State Context and Exclusionary Ideologies

Hollie Nyseth Brehm

Abstract
Social science research has denoted the role that exclusionary and divisive ideologies play in fortifying group boundaries and shaping inequality, including what is arguably its most extreme form—genocide. We know little, however, about where and why such ideologies emerge. This article analyzes 159 countries between 1955 and 2009 to assess the factors that influence the emergence and presence of exclusionary ideologies. Doing so informs broader social science conceptions of the role of culture and politics in the production of inequality and violence. I find that certain critical junctures, including independence and irregular regime change, are associated with the onset of exclusionary ideologies. Colonial histories and threats to political elites are also consequential. I conclude by discussing exclusionary ideologies relative to genocide as well as the general importance of cultural and political dynamics for future analyses of inequality.

Keywords
culture, genocide, politics, inequality

Introduction
Exclusionary and divisive ideological frameworks have long been linked to inequality and social exclusion. These frameworks define the boundaries of group belonging versus the “other” (Bourdieu, 1984; Lamont & Molnar, 2002). In doing so, such ideologies may influence a wide variety of relational and interactional encounters, ranging from micro-level social interactions to macro-level government policies and, of particular interest to this article, the very possibility that genocide may occur. In fact, Harff (2003) includes exclusionary ideologies as one of the six core risk factors of
Genocide, and prominent process-oriented models begin with the establishment of an out-group and an ideology that excludes that out-group (Hagan & Rymond-Richmond, 2008; Mayersen, 2010).

Social scientists have, to be sure, explored the determinants of genocide and other manifestations of macro-level inequality. We know much less, however, about the emergence and presence of exclusionary ideologies. In this article, I examine structural sources of state-driven exclusionary ideologies, or belief systems articulated and disseminated by a governing elite that identify an overriding purpose or principle that restricts, persecutes, or eliminates categories of people who are defined as antithetical to that purpose or principle (Harff, 2003). While important to the study of state violence and genocide, attention to the state’s role in the formation, dissemination, and acceptance of these belief systems has broader utility and is (or should be) central in social scientific analyses of inequality.

Following a brief discussion of pertinent literature on ideology in relation to genocide, I turn to factors that are plausibly associated with the onset and presence of exclusionary ideologies. These factors—such as history of colonization or political instability—are then incorporated into my analyses of exclusionary ideologies in 159 countries between 1955 and 2009. Findings reveal that nation building following independence and irregular regime change, colonial legacies, and threats to the political elite influence whether and when an exclusionary ideology exists. This illustrates the historical and political foundations of state-driven exclusion and, more broadly, suggests that the ideological foundations underpinning inequality in its varied forms warrant attention.

Genocide and Social Exclusion

Social scientists have been studying genocide—or actions taken with the intent to destroy a social group—for decades. Some of these episodes of violence captured global attention, such as the slaughter of Rwandan Tutsis in 1994 or the Khmer Rouge’s population purges during the late 1970s. Other genocides, such as the violence against Iranian Bahá’ís, are less widely known. Nevertheless, each involved killing, displacement, and other gender-based violence that targeted members of an ethnic, racial, religious, national, political, or other social group.

To understand such extreme inequality and discrimination, some have theorized that genocide is motivated, at least in part, by an ideology that excludes a segment of the population. Indeed, genocide is differentiated from other forms of violence because it involves the intent to destroy a group. This suggests that individuals are targeted because of their perceived membership in a group and points toward ideologies that facilitate this targeting by creating us/them dichotomies and casting some groups outside of what Fein (1993) terms the “universe of obligation.”

As genocide does not occur without active (or at least tacit) state involvement (Harff, 2003; Horowitz, 1976), state-driven ideological frameworks are arguably particularly critical. Indeed, these frameworks can make explicit a purpose for the state and deem certain groups antithetical to that purpose, as was the case during the Khmer
Rouge’s societal “purification” efforts or Nazi Germany’s pursuit of an exclusively Aryan nation. In fact, Straus (2015) shows that Sub-Saharan countries where elite ideologies excluded segments of the population—such as Rwanda and Sudan—saw genocide when the country experienced upheaval, while those whose leaders emphasized pluralism and inclusiveness—such as the Ivory Coast and Mali—did not.

Further linking ideology and action, many “foot soldiers” who have committed genocide likely would not have acted if not for a state-led (or state-supported) ideology (e.g., Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Waller, 2007). In Rwanda, hundreds of thousands of civilians participated in the violence after the interim president, mayors, and other political elites encouraged them to attack Tutsis, who the elites framed as dangerous outsiders (Des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2001). While each participant—or even each member of the political elite—was not necessarily motivated by an exclusionary ideology (Fujii, 2009; Straus, 2006), state-driven ideologies certainly supported such action and helped legitimate the violence for actors on the ground.

The preeminent model of preconditions of genocide thus includes exclusionary ideologies as one of six core risk factors (Harff, 2003), and the United Nations atrocity prevention framework also incorporates the presence of these ideologies (United Nations, 2014). Process-oriented models of genocide likewise emphasize exclusionary ideologies (e.g., Mayersen, 2010; Stanton, 1996), and Hagan & Rymond-Richmond’s (2008, 2009) collective action theory of genocide begins with a state-led exclusionary ideology. Although exclusionary ideologies are not sufficient or even necessary causes of genocide, they are clearly important contributing factors.

Even though the relevance of exclusionary ideologies has been established across cases and time, we still know surprisingly little about the circumstances undergirding their emergence and persistence. While countries’ rich and diverse histories likely shape the existence of exclusionary ideologies, common conditions may also influence their manifestation. Understanding these conditions can shed light on the process of genocide, as exclusionary ideologies are often present before the escalation of violence. Exclusionary ideologies are also of sociological import in their own right, as they influence discrimination and stratification globally and because governing elites’ ability to frame and classify is a form of power (Bourdieu, 1989, 1991). I thus rely on genocide scholarship, below, to theorize two sets of factors that may affect whether leaders and other political elites articulate an exclusionary ideology: (a) opportunities for ideology creation and (b) factors that influence exclusionary content.

**Opportunities for Ideology Creation**

Modern nation building may influence the creation of exclusionary ideologies. Weitz (2003) suggests that nations transformed from political communities organized around political rights to socially constructed racial communities tied together by common culture during the 1700s, arguing that the linkage of race and nation facilitated the genocides that subsequently unfolded. Levene (2005) likewise contends that ideologies of exclusion—and, by extension, genocide—are tightly intertwined with the rise of the nation-state as a political organization and the dangers of equating peoples’
rights and recognition with a particular nation. In this sense, the very idea of the modern nation-state is premised on the exclusion of noncitizens (Wimmer, 2002; see also Mann, 2005; Melson, 1992; Sérelain, 2007).

These broad historical processes cannot explain variation in exclusionary ideologies among countries today, as they speak to all modern nation-states and as all countries draw boundaries around citizenship (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983; Hechter, 2000). They nevertheless suggest that certain historical moments may provide fertile opportunities for elites to espouse principles that are used to restrict, persecute, or eliminate categories of people. Specifically, as countries gain independence, political elites have the chance to define the nation and set a path forward. This critical juncture in time is likely accompanied by what Straus (2015) terms “founding narratives” (p. 11), or ideological frameworks that identify a primary community and national goals. While some founding narratives are pluralistic, others contain exclusionary ideologies.

Other political transitions may provide similar windows of opportunity for heads of state to express a mission and redefine the nation, including who belongs as a citizen (Straus, 2015). These transitions can take many forms, including planned regime change as well as coups, revolutions, and other irregular regime changes. In each case, new leaders are presented with the opportunity to articulate a purpose for the country, which may exclude certain segments of the population.

Lastly, Mann (2005) proposes that democratization has the potential to yield exclusionary ideologies, noting that “... nationalism only becomes dangerous when it is politicized, when it represents the perversion of modern aspirations to democracy in the nation-state” (p. 3; italics added). As democracy is rule by the people, “the people” must be defined during democratization, and modern leaders often rely on ethnic categories to delineate citizenship. This may present a chance for majorities to exclude minorities and produce exclusionary ideologies. I thus examine several critical junctures that provide opportunities for political elites to create and foster exclusionary ideologies, including independence, political transitions, and democratization.

Content: Colonial Legacies and Threat to Political Elites

The opportunity to create an exclusionary ideology cannot fully explain why the content of some ideologies is exclusionary, leading Straus (2015) to suggest that country-specific leaders drive the content of founding narratives. While this is undoubtedly true, these leaders may nonetheless be influenced by institutional histories and more immediate situations.

Turning first to historical legacies, many scholars contend that colonists influenced lasting ideologies among the colonized (Berman, 1998; Nanday, 1983). For instance, Mamdani (2001) argues that Belgian colonists in Rwanda altered the meaning attached to social groups in their pursuit to classify the population during the 1920s and 1930s. This involved the introduction of ethnic identification cards and the racialization of ethnicities by suggesting that Rwandan Tutsis had lighter skin and thinner noses than Rwandan Hutus—ideas that were reflected or countered in elite ideologies for decades afterward.
Some scholars believe that colonial officials often saw these communal identities as “natural,” (Baber, 2004; Lentz & Nugent, 2000), while others suggest that classification efforts comprised a conscious divide-and-rule strategy meant to diminish opposition to colonial rule (Morrock, 1973; Newbury, 1983). Regardless of intent, colonialism tied social classification to power and political inclusion, influencing social hierarchies among the populace (Adas, 1998; Newbury, 1983; Steinmetz, 2008). Rwandan colonists, for instance, perceived Tutsis as superior and installed them in positions of power within the government.

These colonial processes and their legacies have also been linked to violence. Examining 160 countries, Lange and Dawson (2011) found that a history of colonial rule is associated with intercommunal violence. They did not identify the mechanism for the association, however, suggesting that colonial rule may have promoted oppositional ideologies and falling in line with many case studies that suggest exclusionary ideologies stem from colonial legacies.

More immediate situations may likewise influence exclusionary ideologies. Threats to state legitimacy and power may be particularly salient, as such threats are often met with attempts to delegitimize their perceived source. For example, much literature on social movements suggests that organizations and institutions frame oppositional social movements in a negative light (Benford & Snow, 2000; Haydu, 1999; Isaac, 2009). State actors likewise engage in framing pursuits to delegitimize a threat and legitimize their response, and these frames can classify, subordinate, and even vilify members of threatening groups (Cunningham, 2004; Roscigno, Cantzler, Restifo, & Guetzkow, 2015). Roscigno et al. (2015) illustrate this by showing how U.S. state agents classified the Ghost Dance movement as a threat, often voicing concerns about radical Sioux who resisted assimilation during the late 1800s. This framing directly preceded the Wounded Knee Massacre of 1890, supporting many claims that threat is a prominent precursor of repression (e.g., Davenport, 1995, 2007; Earl, 2003; Earl, Soule, & McCarthy, 2003) and mirroring genocide scholarship that highlights the role of perceived threat to political elites (e.g., Midlarsky, 2005; Valentino, 2004).

Although the mechanisms linking threat and repression are less established (Davenport, 2007), the case of Wounded Knee suggests that threat may influence the creation or support of ideologies that provide rationale for past, current, or future repression against a group. While these ideologies can guide elite actions, they may also generate fear and create moral panics among the population (Cohen, 1972/2011; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994). As such, exclusionary ideologies can be used as a tool to safeguard elite interests and hegemony, capitalizing on states’ abilities to create and disseminate knowledge (Foucault, 1980, 1994).

I thus anticipate that exclusionary ideologies are present following threats to state power or interests. As state repression is particularly prominent after threats that directly target leaders and their regime (Gartner & Regan, 1996; Regan & Henderson, 2002), political elites may espouse exclusionary ideologies following civil wars, unsuccessful revolutions, and attempted coups, as well as in response to prominent movements against the state. Economic downturns may likewise influence exclusionary ideologies, as economic downturns have been linked to increases in prejudice and...
violence due to perceptions of threat or even displaced blame (Beck & Tolnay, 1990; but see Green, Glasner, & Rich, 1998).

In what follows, I examine factors that may influence the onset and presence of an exclusionary ideology. I begin with situations that provide opportunity for elites to create ideologies relating to their goals for the nation and its members, including independence, political transitions, and democratization. Next, I examine situations that may influence the exclusionary content of these ideologies, including colonial legacies and threat to the regime.

**Methodology**

To assess what influences exclusionary ideologies, I examine 159 countries between 1955 and 2009. This represents over 90% of countries whose populations were above 500,000 during this time period. Data on exclusionary ideologies are available between 1955 and 2009, thus dictating the 55 years examined. Countries that are excluded lack data on many key indicators. I use listwise deletion for country-years that are missing data, resulting in a data set of well over 6,000 country-years.

**Dependent Variable**

Exclusionary ideologies are defined as belief systems articulated by governing elite (e.g., presidents, prime ministers, military leaders, and cabinet members) that identify some kind of overriding purpose or principle that is used to restrict, persecute, or eliminate categories of people who are defined as antithetical to that purpose or principle. The following ideologies are examples of those coded as exclusionary:

- Doctrines of ethnic and ethnonationalist superiority or exclusivity, such as South Africa during Apartheid;
- Strict secular nationalism that excludes political participation of religious movements, such as Turkey prior to 2007;
- Adherents of strict variants of Marxism–Leninism and Socialist regimes that do not tolerate civil society organizations, such as North Korea;
- States governed on the basis of Sharia law that do not permit the expression of other religions, such as numerous country-years in Iran (Harff, 2003; Marshall, 2010; Political Instability Task Force [PITF], 2009).

In total, 1,537 country-years are coded as having an exclusionary ideology, and six countries retain an exclusionary ideology throughout all country-years analyzed.

Barbara Harff and Ted Gurr created these data between 1955 and 2000 using the Europa Yearbook, the Political Handbook of the World, and country-specific sources (Harff, 2003). Monty Marshall and the Center for Systemic Peace then updated the data to 2009 for the PITF. This involved a validity check, as Marshall and colleagues assigned new codes to all countries and compared their coding against the Harff and Gurr coding scheme. Discrepancies were analyzed in detail before final codes were assigned.
As with any data, the operationalization of this variable privileges certain exclusionary ideologies. I focus on ideologies held by state agents because ruling elites have typically been the orchestrators of genocides due to the power that political elites yield within society. As a result, ideologies that are not articulated by political elites may have been overlooked, and structural exclusion that is not accompanied by exclusionary ideologies is not included.

**Independent Variables**

**Opportunities for ideology creation.** To measure the influence of independence, I include a binary variable denoting the 3 years following independence (Norris, 2009). I also include several indicators to capture political transitions. This includes regular regime change (i.e., change according to the prevailing rules and conventions of the country) as well as irregular regime change (i.e., coups and other transitions that do not accord with the law; Goemans, Gleditsch, & Chiozza, 2009). Last, I operationalize democratizing country-years as those between 1 and 5 on the Polity IV scale, which runs from −10 (autocracy) to 10 (democracy).

**Content: Colonialism and threats.** To operationalize colonialism, I include a measure of the percentage of years between 1816 and independence that a country was a colony, an imperial dependency, or part of a land-based empire. Following Wimmer and Fein-stein (2010), I chose 1816 as the cutoff point because the 1800s saw unprecedented pursuit of colonial territory. The date also directly follows the Congress of Vienna, which redrew the map of Europe.

To measure whether and how situations of threat influence the presence of exclusionary ideologies, I incorporate a series of indicators of potential stress on the regime. As previous studies suggest that direct threats to political elites result in repression, I test the influence of ongoing civil wars (excluding those that coincide with regime change), unsuccessful revolutions, unsuccessful coup attempts, and the presence of violent movements against the state. Data on civil wars are obtained from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, & Strand, 2002), and I use a threshold of an annual death count of 1,000 people. I obtain data on unsuccessful coups from the Polity IV Coups d’Etat data set (2014), data on unsuccessful revolutions from Banks (2010), and data on violent movements against the state from the NAVCO data set (Chenoweth, 2011). Last, to assess economic threats, I include a binary indicator of a 10% drop in gross domestic product (GDP; James, Gubbins, Murray, & Gakidou, 2012).

**Control Variables**

**Ethnolinguistic fractionalization, elite ethnicity, and population.** As ideologies classify groups, the existing groups within a society may influence the presence of such ideologies. I thus include a standard measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, which is the probability that two randomly drawn residents speak different languages. To
control for fractionalization within political elites, I also include a measure of salient elite ethnicity, where a 1 is assigned if the ethnicity of the ruling elite is a cause of contention and a 0 is assigned otherwise (PITF, 2009). Lastly, as studies have found links between country size, civil war, and human rights abuses, I control for the number of people within a country, which is obtained from the Penn World Tables\textsuperscript{16} and logged to best fit the data (Heston, Summers, & Aten, 2010).

**Type of government.** Theories of genocide and other forms of state repression suggest that democratic systems of checks and balances help prevent these social problems. Because the same may hold for exclusionary ideologies, I include Polity IV’s 21-point democracy score (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2014).

**Gross domestic product.** I also control for the GDP, as economic well-being is often associated with less violence and fewer human rights violations. I obtain this measure from James et al. (2012), and data are in U.S. dollars and logged.

**International ties.** Lastly, I include the number of international governmental organizations to which a country belongs due to evidence that international interconnectedness influences outcomes within countries (Union of International Associations, n.d.; see Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Romirez, 1997).\textsuperscript{17} All summary statistics can be found in Table 1.

**Analysis**

While countries can transition into and out of exclusionary ideologies, most countries make this full transition only once at most. Yet, exclusionary ideologies are not events but rather are typically present for several years or even decades. Because of this, I employ two estimation approaches. First, I employ an event history analysis using discrete time logit models with clustered standard errors. Logistic regression is necessary due to the binary dependent variable, and countries are censored after the first country-year an exclusionary ideology is present, enabling me to assess the factors that are associated with the onset of an ideology in 36 countries.\textsuperscript{18} In these models, the independent variables measuring regime change and threats to the regime are lagged 1 year. Variables that may be influenced by the presence of an exclusionary ideology, like the democracy scale, are also lagged 1 year.\textsuperscript{19}

To assess the factors associated with ongoing exclusionary ideologies, I also employ random effects models. Pooled regression is often inappropriate for panel data, which violate the assumption of independence of the error terms required for conventional regression. I thus rely on random effects models for binary outcomes (logit), which are preferred over fixed effects models to assess differences between countries and because many country-years are lost when fixed effects models are employed.\textsuperscript{20} I lag the dependent variable by 1 year in these models.\textsuperscript{21}

In all models, I control for time by including the linear year, though I assessed logged year, year squared, and 5- and 10-year periods. All results are presented in odds.
ratios, so coefficients larger than one are associated with increased odds of an exclusionary ideology, while coefficients smaller than one are associated with the reverse.

### Results: Determinants of Exclusionary Ideologies

Table 2 includes the results of all analyses. Models 1 and 2 illustrate the outcomes of the event history analyses, while Models 3 and 4 illustrate the results of the random effects analyses. In each, I first assess indicators of situations that may provide an opportunity for the creation of exclusionary ideologies, including independence, political transitions, and democratization (Models 1 and 3). Subsequent models add factors that may influence the exclusionary content in elite ideologies, including colonial legacies and threats to the regime (Models 2 and 4).

Turning to Table 2, the years immediately following independence are significantly associated with the onset of exclusionary ideologies (Models 1 and 2). As countries gained and implemented independence, political elites created narratives to redefine the nation—pursuits that significantly increased the odds that an exclusionary ideology would emerge.22

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**Table 1. Summary Statistics.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent variable</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Exclusionary ideology</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Independent variables</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Opportunity</strong></td>
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<td>Independence</td>
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<td>Regular regime change</td>
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<td>Irregular regime change</td>
<td>0.031</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.090</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Content</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Proportion of years colonized (since 1816)</td>
<td>0.483</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil war (no regime change)</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Attempted revolution</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted coup</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Violent movement (no regime change)</td>
<td>0.020</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic shock</td>
<td>0.030</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Controls</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (log)</td>
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<td>5.474</td>
<td>21.002</td>
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<td>Elite ethnicity</td>
<td>0.402</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy scale</td>
<td>0.323</td>
<td>-10.000</td>
<td>10.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross domestic product (log)</td>
<td>7.607</td>
<td>4.217</td>
<td>11.364</td>
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<tr>
<td>International governmental organizations (log)</td>
<td>3.682</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>4.654</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*Note. Summary statistics are restricted to the 6,866 country-years in the full analysis.*
Table 2. Discrete Time Logit and Random Effects Analyses of Exclusionary Ideology (Odds Ratios).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Discrete time logit models (see note below regarding lags)</th>
<th>Random effects models (lagged dependent variable)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
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<td><strong>Opportunity</strong></td>
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<td>Independence</td>
<td>4.291***</td>
<td>3.968***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>[1.515, 12.154]</td>
<td>[1.413, 11.149]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regular regime change</td>
<td>0.560</td>
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<td></td>
<td>[0.134, 2.336]</td>
<td>[0.126, 2.523]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Irregular regime change</td>
<td>3.566***</td>
<td>3.255**</td>
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<td>[1.407, 9.036]</td>
<td>[1.215, 8.717]</td>
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<td>[0.356, 4.965]</td>
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<td>Imperial past</td>
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<td>[0.699, 7.487]</td>
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<td>Violent movement</td>
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<td>[2.137, 50.519]</td>
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<td>Economic shock</td>
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<td>Elite ethnicity</td>
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<td>2.157**</td>
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<td>[1.141, 5.461]</td>
<td>[1.007, 4.622]</td>
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<td>Population (logged)</td>
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<td>Democracy scale</td>
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<td>0.931**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>[0.873, 0.986]</td>
<td>[0.874, 0.991]</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP (logged)</td>
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<td>[0.604, 1.153]</td>
<td>[0.612, 1.108]</td>
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<td>IGOs (logged)</td>
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<td>[0.611, 1.607]</td>
<td>[0.667, 1.767]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>0.971**</td>
<td>0.962***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>[0.947, 0.995]</td>
<td>[0.937, 0.988]</td>
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<td>Observations</td>
<td>4,451</td>
<td>4,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of countries</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The constant is included in all models but excluded due to space. In Models 1 and 2, regular regime change, irregular regime change, democratizing country, civil war, attempted revolution, attempted coup, violent movement, elite ethnicity, and the democracy score are lagged. Exponentiated confidence intervals are in parentheses and are clustered by country. GDP = gross domestic product; IGOs = international governmental organizations.

***p < .01. **p < .05. *p < .1.
Other political transitions are also consequential for the onset of ideologies. Specifically, irregular regime change is one of the strongest predictors of the inception of exclusionary ideologies (Models 1 and 2). In fact, a qualitative analysis of the Polity IV Coup d’Etat data set reveals that coups took place within 5 years of the onset of an exclusionary ideology in more than half of the countries that saw such ideologies. Planned transitions and other regular regime changes are not associated with the onset of exclusionary ideologies, however, which suggests that coups, successful revolutions, and other irregular transitions allow repressive leaders to come to power. As these individuals often seize power to reorient the country, they may also be likely to espouse an ideology that counters an existing narrative and attempts to legitimate their rule by stating new goals for the country.

While independence and irregular transitions are associated with the onset of exclusionary ideologies, these transitions are not positively associated with the presence of exclusionary ideologies in Models 3 and 4. In fact, they have the opposite effect, likely due to their relative infrequency. For instance, when examining all country-years with exclusionary ideologies, the years surrounding independence become much less consequential for understanding their presence over time. Thus, while irregular regime change and independence are important for understanding the creation of exclusionary ideologies, they hold less weight in understanding their continued presence across countries.

Models 3 and 4 also show that, in line with Mann’s (2005) theory, democratizing countries have significantly higher odds of exclusionary ideologies. Again, Mann hypothesized that democratizing countries attempt to define “the people” and thus engage in exclusion. This effect further supports other results linking exclusionary ideologies and nation building.

Turning to factors that influence exclusionary content, the proportion of time spent under colonial and imperial rule (imperial past) is associated with increased odds of exclusionary ideologies in Model 4, suggesting that while colonial legacies are not as consequential for understanding when exclusionary ideologies begin, they wield an influence on their presence across countries. As colonizers took control of lands and peoples, they often sought to classify those living under their rule. Such classification efforts had lasting effects on a country, and this finding provides quantitative support for many case studies suggesting that colonialism’s legacy contributes to exclusionary ideologies.

As seen in Models 2 and 4, there is also some evidence that threats are associated with exclusionary ideologies. In particular, the presence of violent campaigns against a state increases the odds of the onset of an exclusionary ideology by a factor of 10.4 (Model 2). Civil wars and revolutions (that do not result in regime change) are associated with the presence of exclusionary ideologies (Model 4), as is a large drop in GDP. Like in the case of Wounded Knee, threat can influence the creation of exclusionary ideologies, though it may also influence the entrenchment of existing ones. To be clear, threat likely has a cyclical relationship with exclusionary ideologies. Country-year data do not allow fine-grained analysis of the timing of these processes, which should be further explored at subannual levels and with other measures of exclusion and other potential threats.
Thus, my results show that exclusionary ideologies stem from instances that present opportunities for elites to espouse a founding narrative, such as independence and irregular regime changes. Looking beyond the onset of these ideologies, countries with comparatively lengthy histories of colonialism have higher odds of exclusionary ideologies. Threats that directly target elite power—including violent movements against the state, civil wars, and revolutions—also influence ideologies that classify and target a group of people.

As this is (to my knowledge) the first study to quantitatively assess the determinants of state-level exclusionary ideologies, a brief examination of several control variables is also warranted. Democracies have significantly lower odds of exclusionary ideologies across all models, perhaps due to the checks and balances built into the political system. Larger countries have higher odds of exclusionary ideologies (Models 3 and 4), while countries where there is contention surrounding the ethnicity of the political elite have higher odds of the onset and presence of exclusionary ideologies. More ethnolinguistically diverse countries have lower odds of exclusionary ideologies across all models, however. This may suggest that elites recognize the difficulty in creating exclusionary ideologies in such societies. It may also imply that salient national groups, which Hechter (2000) links to strong nationalism, do not exist. Last, international governmental organization membership is associated with lower odds of an exclusionary ideology in Models 3 and 4, supporting theories suggesting that international interconnectedness lessens repression and human rights violations.

**Discussion and Conclusions**

This article has analyzed the determinants of exclusionary ideologies, defined as belief systems articulated by governing elite that identify an overriding purpose that is used to restrict, persecute, or eliminate categories of people who are defined as antithetical to that purpose. Such ideologies represent the state’s ability to create and disseminate knowledge and are at the core of political power. They also have significant repercussions, as their emergence bolsters the risk of genocide and, more generally, legitimates many distinct manifestations of social and institutional exclusion and inequality.

Drawing on a data set of 159 countries over 55 years, my analysis offers several important insights, highlighting quite clearly the role of nation building, colonialism, and threat to the regime. As many scholars argue (Levene, 2005; Mann, 2005; Straus, 2015; Weitz, 2003; Wimmer, 2002), nation building involves defining the nation. While this can occur at any time, it typically follows independence, as this is a pivotal time for new political elite to articulate what Straus (2015) calls “founding narratives,” or ideological narratives that define a country, its purpose, and its people (see also Anderson, 1983). My results support such contentions in prior work. The odds of exclusionary ideologies increase in the time period surrounding independence—a time when leaders have the opportunity to redefine the country.

The onset of state-driven narratives of inclusion and exclusion can also emerge alongside other forms of political transition, including irregular regime change. These critical junctures involve illegitimate transfers of power, after which new leaders seize
the window of opportunity to alter the course of the country (Melson, 1992). Such transitions are often accompanied by ideologically charged narratives—narratives that attempt to justify the unconventional grab of power and, in many cases, correct a perceived problem. Furthermore, there is some evidence that democratization may be linked to exclusionary ideologies (Mann, 2005), though future studies should explore other ways to operationalize democratization.

While independence and irregular regime changes provide opportunities for exclusionary ideologies, not all founding narratives are exclusionary, and my analysis also sheds light on other factors that influence whether they take this form. First, histories of colonialism are directly linked with the presence of an exclusionary ideology. Numerous scholars have illustrated that colonizers sought to classify those they ruled, either through attempts to impose structure on the population or as a more pernicious divide-and-rule strategy (Mamdani, 2001; Nanday, 1983). As exemplified by Rwanda, these pursuits had lasting effects on state-led ideologies (and counter-ideologies) in countries around the world. Thus, classification pursuits linked to colonialism influence exclusionary ideologies, with the proportion of years spent under imperial and colonial rule directly associated with the odds an exclusionary ideology exists.

Threats to elite power also influence exclusionary ideologies. Violent movements against the state are particularly salient for their onset, while civil wars and revolutions are associated with the ongoing presence of ideologies across countries. While it is impossible to ascertain whether the group deemed threatening by the political elite is the victim of these ideologies, attention to exclusionary ideologies and the state speaks to broader processes of elite decision-making and knowledge creation under situations of threat. As with many exercises of power and repression (Davenport, 2007; Owens, Su, & Snow, 2013), threat is important for understanding exclusionary ideologies. The result may be inequality in its various forms, including genocide as well as historical or ongoing forms of repression by state actors and institutions.

My results surrounding nation building, colonialism, and threat are robust across several specifications and estimation strategies, though the lack of international data precludes quantitative analysis of their determinants prior to independence. Furthermore, while it is possible to measure some potential threats, the socially constructed nature of threats suggests that other threats likely matter. It is also admittedly difficult to disentangle the complicated, cyclical relationship between threat and ideology. I nevertheless hope that future studies—studies with reliable subannual data that can be used to systematically establish causality in such relations—can do so.

The role of ideological exclusion, of course, extends beyond the extreme outcome of genocide and to other forms of group exclusion, discrimination, and inequality. In fact, one might reasonably consider the processes outlined in this article as consistent with classic theoretical attention to generalized dynamics of social closure (Weber, 1978) and exclusion (Luhmann, 2012), or with meso-level empirical attention to specific and contemporary manifestations of exclusion and inequality in, for instance, education (e.g., Andrews, 2002), housing (e.g., Roscigno, Karafin, & Tester, 2009), or employment (e.g., Moss & Tilly, 2003). In most cases, as in the case of genocide, such exclusions and inequalities are rooted in long-standing cultural, historical, and political
processes. The core task for genocide and inequality scholars, and my hope for future research, is to grapple explicitly with such historical complexity and the political and cultural processes that undergird the formation and implications of group boundaries. To do so effectively, however, will arguably entail important fusions of theoretical insights and methodological strategies across a variety of subspecialties in our field.

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Notes
1. Genocide is legally defined as the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. Many scholars also include other groups, such as political groups, and I follow suit. As such, political mass murder is included in my conceptualization of genocide.
2. Others include upheaval, autocracy, low trade, salient elite ethnicity, and prior genocide. In 2013, Harff updated this model to include seven factors.
3. Even those who view genocide as a tactical, emergent decision acknowledge that state actors often create ideologies to support such decisions. For example, Valentino (2004) suggests that genocide is a “final solution” to rectify a problem with a particular group.
4. Of course, political elites may not necessarily believe their assertions but may rather act in line with strategic interests.
5. Data are rarely available prior to independence, limiting this study to postindependence. Note also that in models with lagged dependent variables, only 54 years are examined.
6. A predictor for a current or former Soviet satellite is not significantly associated with the onset or presence of exclusionary ideologies, however.
7. This includes China, Cuba, Israel, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam (including South Vietnam). In total, 43 country-years saw the onset of genocide (Harff, 2003), and 27 had an exclusionary ideology prior to or coinciding with its onset.
8. I also assessed a 5-year window, which had the same results but did not improve the fit of the model. A 10-year window was no longer significant. Note also that I supplemented these data for country-years that were not included.
9. As these data are currently only publically available through 2004, I used the update conducted by Beger, Dorff, and Ward (2014) for data between 2004 and 2009.
10. I analyzed a change score though do not include it because periods of anarchy are coded as 0. I also assessed an indicator of 1 to 4, which had the same effect as the variable included.
11. Incorporating time helps capture the extent of colonial transformation and the subsequent effect of colonialism on the existing structure of the state. I also analyzed a binary indicator
of whether a country had even been colonized, though this comprised most country-years. Additionally, I tested the effects of particular colonizers, though no singular colonizer was significantly associated with exclusionary ideologies.

12. Assessing the presence of a revolution and the presence of a regime change or regime overthrow yields a measure of an unsuccessful revolution.

13. I explored a 15% drop, which yielded a similar effect in all models. Annual change in GDP is not significantly associated with exclusionary ideologies. Note also that this variable is not lagged because it already incorporates change from the previous year.

14. I also assessed wars in border countries and the presence of oil/diamonds, though none were associated with an exclusionary ideology.

15. Fearon and Laitin (2003) constructed these data. As this measure remains constant over time, I interpolated it for missing years. I supplemented the 10 countries missing this measure with Krain’s (1997) ethnic fractionalization data. Furthermore, I also explored data from the Ethnic Power Relations project, though their indicators did not influence ideologies.

16. Three countries were supplemented with data from the World Bank Population Indicators.

17. These data are interpolated prior to 1980 in line with standard practice. Note also that I assessed trade openness, which is not available for many countries years and is thus excluded. However, its inclusion did not qualitatively change results, and it was significantly associated with lower odds of exclusionary ideologies in all models.

18. This excludes countries where an exclusionary ideology was present when they enter the risk set—as it is impossible to assess the true onset year. Including them does not alter the results shown. I also employed a rare events logit model, which yielded qualitatively similar results.

19. Qualitatively similar results were found with 2- and 3-year lags.

20. Logistic regression with clustered standard errors yielded qualitatively similar results.

21. I also tried directly controlling for the presence of an exclusionary ideology in the prior year, though this resulted in odds ratios well over 5,000, indicating overcontrolling. When this control is included, however, the results presented below remain similar, though civil wars, revolutions, and economic shocks are no longer significantly associated with the presence of an exclusionary ideology.

22. In line with this, countries that have been independent for centuries have significantly lower odds of exclusionary ideologies (not shown).

23. The number of violent campaigns is relatively small, so these effects should be interpreted somewhat cautiously. Yet, the effect of violent campaigns on the onset of exclusionary ideologies holds and is much stronger when there is regime change (which is more common), suggesting that future analyses should further disaggregate below the country-year level.

References


**Author Biography**

**Hollie Nyseth Brehm** is an assistant professor of sociology at The Ohio State University. Her research focuses on the causes of genocide, how genocides unfold, and transitional justice after violence. Her current projects include studies of the *gacaca* courts in Rwanda, gender-based violence in Darfur, and subnational variation in genocidal killings.