

Measures of Stereotyping and Prejudice: Barometers of Bias

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Running title: Measures of Stereotyping and Prejudice

Gregory J. Boyle, Donald H. Saklofske, & Gerald Matthews (Eds.), *Measures of Personality and Social Psychological Constructs* (Elsevier/Academic)

For helpful feedback and permissions to reproduce their scales, we thank Mahzarin Banaji, Amy Cuddy, Jack Dovidio, Russell Fazio, Maryann Fraboni, Peter Glick, Tony Greenwald, P. J. Henry, Felicia Pratto, Jim Sidanius, David Sears, Janet Swim, and Francine Tougas.

Abstract

Twenty-first century intergroup biases are more automatic, ambivalent, and ambiguous than were old-fashioned biases such as authoritarianism and overt racism, which overtly expressed intergroup hostility. Beyond traditional self-report measures of ethnocentrism and hostile sexism, current measures tap more subtle manifestations of bias. Social dominance orientation assesses beliefs about the desirability of group hierarchies and predicts social attitudes such as ethnocentrism. The stereotype content model maps societal groups' stereotypes, based on perceived social structure, predicting emotional prejudices and discriminatory tendencies. Recent racism measures tap modern policy-related attitude configurations, relatively automatic associations between groups and evaluations, and indirect indicators of intergroup attitudes. Current sexism scales assess modern versions oriented toward policies and an ambivalent version separating benevolence and hostility. Ageism scales measure both modern beliefs and prescriptive ambivalence toward older people. Current measures are less direct than earlier ones, consistent with 21st century patterns.

Key Words: stereotypes, prejudice, racism, sexism, ageism, intergroup bias

Social psychologists have measured racial and ethnic bias since the field's origins (Fiske, 1998, reviews): assessing intergroup social distance (Bogardus, 1927) and stereotype contents (Katz & Braly, 1933). More specific measures soon followed. Sparked by the Holocaust, the Authoritarian Personality predicted anti-Semitism and other ethnocentrism (Adorno et al., 1950), while surveys after World War II through the present have reported racial and ethnic attitudes (for reviews, see Kinder & Schuman, 2004; Schuman et al., 1985). With the rise of the civil rights movement, racial attitudes became more complicated than self-reports could always detect, so nonverbal indicators became useful (Crosby et al., 1980). Confronting veiled forms of prejudice informed work on policy-oriented symbolic and modern racism (McConahay & Hough, 1976; Sears & Kinder, 1971). Modern forms pick up this thread; each measure best fits its sociocultural period. An earlier version of this volume (Robinson, Shaver, & Wrightsman, 1999) covered these new racisms (Biernat & Crandall, 1999), and another early version covered prior and then-current indicators of authoritarianism and related ethnocentrism constructs (Christie, 1991; Robinson et al., 1991). This review focuses on indirect, modern forms of racism and ethnocentrism, as well as other indirect forms of intergroup bias.

Nonracial biases have been slower to elicit focused measures. Gender bias research began in earnest only after the 1970's women's movement, when gender-role measures emerged (Lenny, 1991, reviews). Early sexism measures were direct, assessing overt anti-female biases. Subsequently, measures of ageism, sexual prejudice, and classism have been even slower to develop, when each reaches public and scientific consciousness. This review covers indirect, modern forms of sexism and ageism.

Measures Reviewed Here

This chapter focuses on several measures in the most established areas of intergroup bias research: ethnocentrism in general societal intergroup relations (group dominance, stereotype content), as well as racism, sexism, and ageism.

1. Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto et al., 1994)
2. Stereotype Content Model (Fiske et al., 2002)
3. Symbolic Racism Scale (Henry & Sears, 2002)
4. Implicit Association Test (Race) (Greenwald et al., 1998)
5. Indirect Priming Measure of Racism (Fazio et al., 1995)
6. Aversive Racism Measure (Dovidio et al., 1986)
7. Modern Sexism Scale (Swim et al., 1995)
8. Neo-sexism Scale (Tougas et al., 1995)
9. Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1996)
10. Fraboni Scale of Ageism (Fraboni et al., 1990)
11. Succession, Identity, and Consumption Scale of Prescriptive Ageism (North & Fiske, 2013b)

Note. Due to space limitations, some measures are not reviewed here, for example: mental illness stigma (Link et al., 2004), anti-fat prejudices (Crandall, 1994), ableism (Dovidio et al., 2011), anti-Asian bias (Lin et al., 2005), and sexual prejudice (Herek & Lomore, 2013).

Overview of the Measures

All these measures assess category-based biases. The methods vary from survey questionnaires to reaction-time measures. The first two scales, Social Dominance Orientation and the Stereotype Content Model, assess attitudes toward hierarchies across a variety of societal groups.

The next four scales focus on racial biases. Starting in the 1970s, subtle new-wave approaches replaced explicit indicators of blatant old-fashioned racism: Modern forms explore symbolic, modern, ambivalent, implicit, indirect, and aversive racism. Each addresses the cultural shifts in expressions of racism, from more unabashed hatred to perhaps well-intentioned but clueless, or at least self-conscious

and norm-abiding forms that nevertheless have damaging consequences. Of these forms, this chapter defers to an earlier review (Biernat & Crandall, 1999) for coverage of modern racism (McConahay, 1986), ambivalent racism (Katz & Haas, 1988), and subtle prejudice (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995), to focus here on more recent measures.

In this review, the next three scales focus on gender biases. After the original, overt Attitudes Toward Women Scale (Spence et al., 1973), several approaches tackled more subtle forms of sexism (for a review, see McHugh & Frieze, 1997). Building on modern forms of racism, three highly cited sexism scales—modern sexism, neo-sexism, and ambivalent sexism—each take a related but distinct approach to gender attitudes, focusing on anti-female sexism as either gender-relevant policy preferences (modern sexism and neosexism) or hostile/benevolent prescriptive opinions (ambivalent sexism).

The review’s final two scales focus on age biases, an area less often studied. Both measures examine stereotypes and prejudices relevant to the 21st century context, one scale more policy-oriented and the other more prescriptive opinions. Together, all 11 scales illustrate the current landscape of major barometers of bias.

Social Dominance Orientation (SDO)

(Pratto et al., 1994)

Variable

Social dominance orientation is an individual-difference variable expressing preference for unequal relationships among categories of people; contexts also vary in social dominance, as the broader theory indicates (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). People who score highly on this measure believe that group hierarchies are natural, unavoidable, and desirable. For them, the “dog-eat-dog” world requires group

competition, so dominance is only realistic and adaptive. A socially dominant person might endorse the inevitability of patriarchy, older-generation authority, white racial dominance, and upper-class hegemony.

Description

The 16-item SDO scale elicits agreement-disagreement with statements such as: “Inferior groups should stay in their place” and “No one group should dominate in society [reverse-scored]” (Pratto et al., 1994). The SDO assesses social dominance, as opposed to individual dominance or self-esteem (Pratto et al., 1994).

Sample

The original samples comprised 1,977 students from Stanford, University of California-Berkeley, and San Jose State University, ages 17 to 59, about half women. Across 13 samples, Euro-Americans ranged from 19 to 59%, Asian-Americans 16-51%, Hispanics 4-17%, Blacks 2-15%, and Arab-Americans 0-8%. Modal family income, when measured, ranged across samples from under \$20K up to \$100K *per annum*.

Later samples from every continent support generalizability across cultures (Lee et al., 2011; Pratto et al., 2000). One meta-analysis from 27 societies ($n= 50,971$; 95 samples) found reliable measurement and meaningful associations with societal variables (Fischer et al., 2012; cf. Lee et al., 2011).

Reliability

Internal Consistency

The Cronbach alpha coefficient in 13 samples averaged .83, ranging from .80 to .89 (Pratto et al., 1994).

Test-Retest

Two test-retest reliability studies over three months exhibited significant correlations of .81 and .84 (Pratto et al., 1994).

Validity

Convergent/Concurrent

SDO correlates with various hierarchy-enhancing attitudes, .32-.47 in a meta-analysis (Lee et al., 2011). Besides predicting theoretically relevant attitudes, SDO converges with other enduring status-maintaining ideologies. For example, social dominance orientation, Protestant work ethic (PWE), just world beliefs, and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) all correlate (Christopher et al., 2008), but each specializes. Most relevant here, SDO converges with PWE on the centrality of work and the rejection of leisure. Just-world beliefs and SDO also play similar roles in moderating the system-justifying, hierarchy-enhancing belief that higher-status people are simply more competent than lower-status people (Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007).

Divergent/Discriminant

The measures most often compared with SDO are RWA and conservatism. RWA and SDO both predict ethnic prejudices, but SDO focuses on group hierarchies relevant to resource competition, while RWA focuses on group conflict over values. RWA focuses more on PWE values, morality, and self-reliance (Christopher et al., 2008). RWA derives from the earlier work on authoritarianism (Christie, 1991) but focuses on hierarchy-enhancing values for subordinate submission, authoritarian aggression,

and conventionalism (Altemeyer, 1988). RWA subordinates the individual to strongly-identified group membership, demanding group cohesion, under value-threat from other groups (Duckitt, 1992), while SDO endorses group-level resource inequality and superiority. The combination of high SDO and high RWA predicts support for armed anti-government militias (Altemeyer, 2004).

Political conservatism correlates with SDO (.27 median r across eight samples, range .11-.72), but controlling for conservatism does not eliminate correlations between SDO and hierarchy-enhancing attitudes, which hover around .30 across issues and samples (Pratto et al., 1994). SDO's correlations with conservatism (.30) and racism (.47) explain their persistent correlation with each other; $r=.29$ drops to -.05, controlling for SDO; Sidanius et al., 1996). These links undermine the principled conservatism account of prejudice.

Gender differences in SDO distinguish between group-motivated dominance (men) and equality-motivated (women) orientations (see below), catalyzing subfactors, SDO-D and SDO-E (Ho et al., 2012).

Social dominance theory predicts that hegemonic groups will support and subordinated groups will resist group hierarchies. The most consistent finding has been a gender gap, with men supporting group-based hierarchy more than women do (Lee et al., 2011). In the original work, SDO's modal correlation with gender hovered about .30 (Pratto et al., 1994). As the higher-status gender, men might reasonably want to maintain that arrangement. Men's higher average SDO explains gender differences in more specific attitudes toward social compassion, women's and gay/lesbian rights, and the military (Pratto et al., 1997). Although men show more support for conservatism and group-based dominance, their SDO best predicts their under-endorsing women's rights (Eagly et al., 2004). Men endorse equality in general less than women do, consistent with their higher SDO. Men's SDO itself is moderated by how intensely they identify with their gender (Dambrun et al., 2004). SDO justifies the system for the high-status gender by decreasing their ambivalence, but SDO has the opposite effect for women, the lower-status gender (Jost & Burgess, 2000).

Whites, who are high-status among ethnicities, likewise score higher on SDO, tolerate inequality, endorse hierarchy-maintaining ideologies, and are more conservative than Blacks (Davis, 2005; Fang et al., 1998; Sidanius et al., 2001). Income and status also correlate positively with SDO and conservative ideologies (e.g., meta-analysis of various dominant-subordinate societal groups reports $d=.15$, Lee et al., 2011; cf. Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Higher-status groups naturally support their own legitimacy. The belief that “people generally deserve what they get” fits both just world theory (i.e., outcomes are fair; Lerner & Miller, 1978) and social dominance theory (i.e., hierarchies are inevitable and desirable; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Construct/Factor Analytic

The original and subsequent papers used SDO as a unidimensional construct. Both exploratory principal-components analysis (13 original samples, $N=1,932$) and confirmatory maximum-likelihood ($N=446$) factor analysis of the 14-item scale inter-correlations favored a single-dimension, while the 16-item scale includes two sub-dimensions, SDO-Dominance (SDO-D), preferring some groups to dominate, and SDO-Egalitarianism (SDO-E), preferring (non)egalitarian intergroup structures.

Criterion/Predictive

From the outset, SDO has correlated with endorsing belief systems that support or reject group dominance structures (respectively, hierarchy-enhancing ideologies or hierarchy-attenuating ideologies; see above and Pratto et al., 1994). High SDO correlates with choosing hierarchy-enhancing roles such as law, policing, politics, and business, whereas low SDO correlates with choosing hierarchy-attenuating roles such as social work or counseling (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius et al., 1991). Meta-analysis across cultures links SDO negatively to hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing ideologies and gender empowerment (Fischer, Hanke, & Sibley, 2012). In American and Israeli samples, SDO-D especially relates to old-

fashioned racism, zero-sum competition, and aggressive intergroup attitudes, whereas SDO-E especially predicts less obvious legitimating ideologies, such as opposition to redistributive social policies (Ho et al. 2012).

Although correlations are causally ambiguous, SDO does guide responses to new social and political attitudes (Pratto et al., 1994), consistent with its status as an enduring individual difference with a causal role. SDO operates via attitudes toward hierarchy-enhancing assimilation, as well as hierarchy-attenuating multiculturalism and colorblindness, which mediate its relationship with prejudice. SDO consistently correlates with prejudices, especially toward immigrants and minorities when assimilation norms are primed (Levin et al., 2012).

Location

Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social dominance orientation: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 67(4), 741-763. (Appendix C, 16-item version)

For subscales, see:

Ho, A. K., Sidanius, J., Pratto, F., Levin, S., Thomsen, L., Kteily, N., & Sheehy-Skeffington, J. (2012). Social dominance orientation: Revisiting the structure and function of a variable predicting social and political attitudes. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 38(5), 583-606.

Results and Comments

SDO is an established, useful, and distinctive measure embedded in a comprehensive theory of societal structures that encourage intergroup biases favoring high-status groups. Broader than a simple stereotyping or prejudice scale, it nonetheless predicts a variety of ethnocentric and gender biases, as well as overall system endorsement. SDO is particularly suited to measuring bias caused by perceived

intergroup competition, economic threat, for example. Its cousin, RWA (Altemeyer, 2004), is more suited to measuring bias caused by perceived intergroup value inconsistency, norm threat, for example.

Together, they combine to assess the most virulent ethnocentrism.

Social Dominance Orientation

Instructions: “Which of the following objects or statements do you have a positive or negative feeling towards? Beside each object or statement, place a number from '1' to '7' which represents the degree of your positive or negative feeling." The scale was labeled *very positive* (7), *positive* (6), *slightly positive* (5), *neither positive nor negative* (4), *slightly negative* (3), *negative* (2), and *very negative* (1).

1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.
2. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.
3. It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.
5. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.
6. It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.
7. Inferior groups should stay in their place.
8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.
9. It would be good if groups could be equal.
10. Group equality should be our ideal.
11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life.
12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.
13. Increased social equality.
14. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.
15. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible.

16. No one group should dominate in society.

Notes.

Items 9-16 reverse scored.

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Stereotype Content Model (SCM)

(Fiske et al., 2002)

Variable

The SCM measures specific biases directed toward systematic clusters of groups across society (Cuddy et al., 2008; Fiske et al., 2002; 2007). The first dimension, perceived warmth, reflects the group's apparent intention for good or ill (friend-foe), and the second dimension, perceived competence, reflects the group's apparent ability to enact that intent (capability). Among the univalent combinations, the most obvious ingroups and societal reference groups (e.g., middle class, citizens) appear high on both dimensions, whereas extreme outgroups (drug addicts, homeless people) appear low on both dimensions. Among the ambivalent combinations, some appear competent but cold (rich people, outsider entrepreneurs) and others warm but incompetent (older people, disabled people). These quadrants vary in the groups they contain across societies, but the two dimensions are predicted to array groups across space in a variety of settings. This is not an individual-difference measure, but a description of reported intergroup reactions at the level of a society.

Description

SCM research proceeds in two steps. In Phase 1, a preliminary sample ($n = \sim 30$) from a given society lists groups to three prompts (Fiske et al., 2002). In Phase 2, the most important measures are the groups' *trait* images (stereotypes) on the fundamental dimensions of perceived warmth (warm, friendly, sincere, trustworthy) and perceived competence (competent, capable, skilled, intelligent). These then generate the two-dimensional liking (warmth) x respect (competence) space, with some groups typically high on both, others low on both, and still others high on one but low on the other (originally the SCM used a subset of the listed traits, but recent work by Kervyn et al., under review, suggests improved psychometrics with the additional ones included here). The Phase 1 group-listing task established a method of selecting groups mentioned by at least 15-20% of the initial sample, to assure that the groups are commonly known. In Phase 2, trait ratings were factor analyzed across participants, all of whom rated a given group, for each of 6-24 groups.

Sample

The first samples included 346 undergraduates from two state universities (Massachusetts and Colorado, average age 19-20 years), as well as 207 nonstudent adults from Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Illinois, and Florida (mean age 35-78 years). Samples averaged 50-75% female, 66-84% White, and middle-class (where measured).

Sometimes (see articles' methods), to prevent fatigue, randomly assigned participants have each rated half the listed groups. Because group-level results are most relevant (each group receiving warmth and competence ratings means), randomly assigned participants rate different groups and then the combined data sets are analyzed together, especially feasible given the lack of individual differences on these measures of societal beliefs (see below).

An American adult representative sample ($n=571$; Cuddy et al., 2007) generalized beyond earlier student and nonstudent convenience samples. The two dimensions of intergroup perception appear to be

universal across more than 30 nations (Cuddy et al., 2009; Durante et al., 2013) and 75 years (Bergsieker et al., 2012; Durante et al., 2010), as well as targets that are individuals, subgroups, groups, nations, corporations, and species (Brambilla et al., 2011; Clausell & Fiske, 2005; Cuddy et al., 2009; Eckes, 2002; Fiske et al., 2009; Kervyn et al., 2012; Lee & Fiske, 2006; Malone & Fiske, 2013; Sevillano & Fiske, under review).

Reliability

Internal Consistency

Cronbach alpha coefficients averaged .86, ranging from .94 to .67 (Fiske et al., 2002).

Test-Retest

Test-retest reliability at the level of individual participants was not tested, but stereotype content stability has been tested at the level of groups in American society over time (Bergsieker et al., 2012). Consistent with changing norms about expressing prejudices, the negative dimensions for each group are no longer mentioned, but the positive dimension (warmth or competence or both) is remarkably stable over 75 years, and the outgroups mostly locate in the same warmth-X-competence quadrant over time.

Validity

Convergent/Concurrent

Several frameworks and measures propose related dimensions for individual person perception (Fiske et al., 2007): social versus task dimensions for personality traits (Rosenberg et al., 1968), morality versus competence for self and other descriptions (Wojciszke, 1994), trustworthiness versus dominance in spontaneous trait inferences from faces (Willis & Todorov, 2006). Together, these two dimensions account for 82% of the variance in interpersonal impressions (Wojciszke et al., 1998). Others propose

similar dimensions for intergroup and inter-nation relations (respectively, Alexander et al., 1999; Phalet & Poppe, 1997; see Cuddy et al., 2008, for a discussion of the distinctions).

Not an individual-difference measure, SCM relates less clearly to known-groups analyses. However, observers often wonder whether the SCM space depends on the respondent's own group membership, the most plausible prediction being ingroup-favoritism. In the original research, 280 *F* tests (on rated competence, warmth, status, and competition) across two-dozen groups per sample revealed only 8% significant differences by gender and ethnicity of participants (Fiske et al., 2002). Subsequent analysis of students' favoring the ingroup *students* (where mentioned) revealed slight ingroup favoritism in American and Belgian samples but not East Asian samples (Cuddy et al., 2009). EU samples rating each other showed slight ingroup favoritism on their own nation's more positive dimension (Cuddy et al., 2009). Because respondents report societal stereotypes, consensus is mostly high.

Divergent/Discriminant

Although early SCM research included some negative as well as positive traits, to offset acquiescence response bias, patterns across each separate group's factor analyses showed negative items' inconsistent use in describing societal stereotypes (see Bergsieker et al., 2012). Order of presentation makes no detectable differences (Fiske et al., 2002).

The most frequently proposed alternative model comprises the semantic differential dimensions of evaluation, potency, and activity (EPA; Osgood et al., 1957). A multi-dimensional scaling of 26 societal groups found that one-, two-, and three-dimensional solutions were better predicted by SCM than EPA dimensions (Kervyn et al., in press). Moreover, correlational and experimental designs predicted and demonstrated that the two main EPA dimensions (evaluation and potency) run across stereotype content model quadrants at roughly 45° angles.

Construct/Factor Analytic

In each study, two types of cluster analysis described the structure of the two-dimensional space. Following Hair et al. (1995), first, hierarchical cluster analyses determine the best-fit number of clusters, using agglomeration statistics. Second, *k*-means cluster analyses (parallel threshold method) assign groups to clusters (cf. Blashfield & Aldenderfer, 1988). The first 2002 study had used traits derived from the Conway et al. (1996) gender-stereotype study of communality and agency: five competence traits (*competent, intelligent, confident, competitive, independent*) and four warmth traits (*sincere, good natured, warm, tolerant*). Even in the original SCM (2002) paper, items developed over studies, to increase reliability, but most often became *warm, friendly* versus *competent, capable*.

Related research (see convergent validity) identified the dimensions as competence (similar items) and morality, using terms such as *trustworthy, honest, and sincere*. Because some early SCM studies focused on warmth as friendliness but others included morality-related terms such as tolerance and sincerity (Fiske et al., 1999), a psychometric project examined these two correlated sociability/morality dimensions (Kervyn et al., under review). Ingroup perception emphasizes morality over sociality (Leach et al., 2007), and related person perception research refers to communality (which includes both) as the primary dimensions (Wojciszke, 1994). Kervyn et al. compared these two warmth dimensions, finding morality and sociality to be highly correlated.

Criterion/Predictive

According to the SCM, perceived societal structures (competition and status) predict stereotypes (respectively, warmth and competence) (e.g., Cuddy et al., 2009; Durante et al., 2012; Fiske et al., 2002). Specific combinations predict emotional prejudices of pride, pity, disgust, and envy. Emotions in turn predict active and passive help and harm (Cuddy et al., 2008; Fiske et al., 2007).

The first predicted correlation, between social structure and stereotypes, averages .80 for status-competence and -.77 for competition-warmth (Kervyn et al., under review). Competition-warmth correlations were initially lower than status-competence ones, but improve when (a) operationalizing competition over both tangible resources and cultural values (based on research from Integrated Threat Theory; Stephan & Stephan, 2000), and (b) including both sub-dimensions of warmth (see above section titled “dimensions: items”) (Kervyn et al., under review). The non-predicted structure-trait correlations (status-warmth, competition-competence) do not typically differ from zero. Experimental scenario studies manipulating status and competitive relations between fictive social groups also support the structure-stereotype predictions, as well as the indirect link between social structure and prejudiced emotions (Caprariello et al., 2009).

The second prediction, from trait stereotypes to prejudiced emotions, is tested as an interaction of the warmth-competence dimensions predicting distinct emotions for each quadrant, as 3:1 contrasts (distinct emotions for each cluster; Cuddy et al., 2007; Fiske et al., 2002). Moreover, neuroscience evidence, targeting specific quadrants, shows neural and muscular activations consistent with some of the predicted emotions (see Fiske et al., 2013).

The third prediction, from stereotypes and emotions to behavior, suggests a more direct, robust emotion-behavior relationship and a more indirect, mediated stereotype-emotion-behavior relationship (Cuddy et al., 2007).

Location

Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J., Glick, P., & Xu, J. (2002). A model of (often mixed) stereotype content:

Competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived status and competition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 82(6), 878-902.

Results and Comments

The SCM usefully identifies a perceived warmth-by-competence space differentiating among societies' groups in nations around the world and over 75 years, as well across social-group subtypes (e.g., kinds of women), species, and corporations. Because it is not an individual-difference measure but instead a report of societal consensus around positions of various groups, future directions include the challenge to understand individual variations in personal endorsement of these societal warmth-by-competence maps.

Stereotype Content Model

Phase 1:

1. Off the top of your head, what various types of people do you think today's society categorizes into groups (i.e., based on ability, age, ethnicity, gender, occupation, race, religion, etc.)?
2. What groups are considered to be of very low status by [nation's] society?
3. What groups, based on the same kinds of criteria used in the first question, do you consider yourself to be a member of?

Notes.

Participants may list up to 30 groups for each question, with a minimum of three answers for Question 1 and a minimum of one answer each for Questions 2 and 3.

Question 2 encourages listing ignored or unmentionable groups, and Question 3 encourages listing of own groups; both are categories people sometimes neglect. If these two questions bias the groups listed, it is only toward conventional ingroups and outgroups, not toward the SCM's innovative mixed quadrants; only Question 1 allows the listing of the SCM's signature ambivalent outgroups.

Phase 2:

Instructions: “We would like to invite you to participate in a study about impressions of different types of groups in society. We intend to investigate the way different groups are viewed by American society. Thus, we are not interested in your personal beliefs, but in how you think these groups are viewed by others.

Please answer the following questions, using the 5-point scales (1, not at all, to 5, extremely) shown in the pages to follow.

Finally, we remind you that the questionnaire is anonymous, and the data collected will be used for scientific purpose only.”

Note: The questionnaire appears as a groups x items matrix, with group names appearing as column headers and the following items as row labels, with respondents inserting a number from 1 to 5 in each cell of the matrix.

Warmth Items

To what extent do most Americans view members of this group as *friendly*?

...*sincere*?

Competence Items

...*capable*?

...*competent*?

Status Predictors

How prestigious are the jobs generally held by ...?

How economically successful have ... been?

Cooperation-Competition Predictors

If resources go to ..., to what extent does that take resources away from the rest of society?

The values and beliefs of ... are NOT compatible with the beliefs and values of most Americans.

Notes.

Items usually appear in rows and group in columns, with respondents inserting a number from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*extremely*).

All items are answered from the perspective of respondents' society, its name inserted for each warmth and competence items. Groups' names are inserted for predictor items derived from Fiske et al. (2002), and updated by Kervyn et al. (under review).

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Symbolic Racism Scale (SRS)

(Henry & Sears, 2002)

Variable

Symbolic racism theory developed one of the earliest and widely used measures of the new racisms (see Biernat & Crandall, 1999; Sears & Henry, 2005 for reviews). From a cultural perspective, old-fashioned racism became less influential in the 1970s. Instead, research revealed that real and perceived threats to Whites' personal lives were less powerful than other forms of racial beliefs in predicting opposition to Black politicians and policies. Sears and colleagues argued that some Whites' early socialization created a blend of negative affect toward Blacks and traditional conservative values, resulting in racial antipathy.

Description

The SRS, cobbled together from existing survey questions (Sears & Kinder, 1971), included items suggesting Black Americans could get by without welfare if they tried, should not push themselves where not wanted, and get too much attention from city officials; these items predicted voting preferences for a White versus Black Los Angeles mayoral candidate, for liberals and conservatives alike, suggesting a factor other than political identity at work here. Evolving over the next decades, almost always using representative sample surveys, the current 8-item form (Henry & Sears, 2002) includes items such as “How much discrimination against blacks do you feel there is in the United States today, limiting their chances to get ahead?” and “Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same.”, as well as variants on the earlier items.

Sample

The most frequent samples have come from the National Election Studies representative surveys. Generalizability is not an issue, as the most frequent respondents have been U.S. representative samples. The scale does operate the best for Whites, even across education levels (Henry & Sears, 2002; Sears & Henry, 2005).

Reliability

Internal Consistency

Median Cronbach alpha coefficients for White respondents have been reported as .75, and .79 in the most recent version (Henry & Sears, 2002). However, other ethnicities also can exhibit moderate alpha coefficients (in the two samples: Blacks, .55 and .85; Asians, .74 and .60; and Latinos, .42 and .73, respectively).

Test-Retest

Test-retest reliability was .68 over two years in a national sample (Kinder & Sanders, 1996) showing high overall stability from voting age through late middle age (Henry & Sears, 2009).

Validity

Convergent/Concurrent

SRS has concentrated on predicting Whites' racial attitudes (beta=.41-.50 in three studies; Henry & Sears, 2002). Most compelling is that endorsement of Black individualism (responsibility) predicts symbolic racism (beta ~.40), which in turn predicts racial policy preferences (~.50), with a much smaller direct path from endorsing Black individualism to racial policy preferences (~.15) (Sears & Henry, 2005). SRS represents racial attitudes and political conservatism to an equal degree in confirmatory factor analysis, but regressions from three studies each demonstrate significant increase in R^2 adding SRS to those two measures in predicting Whites' opposition to racial policies (Henry & Sears, 2002).

Divergent/Discriminant

The current 8-item measure varies its scaling, having not only *agree* and *disagree* items but also several other response modes (e.g., *a-lot/none-at-all*, and others). Social desirability to a predecessor scale (McConahay, 1986) shows weak and inconsistent correlations.

Discriminant validity suggests that symbolic racism differs clearly from both older racial attitudes and from political conservatism (see previous paragraph), although its base in both has led to controversy (e.g., Sniderman et al., 2000) (see Henry & Sears, 2002; Sears & Henry, 2005).

Divergence among known groups shows that Blacks, not surprisingly, score lower ($M_s = .24$ to $.36$) than Whites ($M_s = .40$ to $.49$), but also lower than Asians ($M_s = .44$ to $.53$), and Latinos ($M_s = .34$ to $.51$). The new immigrants maintain ethnic identity as a result of recency of arrival (Sears et al., 2003),

perhaps explaining why they do not identify with Black Americans as another minority group, therefore scoring closer to Whites.

The theory was designed to explain White racial policy attitudes. Whites' personal self-interest is arguably not the reason (Kinder & Sears, 1981), nor is White group identity or group interest necessarily the key (Sears & Henry, 2005). Instead, the origins of White symbolic racism blend anti-Black affect and conservative values into overall endorsement prescribing Black individualism (blame, responsibility, required effort) (see Sears & Henry, 2003, for items). These patterns cohere in individual development by voting age, and consolidate across the lifespan, but reduce with cognitive decline in older age, however not responding strongly to sociocultural change (Henry & Sears, 2009).

Construct/Factor Analytic

Although the scale has appeared variable across methods and samples in its number of dimensions, even when more than one subfactor appears, the two-factor model dimensions correlate highly, from $r=.49$ (Henry & Sears, 2002) to $r=.96$ (Sears & Henry, 2005). For example, the dominant ideology dimension contains items denying discrimination, seeing change, and endorsing hard work, whereas the political resentment dimension views Blacks as undeserving, getting too much attention, and being too pushy. Conceptually crucial themes are: denial of continuing discrimination, endorsing effort and responsibility, rejecting excessive demands, and resenting undeserved advantage (Sears & Henry, 2005).

Criterion/Predictive

From the outset, symbolic racism has predicted racial policy preferences that each disadvantage Black Americans, independent of ideology, party identification, nonracial values, and more traditional racial attitudes (see above; Sears & Henry, 2005). Some argue that such policy preferences are based on

perceived or actual realistic group conflict (Bobo, 1983) or on the particulars of each policy (Sniderman et al., 2000). Whatever the impact of those variables on policy preferences, symbolic racism clearly has predictive effects (Henry & Sears, 2002).

Location

Henry, P. J., & Sears, D. O. (2002). The Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale. *Political Psychology*, 23(2), 253-283.

Results and Comments

Although its theoretical origin in early childhood experience is less than established, the survival and utility of the symbolic racism measure is impressive. The SRS qualifies as modern and symbolic because it manifests in a racially biased pattern of policy references rather than self-reported prejudices against Black people as a group. The SRS is the self-report benchmark for comparing all other forms of contemporary racial prejudice, which are measured by even less direct methods.

Symbolic Racism Scale

Blacks Should Work Harder

1. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder, they could be just as well off as whites. (1, strongly agree; 2, somewhat agree; 3, somewhat disagree; 4, strongly disagree)

2. Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors. (1, strongly agree; 2, somewhat agree; 3, somewhat disagree; 4, strongly disagree)

Demands for Special Favors

1. Some say that black leaders have been trying to push too fast. Others feel that they haven't pushed fast enough. What do you think? (1, trying to push too fast; 2, going too slowly; 3, moving at about the right speed)
2. How much of the racial tension that exists in the United States today do you think blacks are responsible for creating? (1, all of it; 2, most; 3, some; 4, not much at all)

Denial of Continuing Racial Discrimination

1. How much discrimination against blacks do you feel there is in the United States today, limiting their chances to get ahead? (R) (1, a lot; 2, some; 3, just a little; 4, none at all)
2. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. (R) (1, strongly agree; 2, somewhat agree; 3, somewhat disagree; 4, strongly disagree)

Undeserved Outcomes

1. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve (R) (1, strongly agree; 2, somewhat agree; 3, somewhat disagree; 4, strongly disagree)
2. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve. (1, strongly agree; 2, somewhat agree; 3, somewhat disagree; 4, strongly disagree)

Notes.

Items were originally embedded in several larger social survey questionnaires, so no specific instructions appear in print.

The symbolic racism items from Henry & Sears (2002) appear here, organized by themes.

(R) Reverse scored item.

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Implicit Association Test (Race) (IAT)

(Greenwald et al., 1998)

Variable

Immediate, spontaneous evaluative associations inform one subtle measure of racial bias, the racial IAT, which is a subset of the broader theory and instrument for a variety of biases (Greenwald et al., 1998, 2002). Although this review focuses on race, the IAT has assessed an impressive variety of evaluative links between own group and positive associations, but another group and negative ones (Fazio & Olson, 2003): for example, gender, race, age, religion, nationality (Rudman et al., 1999), and even minimal, arbitrary group memberships (Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2001). All these IAT versions suggest that people like themselves, associate themselves with their ingroup, and favor ingroup accordingly. IAT research generally argues that implicit associations – millisecond differences in speed of responding to evaluatively linked items – reveal prejudice that may not be consciously accessible. Some controversy has ensued about whether to call the IAT a measure of attitudes, hence the narrower name, “association,” linked to its operationalization.

Description

The IAT requires participants to pair like-valenced and unlike-valenced concepts by responding to one type of pair on a left-hand key and the other pair on a right-hand key, for example: implicitly pairing

one concept (e.g., words denoting Black people) and one evaluation (e.g., unpleasant words, such as cancer) by responding with the left-hand key, but pairing White-related words and positive words on the right (see below).

White people are fast to respond to racial categories sharing a valence, when subjective positives and negatives are on opposite sides (on one side, a mixed list of White or good words versus on the other, Black or bad words); they are slow to respond to inconsistent categories sharing a side (White or bad on one side versus Black or good on the other) (Greenwald et al., 1998).

The initial race IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998, Study 3) asked one condition to pair 25 stereotypically White American names (e.g., *Adam, Chip, Harry*) or 25 positive words (e.g., *caress, freedom, health*) on one side but 25 stereotypically Black American names (*Alonzo, Jamel, Lerone*) or negative words (*abuse, crash, filth*) on the other. In another condition, the valence-pairings reversed (White or bad; Black or good). Other versions used male or female, Black or White names, and, for Asian participants, Korean and Japanese names. Participants responded significantly faster to ethnic ingroup-positive and ethnic outgroup-negative pairings.

Sample

The original race IAT involved 26 University of Washington undergraduates. The IAT rapidly went beyond student samples to a website and papers that analyzed literally millions of on-line responses (Nosek et al., 2002, 2007). Regarding race specifically, the web samples all paired more positive terms with White than Black social-category-related stimuli. All racial/ethnic groups (Whites, Asian, Hispanics, native Americans, multi-racials) except Blacks favored Whites implicitly; the effect for Blacks was neutral, neither racial ingroup nor Whites being favored. Regardless of participant race, effect sizes favoring Whites were large (overall $d=.77$), a pattern shown by 68% of all respondents, while only 14%

showed Black favoritism. Among social category biases tested by the IAT, only age showed bigger effects.

Reliability

Internal Consistency

Based on an overview across types of target categories that go beyond race (Schnabel et al., 2008), Cronbach alpha coefficients for the IAT have been reported ranging from .53 to .90 (Cunningham et al., 2001; Hofmann et al., 2005; Nosek et al., 2005; Olson & Fazio, 2003).

Test-Retest

The IAT test-retest reliabilities over a variety of intervals are lower than the alphas: a median of .56 (Nosek et al., 2005; see also Cunningham et al., 2001; Fazio & Olson, 2003, p. 211). The IAT performs best under a revised scoring system that uses data from its practice trials, takes account of individual differences in variability of response latency, and penalizes response latency for error trials (Greenwald et al., 2003).

Validity

Convergent/Concurrent

Entirely compatible indirect techniques predated the IAT (e.g., the MODE model and aversive racism below; Fazio & Olson, 2003); the IAT correlations with indirect measures are surprisingly weak (up to .38) unless latent-variable analysis removes measurement error (.55) (Fazio & Olson, 2003). Unsatisfactory reliabilities on either predictors or criterion may contribute (Schnabel et al., 2008).

The IAT framework suggests modest correlations with explicit measures, higher in less controversial domains. Across domains (self-concept, attitude, stereotype IATs), meta-analyses report

IAT/explicit-self-report correlations averaging .24 (Hofmann et al., 2005) and .37 (Nosek, 2005). Higher correlations emerge when concepts are strong and subjectively important, bipolar rather than unipolar, individually distinctive, and introspectively accessible (Nosek, 2005).

Thus the IAT is especially suited to intergroup bias and other socially sensitive topics that do not necessarily yield reliable self-report. Explicit self-reports are well suited to uncontroversial political and consumer concepts, presumably topics that do not raise social anxieties. When participants are indeed willing to report their racial prejudices explicitly, implicit measures correlate with them (Wittenbrink et al., 1997). Correlations increase for spontaneous self-reports and conceptually similar implicit measures. Overall, the IAT has particular utility for racial attitudes that people do not often report explicitly.

Divergent/Discriminant

From the outset, the IAT has aimed to differentiate itself from rival concepts. For example, racial ingroup preference is not a function of sheer unfamiliarity with outgroup names and faces (Dasgupta et al., 2000). Similarly, according to critics, the IAT might mix personal and cultural beliefs (Arkes & Tetlock, 2004; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001; Kihlstrom, 2004; Olson & Fazio, 2004a; Uhlmann et al., 2006). However, because attitudes do partially originate in culture, even when people disagree with the culture, the IAT should detect the difference between attitudes and cultural influences (Banaji et al., 2004; Lowery et al., 2001).

Comparing to other indirect measures, the IAT as a measure requires conscious pairing and sometimes awareness of the evaluative association among the categories involved, but the IAT does not as much involve control over response latencies (Dasgupta et al., 2000). Other priming techniques (below) do not necessarily include even awareness of the stimuli.

As noted, Black Americans on average show less White favoritism and relatively more Black favoritism (or at least neutrality) than do participants from other racial-ethnic groups, whereas Whites

show the most White favoritism of all racial groups (e.g., Nosek et al., 2007). As noted, Whites' ingroup preference (and relative Black outgroup disfavor) is lessened after diversity training (Rudman et al., 2001). The IAT also picks up Asians' degrees of Asian versus European-American self-reported identify and immersion (Greenwald et al., 1998).

Some critics suggest the IAT is not automatic or unconscious, and its creators do not insist that it is purely so. Nevertheless, this debate has sparked research on how flexible IAT responses really are; if it is malleable, how implicit is it? Most relevantly here, Whites who practice associating self with Blacks then diminish their IAT racial bias (Phills et al., 2011; see also Devine et al., 2002). IAT race-prejudice scores decrease with a variety of relevant experiences: exposure to positive minority and negative majority role models (Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; but see Joy-Gaba & Nosek, 2010), diversity training (Rudman et al., 2001), counter-stereotypic images (Wittenbrink et al., 2001b), context (Mitchell et al., 2003), and social influence (Lowery et al., 2001). Also, race-IAT data depend on whether people are aware that it assesses racism, potentially increasing self-defeating control efforts by well-intentioned respondents, as well as picking up the biases of automatically bigoted ones (Frantz et al., 2004; Siegel et al., 2012). However, faking is potentially detectable (gender and nationality IATs: Cvencek et al., 2010).

Construct/Factor Analytic

The IAT often simplifies bias down to a bipolar positive-negative evaluative association, though other associations (e.g., women & humanities, men & math/science) sometimes appear. No commentators imply that the associations are not evaluative, though their origin (personal or cultural) is disputed (see above).

Criterion/Predictive

According to a meta-analysis, the IAT predicts related interpersonal affect, social judgment, and behavior, acting like an attitude (Greenwald et al., 2009). It also correlates with physiological response, including a palpable sense of the ease of certain (e.g., prejudiced) pairings over others (Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2001), allowing a teachable moment in seminars. The IAT's predictive validity for behavior often fares better than explicit self-reports, especially on interracial responses and other socially sensitive issues. The IAT, like other indirect measures (see below) tends to predict interpersonal nonverbal behaviors, such as observers' molar impressions of friendliness, smiling, speech hesitation, speech errors, and talking time (McConnell & Leibold, 2001). On a similar nonverbal level, Whites' implicit associations predict their own early detection of threatening facial expressions in Black but not White faces (Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003), as well as immediate judgments of trustworthiness (Stanley et al., 2011).

Various neural regions have been implicated in racial IAT responses and in more general interracial perception (amygdala, perhaps related to vigilance and motivational importance; anterior cingulate cortex, perhaps related to discrepancy in social cognition; dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, perhaps related to cognitive control, and the fusiform face area; Kubota et al., 2012).

Behaviorally, the IAT also predicts deliberate behavior: vote in the 2008 McCain-Obama election (Greenwald et al., 2009), as well as intergroup economic choices (Rudman & Ashmore, 2007; Stanley et al., 2011; see also meta-analysis collapsing across behavior, judgment, affect, and physiology, Greenwald et al., 2009).

Location

Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 74(6), 1464-1480.

Note. For on-line examples, stimuli, and programs, see <https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/> or http://faculty.washington.edu/agg/iat_materials.htm.

Results and Comments

Implicit real-world attitudes may originate in a durable, simple, slow-learning memory system, whereas explicit attitudes may originate in a flexible, context-sensitive, fast-learning memory system (DeCoster et al., 2006). Implicit attitudes are primarily associations, perhaps from early preverbal experiences, affective experiences, cultural associations, and cognitive-consistency principles (Rudman, 2004; Sinclair et al., 2005). In contrast, explicit attitudes may be later-acquired verbal propositions subjectively judged as true (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). Implicit associations now form an important teaching, assessment, and research tool, causing less controversy than when the IAT first appeared.

Implicit Association Test (Race)

Sequence	1	2	3	4	5
Task description	Initial target-concept discrimination	Associated attribute discrimination	Initial combined task	Reversed target-concept discrimination	Reversed combined task
Task instructions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BLACK WHITE • 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • pleasant unpleasant • 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BLACK • pleasant WHITE • unpleasant • 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> BLACK • • WHITE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> BLACK • • pleasant • WHITE unpleasant •

Sample stimuli	Meredith <input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> lucky	<input type="radio"/> Jasmine	<input type="radio"/> Courtney	<input type="radio"/> peace
	<input type="radio"/> Latonya	<input checked="" type="radio"/> honor	<input type="radio"/> pleasure	<input type="radio"/> Stephanie	Latisha <input type="radio"/>
	<input type="radio"/> Shavonn	poison <input type="radio"/>	Peggy <input type="radio"/>	Shereen <input type="radio"/>	filth <input type="radio"/>
	Heather <input type="radio"/>	grief <input type="radio"/>	evil <input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> Sue-Ellen	<input type="radio"/> Lauren
	<input type="radio"/> Tashika	<input type="radio"/> gift	Colleen <input type="radio"/>	Tia <input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> rainbow
	Katie <input type="radio"/>	disaster <input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> miracle	Sharise <input type="radio"/>	Shanise <input type="radio"/>
	Betsy <input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> happy	<input type="radio"/> Temeka	<input type="radio"/> Megan	accident <input type="radio"/>
	<input type="radio"/> Ebony	hatred <input type="radio"/>	bomb <input type="radio"/>	Nichelle <input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/> Nancy

Notes.

“Schematic description and illustration of the implicit association test (IAT). The IAT procedure ... involved a series of five discrimination tasks (numbered columns). A pair of target concepts and an attribute dimension are introduced in the first two steps. Categories for each of these discriminations are assigned to a left or right response, indicated by the black circles in the third row. These are combined in the third step and then recombined in the fifth step, after reversing response assignments (in the fourth step) for the target-concept discrimination. The illustration uses stimuli for the specific tasks for one of the task-order conditions..., with correct responses indicated as open circles.”

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Indirect Priming Measure of Racism

(Fazio et al., 1995)

Variable

Although other measures predated the IAT, they have proved less controversial. Five other measures appear in one review (Fazio & Olson, 2003), but this section focuses on one, based on the MODE (motivation-and-opportunity-determine) model (Fazio, 1990; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999). The concept holds that attitudes can influence responses by more automatic or more controlled routes, the latter when motivation and resources allow more deliberation. For present purposes, the attendant measurement focuses on the relatively automatic, spontaneous, or indirect racial-attitude measure. This involves priming participants with Black or White-related stimuli and measuring the facilitated speed of response to similarly evaluated race-unrelated stimuli.

Description

In the original study (Fazio et al., 1995; see below), with an Asian experimenter, White and Black participants, pretested as scoring in the top or bottom 10% on the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986), first provided baseline response latencies to judging common adjectives (e.g., “pleasant,” “awful”) as good or bad. Second, under the guise of a face-learning task, participants merely viewed 16 grey-scale yearbook photos of White, Black, and Asian male and female faces. Third, participants performed a yes-no speeded recognition test of these photos. Finally, in the actual priming task, described as combining the previous tasks, in effect multi-tasking, participants viewed 48 color photographs of undergraduates (Black, White, Asian, Hispanic; male, female), for 315 msec each, then after a 135 msec interval, followed by one of 24 valenced adjectives. As in the first task, participants had to indicate as quickly and accurately as possible whether the adjective was positive or negative. Two subsequent tasks (color-photo recognition, face-attractiveness ratings) are less relevant, except to bolster the cover story. Finally, a new (blind-to-racism-score) experimenter, who was Black, debriefed participants, later

rating their friendliness and interest, and finally asking them to take an allegedly unrelated survey about race-related riots in Los Angeles.

The speed of identifying the adjectives' valence in the fourth task could be facilitated from baseline (the first task) if the participant had a negative evaluation of Black faces and a positive evaluation of White faces, followed by a respectively like-valence adjective. This indeed proved significant, with an effect size (*r*-to-*z* transformed) for White students of -.26, and for Black students of .33, indicating ingroup positivity and outgroup negativity, especially for the White students, regardless of score on the Modern Racism Scale (similar to the Symbolic Racism Scale, above).

Sample

The original study used 53 White and Black participants, pretested as scoring in the top or bottom 10% on the Modern Racism Scale. To this review's knowledge, nonstudent samples have not been used because of the complexity and sensitivity of the required controls.

Reliability

Internal Consistency

The major published internal consistency data appear to be split-half correlations under distinct conditions: (a) .04 for the original measure and (b) .39 when participants were forced to categorize the face-photo primes by race (Olson & Fazio, 2003).

Validity

Convergent /Concurrent

Implicit (IAT) and indirect (these) measures correlate only sporadically (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Schnabel et al., 2008). For example, across studies, 300 participants showed nonsignificant and

essentially zero correlations (Olson & Fazio, 2003). Indirect attitudes may typically focus more on exemplar-level processing, whereas the IAT and a category-oriented version of indirect attitudes correlate more highly. In line with this concrete-experience account, indirect racial attitudes correlate with believing that one's racial attitudes are based on relatively recent personal experiences (Towles-Schwen & Fazio, 2001).

Divergent/Discriminant

Indirect racial attitudes differ from explicit ones, such as the modern racism scale, as noted, although less controversial topics show more correlation (Brauer et al., 2000; Fazio & Olson, 2003). Most two-mode models of social cognition and attitudes (e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Fiske & Taylor, 2013) contrast an explicit process with an implicit process, so this is not surprising, if the theory can specify when the two will and will not correlate.

Black versus White participants show the expected interracial attitudes, as measured by the primed facilitation, revealing 50-60% of White college students to be biased (Fazio et al., 1995). (The IAT estimates 70-90%; Nosek et al., 2002.)

Construct/Factor Analytic

Like the IAT, the major dimension appears to be positive-negative evaluation. Indirect priming studies do control for prime and stimulus order, as well as counterbalancing left/right sides of positive/negative responses.

Criterion/Predictive

In the original racial attitudes study (Fazio et al., 1995), the indirect attitude measure correlated .31 with the Black experimenter's interaction ratings and .32 with rated Black responsibility for the riots.

In contrast, the Modern Racism Scale correlated with Black responsibility and with rated (un)fairness of the Rodney-King trial verdict, as well as rated (un)attractiveness of the Black photos, but not with the interaction ratings.

Subsequent research shows indirect racial-attitude measures predicting longevity of interracial roommate relationships (Towles-Schwen & Fazio, 2006), affective reactions to expressed prejudice (Fazio & Hilden, 2001), use of racial categories (Fazio & Dunton, 1997), and for certain level of motivation to control prejudice, anticipated comfort in cross-racial interaction (Towles-Schwen & Fazio, 2003) (see Fazio & Olson, 2003, for others related to this and similar indirect attitudes measures).

Location

Fazio, R. H., Jackson, J. R., Dunton, B. C., & Williams, C. J. (1995). Variability in automatic activation as an unobtrusive measure of racial attitudes: A bona fide pipeline? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *69*(6), 1013-1027.

Olson, M. A., & Fazio, R. H. (2009). Implicit and explicit measures of attitudes: The perspective of the MODE model. In R. E. Petty, R. H. Fazio, & P. Briñol (Eds.), *Attitudes: Insights from the new implicit measures* (pp. 19-63). New York, NY: Psychology Press.

Results and Comments

Indirect priming methods have the advantage of being less obvious to participants, but the disadvantage of being more difficult to export outside the well-controlled laboratory. Nevertheless, this technique adds critical evidence to individual differences in the spontaneity of ingroup-positive and outgroup-negative evaluative associations. Also developed in the context of correlating attitudes with behavior, it has useful predictive validity.

Indirect Priming Measure of Racism

Steps

1. Baseline: response latencies to judge adjectives (e.g., “pleasant,” “awful”) as good/bad
2. “Face-learning task”: 16 grey-scale photos of White, Black, Asian, & male, female faces
3. Yes-no speeded recognition test of photos
4. Priming (repeated):
 - a. View 1 of 48 color photos of Black, White, Asian, Hispanic, & male, female faces (315 ms)
 - b. 135 ms interval
 - c. View one of 24 valenced adjectives
 - d. Indicate whether positive/negative

Notes.

Procedure schematized by authors from Fazio et al., 1995.

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Aversive Racism Measure

(Dovidio et al., 1986)

Variable

The broad theory of aversive racism posits that well-intentioned Whites avoid the possibility of their own potential racism, both by explicitly denying it and by avoiding interracial contact, which makes

them uncomfortable, but only when they can find a nonracial excuse for avoidance (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Most relevant to measurement is the associated priming measure, perhaps the earliest latency measure of racism, but relevant here because, like the indirect priming measure, it was not covered in either earlier edition of this volume (Robinson et al., 1991, 1999). In this measure, Whites have to identify words and nonword letter strings as words or nonwords; they are faster to identify positive traits (“smart”) as words when primed with “Whites” than with “Blacks” (Dovidio et al., 1986; Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983; Perdue et al., 1990). Ingroup positivity effects can be separated from outgroup negativity effects, unlike the standard IAT, and ingroup favoritism proves stronger.

Description

In one illustrative case (Dovidio et al., 1986; see below), male and female undergraduates were told to think about the typical member of the primed category on practice trials using male, female, and house. Then, on the main task, having thought about typical members of the categories “black,” “white,” or “house,” participants were primed for 2 secs with “black,” “white,” or “house,” and after .5 secs, had to answer whether each of 16 adjectives, *yes*, “could ever be true” or *no*, were “always false” about the primed category. Of the test words, eight referred solely to objects (*drafty, metallic*), and eight were racially stereotypic: White positive (*ambitious, practical*), Black positive (*musical, sensitive*), White negative (*conventional, stubborn*), and Black negative (*lazy, imitative*). Each term was paired twice with each prime, for a total of 96 trials. Stereotypic associations were faster. These methods and results resemble contemporaneous work (Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983; Perdue et al., 1990).

Sample

In the above illustrative example, 36 undergraduates participated. To our knowledge, nonstudent samples have not been used because of the complexity and sensitivity of the required controls.

Reliability

Test-Retest

Using both more and different race-related primes (stereotypic adjectives), as well as more and different racial stimuli (yearbook photos), a Black-White categorization task elicited rapid, racial associations that recurred reliably over times from one hour to two weeks (r averaging .51). A subliminal variation showed similar stability over a three-week period (Kawakami & Dovidio, 2001).

Validity

Divergent/Discriminant

Dovidio et al. (1986) matched items across race for consensus and favorability, and the nature of the response to Black and White stereotypic adjective was held constant (“yes,” “could ever be true”), so as to unconfound race and the nature of the response. The sides for the *yes-no* keys were counterbalanced. In many of the relevant studies, categorization errors (typically fewer than 3-5%) and response times more than three standard deviations above the mean are eliminated.

Having just introduced indirect priming, a comparison of the tasks is in order. They are similar in that both present racial primes. They differ in the target after the prime and in the required response. In the aversive racism measure, ingroup-outgroup primes precede positive-negative racially stereotypic words as targets. Control words are sometimes nonhuman object-related words or a meaningless string of letters, with respectively an ever-true/never-true decision or a word/nonword decision, each speeded by matches between racial primes and relevant stereotypic words. Here, conceptual meaning (as well as valence) matters.

In the just-covered indirect-prime measure, the prime precedes a target word unrelated to race, merely positive or negative, to which the required response is *good-bad*. Here, only evaluative match

matters. Conceptual and evaluative priming do indeed differ (Wittenbrink et al., 2001a). For example, conceptual biases include stereotyping, judgment, and impressions, whereas evaluative biases include affect, preferences, and social distance (Amodio & Devine, 2006).

Although evaluation is a critical dimension, the primary aversive-racism dimension appears to differentiate racial ingroup-outgroup, as these effects are independent (e.g., Dovidio et al., 1986).

Criterion/Predictive

This kind of priming measure tends to predict nonverbal behavior in interracial interactions (Dovidio, Gaertner et al., 2002; Dovidio, Kawakami et al., 2002; Dovidio et al., 1997). (Overt attitudes predict overt verbal behavior.) Priming measures also predict selection biases, especially in ambiguous cases (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; Dovidio, Gaertner et al., 2002).

Location

Dovidio, J. F., Evans, N., & Tyler, R. B. (1986). Racial stereotypes: The contents of their cognitive representations. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 22(1), 22–37.

Results and Comments

Each of the response-time measures (IAT, evaluative priming, conceptual priming) contributes to the evidence for barely-conscious racial ingroup favoritism and sometimes outgroup dis-favoritism. Each has acceptable psychometric properties, so the choice to use them depends on the researcher's purposes. Focused on different levels, the IAT may operate more categorically, the indirect priming measure more evaluatively, and the aversive racism measure more as ingroup-outgroup distinction.

Aversive Racism Measure

Steps

1. Practice: think about typical member of category using male, female, and house.
2. Main task:
 - a. Think about typical members of categories “black,” “white,” or “house”
 - b. Primed (2 sec) with “black,” “white,” or “house”
 - c. .5 sec interval
 - d. Answer *yes*, “could ever be true” of, or *no*, “always false” about primed category, for each of 16 adjectives, related to objects or stereotypic.

Notes.

Procedure schematized by authors from Dovidio et al., 1986 (cf. Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983; Perdue et al., 1990).

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Modern Sexism Scale (MSS)

(Swim et al., 1995)

Variable

Overall parallels between sexism and racism include their historical association, similar cognitive processes, comparable norms, analogous social structures, and equivalent beliefs (Swim et al., 1995).

Old-fashioned and modern sexism should correlate but also prove distinct, as do old-fashioned and modern racism (McConahay & Hough, 1976; see previous section). The modern-sexist construct should moreover show gender differences, correlate with relevant values such as individualism and humanism, and predict under-estimating problems such as gendered job segregation.

Description

Participants completed a packet of racism questionnaires and an unspecified number of items designed to reflect old-fashioned and modern sexism on 5-point *strongly-agree* to *strongly-disagree* Likert-type response scales.

Sample

Psychology undergraduates ($n = 418$ women, 265 men; mostly White) completed the first study. A second study ($n = 477$ women, 311 men) replicated the confirmatory factor analysis. Subsequent work has generalized somewhat from the original American student samples. Good results obtain with Canadian college students (25% non-European origin; Campbell et al., 1997), German students (Eyssel & Bohner, 2007), Swedish students (Akrami et al., 2011), Dutch students (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005), and nonstudent German women (Becker & Wagner, 2009), but more variable results with a small sample ($n=46$) of female White and Black firefighters (Yoder & McDonald, 1997), which obtained some sporadic item correlations with race, education, and age (not corrected for large numbers of correlations calculated). Both older and more educated nonstudent women rejected modern sexism more than did younger and less educated ones in a larger German sample ($n=250$; Becker & Wagner, 2009).

Reliability

Internal Consistency

In both the original studies (Swim et al., 1995), Cronbach alpha coefficients were reported for both modern (.84, .75) and old-fashioned (.66, .65) sexism. In subsequent modern sexism studies, alpha coefficients were comparable (.84, Becker & Wagner, 2009; .80, Eyssel & Bohner, 2007; .78, Swim et

al., 2005; .65, Campbell et al., 1997) or lower (.08, Yoder & McDonald, 1997, although testing conditions were less than ideal: mailed surveys, 1-2 years after an initial survey).

Validity

Convergent/Concurrent

MSS correlates moderately with hostile sexism (.31) and benevolent sexism (.42), described below, as well as traditional gender-role preference (.30) (Becker & Wagner, 2009). Modern sexism and the Attitudes toward Women Scale (AWS; Spence et al., 1973) do correlate ($\phi = .35$ for men, .48 for women; Swim & Cohen, 1997). But MSS operates at a more subtle level than the AWS's blatant self-report, the MSS instead correlating better, for example, with judged sexual harassment (.18-.50, controlling for gender; Swim & Cohen, 1997). MSS correlates as part of a package of measures that indicate acceptance of stereotyping, dominance, authoritarianism, traditional roles, unemotional processing, and more fixed, uncomplicated cognitive style, all more true for White and male participants than Black and female ones (Table 3, Carter et al., 2006). Big-five personality traits agreeableness and openness to experience also relate to MSS (Akrami et al., 2011).

Divergent/Discriminant

As indicated, modern sexism diverges from the more blatant forms of sexism. For example, MSS loads separately from both AWS and old-fashioned sexism in a factor analysis (Swim & Cohen, 1997). The mean judged sexism of items on such measures indicate their degree of overt sexism (Swim et al., 2005): beliefs from the AWS are the highest on rated overt sexism, followed by traditional gender role behaviors, actively hostile sexist beliefs, benevolent sexist beliefs (see below), unwanted sexual attention, and MSS items as the least obviously sexist.

In the original study (Swim et al., 1995), modern sexism correlates negatively with egalitarian values by female (-.29) and male (-.16) respondents, as does old-fashioned sexism (-.16, -.29, respectively). Individualistic values do not correlate with either form of sexism for either gender (-.01-.08), except for men on MS (.19).

In both original studies (Swim et al., 1995), men scored higher than women on both old-fashioned and modern sexism. Progressive, gender-identified women score lower than women more traditionally identified or less identified overall (Becker & Wagner, 2009). All other studies that assess both genders report men scoring higher than women on modern sexism.

Social desirability does not correlate with MSS (.08, Campbell et al., 1997).

Construct/Factor Analytic

Exploratory principal components analysis eliminated several items double-loading on both the intended modern and old-fashioned dimensions, resulting in eight modern sexism items (five for denial of continuing sexism, two for antagonism toward women's demands, and one for resentment of special favors for women; see scale below). All the eliminated double-loading items came from the second two components of the scale. A confirmatory factor analysis on the selected items showed by several indices that a two factor-solution fit better than a one-factor solution, separately by gender and for the combined sample.

Most of the published work differentiates subtle modern sexism from old-fashioned sexism and other more blatant measures, such as the AWS (Swim et al., 1995; Swim & Golden, 1997; but see Yoder & McDonald, 1997). Some finds MSS having one dimension, whereas others find two dimensions, separating beliefs about current discrimination and gender-equality policy (Morrison et al., 1999).

Criterion/Predictive

In the original study (Swim et al., 1995), although all respondents over-estimated the percentage of women in male-dominated fields, high versus low MSS scores predicted additional over-estimation of women's percentage in gender-segregated "male" jobs (unexpectedly, the reverse pattern held for old-fashioned sexism). In the second study, MSS predicted lower ratings of gendered job segregation as caused by gender prejudice, tradition, and socialization, but higher ratings for biology as a cause. Old-fashioned sexism did not show these patterns. MSS also predicted preferring a then-current male Senate candidate over the female one, whereas old-fashioned sexism and respondent gender did not. MSS predicts less collective feminist action ($r = .40$, Becker & Wagner, 2009), judging everyday sexist behaviors as less sexist ($-.35$, Swim et al., 2005), less positive attitudes toward gay and lesbian people (.26, Campbell et al., 1997), less support for the women's movement ($-.53$, Campbell et al., 1997), as well as expressing more gender harassment and gender bias (in experimental simulation, Hitlan et al., 2009), more appreciation of sexist humor (.34 to .44, Eyssel & Bohner, 2007), and both more use and detection of sexist language (.44, Parks & Robertson, 2004; Swim et al., 2004).

Location

Swim, J. K., Aikin, K. J., Hall, W. S., & Hunter, B. A. (1995). Sexism and racism: Old-fashioned and modern prejudices. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 68(2), 199-214.

Results and Comments

One of the first next-generation sexism scales, the modern sexism scale is especially useful for its links to political, employment, and harassment attitudes. It shows good cross-cultural applicability and good psychometric properties, especially predictive validity of gender-related attitudes.

Modern Sexism Scale

Dimension	Item
Denial of continuing discrimination	1. Discrimination against women is no longer a problem in the United States.* 2. Women often miss out on good jobs due to sexual discrimination. 3. It is rare to see women treated in a sexist manner of television.* 4. On average, people in our society treat husbands and wives equally.* 5. Society has reached the point where women and men have equal opportunities for achievement.*
Antagonism toward women's demands	6. It is easy to understand the anger of women's groups in America.* 7. It is easy to understand why women's groups are still concerned about societal limitations of women's opportunities.
Resentment about special favors for women	8. Over the past few years, the government and news media have been showing more concern about the treatment of women than is warranted by women's actual experiences.*

Notes.

Response scale is 1, *strongly agree*, to 5, *strongly disagree*. No specific instructions appear in print.

* Reverse scored item.

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Neosexism Scale (NS)*(Tougas et al., 1995)*

Variable

The conceptual background for the NS is the same parallel to modern racism as the MSS proposes, but with an added emphasis on reactions to affirmative action as a function of men's collective interest.

Description

The original study (Tougas et al., 1995) adapted items from modern, symbolic, and aversive racism measures (above).

Sample

The original sample comprised 130 male French- and English-speaking Canadian undergraduates. Going beyond student samples, reliability and predictive validity are comparable to the original student sample. Study 2 of that paper (Tougas et al., 1995) contacted 281 male workers at a large Canadian firm, with 149 returning questionnaires. Another study successfully used the scale among female secretaries at a Canadian federal agency (Tougas et al., 1999). Besides the original French and English Canadian samples, neosexism scales and translations have been run in, for example, Australia, Belgium, Croatia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, and United States samples (Dardenne et al., 2006; Frieze et al., 2003; Moya et al., 2003).

Reliability

Internal Consistency

Cronbach alpha coefficients have been reported (e.g., Tougas et al., 1995, for original two studies .78 and .76; Cameron, 2001, .80; Campbell et al., 1997, .76).

Test-Retest

The test-retest coefficient in the original sample was .84 over a time interval of one month (Tougas et al., 1995).

Validity

Convergent/Concurrent

The original two studies reported significant positive correlations with old-fashioned sexism (.64, Study 1 only), men's collective interest (.50, .18), negative reactions to affirmative action (-.48, -.33), and negative judgments of women's competence (-.35, Study 2 only). Neosexism correlates with hostile sexism (.52 to .81 in three samples (Masser & Abrams, 1999).

Divergent/Discriminant

Neosexism and subjectively benevolent sexism (see below) do not correlate consistently (-.04 to .48 across genders and samples; Masser & Abrams, 1999). NS does not correlate with social desirability (.08, Campbell et al., 1997). Men score higher than women (e.g., Cameron, 2001; Campbell et al., 1997; Frieze et al., 2003). Item order was varied on the original studies, and 2 of 11 items are reverse-scored.

Construct/Factor Analytic

The original study reports that an exploratory, principal-components analysis resulted in "no definite structure" (p. 845), suggesting a single-dimension scale.

Criterion/Predictive

As with the modern sexism scale, neosexism correlates with accepting sexist language (.53), mediating gender differences (Parks & Robertson, 2004). Neosexism also predicts: less feminist-movement support, negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men, lower humanitarian-egalitarian values (respectively, -.52, .41, -.22, Campbell et al., 1997); negative attitudes toward women's rights (-.56; Masser & Abrams, 1999), negative attitudes toward lesbians' and gay men's rights (-.40; Masser & Abrams, 1999); negative attitudes toward humanitarian-egalitarian values (-.21; Masser & Abrams, 1999); negative attitudes toward affirmative action (beta = -.24, Tougas et al., 1999); as well as perceived discrimination against own-group gender, higher for high-scoring men (.20) but lower instead for high-scoring women (-.41, Cameron, 2001). The more women felt their gender group was deprived, the less they personally endorsed neosexism items (-.18, Tougas et al., 1999). For women, NS correlates with lower ingroup ties and affect (-.25, -.29, Cameron, 2001); men show no such relationship. Men score more highly on NS when they feel threatened (.45), view women as intrusive (.24), and estimate higher percentages of women in their job class (.25); neosexism then correlates with pro-male bias in evaluating women's and men's competence (.41), as well as unwillingness to support women (-.35, Beaton et al., 1996).

Location

Tougas, F., Brown, R., Beaton, A. M., & Joly, S. (1995). Neosexism: Plus ça change, plus c'est pareil.

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21(8), 842-849.

Results and Comments

NS is especially useful in contexts related to affirmative action, perceived discrimination, employment, and gender rights. Applicable across cultures, NS focuses on gender-related attitudes in society.

Neosexism Scale

Items (and Their Parallels in Current Racism Scales)

1. Discrimination against women in the labor force is no longer a problem in Canada. (McConahay, 1986)
2. I consider the present employment system to be fair to women.* (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986)
3. Women shouldn't push themselves where they are not wanted. (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1986)
4. Women will make more progress by being patient and not pushing too hard for change. (Jacobson, 1985)
5. It is difficult to work for a female boss.
6. Women's requests in terms of equality between the sexes are simply exaggerated. (McConahay, 1986; McConahay & Hough, 1976)
7. Over the past few years, women have gotten more from government than they deserve. (McConahay, 1986)
8. Universities are wrong to admit women in costly programs such as medicine, when in fact, a large number will leave their jobs after a few years to raise their children.
9. In order not to appear sexist, many men are inclined to overcompensate women.
10. Due to social pressures, firms frequently have to hire underqualified women.
11. In a fair employment system, men and women would be considered equal.*

Notes.

No instructions appear in print. Response scale is: 1, *total disagreement*, to 7, *total agreement*.

Unspecified filler items were included in the original studies.

* Reverse scored item.

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Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI)

(Glick & Fiske, 1996)

Variable

Like modern sexism and neosexism, ambivalent sexism builds on modern forms of racism. Unlike those scales, the ambivalent sexism scale builds specifically on ambivalent racism (Katz & Hass, 1988). But unlike all that earlier work, ambivalent sexism analyzes the interdependent relationships between men and women, to predict the specific sources of ambivalence (Glick & Fiske, 1996). Like all ingroup-outgroup relations, one group (men) has higher societal status, but uniquely among ingroup-outgroup relations, men and women are intimately interdependent. The theory posited male ambivalence having three sources: paternalism, gender differentiation, and heterosexuality. Women who resist subordination are punished by hostile sexism (HS), which resembles but is more intimately relational than earlier concepts of old-fashioned sexism. The theory predicts resentment of nontraditional women along each dimension: dominative paternalism, competitive gender differentiation, and heterosexual hostility. In contrast, women who cooperate with traditional forms of interdependence elicit subjectively benevolent sexism (BS) on the same three dimensions: protective paternalism, complementary gender differentiation,

and heterosexual intimacy. Together hostile and benevolent sexism form a coherent ideology that punishes some women and rewards others, so they co-exist.

Description

The original survey used 140-items about “attitudes toward men and women and their relationships in contemporary society.” Items were designed to tap the six theorized dimensions. Items with extreme means or low variance were deleted, leaving 112 items, further selected by exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses (including ones on new samples). Finally, three additional principles guided paring items down to the 22 items in the ASI (11 HS, 11 BS; see below): (a) the items that highly and consistently loaded on HS and BS factors in men’s and women’s separate factor analyses, (b) diversity across various aspects of sexism, and (c) consistent item performance in later studies (Glick & Fiske, 1996).

Sample

The first of six original studies sampled 833 students (480 women; 76%–86% White) at three colleges (Amherst College, Lawrence University, University of Massachusetts at Amherst). Across about two-dozen countries, tens of thousands of respondents have completed the ASI in their own languages (Glick et al., 2000, 2004), as well as nonstudent samples in the original studies (Glick & Fiske, 1996) and subsequent ones (e.g., Belgium: Roets et al., 2012; Sweden: Zakrisson et al., 2012). In the first cultural comparison across 19 nations (Glick et al., 2000), 15,000 men and women showed that HS and BS correlate positively across nations, as well as demonstrating other forms of validity (below).

Reliability

Internal consistency

In the original six studies, Cronbach alpha coefficients for the overall scale ranged from .83 to .92, for the HS subscale ranged from .80 to .92, and for BS ranged from .73 to .85. Other researchers have obtained comparable results (e.g., in Germany, respectively, .88, .84, .88; Eyssele & Bohner, 2007). Likewise, Sakalli-Uğurlu (2002) reported a Cronbach alpha coefficient of .85.

Test-Retest

To this review's knowledge, the only test-retest reliability was assessed in Turkish in a Turkish sample, where the stability coefficient was .87 (Sakalli-Uğurlu, 2002).

Validity

Convergent/Concurrent

The ASI correlates with other measures of sexism, but as would be expected, HS especially correlates with AWS (.68), old-fashioned sexism (.48), MSS (.65), and rape-myth acceptance (.61), even controlling for social desirability or BS. In contrast, BS, controlling for HS, does not (-.03, -.04, Glick & Fiske, 1996). HS also correlates with NS (.52 to .81 in three samples, Masser & Abrams, 1999). ASI, especially HS, likewise correlates with modern racism (MRS with ASI .38 to .51, HS controlling for BS .35 to .42, BS controlling for HS, .01 to .24, Glick & Fiske, 1996). ASI tends to correlate with acceptance of stereotyping in a variety of ways: measures across groups, authoritarianism, SDO, fixed and uncomplicated cognitive style (Carter et al., 2006, Table 3; Glick & Fiske, 1996, Tables 11-14). Recognition of racial discrimination correlates with HS and less so with BS.

Divergent/Discriminant

From the outset, men have scored higher on the ASI, especially on HS, but also on BS (Glick & Fiske, 1996; Glick et al., 2000). Women especially reject HS relative to men in more sexist cultures. Highly gender-identified women especially reject both ASI subfactors (Becker & Wagner, 2009).

Only the BS subfactor captures the subjectively benevolence of protective, complementary, intimate sexism, according to Masser and Abrams (1999).

The ASI has 6 out of 22 items reverse-scored. The social-desirability self-deception scale does not correlate with the overall scale, with HS, or with BS (-.01-.07, Glick & Fiske, 1996). ASI correlates weakly (.26-.31) with its impression-management subscale, but that reduces (.13-.18) when isolating the unique variance of HS and BS, each controlling for the other.

Construct/Factor Analytic

From the outset, the ASI most consistently shows two correlated but distinct primary dimensions, HS and BS, with BS breaking down into the three predicted subfactors (complementary gender differentiation, heterosexual intimacy, and protective paternalism), but with HS remaining a single dimension (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 2001, 2011). In the original studies, after the initial study to select items (above), the two-factor model fit five samples' confirmatory factor analyses better than the single-factor model. The full model (with three BS subfactors) yielded acceptable fit indices. Altogether, ASI research consistently shows that BS and HS correlate positively, but not redundantly, often in the .4 to .5 range across individual respondents (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 2001, 2011). The ASI's 2-factor structure (HS and BS) replicates over a diverse array of nations. Across cultures, the HS-BS correlations within nations suggest a coherent sexist cultural ideology, yielding correlations approaching .9 (Glick et al., 2000, 2004).

Criterion/Predictive

In the original studies (Glick & Fiske, 1996, Tables 11-14), overall ASI scores predicted ambivalent attitudes and stereotypes toward women, the HS scale correlating with negative ones, and the BS scale (for nonstudent men) with subjectively positive ones. Cross-nationally (Glick et al., 2000), HS predicts attributing to women negative stereotypes (median $-.25$, range $-.12$ to $-.43$) and BS attributing positive ones (median $.21$, $.11$ to $.33$). HS and BS apparently represent complementary ideologies supporting gender inequality, given that national averages on both scales predict United Nations' indices of national gender inequality in structural power, resources, and outcomes (men's HS, $-.47$, $-.53$; men's BS, $-.40$, $-.43$; women's HS, $.03$, $-.38$; women's BS, $-.32$, $-.42$; Glick et al., 2000).

In the context of other recent sexism scales, the unique feature of the ASI is the utility of its BS dimensions, illustrated by BS predictive validity, independent of HS: Male BS predicts blaming a victim of acquaintance rape if she violated feminine purity norms (Abrams et al., 2003). Male BS in China predicts a preference for women returning to domestic duties (Li et al., 2012) and for preferring submissive, home-oriented mates (Chen et al., 2009).

Even more so, women's BS predicts system-maintaining ideology and behavior. Meta-analysis (32 samples, half male, half female; $n = 5,459$) found high-BS women preferring high-resource partners ($.24$, Sibley & Overall, 2011; replicated for Chinese women, Chen et al., 2009). High-BS women accept a partner's protective but sexist and restrictive paternalism (Moya et al., 2007), and also expect husbands to react with threat and violence to a wife's workplace success (Expósito et al., 2010). Women's egalitarian beliefs do in fact predict partner violence (Karakurt & Cumbie, 2012). Women expecting workplace BS perform worse because of distracting intrusive thoughts about their own potential weakness (Dardenne et al., 2007; Dumont et al., 2010). Priming BS activates women's tendency to justify the existing system and undermines their resisting inequality (Jost & Kay, 2005).

On the hostile side of the equation, meta-analysis indicates that men's HS predicts preferences for physically attractive partners ($.20$, Sibley & Overall, 2011). In China and the U.S., men's HS predicts

marriage norms favoring female subservience, male dominance, and acceptance of male violence (Chen et al, 2009). Outside of marriage, HS, with its combative view of gender relations, predicts a variety of dehumanizing reactions to sexualized (scantily clad) women: Men in general deny these women's agency but view them as objects of the male viewer's actions, remembering their bodies but not their faces, and high-HS men deactivate the brain's social-cognition network (Cikara et al., 2011). Although ASI and BS both predict appreciating sexist jokes (.38-.52, .28-.32), HS especially does so (.34-.54, Eysel & Bohner, 2007).

Location

Glick P., & Fiske S. T. (1996). The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory: Differentiating hostile and benevolent sexism. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 70(3), 491–512.

Results and Comments

The ASI appears uniquely to measure subjective benevolence in some aspects of sexism. Relative to MSS and NS, ASI focuses on more intimate, relational aspects of sexism, consistent with its analysis of male-female interdependence. Applicable across cultures, it shows good psychometric properties.

Ambivalent Sexism Inventory

Relationships between Men and Women

Below is a series of statements concerning men and women and their relationships in contemporary society. Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each statement using the following scale:

0 – disagree strongly; 1 – disagree somewhat; 2 – disagree slightly; 3 – agree slightly; 4 – agree somewhat; 5 – agree strongly.

- B(I) 1. No matter how accomplished he is, a man is not truly complete as a person unless he has the love of a woman.
- H 2. Many women are actually seeking special favors, such as hiring policies that favour them over men, under the guise of asking for “equality”.
- B(P)* 3. In a disaster, women ought not necessarily to be rescued before men.
- H 4. Most women interpret innocent remarks or acts as being sexist.
- H 5. Women are too easily offended.
- B(I)* 6. People are often truly happy in life without being romantically involved with a member of the other sex.
- H* 7. Feminists are not seeking for women to have more power than men.
- B(G) 8. Many women have a quality of purity that few men possess.
- B(P) 9. Women should be cherished and protected by men.
- H 10. Most women fail to appreciate fully all that men do for them.
- H 11. Women seek to gain power by getting control over men.
- B(I) 12. Every man ought to have a woman whom he adores.
- B(I) 13. Men are complete without women.
- H 14. Women exaggerate problems they have at work.
- H 15. Once a woman gets a man to commit to her, she usually tries to put him on a tight leash.
- H 16. When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about being discriminated against.
- B(P) 17. A good woman should be set on a pedestal by her man.
- H* 18. There are actually very few women who get a kick out of teasing men by seeming sexually available and then refusing male advances.

- B(G) 19. Women, compared to men, tend to have superior moral sensibility.
- B(P) 20. Men should be willing to sacrifice their own wellbeing in order to provide financially for the women in their lives.
- H* 21. Feminists are making entirely reasonable demands of men.
- B(G) 22. Women, as compared to men, tend to have a more refined sense of culture and good taste.

Notes.

* Reverse scored item.

H = Hostile Sexism, B = Benevolent Sexism, (P) = Protective Paternalism, (G) = Complementary Gender Differentiation, (I) = Heterosexual Intimacy.

Copyright 1995 by Peter Glick and Susan T. Fiske. Use of this scale requires permission of one of the authors. A Spanish-language version of the ASI is available from the authors.

Scoring Instructions: The ASI may be used as an overall measure of sexism, with hostile and benevolent components equally weighted, by simply averaging the score for all items after reversing the items listed below. The two ASI subscales (Hostile Sexism and Benevolent Sexism) may also be calculated separately. For correlational research, purer measures of HS and BS can be obtained by using partial correlations (so that the effects of the correlation between the scales is removed).

Reverse the following items (0 – 5, 1 – 4, 2 – 3, 3 – 2, 4 – 1, 5 – 0): 3, 6, 7, 13, 18, 21.

Hostile Sexism Score = average the following items: 2, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 18, 21.

Benevolent Sexism Score = average the following items: 1, 3, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 17, 19, 20, 22.

Fraboni Scale of Ageism (FSA)

(Fraboni et al., 1990)

Variable

The FSA is an individual-difference measure of prejudiced attitudes toward older people. It was designed to measure the affective components of age-based bias, in addition to the cognitive biases covered by then-existing ageism measures.

Description

FSA items assess beliefs surrounding *antilocution* (derogatory speech), and more behavior-based items concern both indirect *discrimination* and more direct *avoidance*.

Sample

A pilot sample comprised 102 high school students. Then a larger, Canadian sample provided responses that the authors used to derive their final items using factor analysis. This sample included 231 participants (151 female): 109 undergraduates and 122 adults recruited from local institutions, including psychiatric hospital personnel, small businesses, and other health and educational institutions. The mean age of the sample was 31 years (range 16-65 years). Participant responses were used to conduct an exploratory factor analysis, yielding three different dimensions (described below), and 29 final items. The noted Rupp et al. (2005) follow-up study replicates the basic factor structure with two new, non-Canadian samples. The scale has been validated in French (Parisian, as well as Québécois), German, Mandarin, and Turkish (Fraboni, December 6, 2012, personal communication).

Reliability

Internal Consistency

The Cronbach alpha coefficient for the overall scale was .86 for the scale development study. Alpha coefficients for the three factors were .76, .65, and .77, respectively (Fraboni et al., 1990).

A subsequent validation study, by different authors (Rupp et al., 2005), found similar alpha coefficients for each of the three factors (.75, .61, and .77). Partly because subscale alphas were lower than the overall alpha, these authors proposed a slightly modified version, increasing the alpha coefficients somewhat (to .79, .76, and .70) and better reflecting the authors' original intent to measure both affective and cognitive bases of ageism.

Validity

Convergent/Concurrent

The original study reported significant correlation ($r = .40$) between the FSA and the Acceptance of Others Scale (AOS; Fey, 1955), as well as a significant negative correlation with the Facts on Aging Quiz (FAQ; Palmore 1977). This latter result suggests that increased ageist attitudes predict lower knowledge of elders, which is in line with other work showing that prejudice derives from a lack of target-group knowledge (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008).

Divergent/Discriminant

Men score more highly than women on the FSA (Fraboni et al., 1990). Additionally, younger raters score higher than older raters (Rupp et al., 2005).

The original study showed that the FSA does not correlate with the Marlow-Crowne (1964) scale of social desirability. In follow-up work (Rupp et al., 2005), the FSA cognitive components correlated more strongly with pre-existing ageism measures than did the affective components, supporting the

original authors' claim that the FSA represents a more complete (i.e., both affective and cognitive) measure. Six of the 29 total items were reverse-coded, presumably to minimize response bias.

Construct/Factor Analytic

As per Fraboni et al. (1990), three factors underlie the FSA structure: attitudinal beliefs surrounding *antilocution*, and more behavior-based items concerning indirect *discrimination*, and more direct *avoidance*. The authors did suggest that the use of subscales may not be completely warranted, given a lack of independence between the three factors, as well as their representing “theoretically additive constructs.”

The separate study by Rupp et al. (2005) mostly validated the three-factor measure, via confirmatory factor analysis. AS noted, this study proposed a slightly revised version, with fewer items and modified factor names labeled respectively, “stereotypes,” “separation,” and “affective attitudes.” Rupp et al. argued that these changes would better reflect the original authors' intent to measure cognitive and affective bases of ageism.

Criterion/Predictive

The FSA has been used primarily as a dependent variable, gauging a reduction in ageist attitudes over a period of time. Typically such studies involve an aging, adult-development, or gerontology education program, aimed at increasing aging awareness and reducing age-based prejudices (e.g., Boswell, 2012).

Location

Fraboni, M., Saltstone, R., & Hughes, S. (1990). The Fraboni Scale of Ageism (FSA): An attempt at a more precise measure of ageism. *Canadian Journal of Aging, 9*(1), 56-66.

Results and Comments

The FSA is one the most prominent measures of age-based bias—an understudied topic that warrants greater attention. Per the original authors, it is also the first measure to incorporate affective forms of ageist bias in addition to more cognitive ones. An additional strength seems to be the FSA’s inclusion of both attitudinal beliefs and discriminatory behavior, both indirect and direct.

Fraboni Scale of Ageism

Instructions assure anonymity and ask participants to consider individuals aged 65 years and older as “old” or “elderly.” The responses use a Likert-type response scale: 1, *strongly disagree*, 2, *disagree*, 3, *unanswered*, 4, *agree*, 5, *strongly agree*.

Factor 1: Antilocution

- 2. Teenage suicide is more tragic than suicide among the old.
- 4. Many old people are stingy and hoard their money and possessions.
- 5. Many old people are not interested in making new friends preferring instead the circle of friends they have had for years.
- 7. Many old people just live in the past.
- 13. Complex and interesting conversation cannot be expected from most old people.
- 22. Most old people should not be allowed to renew their driver’s licenses.
- 39. Most old people would be considered to have poor personal hygiene.
- 42. Most old people can be irritating because they tell the same stories over & over again.
- 43. Old people complain more than other people do.

44. Old people do not need much money to meet their needs.
-

Factor 2: Discrimination

3. There should be special clubs set aside within sports facilities so that old people can compete at their own level.
- *12. Old people deserve the same rights and freedoms as do other members of our society.
24. Old people don't really need to use our community sports facilities.
25. Most old people should not be trusted to take care of infants.
28. It is best that old people live where they won't bother anyone.
- *32. The company of most old people is quite enjoyable.
- *33. It is sad to hear about the plight of the old in our society these days.
- *37. Old people should be encouraged to speak out politically.
- *38. Most old people are interesting, individualistic people.
-

Factor 3: Avoidance

8. I sometimes avoid eye contact with old people when I see them.
9. I don't like it when old people try to make conversation with me.
14. Feeling depressed when around old people is probably a common feeling.
15. Old people should find friends their own age.
18. Old people should feel welcome at the social gatherings of young people.
19. I would prefer not to go to an open house at a seniors' club, if invited.
- *20. Old people can be very creative.

- 21. I personally would not want to spend much time with an old person.
- 26. Many old people are happiest when they are with people their own age.
- 41. I would prefer not to live with an old person.

Notes.

* Reverse scored item (5 through 1).

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Succession, Identity, and Consumption Scale of Prescriptive Ageism (SIC)

(North & Fiske, 2013b)

Variable

Ageism research typically focuses on default elder stereotypes of perceived incompetence, illness, and irrelevance. Though useful, this approach ignores society's "graying" demographic trends, which are fast ushering in a more visible, healthy, and influential older age. Also overlooked are the potential (though not inevitable) intergenerational tensions that might result from an enlarged older population use of resources (North & Fiske, 2012).

Similarly, ageism measures tend to focus on *descriptive* content concerning what older people are allegedly like. By contrast, a *prescriptive* approach centers on expectations concerning what older people allegedly *should* do (North & Fiske, 2013-a). This theory-based measure thus centers the idea that age groups are interdependent, and emphasizes intergenerational tensions over practical and symbolic

resources. In this vein, its perspective echoes classic social psychological theories of prejudice emphasizing intergroup resource competition.

Description

The SIC taps three domains of intergenerational resource tension: facilitating active, intergenerational *succession* of enviable resources (e.g., retiring from jobs, ceding wealth), limiting passive *consumption* of shared resources (e.g., minimizing healthcare dollars, expediting highway traffic), and avoiding symbolic youth *identity* resources (e.g., popular music, fashion).

Sample

Four samples (totaling 2,010 participants) forged the SIC (North & Fiske, 2013b). In its development, the scale has been administered to over 2,000 participants across the U.S., ranging in age from 16 to 81 years. Also, recent (North & Fiske, under review) work has collected scale responses from a large, adult sample in India ($n = 801$). Preliminary results indicate that Indians score significantly higher on the measure than do Americans, suggested a greater level of prescriptive ageism in at least one Eastern culture (see North & Fiske, under review, for a meta-analysis of East-West differences).

Reliability

Internal consistency

Cronbach alphas coefficients across the four samples ranged from .90 to .91 for the total scale. Alpha coefficients for the three subscales were: succession (.84 to .85), identity (.83 to .87), and consumption (.75 to .86) across the four samples (North & Fiske, 2013b). Likewise, analyses on Indian responses (North & Fiske, under review) also resulted in acceptable alphas (.80 to .86).

Validity

Convergent/Concurrent

The SIC scale converges strongly with the FSA ($r = .70$), then more moderately with symbolic racism and the ASI ($r = .32$ to $.40$). The measure also correlates moderately with intergroup-hierarchy-focused SDO (Pratto et al., 1994), $r = .31$.

Divergent/Discriminant

The scale does not correlate significantly with intergroup-value-conflict-based RWA (Altemeyer, 1998), $r = .15$. The scale also does not correlate with political orientation ($r < .02$).

Though SIC does correlate strongly with FSA, an experimental paradigm (in which participants were presented with prescription-violating elders) found that SIC predicted resentment toward the various targets, even controlling for FSA. However, the reverse was nonsignificant, suggesting that a prescriptive ageist orientation—not the FSA’s descriptive, affective/cognitive one—underlies this bias (North & Fiske, 2013b).

Central to the scale’s intergenerational focus, rater age consistently predicts SIC, with younger people scoring the highest on the total scale ($\beta = -.31$) and all three subscales: Succession ($\beta = -.37$), Identity ($\beta = -.22$), and Consumption ($\beta = -.17$; North & Fiske, 2013b). Additionally, men score higher than women, as in other prejudice measures.

Unexpected ethnic differences emerge as well: specifically, South- and East Asian-Americans score higher than White, Latino, and Black Americans. These initial findings—in addition to the Indian data cited above—suggest that Eastern cultures are not as reverent of their elders as lay beliefs would suggest (North & Fiske, [under review](#)).

Construct/Factor Analytic

The first sample ($n = 437$) rated their agreement with 41 prescriptive statements targeting older people. An exploratory factor analysis found a 3-factor solution, best fitting 20 items. Additionally, confirmatory factor analysis measures (RMSEA, IFI, CFI, NLI) indicated a 3-factor model to be a good fit for the data. Responses from the next three samples replicated these trends, in addition to adding supplemental demographic (above) and predictive results (below). As noted, each of the three factors emphasizes prescriptive, “should”-based beliefs concerning elders’ use of social resources, each likely to be endorsed particularly by younger people.

Criterion/Predictive

As noted an experimental paradigm presented participants with older targets who either adhered to or violated prescriptive, SIC-based stereotypes (such as refusing to retire). As expected, SIC scores significantly predicted reactions toward the prescription-violating targets, such that participants who scored higher were more resentful (North & Fiske, 2013b).

Location

North, M. S., & Fiske, S. T. (2013b). A prescriptive, intergenerational-tension ageism scale: Succession, Identity, and Consumption. *Psychological Assessment*, 25(3), 706-713..

Results and Comments

The first prescriptive, intergenerational-tension ageism measure, SIC departs from existing scales, in both focus (prescriptive “shoulds” instead of content-based “ares”) and findings (consistent participant age trends do not emerge with other ageism measures). In gauging stances on emergent issues—such as those surrounding mandatory retirement, Social Security, and healthcare—the scale also offers greater contemporary societal relevance than do existing measures.

Succession, Identity, and Consumption Scale of Prescriptive Ageism

Instructions: “Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements” using the response scale: 1, *disagree strongly*, 2, *disagree*, 3, *disagree slightly*, 4, *agree slightly*, 5, *agree*, 6, *agree strongly*.

Factor 1: Consumption

Doctors spend too much time treating sickly older people.*

Older people are too big a burden on the healthcare system.*

Older people are often too much of a burden on families.

At a certain point, older people’s maximum benefit to society is passing along their resources.

Older people shouldn’t be so miserly with their money if younger relatives need it.

Older people don’t really need to get the best seats on buses and trains.

AARP (American Association of Retired Persons) wastes charity money.

Factor 2: Succession

If it weren’t for older people opposed to changing the way things are, we could probably progress much more rapidly as a society.

The older generation has an unfair amount of political power compared to younger people.

Most older people don’t know when to make way for younger people.⁺

Most older workers don’t know when it’s time to make way for the younger generation.⁺

Older people are often too stubborn to realize they don't function like they used to.

Younger people are usually more productive than older people at their jobs.

Job promotions shouldn't be based on older workers' experience rather than their productivity.

It is unfair that older people get to vote on issues that will impact younger people much more.

Factor 3: Identity

Older people typically shouldn't go to places where younger people hang out.^x

In general, older people shouldn't hang out at places for younger people.^x

Generally older people shouldn't go clubbing.

Older people probably should use Facebook.

Older people shouldn't even try to act cool.

Note.

*⁺^x Similar items, potentially redundant, denoted as co-varying in the structural equation model.

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Future Research Directions

Intergroup bias measures are abundant and varied, showing useful and inventive methods for assessing the variety of ways that stereotyping and prejudice researchers have kept busy. The field offers a lively variety of measures for general intergroup relations (RWA, SDO, SCM), subtle forms of racism

(SRS, IAT, indirect priming, aversive racism measure), subtle forms of sexism (MSS, NS, ASI), and subtle forms of ageism (FSA, SIC). Each has more-than-adequate psychometric properties, and most apply across cultures.

Compared with previous stereotyping and prejudice measures reported in earlier editions of this volume, these measures of bias focus on unexamined rather than overt indicators. Some measures rely on relatively automatic processes (reaction times in the IAT, indirect priming of racism, aversive racism measure) that indicate underlying cognitive-evaluative associations. Some measures tap seemingly impersonal societal beliefs (SDO, SCM), so they may seem ambiguous to respondents as evidence of bias, although they predict stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. Some measures rely on seemingly independent policy preferences whose pattern happens to predict ingroup favoritism (SRS, MSS, NS, FSA), again apparently ambiguous to respondents. Still other measures assess ambivalent beliefs (SCM, ASI, SIC); these are evaluatively mixed across dimensions, not overtly univalent—all negative or all positive—reactions to ingroups and outgroups. This automaticity, ambiguity, and ambivalence allows researchers to identify contemporary forms of bias that often differ in kind from more overt, old-fashioned forms.

More research is needed, of course. Not all measures provide complete psychometric profiles, for example, test-retest reliability or nonstudent samples. Not all measures show the expected convergent or predictive validity; more evidence is needed.

Finally, societal categories are evolving, and some are neglected by bias measures (e.g., social class, religion). Many categories intersect, and we do not know how this tempers or exaggerates individual differences in bias. Indeed categories are becoming more volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (Bodenhausen & Peery, 2009), so measures of bias will have to respond with the times. Stay tuned.

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