



*Research Note*

## **Measuring party orientations towards European integration: Results from an expert survey**

LEONARD RAY

*Political Science Department, Binghamton University, New York, USA*

**Abstract.** Some observers have held that political parties have been minor players in the process of European integration due to the low salience of the issue and the prevalence of intra party disagreement over European questions. Although recent scholarship and the rising salience of European issues have brought increased attention to the role of political parties, the study of the relationship between party positions and both public opinion and policy outcomes has been hampered by an absence of comparable data on party positions. This research note presents the findings of an expert survey on party positions on the issue of European integration. In addition to estimates of the parties' positions on the issue itself, this survey provides information on the importance of the issue of European integration to each party, and the extent of internal dissent within parties. The data also indicate that parties have, on average, become increasingly pro-European over the period 1984–1996. Both the salience of the issue of integration and the extent of intra-party disagreement have increased during this period. However, deep intra-party divisions appear less prevalent than commonly believed.

### **Introduction**

Political parties are important actors in the process of European integration. In addition to their role as actors within supranational institutions, political parties play an important role in linking the European Union to the citizens of Europe. While information about the preferences of parties is important for understanding the development of the EU, further information about the importance of European issues to parties, and the internal divisions within parties is needed to understand whether parties can effectively provide a bridge between European citizens and European institutions. The democratic deficit of the EU has been blamed in part on the unwillingness of political parties to stress the issue of European integration because of their internal divisions on the issue. Any systematic study of these topics requires comparable cross national data on the positions taken by political parties on European integration.

Data on party positions on the EU is also important for the analysis of a number of theoretical questions central to the discipline of political science. Such data have been usefully applied to the analysis of coalition formation in multiparty systems (see Laver & Hunt 1992), although the issue of European integration has generally not been included in such analyses. The conditions under which parties may influence the opinions of their electorates can also be addressed with these data (Ray 1997). One can even analyze the direction of influence between parties and electorates to determine whether parties lead or follow public opinion (Ray 1997; Steenbergen & Scott 1997). Further research could address the nature of intergovernmental bargaining, and the role of the media in agenda setting.

This research note describes and presents a comprehensive dataset on the orientations of Western European political parties towards European integration from 1984 to 1996. This dataset contains estimates of three aspects of a party's position on the issue of integration. These are the general orientation of the party (whether it is pro or anti EU), the importance of European issues for the party, and the degree to which parties are internally divided on the issue.

### **Measuring party positions**

Michael Laver & Ben Hunt (1992) discuss three possible methods for determining the issue positions of political parties. The first method is the analysis of party documents, the second is the use of mass public opinion surveys, and the third is the use of expert judgments. Each of these methods has distinctive advantages and disadvantages.

The analysis of party documents (generally electoral manifestos) has the advantage of relying directly on the parties themselves for information about party positions. Manifesto texts reflect the positions which a party has gone on record as holding. While manifestos are an invaluable source of information about party preferences and priorities, turning a party manifesto into a set of data points is a tricky process. To the extent that quantitative content analysis depends upon the evaluations of individual readers it may still be a somewhat subjective and contextual exercise. The content analysis of manifestos requires the elaboration of a strict coding scheme if the results are to be reasonably replicable across coders. Such a method can reduce difficulties arising from the subjective reading of texts.<sup>1</sup> Content analysis also restricts the universe of parties which can be studied. Manifestos may not be available for all political parties, resulting in the exclusion of some (often smaller) parties from the dataset.<sup>2</sup> In addition, some parties, for which manifestos are available, do not mention the issue of European integration in

their manifestos. This may be due to the low salience of the issue for that party, or to the absence of a clear party position on the issue, or to deep internal divisions over the issue. The manifestos themselves do not permit a determination of which, if any, of these interpretations applies. The question of internal dissent is particularly relevant to the issue of European integration, and here the manifestos are totally mute.

Mass survey research allows for an alternate method of determining party positions. Survey data can be used to measure the positions of parties themselves, or of their electorates. If a survey asks respondents to place *themselves* on an ideological or policy preference scale, then the mean position of a party's electorate can be determined. The position of the party leadership must then be inferred from the aggregate position of the party's electorate. This technique was employed by Hix & Lord (1997) in their discussion of party positions on integration. In some cases, survey data can be used to determine the perceived position of the party leadership itself rather than the electorate. This distinction is crucial if the data are then to be used to compare electorate opinion with party positions. Unfortunately, very few cross-national surveys ask about party positions on issues. One Eurobarometer survey, Eurobarometer 30, did ask respondents in each EU member nation to evaluate the positions of the political parties of their nation. The positions of party electorates are generally, but not always, related to perceived positions of parties (see Van der Eijk & Franklin 1991). This survey is therefore an excellent source of data on the public perception of party positions, but only for 1988.

The third method of determining a party's ideological or issue positions is the use of expert judgments.<sup>3</sup> Expert evaluations allow for the inclusion of all parties in a political system whether they have published manifestos or not. Unlike public opinion surveys, expert surveys are non random, and rarely involve over a few hundred experts. The logistical costs are thus relatively low. Expert judgments have been used to place political parties on a left/right ideological scale (Castles & Mair 1984; Huber & Inglehart 1995) as well as to place parties on a number of different policy scales (Laver & Hunt 1992; Laver 1994, 1995, 1998a,b). Unfortunately, expert judgements on party positions on European integration are available for very few nations. These are the Netherlands (Laver 1995), France (Laver & Hunt 1992), Ireland (Laver 1994, 1998b) and the United Kingdom (Laver 1998a).

### **The expert survey**

In order to obtain comparable cross-national data on the positions of parties on the issue of European integration, I conducted a new expert survey. This

survey was intended to measure three aspects of the position taken by all major and minor parties in the EU and EFTA. Respondents were asked to evaluate the position taken by each party on the issue of European integration, the importance of the issue to each party, and the extent of internal dissent within each party. In order to track shifts in party positions as the nature of the European Union has evolved, the experts were asked to provide evaluations of each party at four points in time, 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996. The text of the survey questionnaire is reproduced in the appendix to this note.

The 'experts' whose opinions were canvassed were indigenous professional political scientists in the 18 nations targeted. The ECPR handbook of political scientists in Europe was used to identify survey recipients. Individuals were chosen if they specialized in either the domestic political system of their nation, or European politics. In order to ensure a reasonable number of responses from each nation, this list of 'experts' was supplemented by non-indigenous political scientists with expertise on a given nation as indicated by the ECPR handbook, or by a literature review of recent works on national party systems; 258 experts were identified through this procedure. (Unfortunately, no experts could be identified for Iceland, and this nation was dropped from the study.)

Of the 258 questionnaires that were mailed out 160 were returned, of which 33 forms were returned blank. Most of these blank forms were returned by individuals who indicated that they felt unqualified to accurately complete the questionnaire. Over half of these respondents suggested alternate experts and 22 additional questionnaires were then sent out to those experts suggested by individuals in the original sample. Given the low response rate for Luxembourg, the definition of 'expert' was expanded somewhat, and another round of questionnaires were sent to 19 newspaper editors, leaders of political parties, and members of the European parliament from Luxembourg. In all, 299 surveys were sent out, and 135 usable responses were received, for an overall response rate of 45 percent. This is a rather high response rate for an expert survey, and may reflect the brevity of the questionnaire. The response rates for each nation are presented in Table 1. Following the precedent of Laver and Hunt (1992: 37) and Huber and Inglehart (1995: 76) a minimum threshold of 5 responses per nation was set for the inclusion of any nation in the resulting dataset. All of the nations surveyed met this threshold and the mean number of respondents per nation was 8.

The exact meaning of 'European integration' does vary over time and across national political contexts. I had deliberately left the interpretation of 'European integration' up to the experts themselves. Several experts wrote in to explain exactly what they had interpreted 'European integration' to mean in the context of their national political system. In general, the experts from EU

*Table 1.* Response rates for expert survey

	# of surveys sent	# of respondents	Response rate
Austria <sup>a</sup>	13	5	0.42
Belgium	29	6	0.21
Denmark	11	9	0.82
Finland <sup>a</sup>	12	8	0.67
France	21	9	0.43
Germany	17	7	0.41
Greece	15	10	0.66
Ireland	15	8	0.53
Italy	23	8	0.35
Luxembourg	33	9	0.27
Netherlands	17	9	0.53
Norway <sup>b</sup>	11	7	0.64
Portugal	13	7	0.54
Spain	28	13	0.46
Sweden <sup>a</sup>	15	7	0.47
Switzerland <sup>b</sup>	12	5	0.42
UK	14	8	0.57
Total	299	135	0.45
Mean	17.6	8	0.45

<sup>a</sup> New EU Member.

<sup>b</sup> Non EU Member.

member nations evaluated party orientations towards the European Union, or towards plans for the future of the European Union. Evaluations for 1984 dealt with the status quo of the EC in 1984, and with the proposal to add a security aspect to the EC's competencies. Evaluations for 1988 dealt with the Single European Act, while judgments about 1992 referred to the Treaty on European Union. For 1996, parties were evaluated on their orientations towards EMU and further political integration. Experts from the EFTA nations interpreted 'European integration' to mean joining the EC/EU. This consistency among experts suggested that they were evaluating the parties on the same underlying dimension. A close examination of their responses supports this conclusion.

## Reliability and validity

The evaluations of the experts were averaged to produce estimates of political parties' positions on the issue of European unification. The reliability and validity of these data had to be determined in order to evaluate their usefulness.<sup>4</sup> Reliability refers to the degree to which the data systematically measure some single underlying factor. Validity refers to the degree to which this factor corresponds to the theoretical concept in question, in this case party positions on European integration.

The internal consistency of the expert judgements was used as a rough indicator of their reliability. In order to assess the internal consistency of the data, I examined the responses in two ways. First, I analyzed the responses of individual experts in order to determine whether any individual experts were deviating excessively from the overall consensus for their nation and if so, whether they exerted a substantial influence over the estimates. A second test was to examine the standard deviations of the expert judgements as a measure of the extent of agreement among experts.

One way to measure the internal consistency and robustness of the data is to identify experts providing deviant evaluations of parties, and determine their impact, if any, on the final estimates of party positions. In order to identify 'deviant' experts, I calculated the absolute difference between each expert's judgment for a specific party and the overall mean of the expert judgments for that party. The overall mean on this difference measure was 0.66 for judgments of party positions (on a 7 point scale), 0.56 for judgments about the importance of European integration to a party (on a 5 point scale), and 0.47 for evaluations of the extent of internal dissent (on a 5 point scale). These results indicate significant consistency in the evaluations of most experts.

A careful analysis of the responses of individual experts revealed a few anomalous respondents. Of course, there is no objective standard which dictates when a respondent deviated 'substantially' from the mean judgement. I decided that any expert who was on average more than one point off of the mean would be considered 'suspect'.<sup>5</sup> Applying this rule of thumb, 7 experts provided 'suspect' evaluations of party positions, and 5 experts provided 'suspect' judgements of the importance of the issue. In order to check for the possibility that these outlying experts may have biased the results of the survey, I recalculated the estimates of party positions with these experts included and with them excluded. Of 2,031 estimates, only 38 (2%) were affected substantially by the inclusion of these experts.<sup>6</sup> The estimates most affected by these 'anomalous' experts were the estimates for Swiss parties in 1984, for Finnish parties in 1984 and 1988, and for tiny Portuguese right and left wing parties. Those few estimates which may have been biased by

Table 2. Mean standard deviations of expert evaluations for each time period

Type of judgement	Mean standard deviation of expert judgements			
	1984	1988	1992	1996
Party position on integration	0.97	0.90	0.82	0.82
Salience of issue	0.75	0.75	0.69	0.70
Internal dissent	0.58	0.56	0.59	0.60

the inclusion of 'anomalous' respondents are clearly marked in the Appendix tables.

The analysis of standard deviations of each estimate allows for a rough indicator of the extent of agreement among experts. The mean standard deviation of expert judgements in the present study ranged from 0.56 to 0.97 depending upon the judgement in question. These standard deviations are reported in Table 2. Since the present study used five and seven point scales rather than ten point scales, the standard deviations, while lower in absolute terms than those reported by Huber and Inglehart, actually indicate roughly comparable levels of agreement among experts.<sup>7</sup> The consistency of the experts is also comparable to that reported by Laver and Hunt.<sup>8</sup>

In order to study shifts in party positions, experts were asked to evaluate parties at four different time points. One concern in the creation of the questionnaire was the ability of respondents to evaluate parties' *past* positions on the issue. If these recalled judgments are less reliable than contemporary judgments, then we would expect the standard deviations of expert judgments to be larger for the earlier time periods. As Table 2 indicates, there is a slight decrease in standard deviations over time for evaluations of party positions and estimates of issue importance. For evaluations of internal dissent, the standard deviations display no trend. The small magnitude of the differences in standard deviations suggest that the recalled estimates for the 1980s are only slightly less reliable than those for the 1990s.

The data produced by the expert survey do appear to be reliable measures. Whether they are actually measuring party positions on the issue of European integration turns on the question of their validity. The validity of an indicator is the degree to which the indicator actually measures the intended concept. The simplest test of validity is the inspection of the data for 'face validity'. The results do correspond to conventional wisdom about the positions of various parties. However, face validity is a rather unsatisfactory criterion for the evaluation of a dataset. A more rigorous test of the validity of these data

requires a comparison with other quantitative indicators of party positions on European integration.

Quantitative data on party positions in 1988 were available from two other sources. The other sources were the Eurobarometer survey mentioned earlier, and the Comparative Party Manifesto project.<sup>9</sup> All three of these indicators of party position correlate highly. A principal components factor analysis was carried out to demonstrate the degree of commonality between these three indicators. The factor analysis indicated that one underlying factor could account for most of the variance in the three indicators. This factor accounted for 91 percent of the variance in party positions as indicated by the expert survey. It also accounted for 87 percent of the variance in perceived party positions (as indicated by respondents to Eurobarometer 30) and for 75 percent of the variance in party position as indicated from the Comparative Manifesto Dataset.

This factor analysis indicates that all three of the indicators are valid measures of party position on European integration. The differences in factor loadings do suggest that some of the measures capture the underlying variable better than others. The expert survey data appear to come closest to the underlying party positions (loading = 0.95). The Comparative Party Manifesto data are second in terms of validity (loading = 0.93), and the Eurobarometer data third (loading 0.87).

The expert survey also asked respondents to evaluate the importance of the issue of integration to each of the parties. A test of the validity of this measure of issue salience is somewhat more difficult than the test of party positions because only the manifesto dataset provides a roughly comparable indicator of the importance of the issue to a party.<sup>10</sup> The correlation between these two measures (0.25) is much lower than the correlation between measures of party position (0.80).

Unfortunately, a quantitative test of the validity of our measure of internal party dissent is impossible. There are simply no other sources of quantitative data on internal party dissent (on this issue) with which to compare the expert judgements.

### **Some basic findings**

One of the advantages of the data generated by this expert survey is the possibility of comparing party positions over time. The remainder of this research note will present some basic descriptive statistics on the evolution of party orientations towards European integration from 1984 to 1996.



Table 3. Distribution of parties by position on European integration 1984–1996

Position on European integration		1984	1988	1992	1996
Range	Definition	(in %)	(in %)	(in %)	(in %)
1 to 1.5	Strongly opposed	10.9	12.4	12.1	11.2
1.5 to 2.5	Opposed	13.9	11.2	8.6	7.9
2.5 to 3.5	Somewhat opposed	14.5	13.0	11.5	11.8
3.5 to 4.5	Neutrality	13.3	10.1	9.8	11.2
4.5 to 5.5	Somewhat in favor	10.3	13.0	13.8	13.5
5.5 to 6.5	In favor	26.1	27.8	27.0	27.5
6.5 to 7	Strongly in favor	10.9	12.4	17.2	16.9

Table 4. Mean party position for each time period 1984–1996

	1984	1988	1992	1996
All nations	4.23	4.34	4.57	4.64
EU 12	4.65	4.71	4.77	4.79
New 3	2.96	3.19	4.30	4.51
Non members	3.12	3.37	3.65	3.84

*Increasing support for European integration.* Parties are spread over the entire range of possible positions on integration, from strong support to strong opposition. Table 3 presents the distribution of party positions for each time period. While moderate support is the modal position for all three time periods, there are never more than 30% of the parties in this category. The parties are more evenly spread across the scale in 1984, but by 1996, the majority of parties are concentrated in the pro-EU categories. While the percentage of parties with moderate or weak opposition to integration has declined somewhat from 1984 to 1996, the percentage of parties strongly opposed to integration is fairly constant. As this distribution implies, the mean party position has shifted towards a more pro-integration position. This overall pro-integration trend is largely the effect of changes in party positions in the 3 new members of the EU. As Table 4 indicates, Finnish, Austrian, and Swedish parties shifted rapidly from a mean anti/European position to a mean pro-European position between 1988 and 1992. While the average political party in the 2 non-members, and the 12 older members of the EU has also become somewhat pro-European since 1984, the changes are of much smaller magnitude.

Table 5. Distribution of parties by importance of issue 1984–1996

Importance of issue of integration		1984	1988	1992	1996
Range	Definition	(in %)	(in %)	(in %)	(in %)
1 to 1.5	Issue of no importance	5.5	2.4	0.0	0.0
1.5 to 2.5	A minor issue	36.4	28.4	17.2	17.4
2.5 to 3.5	An important issue	46.1	53.8	48.3	52.2
3.5 to 4.5	One of the most important issues	12.1	15.4	32.8	29.2
4.5 to 5	The most important issue	0.0	0.0	1.7	1.1

Table 6. Mean issue importance for parties in each time period 1984–1996

	1984	1988	1992	1996
All nations	2.71	2.87	3.22	3.18
EU 12	2.95	3.01	3.12	3.14
New 3	1.92	2.40	3.69	3.51
Non members	2.10	2.51	3.30	3.06

*Increasing salience of European integration.* Along with the general trend towards greater support for integration, there has been an increase in the importance of the issue of integration. The distribution of salience scores is presented in Table 5. In 1984, European integration was of ‘no importance’ for 5 percent of the parties, and was ‘the most important issue’ for none of the parties. By 1992, the issue is of ‘no importance’ for none of the parties, while it is ‘the most important issue’ for almost 2 percent of them. Salience levels recede slightly in 1996, reflecting the passing of the referenda of the early 1990s. Here again, there are important differences according to membership status. Mean salience scores by membership are presented in Table 6. The importance of the issue of integration is steadily increasing in the EU12, while it jumps rapidly in the ex EFTA nations between 1988 and 1992, and declines thereafter. This pattern probably reflects the dramatic accession or association referenda held in all of these EFTA nations between 1992 and 1994.

*Increasing internal dissent over European integration.* Overall, levels of internal disagreement are rather low, with most parties scoring 2 or below which corresponds to ‘complete unity’ or ‘some dissent’ (see Table 7). Serious internal dissent, corresponding to an even division of party members is a relatively rare and recent development. In no case did the experts identify

*Table 7.* Distribution of parties by internal dissent over European integration 1984–1996

Extent of internal dissent		1984	1988	1992	1996
Range	Definition	(in %)	(in %)	(in %)	(in %)
1 to 1.5	Complete unity	47.0	45.6	35.3	37.3
1.5 to 2.5	Minor dissent	47.6	47.9	48.0	46.3
2.5 to 3.5	Significant dissent	5.5	6.5	13.9	13.6
3.5 to 4.5	Party evenly split	0.0	0.0	2.9	2.8
4.5 to 5	Majority opposition to leadership	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

*Table 8.* Mean internal dissent from party position in each time period 1984–1996

	1984	1988	1992	1996
All nations	1.66	1.68	1.90	1.88
EU 12	1.70	1.67	1.80	1.80
New 3	1.36	1.46	2.10	2.03
Non members	1.75	1.93	2.26	2.24

a party leadership as being opposed by a majority of party activists. This is not so surprising given that internal dissent on such a scale is likely to result in a change of party leadership, eliminating the disagreement. Record levels of internal dissent are found primarily in nations which have had referenda, and occur in parties across the political spectrum. In 1992, the French Gaullists, the Finnish Center (agrarian) Party, the Danish Social Democrats, the Swedish Social Democrats, and the Swiss Greens are all reported to be evenly split on the issue of integration. In 1996, six parties are reported to have this level of internal division, the Swedish Social Democrats, Finnish Center (agrarian) Party, the Danish Social Democrats and Socialist People's Party, the UK Conservatives, and the Swedish Center (agrarian) Party. As the list of deeply divided parties indicates, internal dissent was greatest among parties in the new EU members and non-members. As the importance of the issue of integration increased, so did the extent of dissent within parties. Table 8 presents the mean values on internal dissent by EU membership status. In the non-member states, mean internal dissent rose from 1.75 to 2.24. In the new members, dissent within parties rose from 1.36 to 2.03. In the EU 12, the mean dissent scores rose more modestly from 1.70 to 1.80.

## Conclusions

Thanks to the high level of cooperation from experts, and the consistency of their evaluations, the expert survey has produced a rich source of comparative and time series data on party positions. The data indicate that parties have taken a wide range of positions on the issue of integration, and that the importance of the issue has generally increased as the scope of EU competence has grown, and the membership of the EU widened. Parties are generally not deeply divided on the issue of integration, with some very important exceptions. These data can be used to study cross national and temporal differences in public opinion about integration, to explain party position taking, and to examine the link between political parties and their electorates. In order to make these data available to other researchers who may find them useful for their own research, the data for each political party are reproduced in seventeen tables in the appendix to this research note.

## Notes

1. Some successful attempts have been made to eliminate inter-coder reliability problems by using computers to code the content of party manifestos; see Laver & Garry (1997). This method seems to shift the problem of subjective interpretation of text to the level of the computer programmer who must decide which terms to associate with which policy areas.
2. The omission of smaller parties may be justifiable if the goal of the research is to study policy outcomes. If the goal is to study other aspects of party behavior, then the omission of smaller, often opposition, parties reduces the generalizability of any findings to the universe of all political parties.
3. For a brief retrospective on the use of expert surveys, see Mair & Castles (1997).
4. For a discussion of reliability and validity, see Johnson & Joslyn (1986: 64–72) and Kenneth Bollen (1989: 184–222).
5. One must keep in mind that the scale for party positions on European integration runs from 1 to 7 while the other two scales run from 1 to 5. The present test is thus somewhat more demanding for measures of party positions.
6. A shift was considered substantial if an estimate changed by more than 0.5.
7. For their study of party positions on the Left-Right dimension, Huber and Inglehart find the mean standard deviations of their estimates vary from 0.90 (on a 10 point scale) for evaluations of parties in consolidated democracies, to 1.33 for parties in non democracies (Huber & Inglehart 1995: 80).
8. Laver and Hunt do not report the overall mean standard deviation of their expert judgments. However, they do report the standard deviations for each estimated party position in Appendix B.
9. For the manifesto data, the indicator used was the proportion of all references to the EU which were pro-integration. Parties whose manifestos do not refer to the EU at all are coded as missing. The manifesto from the election closest to 1988 was used for this analysis. Manifestos from 1989 were used for Greece., Luxembourg, The Netherlands,

Norway, and Spain. 1988 was employed for Denmark, France, and Sweden. Manifestos from 1987 were used for Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. For Austria, the 1986 manifestos were used. For the Eurobarometer data, the mean perception of each party's position on integration was used.

10. Total mentions of European issues as a proportion of the party platform is used here as an indicator of the importance of the issue to the party.

## Appendix

*Instructions to experts.* Please use the form attached to evaluate the positions taken by political parties on the issue of European Integration. Please evaluate the parties using the following scales.

A. The overall orientation of the *party leadership* towards European integration:

- 1 = Strongly opposed to European integration
- 2 = Opposed to European integration
- 3 = Somewhat opposed to European integration
- 4 = Neutral, no stance on the issue of European integration
- 5 = Somewhat in favor of European integration
- 6 = In favor of European integration.
- 7 = Strongly in favor of European Integration

B. The relative importance of this issue in the *party's public stance*:

- 1 = European Integration is of no importance, never mentioned by the party
- 2 = European Integration is a minor issue for the party
- 3 = European Integration is an important issue for the party
- 4 = European Integration is one of the most important issues for the party
- 5 = European Integration is the most important issue for the party

C. The *degree of dissent* within the party over the party leadership's position:

- 1 = Complete unity
- 2 = Minor dissent
- 3 = Significant dissent
- 4 = Party evenly split on issue
- 5 = Leadership position opposed by a majority of party activists

Please rate each party on all three of these dimensions. Evaluate these parties for each of the following years; 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996. Given the important changes in the European Community/Union over the last decade, a dynamic analysis of party positions is particularly important. If possible, specify the approximate timing of any major shifts in the orientation of specific parties. However, I understand that it may be difficult to evaluate the positions taken by parties some 12 years ago. If you feel uncomfortable about

your judgements of party positions in the 1980's, feel free to restrict your evaluations to the more recent periods. A partial response is certainly more useful than a non-response. If you would like to obtain an advance copy of the dataset, please return the dataset request form indicating the format which you would find most convenient.

*Data tables.* The following tables present the dataset compiled from the responses to the expert survey on party positions on European integration. Important mergers or schisms are noted. Estimates which would shift by more than 0.50 when 'suspect' experts are omitted from the dataset are indicated by a '-' if the 'anomalous' experts produce an underestimate, and by a '+' if the inclusion of the suspect expert may have resulted in an overestimate for that parameter. The scales are described in the instruction sheet distributed to experts along with their response forms.

	Position on European Integration				Importance of issue				Extent of internal dissent over issue			
	1984	1988	1992	1996	1984	1988	1992	1996	1984	1988	1992	1996
<b>Austria</b>												
Freedom Party	6.40	6.20	3.80	1.80	2.80	3.40	4.00	3.80	1.40	1.40	2.60	2.60
Green Alternative	2.00	1.20	1.60	3.00	1.25	2.20	3.60	3.40	1.50	1.60	2.60	2.40
Communist Party	1.20	1.40	1.60	1.00	1.75	2.50	3.50	3.50	1.00	1.25	1.50	1.50
Austrian People's Party	4.20	6.00	6.60	7.00	2.20	4.00	4.80	4.40	1.60	1.80	1.80	1.20
Socialist Party	2.40	4.60	6.40	7.00	1.75	3.25	3.75	4.00	1.40	2.40	1.80	1.40
Liberal Forum <sup>a</sup>				7.00				3.50				1.00
<sup>a</sup> Split from Freedom Party in 1993.												
<b>Belgium</b>												
Ecologists (Flemish)	5.00	5.17	4.83	4.67	2.00	2.17	2.33	2.33	2.00	1.80	2.00	2.00
Christian People's Party	6.50	6.50	6.67	6.67	3.00	2.83	3.17	3.33	1.33	1.33	1.50	1.67
Ecologists (Wallon)	5.60	5.60	5.40	5.20	2.00	2.40	2.60	2.60	2.20	2.00	1.80	1.80
Francophone Democratic Front	5.75	5.75	5.75	6.33	2.50	2.50	2.75	3.00	1.25	1.25	1.50	1.33
Belgian Communist Party	2.75	2.75	3.33	3.67	2.25	2.25	2.67	2.67	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
Liberal Party (Wallon)	6.80	6.80	6.80	6.60	3.40	3.40	3.40	3.40	1.40	1.40	1.60	1.60
Socialist Party (Wallon)	5.80	5.80	6.00	6.20	3.00	3.00	3.40	3.40	1.80	2.00	2.40	2.40
Christian Social Party	6.60	6.60	6.60	6.40	3.20	3.20	3.20	3.40	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60
Liberal Party (Flemish)	6.67	6.67	6.67	6.50	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.33	1.33	1.33	1.50
Socialist Party (Flemish)	6.17	6.33	6.50	6.33	2.83	2.83	3.17	3.17	1.50	1.50	1.83	2.00
Flemish Bloc	3.33	3.67	3.50	3.50	2.17	2.17	2.17	2.17	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50
Peoples Union	5.67	5.67	5.33	5.17	2.33	2.33	2.33	2.17	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00

	Position on European integration				Importance of issue				Extent of internal dissent over issue			
	1984	1988	1992	1996	1984	1988	1992	1996	1984	1988	1992	1996
<b>Denmark</b>												
Center Democrats	7.00	7.00	6.89	6.67	4.22	4.22	4.22	4.11	1.38	1.38	1.25	1.25
Common Course	1.00	1.00	1.00		3.33	3.43	3.60		1.00	1.00	1.00	
Progress Party	3.33	3.33	3.44	2.44	2.89	2.89	3.11	3.22	2.00	2.00	2.38	2.38
Conservatives	5.67	5.56	5.89	5.63	2.89	2.89	3.00	3.00	1.75	1.75	2.13	2.29
Christian People's Party	5.00	4.89	5.22	5.13	2.56	2.56	2.67	2.63	2.13	2.13	2.50	2.43
Justice Party	1.00	1.00	1.14	1.14	4.00	4.25	4.33	4.33	1.17	1.17	1.00	1.00
Liberals	6.89	6.67	6.89	6.89	4.11	4.00	4.11	4.11	1.38	1.50	1.63	1.75
Radical Party	4.78	5.00	5.22	5.33	3.00	3.22	3.11	3.22	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.38
Social Democrats	4.67	4.89	5.44	5.89	3.11	3.11	3.11	3.11	3.13	3.25	3.63	3.63
Socialist People's Party	1.67	2.00	3.11	3.78	3.89	3.78	3.89	3.78	1.63	1.75	3.00	3.63
The Greens <sup>a</sup>	2.33	2.25			2.25	3.00			1.50	1.50		
Danish Communist Party <sup>a</sup>	1.11	1.11			3.89	3.89			1.00	1.00		
Left Socialist Party <sup>a</sup>	1.11	1.25			3.67	3.50			1.00	1.00		
Red/Green Unity List			1.20	1.33			4.20	4.00			1.00	1.00
<sup>a</sup> United to form Red/Green Unity list in 1989.												
<b>Finland</b>												
Christian League	1.57	1.57	1.13	1.38	1.43	1.43	3.13	3.38	1.14	1.14	1.50	1.63
Center Party	2.14	2.29	4.25	4.50	1.40	1.83	3.71	3.57	1.43	1.71	3.63	3.63
Democratic Alternative	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.33	2.33 <sup>+</sup>	2.00	4.00	3.33	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Finnish People's Democratic League	1.57	1.71	2.63	3.00	1.71	2.00	3.88	3.38	1.29	1.43	2.75	2.63
Green Party	3.60	3.43	4.63	4.88	1.40	1.57	3.63	3.25	2.00	2.00	3.00	2.75
Liberal People's Party	4.43 <sup>-</sup>	4.86	6.25	6.43	2.29	2.43	3.75	3.43	1.29	1.29	1.38	1.43
National Coalition	4.86 <sup>-</sup>	5.29 <sup>-</sup>	6.88	7.00	2.71	2.86	4.38	4.13	1.43	1.29	1.00	1.00
Pensioners' Party	2.33	2.67	2.75	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.75	2.00	1.33	1.33	1.75	1.75
Rural Party	1.43	1.43	1.75	1.29	1.71	1.71	3.50	3.14	1.00	1.00	1.38	1.29
Social Democrats	3.43 <sup>-</sup>	3.86 <sup>-</sup>	6.00	6.50	1.86	2.00	3.63	3.63	1.71	1.57	2.13	2.13
Swedish People's Party	4.43 <sup>-</sup>	4.86 <sup>-</sup>	6.63	6.63	2.29	2.57	4.13	3.88	1.43	1.43	2.00	2.00

<sup>-</sup> Possible underestimate due to 'anomalous' expert; <sup>+</sup> Possible overestimate due to 'anomalous' expert.



	Position on European integration				Importance of issue				Extent of internal dissent over issue			
	1984	1988	1992	1996	1984	1988	1992	1996	1984	1988	1992	1996
<b>France</b>												
National Front	1.44	1.44	1.22	1.22	2.50	2.50	3.13	2.88	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22
Ecology Generation	5.00	5.33	5.57	5.57	2.00	2.50	3.17	3.17	2.00	2.00	2.50	2.50
Movement for France				1.00				2.00				1.00
Radical Socialist Party <sup>a</sup>	6.25	6.25	6.63	6.63	3.25	3.25	3.63	3.63	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50
French Communist Party	1.78	1.89	1.78	2.00	2.44	2.56	3.11	3.11	1.33	1.33	1.67	1.78
Socialist Party	5.89	6.11	6.44	6.00	3.44	4.00	4.22	4.00	2.44	2.44	2.67	2.56
Unified Socialist Party	4.00	4.00			2.33	2.33			2.67	2.67		
Rally for the Republic	4.11	4.67	5.00	5.25	2.78	2.89	3.56	3.67	2.33	2.67	3.89	3.44
Democratic Force <sup>b</sup>	6.56	6.67	6.78	6.67	4.00	4.00	4.22	4.22	1.56	1.56	1.67	1.56
Republican Party	6.11	6.00	5.89	5.78	3.67	3.67	3.78	3.78	2.00	2.00	2.56	2.33
Radicals	6.11	6.11	6.11	6.11	3.56	3.56	3.78	3.78	1.89	1.89	2.11	2.11
The Greens	3.86	3.86	4.00	4.00	2.57	2.57	2.75	2.63	2.29	2.29	2.38	2.38
<sup>a</sup> Former Radical Left Movement (MRG); <sup>b</sup> Former Social and Democratic Center (CDS).												
<b>Germany</b>												
Christian Democratic Union	6.86	6.86	7.00	6.86	3.43	3.43	3.86	3.86	1.17	1.00	1.57	1.86
Christian Social Union	6.50	6.29	5.43	5.43	2.86	2.86	3.43	3.71	1.57	1.57	2.00	2.43
Social Democratic Party	6.29	6.29	6.14	5.71	3.00	3.00	3.43	4.00	1.67	2.00	2.29	2.86
Free Democratic Party	6.71	6.71	6.71	6.71	3.43	3.29	3.86	3.86	1.17	1.17	1.29	1.29
The Greens	3.57	3.71	4.71	4.86	2.57	2.57	3.14	3.29	2.57	2.57	3.00	2.71
German Communist Party	1.00	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.50	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20
Party of Democratic Socialism			3.57	3.57			1.86	1.86			1.83	1.60
Republican Party	1.83	1.57	1.29	1.29	2.67	2.86	3.14	3.00	1.67	1.71	1.71	1.71

	Position on European integration				Importance of issue				Extent of internal dissent over issue			
	1984	1988	1992	1996	1984	1988	1992	1996	1984	1988	1992	1996
<b>Greece</b>												
Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement	4.00	5.60	6.30	6.70	3.30	3.40	3.70	4.10	2.20	1.70	1.60	1.90
New Democracy	6.90	7.00	7.00	7.00	4.10	4.10	4.00	4.10	1.60	1.50	1.90	1.60
DIANA Democratic Renewal	6.60	6.44	6.57	7.00	4.00	3.75	3.71	5.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Ecologists Alternatives	4.00	4.33	3.20	3.00	3.00	3.33	2.40	2.67	2.67	2.67	2.00	2.00
Communist Party of Greece <sup>b</sup>	1.00	1.80	1.30	1.20	3.10	3.10	3.20	3.30	1.00	1.20	1.10	1.10
Left Progressive Alliance <sup>a</sup>	5.80	5.86	6.20	6.30	3.60	3.57	3.70	3.90	1.80	2.14	1.90	2.10
New Left Current		1.00	1.00	1.00		4.00	3.40	3.40		1.00	1.00	1.00
Political Spring				6.11				3.44				1.50
<sup>a</sup> KKE Interior; <sup>b</sup> KKE Exterior.												
<b>Italy</b>												
Christian Democratic Center <sup>b</sup>				6.00				3.17				1.00
Democratic Center Union <sup>b</sup>				4.50				2.75				2.00
Popular Party <sup>a</sup>	6.38	6.38	6.38	6.38	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.63	1.67	1.67	1.67	1.50
Proletarian Democracy	2.67	3.00	7.00	7.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.80	1.75		
Forza Italia				4.00				2.38				2.80
Northern League		5.80	5.88	6.00		2.80	3.00	3.14		2.00	1.83	1.83
National Alliance	1.63	1.63	1.88	2.25	2.63	2.63	2.63	2.63	1.33	1.33	1.67	1.67
Pannella List			6.33	5.83			4.00	2.83			1.00	1.40
Democratic Party of the Left <sup>c</sup>	5.80	6.00	6.25	6.50	3.00	3.00	3.25	3.25	2.50	2.50	2.00	1.67
Liberal Party	6.63	6.63	6.63	5.50	3.43	3.43	3.43	3.00	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.33
Radical Party	6.33	6.43	5.71	6.20	3.33	3.14	2.57	2.67	1.25	1.25	1.50	1.33
Republican Party	6.50	6.50	6.50	7.00	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.75	1.17	1.17	1.17	1.00 <sup>+</sup>
Italian Social Democratic Party	6.13	6.13	6.14	6.25	2.75	2.75	2.86	3.00	1.40	1.40	1.25	1.00
Italian Socialists	6.38	6.38	6.38	6.25	2.88	2.88	3.00	3.50	1.60	1.60	1.50	1.00
Refounded Communists			2.43	2.14			2.43	2.43			1.50	1.50
The Network		6.25	4.71	5.00		3.00	2.29	2.57		2.00	2.20	2.20
The Green List	5.60	5.60	5.00	5.14	2.40	2.80	3.00	2.86	2.00	2.00	2.50	2.33

<sup>a</sup> Former Christian Democrats; <sup>b</sup> Christian Democratic Splinter; <sup>c</sup> Former Communist Party (PCI).

<sup>+</sup> Possible overestimate due to 'anomalous' respondent; <sup>-</sup> Possible underestimate due to 'anomalous' respondent.

	Position on European integration				Importance of issue				Extent of internal dissent over issue			
	1984	1988	1992	1996	1984	1988	1992	1996	1984	1988	1992	1996
<b>Ireland</b>												
Democratic Socialist Party	3.50 <sup>+</sup>	3.00 <sup>+</sup>	3.25 <sup>+</sup>	4.00	2.00	2.33	2.50	2.67	1.50	1.33	1.50	1.67
Fianna Fail	5.00	5.29	5.71	5.25	2.57	2.71	3.00	2.88	1.86	1.86	2.29	2.00
Fine Gael	6.29	6.29	6.57	6.38	3.14	3.29	3.57	3.63	1.57	1.57	1.57	1.63
Greens	3.60	3.50	3.29	3.13	2.60	2.83	3.00	3.13	2.50	2.20	2.33	2.43
Labour	4.00	4.67	4.57	4.88	2.83	3.00	3.43	3.13	2.83	2.33	2.43	2.38
Progressive Democratic Party	6.50	6.20	6.50	6.29	3.75	3.60	3.83	3.57	1.50	1.40	1.17	1.29
Sinn Fein	2.50	3.00	3.14	3.00	1.83	2.00	1.86	2.00	1.33	1.33	1.29	1.25
Workers Party	2.67	2.83	3.33	3.29	2.83	3.00	2.71	2.86	1.67	1.83	1.57	1.43
Democratic Left Party <sup>a</sup>				3.50				3.00				1.33
<sup>a</sup> Split from Worker's Party; <sup>+</sup> Possible overestimate due to 'anomalous' respondent.												
<b>Luxembourg</b>												
Action Committee for Democracy	2.63	2.75	3.00	3.25	2.88	2.88	2.78	2.88	2.14	2.14	2.13	2.25
Christian Social Peoples Party	6.56	6.67	6.89	6.89	3.56	3.67	3.67	3.67	1.44	1.33	1.44	1.44
Green Alternative	3.33	3.56	3.78	4.22	2.78	2.78	2.89	2.89	2.38	2.38	2.50	2.25
Liberal Party	6.33	6.11	5.44	6.33	3.33	3.33	3.33	3.33	1.78	2.00	2.67	1.78
Green Left Ecological Initiative <sup>a</sup>	4.29	4.29	4.29		3.00	3.00	3.00		2.67	2.67	2.33	
Communist Party of Luxembourg	2.00	2.00	2.11	2.56	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	1.88	1.88	2.13	1.88
Socialist Labor Party	6.44	6.67	6.89	6.89	3.33	3.44	3.67	3.67	1.67	1.56	1.67	1.56
National Movement	1.13	1.13	1.13		3.29	3.29	3.29		1.00	1.00	1.00	

<sup>a</sup> Merged with Green Alternative.

	Position on European integration				Importance of issue				Extent of internal dissent over issue			
	1984	1988	1992	1996	1984	1988	1992	1996	1984	1988	1992	1996
<b>The Netherlands</b>												
Center Democrats	1.86	1.86	1.86	2.13	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.75	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Christian Democratic Appeal	6.44	6.56	6.44	6.33	2.67	2.67	2.89	2.78	1.50	1.38	1.63	1.63
Liberal Party	6.11	6.22	5.44	5.11	2.44	2.33	2.89	3.22	1.63	1.63	2.63	3.00
Democrats '66	6.44	6.33	6.33	6.22	2.22	2.22	2.33	2.44	1.38	1.25	1.63	1.50
Labour Party	5.78	5.78	5.67	5.78	2.22	2.22	2.56	2.44	2.00	1.75	1.88	1.75
Reformed Political Federation	2.89	3.11	3.11	2.89	2.11	2.11	2.11	2.11	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50
Political Reformed Party	2.56	2.56	2.56	2.78	2.22	2.22	2.22	2.33	1.38	1.38	1.38	1.38
Reformed Political Union	2.89	2.89	3.00	3.00	2.11	2.11	2.11	2.22	1.38	1.25	1.25	1.38
Communist Party <sup>a</sup>	1.83	2.33			2.33	2.67			1.00	1.00		
Evangelical People's Party <sup>a</sup>	3.33	3.50			1.33	1.50			1.00	1.00		
Radical Political Party <sup>a</sup>	3.33	4.00			2.33	2.00			1.83	1.33		
Pacifistic Socialist Party <sup>a</sup>	1.83	1.33			2.50	3.00			1.33	1.67		
Green Left			4.00	4.00			2.00	2.17			1.75	1.80
<sup>a</sup> Merged to form Green Left in 1989.												
<b>Norway</b>												
Communist Party	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.57	3.43	4.43	4.00	1.14	1.14	1.14	1.14
Progress Party	4.20	4.60	5.67	5.20	1.40	1.80	2.50	1.80	2.20	2.80	3.33	2.60
Right (Conservatives)	6.43	6.86	7.00	6.86	2.17	3.71	4.86	3.50	1.57	1.57	1.71	1.57
Christian People's Party	3.00	2.86	2.29	2.57	1.71	2.14	3.43	2.29	1.86	2.29	2.43	2.14
Norwegian Labour Party	4.67	5.00	6.43	6.17	2.00	2.67	4.14	2.83	2.33	2.67	3.00	2.83
Center (Agrarian) Party	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.50	3.71	5.00	4.57	1.14	1.14	1.00	1.00
Socialist Left	1.57	1.43	1.29	1.14	2.43	3.29	4.43	3.86	1.33	1.50	1.86	1.57
Liberals (Venstre)	2.71	3.00	2.86	3.14	1.86	2.14	3.29	2.57	2.00	2.57	2.71	2.57

	Position on European integration				Importance of issue				Extent of internal dissent over issue			
	1984	1988	1992	1996	1984	1988	1992	1996	1984	1988	1992	1996
<b>Spain</b>												
Galician Nationalist Block	5.00	5.25	5.50		3.00	3.25	3.75		1.75	1.50	1.50	
Centrist Union <sup>a</sup>	6.46	6.54	6.58	6.83	3.31	3.46	3.54	4.00	1.09	1.09	1.10	1.14
Convergence and Union	6.69	6.69	6.85	6.85	3.77	3.77	3.77	3.85	1.15	1.15	1.08	1.15
Basque Unity	5.75	5.82	5.91	6.00	3.25	3.18	3.09	3.18	1.50	1.45	1.45	1.45
Basque Left <sup>b</sup>	5.56	5.78	6.00	5.33	2.89	3.00	3.11	3.00	1.38	1.38	1.50	1.67
Catalan Republican Left	6.57	6.57	6.71	6.71	3.43	3.43	3.43	3.43	1.33	1.33	1.50	1.50
United People	3.13	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.22	2.11	2.11	2.11	1.88	1.88	1.88	1.88
United Left	5.36	5.00	3.92	3.85	3.27	3.25	3.33	3.42	2.09	2.25	2.75	2.83
Andalusian Party	6.17	6.17	6.17	6.17	3.50	3.67	3.67	3.67	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50
Aragonese Regionalist Party	6.40	6.40	6.40	6.40	3.20	3.20	3.40	3.40	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.40
Basque Nationalist Party	6.17	6.25	6.42	6.42	3.42	3.42	3.33	3.42	1.50	1.50	1.42	1.42
Popular Party	5.85	5.92	6.15	6.31	3.08	3.08	3.31	3.62	1.85	1.69	1.62	1.62
Spanish Socialist Workers Party	6.77	6.85	6.62	6.62	4.00	4.00	3.92	3.92	1.46	1.31	1.38	1.38
Valencian Union	6.29	6.29	6.43	6.43	3.50	3.50	3.67	3.67	1.33	1.33	1.33	1.33
Ecologist Greens	5.25	5.25	5.25	5.25	2.75	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25
Green Party	5.25	5.75	5.75	5.50	2.75	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.50	1.75	1.75	1.75

<sup>a</sup> Former Democratic and Social Center; <sup>b</sup> Merged with PSOE.

	Position on European integration				Importance of issue				Extent of internal dissent over issue			
	1984	1988	1992	1996	1984	1988	1992	1996	1984	1988	1992	1996
<b>Portugal</b>												
Popular Party <sup>a</sup>	6.86	6.57	4.57	2.71	3.43	3.43	3.86	4.14	2.00	2.43	2.43	2.14
Unified Democratic Coalition	1.29	2.00	2.57	2.57	2.86	3.00	3.14	3.14	1.57	1.57	2.00	1.57
Democratic Movement	2.00	2.33	2.33	2.50	2.67 <sup>+</sup>	2.67 <sup>+</sup>	2.67 <sup>+</sup>	3.00 <sup>+</sup>	1.33	1.67	2.00	2.50
Communist Party	1.00	1.00	1.50	1.75	3.00	3.00	3.25 <sup>+</sup>	3.25 <sup>+</sup>	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Christian Democratic Party	4.50 <sup>-</sup>	4.50 <sup>-</sup>	4.50 <sup>-</sup>	4.50 <sup>-</sup>	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	1.50	1.50	1.50
Popular Monarchist Party	4.33 <sup>-</sup>	4.33 <sup>-</sup>	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.00 <sup>+</sup>	3.00 <sup>+</sup>	2.00	2.00	3.00	3.00
Democratic Renewal Party	5.00 <sup>+</sup>	5.25	6.00	6.00	3.00 <sup>+</sup>	3.00	2.75	3.50	2.50	2.00	2.00	2.50
Socialist Party	6.86	6.86	6.86	6.71	4.14	4.14	4.14	4.14	1.57	1.43	1.71	1.57
Social Democratic Party	6.00	6.29	6.57	6.43	3.71	3.86	3.86	3.57	1.83	1.67	1.33	1.83
National Solidarity Party			5.50	5.50			2.50	2.50			2.50	2.50
Revolutionary Socialist Party	1.80	1.80	1.83	1.83	3.20	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.80	1.80	1.67	1.67
Popular Democratic Union	1.50	1.50	1.67	2.17	3.33	3.33	3.33	3.50	1.00	1.00	1.50	1.33
The Greens		3.00	3.00	3.00		2.00	2.00	2.00		1.00	1.00	1.00
<sup>a</sup> Former Social Democratic Center; <sup>+</sup> Possible overestimate due to 'anomalous' respondent; <sup>-</sup> Possible underestimate due to 'anomalous' respondent.												
<b>Sweden</b>												
Center Party	1.86	2.00	4.86	5.00	1.71	2.00	3.43	3.14	1.43	1.71	3.29	3.57
Liberal Peoples Party	4.86	5.71	7.00	7.00	2.43	3.14	4.14	4.14	1.29	1.29	1.50	1.50
Green Ecology Party		1.20	1.00	1.00		3.25	3.86	3.57		1.00	1.14	1.14
Christian Democratic Community	2.83	2.83	6.17	6.50	2.00	2.20	3.33	3.17	1.33	1.67	2.83	2.67
Moderata Samlingspartiet	5.14	5.71	6.86	6.71	2.71	3.57	4.29	4.14	1.29	1.29	1.86	1.86
New Democracy			6.33	6.00			2.33	2.00			2.67	3.33
Social Democrats	2.14	2.29	6.00	6.14	1.86	2.29	4.00	4.00	1.57	1.86	3.57	4.00
Left Party	1.29	1.29	1.14	1.71	1.57	2.00	4.14	4.00	1.00	1.14	1.71	1.43

	Position on European integration				Importance of issue				Extent of internal dissent over issue			
	1984	1988	1992	1996	1984	1988	1992	1996	1984	1988	1992	1996
<b>Switzerland</b>												
Alternative Greens	2.75	2.75	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.00	2.00	2.75	2.75
Autonomous Socialist Party	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	1.50	1.50	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.50
Christian Democratic Peoples	3.60 <sup>-</sup>	4.00	5.20 <sup>-</sup>	5.60	2.00	2.40	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	2.40	2.80
Freedom Party <sup>a</sup>	2.50	2.50	1.00	1.00	2.50	2.50	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Green Party	2.60	2.80	3.20	4.60	1.80	2.00	2.80	2.80	2.20	2.40	3.60	3.40
Independents Party	3.60 <sup>-</sup>	4.00	5.20	5.40	1.80	2.00	2.60	3.00	1.80	2.20	2.80	2.40
Labour Party (Communist)	3.20 <sup>-</sup>	3.60	4.60	5.00	1.60	1.60	2.00	2.20	1.60	2.00	2.60	2.60
Liberal Party	3.40 <sup>-</sup>	4.60	5.60	6.20	2.40	2.80	3.00	3.40	1.60	1.80	1.80	1.80
Swiss Democrats	1.40	1.40	1.20	1.20	2.60	2.80	3.60	3.60	1.20	1.00	1.00	1.20
Protestant Peoples Party	4.00	4.25	4.25	4.25	1.75	1.75	2.00	2.00	2.25	2.25	2.75	3.00
Radical Democrats	3.40 <sup>-</sup>	4.20 <sup>-</sup>	4.80	5.60	2.40	2.60	3.20	3.20	2.00	2.20	2.80	3.20
Social Democrats	4.20 <sup>-</sup>	4.80	5.80	6.60	2.40	2.80	3.80	4.00	1.80	2.00	2.40	2.60
Swiss Peoples Party	2.20	2.20	1.80	1.60	2.20	2.40	3.40	3.80	1.80	2.00	2.40	2.40
<sup>a</sup> Former Automobilst Party; <sup>-</sup> Possible underestimate due to 'anomalous' respondent.												
<b>United Kingdom</b>												
Welsh Nationalist Party	5.67	5.67	6.00	6.00	2.67	2.67	2.67	3.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
Green Party	5.50	5.50	3.75	3.75	2.00	2.00	2.50	2.50	3.00	3.00	2.50	2.50
Labour	4.50	5.50	6.00	6.00	2.75	2.88	3.25	3.50	2.75	2.38	2.38	2.38
Social Democratic Labour Party	6.33	6.33	6.20	6.20	2.33	2.33	2.60	2.60	1.67	1.67	1.80	1.80
Social and Liberal Democrats	6.63	6.63	6.63	6.63	3.50	3.38	3.38	3.38	2.13	2.13	2.13	2.13
Scottish National Party	5.67	5.67	6.33	6.00	2.67	2.67	3.50	3.33	1.67	1.67	2.33 <sup>+</sup>	2.17
Conservative Party	3.38	3.50	3.88	3.50	3.00	3.00	3.63	4.00	2.63	2.75	3.25	3.50

<sup>+</sup> Possible overestimate due to 'anomalous' respondent.

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*Address for correspondence:* Professor Leonard Ray, Department of Political Science, Binghamton University, P.O. Box 6000, Binghamton, NY 13902-6000, USA  
Phone: (606) 777-4374; Fax: (606) 777-2675; E-mail: lray@binghamton.edu