One of the main concerns of Human Geography is the relation between human culture and the natural environment. How we live on and with the natural world, the impact of our activities on the environment and the social meaning of nature have been for a long time at the centre of the discipline. The interest of human geographers is not limited to nature. It extends to all facets of human life, which are all bound up with questions of space and place. Human geography is uniquely concerned with the spatiality of social life, that is, with the way human beings encounter, know, co-construct and experience the world in which we live. This is not an abstract facet of human life. Encounters with the spatiality of the world permeate our everyday lives.

In recent years, notions of dwelling have been proposed as an alternative style of thinking about the spatiality of human life. Many commentators have made use of this concept to think of nature and landscape (Ingold, 1995, 2000; Macnaghten and Urry, 1998; Franklin, 2002; Cloke and Jones, 2001; Wylie, 2003;), place and space (Thrift, 1999; Urry, 2000; Casey 1998), the role of objects (Lury, 1997) tourism (Obrador-Pons, 2003) and surfing (Shields, 2004). In all these cases, the use of dwelling as a motif responds to a growing unease with conventional epistemologies and, in particular, with the common separation of people and space. Notions of dwelling are by no means alone in responding to this sense of unease as other theoretical developments have demonstrated, most notably Actor Network Theory (Latour, 1999, Law and Hassard, 1999), non-Representational theory (Thrift, 1999, 2004) and notions of performativity (Rose, 1999; Dewsbury, 2000) and hybridity (Haraway, 1991; Whatmore, 2002). All of these approaches defy the idealism that dominates western thought.

The sense of unease to which these theories respond stems from the inadequacy of conventional approaches to ‘making sense’ of the spatiality of human life. Dominant ways of thinking in geography are often premised upon the severance of subjects and objects. The same division is replicated between culture and nature. These binary divisions are not simply physical demarcations; they are first and foremost ontological separations. Conventional approaches assume a distal and idealistic form of knowledge wherein a detached subject contemplates the world from an outside point of view. In this scheme of thought the emphasis is placed on a penetrating gaze seeking the a priori order of things, their intrinsic foundations and underlying meanings and structures. Such spectatorial epistemologies have left us with a de-materialised and disembodied view of the world. Giving priority to detached forms of knowledge, human relations with the environment are reduced to an intellectual and visual exercise, leaving little space for skilful, embodied coping or engagement with the environment. In this context the material world seems only to exist either as an unavoidable precondition - a mere container of human activities- or as the product of social construction.
This chapter considers the so-called dwelling perspective in geography. The aim is twofold: to comment upon recent developments that make use of dwelling and to assess its value. The underlying question is whether notions of dwelling provide a useful framework for understanding the complex relations between human culture and nature. This chapter is structured in four parts. The first part presents the theoretical development and traces its philosophical roots. The fundamental experience of involvement is identified as the primary focus of this approach. The second part looks at how dwelling has been deployed in re-materialising and re-embodying landscape, an entity previously reduced to symbols and representation. While bridging the Cartesian gap between the material and the ideal, dwelling does however risk erecting new binarisms between vision and embodied practice. The third part comes back to the original question and considers what makes dwelling attractive as an alternative framework for the understanding of human nature relations. Geographers and other social scientists have turned to dwelling in search of an interconnected and embodied view of human nature relations that can still retain a notion of place. The final part considers the limitations of the dwelling perspective. If dwelling is to be a useful concept in geography its interpretative scope has to be extended beyond its original usage. It should register the fleeting as well as the enduring, the mobile as well as fixed, the modern as well as the traditional.

The Dwelling Perspective

In geography, the concept of dwelling owes its reputation to the work of Tim Ingold (1995, 2000), an anthropologist with an interest in hunter-gatherer societies, human-animal relationships and human ecology. He turned to the phenomenological writings of Heidegger and MerleauPonty searching for more adequate ways of understanding the relations between people and the environment and how they are different from animals. Ingold felt uneasy with the conventional belief that humans inhabit intentional worlds, in which life is designed prior to its material realisation. This belief prompts the unreasonable conclusion that human beings develop a dual level existence as organisms and as persons, that is half nature and half culture, half body and half mind (Ingold, 2000: 172). In suggesting a split-level existence, conventional ways of thinking effectively reintroduce a Cartesian dichotomist epistemology.

Notions of dwelling provide a valuable route for those seeking to move beyond dichotomist ways of thinking such as those troubling Ingold. The notion of dwelling leaves no place for theories that perpetuate a Cartesian division between the material and the ideal, the brain and the body. Instead a sense of proximity and togetherness, of staying with things, is presupposed. The embeddeness of human beings in the world is the primary focus of this approach (Dreyfus, 1993; Casey, 1998; Ingold, 2000; Cloke and Jones, 2001; Wylie, 2003; Thrift, 1999). Being is always being-in-the-world, that is, a situated and contingent process of engagement with the environment. For Heidegger, to be-in does not primarily refer to the spatial location of human activities- that is to sheer containment- but to the involvement of humans with things (Dreyfus, 1993: 42). Dwelling connotes taking care, being familiar with, cherishing or looking after, which according to Heidegger are the primordial meanings of dwelling. It is worth noting that some of the usages of the preposition “in” still have an existential sense which expresses involvement, as in being in love or being in business (Dreyfus, 1993: 46). In giving emphasis to involvement, notions of dwelling argue against the
severance of human beings and the material environment. “Dwelling is about the rich intimate ongoing togetherness of beings and things which make up landscapes and places, and which bind together nature and culture”, Cloke and Jones points out (2001: 651). Human beings reside somewhere alongside things in an intense relationship with the environment.

Recognition of dwelling implies a shift from the so-called ‘building’ perspective, where ideal mental constructs are imposed on the world. Notions of dwelling reverse the normal order of priority of form over process. “Life (...) is not the revelation of pre-existent form, but the very process wherein form is generated and held in place” Ingold points out (2000: 173). Conventional ‘building’ approaches sees humans as unique beings occupying intentional worlds. Contrary to animals, whose relations with the environment consist of practical absorption into the landscape, human engagement in the world is thought to be designed in the imagination, in webs of meaning, prior to the material realisation. Humans appear to cover the world with a ‘tapestry of meaning’ (Ingold, 2000: 177). The trouble with building perspectives is that a pre-given order before life is presupposed. As Ingold point out “Something […] must be wrong somewhere, if the only way to understand our own creative involvement in the world is by taking ourselves out of it” (Ingold, 1995: 58). A Dwelling perspective does not deny the importance of processes of social construction, but sees them as possible only because we are engaged in the world. “Any act of building, living, or even thinking, is formed in the context of already being-in-the-world” Cloke and Jones point out (2001: 651). What a dwelling perspective denies is the possibility of representing the world, of extracting an image of some naturally present, externally given reality. Human imagination does not pre-exists human practices. “People do not import their ideas, plans or mutual representations into the world, since that very world (...) is the homeland of thoughts they do” (Ingold, 1995: 76). Consciousness does not precede the act of dwelling, but emerges from it.

In their current usage, notions of dwelling take for granted the primacy of pragmatic involvement. Central to the work of Ingold is the idea that our commitment with the world is mainly practical not cognitive. Being-in-the-world consists of an everyday skilful, embodied coping or engagement with the environment. A dwelling perspective suggests that the world is disclosed without resorting to deliberate consciousness. According to Dreyfus, “Subject-object epistemology is secondary to what may be termed ‘the directly given and fundamentally experience of involvement” (1991: 42). However this interpretation of dwelling may be read as an alteration of the original meaning of dwelling. Dwelling as formulated by Heidegger in his essay ‘building, Dwelling, Thinking’ (1993) does not imply simply the primacy of the practical activity. Heidegger does not overcome Cartesianism by eliminating the spiritual components of our lives, but by integrating it. In his later writings, Heidegger makes space for dwelling in depth, that is, for the invisible and spiritual components of our lives (Casey, 1998: 273). It is by means of dwelling that humans become humans. And not only because they are practically involved in the world in a constant manipulative frequently unreflexive relation (participation) with things and people, but also through bringing the fourfold elements, earth, sky, divinities and mortals together in one entity (Harrison, forthcoming: 17) Since we-are-in-the-world life is preserved from dispersion and disintegration.
Despite the lack of concern for movement, a dwelling perspective can be aligned with such relational and performative approaches to place as for example those of Massey (2005) and Thrift, (1999). Within a dwelling perspective, place is considered as a situated and relational phenomena wherein humans and non-humans are bounded together co-constituting and performing the world. These are not abstract relations, but material interactions between people and their environment, “relations which are necessarily embedded material practices that have to be carried out” Massey explains (2005:9). Place emerges as a lived entity that is always in the process of being made. It is always under construction, never finished nor closed. A relational and performative notion of place does not necessarily exclude in-material elements. Places are the result of multiple relations, including invisible and spiritual ones. “The ecology of place is a rich and varied spectral gathering, an articulation of presence (…) and seething absences’ (Thrift 1999: 316-317). Places haunt us at the same time that we haunt them. That is, places frequently visit us in the form of ghosts, since they are constituted through human and non-human dwelling. By leaving space for the invisible in the visible, an understanding of place as a lived and autonomous entity is made possible.

**Dwelling and Landscape**

In geography notions of dwelling have been extensively deployed in re-materialising and re-embodying cultural geographies of landscape (Ingold, 2000, Cloke and Jones, 2001; Wylie 2003). Many commentators have turned to dwelling as a means to renovate the conceptual basis of a field which was felt to be ‘sliding out of sight’ with the performative turn and the nascent critiques to representation. Its main appeal comes from the fact that it provides a passageway between the ‘cultural turn’ and theorisations of praxis and performance (Wylie, 2003: 141-142). In re-conceptualising landscape as a ‘milieu of involvement’, a ‘kinaesthetic medium of practices’ (Wylie, 2003: 155), dwelling is able to transcend the theoretical impasse of culturalist approaches to landscape and re-materialise an entity that has often been reduced to texts, representation and ways of seeing.

Tim Ingold was the first to use notions of dwelling to think of landscape. For Ingold the “Landscape is constituted as an enduring record of- and testimony to- the lives and works of past generations, who have dwelt within it, and in so doing have left there something of themselves” (2000: 189). Landscape is presented as something different from land and space. It is neither quantitative nor homogeneous but qualitative and heterogeneous, it is the world as known to those who inhabit it. This means that landscape is neither just a ‘way of seeing’, nor simply an object of contemplation, but the sedimentation of mundane everyday practices of both humans and non-humans. “A place owes its character” - Ingold explains- “to the experiences it affords to those who spend time there- to the sights, sounds and indeed smells that constitute its specific ambience. (…) It is from this relational context of people’s engagement with the world, in the business of dwelling, that each place draws its unique significance” (2000: 192). We are not spectators of landscape but participants in it, not just with the eyes, but with the whole of our body. Landscapes are felt through the senses

Ingold provides illustration of his dwelling approach to landscape though an analysis of a European rural scene called *The Harvesters*, painted by Pierre Brueghel in 1565
(Ingold, 2000: 201-107). In this analysis, landscape is presented as the historical record of human dwelling. Rather than focusing on the symbolism of the scene, Ingold brings to the fore how landscape is felt, as it is incorporated into our bodily experience. Particularly illuminating is his analysis of the paths that traverse the landscape. For Ingold, paths reveal the accumulated imprint of countless journeys. They are the sedimentation of the mundane activity of an entire community over many generations.

“Taken together, these paths and tracks ‘impose a habitual pattern on the movement of people’ (Jackson 1989: 146). And yet they also arise out of that movement, for every path or track shows up as the accumulated imprint of countless journeys that people have made (…) as they have gone about their everyday business.”

At the centre of the painting there is a pear-tree, around which the landscape is ordered. Echoing Heidegger’s analysis of the bridge (1993), Ingold suggests that the very place arises out the solid presence of that tree. In part the tree constitutes the scene.

“But this is not just a tree. For one thing, it draws the entire landscape around it into a unique focus: in other words, by its presence it constitutes a particular place. The place was not there before the tree, but came into being with it”

A commentary of a church, the hills, the valley, the cornfields and the people complete the analysis of the painting. Two elements are central in this rural landscape: the solid materiality of non-human elements such as the tree and the everyday imprint of the people who live and work in it.

The notion of landscape developed by Ingold is considered in combination with temporality. For Ingold landscape “unfolds the lives and times of predecessors who, over the generations have moved around in it and played their part in its formation” (2000: 189). Landscape is not only saturated with the lives and practices of those who have lived there in the past, it also gathers many projections into the future. In his account the present is not detached from the past and the future, instead all three are gathered together in the landscape “like refractions in a crystal ball”. Landscape is a place of memory that tells multiple stories, evoking different temporalities and spatialities. Central to Ingold’s approach to landscape and temporality is the notion of taskscape, which refer to the array of “practical operations carried out by a skilled agent in an environment as part of his or her normal business of life” (2000: 195). The so-called taskscape is what confers the social character to landscape, what saturates the place with memories. For Ingold the temporality of the taskscape is neither chronological nor historical, but social. Time is not an external abstract frame that covers up the world but is something that emerges from the engagement of people in the manifold tasks and practical activities of dwelling. As he points out “the notion that we can stand aside and observe the passage of time is founded upon an illusion of disembodiment. This passage is, indeed, none other than our own journey through the taskscape in the business of dwelling” (2000: 196). For Ingold, temporality and landscape are quintessentially performed, enacted.
Drawing on notions of dwelling, Ingold manages to transcend the theoretical impasse of conventional approaches to landscape and re-materialise an entity that has often been reduced to texts, symbols and representations. While bridging the Cartesian division between the material and the ideal, his dwelling perspective risks erecting new binarisms between vision and embodied practice, in which vision is defined negatively. As Wylie points out, “The sense remains that the ‘dwelling perspective’, and notions of embodied practice and performance more widely, in some sense involve a rejection of the visual gaze” (2003: 145). In the work of Ingold there is what Hinchliffe terms an “earthy romanticism” that gives priority to embodied practices and the know-how that makes living possible and marginalizes the textual and the visual (Hinchliffe, 2002: 220). A disdain for the visual together with its rustic romantic connotations have been singled out as the main weaknesses of the dwelling perspective.

If it is to be a useful concept, a dwelling perspective must not eliminate the visual. In his critique, Wylie speaks to the need to re-sensitise seeing by recasting it as bodily sensuous experience. Although vision is often identified as external and detached, it still is part of the sensuous apparatus of the body and as such is one of the ways through which we experience and co-construct landscape. For Wylie, the dwelling perspective must not reject the visual but reconfigure it as a practice of dwelling.

“Rather than focusing upon a critique of particular cultural forms of visuality, and their association with, for example, discourses of objectivity, control and authority, the task of a dwelling perspective upon landscape should involve a reconfiguration of vision such that (…) the activity of gazing is itself understood as a practice of dwelling” (Wylie, 2003: 146)

Neither should a dwelling perspective reject texts. As Hinchliffe points out, texts such as landscape paintings are not simply representations but experimentations that make places habitable. They are actions that produce connections. Rather than arguing for fewer texts, textualities can actually be pursued for they production of an inhabitable and affective world.

“Rather than looking for things that exist outside texts, the aim becomes one of gaining understanding of how texts (perhaps among other means) can enable what Latour calls a ‘learning to be affected’” (2002: 216)

Notions of dwelling are valuable ideas for cultural geographies of landscape. However, they cannot be taken uncritically. To do so would risk erecting new binarisms, thus excluding some legitimate modes of engagement with the world, in particular vision and textuality.

**Human-nature relations**

Notions of dwelling provide a valuable route for those seeking to re-theorise human-nature relations. Its main value comes from its ability to transcend the theoretical and methodological impasse of conventional approaches, which envision nature either as an unavoidable precondition - a mere container of human activities- or as the product of social construction (Franklin, 2002; Urry and Macnaghten, 1998). Emphasising performativity, involvement and togetherness, notions of dwelling have the potential
to break up this sterile dichotomy, paving a way between naturalist and culturalist approaches (Ingold, 2000: 189). A dwelling perspective offers an interconnected and embodied view of human-nature relations, which acknowledges the complex, diverse and overlapping ways humans experience the environment. Nature came to be seen as a collection of always localised and relational phenomena embedded in particular times and spaces. This interconnected view of the world is not detrimental to a notion of place as is the case of Actor network theory (Cloke and Jones, 2001). Humans and non-humans are interwoven together, co-constructing and performing the world without stripping them of their own agency.

Moreover, notions of dwelling offer the opportunity to move beyond an occulocentric view of nature. Much writing on nature takes for granted a visual and cognitive relation with the environment. Human experience of nature is often reduced to a practice of visual consumption, wherein a detached subject has the privilege to observe nature from a vantage point. Nature transpires as a collection of views, which are extraordinary and separated from everyday life. This means concealing the complex and contradictory ways people inhabit the world around them. The reduction of nature to a visual representation and its conversion into spectacle participate in the occulocentrism that since modernity has dominated not only the experience of nature but also the whole western culture (Jay, 1994). When notions of dwelling are employed the visual is no longer treated as a disembodied relation with the world just as nature is no longer reduced to visual representations. In a dwelling perspective being is always being-in-the-world, a situated, embodied and contingent process of engagement with the environment. To be in nature is not only a question of being ‘located’ in nature or ‘representing’ nature but of practicing and performing nature. A dwelling perspective assumes that nature is always experienced in sensual and embodied terms. Encountering nature is a complex and diverse process in which vision, sound and kinaesthetics overlap.

By taking into account what exceeds the rational and the visual, notions of dwelling have the potential to unveil new dimensions of the human engagement with nature. Such is the case with the beach. An account of the tourist experience of the beach is uncompleted if it focuses only on the visual consumption of the beach even when considering this already as an embodied practice. Working within a visual framework neither exhausts the experience of the beach nor overcomes the limitations and contradictions of vision. On the beach there are other articulations of senses, movements and taskscapes that penetrate the surfaces and superficialities of modern visual natures. Most of the time the beach is experienced in sensual and embodied terms, through a combination of visual and non-visual senses, distal and proximal modes of engagement. What makes the beach a distinctive and pleasant experience is the direct exposure of the skin to the sun as well as the possibility of manipulating the sand and moving the body into the water. Swimming, sunbathing and building sandcastles- the most characteristic beach activities- suggest a haptic order of the sensible, as well as a visual one. The beach shares with other leisure activities such as hunting and angling (Franklin, 2001, 2002) Walking (Edensor, 2000) and adventure sports (Cloke and Perkins, 1998) a performative character.

Nature is something material, not ideal, that is socially constituted through both discursive and non-discursive everyday practices. “Each such nature”- Macnaghten and Urry argue- “is constituted through a variety of socio-cultural processes from
which such natures cannot be plausibly separated” (1998: 1). Nature is not an external and pre-given reality, it is always a localised and relational phenomena embedded in particular times and spaces. This means that there is no singular nature but a diversity of natures. In using the notion of dwelling, Ingold (2000) and Urry and Macnaghten (1998) are able to eschew the unproductive tension between naturalistic and culturalist approaches to nature. Nature is conceived neither as a neutral, external backdrop to human activities that has the power to produce unambiguous, observable and rectifiable outcomes, the point of view of environmental realism; nor as a particular cognitive or symbolic ordering of space, the point of view of environmental idealism (Ingold, 2000:189; Macnaghten and Urry, 1998: 1). As Franklin points out, “nature is always and everywhere socially constructed but it also a performed as well as a lived and dwelt experience” (2002: 7).

Notions of Dwelling offer an interconnected view of the world in which humans and non-humans are bounded together co-constituting and performing the world. In a dwelling perspective, human culture and the natural environment are not independent from each other, but blended together and often confused. The focus is not the borders of nature and culture but the interface and hybridisation of both realities. There are at least two common grounds between dwelling perspectives and hybrid geographies: a radical opposition to western dualisms and constituted totalities like the binary opposition between nature and culture; and an argument “for pleasure in the confusion of boundaries and for responsibility in their construction” (Haraway 1991: 154). Dealing with the interface of people and nature means considering “transgressed boundaries, potent fusions and dangerous possibilities” (Haraway 1991: 154). Human societies cannot be thought of as apart from things, whether natural environments like the beach or manmade things like a house or a car. In a Dwelling perspective this interconnected and hybrid view of the world is not detrimental to a sense of place and agency, as is often the case in Actor Network theory. Cloke and Jones locate here some of the main differences between these two perspectives. Noitons of Dwelling “could provide a fruitful framework for giving notice to the physical active presence of actants other than humans; doing so in a way similar to ANT, but yet acknowledging the creative agency of particular entities, and taking into account the common ground that is place” (2001: 654). Humans and non-humans are bounded together without this involving losing their agency.

**Authenticity and Dwelling**

There are major downsides subsisting within the dwelling metaphor that considerably narrow the interpretative scope of the concept. The main trouble derives from its common association with authenticity. Traditional modes of dwelling are often presented as the authentic mode of being-in-the world. In so doing, dwelling carries romantic and rustic connotations, which do not correspond with the way we live in the contemporary world. This links with other concerns such as the ‘partial eschewing of the visual’ (Wylie, 2003: 145), the ignorance of bodily movement (Urry, 2000: 133) and the ‘framing of the landscape (Cloke and Jones, 2001: 663). Dwelling can only be useful if is adapted beyond its original nostalgic usage to explain not only pre-industrial rural communities but also contemporary fleeting societies.
Dwelling was not originally conceived to embrace contemporary urban life. In its original usage, dwelling is almost impossible under the conditions of modernity. In much of the literature (including Urry and Macnaghten, 1998) a rural pattern of life rooted in a particular earth and world is taken as the model form of dwelling. Modernism is presented as alienating and destructive, whereas stable rural communities are commonly identified as genuine and authentic. The prominence of the traditional over the modern itself stems from Heidegger. “A sinister (nationalistic) rustic romanticism (…) pervades Heidegger ideas”, Cloke and Jones point out (2003: 661). His argument takes for granted a close relationship between authenticity and dwelling. The discrimination between authentic and non-authentic modes of dwelling suggests nostalgia for fictitious pre-industrial societies as well as a desire to live in a harmonious and stable place. In the work of Heidegger there is a persistent anxiety for the stranger, the uncanny and the unfamiliar (Casey, 1998). The ‘original’ sense of dwelling puts forward important questions about the relation between human culture and the natural environment in contemporary conditions. Taken to their extreme such arguments lead to, paraphrasing Cloke and Janes, “a view of true nature, or authentic landscape, or communities, as consisting of diminishing pockets of harmonious authentic dwelling in an ever-encroaching sea of alienation” (2001: 657). Without adaptation notions of dwelling are unable to explain the contemporary world.

In its original usage, only territorial forms of engagement create dwelling, that is, are productive of spatialities and temporalities. There is a coincidence between place, community and landscape, which leads to a locality-based and ‘presentist’ sense of place (Hinchliffe, 2002: 220). Assuming the oneness of people and the environment, dwelling commonly implies physical proximity and spatial fixity, neither of which corresponds with the fleeting reality of today’s globalised world. There is the risk of obscuring the multiple and complex connections and virtualities that transcend local boundaries, thus mistaking place and landscape as solely a local achievement. An emphasis on the proximal and the static pervades much of the literature on dwelling. The kind of dwelling that Heidegger has in mind is a “dwelling in nearness” (Casey, 1998: 281), enduring, self-contained and time-deepened. This vision of a local bounded harmonious community corresponds with his vision of the idyllic peasant life in the Black Forest. There is no dwelling in the urban, mobile, fragmentary life of the city. Although being more naïve, Ingold’s pursuit of dwelling also contains a certain degree of romanticism (Urry, 2000; Cloke and Jones, 2001; Wylie, 2003). The societies upon which Ingold rests upon his notion of dwelling are those of hunters and gatherers, apparently unaffected by the shrinking of the planet, the acceleration of western life and increasingly global flows and mobilities. Ultimately Ingold’s work emphasises spatial fixity and physical proximity and the prominence of bounded local space. As Urry points out “In the painting described by Ingold, propinquity, localness and communion thus coincide. But in the contemporary world they almost never coincide. The emergence of new, often more or less instantaneous mobilities mean that the patterns of dwelling described by Ingold require extensive reconceptualisation” (Urry, 2000: 136). The oneness of people and the environment is equated to a reciprocal face-to-face interaction.

A useful employment of dwelling in geography must extend its interpretative scope beyond the analysis of traditional pre-industrial societies. In the western world only a tiny bit of human experience corresponds with such a romantic and rustic view of dwelling. It is a matter of fact that our societies are no longer arranged as bounded,
face-to-face communities. Place, community and landscape often do not correspond. Central to modernity is a variety of bodily movements and interconnections that extend all over the world. Travel and tourism, migration and Diasporas, instant communications and other technologies are now everyday experiences, at least in the West. Even quotidian objects we live with in proximal close relationship incorporate many mobilities. In fact only a tiny proportion of what we consume is local. As Massey points out, these complex networks and mobilities, far from destroying the local sense of place, are often what make these places unique and different (Massey, 2005). Without the ethnic mix of people, exotic cuisines and communication technologies our cities would not be the interesting and exciting places they are today. We must neither comprehend the contemporary world as an inauthentic way of dwelling, nor treat modern societies as if they were hunters and gather, avoiding their mobile and fluid reality. As Urry points out “There are (...) a variety of ways of dwelling, but once we move beyond that of land, almost all involve complex relationships between belongingness and travelling, within and beyond the boundaries of national societies. People can indeed be said to dwell in various mobilities” (2000: 157, italics in original). A relationship between belongingness and travelling is not exclusive of modernity. Traditional societies also involve complex relationships between them. The gypsy and Jewish communities are good examples of dwelling-in-mobilities.

If dwelling is to be a useful concept in geography it should register the fleeting as well as the enduring, the mobile as well as fixed, the global as well as the local. Promising insights can be gained by articulating transitory experiences such as tourism in terms of involvement rather than location or detachment (Obrador-Pons, 2003). Doing tourism is not only a matter of being in space or representing the space. It is, above all, a matter of practising space and practising through space. That is, tourists are not only in place but also involved with the place, although not in the same manner that non-tourist are. Tourism is a form of dwelling that often corresponds with what Urry & Macnaghten term ‘leisure landscapes’. This kind of ‘dwellingness’ is distinctive in the exceptional power of the visual sense, the pre-eminence of an aesthetic sensibility and the temporal and geographical estrangement from everyday life. “In such leisure landscapes”- Macnaghten and Urry argue- “work, leisure and domestic routines are geographically and temporally estranged from each other and the physicalities of the situated body are leisured and have nothing to do with those of land per se” (2000:7-8). Most holidaymakers do not engage with the places they visit as insiders, like the peasant does, working the land as a way of economic survival. Their ‘dwellingness’ is not that of the land, but that of the ‘landscape’. Holidaymakers do not develop an unalienated relationship with the environment based on use values that dominate agrarian economies. They approach the environment as consumers and pleasure-seekers through practices that not only pursue the visual consumption of the place but also allow them ‘to get away from it all’ and re-live a simpler and more natural life. In considering transitory and banal experiences such as tourism, the challenge is to grasp this reality as dwelling without concealing the flows, networks and connections that make it possible. The non-bounded character of tourism cannot be an excuse to reintroduce a de-specialised, ungrounded subject.

Conclusion
This chapter has examined the possibilities and limitations of the so-called dwelling perspective. It has been conceived as both an introduction to recent developments that have made use of dwelling, and as a critical review of the concept. Dwelling provides a valuable route for those seeking to move beyond dichotomist ways of thinking that sever the material and the ideal as well as culture and nature. Its main value is the provision of an alternative style of thinking about the spatiality of human life, including human-nature relations. A dwelling perspective takes for granted an interconnected and embodied view of the world that still retains a notion of place (Cloke and Jones, 2001). Place, nature and landscape emerge as situated, localised and material phenomena wherein humans and non-humans are bounded together co-constituting and performing the world. By emphasising involvement over detached contemplation, scholars such as Ingold (2000) manage to re-materialise and re-embodie cultural geographies of landscape, thus renovating the conceptual basis of a field that was felt to be ‘sliding out’ of sight with the performative turn and the nascent critiques to representation (Wylie, 2003).

Despite its enormous potential the use of notions of dwelling in geography is not without pitfalls. There are major downsides subsisting within the dwelling perspective that considerably narrow the scope of the concept, the main one being its rustic and romantic overtones. Dwelling was not originally conceived to embrace contemporary urban life. In its original usage, dwelling is almost impossible under the conditions of modernity. Other concerns refer to the ‘partial eschewing of the visual’ (Wylie, 2003: 145), the ignorance of bodily movement (Urry, 2000: 133) and the ‘framing of the landscape (Cloke and Jones, 2001: 663). While bridging the Cartesian division between the material and the ideal, the dwelling perspective risks erecting new binarisms between vision and embodied practice, fleeting and enduring life. All these weaknesses ultimately derive from its common association with authenticity. While some particular forms of being-in-the-world seem to create dwelling, others appear to destroy dwelling. If dwelling is to be a useful concept in geography it should register the fleeting as well as the enduring, the mobile as well as fixed, the global as well as the local.

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