In Bogotá, city planners and residents struggle over downtown renewal by mobilizing security frameworks linked to Colombia's history of political and criminal violence. Urban spaces appear as terrains of military strategy, bureaucratic artifacts as weapons of (para)state violence, and housing transformations as incarnations of rural land grabbing and displacement. Far from being only metaphorical reverberations of the country's pervasive imagery of warfare, such discursive maneuvers are practical enactments that become intimately entangled with the constitution of urban materialities. Everyday performances of security activate the physical qualities of urban forms and things, endowing them with significance both as sources of insecurity and as vehicles of securitization. While recent scholarship has explored the ways in which urban infrastructure and materiality mediate urban politics, conflicts over Bogotá's renewal highlight the relational dynamics between social actors' discursive performances and urban materialities. At stake here is what I conceptualize as ongoing and tentative processes of materialization. As urban actors assemble, calibrate, and deploy repertoires of (in)security, they actively contribute to the material shaping of urban worlds. Tracing such security performances and their attendant materialities usefully refocuses attention on human action and political accountability within complex social-material assemblages. It reveals the ways in which contests over authority and belonging are enacted by a range of urban actors, mediated through specific histories, and sedimented in urban forms.

In the early hours of May 28, 2016, over 2,500 law enforcement agents stormed into two blocks in downtown Bogotá to recapture El Bronx, one of the city’s largest drug markets and most feared neighborhoods. The operation aimed to dismantle three micro-trafficking organizations known as ganchos (hooks) and “rescue” hundreds of children and homeless drug addicts who had been caught in their grips. The officer in charge of the takeover was a veteran counterinsurgency police coronel who had participated in emblematic military raids of guerrilla camps and drug laboratories in the countryside. Intelligence reports warned of the presence of the ganchos’ heavily armed foot soldiers, the Sayayines, as well as an elaborate network of counter-intelligence and underground escape routes. Authorities employed surveillance and drones for terrain reconnaissance, and special forces swooped into the area hidden in unmarked commercial trucks.
News coverage described a form of military swarming: “The official troop overwhelmed the zone in minutes and units Alfa, Charly, Bravo, and Delta concentrated on each one of the ‘ganchos’ and ‘Sayayines,’ while snipers and a team of special forces secured the area” (El Tiempo 2016). Weeks later, I was talking with the city’s Secretary of Security, Daniel Mejía, in his office, only few blocks from where the operations were still underway. Mejía explained that police had deployed “security rings” and the government had scheduled helicopter flyovers to “demonstrate overwhelming force.” But the command did not encounter gunfire, only unarmed crowds of destitute residents. Accounts of the confrontation were nonetheless thoroughly militarized. In a recent news interview, Mejía had even remarked on the tactical use of debris: “Filling up the place with garbage was a strategy, using it as a barricade to isolate people, [especially] law enforcement” (León and Arenas 2016). Protesters emerged as an army of addicts, social debris that had been weaponized by drug leaders. And the built environment became a target of military intervention: “criminal architecture” (Marín Correa and Flórez Suarez 2016), as another newspaper put it.

Alongside the militaristic spectacle the operation revealed other modalities of security ranging from humanitarian and juridical to infrastructural. Immediately behind the military frontline, Mejía noted, the government had mobilized its “social arm” of medical professionals and social workers establishing a “route of treatment” for exploited children and homeless addicts. The administration had decided to enter El Bronx, Mejía explained, not for “cosmetic or aesthetic” reasons, but rather because “the rights of underage and homeless populations were being violated.” The operation had decidedly humanitarian goals, he stressed, seeking mainly to “reestablish subjects’ rights along with security and territorial control.”
Another battlefront was urban law. El Bronx had been for years associated with the loss of legal ownership. As a city planner put it in another conversation about the raid, “the chain of property owners had been broken” by events of political and criminal violence dating back to the mid-twentieth century. Many properties had been abandoned or forcefully occupied by local gangs. In this context, the operation was also a legal takeover against what he and other officials described as “juridical insecurity.” Police evictions and arrests were accompanied by the seizure of properties that had been used for criminal activities (*extinción de dominio*), as well as the creation of redevelopment and zoning regulations aimed at establishing new forms of ownership and land uses. With demolitions already underway, several displaced business owners and tenants initiated lawsuits against the government, evincing the entanglements between legality and insecurity.

Finally, the neighborhood’s physical infrastructure itself appeared as inherently insecure. City officials commented on the extent of El Bronx’s material decay and the fact that a majority of buildings were “at risk of collapsing” (*amenaza de ruina*). “It’s in such bad shape that we have to tear it all down,” one functionary told me. Here it was not police, social workers, or lawyers who defined insecurity, but rather risk technicians assessing infrastructural threats. In the weeks following the takeover, twenty-two buildings were declared at risk by the city’s risk management agency and slated for demolition. While disaster intervention had been typically associated with landslides and floods, in this case authorities resignified the notion of public emergency as “civil disorder” (*desorden civil*). The police operation was treated as a disaster, legitimating emergency measures that blurred the boundaries between eviction and evacuation.1

These security frameworks converged to create the sense of a radically uninhabitable built environment. The consensus among city officials was that all buildings had to be demolished. That “a total physical transformation” was required to overcome the area’s history of violence and
illegality. Secretary Mejia stressed the need to construct “public buildings [to create] a government zone.” Mirroring the country’s post-conflict sensibilities at a time when the national government was reaching a peace agreement with the country’s largest guerrilla group (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo or FARC-EP), Mejía also imagined the creation of a site of memory, “something like a museum or a place that tells people what was there before and how the city changed it.” By 2017, planners were talking about the development of housing and commercial spaces, as well as the construction of a vocational education center. During a meeting at the city’s Company of Urban Renewal (Empresa de Renovación Urbana), a group of architects described to me the latest vision for the area: its transformation into a key node of an emergent creative economy—the so-called Orange Economy—through which “vulnerable populations, the unemployed, people with a history of addiction, could be reintegrated into social life.” The plan, now known as “El Bronx: Orange Hope,” would also seek to convert a military headquarters that had for decades flanked the neighborhood into a hub for the creative industries. With the post-conflict era looming in the horizon, the intervention in El Bronx became emblematic of national shifts toward new models of security centered on social integration and development. It revealed the coexistence of multiple “security logics” (Valverde 2011: 10): from military and humanitarian action to juridical technique and inclusionary development. Ultimately, the operation raised questions about the shifting interconnections among different enactments of security and their critical role mediating the destruction and reconstruction of urban space.

In this article, I explore the interrelations between security and urban transformation so spectacularly showcased in the takeover of El Bronx, by plumbing the everyday security practices and material configurations of Bogotá’s downtown renewal (renovación urbana) projects since the late 1940s. As the takeover of El Bronx made clear, “security” is a fundamentally polyvalent and
fluid notion. Its meaning and form, as Daniel Goldstein argues, is “configured and deployed [in multiple ways]—not only by states and authorized speakers but by communities, groups, and individuals—in their engagements with other local actors and with arms of the state itself” (2010:492). Far from striving for analytical discreteness, this essay engages directly with the conceptual slipperiness of security. In Bogotá’s downtown struggles, social actors mobilize a variety of shifting and overlapping repertoires of (in)security. Individuals move seamlessly between understandings of security linked to military warfare, paramilitary violence, urban crime, legal power, and conflicts over property and belonging. Taken together, Bogotá’s renewal trajectories reflect Colombia’s gradual turn from military-infused repertoires of security to less overtly repressive ideologies linked to development, participation, and citizenship (Ramírez 2019). Far from a linear progression, at stake here are amalgamated and deeply “uneven geographies of security” (Ojeda 2013).

In tracking these shifts, I make two main arguments. First, although urban reconstruction in contemporary Bogotá has been increasingly framed as an issue of legality and citizenship, rather than of territorial control, the specters of militarism and violent warfare continue to resurface in downtown renewal struggles. Significantly, residents articulate socio-political critiques and voice dissent by calling attention to these underlying forms of insecurity. Second, “security talk” (Goldstein 2010) in downtown Bogotá is not simply a metaphorical extension of Colombia’s prolonged history of armed conflict and criminal violence. Repertoires of (in)security are best viewed as practical enactments that are intimately entangled with the constitution of urban materialities. They are ways of doing things in the world (Austin 1962) and, more precisely, of materializing and dematerializing urban worlds. A textured account of security performances and their attendant materialities ultimately reveals the ways in which struggles over political authority
and belonging are channeled into processes of urban transformation: how they are experienced and enacted by a range of urban actors and historically sedimented in urban forms.

A wealth of literature, particularly in critical security studies and geography, has explored the longstanding links between urbanism and warfare (Virilio 1986, Graham 2010, Cowen 2014). From the fortified medieval town and the colonial outpost to Cold War suburbia and the global logistics city, scholars have elaborated on the security and defense underpinnings of urban planning and development. These works have importantly shown that the city should not be understood simply as the “passive backdrop to the imagination and propagation of violence or the construction of ‘security’” (Graham 2010:xxvi), but rather as the “very medium of warfare” (Weizman 2007:186, emphasis in original). Such critiques, however, have tended to adopt macro-level perspectives that privilege state institutions and the Western history of militarism, keeping the notion of security, and its grounded meanings and deployments outside of the scope of analysis. An expanding body of anthropological work addresses these lacunae by approaching security—its forms, practices, and effects—as the central object of inquiry (e.g. Lakoff and Collier 2008, Gusterson and Besteman 2010, Masco 2014). Cities, in particular, have proven to be key sites to ethnographically interrogate the politics of security across a variety of realms, including: fortification and segregation (Caldeira 2000, Low 2003), rights and citizenship (Goldstein 2012), real estate development (Davis 2013), mobility (Monroe 2016), and environmental risk (Zeierman 2016). Building on this literature, and particularly on the recent call to address more explicitly the spatial dynamics of security at the urban scale (Glück and Low 2017), this essay examines the intricate connections between security frameworks and city (un)building.3

While questions of governance and capital accumulation are central to the urban transformations documented below, my focus is not on the political economic “production of
security spaces” (Glück 2015). Instead, I draw on the growing anthropological scholarship on the materiality of urban politics (Hull 2012, Von Schnitzler 2016, Anand 2017) to illuminate the material enactments of security frameworks. But unlike much of this literature’s emphasis on nonhuman agency, my analysis highlights the relational dynamics between social actors’ discursive performances and the constitution of urban materialities. Following Karen Barad, I conceptualize everyday repertoires of (in)security as “specific material (re)configurings of the world through which local determinations of boundaries, properties, and meanings are differentially enacted” (2003: 821). More than materiality, then, the main concern here is the materialization of urban security (Barad 2003:810, Aradau 2010, Appadurai 2015). This is what Arjun Appadurai has recently described as a “mode of materialization”: the mediations—ideational and practical—through which “matter comes to matter” (2015:233-234). Adopting this perspective usefully refocuses attention on the status of human action and political accountability within complex techno-material assemblages. This is an issue that is particularly salient in urban planning and design, where social actors are deliberately involved in “form-giving” practices (Murphy 2016).

To illuminate the ways in which performances of security have mediated the material (de)composition of urban landscapes in downtown Bogotá, I draw on fieldwork conducted since 2009. The article moves through four parts. First, I show how counterrevolutionary warfare in the 1940s and 1950s cemented the discursive and material coordinates of contemporary urban renewal. The next three sections explore the materialization of repertoires of (in)security through three overlapping modalities of urban reconstruction from the late 1990s into the present: (1) spatial militarism, (2) bureaucratic force, and (3) inclusionary development. While each these waves centers around a particular area of intervention—urban terrain, bureaucratic artifacts, and
housing arrangements—they should not be understood as forming a neat sequence, but rather as coalescing into a composite socio-material world. Tracking these processes of urban (de)materialization reveals the unstable articulation of repertoires of (in)security and the openings and constraints they create for different political imaginaries to emerge. This ongoing and conflicted crystallization of ideals of authority and belonging is not only particularly relevant in Colombia’s current transition to an uncertain post-conflict era, but also in the context of its longstanding struggles over sovereignty. It is to this latter history that I now turn.

**El Bogotazo and counter-revolutionary urbanism**

On April 9, 1948, presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán was assassinated in plain daylight in downtown Bogotá. Both a populist politician and a modernizing middle-class intellectual, Gaitán mobilized scores of followers as he forcefully attacked the country’s entrenched conservative establishment. His assassination led to a wave of urban riots known as El Bogotazo, which partly destroyed downtown Bogotá and left thousands dead. The widespread devastation that occurred that day became modern Bogotá’s foundational myth and marked the intensification of a period of extreme political violence known as La Violencia (1948-1958).

Although accounts of El Bogotazo are rife with images of indiscriminate destruction, they also suggest that the multitude’s actions and targets were far from arbitrary. It was a “political mass” (Medina 1984) that blurred the boundaries between mob violence and revolutionary action. The destruction of objects, particularly bureaucratic and luxury artifacts, took on particular significance from the beginning of the upheaval. Downtown streets became littered with toppled streetcars, mounds of official documents, office desks and chairs, and burning merchandise. As one protestor screamed, “We have come here to destroy, to end everything, not to steal!” (Quoted
in Braun 1985:160). The uprising would then besiege the city’s official architecture. It targeted the Presidential Palace, Congress, national ministries, and the palace of the archbishop, among other buildings. Ultimately, the crowds had strategically aimed to overturn the city’s social and political order by “systematically destroying the symbols of power, inequality, and exclusion that had once been so easily accepted” (Braun 1985:158). It was a popular assault on the materiality urban privilege.

If El Bogotazo constituted a mode of revolutionary action centered on material destruction, the planning interventions that came in its wake were couched as a distinct form of counter-revolutionary urbanism. At the very moment Gaitán was killed, US Secretary of State George Marshall was presiding over the ninth International Conference of American States in Bogotá, which led to the expansion of anticommunist military doctrine in Latin America. As the events of April 9 unfolded, Cold War counterinsurgency infused representations of the upheaval, portraying it as part of an international communist conspiracy and shaping authorities’ response to the wave of destruction.

Local elites used the episode of ruination to accelerate aggressive plans of urban modernization that had been launched in previous years. Media and authorities magnified the extent of the destruction justifying the need for the radical reconstruction of the city center (Aprile-Gniset 1983:34-36). Architects who had long decried the backwardness of peasant markets and downtown tenements went so far as to celebrate the riots declaring that “Bogotá’s urban problem… had been frankly cleared and partially resolved” (Arango et al. 1948:11). With the ashes of El Bogotazo still settling, one columnist applauded the administration’s ambitious reconstruction plans, calling for the creation of a city that would be “more beautiful, more
welcoming, and more secure and protected against the possibility of horrors such as those of the black Friday [of April 9]” (Quoted in Aprile-Gniset 1983:49).

The built environment became the central target and medium for the expansion of state power and for a full-scale “business offensive” (Sáenz Rovner 1992). One of the most significant projects of urban control and speculation was the construction of the Carrera Décima, a forty-meter-wide and eight-kilometer-long avenue. The avenue cut through the heart of the city, displacing thousands of residents and severing the west side of the city center from the administrative and cultural districts of the east. The Carrera Décima became Bogotá’s “road to modernity” (Niño Murcia and Reina Mendoza 2010), concentrating most of the city’s new developments and architectural innovations. At the same, it proved to be a strategic space for the deployment of security forces. Mirroring the nation’s larger efforts to develop transportation infrastructure and conquer the country’s deep “social and regional fragmentation” (Palacios 2006:xiii), the downtown road project constituted a spectacle of state-building and territorial control.

[Figure 2]

On the legal front, a battery of ordinances opened the terrain for counterrevolutionary urban operations. Immediately after the uprising, President Ospina Pérez decreed a state of siege (estado de sitio), advancing a series of controversial measures to quell the insurrection and initiate the reconstruction. One early governmental measure ruled the expropriation of several houses near the Presidential Palace to install emergency state offices and army troops. It invoked a “state of abnormality” and called for the centralization of military power (Decree 1370 of 1948). Through extraordinary legislation the President created commissions for the assessment of the damage and the emergency planning of a new civic center. Other decrees authorized an urban reconstruction
credit line with the United States as well as the emission of reconstruction bonds and higher property taxes.

Most significant was the creation of Colombia’s first condominium law by presidential decree only twelve days after the riots. This legal framework was presented as a definitive step toward urban reconstruction and “to solve in satisfactory fashion the problem of middle class housing” (Decree 1286 of 1948). The promotion of modern real estate—particularly apartment buildings—was an onslaught on fractioned, small-scale ownership arrangements, which had characterized inner-city districts and which had been assimilated by elites to moral decay and revolutionary dispositions. According to historian Jacques Aprile-Gniet (1983:211-212), the securitization of property regimes ultimately laid the groundwork for the displacement of urban smallholdings (minifundios urbanos) by urban estates (latifundios urbanos) with increased rents and firmer control over land. The high-rise rental building (edificio de renta) replaced subdivided houses and tenements (inquilinatos), both concentrating ownership and eliminating overlapping property claims.

Urban destruction and reconstruction during El Bogotazo can be viewed as the tentative materialization of an urban “securitiescape” (Gusterson 2004). The technocratic war over downtown Bogotá was an irregular and incomplete process that took material form in the city’s bureaucratic and physical infrastructure. Most visibly, this brand of counterrevolutionary urbanism was materialized in the modernist high-rises and avenues built in the decades following the uprising. Significantly, as the US expanded the commercialization of military technology in the region, it also increased the export of construction materials and expertise. A new urban landscape of steel, glass, aluminum, and concrete emerged in close connection with this nascent industrial-
military order. Modernist planning blurred into a mode of “strategic-military urbanism” (ibid.:206) that continued to reverberate in downtown’s socio-material transformations for decades.

**Spatial militarism and urban terrain**

In the morning of August 7, 2002 mortar shells aimed at the Presidential Palace flew over Bogotá. The attack targeted President Álvaro Úribe Vélez who was being sworn into office that day with a hardline military agenda to debilitate the FARC. The rockets missed their targets, landing instead a few blocks to the west, on El Cartucho. Formerly a hub of criminal activity and a refuge for impoverished families, homeless waste pickers, and small businesses, El Cartucho had become the city’s largest site of destruction since El Bogotazo. In 1998 the government had launched a plan to raze the infamous neighborhood for the construction of a metropolitan park known as *Parque Tercer Milenio* (Third Millennium Park). The bombing, presumably launched by the FARC, resulted in the death of several homeless drug addicts who were clinging to the ruins left by the city’s bulldozers. Significantly, the rockets landed on a house whose demolition had been ordered in the very first stages of the renewal plan. Gancho Amarillo, as the building was known, was one of the area’s largest tenements and *bazuco* houses. Along with several *cambuches* (shacks) made of plastic tarp and sticks, it was among El Cartuco’s last hold-outs in a sea of rubble. The accidental bombing of the building was the final blow in a contentious process of planned removal. Urban terrorism had concluded the work of planners and bulldozers.

In 2002 Colombia lived one of the most turbulent years of criminal and political violence. Peace negotiations with the FARC under President Andrés Pastrana Arango had failed and the election of Uribe Vélez marked the expansion of military operations and the escalation of guerrilla and paramilitary violence across the country. Authorities in Bogotá were on high alert as terrorist
attacks rattled the country, and police raided houses in downtown and the city’s southern peripheries in search for armament. One month before the August attack a special report in the country’s leading newspaper, El Tiempo, featured the semi-demolished El Cartucho as a key link within the country’s illegal arms trade: “among the houses in ruins that still remain in El Cartucho, after two years of demolitions to build the park Tercer Milenio, there are still enough weapons and ammunition to create a FARC front” (Bedoya Lima 2002). National security concerns had infused the spatial imagination of the area, and resignified demolition and reconstruction efforts as acts of state sovereignty.

During 2012, I interviewed urban planners and designers who had been involved in the development of the park and whose recollections showed how deeply military metaphors had permeated the implementation of the project. Cristina, an architect who had worked in downtown redevelopment since the 1990s, described to me the first stages of the intervention: “the strategy to acquire land was almost like a military strategy. The city purchased properties through the acquisition of entire blocks [moving along] the edges [of the neighborhood]. In the center [of El Cartucho] was where the most complex, hidden issues of drugs and weapons were located, so we had to move first through the periphery [encircling the core].”

She portrayed military strategy as the organizing logic in the design and construction of Tercer Milenio. Planning had literally become “the continuation of war by other means” (Foucault 2003:16). Most significantly, Cristina’s use of militaristic imagery constituted a performative gesture with political and material effects. In On War, Carl von Clausewitz notes that strategizing is particularly valuable in “persuading others” with “clear ideas” and “an orderly scheme of things” (1989:71). Strategy simplifies and depoliticizes complex realities: it “provides the script and the props for a convincing performance of the future in the here-and-now” (Kornberger
In Tercer Milenio, the imagined future was one of territorial control and order, which closely resembled national strategies to uproot guerilla enclaves in the countryside through the militarization of “conflict zones” and the policing (or expulsion) of their populations.

During the demolition and construction process, military strategy under the guise of “social intervention” allowed planners to minimize property disputes and flatten a complex socio-material topography. This included bureaucratic tools and incipient participatory logics such as census-taking, analyses of ownership and tenure, property negotiations, and resettlement schemes. Felipe, a real estate broker who had been part of the city’s planning team, elaborated on the strategic dimension of these “socialization” \((socialización)\) techniques in his recollections. As land surveyors and demolition crews moved into the neighborhood and security threats became more tangible, the city employed a “divide and rule” strategy through contracts and temporary jobs. Demolition companies gave out contracts to local gang leaders to act as “security guards over the city’s machinery,” while property appraisal firms hired others to accompany them in their field visits. As Felipe explained in his upscale real estate management office in north Bogotá: “It was an interesting move in the sense that you generated jobs, you paid them salaries for their assistance, and you divided them. It was an interesting strategy that worked well; it was recruiting people from the zone. [This strategy] also created many problems, because it generated complex internal wars among [local strongmen].” Instead of engaging them as subjects of rights or legitimate stakeholders, these soft, socially attuned tactics turned residents into tactical assets, something akin to a counterinsurgent “human terrain” (González 2008).

Military strategizing thus rendered El Cartucho—its inhabitants and built forms—into an urban terrain. “Terrain,” as Stuart Elden argues, “combines materiality and strategy—the physical and human dimensions of geography” (2017:217). The “intrinsic opacity” and “volumetric
physicality” of terrain, Gastón Gordillo further elaborates, is what makes it distinctly susceptible to weaponization by state militaries and insurgents (2018:54-55, 60). It is also why its control and domestication relies so heavily on fantasies of opening and levelling terrain (Ibid:61): of “violently carving shapes in urban space,” as Danny Hoffman (2019: S105) puts it in his analysis of the new urban terrains of contemporary security operations. Experts attributed El Cartucho’s history of violence to the neighborhood’s rugged architecture and physical features: to its crooked roads, narrow alleys, dead-end streets, and the winding city rivers that had originally traversed it. At stake here, like in El Bronx years later, was the criminalization of urban form itself. This was often indexed by everyday uses of the word “cartucho,” which literally means “lily” but also “cartridge” or “roll of paper.” As one planner with extensive field experience in the area explained: “El Cartucho was like a triangle with a very particular urban form, so people rolled themselves up [se encartuchaban], they got into spaces into which authorities could not easily penetrate.” The main goal, several city officials insisted, was therefore to “desencartuchar el cartucho,” to “unroll the roll.”

[Figure 3]

The military-strategic focus on terrain resonated closely with what historians have described as the state’s failure to control Colombia’s “fragmented topography” since colonial times (Safford and Palacios 2001:15). In this sense, and returning to Elden’s terminology, Tercer Milenio illustrated the intimate relationship between territory, understood as a “bundle of political technologies,” and terrain, as the physical-material properties of space (Elden 2017: 206). This was brought home to me when Enrique Peñalosa, who launched Tercer Milenio as one of his signature projects during his first term as mayor (1998-2001), elaborated on the metonymic relationship between the urban spaces targeted by the plan and national security issues. In 2012, he
described to me the government’s first incursion into El Cartucho to remove street vendors in the neighboring plaza of San Victorino, in the following terms: “The struggle to remove San Victorino was monumental. San Victorino was something that no one would have dared touch, it was almost like the guerrilla of the FARC…It’s unimaginable what it was, it was the symbol of the impotence of the state: the center of Bogotá totally occupied, it was complete chaos.” The demolition and reconstruction of the area appeared as a form of statecraft, of “capitalizing” (Foucault 2007) the nation’s conflict-ridden territory and rematerializing it through the allegedly transparent and disciplined terrain of a downtown plaza and park. Militarism had been encoded in planning and design practices and materialized into a fortified, semi-deserted, and exclusionary “public space.”

As a socio-material medium, however, the afterlife of the park made visible the ongoing, dynamic reworking of security repertoires. In 2009, humanitarian models took center stage when Tercer Milenio became a transitory tent camp for hundreds of internally displaced persons (Zeiderman 2016:150-156). Between 2013 and 2017, narratives of post-conflict integration infused the construction of a housing complex for victims of the armed conflict on the park’s northwest corner. Ultimately, Tercer Milenio proved integral to new articulations of urban renewal in which militarism partly receded in favor of modes of bureaucratic and participatory governance.

**Bureaucratic renewal and paperwork insecurities**

The beginning of the 21st century saw the emergence of a series of real estate projects in which overt security agendas were displaced by bureaucratization. A project known as *Manzana Cinco* (Block Five), launched in 2006 in the eastside of downtown Bogotá, became ground zero in this new wave of urban interventions. The project involved the demolition of more than thirty properties for the construction of a cultural center and a high-income housing complex. Far from
El Cartucho’s criminal gangs and abandoned properties, the area consisted of a collection of modest houses, parking lots, and small apartment buildings. Its location near prestigious university campuses and busy commercial and tourist corridors made it prime real estate. Militaristic repertoires gave way to official calls to “recover” and reverse the area’s “urban decay” by “strengthening residential, cultural, touristic, and commercial land uses” (Decree 240 of 2006). Insecurity, the future developer of the project explained to me in 2012, would be prevented through “mixed-use, vertical” urbanism. The city government declared “conditions of urgency for reasons of social interest,” authorizing expropriations and turning over the parcels of land to a private firm. Under a form of legally-enforced development, a barrage of urban decrees mobilized by the city’s Company of Urban Renewal became the critical medium for a gradual and contested process of destruction and displacement. In one sense, the Manzana Cinco project was emblematic of what scholars have recently conceptualized as “structural violence…enacted through everyday practices of bureaucracy” (Gupta 2012:33; cf. Graeber 2015). In this vein, one researcher recently described the Manzana Cinco plan as a form of “quotidian…silent and slow violence” (Urbina Vanegas 2015:237). Residents themselves, however, recognized and spoke openly of the ways in which bureaucratic violence had permeated the plan’s implementation. In contrast to “diffuse accounts of structural violence” (Gledhill 2015:3), legal and institutional insecurities appeared as concrete enactments of dissent in the form of perilous bureaucratic artifacts. Here it was not only that paperwork mediated processes of destruction and displacement, but also that local residents “performatively materialize[d]” official documents as sources of insecurity and transformed them into a material medium for socio-political critique (Nakassis 2013:403; cf. Hull 2012).

In 2012, almost six years after the city had officially launched the plan, I met with Jairo, a property owner who had managed to stall his expropriation process by outwitting city officials and
evading the notification procedures required for the eviction to come into effect. We talked in front of his family’s aging house, the last standing structure in the block. Visibly upset, he recounted the grievances his family had gone through as he gestured with indignation to the demolition site. Jairo experienced the eviction process as a distinctly material form of bureaucratic intimidation. He recalled how the first encounter with the city’s Company of Urban Renewal had come in the form of signs fixed on the neighborhoods’ doors, which read: “This lot is property of the Company of Urban Renewal. No entry without permission.” The company had claimed possession of the land before informing residents about the plan or initiating negotiations. It had been the materialization of “state abuse” and “arbitrariness” in the eyes of local inhabitants. For Jairo, the circulation of bureaucratic artifacts had literally turned deadly when his elderly father’s failing health deteriorated, and he passed away during the legal battle. As he and some of his neighbors often reminded me, the elderly man had been a casualty of the plan, one of its first “victims.”

Another resident, Margarita, further elaborated on the violent qualities of bureaucratic materiality. Surrounded by porcelain figures and crystal decorations typical of an aspiring middle-class family, Margarita explained how she and her husband had been forced to live in their son’s apartment, not far from Manzana Cinco, after losing their property and main source of income, a small parking lot. The couple moved about and talked hurriedly, as if they had incorporated the frenzied rhythm of their bureaucratic ordeal into their everyday routines. Significantly, Margarita recalled how she and her neighbors had been informed about the impending evictions through “pamphlets without a signature or anything.” Her choice of words was significant. In Colombia, illegal armed groups have typically employed “pamphlets” (panfletos), among other pseudo-bureaucratic paperwork, to extort populations. Drawing a parallel with the “dazzling legalism of
Colombia’s armed actors” (Gutiérrez 2001), Margarita portrayed the Company of Urban Renewal as a para-state agency that mimicked the authority of the state to “steal land from its rightful owners.” In the process, she performatively reconstituted official signs and documents as bureaucratic weapons.

[Figure 4]

During the extended legal battle, the elderly couple had painstakingly collected and classified countless documents related to the project and their eviction—everything from news clippings and online reports to official letters and judicial files. Drawing from her previous experience as an administrative secretary, Margarita had become the custodian of a counter-archive. For her and her neighbors, these were the material traces of a criminal collusion between bureaucrats and developers: insecurities encoded in bureaucratic paperwork and legal formalism. Repertoires of legal insecurity had become tangible in the excesses of bureaucratic paperwork, even as they simultaneously contributed to the dematerialization of apartments, homes, and businesses. For Margarita, the block had ultimately become a site of violent destruction, something akin to rural towns overrun by armed groups.

Viewing Manzana Cinco as structurally equivalent to violent land grabbing in the countryside not only mediated the (de)materialization of buildings and documents, it also shaped the socio-material context of juridical dispute. This became clear to me when I met Carlos, a young attorney representing several of the block’s property owners. Carlos did not look like many of the unscrupulous attorneys, or tinterillos, who hover around property disputes in their well-worn suits and ties. Draped in denim, with close-cropped hair, and a backpack, his appearance was closer to that of a social activist. He would later describe himself as a “lawyer of the poor.” As we talked over coffee in one of the city’s expansive new malls to the west of the city center, Carlos
told me that the Manzana Cinco case had become a personal obsession. For him, the connection between the case and the Colombia’s history of land violence was not incidental. “This is a country of the dispossessed and uprooted (desarraigados),” Carlos noted. He had met the Manzana Cinco clients after years of pouring over files of forcefully displaced persons and disappearances as an attorney for victims of the armed conflict. This real estate conflict was no different, it revealed the close imbrication of state violence and bureaucracy through the materiality of urban renewal law. As Carlos put it: “in the countryside populations are displaced with the use of force and weapons, here [it is with] the unjust and manipulative application of norms and under the cloak of legality.” Carlos led his clients through judicial itineraries that included media interviews, a congressional hearing, and appeals to local and international human rights organizations. In their documentary production, residents wrote about the “disrespect of our human and fundamental rights,” and signed their communications as the “displaced (los desplazados) of Manzana Cinco,” identifying with the country’s internally displaced persons. The eviction case and its bureaucratic materialization of victimhood aligned closely with the trappings of justice in Colombia’s perpetual “pre-post-conflict” moment (Laplante and Theidon 2006).

The juridification of urban renewal under Manzana Cinco was emblematic of what Jean and John Comaroff call “lawfare”: “the resort to legal instruments, to the violence inherent in the law, to commit acts of political coercion, even erasure” (2006:30). More than pointing to the intrinsic relationship between violence and the law (Fraser 1991), however, the bureaucratic battles above call attention to the performative materializations of urban lawfare. The material production and circulation of bureaucratic artifacts, as Matthew Hull perceptively argues, engender forms of “corporate authority” through which individual officials obscure their agency and deflect responsibility (2012:126-134). But this is always a
tentative achievement, the result of social mediations that are subject to negotiation and contestation. By mobilizing repertoires of land and state violence, the residents of Manzana Cinco rematerialized official artifacts as weapons that had been deployed tactically and deliberately. In doing so, they destabilized the opaque machinations of the city’s bureaucratic infrastructure. At every step, residents sought to assign moral and political accountability, tracking down the individuals behind such bureaucratic assaults and scrutinizing their motives: from the director of the Company of Urban Renewal and interested developers to low-level bureaucrats. In one telling case, residents argued that a city functionary had “stolen a house” from one of the block’s lots. The prefabricated house had been disassembled during the demolition process only to reappear months later, rebuilt, on a parcel of land outside the city. Residents recast the eviction notice as an extortion letter and the demolition as theft, ultimately identifying the official responsible for the misappropriation and putting in motion her destitution. Although a small victory, it demonstrated the ways in which the enactment of repertoires of (in)security rematerialized the bureaucratic and physical infrastructures of renewal and opened spaces for social dissent.

**Post-conflict renewal and rematerializing urban housing**

“Let him work! You should be out catching thieves.” It was an early Monday morning in April 2012 and a crowd had surrounded a group of police officers attempting to remove a street vendor from a busy walkway. The event would have been business as usual had it not unfolded in front of the semi-demolished site of Manzana Cinco and across the street from the Universidad de los Andes, an elite private university. One block to the north was Las Aguas, a neighborhood that had been slated for renewal. The University was the plan’s promoter and local inhabitants—from
middle-class apartment owners to tenement dwellers and squatters—feared it would continue the wave of displacement started by Manzana Cinco. As more college students joined the protest and city authorities became visibly concerned, one voice came forward. It was Manuel, the owner of a small restaurant in Las Aguas, who shouted: “I’ve been here for more than sixty years and now the University also wants to make us leave!” The middle-aged man was referring to what he and many residents believed was a new veiled threat couched in the language of participation and inclusion.

Since 2011 university planners had set out to transform Las Aguas into a laboratory of inclusionary renewal. The plan—known as *Progresa Fenicia* (Fenicia Progresses)—represented a radical shift from previous interventions.7 “The University wanted to do things differently,” one expert explained during a planning meeting, “starting not with a spatial plan but rather with people.” The main goal was to persuade owners to become partners in the project, investing their land in exchange for new and more valuable properties in the future development. Additionally, Progresa Fenicia aimed to produce affordable housing to resettle the neighborhood’s most impoverished residents—from the squatters who had illegally occupied public land on the hillside to low-income tenants and renters. The challenge was significant: building a consensus around the transformation of nine densely populated blocks containing mixed incomes and uses, and a range of modes of tenure and occupation.

On the surface, the Progresa Fenicia plan suggested a form of post-conflict renewal. Something akin to global paradigms of “human security” that seek to “expand the notion of politics to reintegrate social justice and economic development” (Amar 2013:15). Beyond questions of spatial and bureaucratic control, university planners emphasized the role of participation, alliance-building, and community development. They produced property maps,
analyses of economic activities, and ethnographic studies of local living conditions, and carried out participatory design workshops and public meetings. The leftist city government of Gustavo Petro (2012-2016) took up the plan as a new model for the inclusionary revitalization. And as the national government launched peace negotiations with the FARC, Progresa Fenicia came to embody political sensibilities linked to projects of land restitution and social integration. While university experts and city officials reframed renewal as an opportunity for socio-economic progress and inclusionary community-building—rarely talking about urban insecurity and decay—many residents directed their attention to the violent underside of property arrangements. Planners rendered the neighborhood into a collection of households, floor areas, and land uses to be converted into shares in a fiduciary trust, and ultimately reassembled as apartments and commercial spaces in mixed-use high rises. But for residents, the neighborhood constituted a fractious terrain intimately tied to the specters of land violence and misappropriation (cf. Appadurai 2000). At stake here was the recognition of what Nicholas Blomley (2003) calls the “violences of property”: the implied and overt, legal and corporeal violences through which property regimes are founded and reproduced. Crucially, residents wove repertoires of property violence into the painstaking building, improvement, and defense of their homes. Everyday insecurities—from the immediate threats of local gangs to the latent perils of illegal tenure—were physically encoded in houses and in the neighborhood’s topography. The materiality of housing emerged as a key “site of struggle over the making and remaking of the political” (Elinoff 2016:612; see also Holston 1991, Féhéravy 2013). It embodied residents’ embattled sense of belonging and served as a reminder of the potential exclusions of rematerializing Las Aguas as a real estate partnership and vertical condominium.
Sara, an elderly single-mother of a disabled adult son, elaborated on the intimate connection between violence and her path toward home ownership. She had bought her small shack (rancho) in the 1980s at a very low price from a taxi driver who had received threats and decided to leave. “But I had it very hard too,” Sara recalled pensively, sitting in the sparsely stocked cafeteria she ran out of her small living room. Since her arrival, her clean and well-organized home/cafeteria had collided with the street’s aesthetics: its “dingy bars, brothels, and clouds of smoke.” Almost immediately after moving into her house and reconditioning it for her modest business, she was pressured by local drug dealers and brothel owners to aid in their illicit operations. Her refusal increased animosities from neighbors, leading up to a critical event in the 1990s: “They put a revolver to my chest. It was a woman who ran a repair shop across the street, one of the toughest families in the area.” This was part of an attempt to get her to leave the neighborhood and give up her house. “But I went back up to them,” she continued, “and I told them they would have to buy my house or kill me.” Tensions had resurfaced more recently when the house next to hers was abandoned by its owners and “people tried to invade it.” Sara decided to “take charge of the property,” carrying out repairs and making sure no one got in. Other residents looking to appropriate the house “declared a war” against her and accused her of “hiding thieves and drugs” behind the restored facade. In the end, the house remained vacant and its entrances sealed, with Sara claiming she had only been trying “to benefit the community.”

Other residents similarly pointed to the dangers associated with home building and ownership. A street vendor explained how the remodeling of the first two floors of her auto-constructed home had antagonized some neighbors, “people who think they own the barrio.” When they saw construction materials and the changing appearance of her home they sent city officials to inspect the construction—an oblique threat to her tenure. Another property-owner had
endured more overt attacks from a family who had been after her house—they threw bricks on her roof every week both to scare her and deteriorate the well-kept structure. Conversely, a local storeowner with no legal title, or *poseedor*, took great pains to build up and improve his house in order to have more legal security and avoid expropriation. And yet another homeowner with a unique penchant for vernacular design had incorporated security features into his house—such as concealed lookout openings—to “keep an eye on the street” and prevent the squatting of neighboring structures and the theft of electrical wiring and exposed metal pipes. In all these cases, the aesthetics of property, the texture of housing, became imbued with residents’ views of insecurity. Through their everyday practices and performances, residents “stitched” a politics of property insecurity to housing forms (Murphy 2013:124). Revealingly, Sara concluded her story about the trials of home ownership, commenting on the University’s plan and gesturing to the country’s broader currents of land violence: “You know, I really pity those poor peasants who get thrown off their lands.”

While official understandings of dispossession in Colombia have been typically linked to rural warfare and land grabbing, the reconstruction of downtown Bogotá demonstrates the equally central place of such repertoires in struggles over urban property. The country’s urbanization was largely driven by successive waves of rural migration set into motion by violent conflicts over territorial control dating back to the early twentieth century. Las Aguas, once a working-class periphery of downtown Bogotá, was exemplary of these trends. Many of the older, established residents had fled the partisan political violence of the 1950s and 1960s, while a majority of the recent arrivals had been caught in the crossfire of contemporary conflicts between guerrillas, paramilitaries, and the state. Crucially, as people moved into the city, property forms and practices migrated with them. More than “resettling” in urban contexts, as Andrés Salcedo importantly
argues, such itineraries involved the “reconstruction” itself of urban space (2015:208). The agonistic practices associated with rural property were translated and rematerialized in the construction of urban housing—in what Sara and others still called their ranchos, a throwback to the rural smallholding. The precarious possession (posesión) of land through gradual improvements (mejoras) and its constant defense from legal and extralegal threats of expulsion had thus continued to echo through urban dwellers’ everyday experience.

[Figure 6]

University spaces, as well as the vision of a renewed campus-neighborhood, took on threatening qualities within this contentious landscape of property. For many local observers, discourses of inclusionary renewal were belied by the University’s physical presence and operations. In recent years, the University had acquired a large parking lot in the core of the neighborhood for the construction of its new School of Administration. For residents, the ten-story building represented the fortified extension of the heavily guarded main campus: an aesthetic and territorial encroachment epitomized by the large and widely resented black facades framing the structure. The University made additional inroads into the neighborhood by deploying private security guards around the building and in adjacent streets. And most concerning for locals, it had continued to play a key role in the local land market quietly purchasing houses and lots. Every new acquisition made waves in the neighborhood’s circuits of daily gossip and increased anxieties that the University was ultimately “taking over el barrio.” This created a dissonance between university planners’ attempts to reframe renewal in the language of inclusion and the material sedimentation of property insecurities. University-hired census-takers, for instance, were often met with distrust and their right to collect information questioned: “Are you from the city government? Why do I need to answer these questions?” Surveys, a quintessential bureaucratic technology,
emerged as a claim of authority on the part of university planners, more than a partnership-building exercise. Further compounding such paradoxes, the University ran its community outreach programs—including educational, economic development initiatives, and participatory meetings—from houses it had purchased in different locations in the neighborhood. One of these, formerly squatted by a family recently displaced by rural violence, had been partially demolished, equipped with a shipping container-turned-office, and guarded by the University’s private security. Ultimately, the ambivalence between progressive messages and material mediums was for many residents an indication of the plan’s realpolitik—the undercurrents of power made visible through material forms. One property owner pointed to these paradoxes during a public meeting at the University when he shouted, “this is the same thing as Manzana Cinco, they want to kick us out, the only difference is that they want to do it more elegantly.”

The materialization of property insecurities proved central to broader mobilizations against the plan. “No to urban displacement in Bogotá” and “For the defense of territory” emerged as slogans in downtown-wide movements, crystallizing the links between long-standing repertoires of land violence and inner-city renewal. Closely connected to these initiatives, a considerable number of property owners in Las Aguas organized marches and public meetings, persuading other residents to abstain from partnering with the University. The group called itself No se tomen Las Aguas (Don’t take over/drink The Waters), a revealing double entendre. On one hand, it conjured both the physical takeover of the neighborhood—an image resonant with the country’s history of armed invasions of towns and villages. On the other hand, it represented Las Aguas as a kind of commons—The Waters—and the University as a sophisticated urban land grabber. Many residents increasingly linked the threat of displacement to the material rearrangement of housing. For them, high-rise living would introduce new, destabilizing property practices: from limitations
on subdividing homes for business and rental purposes and new forms of residential proximity to added costs associated with building administration and utilities. As one resident put it, commenting on the “beautiful buildings” the University had envisioned: “this will be very nice but it won’t be for us, people have been taught to live differently.”

[Figure 7]

An online post in the No se tomen Las Aguas Facebook page encapsulated some of these concerns: it displayed a collage of photographs of Hong Kong high-rise facades with the caption “Monstrous Densification.” The serial repetition of packed-in windows and architectural patterns indexed the oppressive, threatening nature of high-density buildings. The emergent vertical housing landscape had thus come to embody residents’ ideas about the dangers entailed by the plan, particularly its long-term effects and potential socio-economic exclusions. It was the materialization of insecurities linked to a new property regime that assumed a new kind of urban subject and new social relations. Resonating with global neoliberal shifts, tenants would have to become owners, street vendors would be compelled to formalize their businesses, property owners would have to act as real estate entrepreneurs, and so forth. Residents’ incapacity to become competent partners within the plan’s framework, many feared, would ultimately displace them. The violences of property so familiar to locals appeared to have been subtly reinscribed in the progressive idioms of participation and inclusion, and materialized in the forms of high-density, mixed-use renewal.

Conclusion

In her pathbreaking work on urban security in São Paulo, Teresa Caldeira writes that everyday stories about crime and violence are “not only expressive but productive” (2000:19). Such narratives become integral to an “aesthetics of security” characterized by the production of
material forms such as walls, fences, window bars, and surveillance devices (292). Scholars have further argued that “structural forms of violence often flow through material infrastructural forms” (Rodgers and O’Neill 2012:405). In his research in the city of Managua, Dennis Rodgers shows how elitist agendas to repress the urban poor in the name of security have been materially inscribed in new road networks. These are forms of “infrastructural violence,” he asserts, that represent the “systemic and purposeful articulation of a particular political configuration and a deliberate pattern of infrastructural development” (2012:432). This essay has expanded on these theorizations by exploring more directly the ways in which martial, bureaucratic, and participatory repertoires of (in)security get tied to urban materialities. By attending to the everyday performative dimensions of downtown renewal, I have tracked the manner in which multiple urban actors calibrate, assemble, and deploy logics of security in processes of urban reconstruction. What comes to the fore here is not a clear-cut typology or progression, but rather a dynamic amalgamation of security modalities which actors seize on and materialize in divergent ways and contexts.

What we see in Bogotá’s renewal struggles is thus not the mechanical circulation of a vocabulary of violence or the systemic structuring of oppressive urban environments. What emerges most clearly is the continual performative work through which both planners and residents render urban forms and things meaningful in the registers of security. While the trajectories recounted above suggest that the materiality of the city is politically charged and actively implied in enduring social conflicts, they also remind us that the affordances and qualities of urban matter cannot be divorced from the everyday life worlds they co-constitute. At stake here is what Keith Murphy describes as the “tethering [of] political ideology to the mundane material world—if not by blunt force, then by relentless implication” (2013:127). In Bogotá, social actors
crafted pragmatic links between repertoires of (in)security— notions of militarism, state violence, and land grabbing—and a range of urban things—expansive parks, demolition sites, bureaucratic artifacts, and housing forms. They stretched narratives tied to the historical and geographical registers of Colombia’s armed conflict, and anchored them to the material world of downtown destruction and reconstruction.

The material enactment of security repertoires was not only integral to plans of spatial control, as in Third Millennium, but also to emergent logics of opposition and dissent directed at the materialities of bureaucracy and housing. While matter undoubtedly mattered in all these cases (cf. Barad 2003:817), how it mattered and to whom—how urban forms took on dangerous qualities, for whom, and in what terms—ranged considerably. Such radical instabilities and contestations become visible by considering the fluid entanglements between discursive performances and materiality; what I have been describing as the materialization of urban (in)security. Tracking such processes, furthermore, shows that marginalized residents themselves can be sharply attuned to the politics of urban materiality. They actively materialize urban forms and artifacts as inherently insecure, not only to make visible the modes of oppression and injustice encoded into urban materiality, but also to search for accountability in what are the otherwise faceless assemblages of built form and paperwork.

Recent scholarship has importantly called attention to the “rise of the security paradigm as a framework for organizing contemporary social life” (Goldstein 2010:488), and to the critical role that cities play within this global landscape as “security laboratories” (Amar 2013:20). If Colombia is emblematic of the extent to which “security shapes the terrain of urban politics,” as Austin Zeiderman (2016:159) aptly puts it, then this essay has been concerned with the material composition of such political terrains and the practices through which they are imbued with
meaning. In downtown Bogotá, urban forms and things acquire crucial significance as sources of insecurity, mediating projects of control, speculation, and opposition. Probing the practices through which the city is materialized as a repository of repertoires of (in)security is thus critical to illuminate the banal immediacy and pervasive force with which security can be woven into the fabric of everyday life and rendered into a tangible horizon of urban politics.

Notes

1 In his recent ethnography of environmental risk in Bogotá, Austin Zeiderman (2016) importantly illuminates the ‘hybridization’ of environmental dangers with the threats of violence and crime (82-88).

2 The Copenhagen school of security studies (e.g. Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998) has similarly emphasized the performative dimensions of securitization. This scholarship, however, is largely state-centric (Goldstein 2010: 492) and does not attend to the socio-material dimensions of securitization.

3 The material enactments I analyze include processes of ruination, destruction, and “unbuilding” (see Hommels 2005).

4 See Navaro-Yashin (2012) for a recent anthropological work in this vein.

5 While Barad’s thought is arguably representative of the posthuman, new materialism literature, in my reading of her work I am more interested in her insistence on the dialectical relationship between discursive practices and material phenomena.

6 Bazuco is a very powerful and cheap form of crack cocaine.
“Fenicia” was the name of a bottle factory located in the area in the 1950s. The name would become a source of controversy as most residents identified with the traditional names of Las Aguas or Germania.

The technical term for this process is land readjustment. For more details on the financial and legal mechanisms at the core of the plan see https://progresafenicia.uniandes.edu.co (last accessed April 26, 2018).

While this recalls Bruno Latour’s (2005) call to attend to the politics of things, or dingpolitik, my interest here is on how politics gets attached by people to material formations in specific social and historical contexts, that is, how politics is actively materialized.


References


Figure 1. Ruins of El Bogotazo in downtown Bogotá, two blocks from where Jorge Eliécer Gaitán was assassinated. April 9, 1948. Photograph by Manuel H. Rodríguez. Credit: Fondo Manuel H. Rodríguez/ Colección Museo de Bogotá.
Figure 2. Military march along the partially inaugurated Carrera Décima. 1953. Photograph by Saúl Orduz. Credit: Fondo Saúl Orduz /Colección Museo de Bogotá.
Figure 3. Parque Tercer Milenio. 2012. Photograph by author.
Figure 4. Manzana Cinco residents find a city notice on their door. October 22, 2008. Photograph by Saúl Suárez. Courtesy of Saúl Suárez.
Figure 5. Las Aguas. August 11, 2012. Photograph by author.
Figure 6. Private security guard at the entrance to the University’s School of Administration in Las Aguas. August 2, 2016. Photograph by author
Figure 7. “Monstrous Densification in Hong Kong.” No Se Tomen Las Aguas Facebook.