect the Quebecois culture, the government (especially since the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s) has attempted to keep control over non-French influences. This became clear with the passing of Bill 101 in 1977, which made French the official language of the province and made it illegal to have signs in any language other than French.

The relevant attitude is that the French culture and language needs to be preserved, and this has influenced opinions about immigration. Turgeon and Bilodeau (2014) found support for a "linguistic insecurity hypothesis", in that feeling that French was threatened was associated with preferring fewer immigrants among Quebecois. Similarly, a 2017

CROP poll found that 67% of Quebecois were in favour of new immigrants adopting Canadian culture, compared to 60% in the rest of the country, and that attitudes toward Muslims were similarly divided (Hinkson and Laframboise 2017).

Given the salience of language for the French culture, the degree of linguistic heterogeneity in a community is likely to be a key factor in political participation for many of the reasons discussed above. In particular, one can imagine that social capital/cohesion is likely to be affected by the presence of large groups of non-Francophones, such that linguistic diversity is likely to negatively affect participation in Quebec. Because of the relatively small size of both the Anglophone and Allophone communities, as well as the substantial bilingual population, it is doubtful that there is any real campaign activity related to mobilizing non-Francophones, so the mobilization hypothesis is questionable.

For greater purchase on the issue of language heterogeneity and political participation, we focus in this paper on two very different municipalities in Quebec – Montreal and Quebec City. The province of Quebec is very francophone - 79% report French as their mother tongue and 94.5% either know French or both French and English. Only 46% report knowing only English and 0.9% only a different language (Statistics Canada 2017). The cities, however, vary on the linguistic heterogeneity spectrum. The Montreal area has many anglophone Quebecois (many with very long roots in the province), while Quebec City is predominantly francophone (65.9% French mother tongue vs. 94.8%). In Quebec City, only 0.2% know only English and 0.3% know neither French nor English, and 38.9% have knowledge of both official languages. In contrast, in Montreal 7.1% know only English, 1.6% neither English nor French, and 55.1% have knowledge of both official languages (Statistics Canada 2017).

The stark linguistic contrast between the two cities leads to the expectation that diversity in Quebec City should have less of an effect on voting behaviour than in Montreal. Simply put, because there are so few non-Francophones, the effects of community social capital are unlikely to be realized.

However, as noted above in the work of Fieldhouse and Cutts (2008, 2010) and Marschall and Stolle (2004), the behaviour of the minority and majority linguistic groups may vary. We can expect, then, that the issue of density becomes extremely important when considering the behaviour of minority language groups. Given the small size of the groups in Quebec City, one might expect the marginalization hypothesis to be relevant. On the other hand, given that there are more non-Francophones in Montreal (and the long history of Anglophones there), the opportunity for community organizations and social networking among Anglophones or Allophones is much greater. Therefore, we hypothesize there may be a mobilization effect on the voting behaviour of non-Francophones in Montreal. Considering the francophone populations in particular, the literature suggests that the majority group in a community with high heterogeneity often has weaker participation. In Montreal, we expect to find that Francophones who perceive diversity would be less likely to vote. However, in Quebec City, given the small threat posed by the small number of non-francophone electors, we expect no effect.

To summarize, our generation expectation is:

H1. Linguistic diversity is more likely to affect turnout in Montreal than Quebec City.

Taking into account language groups and their density, we expect:

H2. Minority language group members will be more likely to vote as they perceive greater linguistic diversity in Montreal.

H3. Francophones will be less likely to vote as they perceive greater linguistic diversity in Montreal.

H4. Minority language group members will be less likely to vote as they perceive greater linguistic diversity in Quebec City.

H5. Turnout amongst Francophones in Quebec City will be unaffected by perception of linguistic diversity.

## Data and Methods

The data we use in this paper come from two sources: the Canadian Municipal Election Study (CMES) and the 2016 Canadian Census. All individual-level data come from the CMES. Because the CMES asked respondents to list the first three digits of their postal code we were able to merge Canadian Census data by Forward Sortation Area (FSA) to provide objective measures of neighbourhood linguistic diversity for each respondent.

Our main variable of interest in this paper is linguistic diversity. There are benefits and disadvantages to using either objective or subjective measures of linguistic diversity and we are in the fortunate position to have data for both kinds of measures. Using perceptions of diversity would be in keeping with McDonald and Tolbert (2012), who find that perceptions of competitiveness affected turnout behaviour more than factual information. However, people may not be aware of what contextual information shapes their behaviours and beliefs, such that objective data is a better measure of real-life experience. Therefore, we consider both types of measures in our analyses.

Our objective measure of linguistic diversity comes from Canadian Census data for each respondent's FSA. For each valid FSA reported in our individual-level sample, we code the proportion of individuals who are Francophone, Anglophone and Allophone. From this, we calculated a measure of linguistic diversity using the Herfindahl Index of Dissimilarity.[1] This produces values for each FSA between 0 and 1 where smaller (larger) values indicate less (more) linguistic diversity. For Montreal, the index scores ranged from 0.06 to 0.70 with an FSA average of 0.49, in Quebec they ranged from 0.02 to 0.27 with an FSA average of 0.14. This confirms the aggregate information – Montreal is more diverse than Quebec. For each city, the objective diversity index is recoded into quartiles.

The CMES survey also asked a relatively fine-grained subjective measure about linguistic diversity in one's neighbourhood. The question read: "With respect to the

[1] Herfindahl Index of Dissimilarity=$1-(\sum(\text{Francophone})^2+ (\text{Anglophone})^2+ (\text{Allophone})^2)$

following characteristics, how diverse would you say your neighbourhood is? Linguistically (very diverse, fairly diverse, not very diverse, not at all diverse, don't know/prefer not to answer)".

We also have measures of respondent language. As we expect different reactions to linguistic diversity depending upon one's own linguistic group, we created variables for Francophones, Anglophones and Allophones from first responses to the question: "What is the first language you learned and still understand?"

Our dependent variable is turnout. We look at both mayoral turnout and city council turnout in Montreal and Quebec, as individuals do not have to mark both ballots. We also look at borough mayoral contests in Montreal, which are much more decentralized and likely to better reflect more diverse community interests. These behaviours were probed with a question that first asked about voting in general and included options that would allow people to indicate they did not but had considered it or usually did, to provide options that would decrease the social desirability bias related to the question (see Morin-Chassé et al. 2017 for more information about the measure). A follow-up question for those who indicated voting asked respondents to indicate whether they voted in the race for mayor and council.[2]

The level of information and degree of familiarity with these different offices and the competing candidates likely varies greatly. Mayoral contests are well-publicized and can structure municipal elections in Quebec because council candidates often run as part of mayoral "equipes". For example, the former mayor of Montreal led "Équipe Denis Coderre pour Montreal", which drew council candidates from other municipal parties as well as independent incumbents and new candidates. Much like parties at other levels of government, the ones in Quebec announce party platforms and the mayoral candidate expects support from his party members when in office. On the other hand, elections for city councillors are far less high profile.

We include a number of control variables in our models, such as age, education, gender, income, interest in the municipal election and feeling that voting is a duty at the municipal level. For our initial tests, we also look at feeling thermometers of attitudes towards different linguistic groups (Francophones, Anglophones and Allophones). Finally, we use a variable that is coded 1 if the respondent indicates they belong to a voluntary organization and 0 if not as a proxy for social capital, given its prevalence in the literature as a mobilizing factor for minority groups.

Background Results

First and foremost, it is important to note the actual turnout rates in the mayoral elections: 42.5% in Montreal and 50.9% in Quebec. Given the information presented above about linguistic diversity, these values already suggest that linguistic heterogeneity may

[2] In Montreal respondents were also asked about voting for borough mayors. We do not analyze that data here.

decrease voter turnout. Of course, as such a conclusion would be ill-informed and subject to the ecological fallacy, we turn to our individual-level data.

To get a picture of the two different cities and their attitudes toward language, we present in Table 1 some basic demographic information. First, in the two surveys, the language breakdown is the following. In Montreal, just under 76 percent of our sample is Francophone, about 10 percent is Anglophone and about 13 percent have a first language other than French or English (Allophone). In Quebec, the linguistic diversity picture is vastly different. Just over 97 percent of our respondents report a first language as French while Anglophones represent about 1 percent of the sample and Allophones slightly under 2 percent. The linguistic composition of our sample in these two cities is clearly very different, as we expected.

The second background piece of information that is relevant for our discussion in this paper is a sense of the reported turnout in the municipal races held in 2017. Table 1 presents turnout rates by the office type and language group. In the first instance, it appears that desirability bias and selection effects are present, even with the careful wording of the survey question, as our reported rates of turnout well exceed population averages. This said, the actually observed higher turnout rate in Quebec of roughly 8 points (at the mayoral level) is replicated in our individual-level data. We also find evidence of ballot roll-off dynamics, especially in Montreal, as reported turnout rates drop significantly from mayoral to council races. The last substantive point to make regarding Table 1 is the suggestive evidence of the effects of language on turnout in these elections. In Montreal, there is little difference in mayoral turnout by language group but a gap does emerge in Council races in which Anglophones have a higher rate of turnout.

Table 1. Turnout by Language Group by Office and City

| | Montreal | | | | Quebec | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Office | All | Franco | Anglo | Allo | All | Franco | Anglo | Allo |
| Mayor | 79.3 | 79.4 | 81.5 | 77.6 | 87.9 | 88.1 | 82.1 | 83.3 |
| Council | 69.2 | 69.0 | 78.0 | 67.2 | 84.6 | 84.9 | 68.9 | 79.1 |

Additionally, as a way of laying the groundwork for understanding the linguistic features of these cases, we consider the perceptions of language groups. As noted above, the objective data clearly indicate that Montreal is more linguistically diverse than Quebec City. But do people perceive this? Overall, the answer is yes. Our individual-level data confirm differences in perceptions of linguistic diversity – the mean value on the 0 to 3 linguistic diversity variable is 1.82 in Montreal and 0.95 in Quebec City. However, moving to the neighbourhood level, the data suggest that respondents are not very good at gauging the extent of linguistic diversity. In Montreal, the correlation coefficient between objective and subjective indicators of linguistic diversity is only 0.42.[3] In Quebec, the relationship is even weaker (0.25) and collectively these results suggest that in both cities, residents do not have a fine-grained sense of linguistic diversity at the neighbourhood level. As perceptions may differ depending on whether someone is part of

[3] A strong association between these variables would be somewhere in the 0.7-0.8 range.

a majority or minority language group, we also examined these correlations by language. In both cities, the correlation coefficient of objective and subjective indicators was greatest among Francophones (just higher than the city average in both cases) and lowest among Anglophones. This finding suggests that the relative size of the language group (majority or minority) strongly conditions the accuracy of linguistic diversity perceptions.

Because animosity toward other groups can increase the feeling of competition, we consider next whether the differences in rates of linguistic diversity are reflected in the attitudes toward different language groups. Table 2 presents thermometer scores by city and language group for each language group. Perhaps surprisingly, amongst all respondents and in both cities, feelings toward Anglophones are highest and feelings towards Francophones lowest on the 0 to 100 scale.

Table 2. Mean Feeling Thermometers about Language Groups by Language and City

| | Montreal | | | | Quebec | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Group | All | Franco | Anglo | Allo | All | Franco | Anglo | Allo |
| Franco | 67.7 | 63.3+# | 74.7* | 77.6* | 66.1 | 65.8 | 71.4 | 78.9 |
| Anglo | 78.9 | 73.6+# | 87.8* | 83.5* | 77.8 | 77.5+ | 90.8* | 82.4 |
| Allo | 69.1 | 69.3+# | 75.4*# | 60.6*+ | 71.3 | 71.7# | 75.5# | 53.7+ |

Note: Sign indicates significant difference in mean thermometer ratings from named language group. *p<.05 difference from Francophones, +p<.05 difference from Anglophones, #p<.05 difference from Allophones.

When we break these ratings down further by language group some significant differences emerge. In Montreal, the comparatively low ranking for Francophones appears to be driven by Francophones themselves as their average ratings are 11 and 14 points, respectively, lower than Anglophones and Allophones (significant at p<.05). While the aggregate Anglophone thermometer score (78.9) may be driven in part by the high self-regard amongst Montreal Anglophones, it is also the case that both Francophones and Allophones collectively indicate that their feelings for Anglophones are the highest.

Turning to Quebec City, the aggregate mean feeling towards linguistic groups is largely driven by Francophones, owing to their demographic dominance in the city. This said, we do note that Anglophones and Francophones differ significantly (p<.05) in their collective ratings of the Anglophone linguistic community – with Anglophones giving themselves much higher ratings. Last, both Francophones and Anglophones in Quebec City have a significantly more positive view of Allophones as a linguistic group than do Allophones themselves.

A last initial piece of data to consider focuses on the presence of social capital amongst linguistic groups in Quebec. The literature suggests that social capital has important influences on engagement and the presence of social capital in a language group may be an important factor in understanding how linguistic diversity influences turnout in municipal elections in Montreal and Quebec City. Table 3 shows the distribution of social capital by language group in these two cities. The first thing to notice is that fewer people report group membership in Montreal than Quebec (significant at p<.01). If social

capital is in fact weaker in that city due to greater diversity, then this is what we would expect. Between groups, however, there is also some interesting variation. In Montreal, Francophones are less likely to belong to volunteer groups than both Anglophones and Allophones and the rate of group membership is not significantly different between the two minority language groups. By contrast, in Quebec City there is no difference in the rate of voluntary group membership by language.

Table 3. Mean Voluntary Group Membership by Language and City

| Montreal | | | | Quebec | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| All | Franco | Anglo | Allo | All | Franco | Anglo | Allo |
| 36.3 | 33.7+# | 47.2* | 45.3* | 42.0 | 42.0 | 52.9 | 42.3 |

Note: Cell values indicate the percentage of linguistic group who are members of a voluntary association *p<.05 difference from Francophones, +p<.05 difference from Anglophones, #p<.05 difference from Allophones.

To sum, thus far we have demonstrated the different rates of turnout in the various 2017 municipal electoral contests and have sketched some of the linguistic and social capital dimensions of both Montreal and Quebec City. We now turn to consider our first hypothesis – that linguistic diversity will impact turnout in Montreal more than in Quebec City.

Linguistic Diversity and Turnout

To analyze the individual-level impact of linguistic diversity on turnout in Montreal and Quebec City, we ran logistic regression models for mayor and council voting. We estimate a model that includes controls (female, education, age, income, duty and interest in municipal politics), social capital and our measures of linguistic diversity (first objective indicators, then separate models with subjective perceptions). We present marginal effects in Figures 1 and 2 below to display the results in an interpretable format.[4]







Figures 1 and 2 display the effect of increasing objective linguistic diversity on turnout in mayoral and council elections in both Montreal and Quebec. These figures present the

[4] All models involving objective data cluster standard errors on the FSA. Full regression results are available, on request, from the authors.

point estimates with 95% confidence interval bands. At low levels of diversity, there is a large and significant difference in turnout rates between Montreal and Quebec with Quebec residents being much more likely to turnout in both types of elections. However, as objective diversity at the FSA level rises, turnout in the Montreal elections increases to the point where, at high levels of diversity, there is no statistical difference in rates of turnout between the two cities. Figures 3 and 4 display exactly the same pattern with subjective linguistic diversity. Taken together, these figures reveal the mobilizing effect of linguistic diversity in Montreal as compared to Quebec, consistent with our first expectation.







Our remaining expectations are based in the literature that suggests that different groups may react to heterogeneity differently. Before looking at turnout, we first considered whether there was in fact a difference in perceptions of diversity across language groups. The OLS regression results are reported in Appendix Table 1. Anglophones are more likely to perceive linguistic diversity in Montreal (compared to Francophones), whereas Allophones are more likely to perceive it in Quebec City. In both cities, Francophones are significantly less likely to perceive linguistic diversity than the minority language groups. This latter finding is not surprising (Francophones are solid majorities in both cities), and these results hold even when controlling for social capital. If we are to find any unique linguistic diversity effects in the cities, then, we might expect Anglophones to behave differently in Montreal and Allophones in Quebec City.

We ran models similar to those in Figures 1-4 by city to test for unique effects of linguistic diversity on different language groups.[5] Figures 5 and 6 display the effects of increasing linguistic diversity (objective and subjective) on the probability of turning out in the mayoral election in Montreal. Both figures show that the effects are not significantly different for Anglophones compared to other language groups. However, even though they are insignificant across all levels (unlike in Figures 1-4), we do observe an interesting pattern among Anglophones. In both cities the trend is *decreasing* as perceptions of linguistic diversity increase.

[5] All results available from authors on request.







We only show these results for Anglophones in Montreal as they are exemplary of the null results we find in all other analyses. Indeed, insignificant interaction effects were observed for all language groups, with both types of linguistic diversity data, at both the mayoral and council level in both cities. What this suggests is that linguistic diversity (either in actuality or the perception of it) did not impact the turnout decisions of language groups differently in Montreal and Quebec in 2017 municipal elections. As such, our results do not support the majority of the expectations that emerged from the literature. While linguistic diversity does have a different aggregate effect in Montreal than in Quebec City (consistent with our expectations given the different levels of heterogeneity), there are no significant differences between language groups. This latter finding is contrary to the results found elsewhere and suggests that pursuing this study further is warranted.

## Discussion and Conclusion

Language and linguistic diversity is a distinguishing feature of Quebec politics. In this paper, we outline the empirical landscape of this diversity in Montreal and Quebec City and consider the extent to which linguistic diversity influenced turnout in the 2017 municipal elections. Briefly, we find that, in the aggregate, turnout in Montreal is lower than in Quebec City. There are also some important differences in rates of turnout by language group. In Montreal, at the council and mayoral level Anglophones have higher rates of turnout in comparison to the other language groups (Francophones and Allophones), while in Quebec City Anglophones clearly have a lower rate of turnout at the council level. This comports with our expectations for how diversity and density interact. Given the smaller concentration of Anglophones in Quebec City it is not surprising that their turnout is depressed, while in Montreal there may be mobilization amongst Anglophones in particular.

We also find that levels of social capital are significantly differentiated by language group in Montreal (Francophones are least likely to be members) while in Quebec there is no statistical difference. Anglophones in Montreal are most likely to perceive linguistic diversity while in Quebec Allophones are more likely. There are also differences in the amount of social capital held by residents in each city. Given the importance of social capital as a mechanism by which diversity affects turnout, that Montrealers have less

social capital overall suggests, at least at the aggregate level, that linguistic diversity may be at the root of the lower turnout in that city.

However, when we turn to investigate our main research question at the individual level, we find only suggestive evidence, at best, that linguistic diversity affects turnout. We expected to find some indication that the effects are conditional on language group, but we only find that linguistic diversity impacts turnout in Montreal for all respondents, regardless of language group.

What does this all mean? Language and perceptions of linguistic diversity are important considerations for municipal politics in general but it seems that their impacts on turnout at the municipal level in Montreal and Quebec City are limited at best. The literature, while disagreeing on the direction of the effects, was unified in finding results – therefore we find our results curious. Further investigation is needed to understand whether our findings are unique to our data, our measures, or the linguistic context in Quebec.

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Appendix Table 1. Predicting Perceptions of Linguistic Diversity

| | Montreal | | Quebec | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Female | 0.041 | 0.041 | 0.016 | 0.017 |
| | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.047 | 0.047 |
| Education | 0.002 | -0.003 | -0.048 | -0.048 |
| | 0.065 | 0.065 | 0.047 | 0.047 |
| Age | 0.016 | 0.023 | 0.000*** | 0.000*** |
| | 0.045 | 0.045 | 0 | 0 |
| Income | 0.003 | 0.005 | -0.067*** | -0.066*** |
| | 0.016 | 0.016 | 0.012 | 0.012 |
| Interest | 0.025+ | 0.025+ | -0.008 | -0.008 |
| | 0.013 | 0.014 | 0.011 | 0.011 |
| Anglophone | 0.269** | | 0.121 | |
| | 0.1 | | 0.151 | |
| Allophone | 0.016 | | 0.526** | |
| | 0.109 | | 0.192 | |
| Social Capital | 0.208** | 0.212** | 0.132** | 0.132** |
| | 0.067 | 0.067 | 0.047 | 0.047 |
| Francophone | | -0.132+ | | -0.358** |
| | | 0.079 | | 0.136 |
| Constant | 1.497*** | 1.613*** | 1.203*** | 1.556*** |
| | 0.134 | 0.151 | 0.097 | 0.162 |
| N | 848 | 848 | 1183 | 1183 |
| $R^2$ | 0.037 | 0.032 | 0.049 | 0.047 |
| Coefficients from OLS regression in first line and standard errors in line below | | | | |
| + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 | | | | |