Representing Human Rights Violations in Darfur: Global Justice, National Distinctions

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This article examines how international judicial interventions in mass atrocity influence representations of violence. It relies on content analysis of 3,387 articles and opinion pieces in leading newspapers from eight Western countries, compiled into the Darfur Media Dataset, as well as in-depth interviews to assess how media frame violence in the Darfur region of Sudan. Overall, it finds that UN Security Council and International Criminal Court interventions increase representations of mass violence as crime in all countries under investigation, although each country applies the crime frame at a different level. Reporting suffering and categorizing the violence as genocide also varies across countries. Comparative case studies identify country specific structural and cultural forces that appear to account for these differences. Multilevel multivariate analyses confirm the explanatory power of cultural sensitivities and policy practices, while individual- and organization-level factors, such as reporters’ gender and the newspapers’ ideological orientation, also have explanatory power.

Government actors responsible for mass violence have been celebrated as founders of empires and heroes for much of human history (Giesen 2004).
The past century, however, saw unique efforts to redefine such violence and to hold government leaders criminally accountable (Minow 1998). Beginning with the Nuremberg Trials and continuing with several ad hoc tribunals during the 1990s, this “justice cascade” saw its watershed moment in 1998 when the Rome Statute established the world’s first permanent international criminal court (Sikkink 2011). This court—the International Criminal Court (ICC)—came into being in 2002 and has jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and the crime of aggression.²

Along with this global change, a new wave of research has begun to examine how criminal court proceedings against political and military leaders and frontline actors color the representation of mass violence (e.g., Osiel 1999; Alexander et al. 2004; Pendas 2006; Marrus 2008; Sikkensberg and King 2011; Gephart et al. 2013).³ In line with the cultural sociology of punishment (e.g., Smith 2008), such studies have found that criminal court intervention in atrocity intensifies public conscience and memory but that such interventions influence knowledge in institution-specific ways. Yet, these studies still address select cases only. Furthermore, no studies have examined whether and how the ICC influences knowledge about mass atrocity and, specifically, whether this new court can impress on the global collective conscience an understanding of government-initiated violence as a form of criminal behavior.

In this article, we take a first step to fill this gap. We examine whether and how ICC interventions influence knowledge about the ongoing mass violence in Darfur, Sudan—one of nine situations at the ICC and the first case to see a sitting president indicted for genocide.⁴ Specifically, we analyze 3,387 newspaper articles and opinion pieces on violence in Darfur that were published in eight Western countries between 2003 and 2010. This

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² The ICC is an international court rather than a global court, as (only) three-fifths of the world’s countries have ratified the Rome Statute. Yet, countries from all corners of the globe are among the ratifying nations, and there are several mechanisms to try situations in nonmember countries. We thus use the terms “international” and “global” interchangeably when we examine effects of the ICC.

³ This work is conducted across disciplinary lines by historians such as Devin Pendas (2006) on public reactions to the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial or Michael Marrus (2008) on the Doctors’ Trial; sociologists like Jeffrey Alexander (Alexander et al. 2004) on the impact of judicial interventions on the cultural framing of the Shoah or Joachim Sikkensberg and Ryan King (2011) on effects of the My Lai and Haditha trials and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia on American memories; and legal scholars such as Mark Osiel (1999).

⁴ In January 2015, the ICC’s chief prosecutor Fatou Bensouda “hibernated” the genocide charges against President Bashir. She cited the lack of international enforcement action on behalf of the court as a reason. This is reflective of the particular challenges an international
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new data set allows us to assess how atrocity in Darfur has been acknowledged and framed. In-depth interviews with 42 Africa correspondents, specialists in foreign ministries, and experts at rights- and humanitarian aid-oriented international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) provide supplemental information on the context of knowledge production.

The construction of knowledge about mass atrocity is of theoretical and applied interest. Sociologists have long argued that knowledge about the world, including crimes (Hall 1952; Chambliss 1964), is socially constructed (Mannheim 1936; Berger and Luckmann 1966; Halbwachs 1992). We extend this tradition to the construction of knowledge about international crimes. In doing so, we test world polity and constructivist predictions that global forces—such as ICC intervention in the violence—produce relatively uniform knowledge across countries (Boyle and Meyer 1998; Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer 2000) and competing neo-Weberian work that highlights nation-specific institutional and cultural sensitivities through which global messages may be filtered before they reach national publics (Bendix 1974; Roth 1987; Savelsberg 1994; Kalberg 2014).

The framing of mass violence can have numerous consequences, as past literature suggests that the intensity and form of media reporting can directly influence foreign policy (Hawkins 2002; Walgrave, Soroka, and Nuytemans 2008), public opinion (McCombs and Shaw 1972; Wanta and Hu 1994), the allocation of foreign aid (Van Belle and Hook 2000; Rioux and Van Belle 2005), and presidential actions (Wood and Peake 1998), both in the United States and abroad. Such consequences of framing are not the subject of this research, but the constitution of knowledge on which we focus is a crucial step in the causal chain toward action. In addition, repertoires of knowledge are social facts in their own right, and the global public conscience regarding the perpetration of mass atrocities must be considered a foundation for the long-term prospects of an international criminal justice system.

We begin by reviewing pertinent literature and introducing the new Darfur Media Dataset. We then present two interlinked empirical explorations, starting with a close look at three cases that deviate noticeably from the average pattern of reporting events on Darfur. Building on theoretical axioms implied in the literature, these cases suggest specific hypotheses in line with the potential Ermakoff (2014) sees in exceptional cases. We then test these hypotheses with a multilevel analysis that generates several conclusions concerning the global effects of ICC interventions on representations of the Darfur conflict, the filtering of those effects through country-specific cultural sensitivities and policy practices, and lower-level effects of paper-specific ideological orientation, journalist gender, and article genre.
LITERATURE AND THEORY: BETWEEN GLOBAL AND NATIONAL FORCES

Sociologists have established that knowledge, here understood as matter-of-course assumptions about the world, is socially constructed—an argument that finds its foundations in classic sociological literature (Durkheim 1912; Mannheim 1936; Halbwachs 1992). The constructed nature of knowledge is perhaps most evident for events that occur far away and that are removed from the everyday experience of global citizens, such as instances of mass violence. These events are increasingly processed by criminal courts, which in turn rely on news media to communicate information about such violence—based on their own investigation, court communications, or other sources—to national or language communities across the globe. Bodies of literature that concern us thus pertain to the coloring of knowledge about mass violence through legal proceedings, the communication of violence and its legal processing through mass media, and the tension between global and nation-level processes and perceptions.

Courts, Media, and Knowledge

Sociological work on courts’ impact on knowledge, including the representation of violence, has a long history reaching from Mead’s (1918) ideas about the affective functions of trials and Garfinkel’s (1956) notion of trials as “degradation ceremonies” to Halbwachs’s (1992) classical ideas on collective memory and more recent work within cultural sociology (Alexander et al. 2004; Smith 2008). This research has focused primarily on how national courts influence national knowledge and collective memory. To date, findings have confirmed that legal proceedings have great potential to create awareness of mass crimes, a potential that Durkheimians attribute to the ritual power of trials (Garland 1990; Smith 2008) and Habermasians ascribe to their discursive nature (Osiel 1999).

Beyond awareness, courts often influence the labeling of violence as “crime” as opposed to the application of other categories, such as humanitarian emergency or counterinsurgency (see Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008). The use of the “crime frame” comes with constraints, however, as representations and memories inspired by criminal trials reflect the particular institutional logic of the legal field. Trials, after all, focus on individual perpetrators as

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5 This classical tradition has been carried forward by scholars such as Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966) on the social construction of reality, Barry Schwartz (1982) and Jeffrey Olick (1999) on collective memory, Jeffrey Alexander et al. (2004) on cultural trauma, and Gary A. Fine (2001) on reputations.
opposed to structural and cultural conditions, on the recent past rather than historical path dependency, and on specific forms of legally admitted evidence in contrast to the evidentiary rules of historical or social sciences (Giesen 2004; Pendas 2006; Marrus 2008; Savelsberg and King 2011).

Nonetheless, court proceedings have the potential to intensify recognition of violence and influence how it is interpreted. Yet, they depend on media to reach a broad audience. Media, thus crucial actors in our context, constitute a semiautonomous social field that is subject to specific rules (Benson 1998, 2006; Bourdieu 1998) and report selectively. As media communicate to the world, they frame events by casting them through a particular lens (Benford and Snow 2000). In other words, media package knowledge in order to provide “a central organizing idea, or frame, for making sense of relevant events, suggesting what is at issue” (Gamson and Modigliani 1989, p. 3).

Journalists do not just report what takes place in courts but rather represent events in certain ways, and existing literature suggests that courts influence media use of the crime frame and other particular logics of the legal field. Writing specifically on mass violence, for example, Pendas (2006) examines the application and consequences of journalistic rules in the context of the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial, which tried officials for their actions at the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration and extermination camp. Importantly, journalists are committed to the objectivity rule—the notion that facts are to speak for themselves. In the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial, application of this rule meant that the logic of the criminal court was directly transmitted to the reader. As a consequence, media primarily reported aspects of the cases that the court focused on in light of the logic of criminal law, especially atrocities for which malicious intent was at full display. They paid less attention to the bureaucratized mass murder machine of the gas chambers (e.g., transport, administration), where the “banality of evil” was evident. Research on one of the “subsequent Nuremberg trials” known as the Doctors’ Trial (Marrus 2008) and on war crimes trials in the United States (Savelsberg and King 2011) confirms such patterns.

In short, when media report about criminal court proceedings in cases of mass violence, they are likely to privilege the crime frame over other potentially competing frames and may amplify the selective construction of reality that follows the institutional logic of criminal law. Yet, as studies have thus far focused on ad hoc tribunals and national courts, we do not know how media in different countries report proceedings by a permanent international criminal court. To further inform our expectations about this reporting, we draw on world polity literature, which suggests that a global pattern of reporting will emerge, and neo-Weberian work that suggests nation-specific particularities and thus challenges world polity theory.
Global Patterns, National Influences

Neo-institutional literature, especially the world polity school, highlights how global forces influence processes—including the creation of knowledge—at national and subnational levels (e.g., Frank et al. 2000; Boyle 2002). Research in this vein has shown how knowledge developed at the level of the world polity sweeps around the globe, suggesting that global scripts generated at an international level can influence perceptions and events in national and local contexts (Meyer, Ramírez, et al. 1992; Meyer, Boli, et al. 1997). Actors who generate such scripts typically include global epistemic communities, international governmental organizations (IGOs), INGOs, and transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Sikkink 2011; Neier 2012).

Potential effects of international courts have yet to be incorporated into this literature, in large part due to the infancy of judicial globalization. Yet, existing work on ad hoc tribunals suggests that knowledge developed by global judicial institutions may also influence the construction of knowledge within countries. Hagan (2003), for example, documents how the opening of mass graves, initiated by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia for the collection of evidence, reached a broad public through journalistic reports. Such legal action influenced global acknowledgment of the events themselves, challenging “states of denial” (Cohen 2001) regarding grave human rights violations worldwide.

While recognizing the effects international interventions may have on forging a global understanding of mass violence, a particular brand of neo-Weberian work suggests that national factors may also influence the construction of knowledge about foreign atrocities. These include national interests (Mead 2001), cultural practices and identities (Savelsberg and King 2007, 2011; Baer 2011), and civil societies (Kalberg 2014).

The realist school in political science argues that a country’s perceptions of the world and its policies are informed by national material and strategic interests (e.g., Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003). Proponents of this school thus suggest variation in the definition of a situation across countries in line with their interests and modifications in positions when interests change over time. Recent sociological work provides supporting evidence for the case of Darfur, as Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2009) show how death toll estimates by the U.S. government changed substantially after Sudan offered cooperation in the fight against Al-Qaeda terrorism. A country may thus be less inclined to acknowledge human rights violations and label them crime, even genocide, if it has economic or geopolitical interests in the perpetrating country.

In addition to interests, national practices, cultural particularities, and associated identities and memories may color the globalized representation and perception of foreign mass violence. In Germany, for example, the weight
of collective memory of the Holocaust came to full display in the 1990s when the German government, including the Green Party with its pacifist roots, decided to intervene militarily in the former Yugoslavia. The decision came after images of atrocities in news media served as “bridging metaphors” (Alexander et al. 2004) that evoked memories of the Holocaust, suggesting that collective memories may filter knowledge about atrocities. Likewise, Savelsberg and King (2005) show how global memories of hate-motivated violence inspire distinct legal responses in Germany and the United States on the basis of these countries’ respective experiences with hate. Similarly, Baer (2011) traces the commitment of a growing number of the world’s nations to participate in the annual Holocaust memorial day on January 27, illustrating how the content and style of commemorations varies across countries by identity and collective memory and the presence of groups that claim victim status.

More broadly, different members of civil society may influence the coloring of events. Specifically, social movements, NGOs, and other organized advocacy networks seek to document violence and frame it in distinct ways (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2009; Zacher, Nyseth Brehm, and Savelsberg 2014; Savelsberg 2010, 2015). In doing so, they often interact with media (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993). Thus, differences in civil society activism across countries may also influence how newspapers frame violence. Such activism may vary in intensity as well as in focus, as activism regarding mass atrocity often faces competing interests between human rights issues and humanitarian concerns.

Finally, this article’s focus on the interrelationship between global and nation-level forces in the construction of knowledge about mass atrocity does not deny the potential explanatory weight of factors that operate below the nation level. Previous literature has documented that media biases may influence content in a variety of ways. Furthermore, while news reports are never the result of just one person’s work, characteristics of the reporter may also come into play. Some scholars have argued, for example, that the gender of a journalist influences content choices. While much of this literature focuses on the impact of gender on source selection (e.g., Zoch and Turk 1998; Armstrong 2004), it is possible that a journalist’s gender may also affect content in other ways, such as the selection of events and issues reported. The form of news products may also influence reporting, as it is clear that opinion pieces differ from “hard news” (Bell 1991), and news agency reports may be more general in order to appeal to a wider audience.

In short, literature suggests that judicial interventions by the ICC potentially influence the representation of atrocity in Darfur. Yet, national forces may also color those representations, while lower-level forces are likely at work as well. This review of literature thus suggests the following axioms, which we will specify as testable hypotheses when we present qualitative case studies below (axioms 1–3) or as control variables in the statistical analysis (axiom 4).

**AXIOM 1.**—Interventions by international and global quasi-judicial and legal institutions affect representations of mass violence in news media across national boundaries.7

**AXIOM 2.**—Nation-specific interests, policy practices, and cultural sensitivities filter effects of international and global institutions.

**AXIOM 3.**—Potentially competing fields that do not share the logic of criminal law, especially the humanitarian field, may override the framing of violence by the criminal court.

**AXIOM 4.**—Forces below the nation level also color the reporting of mass violence and the legal processing of such violence.

We word these axioms broadly. Qualitative studies on exceptional cases (Ermakoff 2014) reported below (named the “context of discovery” by Bendix [1992]) suggest hypotheses that specify the expectations expressed in these axioms and allow for empirical testing based on a quantitative data set (“context of proof” à la Bendix [1992]).8

**DATA, METHODS, AND THE CASE OF DARFUR**

To better understand whether and how the ICC influenced acknowledgment and framing of violence in Darfur, we examined reporting in prominent daily newspapers from eight countries. The eight countries include Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. All eight countries are Western democracies with developed economies, although all differ in interests, policy practices, and identities.9

7 We refer to ICC-related actions by the UN Security Council—which we describe in more detail below—as quasi-judicial, as the Security Council is not a judicial organization. Nonetheless, it initiated an investigation by the Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, subsequently referred the case of Darfur to the ICC, and has the authority to defer the prosecution under Article 16 of the Rome Statute, an authority it has not used to this point.

8 Different from Ermakoff’s “exceptional cases,” however, we here do not refer to outliers or unique cases but to cases that, on some dimensions, exemplify a particular pattern.

9 We selected Western democracies from the Global North for several reasons. First, a controlled comparison holds variation along some variables to a minimum, thus allowing for the identification of causal mechanisms, especially in small N studies. Second,
We selected two papers that were among those with the highest circulation within their country and chose, within this spectrum, one conservative and one center-left-leaning paper from each country, excluding tabloids. There were two exceptions—Ireland and Switzerland—as these are small countries with only one paper that widely covers international news. Editorial sections of most newspapers have a clearly recognizable ideological orientation, even if papers strive for neutral news reporting. As all governments in the countries examined had at all times either center-right or center-left political majorities, our data always entail potential for alignment and disagreement with government positions (with the exception of Ireland and Switzerland). As there is no global database that classifies papers according to political leaning, we categorized newspapers on the basis of their general reputation in their respective countries. Our assessment was confirmed in conversations with residents of these countries that further coincided with media descriptions in Wikipedia. In total, 14 papers were selected for analysis, as shown in table 1.

We conducted content analysis on articles published in these newspapers between January 1, 2003, and May 30, 2010. In line with our interest in the effects of judicial interventions, we structure the time frame of the study into nine time periods that are marked by judicial or quasi-judicial steps. In February 2003, two Darfuri rebel groups attacked Sudanese government forces. The government, in collaboration with militias (Janjaweed) whom it equipped and mobilized, responded with a vengeance. On September 18, 2004, UN Resolution 1564 established an International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur in response to ongoing violence, and on January 25, 2005, this commission delivered its report to Secretary General

we were interested in reflections of violence in media that are not government controlled (positions in the latter are easily predictable), which disqualified a range of countries. The third reason is research economics. Researching eight (mostly) neighboring countries from the Global North for a comparative study is already costly. Yet, research on representations of Darfur and on effects of ICC interventions on media reporting in other parts of the globe is desirable, and a few studies on the former do exist. Research on reporting about Darfur in African countries finds substantial similarities to narratives in Northern newspapers (Ray 2009). A current dissertation project by Wahutu Siguru at the University of Minnesota examines whether these patterns also apply to Kenya and South Africa. Mody (2010), however, identifies differences in reporting between the Global North and the Global South countries, especially in the Arab world. No media studies on the Global South have, however, examined effects of judicial interventions on media reporting, leaving this task to future research.

10 We also considered whether the papers are widely read by policy makers, internationally renowned, and deemed to meet high standards (such as editorial independence and attention to accuracy). Note also that Canada’s Globe and Mail is considered a centrist paper. We chose this as one of the two papers and classified it as center-left in contrast with the second Canadian paper.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Conservative Newspaper</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Left-Liberal Newspaper</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Other Newspaper</th>
<th>Country Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Die Presse</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>Der Standard</td>
<td>103</td>
<td></td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Toronto Sun</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>Globe and Mail</td>
<td>213</td>
<td></td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Le Figaro</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>Le Monde</td>
<td>341</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</td>
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<td>Süddeutsche Zeitung</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Guardian</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Wall Street Journal</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>531</td>
<td></td>
<td>702</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.*—No. of opinion pieces included in parentheses. Ireland and Switzerland each have only one newspaper reporting international news; therefore, the conservative/liberal distinction is not relevant.
Kofi Annan, concluding that the Sudanese government had committed serious offenses against human rights and humanitarian law but not genocide (International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 2005). The UN Security Council then referred the situation to the ICC (March 31, 2005). After investigation, the ICC prosecutor applied for an arrest warrant against Sudanese Humanitarian Affairs Minister Ahmad Harun and Janjaweed militia leader Ali Kushayb (February 27, 2007), and the ICC issued a warrant of arrest for both actors for war crimes and crimes against humanity (May 2, 2007). The prosecutor then applied for an arrest warrant against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir (July 14, 2008), and the court issued a warrant for crimes against humanity and war crimes (March 4, 2009). Two months later (May 18, 2009), a rebel leader who had previously been summoned to appear before the ICC under seal had his initial appearance before the ICC.11

We used the newspapers’ online archives of print articles to find all articles published during this time period. If this was not available, we performed searches of the term Darfur in both Lexis Nexis and ProQuest Newsstand. Closer review led to the exclusion of articles that did not pertain to the violence.12 Then, from all possible documents, we selected every other article for most time periods and every sixth article for two lengthy time periods that passed without judicial intervention, resulting in a total sample of 3,387 articles.

Content analysis was conducted on the basis of a coding scheme we created inductively and deductively. Although we coded at the article level, we treated each article as a collection of statements based on different sources that the journalist combined. In other words, each statement was coded so an article could include different frames, as the frames are not mutually exclusive and as several could appear in an article. Six graduate student coders were chosen on the basis of their language abilities (English, German, or French) and their familiarity with content analysis. Coders received one week of intensive training and met weekly over several months to discuss questions. In addition, coders coded three of the same articles (from different newspapers and years) each week in order to assess intercoder reliability; we also periodically chose articles to assess each coder’s work. Coders assigned each variable a quantitative code, and we

11 At the time of data collection, this appearance before the ICC was the most recent court intervention in Darfur. We decided to analyze newspaper articles one year after this intervention to assess whether and how representation and acknowledgment change without international interventions.

12 We did not code articles that reported only on the 1983–2005 Sudanese civil war (North-South war). We also did not code violence that took place outside of Sudan’s borders but included reports on Darfuris in refugee camps.
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compiled results into a database.\textsuperscript{13} Intercoder reliability for variables analyzed here was high (Cohen’s \(k\) ranging from .72 to 1.00).\textsuperscript{14}

To supplement our content analysis data, the first author conducted in-depth interviews with journalists, foreign ministry officials, and INGO experts in the eight countries under study. Interviewees included 12 current or previous Africa correspondents who had covered events in Darfur. Journalists who had contributed the largest number of articles about the conflict in Darfur in the newspapers we examined were contacted, and those available in Europe or the United States were interviewed (representing seven countries and 11 newspapers).\textsuperscript{15} All but three interviews were conducted in person between 2010 and 2011 in Washington, D.C., New York City, Berlin, Frankfurt, Bielefeld, Munich, Vienna, Bern, Geneva, Paris, London, and Dublin. Most interviews lasted between one and one and a half hours. The interview guide included questions regarding perceptions of the types of violence in Darfur, the causes of that violence, the appropriate framing, policy preferences, and sources of information. Interviews were recorded, transcribed, and read repeatedly (for more details, see Savelsberg [2015]).

Dependent Variables

In this article, we rely on two types of binary dependent variables. Three of the variables pertain to acknowledgment of victimization, including whether an article reports killings, rapes, or displacements, arguably three of the main types of victimization in Darfur. Each article was assigned a 1 if any killings or deaths were mentioned and a 0 if they were not.\textsuperscript{16} Similarly, an article received a 1 if rape was mentioned in the context of Darfur and a 0 if it was not. Finally, an article was assigned a 1 if the article mentioned that the violence resulted in refugees or internally displaced people and a 0 otherwise. While there is a legal difference between refugees and internally displaced peoples, articles typically cited general numbers of those displaced by the conflict, meaning we cannot separate categories of displaced peoples.

\textsuperscript{13} We use a small fraction of the 178 variables in the data set in this article.

\textsuperscript{14} As we expected, intercoder reliability is highest for variables pertaining to victimization and slightly lower for variables that required judgment from the coder, such as frame variables. Overall, even the lowest Cohen’s kappa illustrates considerable agreement between coders.

\textsuperscript{15} The logistics of interviewing individuals who are stationed in Africa and whose work involves frequent travel were difficult, which explains the lack of complete coverage.

\textsuperscript{16} We further differentiated between “natural” deaths (such as starvation) and targeted deaths (such as shootings); although since reporters often did not differentiate between these types of deaths, we use the all-encompassing variable here. Note also that reporters almost always referred to rape rather than other forms of sexual violence, which is the reason for our focus here.
We also coded conflict frames, which capture how the violence was labeled. Specifically, we coded five different frames: an insurgency frame that depicts the violence as caused by Darfuri insurgents; a civil war frame; a humanitarian emergency frame; a crime frame; and an aggression frame, which identifies the violence as disproportionate but not criminal. All but one of these frames were identified in previous analyses of discourses on Darfur (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2009) and supplemented after our initial reading of articles.

Given our specific interest in how suffering is framed as a crime and in the impact of ICC intervention on the representation of atrocity, we focus on the use of the crime frame. This variable received a 1 if an article included diagnostic framing (diagnosis of acts as criminal), prognostic framing (criminal justice solution proposed), or motivational framing (justice as motivating force), the three core framing strategies identified by Benford and Snow (2000). Within the crime frame, we assessed whether articles labeled the violence as a specific type of crime—genocide—given the intense debate surrounding the use of this label in the case of Darfur and because genocide is widely regarded as the “crime of crimes.” Articles were assigned a 1 if the violence was labeled genocide or “genocidal acts,” although we did not count more ambiguous labels, such as “characteristics of genocide,” as genocide.

Finally, given our interest in the individualizing effect of law, we assess who is deemed responsible for the violence in Sudan. While we coded for a range of perpetrators, here we test what influences whether an article deemed the Sudanese state a perpetrator. Coders were instructed to assign articles a 1 if the state was explicitly called a criminal or a perpetrator or if the article said that the state was responsible for rape, murder, or other universally accepted crimes against its citizens. However, aggressive behavior that was not framed as criminal, even if it was deemed disproportionate, was not included. Similarly, we assessed whether articles referred to President Omar al-Bashir as a criminal or perpetrator. We assigned a 1 if this was the case and otherwise assigned a 0. Thus, the dependent variables of interest are killings, rapes, displacements, crime frame, genocide, Sudanese state, and President Bashir. Each of these variables is a dummy variable, and summary statistics for dependent variables are found in table 2.

Analytic Strategy

We separate our analysis into two parts. As reporting on Darfur is understudied and relatively unknown, and as we are interested in the impact of ICC intervention on acknowledgment and representation over time, we first explore patterns in select dependent variables across countries and over time and present interview data to inform these patterns. Simple descriptive
analyses can be powerful in establishing basic patterns, and they can also provide a context of discovery (Bendix 1992) and generate hypotheses.

We subsequently turn to multivariate analysis to test hypotheses on the construction of knowledge in news media. These hypotheses are inspired deductively by the literature and inductively through descriptive analysis, with a particular focus on country-specific differences. Independent variables are described in more detail below. We use a modeling technique to predict a dichotomous outcome using data with a two-level hierarchical structure. A multilevel model is preferred due to the nested nature of the data (articles nested within countries), which violates the assumption of independence of the error terms required for conventional logistic regression. More specifically, we use the xtmelogit command in Stata to fit a multilevel logit model with a country-level random intercept, thus correcting for the clustered nature of the data.\textsuperscript{17} This particular command uses maximum likelihood estimation with adaptive quadrature to fit the following null equation:

$$\log \left( \frac{Pr(\text{reporting})}{1 - Pr(\text{reporting})} \right) = \beta_0 + \mu_{0j},$$

where $\beta_0$ is the intercept shared by all countries and $\mu_{0j}$ is the random effect unique to country $j$. Independent variables at the article (level 1) and country (level 2) levels can then be included as explanatory factors, and we review those included and provide additional details about the model in the forthcoming analysis.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{17} We also ran models with an unstructured covariance matrix to ensure that results did not qualitatively change.

\textsuperscript{18} We also ran three-level models (articles nested within newspapers nested within countries), and the significance and relative magnitude of all effects remained the same.

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Binary Dependent Variables}
\begin{tabular}{llr}
\hline
Variable & Definition & \%\\
\hline
Killings & 1 = killings mentioned & 44.76 \\
Displacements & 1 = displacement mentioned & 46.06 \\
Rapes & 1 = rapes mentioned & 14.73 \\
Crime frame & 1 = violence labeled criminal & 49.28 \\
Genocide & 1 = violence labeled genocide & 21.49 \\
Sudanese state & 1 = state called perpetrator & 14.56 \\
President Bashir & 1 = President Bashir called perpetrator & 10.92 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textit{Note.---} $N = 3,387$ articles.
RESULTS: GLOBAL PATTERNS AND REMARKABLE CASES

Descriptive analyses of the media data set reveal astonishing similarities and differences across counties. In line with our expectations, the violence in Darfur was most commonly diagnosed as criminal violence (49% of articles). The second most frequent lens through which the violence in Darfur was viewed is the civil war frame (38%). Aggressive state (31%) and humanitarian emergency (25%) frames were somewhat common, but the violence was rarely viewed as an insurgency (2%).

As we anticipate that the dominance of the crime frame is linked to judicial and quasi-judicial interventions, an examination of trends over the nine time periods begins to reveal patterns. Figure 1 illustrates the percentage of articles that use the crime frame in each time period by country. Differences across countries and over time are evident, although patterns over time are also quite similar, suggesting effects of interventions. There are clear spikes in the use of the crime frame, particularly after the International Commission of Inquiry delivered its report on the violence on January 25, 2005. The commission concluded that crimes were occurring in Darfur, which appears to be reflected in media reporting. There are also evident spikes surrounding several other interventions; most notably, the percentage of articles using the crime frame increased across countries around the time that the ICC issued a warrant for President Bashir in 2009.

The human rights and criminal justice field, including the ICC, is of course not the only actors who speak to the issue of Darfur. Analyses show, however, that court interventions are comparatively effective in shaping media reporting, at least as compared to the humanitarian field. On the one hand, announcements and reports issued by humanitarian aid INGOs and IGOs are relatively frequent (e.g., an accounting of major announcements between 2004 and 2007 yielded a number larger than 50). Yet, on the other hand, use of the humanitarian frame in media reporting rapidly declined after a strong representation in the first period under study (see fig. 2). It appears as though judicial interventions, rituals of a dramatizing nature, are more effective at coloring narratives about mass violence than humanitarian actions. The latter are frequent but routinized, and they address suffering that, given the nature of media markets, is newsworthy for only limited periods of time. In addition to market forces, the eviction of INGOs from Darfur by the Sudanese state and resulting self-censorship might have weakened potential effects of the humanitarian sector on the global representation of the violence in Darfur, although it also likely accounts for the rise in the humanitarian emergency frame after the warrant for Bashir was issued.

Other variables show varying degrees of similarity across countries over time. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate temporal variation in two other dependent
Fig. 1.—Crime frame in Western countries over time
FIG. 2.—Crime frame and humanitarian emergency frame of the violence in Darfur in Western media over time
FIG. 3. Darfur labeled genocide in Western countries over time.
FIG. 4.—President Bashir labeled perpetrator by Western countries over time
variables—labeling the conflict genocide and labeling President Bashir as a criminal perpetrator, respectively. The use of the label of genocide varies over time—specifically during the earlier periods of the conflict, and judicial interventions appear to have country-specific influences on the use of the label of genocide over time (fig. 3). However, there is a uniform spike in the percentage of articles across countries that label the violence genocide after the July 14, 2008, application for the warrant for President Bashir.

Figure 4, which illustrates the percentage of articles in different countries over time that label President Bashir as a criminal perpetrator, displays much greater similarity across countries. Earlier time periods show almost uniform lack of mention of Bashir as a perpetrator. This stands in stark contrast to the period after July 14, 2008, when the ICC prosecutor applied for an arrest warrant for Bashir. These trends suggest that ICC interventions did indeed influence media reporting of Darfur but also highlight the specific nature in which they did—in this case, the individualizing effect of law is clear.

Overall, these figures illustrate that the effects of judicial interventions are noticeable although variable, depending on the intervention, and that they are not uniform across countries. However, we see remarkably similar patterns in some instances, specifically in response to the application and issuance of the warrant for President Bashir. Thus, similarities in the depiction of Darfur across countries begin to confirm our expectation about the strength of global forces.19

While these observations are largely descriptive in nature, they support expectations in line with axioms derived from the literature and suggest the following hypothesis:

HYPOTHESIS 1.—Global and international judicial and quasi-judicial interventions in Darfur are associated with (a) higher odds of the crime frame, (b) higher odds of labeling the violence as genocide, (c) higher odds of recognition of victimization, and (d) lower odds of citing the state as a perpetrator.

Differences between Countries

While theoretical arguments about the effect of judicial action and globalization on the representation of violence are in sync with parallels in reporting across countries, they do not explain the different levels at which

19 Other global factors are also likely behind fairly uniform trends seen in these figures. Interviews with Africa correspondents revealed, e.g., journalistic dependency on information provided by global institutions such key media outlets and INGOs. They also revealed informal and formal communicative network ties between Western journalists in those few African settings from which they cover the African continent (see Savelsberg 2015).
publics in various countries encounter distinct content. Table 3 shows select variables by country (in articles and opinion pieces combined).

As seen in the table, the United States stands out in its use of the crime frame (54%) and the label of genocide (31%). This distinction is even more prominent when we examine opinion pieces alone (not shown), as 76% define the violence in Darfur as criminal in contrast to an average of 63% of all opinion pieces. Even more pronounced, 62% of American opinion pieces cite a particular type of crime—genocide—compared against an average of 38%. They did so in particularly drastic ways, at times analogically bridging to the Holocaust. Nicholas Kristof, for example, entitled two of his op-ed pieces “Sudan’s Final Solution” (New York Times, June 19, 2004, sec. A, p. 17) and “Africa’s Brutal Lebensraum” (New York Times, March 14, 2006, sec. A, p. 27). His words in the latter piece are characteristic: “As in Rwanda and even during the Holocaust, racist ideologies sometimes disguise greed, insecurity and other pathologies. Indeed, one of the genocide’s aims is to drive away African tribes to achieve what Hitler called Lebensraum: ‘living space’ for nomadic Arabs and their camels.”

Literature and observations suggest potential explanations for these American particularities. The mobilization on behalf of Darfur by religiously based organizations and churches was crucial for the attention the case received in the U.S. administration under President George W. Bush (Mamdani 2009). Many conservative evangelical denominations who were involved in missionary work in Southern Sudan (now South Sudan) were joined by the African-American caucus on Capitol Hill (as victims were perceived as “black” Africans) and by liberal Jewish groups who had been mobilized by the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, which issued a “genocide alert” on behalf of Darfur in January 2004. Out of these diverse contributors emerged the Save Darfur movement, a coalition of over 200 civil society organizations and an almost unprecedented force in a case of mass violence abroad. Such movement activities likely motivated President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell to define the violence as genocidal early

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reporting on Darfur</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>All Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crime frame ..........</td>
<td>54.42</td>
<td>45.04</td>
<td>49.29</td>
<td>49.28</td>
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<tr>
<td>Genocide ............</td>
<td>30.91</td>
<td>17.36</td>
<td>16.62</td>
<td>21.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displacement ........</td>
<td>46.44</td>
<td>55.79</td>
<td>48.93</td>
<td>46.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian emergency frame ...</td>
<td>24.07</td>
<td>33.47</td>
<td>28.69</td>
<td>25.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holocaust bridging ...</td>
<td>21.37</td>
<td>18.75</td>
<td>9.26</td>
<td>14.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE.**—For Holocaust bridging, the denominator is articles that include any bridging rather than total articles.
and to do so more strongly than leaders from other countries. In short, an unusual coalition between liberal and conservative civil society groups contributed to the massive attention and dramatic representation the case of Darfur experienced in the United States; not only were movements likely to affect media reporting (Ryan, Carragee, and Schwerner 1998), but the porous nature of the boundary between state and society (Bendix 1974; Roth 1987) likely contributed to the smooth transition of attention from civil society to the U.S. government. These observations suggest that civil society organizations may influence narratives of the violence in Darfur, and we propose the following hypothesis for empirical testing:

**Hypothesis 2.**—Strong civil society mobilization for the cause of Darfur is associated with comparatively higher odds of using (a) the crime frame in general and (b) the label of genocide in particular.

In contrast to the United States, Irish representation of the violence downplayed both the crime frame and the label of genocide. Yet, Ireland had the highest percentage of articles citing displacement as a form of victimization—56% compared to an average of 46% in all countries—and the highest percentage of articles citing a humanitarian emergency frame. Interviewees in Dublin’s Department of Foreign Affairs provided reasons for the country’s reluctance to portray the violence in Darfur in dramatic, especially criminalizing, terms. They emphasized their country’s history and collective memory of extreme poverty and famine, arguing that such memories influence engagement in humanitarian aid delivery. “We always point to the history of our aid program. . . . Also in Sudan a lot of our focus was humanitarian . . . there are still about 2,000 missionaries whom we fund for their development work and there would also be NGOs whose roots would be in the Catholic missions. . . . In 2003, our focus [in Darfur] really shifted to the humanitarian challenge that was evolving. . . . Our Northern Ireland situation taught us that amnesties are sometimes the way to go” (March 2011).

Irish policies regarding the delivery of humanitarian aid are associated with cautious positions toward the government of the receiving country. This is not surprising, as governments and INGOs that provide aid depend on cooperation with other governments, including those that engage in grave human rights violations. They are thus less willing to blame states for committing crimes, which is reflected in news media reporting.

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20 For a chapter-long analysis of responses in the United States, see Savelsberg (2015).

21 It is conceivable that cases with predominantly humanitarian civil society mobilization respond differently, but we expect that effect to be overwhelmed by strong human rights mobilization.

22 Aid-oriented INGOs also typically depend on this cooperation, which may influence whether they label government action as criminal, as suggested by interviewees (see also de Waal 1997).
short, the Irish case illustrates how national experiences, policies, and associated identities may affect a country’s position vis-à-vis political violence abroad.\(^{23}\) Again, a particular case suggests that we examine the link between aid policy and the representation of mass violence through multivariate analysis. Accordingly, we propose hypothesis 3:

**HYPOTHESIS 3.**—More worldwide humanitarian aid given by a country is associated with (a) higher odds of media attention to displacements, (b) lower odds of use of the crime frame, and (c) comparatively lower use of the label of genocide.

Humanitarianism is, of course, not just represented at the national level. Major humanitarian INGOs issue reports and inform about situations in order to mobilize public engagement, voluntarism, and donations. Yet, their actions and reports, while many, are of a routine nature. They lack the drama of a major court decision, and descriptive analyses show that their effect on reporting is less pronounced and less enduring than that of court decisions.\(^ {24}\)

Finally, as in Ireland, German newspapers are reluctant to use the term genocide, with 17% of articles doing so compared to the average of 21% for all countries.\(^ {25}\) Likewise, only 24% of German opinion pieces labeled the violence genocide compared to 34% of others. Yet, another reason is likely at play. A prominent German Africa correspondent explained why he thought he was less inclined to apply the term genocide to Darfur than his colleagues from other countries: “If my background as a German matters in reporting about Darfur, then that is because I have this annihilation machinery [Holocaust] in mind . . . and these cases are just so far removed from each other” (December 2010). Related, the director of a major German Holocaust memorial site, himself the son of an Auschwitz survivor, pointed out that it is difficult for Germans to draw links between the Shoah and contemporary atrocities. Germans, after all, had perpetrated the Holocaust. The “trauma of perpetrators” (Giesen 2004) colors their identity, and international perception similarly attributes responsibility for the Holocaust to the German people. Any wording that links the Holocaust with other mass atrocities could thus be interpreted as an attempt at relativizing the Holocaust.

Indeed, German journalists are more cautious in the use of analogical bridging to the Holocaust. Only 9% of articles that reference other mass atrocities in German articles refer to the Holocaust, compared to 15% aver-

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\(^{23}\) For a chapter-long analysis of the Irish case in terms of a “humanitarian complex,” see Savelsberg (2015).

\(^{24}\) For an in-depth analysis of Médecins Sans Frontières, see Savelsberg (2015).

\(^{25}\) Other countries that were particularly affected by the Holocaust, such as France, also had very low levels of use of the term genocide.
age across countries. Journalist Alex Rühle quoted Robert Stockhammer’s critique of comparisons between the genocide in Rwanda and the Holocaust in Germany’s Süddeutsche Zeitung, stating, “Here something is compared with that which is synonymous with the incomparable” (May 10, 2005, p. 16). This provides additional support for the notion that national identities color global narratives and lends particular support to the idea that collective memories about violence influence representations of violence.

We cannot statistically examine the link between self-identification as perpetrator (or victim) people of genocide and the recognition of other mass killings as genocide, as Germany is the only relevant case in our sample. Yet, the German experience suggests an examination of the effects of memories of genocide more generally. We thus test a broader theoretical argument about links between the intensity of collective memory of genocide (which varies across all countries) and the labeling of subsequent mass violence as genocide. Contrary to the German case, we anticipate that collective memories that are reflected in news media are associated with identities and normative obligations. In other words, strongly remembering genocide likely encourages the naming of mass violence as genocide and demanding intervention. We propose the following:

HYPOTHESIS 4.—Stronger collective memories of genocide are associated with higher odds of (a) the label of genocide and (b) recognition of victimization.

Other Social Forces and Factors at the Newspaper and Article Levels

In addition to the four hypotheses that specify the axioms introduced earlier on the basis of information from case studies, we take seriously arguments developed in the realist literature, especially the point that trade and economic interests color the way a country responds to human rights violations. In the case of Darfur, the weight of this factor became most obvious in refusals on the part of China, a major trading partner of Sudan, to support interventions. China is not part of our sample, and variation in trade is relatively limited among the countries under study. But variation exists, and we thus propose the following:

HYPOTHESIS 5.—Greater intensity of trade relations with the perpetrating country is associated with decreased use of (a) the crime frame, (b) the label of genocide, and (c) recognition of victimization.

It is conceivable, especially with regard to trade interests, that government positions differ from those of news media. Yet, our selection of a newspaper on each side of the ideological spectrum makes sure that at least one paper is potentially aligned with positions of the country’s governing majority (with the exception of Ireland and Switzerland). Importantly though, we are not concerned here with government positions per se but
rather with media representations in which government and societal responses may be reflected.

Finally, several factors below the country level may have explanatory weight. We do not formulate explicit hypotheses regarding these factors, as our focus is on the effect on global/international and national forces, and their potential coalescence with sector-specific reasoning, on representations of mass violence. Yet, we do include them as control variables. This includes the conservative (center-right) versus liberal (center-left) orientation of papers. The United States, as well as other countries, provides manifold examples for greater support for international criminal justice interventions on the liberal side of the political spectrum. Liberal-leaning papers may thus be more willing to use the crime frame and apply the label of genocide. A second factor is the gender of journalists. Literature has established the gendered nature of genocide (e.g., Kaiser and Hagan 2015), and we expect that female journalists may be more likely to pay attention to violence committed against women, especially rape, during genocidal campaigns. We also include factors that concern the nature of media contributions. Opinion pieces (editorials and op-eds) often express a paper’s leaning in much more pronounced ways than articles. We thus expect country-specific patterns to be especially pronounced for opinion pieces. Finally, news agency reports are often shorter and less likely to use evaluative terms. We thus expect reference to victimization, the crime frame, and the label of genocide to appear less frequently. Controlling for news agency reports is also important because papers in smaller countries with less lucrative media markets and more constrained resources may rely on them more frequently.

RESULTS: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

To test these hypotheses, we employ a random effects model, as explained in the analysis section. Independent variables, inspired by the axioms presented in the literature review and the more detailed hypotheses presented above, are summarized in table 4. We also examined membership in the UN Security Council, acknowledgment of the Holocaust, circulation, number of peacekeepers in Sudan, and specific humanitarian aid given to Sudan. These did not yield theoretically meaningful results. In addition, we examined a control for the length of the article, although this also captures interest in Darfur and other forces at play and does not significantly change results when excluded. See Enders and Tofighi (2007). Note that centering around the grand mean changes the interpretation of the intercept but not the coefficients.
Judicial interventions.—At the article level, we include a series of dummy variables for the time period (as marked by judicial and quasi-judicial interventions reviewed earlier) in which each article was published. The first time period before any judicial intervention occurred is excluded for comparison.  

Humanitarian aid.—As a measure of country identification with humanitarian pursuits, we include foreign humanitarian aid as a percentage of a country’s gross national income (GNI measured in 100s). Yearly humanitarian aid data are obtained from Global Humanitarian

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**TABLE 4**

**OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Mean/%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Judicial interventions</td>
<td>1 = conflict begins (excluded)</td>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>21.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 = Resolution 1564</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 = commission report</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 = ICC referral</td>
<td></td>
<td>17.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 = midlevel application</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 = midlevel issue</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 = Bashir application</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 = Bashir issue</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 = first appearance</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Nation-specific differences:**

- **Humanitarian aid**
  - % of GNI (measured in 100s)
    - World Bank, GHA
    - Mean: 3.02%

- **Civil society**
  - Demonstrations about Darfur
    - Save Darfur website
    - Mean: 6.25%

- **Exports to Sudan**
  - % of GDP
    - UN Comtrade
    - Mean: 1.96%

- **Genocide bridging**
  - % of articles mentioning other genocides
    - Newspapers
    - Mean: 9.57%

**Subnational factors:**

- **Political leaning**
  - 1 = liberal (excluded)
    - Interviews/Wikipedia
    - Mean: 53.82%
  - 1 = conservative
    - Interviews/Wikipedia
    - Mean: 32.86%
  - 1 = centrist
    - Interviews/Wikipedia
    - Mean: 13.32%

- **Opinion piece**
  - 1 = article is an op-ed or an editorial
    - Newspapers
    - Mean: 16.03%

- **News agency**
  - 1 = article is written by a news agency
    - Newspapers
    - Mean: 17.51%

- **Female journalist**
  - 1 = author is female
    - Newspapers
    - Mean: 13.20%

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28 The first op-ed pieces appeared in the Washington Post (by Eric Reeves) and the New York Times (by Nikolas Kristof) in February and March 2004, respectively. While this period was not marked by judicial or quasi-judicial interventions, Darfur began to
Assistance (2011), while GNI is obtained from the World Bank Development Indicators (2012).

Civil society.—Typical measures of civil society rely on the number of INGOs (UIA 1967–) or civic associations (Schofer et al. 2012), and we tested each. However, in order to capture the strength of mobilization specific to the case of Darfur, we operationalize Darfur-specific demonstrations. A global day for Darfur took place on September 17, 2006, and we use the number of cities with demonstrations as an indicator of the strength of civil society on the issue of Darfur. Regrettably, measures over time are not available.  

Genocide bridging.—To measure the collective memory of genocides within a society, we include a variable that captures the percentage of articles in a country that made reference to any episode of mass violence commonly considered genocide, such as the Holocaust or Rwanda, when discussing Darfur.

Exports to Sudan.—To measure a country’s economic interests in Sudan, we include a measure of exports to Sudan as a percentage of a country’s Gross Domestic Project for each year. This measures some material interests in Sudan, and it is obtained from United Nations data (United Nations 2012).  

Political leaning.—To control for how political leaning of a newspaper may influence reporting on Darfur, we include an ordinal variable for whether the paper is liberal, centrist, or conservative. We exclude liberal as the comparison category.

Opinion piece.—As opinion pieces may differ from news reports, we include a dummy variable to capture whether the article is an opinion piece, including editorials and op-eds.

attract highly visible international attention. For example, in April 2004, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan referred to Darfur in a speech to the UN General Assembly on the tenth anniversary of genocide in Rwanda. Shortly after, Secretary of State Colin Powell referred to the violence as genocide. Given such attention, measuring effects of judicial interventions in the eight later time periods compared against the first constitutes a conservative test.

We explored other measures pertaining to civil society. As noted, we tested INGOs and civic associations, although we do not include them in the models below because they did not significantly improve the fit of the models. We also examined the number of genocide-specific organizations within a country and membership in various human rights organizations, although there was little variation across countries. Beyond this, we examined the number of reports that country branches of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch published on Darfur, although this was clearly contingent on other factors (such as resources).

Other types of interest can be imagined, although we limit ourselves to that for which solid measures are available.
Authorship.—We include a dummy variable for whether the article was written by a news agency. In addition, we include a variable to indicate whether a female journalist wrote the article.

All explanatory variables are fixed, and only the intercept is considered random. The null models (not presented here) partition the variance between the article and country levels and show the random effect of reporting at the country level, or the variance that can be attributed to country-specific differences. The null model reports a residual variance for the country-level random effect, and the variance partition coefficient can be calculated by dividing the level 2 variance by the total variance for both levels (logit models assign the level 1 variance to roughly 3.289), resulting in variance partition coefficients ranging from .011 to .156. In other words, the variance due to differences at the country level for our dependent variables ranges from 1.1% to 15.6%. The lowest variance, 1.1%, is for citation of President Bashir as a perpetrator. As shown in figure 4, there was remarkably high homogeneity between countries for this variable. This variable is thus excluded from these multivariate analyses, which seek to explain differences between countries. Yet, the high degree of homogeneity is significant in its own right, as it illustrates the power of global forces.

Results from the final models for the other dependent variables are presented in table 5. We report odds ratios; thus, coefficients larger than 1 are associated with increased odds of the dependent variable, while coefficients smaller than 1 are associated with decreased odds of the dependent variable. We also tested interaction effects but opt for the simplest models, as no meaningful interaction effects were found between any of the variables included. Finally, we recognize that eight countries is a small number of level 2 units (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). Accordingly, we treated the model-building process very carefully, examining each additional variable as well as examining the final models presented against more parsimonious models.

31 Articles are considered written by news agencies if the news agency is the only listed author. If an article lists a person as the first author and a news agency as the second, it is not coded as authored by a news agency, as the reporter chose which aspects of the news agency report to include and also added some additional information that merited her or his name.

32 We tested whether a random slope for different time periods is more appropriate, although this, as well as any other random coefficients, did not contribute significantly to the model.

33 The model-building process for each variable is available by request.

34 Note also that weights are not allowed with this particular type of multilevel model. However, we explored weights with linear probability models and in descriptive statistics to ensure that the sampling strategy did not influence the results.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Killing</th>
<th>Displacement</th>
<th>Rape</th>
<th>Crime Frame</th>
<th>Genocide</th>
<th>State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Judicial interventions:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1564</td>
<td>.70***</td>
<td>.43***</td>
<td>.44***</td>
<td>.77**</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>.61***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.55–.90)</td>
<td>(.34–.56)</td>
<td>(.31–.62)</td>
<td>(.60–.99)</td>
<td>(1.90–1.82)</td>
<td>(.41–.89)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Commission report</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>.28***</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>3.18***</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>2.46***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.79–1.60)</td>
<td>(.19–.396)</td>
<td>(.61–1.42)</td>
<td>(2.36–4.68)</td>
<td>(1.78–1.91)</td>
<td>(1.61–3.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC referral</td>
<td>.68***</td>
<td>.27***</td>
<td>.41***</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>1.32*</td>
<td>.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(.21–.35)</td>
<td>(.29–.58)</td>
<td>(.73–1.22)</td>
<td>(1.96–1.81)</td>
<td>(.67–1.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.75*</td>
<td>.27***</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.62**</td>
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<td>(.54–1.03)</td>
<td>(.19–.37)</td>
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<td>(.86–1.63)</td>
<td>(1.93–2.09)</td>
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<td>Midlevel issue</td>
<td>.58***</td>
<td>.31***</td>
<td>.18***</td>
<td>.61****</td>
<td>1.44***</td>
<td>.51***</td>
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<td>(1.05–1.97)</td>
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<td>.19***</td>
<td>.33***</td>
<td>1.53***</td>
<td>3.90***</td>
<td>.42***</td>
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<td>(.14–.26)</td>
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<td>(2.84–5.36)</td>
<td>(.27–.66)</td>
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<td>.18***</td>
<td>.56**</td>
<td>3.52***</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>.34***</td>
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<td>(2.40–5.17)</td>
<td>(1.84–2.08)</td>
<td>(.175–.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial appearance</td>
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<td>.10***</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>1.57***</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.27–.50)</td>
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<td>(.08–.25)</td>
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**Note.**—Random effects excluded due to space. Confidence intervals in parentheses. \( N \) observations = 3,387; \( N \) countries = 8.

* \( P < .10 \)

** \( P < .05 \)

*** \( P < .01 \)
Global Law, the ICC, and the Representation of Atrocities

The key variable of interest at the article level—time period—allows us to assess the influence of global judicial and quasi-judicial intervention. Each time period is marked by an intervention, and they are all compared against the first time period that saw no judicial or quasi-judicial intervention. Table 5 shows that judicial interventions do not increase acknowledgment of some types of victimization; instead, articles had higher odds of citing killings or displacement in 2003 and 2004 before interventions occurred. However, as noted previously, our measure is conservative because the first time period already saw much global attention, especially due to campaigns by faith-based NGOs and rhetoric by prominent political leaders. It is conceivable that reporting of victimization might have diminished further had interventions not drawn public attention back to the conflict, although we cannot test this counterfactual.

While reporting of victimization diminishes in the time periods in which interventions occurred, the use of the crime frame increases, confirming hypothesis 1. For example, as seen in table 5, articles written in the time period after the United Nations commission report had 3.2 times higher odds of using the crime frame than articles written before judicial intervention in the conflict. As the report recommended ICC referral, this finding suggests that the report influenced reporting about the violence. Yet, the time period did not have significantly higher odds of the use of the term genocide. As the report labeled the conflict a crime (specifically a war crime and a crime against humanity) but did not use the term genocide, this indicates the commission report’s strong influence on how the conflict was represented in news media.

While the application and issuance of warrants for Minister Ahmad Harun and Janjaweed leader Ali Kushayb had moderate effects on some dependent variables, we highlight the effect of ICC intervention pertaining to President Bashir, which clearly affects the framing of the violence. The time periods after the application and issuance of his warrant saw comparatively higher odds of the crime frame. The period after the application for the warrant also saw comparatively higher odds of the label of genocide, although the period after the issuance of the warrant did not. Interestingly, this mirrors the ICC interventions, as the prosecutor included genocide in his application for a warrant, but it was not included in the actual warrant the court issued.

Analyses (not shown) explored the effects of judicial and quasi-judicial interventions on a weekly basis. We also analyzed the effects of other events that may have influenced reporting, including but not limited to speeches by prominent political figures, other humanitarian disasters, anniversaries of genocides, violence against aid workers, and the arrival of aid. This fine-grained analysis confirmed our finding that judicial interventions affect reporting patterns.
Finally, we see that later articles have comparatively lower odds of calling the state a perpetrator in Darfur. Instead, after the ICC prosecutor applied to issue (and later did issue) warrants for specific actors, the odds of citing particular perpetrators—especially President Bashir—named by the ICC increase (logistic regression not shown, although see fig. 4). This reflects the particular institutional logic of criminal law and the “decoupling” (Giesen 2004) of larger collectivities from notions of guilt once criminal law has focused on individual actors. The fact that effects for President Bashir are much stronger than those for the midlevel actors charged by the ICC also suggests that ICC interventions affect public representations around the globe more strongly when highest-level actors are charged.36

National Forces: Interests, Identities, Memories, and Civil Society

While global forces are at work, this analysis illustrates how nation-specific forces also influence reporting on Darfur. It is clear that demonstrations about Darfur are associated with higher odds of the use of the term genocide, illustrating that civil society mobilization influenced how countries filtered global narratives and supporting hypothesis 2. However, demonstrations did not influence the crime frame or increased acknowledgment of the victimization, although we are unable to fully examine this effect over time.

Furthermore, an increase of 1% of humanitarian aid given is associated with a 1.4% increase in the odds of citing displacements, the form of victimization that can best be remedied by aid programs. Humanitarian aid is also associated with decreased odds of framing the violence as criminal and calling the state a perpetrator. This may reflect an effort to focus on victims rather than point blame to perpetrators, which could hinder aid efforts. This statistical finding is in line with interview responses by Irish foreign policy makers cited above and confirms hypothesis 3.

In regard to collective memories of atrocities, countries with higher percentages of genocide bridging in their newspapers had higher odds of citing 36 It may be interesting to consider whether reflections of ICC interventions in media are direct (i.e., reporting about events based, e.g., on ICC press releases) or indirect (i.e., events on the ground are interpreted in a new light after ICC decisions). We found that about 160 articles (10% of all articles that use the crime frame) quoted ICC pronouncements (press office, prosecutor, judges, or other actors labeled representatives of the ICC). Excluding those articles from relevant models does not affect the direction or significance of coefficients. It should also be noted that press releases from the ICC are not frequent. A review shows that there were four press releases pertaining to Darfur in 2005, two in 2006, nine in 2007, nine in 2008, 14 in 2009, and 10 in 2010. It thus seems as though the major effect of ICC actions on the framing of Darfur in news media is indirect, independent of the court speaking directly to the media. Thus, additional research could better explore this question.
killings and rapes as well as genocide, confirming hypothesis 4. The effect would likely be stronger were it not for one countervailing force. While genocide memory in Germany is especially intense (Savelsberg and King 2005), the country also self-identifies with the role of perpetrator, and German journalists thus use the label of genocide cautiously.

Hypothesis 5 regarding the impact of country interests, operationalized here as exports to Sudan, is not well supported, with only nominal effects on victimization variables and no effects on the use of the crime frame or the genocide label. To probe this finding, we also tested a measure of imports from Sudan, which had no significant effects. It is possible, of course, that other interests beyond trade influence reporting, something that should be explored in the future. In addition, trade interests may influence how state departments and foreign ministries frame and respond to conflicts, but these interests may have less of an effect on reporters and newspapers. The relatively low level of trade across all eight countries may also account for the lack of significant findings. For example, massive trade relations, such as oil imports to China and Chinese investment in Sudanese agriculture and construction, are often identified as reasons for China’s reluctance to take action against Sudan.

Subnational Factors

While we are interested in global and national forces, it is clear that subnational factors are also at play. First, the ideological slant of a paper influences the framing of the violence, as conservative papers had lower odds of citing victimization and using the crime frame than liberal papers, although there is not a significant difference in terms of the label of genocide. We also see that, compared to articles written by reporters and opinion pieces, articles written by news agencies have lower odds of citing victimization (killings, displacement, and rapes), using the crime frame or the genocide label, and citing the state as a criminal perpetrator. News agencies may strive to be more neutral and thus less controversial than other news sources, as their business depends in part on their neutrality.

By contrast, opinion pieces have higher odds of citing killings and rapes but have significantly lower odds of citing displacement, a type of victimization that is arguably the least controversial (reflected by great agreement in numbers of displaced peoples cited across countries). Opinion pieces also have higher odds of using the crime frame, labeling the conflict genocide, and citing the state as a perpetrator. The tendency of editorial writers to express opinion and to impress it on the reader through dramatizing strategies is reflected in this pattern. This contrasts most sharply with press agency reports that are less likely to dramatize mass violence. Finally, female journalists have comparatively higher odds of citing rape, suggesting that
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION: REPRESENTATIONS BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE NATIONAL

Our findings speak to the question of whether and how global narratives from the world’s first permanent international criminal court reach publics around the world. We find, most clearly, that ICC and UN interventions in the violence in Darfur influence the representation of the violence itself. This is in line with the literature we reviewed that suggests that the processing of mass atrocities through legal interventions affects representations of such events, incorporating them into the public consciousness so they become, under some circumstances, sedimented in collective knowledge and memories (Osiel 1999; Savelsberg and King 2007, 2011). While research to date has focused on national courts, we extend these literatures to the first empirical test of the influence of the ICC, showing that it does indeed influence the use of the crime frame and, in some instances, the label of genocide.37 This was not the case for reporting of victimization, although the operationalization of time and the use of the first time period as our reference period likely accounts for this (see n. 29).

Simultaneously, sociolegal literature’s argument that law’s particular institutional logic is reflected in collective representations is also confirmed (Pendas 2006; Marrus 2008; Savelsberg and King 2011). This is particularly true for “decoupling” (Giesen 2004)—the identification of evil with few individuals and the exculpation of larger groups. Even if initial interventions intensify the definition of the state as criminal, legal action against President Bashir essentially reverses that effect. Our descriptive analyses show that much public attention was focused on President Bashir after the ICC prosecutor applied for and issued his arrest warrant.

And yet, despite these global forces, we find that the understanding of mass atrocities as crime is simultaneously affected by national factors, especially where these are reinforced by field effects, as the case of Ireland and the humanitarian field illustrated and the regression analyses confirmed. This is consistent with recent research that highlights interactions between global and local forces in legal processes (Halliday and Carruthers 2009) and in the cultural processing of global messages about genocide (Levy and

37 The fact that the use of particular descriptors such as the genocide label drop off after an increase following intervention does not mean that the effect is short-lived. News media do not keep repeating a finding or interpretation once established. Future research is needed to find whether periodic depictions by media have lasting effects on the public mind (for preliminary indications, see Savelsberg and King [2011]).
Yet, while the classic literature stresses intergroup conflict and power differentials between social classes or ethnic groups as driving forces in the definition of behaviors as crimes (e.g., Hall 1952; Chambliss 1964), our analysis alerts us to quite different factors. Material interests, as measured by trade relations with Sudan, actually do not strongly influence the framing of the violence in Darfur.

Rather, cultural sensitivities, associated with a nation’s policy practices and identities, affect the national interpretations of mass violence as criminal. As we found through our case studies, country identification with humanitarian pursuits is associated with increased attention to related victimization (displacements) and decreased use of the crime frame and allocation of blame, likely due to the need to appear more neutral.

This finding links to insights from past work and suggests future examination of the humanitarian aid field and the knowledge it generates. Alex de Waal’s classic book *Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa* depicts a “Humanitarian International” (1997, p. 65) composed of a complex of INGOs and relief agencies that seek to appease the states that commit human rights crimes. Countries and agencies that attempt to provide humanitarian aid find that they are not allowed into “host” countries if they press the issue of criminal responsibility. They focus instead on malnutrition and disease rather than criminal prosecution. Similarly, Hagan, Schoenfeld, and Palloni (2006) argue that the associated retreat into a language of “complex humanitarian emergencies” challenges uses of the crime frame. These authors further show how this approach to mass violence is associated with the disciplinary focus of a public health rather than a criminal law orientation. We here build on these insights and have shown empirically how a humanitarian approach emerges and shapes public and policy awareness, and additional research should examine effects on policy.

Further, strong collective memories of atrocity increase the willingness to recognize new episodes of mass killings as genocide. This general rule is likely to be broken, however, in cases in which countries have intense memories but self-identify as perpetrators or victims as indicated by the German case, although we cannot fully test this effect quantitatively. Finally, our findings show that civil society also influences framing of mass violence. In this case, specific efforts to mobilize around Darfur are associated with higher odds of the use of the term genocide.

These results illustrate that national forces, especially where supported by field effects, filter global and international knowledge, and our findings also show that subnational factors were at play. We again caution that we interpret our results carefully because of the small number of countries, although we are confident that our descriptive analyses and case studies provide additional support. We are also mindful that Western news reporting is not dictated by national governments and recognize that re-
porters exert agency. Nonetheless, most journalists are employed in countries in which they were socialized and are typically tied to particular language communities. Simultaneously, media reporting on foreign affairs strongly affects public opinion, as events beyond a country’s borders are not subject to citizens’ everyday lived experience (Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon 2005). While the relationship is thus likely to be reciprocal, it is reasonable to assume a close correspondence between media interpretation, government positions, and public opinion in the realm of foreign events.38

Finally, while we identify social forces that contribute to the construction of crime, we do not discard other factors, including power, that are highlighted by conflict traditions. Power that generally matters in the construction of crime (Chambliss 1964; Gusfield 1986) and in the imposition of punishment (Beckett 1997; Garland 2001; Barker 2009) also plays a central role at the international level. Yet, our findings suggest that the constructivist crime tradition must become sensitized to cultural forces, at least in the case of international processes, and especially when it seeks to understand whether legal definitions become translated into the public consciousness of different countries.

In short, our analysis shows that ICC and UN interventions in Darfur influence Northern knowledge about the violence in the Global South, here examined for the case of Darfur, as depicted in media. Actions taken by international judicial and quasi-judicial institutions reinforce the definition of such violence as criminal, in line with new global scripts of individual criminal accountability for grave human rights violations. Simultaneously, national practices, identities, and associated cultural sensitivities affect the ways in which global definitions are processed and represented at the national level.

REFERENCES


38 We also examined what percentage of articles came from which journalists, and even the most news-producing journalists were responsible for small percentages only. Patterns are thus not driven by particular individuals.
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Human Rights Violations in Darfur


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