Setting the Record Straight: Identifying the Correlates of Split-Ticket Voting in Montreal and Quebec

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Split-ticket voting exists in every system where multiple partisan races are contested simultaneously. That is, some voters choose to support a party's candidate for one position, but another party's candidate for another. Given that concurrent elections are rare in Canada, Canadian scholars have largely ignored this topic. The only level in this country where concurrent elections are held, and thus the only locale where split ticket voting can occur, is municipally. Still, municipal split ticket voting has not been studied in Canada, primarily because of a lack of available individual-level data. The objective of this study is to address this shortcoming using Canadian Municipal Election Study data from the 2017 elections in Montreal and Quebec. Results indicate that roughly one in five voters split their tickets in these cities. We identify a number of factors associated with split ticket voting and point to several avenues for future research on the topic.

Split-ticket voting exists in every system where multiple partisan races are contested simultaneously. That is, some voters choose to support a party's candidate for one position, but another party's candidate for another. This phenomenon has received a significant amount of scholarly attention in the United States (Morris P. Fiorina, 1988; Jacobson, 1990). Though split ticket voters have always existed, the reasons for such behaviour have not always been well understood (see Campbell et al., 1957). However, a succession of divided American federal governments, starting in the 1980s, leading scholars to devote more energy to determining why such behaviour exists, and just how widespread it is. This interest quickly spread to many other regions of the world where conditions make split ticket voting possible (see Moser et al., 2009).

For the most part, Canadian elections are immune to split ticket voting and, unsurprisingly, Canadian researchers have largely ignored this subject. Voters in this country cast just a single ballot in federal and provincial elections. Scholars have considered the question of whether voters consider partisan 'balancing' between federal and provincial governments (Erikson et al., 2001), though, given that provincial and federal elections are held at different times, that party systems often do not match between levels, and the questionable utility of aggregate-level data for drawing causal conclusions about the motivations of individuals, make such an analysis qualitatively different from a traditional study of split ticket voting.

The only level in this country where concurrent elections are held, and thus the only locale where split ticket voting can occur, is municipally. Canadian local voters cast their ballots for mayor and council, and often for other positions (such as borough mayor or school board trustee). While local politics in most of Canada is non-partisan, there are many cities in British Columbia and Quebec where formal parties do indeed exist and context elections. Such is the case in both Quebec City and Montreal. In Montreal, the two major parties (Équipe Denis Coderre and Projet Montréal) ran candidates in the mayoral race, as well as in all city council and borough mayoral races. The same can be said of the three largest parties in Quebec City (Équipe Labeaume, Québec 21 Équipe JF Gosselin and Démocratie Québec). Nevertheless, municipal split ticket voting has yet to be studied in Canada. We suggest that the primary reason for this omission is simply a lack of available individual-level data, a shortcoming which the current study overcomes.

Our goal here is to introduce the concept of split ticket voting to the Canadian academic lexicon. If such behaviour exists at the local level (as it almost certainly does), then scholars and practitioners alike stand to benefit from an understanding of how common this phenomenon is, and who it is that behaves this way. This chapter represents the first individual-level analysis of municipal split ticket voting in Canada, but it is also, to our knowledge, the first such study to be conducted anywhere in the world. The subject of municipal political behaviour receives a small fraction of the attention that academics tend to focus on elections at higher order of government, and the subject of split-ticket voting is no exception.[1]

Through the use of Canadian Municipal Election Study (CMES) data, we estimate the rates

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[1] Our review of the existing literature failed to identify any studies of this nature. The study which came closest is a British study of split ticket voting between the national and local levels (Ralling et al., 2003).

of split ticket voting in the 2017 elections in Montreal and Quebec, and consider the correlates of such behaviour. Informed by American literature, we focus on two competing explanations for splitting one's vote. First, it has been argued (Morris P. Fiorina, 1992, 1996) that some voters have a desire to see balance between the executive and legislative branches (the closest equivalent in Montreal and Quebec would be balance between mayor and council, or other down-ballot rates). Such voters are said to split their tickets with this 'strategy' in mind. Of course, voters may have other motivations for supporting different parties at different levels. The existing literature refers to such factors, which do not have the explicit strategy of seeking a division of power in the name of policy balancing, as 'accidental.' CMES data suggest strongly that accidental, rather than strategic factors drive split ticket voting in both Montreal and Quebec.

The Strategy (Accident?) Behind Split-Ticket Voting

As noted above, the study of the causes of split ticket voting been well-studied in the United States (Morris P. Fiorina, 1992, 1996), though the phenomenon has received attention in many other settings (Moser et al., 2009). Despite the differences which inescapably exist when making cross-country comparisons, both the American and international literatures are largely based upon a debate between those who contend that vote splitting is a strategic choice (either aimed at partisan or policy balancing), and those who consider it is the by-product of the effects of other variables (collectively referred to as 'accidental' reasons for splitting one's vote).

In the strictest sense of the word, every voter who supports different parties in concurrent elections is doing so with a 'strategy' in mind: to see the individuals they vote for win office.[2] In the literature on split ticket voting, however, the term 'strategic' has an more specific meaning, and it stems from two narratives. The first stems from the notion that a many voters support the idea that a divided government in principle, based upon the belief that checks and balances between the branches of government will produce better government outcomes. Those who hold such a belief have been described by Ladd (1990) as "cognitive Madisonians". Interestingly, Sigelman et al. (1997) find that, while surveys confirm that a majority of voters do have a desire for divided governments, when controlling for other predictors such as candidates affect or incumbency, this desire does not significantly affect vote splitting. Still, there is an undeniable logic to the argument that individuals who prefer power sharing will support different parties for different positions.

A second, and very closely related, narrative on the concept of 'strategic' split ticket voting comes from Fiorina (1988; 1992, 1996), who suggest that voters consciously split their tickets in an effort to balance policy outputs, rather than simply the composition of government itself. According to Fiorina, voters who are more ideologically extreme than any party (on the basis of a standard bi-polar ideological scale) are relatively likely to straight-ticket vote; such individuals have a strong ideological preference for one party over another, and have no desire to have governmental policy outputs tempered by a competing party. In contrast, voters who are 'between' two parties on that same ideological scale, are relatively likely split their votes, presumably with the goal of moderating the more extreme policies of either party. Again, this logic is difficult to

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[2] An exception to this claim would be protest voters, a group we do not consider here but is expected to be quite small.

argue with, but again, there is little empirical evidence that supports this narrative. There have been many studies which have concluded that policy-balancing is not a significant determinant of ticket-splitting (Born, 1994; Burden et al., 1998; Mattei et al., 2000; Petrocik et al., 1996).

In light of the apparent lack of support for strategic split ticket voting, it has been argued that such policy balancing does exist, but only under certain conditions. Lewis-Beck et al. (2004) argue that the previous attempts to identify 'strategic' motivations for split ticket voting are due to shortcomings in the methods of operationalizion. They suggest that previous studies consider 'separable preferences', meaning that evaluations of parties are considered independently, rather than in comparison to one another. Adopting the latter approach, they find support for 'strategic' split ticket voting in support of party balancing. Lacy et al. (1998) also find evidences in support of 'strategic' split ticket voting by considering voters' expected policy outcome instead of the policy platforms of the candidates. Others argue only the more sophisticated voters are able to engage in such behavior (Mattei et al., 2000).

The international literature finds similarly mixed support for notion that strategic considerations drive split ticket voting. Research from Germany (Bawn, 1999), suggests that German voters are no strangers to using their vote choices as a way of tempering the power of parties for the purpose of balance. Australian research (Bowler et al., 1993) finds that ticket-splitting is often used as away of restricting major party hegemony, but that such logic is more commonly employed among sophisticated voters. They also find that partisanship is a much more important consideration when making vote decisions than is a desire for policy or party balance. In contrast to these findings which support the 'strategic' view of split ticket voting, other authors find evidence that ticket splitting is not the results of a conscious choice, but rather the by-product of other variables such as candidate characteristics and the amount of information received by the voters. Such results have been find in Germany (Schoe, 1999), Brazil (Ames et al., 2009) and the UK (Johnston et al., 2002). In essence, these authors argue that 'accidental' causes for split ticket voting are being incorrectly attributed to 'strategic' reasons.

There is relatively limited evidence, therefore, from either the United States or elsewhere, that vote-splitting is done with the intention of moderating either party power or policy. In contrast, there is ample evidence that other, accidental' factors drive split-ticket voting. One of the most prominent explanation in the U.S. in this regard is partisan issue ownership. Studies from the 1990s (Jacobson (1990); Alvarez et al. 1993) contended that Republicans had a tendency to 'own' (or to be stronger on) national issues, such as national defence, while Democrats owned local issues, such as poverty. As such, many American voters (at least in the period leading up to the 1990s) would tend to support the Republicans at the presidential level, but the Democrats in the House of Representatives. Individual level variables such as sociodemographic characteristics (DeVries et al., 1972), partisan strength (Petrocik et al., 1996) and ambivalence towards parties and candidates (Mulligan, 2011) have been found to be associated with split ticket voting. Other scholars have emphasized the impact of contextual variables such as campaign funding, candidates' activities, candidates notoriety or incumbency (Born, 2000; Burden et al., 1998; Johnston et al., 2002; Petrocik et al., 1996; Ralling et al., 2003; Roscoe, 2003).

To summarize, a great many factors have been suggested as explanations for split ticket voting. The most common are those related to a desire to balance the power of parties, though the evidence in support of this 'strategic' account is mixed. A great many other, 'accidental' explanations for split ticket voting have been suggested, and there is evidence to support many of them. As a whole, the existing literature on the sources of split ticket voting suggest to us two testable, potentially competing, hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1 (H1): "Strategic factors" will be associated with an increase in split ticket voting. That is, there will be some individuals who have a desire to see partisan balance between the mayor and council. These factors include ideological differences between one's self and leading candidates, and voter sophistication.

Hypothesis 2 (H2): "Accidental" factors will affect rates of split ticket voting. For some voters, it is not a desire to see balance between the mayor and council that drives split ticket voting. Other, 'accidental' factors include the partisan strength of voters, evaluations of mayoral candidates, mayoral vote choice, and congruence between mayoral choice and the incumbent party in down-ballot positions.

Prior to adjudicating between these two hypotheses, we outline the method by which we consider the sources of split ticket voting in Montreal and Quebec,

Methodology

Our analysis consists of two stages. First, we provide a baseline description of split ticket voting in our two cities. We determine if CMES survey respondents split their tickets by comparing vote choice (as reported in the post-election questionnaire) for the various positions on the ballots. Simply put, those individuals who support candidates from different parties are considered to have split their ticket. In addition to mayoral races, Montreal and Quebec hold contests for city council positions. Montreal also holds concurrent borough elections, and the CMES includes data on vote choice for borough mayoral races. In Quebec, therefore, straight ticket voting is based upon only two decisions, while in Montreal, it is based upon vote choice for three positions. In this first, descriptive, stage of data analysis we estimate the rate of split ticket voting for our two cities, for different positions (council and borough), and based upon mayoral vote choice.

In the second stage of our analysis, we consider the correlates of straight ticket voting. Why is it that some voters support the same party for multiple positions, but others do not? Are strategic or accidental factors behind this distinction? To answer these questions, we consider three sets of factors.

First, two strategic variables are included. The first is a measure of ideology. According to the strategic view of split-ticket voting, (Fiorina, 1992, 1996), split ticket voting should increase as the difference in ideological distances between candidates increases. Consider, for example, a respondent who positions himself as a 7 on an ideological scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right), and that

the same person views Candidate A as having an ideological score of 8, and candidate B an ideological score of 2. The distance from candidate a is 1, and from candidate B is 5. If, however, that voter saw candidate A as having an ideological score of 8, but candidate B a score of 6, the person is equidistant from the two candidates (and conceivably, the parties they represent). Strategic split ticket voting should be more likely in the second scenario than the first, as a voter is more likely to desire balance between parties when the ideological distance between the voter and the parties is similar. The variable we employ to measure this phenomenon is operationalized by comparing the difference in the differences in distance between the voter and the candidates, as determined by the voter himself. The first voter above would be assigned a score of -4 (1-5) and the second would receive a score of 0 (1-1).[3] We note that this, and all variables described below, are normalized to range from 0 to 1 (we do so in order to enable comparison of the effects of the explanatory variables).

The second strategic variable we consider is voter sophistication. If vote splitting is truly a strategic choice, it is likely limited to more sophisticated voters considering the complexity of the task (Mattei & Howes 2000). Therefore, the absence of relation between ticket splitting and sophistication could be an indication that it is not a strategic behavior. The measure of sophistication we employ here is a four-question index of political knowledge. If sophistication leads to a desire for balance between the mayor and council, knowledge should be positively associated with split ticket voting.

In contrast to the 'strategic' view of split ticket voting, we consider several explanatory variables that might be considered to lead to 'accidental' such behaviour. First, we employ measures of partisanship and evaluations of the mayoral candidates (and party leaders). Party identification, or a long-standing psychological attachment to a political party (Campbell et al., 1960) is not a factor in most Canadian municipalities, given that local parties do not exist in much of the country. Both Montreal and Quebec, however, have party systems made of up a combination of long-standing and transient parties, and all major mayoral candidates represent parties. We expect that the municipal partisan identification and strength of a voter will affect the likelihood of split ticket voting.[4] Existing research suggests that those respondents who are strong partisans of the mayor candidate they vote for should be more likely to support that party in down ballot races than those who only weakly support that party, or those who are partisans of a party different from the one represented by the mayoral candidate they supported (Bowler et al., 1993). Respondents are assigned a value of 1 for this variable if they are strong partisans of the party of the candidate they vote for, 0 if they are strong partisans of a different party, and 0.5 if they are

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[3] In Montreal there are only two major mayoral candidates, so this calculation is simple. In Quebec, however, there are three candidates. In that city we consider the mayoral candidate voted for and the mayoral candidate not vote for which is closest ideologically to the voter.

[4] We recognize the possibility that local and federal/provincial partisanship may be qualitatively different from one another. As noted, municipal parties are often transient and/or leader oriented. By definition, voters cannot develop the same type of long-term attachment that is possible at other orders of government, where parties persist for generations. We have nevertheless applied the standard approach to measuring partisanship, under the belief that, even if it is measuring something that is different from federal and/or provincial partisanship, this measure is nevertheless an accurate indicator of attitudes towards the local parties.

non-partisans.

The next 'accidental' variable we consider is evaluations of the leaders themselves. We suspect that split ticket voting will be relatively unlikely among voters who have a strong preference for the mayoral candidate they voted for, as compared to the next highest ranked candidate. This variable is based upon a comparison of the rating of the candidate voted for (on a scale from 0 to 100), as compared to the rating of the next highest rated candidate. High values are assigned if voters have a strong preference for the candidate voted for, and a low value if they have a strong preference for another candidate.[5] This approach follows that of Lewis-Beck et al. (2004), who point to the importance of considering evaluations of candidates in comparison to one another, rather than independently.

Next, we account for effect of down-ballot incumbency upon split ticket voting. Incumbency has been found in other Canadian municipalities to be a significant advantage (McGregor et al., 2017; Moore et al., 2017). At the same time, however, it has been argued that leader- and party-centered politics, such as that found at the provincial and federal levels in Canada, serves to depress incumbency effects (Blais et al., 2003). Though Montreal and Quebec have party systems which link mayoral contests to those for other positions, we nevertheless wish to account for the possibility that incumbent parties receive an electoral advantage, simply due to the fact that they have previously held a down-ballot position. As such, we include dummies that account for the (in)congruence between mayoral vote choice and the party that currently holds down-ballot seats. We expect rates of split ticket voting to be depressed if the party which currently holds council or borough mayoral seats is from a party different from that which a voter supports at the mayoral level. In contrast, rates of split ticket voting should decline if the party which is the incumbent in down ballot races is the same as that which a voter supports at the mayoral level. This variable has a value of 1 if the incumbent party matches mayor vote choice, and 0 if it does not.

The last 'accidental' explanatory variable we consider is mayoral vote choice. Municipal politics in Montreal and Quebec are centered around party leaders (mayoral candidates). In fact, the incumbent mayors in both cities lent their names to their parties (Équipe Denis Coderre and Équipe Labeaume). Given this, we include a variable to consider if split ticket voting rates vary by mayoral vote choice. We have no directional expectation in this regard, but suspect that some mayoral candidates may engender greater down-ballot loyalty than others.

The third set of explanatory factors we consider are a series of sociodemographic control variables (following DeVries & Tarrance, 1972). These include a number of standard characteristics (age, gender, education, immigration status and language). We have no specific expectations about the relationship between these controls and split ticket voting.

We also include one final control variable, to account for a wording experiment included in the CMES that is relevant to this study. In both Montreal in Quebec, roughly half of respondents

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[5] We note that partisan identification, attitudes and the ideological distance variable are expected to be correlated with one another – all are related to one another at the $p < 0.01$ level. We include them all simultaneously in our model, however, to determine which, if any, has the most robust relationship with split ticket voting, and to ensure that we are able to identity the most important driver of split ticket voting from this group of correlated factors.

(randomly assigned) were provided with party labels when reporting vote choice, while the other half were not (see Anderson and McGregor, 2018). In the actual election, this information was available on ballots. Given the low information nature of municipal elections, we expect that some respondents may be unable to recall who they voted for in, absent this information. We account for this experiment in both parts of our analysis. When describing rates of split ticket voting, we consider those individuals who had labels available to them, as well as the sample as a whole. When identifying the correlates of split-ticket voting, we include this 'label' variable as a control. As respondents were randomly assigned to an treatment group, this experiment introduces no bias to our analysis below.[6]

We consider a series of four outcome variables in our exploration of the correlates of split ticket voting. For Montreal (where the CMES contains vote choice data on mayoral, council and borough mayoral race), we consider split ticket voting for mayoral and council races, mayoral and borough mayoral, and then all three positions combined. For Quebec, split ticket voting is determined on the basis of mayoral and council vote only. We are thus able to compare rates of split ticket voting across levels, but also cities.

Prior to presenting our results, several other minor methodological notes should be addressed. First, we include only those respondents who voted in all positions. There are inevitably some respondents who vote for some positions, but not others (usually such individuals participate in mayoral elections but abstain from down ballot races – see McGregor, Forthcoming). This selective abstention is an altogether different phenomenon from split ticket voting, and we thus exclude these individuals from our analysis.[7] Next, we only include in our analysis those respondents who voted for one of the major candidates. In Montreal, this includes supporters of Coderre and Plante, while in Quebec, only those who voted for Guerette, Gosselin or Labeaume are included – these candidates accounted for over 97% of votes in the two cities. There are not enough respondents in our sample to obtain reliable statistical estimates of the behaviour of those individuals who voted for minor candidates. Next, we note that all variables (explanatory and outcome) are coded to range from 0 to 1. Such an approach allows us to compare the magnitude of the effects of the explanatory variables upon rates of split ticket voting. Finally, all results below are weighted for age and gender.

Results

We begin our analysis with a baseline description of the rates of straight ticket voting in Montreal and Quebec. At fist glance, it may appear that there was little split ticket voting in either city. Valérie Plante received 51.4% of the mayoral vote share, while her party, Projet Montréal, won 52% of seats on city council and 55.6% of borough mayoral seats. In Quebec, Régis

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[6] Balance tests show no statistically significant relationship between any explanatory variables and experimental group.
[7] The number of selective abstainers is very low. In Quebec, it is estimated that roughly 3% of respondents voted for the mayoral election only. It is impossible to calculate a comparable, simple number in Montreal, given that some voters in that city are able to vote in council elections only, some in borough elections only, and some in both. Still, rates of 'roll-off' are nevertheless quite low.

Labeaume won 55.3% of the vote in a field of three major candidates, while Équipe Labeaume won 80.9% of city council seats. The victorious mayoral candidates thus saw their party achieve success at all levels. An aggregate level analysis of this nature, however, is insufficient to either quantify split ticket voting or identify the reasons for such behaviour.

The individual-level data provided by the CMES allow us to properly conduct both analyses. We begin by estimating rates of split ticket voting, and these results are found in Table 1. Given the label experiment (described above), we present the data in two formats: with those who saw the label when reporting vote choice, and all respondents (including those respondents who did not see the label). Strictly speaking, the first set of results more closely approximate the actual conditions under which voter made their decision (i.e. they had access to information on party labels in the voting booth), and provide a more accurate point estimate of the rate of split ticket voting.[8] However, even if the availability of party labels does have an effect upon reported rates of straight ticket voting, this does not affect our ability to compare rates of split ticket voting across cities and positions.[9]

TABLE 1: SPLIT TICKET VOTING BY CITY AND POSITION

	Party Label Available		Entire Sample	
	Montreal	Quebec	Montreal	Quebec
City Council	16.3%	21.0%	21.9%	22.0%
Borough mayor	17.4%		21.4%	
All	21.6%		29.2%	
N	256	487	517	1043

Table 1 reveals several findings of note. First, CMES data reveal that roughly one in five voters in both Montreal and Quebec split their tickets. This rate is comparable to those found in the US (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2004) and in the UK (Ralling and Trasher, 2004). In terms of comparing rates of split ticket voting across positions and cities, there are few statistically significant differences in Table 1. Among the subset of the sample who received information on party labels, there are no differences between any of the values presented, either between Montreal and Quebec or between combinations of votes in Montreal. We are thus unable to identify any differences among those respondents who had party label information available to them.

In contrast, however, when we consider the sample as a whole (and thus increase our statistical leverage), we do find evidence that rates of split ticket voting increase in Montreal when all three positions are consider simultaneously, as compared to when council or borough mayor

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[8] An analysis confirms that estimated rates of split ticket voting are higher among those respondents who did not have party information available. We contend that this is due to a decline in the accuracy of responses, particularly in down-ballot races, among this group, as compared to their counterparts who saw party labels. Again, since respondents were randomly assigned to either treatment or experimental group, this effect will not bias estimates of relationships between split-ticket voting and the explanatory variables considered in Table 3.

[9] The CMES includes a mixture of respondents recruited using random digit dialing, and those who are already part of an online panel. We find no difference in the split ticket voting rates of these respondent, and this variable is insignificant if included in the models in Table 3.

votes are considered independently. While not surprising, such a find is nevertheless worthy of recognition. As with the partial sample, however, we find no difference in rates of split ticket voting, for mayoral and council races, between Montreal and Quebec. Given the different political landscapes in the cities, including the fact that Montreal had two significant parties, and Quebec City had 3, this also is a noteworthy finding.

With this information in mind, and prior to conducting our multivariate analysis of the correlates of split ticket voting, we conduct an exploratory analysis of the relationship between mayoral vote choice and rates of straight ticket voting. CMES data suggest that there are no observable differences in the rate of split ticket voting between our cities. Is it the case, however, that there are differences between the supporters of various mayoral candidates? Is it the case that some mayoral candidates are better able to convince their supporters to back down-ballot candidates of their party? We answer this question in Table 2, which shows rates of split ticket voting according to mayoral vote choice. Here, and for the remainder of our analysis, we consider all respondents (rather than limited the sample on the basis of the availability of party label information).

TABLE 2: SPLIT TICKET VOTING RATES BY MAYORAL VOTE CHOICE

	Montreal		Quebec		
	Coderre	Plante	Gosselin	Guérette	Labeaume
City Council	27.7%	18.1%	12.5%	24.3%	27.2%
Borough mayor	26.6%	17.8%			
All	35.3%	25.1%			
N	203	314	330	212	501

In comparison to Table 1, the results in Table 2 are striking. In both Montreal and Quebec, there are significant differences in the rate of split ticket voting on the basis of mayoral vote choice. In Montreal, supporters of incumbent Mayor Denis Coderre are more likely than those of his challenger to abandon his slate of candidates (Équipe Coderre) in down ballot races. This is true at both the council and borough mayoral level, and when all three positions are considered at the same time. The difference between Coderre and Plante voters is significant at $p < 0.05$ in all instances.

We also see differences between supporters of the mayoral candidates in Quebec. Again, we see that supporters of the incumbent, Régis Labeaume, are relatively likely to split their tickets (coincidentally, the estimate rate of split ticket voting for both Coderre and Labeaume supporters is roughly 27%). Also experiencing a relatively high rate of down-ballot defection is Anne Guérette, leader of Démocratie Québec. The estimated rate of split ticket voting upon her voters is 24.3%, though this value is not statistically different than the rate for Labeaume – for both candidates, roughly one in four voters supported a different party for council. However, those Quebecers who voted for Jean-François Gosselin and Québec 21 were particularly unlikely to split their tickets – only one in eight of Gosselin's voters supported a different party for city council. This estimate differs from those for Guerette and Labeaume voters at $p < 0.01$.

Thus it appears that Plante and Gosselin attracted the greatest loyalty, helping their down-ballot party members more than any of the other mayoral candidates. Interestingly, however, while Plante won the mayoral race and her party won a majority on council, Gosselin ran a distant second place in Quebec, receiving fewer than half the votes that Labeaume did, and his party won only two seats on council. Though they may have been loyal, there were simply not enough Gosselin supporters to propel Québec 21 to victory on council. We suspect that this loyalty may be due to the fact that the party was created almost solely for the issue of a "third bridge" linking the city with the south shore, a very polarizing issue in Québec fueled by the populist radio. Support for this bridge may have fueled a high level of straight ticket voting.

We have now established that roughly one in five voters, in both Montreal and Quebec, split their tickets in the 2017 municipal elections. We also know that rates of split ticket voting vary according to mayoral vote choice; some candidates were more successful than others in convincing their supporters to also support the party in down ballot races (conversely, some parties were apparently better at attracting the supporters of other mayoral candidates in down ballot contests). We turn now to consider what other types of factors are associated with split ticket voting.

We do so in Table 3, which shows a series of logistic regression models, where the outcome variables have a value of 1 if a voter split his or her ticket and 0 if not. Entries report marginal effects and represent the effect of each factor upon the probability of split ticket voting. As all explanatory variables are coded to range from 0 to 1, entries represent the effect of a 'full dose' of each variable. To account for variation by borough and electoral district, results are clustered according to these groupings.[10]

Table 3 includes three pairs of models for Montreal and one for Quebec (due again to the fact that the CMES has data on borough mayoral vote choice in Montreal). In each instance we include two models. In addition to several control variables (found at the bottom of the table), the first set of models considers the two 'strategic' variables which the literature suggests should drive split ticket voting: the ideological position of the voter relative to that of the two closest candidates and voter sophistication. Recall that the ideological variable should have a high value if the voter sees him/herself as closer to a candidate not voted for than the one supported, and low if the opposite is true. The sophistication variable has a high value for high knowledge respondents, and low for those who know little about politics. *H1* suggests that both factors should be positively associated with split ticket voting.

As a test of the robustness of the effects of strategic factors upon split ticket voting rates, we include a second set of models where a series of 'accidental' factors are added (controls are once again included). These variables include the strength (and direction) of local partisanship (this variable has a high value for those who are partisans of the mayoral candidate voted for, and low if they are partisans of another party), and mayoral candidate evaluations (based upon the strength of preference for the candidate voted for, as compared to the next highest candidate). The

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[10] In Montreal we cluster by borough when considering borough mayoral results, and by electoral district when considering council voting, as well as for the models where all three levels of positions are considered.

models also include dummy variables that take down-ballot incumbency into account. These variables have a value of 1 if they down-ballot position in question was previously held by the party of the mayoral candidate voted for, and 0 if not. We expect all of these 'accidental' factors to be negatively associated with split ticket voting. Voters are more likely to support their mayoral candidate's party in down ballot races if they are partisans of that person's party, if they have a strong preference for that candidate over other candidates, and if that party previously held down-ballot positions.

TABLE 3: THE CORRELATES OF SPLIT TICKET VOTING

	Montreal - City council		Montreal - Borough mayor		Montreal - all positions		Quebec - City council	
	Model 3A	Model 3B	Model 3C	Model 3D	Model 3E	Model 3F	Model 3G	Model 3H
Ideological distance	0.60 (0.15)**	0.08 (0.13)	0.48 (0.20)*	0.05 (0.21)	0.74 (0.15)**	0.21 (0.14)	0.63 (0.16)**	0.18 (0.14)
Voter sophistication	0.00 (0.13)	0.04 (0.11)	0.22 (0.17)	0.26 (0.15)	0.07 (0.14)	0.11 (0.14)	0.17 (0.11)	0.10 (0.09)
Partisan strength		-0.25 (0.08)**		-0.42 (0.11)**		-0.43 (0.11)**		-0.32 (0.06)**
Leader evaluations		-0.47 (0.15)**		-0.15 (0.20)		-0.33 (0.18)		-0.26 (0.15)
City council incumbent		-0.14 (0.04)**				-0.07 (0.04)		-0.22 (0.07)**
Borough mayor incumbent				-0.17 (0.04)**		-0.15 (0.04)**		
Plante voter		-0.05 (0.04)		-0.08 (0.03)**		-0.08 (0.04)		
Gosselin voter								-0.33 (0.08)**
Guerette voter								-0.16 (0.06)**
Over 50	0.00 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)
Female	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.10 (0.05)*	-0.08 (0.03)*	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
University education	0.03 (0.05)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.04)	0.10 (0.03)**	0.04 (0.03)
Immigrant	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.04)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)	0.07 (0.07)
Francophone	-0.11 (0.05)*	-0.08 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.08)
Label shown	-0.10 (0.04)**	-0.10 (0.03)**	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.11 (0.05)*	-0.10 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
N	441	441	441	441	441	441	922	922
Pseudo R2	0.074	0.245	0.048	0.221	0.076	0.250	0.051	0.162
# clusters	41	41	14	14	41	41	21	21

Entries report marginal effects and standard errors (in parentheses).

*: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$

In terms of the debate between the relative importance of strategic and accidental drivers of split ticket voting, Table 3 is unequivocal: the latter type of factors is much more likely to drive such behaviour. The first reason for arguing as much is the finding that the voter sophistication variable is statistically insignificant in all eight models; those voters with a high degree of political knowledge, and who one might expect to be most likely to recognize any potential value in having policy balance between the mayor and council, are no more likely to split their tickets than are their low knowledge counterparts. In a separate analysis (not shown here but available from the authors, we also find that when sophistication is interacted with the ideology variable, there are no statistically significant findings. This suggests that the effect of the ideology variable is no different among high and low sophistication voters, as some literature suggests might be the case (Mattei et al., 2000).

In contrast to this null finding for sophistication, the ideological variable is statistically significant in the models without the accidental factors (3A, 3C, 3E and 3G). As expected by some existing literature (Fiorina, 1992, 1996), those individuals who see themselves as further away, ideologically, from the mayoral candidate voted for than they are from competitors are likely to vote for a different party in down ballot races. This pattern exists for all positions and in both Montreal in Quebec. If this were the only information available, one might argue that split ticket voting among such individuals is driven by a desire for balance between the mayor and council (or borough mayor). However, the addition of the 'accidental' variables (models 3B, 3D, 3F and 3H) quickly extinguishes such a notion.

In the full models we find that the significant results previously observed for the ideology variables vanish. In their place are significant results for several of the accidental variables. In particular, municipal partisanship displays a large effect upon rates of straight ticket voting. In all four models where the variable is present, it is significant at $p < 0.01$ and the coefficients consistently have some of the greatest magnitudes found in the table. Somewhat less important are the leadership evaluations. This variable is significant in city council races in Montreal, but fails to meet conventional significance levels in other instances. That said, the variable is significant at $p < 0.10$ in all other models, so we are not prepared to discount the importance of this leader evaluations for municipal split ticket voting.

Also important are the down-ballot incumbency variables. Split ticket voting is less likely when voters support the mayoral candidate of the party that won the down-ballot races in the previous election. There appears to be a bias towards incumbents, therefore, even among those who vote for other parties at the mayoral level. This is the case in all four models where this variable is present. When council and borough mayoral incumbency are included concurrently in Model 3F, the borough mayoral variable is stronger, which could suggest that incumbency effects are stronger in such positions than on city council.

Finally, as one might expect given the results of Table 2, Table 3 reveals fairly compelling evidence that split ticket voting is associated with mayoral vote choice, particularly in Quebec City. In Montreal, Plante supporters are less likely than Coderre voters to split their tickets when considering borough mayoral races (though this variable is not significant for either the council or

'combined' variables). In Quebec, both Gosselin and Guerette voters are unlikely to split their tickets, as compared to Labeaume voters. Gosselin voters, in particular, tend to be straight ticket voters. The reader may note that, in the uncontrolled analysis in Table 2, Gosselin voters were observed to have low rates of split ticket voting. The multivariate analysis in Table 3, however, suggests that the same can be said of Guenette voters, once relevant explanatory variables are accounted for. As such, it is the case in both Montreal and Quebec that it is supporters of incumbents who are relatively likely to split their tickets.

Taken together, the results in Table 3 show much more support for *H2* than *H1*. It is 'accidental', rather than 'strategic' variables that largely drive split ticket voting in municipal elections in Montreal and Quebec. While many voters are making the decision to support different parties in different portions of their ballots, we find no evidence that they do so out of a desire to see balance between the mayor and council (or borough). Instead, this behaviour is driven largely by partisanship, down-ballot incumbency effects, and mayoral vote choice. Many voters have a desire to see members of different parties successful in different positions in municipal government, but they have reasons other than a desire for party or policy balancing for doing so.

CONCLUSION

This chapter represents the first individual-level examination of municipal split ticket voting in Canada, and it advances our knowledge of the subject in several ways. To begin with, we have found that roughly one in five voters split their tickets in Montreal and in Quebec, rates that are very close to those observed in other settings. We also find that the of split ticket voting varies according to mayoral vote choice - we find such a pattern in both bivariate and multivariate analyses. In this instance, the party of incumbent mayoral candidates had the lowest rates of straight ticket support. Of theoretical importance is our test of two competing explanations for split ticket behavior. In short, we find little to no support for the strategic explanation (*H1*), and a great deal of support for a number of other, accidental explanations (*H2*). On the basis of ideology and sophistication variables, we find little evidence that voters in either Montreal or Quebec had a desire to see party or policy balance in their municipal legislatures. Instead, partisanship, down-ballot incumbency and mayoral vote choice are the largest drivers of split ticket behaviour. These findings represent the first academic examination of municipal split ticket voting in Canada (and likely elsewhere), and add to the existing literature on split ticket voting more generally.

In addition to offering these many new insights into ticket splitting in municipal elections, this study raises a number of new questions. First, why is it that some mayoral candidates better able than others to convince their supporters to back their parties in down-ballot races? Is it always the case that incumbents are at a disadvantage in this sense, or do other factors account for this? Next, though CMES data allow us to develop an understanding of the individual-level correlates of split ticket voting, the fact that this study is limited to two cities means that we are unable to consider institutional factors. Do, for example, the number or type (permanent versus transient and leader based) of parties or the size of a city affect rates of split ticket voting? In a similar vein, we found above that partisan attachment is one of, if not the strongest predictors of split ticket voting.

However, it is unclear what the concept of partisan ID means in settings such as these, where some parties are based upon leaders and others around broader ideologies. Is it the case that different types of parties are better at attracting straight ticket voters? In contrast, we find in only one set of models (the Montreal council model) do mayoral leadership evaluations have an independent impact upon split ticket voting. Is it possible that votes for councillor are more heavily influenced by mayoral evaluations than are borough mayoral races? Finally, we note above that most municipal elections in Canada are non-partisan. Still, in most cities the mayor has clear allies, who tend to vote with him or her on most issues, as well as opponents who tend to vote in opposition. Future work could be conducted to determine the extent to which voters are aware of such links and if and how these links affect down ballot vote decisions. Though such behaviour cannot be considered straight ticket voting in the strictest sense, it is consistent with the spirit of the term. While this study provides a valuable first contribution to the study of municipal split ticket voting in Canada, it represents but the first of many steps towards understanding this phenomenon.

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