NEW JERSEY LAW REVISION COMMISSION

Draft Final Report Regarding the Workers Compensation Act and the Scope of “Intentional Wrong” in N.J.S. 34:15-8

September 11, 2023

The work of the New Jersey Law Revision Commission is only a recommendation until enacted. Please consult the New Jersey statutes in order to determine the law of the State. Please send comments concerning this Report or direct any related inquiries, to:

Whitney G. Schlimbach, Counsel
New Jersey Law Revision Commission
153 Halsey Street, 7th Fl., Box 47016
Newark, New Jersey 07102
973-648-4575
(Fax) 973-648-3123
Email: wgs@njlrc.org
Web site: http://www.njlrc.org
Project Summary

The New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) provides employees with an “automatic entitlement to certain, but reduced,” compensation for workplace injury or death in exchange for “relinquish[ing] their right to pursue common law remedies.” New Jersey Courts have characterized this exclusive remedy provision as “a historic trade-off.” In N.J.S. 34:15-8, the WCA provides an exception for injuries or death resulting from an “intentional wrong,” but does not define that term.

In Bove v. AkPharma Inc., the Appellate Division held that the intentional wrong exception did not apply to an employee whose injuries were allegedly caused by his use of a nasal spray developed and provided to him by his employer. The Bove Court engaged in a detailed discussion of the legislative history and common law defining the scope of the intentional wrong exception, reviewing three key New Jersey Supreme Court cases: Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Laidlow v. Hariton Machine Co., and Van Dunk v. Reckson Associates Realty Corp.

The recommended modifications to N.J.S. 34:15-8, set forth in the Appendix, are intended to clarify the scope of the intentional wrong exception to the exclusive remedy provision in the WCA, consistent with its legislative history and the interpretation of the statutory language by the New Jersey Supreme Court.

Statute Considered

N.J.S. 34:15-8, entitled “Election surrender of other remedies,” provides:

Such agreement shall be a surrender by the parties thereto of their rights to any other method, form or amount of compensation or determination thereof than as provided in this article and an acceptance of all the provisions of this article, and shall bind the employee and for compensation for the employee’s death shall bind the employee’s personal representatives, surviving spouse and next of kin, as well as the employer, and those conducting the employer's business during bankruptcy or insolvency.

---

1 Preliminary work on this project was conducted by Alyssa Brandley, during her tenure as Legislative Law Clerk, and Karyn White, during her tenure as Counsel, with the New Jersey Law Revision Commission.
3 Id.
4 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-8 (West 2022).
6 Id. at 135.
7 Id. at 139 – 143.
If an injury or death is compensable under this article, a person shall not be liable to anyone at common law or otherwise on account of such injury or death for any act or omission occurring while such person was in the same employ as the person injured or killed, except for intentional wrong.11

Background

The *Bove* Plaintiff was the Director of Clinical Studies at AkPharma.12 In 2007, AkPharma’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) suggested that Plaintiff and other employees use a nasal spray that the CEO developed and used to treat his own asthma.13 Although Plaintiff was aware that the nasal spray did not have FDA approval, he voluntarily used it from 2007 to 2010.14 During that time, he documented the effects of the product and provided his observations to the CEO.15 When the FDA issued a “full clinical hold letter,” Plaintiff discontinued his use of the nasal spray.16 In 2011, Plaintiff was terminated from AkPharma due to a workforce reduction.17 Two years later, he was diagnosed with permanent endocrine failure and a tumor in his colon, both of which he attributed to the nasal spray.18

Plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation claim for his injuries.19 He also sued his employer for fraudulent concealment, battery, and prima facie tort based on injuries he alleged were caused by the nasal spray.20 Following an evidentiary hearing in the lawsuit, the trial court granted Defendant AkPharma’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Plaintiff “did not vault the exclusivity provision of the WCA,” and Plaintiff appealed.21

Analysis

- **Bove v. AkPharma**

  In *Bove*, the Appellate Division examined the history and purpose of the WCA to determine whether Defendant’s conduct fell within the scope of the intentional wrong exception. The Court explained that the WCA “compensates employees for personal injuries caused ‘by accident arising out of and in the course of employment’ [and] authorizes benefits irrespective of the fault of the employer or contributory negligence and assumption of risk of the employee.”22

---

11 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-8 (emphasis added).
12 *Bove*, 460 N.J. Super. at 135.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 136.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 136 – 37.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 133.
21 Id. at 137 (internal quotations omitted).
22 Id. at 139 (internal quotation omitted).
In 1961, the Legislature amended N.J.S. 34:15-8 by adding the intentional wrong exception. Courts gave this language “a narrow construction,” reasoning that the “Legislature intended the words . . . to have their commonly understood signification of deliberate intention.” The Bove Court examined the New Jersey Supreme Court’s approach to the intentional wrong exception and reviewed the decisions of Millison, Laidlow, and Van Dunk.


Almost twenty-five years after N.J.S. 34:15-8 was amended, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the concept of intentional wrong in Millison, concluding that it “encompassed more than a subjective intention to injure.” Prior to Millison, demonstrating an intentional wrong required that “‘deliberate intention’ be shown.” In analyzing whether an intentional wrong had occurred, the Millison Court considered the necessary level of risk-exposure experienced by the harmed employee, as well as the context in which an employer’s conduct takes place.

In Millison, Plaintiffs alleged their employer knowingly exposed them to asbestos and concealed the health hazards of the exposure from them. Plaintiffs also alleged that their employer, along with company doctors who conducted regular medical examinations of employees, concealed medical findings indicating that Plaintiffs were already suffering from asbestos-related diseases.

To determine whether the employer had committed an intentional wrong within the meaning of N.J.S. 34:15-8, the Millison Court employed a “substantial certainty” standard. Under the substantial certainty standard, “the mere knowledge and appreciation of a risk — something short of substantial certainty — is not intent.” The Millison Court required “a virtual certainty” to ensure that “the statutory framework of the [WCA] is not circumvented simply because a known risk later blossoms into reality.”

In addition, the Court required an examination of “the context in which [the] conduct takes place.” When analyzing context, the Court focused on whether “the resulting injury or disease, and the circumstances in which it is inflicted . . . [can] fairly be viewed as a fact of life of industrial

---

23 Id.; see also L.1961, c. 2, p. 14, § 1.
25 Id. at 140-42.
26 Id. at 141.
28 Millison, 101 N.J. at 177.
29 Id. at 179.
30 Id. at 168.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 177.
33 Id. (quoting W. Prosser and W. Keeton, The Law of Torts, § 8 at 36 (5th ed. 1984)).
34 Id. at 178.
35 Id. at 179.
employment, or is it rather plainly beyond anything the legislature could have contemplated as entitling the employee to recover only under the Compensation Act.”

Although acknowledging that “knowingly exposing plaintiffs to asbestos clearly amounts to taking risks with employees’ health,” the Millison Court found this level of risk “come[s] up short of the ‘substantial certainty’ needed to find an intentional wrong.” Furthermore, the Court concluded that “the legislature’s awareness of occupational diseases as a fact of industrial employment” compelled the conclusion that this harm “must be considered the type of hazard of employment that the legislature anticipated would be compensable under [the WCA].”

The Millison Court held, however, that “[a]n employer’s fraudulent concealment of diseases already developed is not one of the risks an employee should have to assume.” Since “[s]uch intentionally-deceitful action goes beyond the bargain struck by the [WCA],” the Millison Court held the substantial certainty standard was satisfied.


Almost two decades after Millison was decided, the Supreme Court revisited the “substantial certainty” standard in Laidlow. In Laidlow, Plaintiff was injured operating a machine without a safety guard, which his employer had “tied up” to increase “speed and convenience.” In addition, the employer had a long-running practice of temporarily placing the safety guard in its proper position while OSHA carried out safety inspections.

Prior to Plaintiff’s injury, there were “close-calls” but the unguarded mill was operated “for approximately twelve to thirteen years” without any accidents. The Laidlow Court therefore addressed whether the removal of the safety guard gave rise to a “substantial certainty” of harm, in the “absence of any prior injury.”

To resolve this issue, the Laidlow Court emphasized several key principles from the Millison opinion. Although the “narrow and limited approach . . . requir[ing] subjective intention

---

36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 182.
40 Id.
41 Laidlow, 170 N.J. at 606.
42 Id. at 608.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 610 (comparing Defendant’s “position that, under Millison, the standard for an intentional wrong requires proof of an employer's subjective intent to injure and that the deliberate removal or alteration of a safety guard does not constitute a ‘deliberate intent to injure’” to the opposing position “that Millison specifically rejected the notion that an intentional wrong requires a deliberate intent to injure on the part of the employer [and] that Millison never declared that removal of a safety device failed to meet the standard for an intentional wrong”).
46 Id. at 617.
to injure” was rejected, the Millison Court left open the question whether removal of a safety device can be sufficiently egregious to find an intentional wrong. The Laidlow Court described the “substantial certainty test [as] encompassing acts that the employer knows are substantially certain to produce injury even though, strictly speaking, the employer does not will that result.”

The Laidlow Court restated the requirements for establishing an intentional wrong as follows:

(1) the employer must know that his actions are substantially certain to result in injury or death to the employee, and (2) the resulting injury and the circumstances of its infliction on the worker must be (a) more than a fact of life of industrial employment and (b) plainly beyond anything the Legislature intended the Workers’ Compensation Act to immunize.

Finding both prongs had been met, the Laidlow Court held the employer’s conduct fell within the scope of the intentional wrong exception in the WCA. The Court found that “the absence of a prior accident does not mean that the employer did not appreciate that its conduct was substantially certain to cause death or injury.”

The Court clarified, however, that its holding did not establish a “per se rule that [an employer commits an] ‘intentional wrong’ . . . whenever that employer removes a guard or similar safety device from equipment or machinery, or commits some other OSHA violation.”

Van Dunk v. Reckson Associates Realty Corp.

In contrast to Millison and Laidlow, the Van Dunk Court held Plaintiff did not establish an intentional wrong. In that case, the Plaintiff’s injury occurred when an unsecured trench collapsed on him less than five minutes after his supervisor told him to go in and fix a piece of filter fabric that would not lay flat. The on-site supervisor “readily acknowledged to OSHA that . . . he knew the OSHA requirements and did not follow [them],” and “against his own better judgment [sent Plaintiff into the trench] to perform a brief task and get out.” As a result, OSHA issued a “willful violation,” meaning the “non-compliance . . . was not an accident or negligence.”

---

47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 617.
50 Id. at 622.
51 Id. at 621; see also Bove, 460 N.J. Super. at 141 – 42.
52 Laidlow, 170 N.J. at 622 – 23.
53 Van Dunk, 210 N.J. at 452.
54 Id. at 454.
55 Id. at 455.
56 Id. at 472.
57 Id.
In keeping with the considerations in Laidlow and Millison, the Van Dunk Court concluded that “[t]he existence of an uncontroverted finding of an OSHA safety violation [even one categorized as willful] does not establish the virtual certainty that Millison demands.”58 The Van Dunk Court distinguished prior, successful intentional wrong claims because they “involved the employer's affirmative action to remove a safety device from a machine, prior OSHA citations, deliberate deceit regarding the condition of the workplace, machine, or . . . the employee's medical condition, knowledge of prior injury or accidents, and previous complaints from employees.”59 The Court also emphasized “the durational aspect of the employer’s intentional noncompliance with OSHA requirements or other demonstrations of a longer-term decision to forego required safety devices or practices” in prior cases.60

Consequently, although the Van Dunk Court held that there was “an exceptional wrong” in that the “employer may have committed a reckless act [or] gross negligence . . . the plaintiff did not satisfy the conduct prong of the substantial-certainty test of Millison.”61 The Van Dunk Court then addressed the “context prong.”62 The Court concluded that “the type of mistaken judgment by the employer and ensuing employee accident [in Van Dunk] was [not] so far outside the bounds of industrial life as never to be contemplated for inclusion in the Act’s exclusivity bar.”63 Despite holding that Plaintiff had not satisfied either prong, the Van Dunk Court did not foreclose the possibility that “a single egregiously wrong act by an employer might, in the proper circumstances, satisfy the intentional-wrong standard.”64

After summarizing the facts and holdings in these three primary Supreme Court cases, the Bove court concluded that

[r]eviewing these cases together, it is apparent that in addition to violations of safety regulations or failure to follow good safety practice, an intentional wrong will be found when it is accompanied by something more, such as deception, affirmative acts that defeat safety devices, or a willful failure to remedy past violations.65

The Bove Court determined that Plaintiff “presented no evidence to support his contention defendants were substantially certain his use of [the nasal spray] would result in injury or death,” or even that “his alleged injuries resulted from defendants’ actions.”66

58 Id. at 469 – 70.
59 Id. at 471.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 472.
62 Id. at 474.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Bove, 460 N.J. Super. at 142 (emphasis added).
66 Id. at 145.
Therefore, the Bove court held that Plaintiff failed to satisfy the substantial certainty standard and establish an intentional wrong.67

- **Other New Jersey Supreme Court Cases Addressing “Intentional Wrong”**

  In addition to the leading cases of Millison, Laidlow, and Van Dunk, the New Jersey Supreme Court has analyzed the scope of the intentional wrong exception in three additional cases, all issued on the same day in 2003. In two of the cases, Crippen v. Central Jersey Concrete Pipe Co.,68 and Mull v. Zeta Consumer Products,69 the Supreme Court found an intentional wrong.70 In Tomeo v. Thomas Whitesell Construction Co.,71 however, the Court determined that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate an intentional wrong.72

  In Crippen, an employee suffocated after falling into a hopper filled with sand and gravel.73 The Supreme Court found that his employer “had knowledge that its deliberate failure to cure . . . OSHA violations” related to “inherently dangerous conditions” for a period of eighteen months was “substantial[ly] certain[ to result in] injury or death to one of its employees.”74 The Court held that the employer’s conduct and the “intentional[] dece[ption of] OSHA into believing that it had abated the violations[,]” satisfied both the conduct and context prongs of the Millison standard.75

  In Mull, the Supreme Court addressed an injury that occurred when a winder machine started up unexpectedly while an employee was unjamming it.76 The Court rejected the employer’s argument that his “lack of deception toward OSHA” warranted a finding that the “conduct” prong was not met.77 The Mull Court found that the employer disengaged safety devices and failed to provide a procedure for halting operation of the winder, despite a prior accident, employee safety complaints, and previous OSHA citations.78 The Court held that those findings were sufficient to meet both prongs of the substantial certainty test.79

  Finally, in Tomeo, an employee used his hand to clear snow from the chute of a snowblower and was pulled into its propellers, which continued to operate because the safety lever was taped in the disengaged position.80 The Tomeo Court found that, even assuming the employer had taped

---

67 *Id.* at 146.
70 *Crippen*, 176 N.J. at 399; *Mull*, 176 N.J. at 387.
72 *Tomeo*, 176 N.J. at 367.
73 *Crippen*, 176 N.J. at 400.
74 *Id.* at 409.
75 *Id.* at 410 (finding the employer “effectively precluded OSHA from carrying out its mandate to protect the life and health” of the employees).
76 *Mull*, 176 N.J. at 387-88.
77 *Id.* at 392.
78 *Id.* at 393.
79 *Id.* at 392.
80 *Tomeo*, 176 N.J. at 368.
the safety lever, the employee’s act of putting his hand in the chute while the propellers were activated was an “intervening-superceding [sic] cause”\(^81\) of the injury, and therefore, he did not establish an intentional wrong by his employer.\(^82\)

- **Appellate Division Cases Addressing “Intentional Wrong”**

  In *Van Dunk*, the Supreme Court described the intentional wrong standard as “formidable,” a characterization confirmed by the rarity of successful claims at the appellate level.\(^83\) Using the framework developed by the Supreme Court, the Appellate Division has analyzed a multitude of varied fact patterns to determine whether an injured employee has established an intentional wrong and vaulted the exclusivity provision in the WCA.

  Many intentional wrong cases addressed injuries caused solely by work-related equipment, usually because the equipment was in a state of disrepair;\(^84\) lacked safety devices or precautions;\(^85\) or was improperly operated.\(^86\) Plaintiffs also commonly alleged injury caused by exposure to toxins or chemicals in the workplace\(^87\) or by the negligent conduct of a third party.\(^88\) When

---

\(^{81}\) *Id.* at 375.

\(^{82}\) *Id.* at 377 (“the law does not impose a duty on an employer to prevent an employee from engaging in self-damaging conduct absent a showing that the employer encouraged such conduct or concealed its danger”).

\(^{83}\) *Van Dunk*, 210 N.J. at 451; see e.g. *Mabee v. Borden, Inc.*, 316 N.J. Super. 218, 229 (1998) (observing that “[s]ince the *Millison* decision . . . New Jersey courts have yet to find an employee's allegations of intentional conduct sufficiently flagrant so as to trigger the exception to the exclusivity bar” and holding that Plaintiff’s evidence (1) that employer removed safety guard and installed bypass switch to prevent automatic stoppage of labeling machine and (2) of a similar prior injury, satisfied the substantial certainty test); *Soto v. IOC*, 2017 WL 4530602 (N.J. Super. Oct. 11, 2017) (holding that substantial certainty standard was met where, after an explosion was caused by accumulations of combustible dust, employer misrepresented that numerous resulting OSHA violations had been abated, and Plaintiff was injured in subsequent explosion caused by same condition); *Alberto v. N. E. Linen Supply Co.*, 2015 WL 9942207 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 1, 2016) (finding that employer knew there was a substantial certainty of injury when he caused two employees to enter wastewater tank to clean it and both were killed almost immediately from exposure to the lethal chemicals inside the tank).


analyzing whether a plaintiff met the intentional wrong standard, appellate courts adhered closely to the language and considerations in Millison, Laidlow, and Van Dunk.

Appellate courts have also held that an employer’s acquiescence in bad safety practices was insufficient to demonstrate an intentional wrong, on the basis that “[m]ere knowledge by an employer that a workplace is dangerous does not equate to an intentional wrong.”89 When evaluating an employer’s appreciation of risk, courts have considered the following: whether there were prior accidents, close-calls, or safety complaints, of which the employer was aware;90 whether an employer removed or was aware of the absence of a safety device,91 and whether there were prior OSHA violations or deception.92

Intentional wrong claims often failed because an employer attempted to provide safety training and equipment to its employees, even if insufficient,93 or responded to employee safety complaints, even if the response was ineffective.94 Claims were also unsuccessful when a third party’s illegal act directly caused the injury,95 or an employee failed to heed warnings or follow safety instructions.96 An employer’s lack of knowledge of relevant safety issues has also defeated intentional wrong claims, since an employer must know there is a substantial certainty of injury.97

80 See Suarez v. Lee Indus., 2007 WL 2141505, *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 27, 2007) (“[Employer] had been using a forklift to raise employees pouring ingredients into the . . . tank for approximately seven years [and d]uring that period, there had not been any accident in which a person fell from the forklift into the tank or onto the ground next to the tank[, nor] evidence of any ‘close call’ in which such an accident had almost occurred”).
81 See Suarez, 2007 WL 2141505, *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 27, 2007) (“[Employer] had been using a forklift to raise employees pouring ingredients into the . . . tank for approximately seven years [and d]uring that period, there had not been any accident in which a person fell from the forklift into the tank or onto the ground next to the tank[, nor] evidence of any ‘close call’ in which such an accident had almost occurred”).
82 See Suarez v. Lee Indus., 2007 WL 2141505, *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 27, 2007) (“[Employer] had been using a forklift to raise employees pouring ingredients into the . . . tank for approximately seven years [and d]uring that period, there had not been any accident in which a person fell from the forklift into the tank or onto the ground next to the tank[, nor] evidence of any ‘close call’ in which such an accident had almost occurred”).
83 See Suarez, 2007 WL 2141505, *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 27, 2007) (“[Employer] had been using a forklift to raise employees pouring ingredients into the . . . tank for approximately seven years [and d]uring that period, there had not been any accident in which a person fell from the forklift into the tank or onto the ground next to the tank[, nor] evidence of any ‘close call’ in which such an accident had almost occurred”).
84 See Suarez, 2007 WL 2141505, *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 27, 2007) (“[Employer] had been using a forklift to raise employees pouring ingredients into the . . . tank for approximately seven years [and d]uring that period, there had not been any accident in which a person fell from the forklift into the tank or onto the ground next to the tank[, nor] evidence of any ‘close call’ in which such an accident had almost occurred”).
85 See Suarez, 2007 WL 2141505, *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 27, 2007) (“[Employer] had been using a forklift to raise employees pouring ingredients into the . . . tank for approximately seven years [and d]uring that period, there had not been any accident in which a person fell from the forklift into the tank or onto the ground next to the tank[, nor] evidence of any ‘close call’ in which such an accident had almost occurred”).
86 See Suarez, 2007 WL 2141505, *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 27, 2007) (“[Employer] had been using a forklift to raise employees pouring ingredients into the . . . tank for approximately seven years [and d]uring that period, there had not been any accident in which a person fell from the forklift into the tank or onto the ground next to the tank[, nor] evidence of any ‘close call’ in which such an accident had almost occurred”).
87 See Suarez, 2007 WL 2141505, *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 27, 2007) (“[Employer] had been using a forklift to raise employees pouring ingredients into the . . . tank for approximately seven years [and d]uring that period, there had not been any accident in which a person fell from the forklift into the tank or onto the ground next to the tank[, nor] evidence of any ‘close call’ in which such an accident had almost occurred”).
The Appellate Division has observed that the “consistent trend of our courts [is] holding the ‘intentional wrong’ exception in N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 ‘applicable in only rare and extreme factual circumstances.’”

The common elements in successful intentional wrong cases have been: prior similar accidents or close-calls; safety complaints or violations; alteration or removal of safety devices and guards; or a deliberate failure to correct unsafe conditions, sometimes accompanied by deception of either employees or those charged with regulating workplace safety, regarding safety conditions. This list is not comprehensive, nor have courts held that any of these examples are *per se* evidence of an intentional wrong.

- **Intentional Wrong in Other States**

Most states provide an exception to the exclusive remedy of workers compensation. The states that do so are fairly evenly split between providing a statutory or a common law exception. States that have codified the exception generally limit its scope to a deliberate or specific intent to injure on the part of the employer. Other states have narrowed the exception to provide relief
only when there has been: willful, unprovoked physical aggression;\(^{108}\) sexual assault or harassment;\(^{109}\) or when the injurious conduct is unrelated to work.\(^{110}\)

Florida is the only state that has codified an exception similar to New Jersey’s common law exception of substantial certainty of harm.\(^{111}\) Florida’s exclusive remedy statute provides two exceptions: (1) when an employer “fails to secure payment of compensation as required” by the workers’ compensation act, and (2) “[w]hen an employer commits an intentional tort that causes the injury or death of the employee.”\(^{112}\) The Florida statute continues that “an employer’s actions shall be deemed to constitute an intentional tort” when the employer “deliberately intended” to injure the employee,\(^{113}\) or engaged in conduct that the employer knew, based on prior similar accidents or on explicit warnings specifically identifying a known danger, was virtually certain to result in injury or death to the employee, and the employee was not aware of the risk because the danger was not apparent and the employer deliberately concealed or misrepresented the danger so as to prevent the employee from exercising informed judgment about whether to perform the work.\(^{114}\)

Although the Florida statute and New Jersey’s common law on this subject share several similarities, there are significant differences as well. When describing conduct that qualifies as an intentional wrong, the Florida statute employs similar language to that used by the New Jersey courts.\(^{115}\) Both states require either that the conduct is deliberate or an employer knows its conduct is almost certain to result in harm to the employee.\(^{116}\) Additionally, the examples in the Florida

\(^{108}\) CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602(b)(1) (West 2022) (“willful physical assault by the employer”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-209(3) (West 2022); (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.690(1) (West 2022); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-111 (West 2022).

\(^{109}\) HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386-5 (West 2022) (“sexual harassment or sexual assault and infliction of emotional distress or invasion of privacy related thereto”); VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-301(B) – (C) (West 2022) (“sexually assaulted and can identify the attacker . . . even if the attacker is the assaulted employee's employer or co-employee” and “nor shall this title bar any action at law, that might otherwise exist, by an employee who is sexually harassed”).

\(^{110}\) 77 PA. STAT. ANN. § 411(1) (West 2022) (“injury arising in the course of his employment,” as used in this article, shall not include an injury caused by an act of a third person intended to injure the employee [sic] because of reasons personal to him, and not directed against him as an employee [sic] or because of his employment”).

\(^{111}\) FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.11 (West 2022).

\(^{112}\) FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 440.11(1)(a) – (b).

\(^{113}\) FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 440.11(1)(a) – (b).

\(^{114}\) FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 440.11(1)(b)a.

\(^{115}\) See Millison, 101 N.J. at 178 (explaining that “the dividing line between negligent or reckless conduct on the one hand and intentional wrong on the other must be drawn with caution. . . [so w]e must demand a virtual certainty”).

\(^{116}\) See Laidlow, 170 N.J. at 614 (“an intentional wrong can be shown not only by proving a subjective desire to injure, but also by a showing, based on all the facts and circumstances of the case, that the employer knew an injury was substantially certain to result”).
statute — “prior similar accidents or . . . explicit warnings” — are commonly cited in New Jersey cases as relevant evidence of an employer’s knowledge of a substantial certainty of harm.\textsuperscript{117}

However, the Florida statute diverges significantly from New Jersey common law with respect to the requirement that an employer must conceal or misrepresent the danger to the employee, as deception by an employer is not \textit{necessary} to establish an intentional wrong in New Jersey.\textsuperscript{118} New Jersey common law also does not recognize a requirement that the concealment or deception “prevent the employee from exercising informed judgment about whether to perform the work,” as is required by the Florida statute.\textsuperscript{119}

Although the substance of the Florida intentional wrong exception is not identical to the New Jersey exception, the structure and language of the Florida statute provided guidance for developing the recommended language set forth in the Appendix.

Outreach

Outreach was conducted to knowledgeable individuals and organizations, including: the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development; NJM Insurance Group; the New Jersey Council on Safety and Health; the Workers Compensation Section of the New Jersey State Bar Association; the New Jersey Compensation Association; the New Jersey Self-Insurers Association; the Insurance Council of New Jersey; the New Jersey Civil Justice Institute; the attorneys who represented the parties in \textit{Bove v. AkPharma}; the New Jersey Business and Industry Association; and private attorneys with expertise in the area of workers’ compensation.

Opposition

Opposition to the proposed modifications to N.J.S. 34:15-7 was received in a joint comment from the Insurance Council of New Jersey (ICNJ) and the New Jersey Civil Justice Institute (NJCJI), and separately from the New Jersey Business and Industry Association.

\textsuperscript{117} \textit{Id.} at 621 (“reports of prior accidents like prior ‘close-calls’ are evidence of an employer's knowledge that death or injury are substantially certain to result, but they are not the only such evidence”).

\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Mull}, 176 N.J. at 392 (“Although the employer's purported deception in \textit{Laidlow} was a prominent factor in our analysis, we emphasized in that case that no one fact compelled our holding. In that respect, we stated as guidance to future courts and litigants that our disposition in such a case involving removal of safety devices will be grounded in the \textit{totality of the facts} contained in the record.”) (internal quotations omitted).

In addition, the New Jersey Manufacturer’s Insurance Group (NJM) aligned its official comment with the joint comment of the ICNJ and the NJBIA.121

- **Insurance Council of New Jersey & New Jersey Civil Justice Institute Joint Comment**

The organizations first expressed “appreciation [of] the Commission’s mandate to improve the quality of New Jersey’s statutes,” and noted the “deliberative approach [the Commission takes] to its mandate is clearly demonstrated by the thoughtful analysis set forth in the Report.”122

The ICNJ and NJCJI agreed, however, that, “given the fact-sensitive nature of determining whether the intentional wrong exception applies to workplace injuries, . . . the proposed amendment does not provide clarification regarding application of the exception above and beyond existing case law.”123 In addition, the organizations specifically objected to “the language set forth in Subsection c(2)(B),”124 which is “different from the existing common law test” and would therefore, “generate legal uncertainty, which in turn will spawn new litigation.”125

The ICNJ and NJCJI concluded their comments by “respectfully request[ing] that the Commission decline to recommend any amendments to the WCA to address application of the intentional wrong exception.”126

- **New Jersey Business and Industry Association Comment**

Opposition to the proposed modifications was also received from the New Jersey Business and Industry Association (NJBIA).127 The NJBIA echoed the concerns of the ICNJ and NJCJI that the proposed language indicating that an “intentional wrong is ‘established when an employee

120 Letter from Christine O’Brien, President Insurance Council of New Jersey and Anthony M. Anastasio, President New Jersey Civil Justice Institute, to Whitney Schlimbach, Counsel at NJLRC, at *1 (Nov. 14, 2022) (on file with NJLRC) [hereinafter ICNJ and NJCJI Comment] (“ICNJ is the leading trade association representing the interests of property and casualty insurers in the state. . . . NJCJI is the leading trade association advocating for the broader business community on matters of law and legal policy.”).

121 E-mail from Andrew Musick, Senior Advisor, Legislative Affairs, on behalf of New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Group, to Whitney G. Schlimbach, Counsel, NJLRC (Dec. 22, 2022, 9:35 AM EST) (on file with NJLRC) (“NJM’s official comments can be aligned with those submitted in the joint statement on the Draft Tentative Report to Clarify the Scope of “Intentional Wrong” in N.J.S. 34:15-8 [“Report”], as provided by the ICNJ/NJCJI.”).

122 Id.

123 Id. at *2.

124 See e.g. N.J. Law Revision Comm’n, Tentative Report to Clarify the Scope of “Intentional Wrong” in N.J.S. 34:15-8, at 14 (Sept. 15, 2022), www.njlrc.org (last visited Aug. 30, 2023) (“the circumstances and the resulting injury or death are not a known and accepted risk in the industry”) [hereinafter “September 2022 Tentative Report”].

125 ICNJ and NJCJI Comment, supra note 120, at *2.

126 Id.

127 Memorandum re: NJBIA comments regarding Draft Tentative Report to Clarify the Scope of “Intentional Wrong” in N.J.S. 34:15-8, from Alexis Bailey, NJBIA Vice President of Government Affairs, to the New Jersey Law Revision Commission (Nov. 15, 2022) (on file with the NJLRC).
demonstrates that the circumstances and the resulting injury or death are not a known and accepted risk in the industry’ . . . could lead to uncertainty and increase litigation by workers.”128

Therefore, the NJBIA “strongly urge[s] the Law Revision Commission to reconsider this recommendation in order to avoid overburdening the business community and diverting claims from the workers’ compensation system.”129

Alternative Language

On behalf of Ballard Spahr, LLP, the Honorable Roberto Rivera-Soto, who represented the Respondent in Bove v. AkPharma, provided detailed comments and alternative proposed language to the Commission.130 Justice Rivera-Soto suggested that the statutory language “be modified to more closely track the jurisprudentially defined requirements collectively laid out in Van Dunk . . , Millison . . , Laidlow . . , and Bove . . . ”131

Ballard Spahr provided the following alternative language be employed in subsection (c) of N.J.S. 34:15-8:

c. For purposes of this article, an “intentional wrong” is established when an employee demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence both the “conduct prong” and the “context prong” of an “intentional wrong” as follows:

(1) that the employer knowingly exposed the employee to a substantial certainty of injury (the “conduct prong”); and,

(2) that the resulting injury (i) is not a fact of life of industrial employment and (ii) must be plainly beyond anything the Legislature intended this Act to immunize (the “context prong”).

In the application of the definition of “intentional wrong” set forth in this subsection c., the following principles also govern:

• A finding of a willful violation under the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act, 15 U.S.C. §651, et seq., and the regulations adopted thereunder is not dispositive if the issue of whether the employer committed an “intentional wrong”;

• A probability or knowledge that injury or death could result is insufficient to establish an “intentional wrong”;

128 Id. (expressing concern specifically of increased litigation over “the notion that a workplace injury incident occurred as ‘a known and accepted risk in the industry’”).

129 Id.


131 Id. at 1.
• An “intentional wrong” must amount to a virtual certainty that bodily injury or death will result;

• Although the failure to take safety precautions may constitute an “exceptional wrong,” it is not, standing alone, the type of egregious conduct associated with an “intentional wrong”;

• An “intentional wrong” will be found when, in addition to violations of safety regulations or the failure to follow good safety practices, it is accompanied by something more, such as deception, affirmative acts that defeat safety devices, or a willful failure to remedy past violations; and,

• Mere allegations of intentional or negligent torts do not constitute an “intentional wrong.”\textsuperscript{132}

With respect to this alternative proposed language, Justice Rivera-Soto noted that “the more detailed provisions of these suggestions will be of much aid to litigants, lawyers and judges alike.”\textsuperscript{133} Furthermore, he explained that “the greater and more detailed definition of what constitutes an ‘intentional wrong’ simply codifies that which already appears in our jurisprudence.”\textsuperscript{134}

\textbf{Pending Bills}

There are no pending bills that address the scope of the intentional wrong exception in N.J.S. 34:15-8.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The WCA provides limited recovery for injuries sustained by employees in the course of their employment in exchange for relinquishing their right to pursue common law legal remedies, except in the case of an intentional wrong. Although the WCA does not define the term, the New Jersey courts, including the Appellate Division in \textit{Bove}, have addressed the scope of the exception.

The recommended modifications are set forth in the Appendix and add language to N.J.S. 34:15-8 intended to clarify the scope of the “intentional wrong” exception, consistent with the holdings of the New Jersey Supreme Court decisions in \textit{Millison}, \textit{Laidlow}, and \textit{Van Dunk}.

\textbf{APPENDIX}

\textsuperscript{132} \textit{Id.} at 1-2.
\textsuperscript{133} \textit{Id.} at 3.
\textsuperscript{134} \textit{Id.}
The recommended modifications to **N.J.S. 34:15-8. Election surrender of other remedies**, (shown with strikethrough, underlining, and *italics*, indicating language changed since the release of the September 2022 Tentative Report\(^{135}\), follow:

**a.** An agreement described in section 34:15-7 Such agreement shall be:

1. a surrender by the parties thereto of their rights to any other method, form or amount of compensation, or determination thereof, than as provided in this article; and,
2. an acceptance of all the provisions of this article; and,
3. shall bind the employee and, for compensation for the employee's death, shall bind the employee's personal representatives, surviving spouse and next of kin, as well as the employer, and those conducting the employer's business during bankruptcy or insolvency.

**b.** If an injury or death is compensable under this article, a person shall not be liable to anyone at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury or death, for any act or omission occurring while such person was in the same employ\(^{136}\) as the person injured or killed, except for an intentional wrong, as set forth in subsection (c).

**c.** For purposes of this article, an “intentional wrong” is established when an employee demonstrates that:

1. a person in the same employ deliberately intended to injure the employee;\(^{137}\) or
2. (A) the employer\(^{138}\) engaged in conduct knowing that it was substantially certain to result in an employee’s injury or death; and,
   (B) the circumstances and the resulting injury or death are not a known and accepted risk in the industry\(^{139}\) the resulting injury or death, and the circumstances in which it occurred, are outside the bounds of industry life such that they are


\(^{136}\) *Millison*, 101 N.J. at 185 (“We are convinced that the intentional wrongs of an employer as well as those of co-employees fall outside of the boundaries of the Compensation Act.”).

\(^{137}\) *Id.* at 170 (“in order to satisfy the Compensation Act's definition of ‘intentional wrong,’ claimants have heretofore been required to show a deliberate intention to injure”).

\(^{138}\) No cases were found addressing a situation where a co-employee’s conduct was subject to the substantial certainty test. There are numerous cases in which a co-employee is the cause of the harm, but the substantial certainty standard focuses on an employer’s conduct in those circumstances.

\(^{139}\) This proposed language appeared in the September 2022 Tentative Report, *see supra* note 124, at 14, and was universally rejected by commenters. See *supra* at pp.13-15 and Comment, *infra* at p.19.
plainly beyond the scope of the agreement referenced in subsection (a) of this section.\textsuperscript{140}

**COMMENT**

The recommended modifications divide the statute into lettered and numbered sections to make it more accessible, consistent with modern statutory drafting.

*Subsection (a)*

In the first paragraph of N.J.S. 34:15-8, re-labeled subsection (a), the recommended modifications replace “such agreement” with the language “an agreement as described in section 34:15-7.”

N.J.S. 34:15-7 is entitled “Compensation by agreement” and provides that:

\[\text{[w]hen employer and employee shall by agreement, either express or implied, as hereinafter provided, accept the provisions of this article[,] compensation for personal injuries to, or for the death of, such employee by accident arising out of and in the course of employment shall be made by the employer without regard to the negligence of the employer.}\textsuperscript{141}\]

As originally enacted in 1911, N.J.S. 34:15-7 immediately preceded N.J.S. 34:15-8, making clear that the agreement referenced by “such agreement” in N.J.S. 34:15-8 referred to that described in N.J.S. 34:15-7.\textsuperscript{142} However, in the intervening years, three statutes were added: N.J.S. 34:15-7.1,\textsuperscript{143} 7.2,\textsuperscript{144} and 7.3,\textsuperscript{145} obscuring the connection between the language “such agreement” in N.J.S. 34:15-8 and the agreement between an employer and employee described in N.J.S. 34:15-7. The modification clarifies the reference.

*Subsection (b)*

The second paragraph of N.J.S. 34:15-8, which contains the language added in 1961 to specify that injuries or death caused by a co-worker fall within the WCA except for an “intentional wrong,”\textsuperscript{146} is re-labeled as subsection (b). The recommended modifications add the language “as set forth in section (c),” to clarify that application of the intentional wrong exception is subject to the requirements articulated in the following subsection.

\[\text{140 The new recommended language tracks the Supreme Court’s language in } \text{Van Dunk. See Van Dunk, 210 N.J. at 474 (“so far outside the bounds of industrial life as never to be contemplated for inclusion in the Act’s exclusivity bar”). Although the language used in } \text{Millison and Laidlow is cited more frequently than the Van Dunk language, the Van Dunk opinion is the most recent Supreme Court opinion to address the intentional wrong standard. See id. at 457 (granting the “petition for certification . . . on January 27, 2011”). In addition, the } \text{Van Dunk language seems to articulate a more objective standard than the language used in Millison and Laidlow. See Millison, 101 N.J. at 179 (“may the resulting injury or disease, and the circumstances in which it is inflicted on the worker, fairly be viewed as a fact of life of industrial employment, or is it rather plainly beyond anything the legislature could have contemplated as entitling the employee to recover only under the Compensation Act?”) (emphasis added); see also Laidlow, 170 N.J. at 617 (“2) the resulting injury and the circumstances of its infliction on the worker must be (a) more than a fact of life of industrial employment and (b) plainly beyond anything the Legislature intended the Workers’ Compensation Act to immunize”) (emphasis added). Employing language adhering as closely as possible to Supreme Court language was recommended by a commenter, see supra at p.14, and endorsed by the Commission during the September 15, 2022, Commission meeting. See infra at note 158.}\]

\[\text{141 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7 (West 2023).}\]

\[\text{142 L. 1911, c. 95, §§ 7-8, eff. July 4, 1911.}\]

\[\text{143 L. 1956, c. 141, p. 579, § 9, eff. Jan. 1, 1957.}\]

\[\text{144 L. 1979, c. 283, § 3, eff. Jan. 10, 1980.}\]

\[\text{145 L. 1987, c. 382, § 1, eff. Jan. 8, 1988.}\]

\[\text{146 L. 1961, c. 2, § 1, eff. Feb. 9, 1961.}\]


**Subsection (c)**

The recommended modifications add subsection (c), which sets forth the standard an employee must satisfy to establish an intentional wrong. The language “for purposes of this article” is consistent with earlier references to the applicability of the provisions in N.J.S. 34:15-8 to Article 2, “Elective Compensation.”

Rather than set forth a definition of “intentional wrong,” the modifications articulate the evidentiary requirements for establishing an intentional wrong. The modifications subdivide subsection (c) into two further subsections to clearly separate the two available avenues for establishing an “intentional wrong,” as described by New Jersey courts.

- **Deliberate Intention to Injure**

  First, the recommended language in subsection (c)(1) sets forth the intentional wrong standard prior to the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Millison. The new language in subsection (c)(1) requires first that the harm is caused by “a person in the same employ,” incorporating the language used in subsection (b), which sets forth that liability shall not attach “for any act or omission occurring while such person was in the same employ as the person injured or killed.”

  The recommended language also requires that the actor “deliberately intended to injure the employee.” This language is drawn from the Millison Court’s description of the original intentional wrong standard: “in order to satisfy the Compensation Act’s definition of ‘intentional wrong,’ claimants have heretofore been required to show a deliberate intention to injure.”

- **Substantial Certainty**

  The recommended modifications in subsection (c)(2) incorporate the substantial certainty standard that was promulgated in Millison and affirmed in subsequent Supreme Court decisions. The recommended modifications also subdivide subsection (c)(2) into two subsections to separately address the “conduct” and “context” prongs of the Millison standard.

  **“Conduct” Prong**

  The recommended language in subsection (c)(2)(A) corresponds to the articulation of the substantial certainty standard in the Laidlow decision. With respect to the “conduct” prong, the Laidlow Court stated that “the employer...”

---

147 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-8. In the WCA, the term “intentional wrong” only appears once, in N.J.S. 34:15-8. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-8. However, the term also appears in four statutes in Title 59 in the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, see N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:3-16, 59:10-1 to -2 & -4 (West 2023), and in one statute in Title 44 in the chapter titled “Assistance for Dependent Children, Other Persons and Families.” See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:10-67 (West 2023).

148 Millison, 101 N.J. at 178 (explaining that the substantial certainty standard is “not so much . . . a substantive test itself nor . . . a substitute for a subjective desire to harm, [but] a specie of evidence that will satisfy the requirement . . . that ‘deliberate intention’ be shown”).

149 Laidlow, 170 N.J. at 613 (“an intentional wrong is not limited to actions taken with a subjective desire to harm, but also includes instances where an employer knows that the consequences of those acts are substantially certain to result in such harm.”).

150 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-8 (emphasis added).

151 Millison, 101 N.J. at 170.

152 Id.

153 Id. at 179 (“Courts must examine not only the conduct of the employer, but also the context in which that conduct takes place . . . ”).

154 Laidlow, 170 N.J. at 617 (“(1) the employer must know that his actions are substantially certain to result in injury or death to the employee . . . ”).
must know that his actions are substantially certain to result in injury or death to the employee,” and the recommended language is largely identical.155

  o “Context” Prong

In subsection (c)(2)(B), the recommended language articulates the “context” prong.156 Given the uniform objection from commenters to the formulation of this prong as proposed in the Tentative Report,157 the recommended modifications closely track the Supreme Court’s formulation and language.158

The structure of subsection (c)(2)(B) is based on the Van Dunk Court’s articulation of the context prong, as the language used in that decision is the most recent and provides a more objective standard than the language employed in Millison and Laidlow.159

With respect to the structure of the context prong, both the Millison and Laidlow opinions separate the context prong into separate clauses. In Millison, the context prong is framed as an either/or question: “may the resulting injury or disease, and [its] circumstances . . . , fairly be viewed as a fact of life of industrial employment, or is it rather plainly beyond anything the legislature could have contemplated as entitling the employee to recover only under the Compensation Act?”160 In Laidlow, the clauses are separated by an “and,” rather than an “or.”161 Both formulations present an issue because, in the context of statutory drafting, separate clauses often imply separate requirements.

The Van Dunk Court, however, clarified that, under Millison, the context prong is a “unitary test” which asks the court to determine whether the injury and its circumstances are “so far outside the bounds of industrial life as never to be contemplated for inclusion in the Act's exclusivity bar.”162 This language makes clear that the context prong does not require two separate showings, and therefore, the structure of subsection (c)(2)(B) is based on the Van Dunk opinion.

The language addressing whether the circumstances are beyond what the Legislature intended the WCA to immunize differs from the language used in all three Supreme Court opinions. The deviation is intended to (1) avoid making a statutory reference to the Legislature’s intent; and (2) replace the reference to the WCA itself with a reference to the agreement described in N.J.S. 34:15-8(a), which contains the exclusivity bar of the WCA.163

Finally, the recommended modifications replace the phrase “industrial life” with “life in the industry” to make clear that the intentional wrong exception is applicable to employment contexts other than “industrial.”164

---

155 Id.
156 Millison, 101 N.J. at 179 (“[c]ourts must examine not only the conduct of the employer, but also the context in which that conduct takes place”).
158 Millison, 101 N.J. at 179; Laidlow, 170 N.J. at 617; Van Dunk, 210 N.J. at 474. See also N.J. Law Revision Comm’n, Minutes NJLRC Meeting, at 8, Sept. 15, 2023, www.njlrc.org (last visited Aug. 30, 2023) (Commissioner Bunn “stated that he agrees with the approach in the draft and codifying the Supreme Court language requires finders of fact to be disciplined in their analysis and word choice”).
159 See Van Dunk, 210 N.J. at 474; see also supra n.140.
160 Millison, 101 N.J. at 179.
161 Laidlow, 170 N.J. at 617 (“(a) more than a fact of life of industrial employment and (b) plainly beyond anything the Legislature intended the Workers' Compensation Act to immunize”) (emphasis added).
162 Van Dunk, 210 N.J. at 474.
163 See Millison, 101 N.J. at 179 (“beyond anything the legislature could have contemplated”); see Laidlow, 170 N.J. at 617 (“plainly beyond anything the Legislature intended the [WCA] to immunize”); see also Van Dunk, 210 N.J. at 474 (“never to be contemplated for inclusion in the Act's exclusivity bar”).