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Welcome to Volume XXVIII of the Social and Political Review. The SPR has, since its foundation, showcased the outstanding calibre of academic achievement in Trinity College Dublin, aiming to promote more meaningful and involved engagement among young people with the pressing social and political challenges of our time. This year’s collection is no different.

It is my belief that engaging in pressing social and political issues is more important now than ever before. As the Trump presidency continues to challenge political norms, as the Brexit negotiations raises the question of the return of a hard border in the North, and as the #MeToo campaign sheds light on decades of sexual abuse, we must continue to think critically about how our society is, and ought to be, structured, at a local, national and international level. The writing in this year’s volume contains a wide range of articles, from assessing the prevalence of sexual violence in civil war to seeking alternatives to neoliberalism, and from discussing political perspectives on the veil, to analysing how the internet has changed hip-hop subculture.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Editorial Board of this year’s Review for their hard work and dedication. This year we received more submissions than ever before and the whole team worked tirelessly to ensure each submission was given careful consideration. A special thanks must go to our design editor, Carla, for her artistic flare. I would also like to specially thank Aisling, General Manager, and Hugh, Financial Officer, who have both made the process a thoroughly enjoyable one. It has been a pleasure to work alongside them, and indeed the whole Editorial Board.

The Departments of Political Science and Sociology have been, once again, generous in their support of the Review. I would like to thank our advisors from these departments, Dr. Jacqueline Hayden and Prof. Richard Layte for their guidance. We would also like to thank Grehan Printers, who have produced the Review for the last number of years.

It has been an honour to serve as Editor-in-Chief of the Social and Political Review for its 28th Volume. I hope you enjoy reading this collection of articles as much as I have.

Matthew Nuding
Editor-in-Chief
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With the advent of the Industrial Revolution, men’s involvement in paid work became a societal norm that contributed to producing a standard of masculinity that dominated. Work and masculinity combined to create the construction of a particular understanding of Hegemonic Masculinity which remains significant to this day. The previous fifty years have challenged this notion of work defining manhood through the degendering of work. I will argue that is not merely the features of the workplace that identify work with masculinity. Rather, it is the interaction between the continuing ideology of the breadwinner model and societies adherence to it. I will examine this by reviewing the literature of unemployment in males and apparent changes in approaches to fatherhood. Both of these have seen considerable development over the past forty years, especially with regards to the ‘Mancessions’ of 1980 and 2008 (Zhang et al., 2015: 51) and the growing acceptance of men remaining in the private sphere. I will conclude by accounting for the lack of societal change by referring to the above dispositions under the framework of Connell’s Complicit Masculinity (Connell, 2005: 80).

Prior to laying out the argument, it is important to understand what it meant by ‘Hegemonic Masculinity’. In its simplest form, it is the current form of masculinity that is ‘culturally exalted’ (Connell, 2005: 77). While difficult to define as it differs across cultures, Hegemonic Masculinity is somewhat recognisable by the tropes of physical strength, emotional resilience, athletic and sexual prowess among a myriad of other ‘desired forms of masculinity’ (Connell, 2000). It is based upon a link between the cultural ideal of masculinity and the institutional power that maintains or claims authority which contributes to masculine hierarchy. It can continuously change when challenged by groups or events, but some form of hegemonic masculinity remains even if highly altered. This ability/inability to change found in the studies used in this article is key to the following discussion.

In deciding upon the approach to the topic, I drew heavily upon the work of David Morgan (1992) who developed two foundational aspects of my article. The first of these is his claim that it is ‘too simplistic’ (Morgan, 1992: 96) to equate features of the workplace with masculinity. He considered the
popular distinctions between masculine and feminine work such as light/heavy, dirty/clean, dangerous/safe and concluded that while important, it was only a minor part of the masculine identity with work. The equation of masculine identity with masculine work practices was added ex post facto by social construction and cannot account fully for masculine identity. As an answer to this, Morgan contends that it is the other features of work life that contribute to a work identity. These include the job itself, the setting, the relationships made through it and the effect on one’s sense of self. It is an ‘interplay of agency and structure’ that is common to both men and women (Morgan, 1992: 80). Therefore, it is a much more complex matter than strictly studying the mechanization of work or the entering of women into male work environments. For this reason, I have again drawn on Morgan by examining masculinity through challenges. This mitigates the problems of studying men by avoiding confusion with essentialism, pluralistic masculinities and ‘doing masculinity’ (Morgan, 1992: 47). Unemployment and the changing expectations of fatherhood are the challenges under which I will analyse male identity and its relationship with paid work.

Paid work has been routinely associated with male identity, but it must be noted that this is due to the importance of providing for others and not due to the work itself. Morgan discusses the role of ‘responsibility and sacrifice’ in the way men see their work lives (Morgan, 1992: 90). It must be noted that the sense of sacrifice is prevalent among women too in their non-paid work of minding children (Leira, 1993). However, it is less culturally prevalent since it is less public and only seen as ‘being’ feminine, not ‘doing’ femininity (Dalley, 1988). A verifiable method to examine the importance of sacrifice is to analyse the views of masculinity by men unable to make this sacrifice – the unemployed. Studies of the 1930’s Depression first spoke of a ‘dependence phenomenon’ where the loss of the breadwinner role in men had a negative effect of their views of masculinity (Beale and Lambert, 1934). These studies stem from a cultural era where the breadwinner role strongly co-existed with masculinity due to a lack of other workplace options. Any study from this pre-feminist era will prove less reliable and we must account for this. It is the effects of the 1980’s recession that one must examine in detail. Two studies undertaken in a period which now included women found that there was a negative psychological effect of unemployment but very little psychological difference between unemployed men and women (Coyle, 1984) (Fryer and Ullah, 1987: 94-110). There was a merging of the gender response when both genders could be studied. This is evidence for the lack of significance of work alone to male identity gauged through the way men saw themselves. The lack
of difference between men and women suggests a basic psychological impact of unemployment that was not influenced by a greater tendency to connect male identity with paid work. These studies however do not distinguish between the effects of those providing for others and those providing for themselves. Therefore, one cannot comment of the importance of the breadwinner model and another study is required.

A connection of breadwinning and male identity can be seen when unemployment has a higher impact on men’s mental health than women’s but there was no psychological difference between single men and women without a family role as a breadwinner (Artazcoz et al., 2004: 83-84). Artazcoz’s evidence also states that marriage had a protective role on women’s mental health as opposed to their single counterparts. Interestingly, this protective effect was reversed for married men. It could be argued that this reversal is due to the traditionally assumed role of the male provider defining masculine identity. The importance of breadwinning over work can also explain why men with lower breadwinning status are less likely to hold traditional gender beliefs (Zuo and Tang, 2000). Fathers of dependent children are also more likely to work longer hours in order to provide for dependents (Eggebeen and Knoester, 2001: 389). The conclusion to draw from the study of unemployment in men is that male identity is equated with work only because of the ability that work provides men the mean to support others. It is the breadwinning ability of paid work that identifies work with masculinity and not the practices of labour itself.

If the importance of breadwinning is equated with male work identity, why is it that this connection continues to exist in societies where the male breadwinning role has been minimised? This is of importance particularly with regards to societies where fatherhood has emerged as an alternative to work in constructing male identity. Masculinity has always had competing roles that seek to validate male identity (McDowell, 2003) whether they be paid work, public life, martial prowess or, in an emerging sense, fatherhood (Halford, 2006: 385). If fatherhood provides another source of male identity, it is reasonable to assume that fathers will emphasise this part of their identity when it becomes possible by partaking in their children’s lives and working less. After all, if the gains in male identity from fatherhood offset the loss of identity from work, there is no aggregate loss of masculine identity. If economic theory is applied, there is even a net gain due to the diminishing marginal utility of work identity. However, this is not the case, as previously noted, fathers in Scandinavia averaged more hours per week than non-fathers.
UK men who were fathers worked the longest hours in Europe, particularly when their children were young (Brannen, 1997). This result can be accounted for by the importance of not just the work role of masculine identity but the breadwinning role it confers. The extent of this continuing importance of the breadwinner role is known to exist even in Scandinavian countries where the socialisation of the male breadwinner is declining (Burnett et al., 2013: 637). It can also explain the continuing attachment to paid work by men. Men feel the need to be the main providers (Gerson, 1993) and men are more likely to report work as their main interest in life (Hass, 1993).

Even in the most egalitarian of societies, the actual practices of men do not comply with emerging theories of fatherhood. Halford states that “there remains a prevalent cultural belief that to be a good father is to be an effective provider” (Halford, 2006: 386). This furthers the argument that the emergence of fatherhood in men remains highly connected to the involvement in paid work and the breadwinning ability that it provides. It is the changes in the workplace that has allowed the study of fatherhood due to the process by which men can afford to stay at home and greater acceptance of dual parenting by society and government policies in the western world. In keeping with the exploration present in Norwegian literature, it can be argued that the loss of male identity due to a loss of the breadwinning role has led to efforts to emphasise their masculinity in other methods (Brandth and Kvande, 1998: 296). It is not enough to understand that men perform fatherhood differently, but one must continue this analysis to understand why this is and how it correlates with the dominant form of masculinity. Challenges to masculinity present in fathers who lose their breadwinning role either semi-permanently through unemployment or temporarily through parental leave cause a reactionary response in men with parenting methods that seek to conform with hegemonic masculinity. Fathers in Norway, for example, have a greater tendency to provide ‘Masculine care’ (Brandth and Kvande, 1998: 310) which includes becoming friendly with the child, doing things together and teaching the child independence. This can be seen as manifestations of hegemonic masculinity with involvement in the public sphere and a lack of dependence seen as masculine maturity. Another example of a reaction to a challenged identity is the attitude of men towards housework with regards to their relative breadwinning status. Thébaud (2010) found that men in dual earner households contributed more towards household tasks than men who were the household’s sole breadwinner.

However, this trend did not continue as women partners earned more.
It in fact reversed, with men whose partner earned more contributed less than the dual earner and contribution may decline further in unemployment (Thébaud, 2010: 333). This again seems counter-intuitive for men who are unemployed have more time and energy to put into housework which benefits the whole family. Once again, it can be explained as a male response to their challenged identity in the loss of the breadwinner role. Due to this reason, men emphasise their masculinity by avoiding ‘feminine’ tasks. This counter-intuitive time-use finding also holds in the study of Norwegian fathers who did not contribute to household tasks while on parental leave to any greater extent (Brandth and Kvande, 1998: 310).

Brandth and Kvande conclude that these fathers are representative of hegemonic masculinity due to ‘Masculine care’ and their relationship towards housework, but I argue that they are better accommodated as complicit masculinities (Brandth and Kvande, 1998: 311). This is not a radical diversion but it is an important distinction when realised by these men in that their place in the ‘Stalled Revolution’ (Hochschild, 1989) can be more fully realised. Complicit masculinity is, as the name suggests, complicit in its support of hegemonic masculinity. This is because men who ascribe to this masculinity have much to gain from support of hegemonic masculinity and little to win if they subvert the established order (Connell, 2005: 79). Complicit masculinity represents the majority of men in a male hierarchy due to the fact that hegemonic masculinity is difficult to achieve both physically, mentally, culturally and professionally because it is an ideal of masculinity that may only exist as an archetype. Other forms of masculinity are products of their smaller size and lack of authorisation due to the dominance of hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 2005: 81).

The adherence to the breadwinning role I have discussed previously and the strong emphasis of masculinity when this role is lost through fatherhood can be explained by the lack of change in our culture’s view of hegemonic masculinity. Male breadwinning remains a defining part of hegemonic masculinity whereas fatherhood has not become embodied in hegemony. This lack of shift in hegemonic masculinity explains why the loss of breadwinning has a greater effect on men (Artazcoz et al., 2004: 83-84) and why men feel the need to define fatherhood under the shadow of hegemonic masculinity (Brandth and Kvande, 1998: 310). These are examples of actions that complement the theory of complicit masculinity as fathers have much to lose by not complying with the dominant cultural strategy. These losses can be seen in the stigma that exists around stay-at-home dads (Donaldson, 1993: 651)
or the discouragement of employers from men prioritising childcare (Burnett et al., 2013: 635). Furthermore, this lack of a cultural shift is explicitly stated when average American’s are asked for their views on fathering and children. As late as 2013, only 34% of respondents felt that the child was just as well off if the mother works versus 76% agreeing that he was in the case of a working father (Wang et al., 2013).

The lack of change in hegemonic masculinity accounts for the theories of emerging fathers not being supported by actual practices which is particularly pertinent in relatively egalitarian states such as the Nordic countries. The ‘prevalent cultural belief’ (Halford, 2006: 386) that accompanies breadwinning can be tied directly to the prevalent cultural belief that accompanies hegemonic masculinity. Furthermore, the lack of identity garnered through fatherhood, or more specifically, the lack of change away from the fatherhood as provider model can once again be conflated with the minimal role fatherhood has in hegemonic masculinity. Men therefore emerge who have been stripped of identity earned though breadwinning but still conform to the norms of hegemonic masculinity and embody this in their approach to fatherhood, (Brandth and Kvande, 1998: 310) their continuing belief in the importance of work and aversion to the private sphere (Thébaud, 2010: 333-334). From such men, we can imply a type of unconscious complicity with hegemony. They are aware that they do not embody hegemonic masculinity however, as Connell theorised, they are reluctant to re-invent hegemonic masculinity due to the societal pressures that would cause. Therefore, they seek to conform to the normative ideal of hegemonic masculinity in whatever method they can since it seems to them to be the safest option. This can be popularly seen in the supposedly liberal family arrangement which still sees the women do more housework (Nordenmark and Nyman, 2003).

I have argued that is not the fault of the man alone in these arrangements but rather the fault of the current construction of hegemonic masculinity and the man’s relationship to it that demands tacit or even unconscious co-operation. This unconsciousness may explain some authors descriptions of ambivalent fatherhood (Nordenmark and Nyman, 2003: 207) (Brandth and Kvande, 1998: 310). It is a shift in the current conception of hegemonic masculinity that must change before complicit masculinities can change. When that happens, full egalitarianism is much more likely to become the dominant cultural force at work within households.

Drawing on the idea that we cannot simply equate masculinity with
features of the workplace, this article has sought to add to the literature of multiple masculinities in the occupational sphere. It has developed the argument that the breadwinner model is essential to the understanding of masculine identity and examined this through two major challenges to that model in unemployment and fatherhood. Evidence of persistence of the breadwinning model could be found in unemployed men and when fatherhood was examined, it is clear that an emphasis on hegemonic masculinity remains despite the growing importance of fatherhood in that hegemony. While other authors have credited this reactionary fatherhood as a consequence of hegemonic masculinity, this article has argued that it is better understood as complicit masculinity. Through acceptance of this small but crucial distinction, it posits that the current construction of Hegemonic Masculinity must change if men who complicitly embody it are to change as well.
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Introduction

Over the decades, discourse has developed significantly on the “under-representation of women”. Women continue to comprise a small minority of parliaments, averaging 22% across the world (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2016). Whilst this demonstrates the descriptive representation of women, or rather the lack thereof, the discussion regarding the “under-representation of women” has often also referred to shortcomings in the substantive representation of women. Indeed, many consider descriptive under-representation of women to have resulting consequences for the substantive under-representation of women, a link that this paper will explore.

The concepts of descriptive and substantive representation were first introduced by Hannah Pitkin in *The Concept of Representation* (1967). By descriptive representation she sought to describe the ‘extent to which a representative resembles those being represented’ (Dovi, 2011). In the case of sex, descriptive representation describes the under-representation of women in national parliaments, where they comprise 22% of elected representatives internationally when they comprise 50% of the population (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2016). By substantive representation, Pitkin referred to ‘the activity of representatives’, namely ‘the actions taken on the behalf of, in the interest of, as an agent of, and as a substitute for the represented’ (Dovi, 2011). In assessing substantive representation in this paper, we will focus on legislative discourses, proposals, debates and outcomes.

With the gradual increase in the number of women in parliaments in recent decades, and with more countries taking active steps to improve the numbers of women in parliament, this paper asks if improved descriptive representation of women in parliament leads to observable outcomes in terms of the substantive representation of women.

This paper will first analyse whether numerical increases in women in parliament have a direct impact on substantive representation, focusing on critical mass theory, critical actors theory, and on factors which constrain descriptive improvements having an impact on substantive outcomes. Second
it will discuss women as a diverse and complex group, as well as taking into account a reflexive approach, namely changes to female voter behaviour due to being represented by women. The paper will argue that there is some link between improved descriptive and substantive representation of women, but that this link is complex and intersectional, and should not be over-estimated.

1. The Impact of Numerical Increases in the Proportion of Women in Parliament

a. Critical Mass Theory

At its most basic, the argument that improved descriptive representation of women would result in improved substantive representation of women, would seem to imply a straightforward relationship between the two, with substantive representation dependent upon the proportion of women in parliament. Some studies have supported this view, finding that the increased presence of women in parliament can lead to tangible changes in legislative discourses, proposals, debates and outcomes. However, many others have found little or no effect.

Traditionally, the view that increased representation can have substantive outcomes was advanced in the form of critical mass theory. This theory posits a relationship between number and outcome (Beckwith, 2007). The theory postulates that when women are only a few token individuals in parliament that they are unlikely to have significant substantive outcomes in terms of representation of women (Childs & Krook, 2009). As a small distinct minority, they seek to adapt to their surroundings and conform to the rules of the game (Beckwith, 2007). However, when women come to constitute a considerable minority, or a critical mass, they can have a substantive impact (Childs & Krook, 2009), because the nature of group interactions changes, as the minority starts to assert itself and thereby transform the institutional culture, norms and values (Beckwith, 2007).

Several studies have corroborated such a view, finding an aggregate level link between representation of women in legislative office and the presence of ‘women’s issues’ in policies (Osborn, 2012). In both the U.S. Congress and the state legislatures, there is evidence that women change the legislative agenda by introducing bills ‘that reflect their priorities on gender-role related issues such as women’s rights, welfare, and children’ (Osborn, 2012, p. 5). However, in general, when tested in empirical evidence, the validity of the
critical mass thesis is limited, with Osborn (2012) considering it ‘tenuous’. Trimble (2006) posits that research shows female politicians may express willingness to represent women and may consider themselves to have a special mandate to represent women, but when tested empirically the extent to which they put this into practice is limited. Osborn (2012, p. 4) points to the example of the 2003 Florida ‘Scarlet Letter Law’, which was widely criticised, with The New York Times referring to it as ‘requiring public humiliation of women’. The majority of female representatives in Florida’s State Legislature supported the bill, and that the small number of representatives in both houses who voted against comprised both women and men. Thus, an increase in the numbers of women present may, in practice, achieve little or no ‘feminised change’ (Childs & Withey, 2006).

b. Critical Acts

Childs and Whitney (2006) argue that it is more important to investigate not ‘when women make a difference’ in terms of changes in numerical proportions in parliament, but rather ‘how women’s substantive representation occurs’. Childs and Krook (2009) argue in this regard that the concept of ‘critical actors’ should be prioritised over critical mass. This theory emphasises agents over outcomes, with critical actors defined as legislators who ‘initiate policy proposals on their own and/or embolden others to take steps to promote policies for women, regardless of the numbers of female representatives’ (Childs & Krook, 2009, p. 138). What distinguishes critical actors is their ‘relatively low threshold for political actions (Childs & Krook, 2009). Although they hold the same attitudes as other representation, they are more motivated to initiate policy-reforms on them (Childs & Krook, 2009). Childs and Krook (2009) posit that the shape and impact of critical actors ‘are not absolute’. Small numbers of women acting together in legislative contexts to promote common goals can have great success, while larger numbers may enhance the opportunity for critical acts but may in fact also foil their effects (Childs & Krook, 2009).

Childs and Whitney (2006) use the example of the reduction of VAT from 17.5% to 5% on sanitary products in the UK in the 2000 Budget. They credit an individual Labour backbench MP Christine McCafferty as the individual who ultimately triggered the change (Childs & Withey, 2006). Another example is Murray’s research on an earlier stage in the chain of representation, positing that the candidature of Ségolène Royal in the 2007 French Presidential Elections suggests that the presence of a viable
female candidate, even if they do not get elected, may engender substantive representation of women by forcing her male opponents to ‘feminise their campaign, campaign team and policy commitments’ (Celis & Childs, 2008).

c. Other Factors impinging on the Relationship between Descriptive and Substantive Representation

The study of critical actors provides an interesting example, but evidence here is still not straightforward. It is thus important to look at the other factors impinging on how women representatives perform. Trimble (2006) posits that a shared social perspective is what defines a representative’s ability to act on behalf of a group, such as women, but that this must be placed ‘within complex representational processes including party opinions, parliamentary process and institutional norms which structure attitudes and behaviours’.

Partisan politics in particular can be a constraining factor. Political parties, especially in terms of party ideology, their mechanisms of candidate selection and norms of party discipline determine what kinds of men and women get elected and the types of policy positions they are likely to adopt once in office (Childs & Krook, 2009). For example, as Trimble (2006) points out, the strict party discipline in Westminster-style parliamentary systems means opportunities for representatives to voice interests are controlled by parliamentary parties. Furthermore, the prevailing norms in parliament affect the contexts in which female MPs operate.

Situational factors are also relevant in analysing when women achieve policy change on ‘women’s issues’, such as the balance of power between parties, if there is a new government after an election, if a returned government after an election was weakened in the election, and if the opposition party has enlarged its seat total (Beckwith, 2007). In such situations, newly elected women will ‘experience positive and negative opportunities for constructing cross-party alliances among women, for strengthening their own party ties, and for acting independently in policy making’ (Beckwith, 2007). The wider political climate is relevant too, especially in terms of its relation to women’s empowerment, such as local and global trends (Childs & Krook, 2009).

The presence or absence of women’s groups both outside and within parliament, and internally within parties, are relevant. Celis and Child (2008) point to Curtin’s remarks that an ‘influential feminist reference group’ played
an important role regarding the substantive impact of female cabinet ministers in New Zealand. Parliamentary sub-settings too have been argued by some to present strategic opportunities for substantive representation of women ‘because they can facilitate collective deliberations by holding hearings and/or inviting interested parties to offer views on policy matters’ (Trimble, 2006). Although women may be a very small minority in the chamber, they might constitute larger minorities in party delegations or committee rooms, allowing greater impact on policy formation (Childs & Krook, 2009).

Beckwith (2007) contends that the number of female MPs is relevant, but it must be analysed in a broader context, intersecting with other features such as ‘newness’, namely a substantial increase in the numbers and proportions of women elected for the first time. Beckwith (2007) concludes that newness may result in the ‘least positive policy impacts, in terms of women-friendly legislation and women’s substantive representation’, as new female representatives lack experience, standing, a supportive party, and familiarity with the institutional context. However, in the future such women can become incumbents, meaning that the impact on substantive outcomes of significant increases in female descriptive representation in the short-term may be best judged several election cycles later.

Thus, research has found, in many but not all cases, that when studied over time, across institutions, and with varied definitions of “women’s issues”, there exists an independent effect for gender on women’s legislative behaviour. (Osborn, 2012). But this should not be over-stated and it is of great importance to understand the impact of improved descriptive representation of women within the context of other factors, in order to understand its impact on substantive representation outcomes.

It is important too, to note the limits of empirical measures, which analyse substantive representation of women based on variables such as legislative discourses, proposals, debates and outcomes. Trimble (2006) cites one example of how women MPs in the governing party during the first session of parliament of the Rae government in Ontario, Canada were not proportionally more likely to raise policy matters of particular relevance to women in their statements and questions. However, a cabinet member in an interview said this finding was a result of the refusal of female cabinet members to let their male colleagues ‘deflect responsibility’ on key policy issues and defer to their female colleagues on ‘women’s issues’ (Trimble, 2006). Thus, this shows how examples of improved substantive representation
of women due to the presence of women might not show up on the most utilised empirical measures.

2. Towards a more Nuanced Understanding of Substantive Representation of Women

a. Substantive Representation of Women as Heterogeneous

So far, this paper has tended to treat women as a somewhat homogenous group, assuming they have shared policy interests. However, this paper will now take a more nuanced approach, drawing on intersectionality theory, which rejects treating women as a homogeneous group without regard to other politically salient categories, such as race, class, and sexuality (Smooth, 2011). Women’s interests are ‘complex, fluid, and varied’, with the ‘coexistence of shared as well as divergent interests under the label of women’s interests’ (Smooth, 2011). Consequently, substantive representation of women is achieved through ‘diverse, complementing, and conflicting claims about what is in the interest of women’ (Celis, 2012).

Celis’ approach is one that places political debate and conflict about what is in the interest of women at centre stage (Celis, 2012). Celis (2012) posits that the level of responsiveness during the process and the outcome of substantive representation greatly depends on the reflexivity of the political and policymaking system, namely ‘its capacity to draw out and engage with different groups and perspectives’. Reflexivity captures ‘the extent to which the system furthers input, contestation, and objection from the represented citizens’ (Celis, 2012). It entails a ‘true political debate about what is good and advantageous for women’ (Celis, 2012). Therefore, it is ‘a strategy to capture diverging and conflicting interests and, hence, a prerequisite to establishing responsiveness with as many groups in society as possible’ (Celis, 2012).

Osborn’s analysis is relevant to this conception of representation, which argues that the pursuit of women’s policy is an inherently partisan endeavour, with female representatives having separate agendas on women’s issues based on their partisan identity (Osborn, 2012). Women support policy solutions to women’s issues rooted in their partisan identity, therefore ‘when women represent women, they do so as partisans’ (Osborn, 2012). For example, Osborn (2012) cites Bratton who found that increasing gender diversity within the Republican Party actually results in an increase in the number of bills sponsored by Republican women that are contrary to ‘explicitly feminist
women’s interests’ (Osborn, 2012).

b. Reflexivity of Female Voters and Representatives

Having analysed how women are a heterogeneous group, and how substantive representation of women is achieved in that context, this paper will now discuss responsiveness. Celis (2012) argues that ‘legitimate representation’ is in practice generated by the enabling of the ‘interaction of claims and empowering the represented to form their preferences and to make judgments’ (Celis, 2012, p. 526). Jones (2014) probes responsiveness from the voter side, focusing on the effect on female constituents having female representatives in terms of their awareness of the substantive policy positions their representatives have taken and consequently weighing those positions more heavily when voting. This approach to substantive representation fits with that of Saward (2012) who sees substantive representation as a market of claims, ‘an interactive process of interest articulation during which a multitude of interests and perspectives can be formulated by many actors and during which the representatives and the represented respond to one another in an iterative fashion’ (Celis, 2012, p. 527).

Jones (2014), studying the US Senate, finds that women do know more about their senators’ record, and weigh that information more heavily in evaluations of their representatives, when their senators are women. No such effect is noted for male constituents, suggesting gender-based factors have an important explanatory role. Jones (2014, p. 196) notes that politicians ‘have a particular interest in paying attention to the needs and interests of those citizens most engaged with politics’. Thus, he concludes that descriptive representation in a legislature might lead to improved substantive representation in government policy, not just because of the different priorities and positions of female legislators, but also because descriptively represented voters are more aware of and responsive to their legislators’ records (Jones, 2014).

Conclusion

This paper has shown that improved descriptive representation of women can have impacts on substantive representation of women. First it demonstrated that this relationship is a highly complex one, and cannot be simplified to a simplistic linear numerical relationship, but rather must be placed in the broader context of representation in legislative settings. Second, it demonstrated the further nuances of representation of women given their
homogeneity as a group, with substantive representation strengthened when it reflects the diversity of views and differences between women on issues considered of particular importance to women. Additionally, it showed the reflexive nature of substantive representation. Thus, there is certainly a relationship between descriptive representation and substantive representation of women, but the nature of that relationship should not be exaggerated as a simple linear one. However, perhaps this is understandable. As Trimble (2006) says: within the ‘masculinist, partisan, hierarchical and regimental nature of parliamentary politics, why should we expect the admission of a few more women into the club to [significantly] change a socially constructed, historically constituted and deeply embedded set of gendered norms and practises?’ (Trimble, 2006)
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This paper is arranged as follows: first is an introduction and overview of neoliberalism. Second is an examination of the omnipresent nature of neoliberal ideology and how this has enabled it to shape global development. This paper will then argue that despite being widely accepted, neoliberalism is merely an ideological project that came about as a response to the increase in Keynesian style economics and it should not be allowed to continue unquestioned. Two of the reasons for this are explored: first, neoliberalism relies on assumptions that have been proved incorrect by behavioural economics and second, neoliberalism focuses on the individual which is detrimental to communities. All of these things happen because neoliberalism is merely a theory not a fact. The seeds of its downfall rest in the theoretical rather than factual basis of neoliberalism.

“Neoliberalism is anything but a succinct, clearly defined political philosophy” (Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009:1). Neoliberal ideology dominates our lives and yet, few of us know its name or are able to define it. It is commonly understood as an ideological system that favours liberalization, privatization, deregulation and free market solutions to economic problems (Campbell and Pederson, 2001). The neoliberal argues that the growing instability in the world economy is due to too much regulation and government intervention (World Bank, 2006; Siddiqui, 2012). Thus, neoliberalism promotes negative liberty; the absence of interference from government and favours the absence of barriers to international capital mobility (Gray 1995; Hardin, 2012; Mudge, 2008). Neoliberalism is omnipresent and promiscuous (Clarke, 2008). It’s pervasive yet anonymous nature has empowered it to shape global development (Monbiot, 2016). Starting from the University of Chicago with the philosopher-economist Friedrich von Hayek and his students such as Milton Friedman, the ideology of neoliberalism has been pushed very thoroughly around the world (Shah, 2010) and has now become prevalent in universities, corporate boardrooms, financial institutions and politics.

Harvey (2016) asserts that universities have been taken over by the neoliberal projects that surround them. Economics education is now dominated by neoclassical economics. Students are taught to understand the economy through modelling individual agents who act rationally in order to maximise
their respective utilities. When free from external interferences, these agents meet through a market, where mathematical formulae that supposedly capture their behaviour interact to produce an efficient “equilibrium” (Ward-Perkins and Earle, 2013). Essentially, allocative efficiency is the main tool of welfare analysis (Deda et al, 2013). Apart from the occasional development or behavioural economics modules, budding economists are taught with few caveats that free markets are allocatively efficient and are thus the best way to ensure pareto efficiency (i.e. it’s not possible to make any one person better off without making at least someone worse off) (Deda et al, 2013). However, allocative efficiency and pareto efficiency fail to take into account the negative externalities and social costs of free markets. Despite this, Cahill (2011) argues that academics who do not share the above assumptions are often deemed not to be economists and will find it difficult to get published in leading economic journals. In sum, the pervasiveness of neoliberal theory in education leads to the reproduction of these ideas and thus, dominant conceptions and understandings of economic theory continue to be guided by neoliberalism (Kirman 1998; Siddiqui, 2012).

The Thatcher-Reagan political revolution marked a turning point away from market regulation and the academic world’s formalization of free markets into mathematical economics aided this movement (Shiller, 2015). Neoliberal ideology is evident in a general shift towards right wing (and centre-right) politics. When Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan took power, neoliberalism was apparent in massive tax cuts for the rich, the crushing of trade unions, deregulation, privatisation, outsourcing and competition in public services. Thatcher’s slogan ‘There is no alternative’ captures the power of neoliberalism. Over time, tax rates have steadily declined in the United States: in the 1950s, the top marginal income tax rate was 91 percent - now it is 35 percent (Reich, 2010) and recently, Donald Trump has championed less government regulation. By the end of 2017, the Trump administration had issued 67 deregulatory actions and imposed only three new regulatory actions (www.whitehouse.gov). Meanwhile, the UK’s National Health Service is teetering on the brink of privatisation (Lucas, 2015). Neoliberal ideas have not just taken over universities and political ideology; they have also permeated international political organisations. Through the IMF, the World Bank, the Maastricht treaty and the World Trade Organisation, neoliberal policies have been imposed, often without democratic consent, on much of the world (Monbiot, 2016). For example, Klein’s (2007) book The Shock Doctrine describes the tribulation caused by free-market policies in Latin America, the first region where neoliberalism was imposed. Mudge (2008), brands this as
the political institutionalization of dominant schools of economic thought. The ubiquitous nature of neoliberal ideology and its formalization by both academia and international institutions has enabled neoliberalism to shape global development.

Neoliberalism has become an unquestioned reality (Smith, 2012) when in truth, it ought to be understood as a knowledge apparatus and epistemological project focused on the production and dissemination of ideas (Hardin, 2012). If one looks at neoliberal hegemonic projects at base level, rather than from the perspective of the neoliberal advocates, it becomes clear that history has been rewritten by these advocates and that academia has bought it (Bockman, 2007). Neoliberalism was launched by political elites in the late 1970s as a response to the threat posed by Soviet communism, the rise of the welfare state in Western democracies and the dominance of Keynesian-style approaches to macroeconomic management (Hall, 1989; Siddiqui, 2012; Mudge, 2008). Neoliberal ideas were subsequently spread through a strategic network of right-wing think tanks and associations such as the Mont Pelerin Society. Over time, these transnational networks of right-wing economists and activists caused the worldwide embrace of neoliberalism (Campbell, 1998; Bockman, 2007). Instead of being blindly accepted as fact, neoliberalism should be recognised, as outlined by Harvey (2005) as merely a political or ideological project of a class seeking to change the balance of power in global capitalism and create new means of capital accumulation (Clarke, 2008). The origins of neoliberalism have been examined; this demonstrates why neoliberalism should not be allowed to continue as an unquestioned reality but let us now consider in more detail the flaws of neoliberalism.

The assumptions at the root of neoliberal economic theory have been proven false and yet the majority of us continue to accept its conclusions as fact. Neoliberal economic theory portrays individuals as the ‘Homo Economicus’ or ‘economic man’ and insists that rationality, individuality, and self-interest guide all actions (Peters, 2001; Smith, 2012). It also rests on the assumption that humans have precise, consistent preferences and symmetric information that they use to maximise their utility (Thaler, 2000). Such axioms of rational decision making are simplistic and have been proved to be invalid by behavioural economics. For example, studies on framing and the reversal of preferences clearly demonstrate that the way choices are presented can strongly influence decision making (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Thaler (2015) affirms that if humans behaved like the Homo Economicus, they would be cold blooded optimizers comparable to Mr. Spock in Star Trek. In reality,
humans do a lot of misbehaving (Thaler, 2015). Stiglitz (2010) highlights the fact that often in formulating scientific theories, the assumptions made are so strongly held that they are ingrained in people’s thinking and no-one realises that they are merely assumptions. Real life experiences and history suggest that things are not quite as certain and rosy as market advocates would like to believe. People do not act rationally; they are driven by non-economic motives such as emotion which Akerlof and Schiller (2009) refer to as our ‘animal spirits’. Thus, it is important to question these assumptions. The concept of Homo Economicus is simply too narrow (Stiglitz, 2010). It fails to recognise the reality of human nature and behaviour, and this is reason enough to question hegemonic neoliberal thinking. In truth, people do not merely act out of self-interest but classical economists such as Adam Smith lacked the tools to empirically test their theorems. Consequently, they produced clean mathematical policy that had no use in the real world (Colander, 2009; Musura, 2016).

Adam Smith, in his famous treatise, The Wealth of Nations, argues that through economic actors pursuing their own self-interest, the market is capable of achieving what is best overall for society. Fourcade and Healy (2007) draw attention to the fact that free market theory is rarely questioned. Smith (2012) concurs; she states that it now appears logical for markets to allocate resources. The seemingly natural assumptions outlined above point to a seemingly natural free market, however, this is not the case. Free markets cannot be relied on to produce the best overall welfare for society. Shah (2010) highlights the fact that free markets are not natural; they were enforced. The Great Depression clearly demonstrated that historically the market economy has not in fact succeeded in correcting itself (Stiglitz, 2010). Furthermore, creating ostensibly “free markets”, urging them to be efficient, self-correcting and complete, is itself a massive act of political will (Smith, 2014). Neo-liberal free markets are themselves a product of intervention. Yet, we appear to accept the idea that a neutral force; a kind of biological law, like Darwin’s Theory of Evolution guides the markets to equilibrium and the best possible outcome for all when instead this philosophy arose as a conscious attempt to reshape human life and shift the locus of power (Monbiot, 2016).

Given that free markets are not self-correcting or driven by a natural force, they could still be defended via their association with freedom. For supporters of neoliberalism, markets are ‘a necessary condition for freedom in other aspects of life’ (Fourcade and Healy, 2007:287; Mudge, 2008). However, Monbiot (2016) contends that freedom from trade unions and collective
bargaining results in freedom to suppress wages. Freedom from tax leads to freedom from the redistribution of wealth that lifts people out of poverty. Fourcade and Healy (2007) aver that this kind of liberty can only deliver as much freedom as one’s money can buy. Monbiot (2016) also remarks that it is rather strange for a doctrine that promises choice and freedom to be promoted with the slogan “there is no alternative”.

It is now more obvious than ever before that markets are not, and can never be, complete, efficient, optimal or animated by rational economic actors. Smith (2014) asserts that evidence for this is stronger and more exposed today than it was a decade ago, particularly, in the wake of the global financial crisis of the mid-2000s. In the lead up to the Global Financial Crisis, decision makers were guided by neoliberal economic theories which they did not expect to fail. Consequently, the signs were ignored (Smith, 2014). As outlined above, neoliberalism asserts that markets are efficient and self-correcting. It therefore follows that when a country’s economy plunges into recession and then depression, the most straight forward advice from a neoliberal perspective is to simply ‘do nothing’ and allow the market to correct itself. The fact that governments in the United States and Europe were forced to intervene in 2007 and 2008 in order to prevent the collapse of the global financial sector is a clear demonstration of the weakness of neoliberal economic theories. Stiglitz (2010) criticises economists for the flawed advice that they have provided us with. According to Stiglitz, economists blatantly failed in their basic task of predicting and forecasting. Smith (2014) asserts that the fact that the theory of general equilibrium and the efficient markets hypothesis did, in the end, fail is an interesting reflection on the reality that economics cannot always make itself true, even with strong political backing.

The flaws of neoliberal economic theory have been examined; let us now look at some of the problems that result from such flawed theories. Neoliberalism is centred on the role of the individual, competition and the pursuit of self-interest and this is detrimental to communities. Rather than encouraging cooperation and altruism, free markets make such impulses unintelligible and consequently crowd out people’s motivation to engage in them (Frey, 1997; Fourcade and Healy, 2007). Smith (2012) claims that neoliberalism’s focus on the individual means that things such as “the public good” and “the community” are now being discarded as unnecessary components of a welfare state (Martinez and García 2000). Neoliberal theories provide no room for human empathy, public spiritedness, or altruism (Stiglitz, 2010) but this is far from the reality of human nature and behavior. People do
not act in isolation or make choices purely out of self-interest. Stiglitz argues that anywhere you have more than two people; they will take the other person/people into account. Markets are feeble when compared to human connection and communities (Fourcade and Healy, 2007). Humans do not naturally consider their own interests in isolation; we are not calculating, rational, self-serving, and self-interested as proposed by neoliberal theory. Our wellbeing is inextricably linked to the lives of others, yet, everywhere we are told that we will prosper through competitive self-interest and extreme individualism (Monbiot, 2016).

The rise of neoliberalism has coincided with notable declines in subjective wellbeing and an unsettling increase in mental health problems. One cannot deny that mental health issues are on the rise in Western countries. The Mental Health Foundation (2004) reports that rates of depression and anxiety among teenagers have increased by 70% in the past 25 years, particularly since the mid 1980’s. One in six people in Ireland will experience a mental health problem in any given year according to Mental Health Ireland; this essay argues that ubiquitous neoliberal ideology may be partly to blame. The pursuit of self-interest and extreme individualism leads to isolation, loneliness and the exacerbation of mental health issues according to Monbiot (2016). Neoliberal societies make their citizens physically as well as mentally sick (Schrecker and Bambra, 2015), and this effect is augmented the more unequal the society is and the more unprotected its citizens are from free-market “competitiveness” (Cain, 2018). Using measures of subjective wellbeing, Stevenson and Wolfers (2009) demonstrate that women have experienced both an absolute and relative decline in happiness in recent decades; Herbst (2011) argues that the persistent erosion of social and civic engagement and interpersonal trust may be partly responsible for the widespread decline in subjective well-being over the past few decades. In 1999, Bourdieu predicted that social problems such as suicide, alcoholism, depression, and domestic violence would become increasingly prominent due to the fact that people are turning away from the role of the community and instead focusing solely on individuals (Smith, 2012). It seems that this has become a reality. In 2003, The World Health Organisation reported that one in five people will develop a depressive episode during their lifetime and that mental health problems account for 30% of consultations with general practitioners in Europe. Monbiot (2016) declares that neoliberalism is creating loneliness, and this is wrenching society apart. A clear example of this is the privatization and commoditization of community processes. It is said that ‘it takes a village to raise a child’ but since the spread of neoliberal ideology, children are no longer cared for by their
grandparents, neighbourhood watch is replaced by police, communal harvest is replaced by industrial farming etc. Neoliberal theory leaves no room for active communities, interdependence and the social benefits that accrue with this. This ought to be seen as a flaw of neoliberalism. Developing countries should integrate the above knowledge into their economic development rather than attempting to recreate western practices. However, as shown below, the latter seems to be the reality.

Neoliberalism is now the dominant ideology in developed countries and as a result, for the past three decades, neoclassical theory has been imposed on developing countries (see Klein, 2007; Loewenstein, 2013; Siddiqui, 2012). Such theories are anchored in Anglo-American academia and rest on the incorrect assumptions outlined above. They therefore should not be forced onto developing countries. Fourcade (2006) asserts that the internationalization of economics has enabled economists to ‘reconstruct societies according to the principles of the dominant economic ideology’ (Fourcade, 2006, p. 157). This in turn, has enabled economists to formalize and validate such ideology as economic theory. That is to say, neoliberal ideas and assumptions are now being taken as fact. Neoliberal theorists, networks, institutions, and economic structures work together to create a hegemonic constellation that supports certain transnational capitalist interests and blocks attempts at considering alternatives (Bockman, 2007). This is not dissimilar to Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony. Neoliberal ideas have become so enveloping that we seldom even recognise it as an ideology (Monbiot, 2016).

It is possible that the neoliberal way of thinking is now too pervasive to be brought down, but it does not follow that other countries should be pressurized into this way of thinking. Neoliberalism does not offer a superior way of doing things. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that the neoliberal policies implemented by The World Bank and IMF have resulted in deteriorating social and economic conditions in many developing regions. For example, both UNCTAD (1999) and Weisbrot et al (2005) report that, contrary to popular belief, there has been a slower rate of economic growth, greater trade imbalances and reduced progress on social indicators for developing countries in recent years (Siddiqui, 2012). Upon reflection of past neoliberal policies, IMF economists Ostry, Loungani, and Furceri (2016) note that the pursuit of a neoliberal agenda has led to increased inequality, which in turn hurts the level and sustainability of growth. Furthermore in 2013, IMF chief Christine Lagarde admitted that the IMF failed to foresee the damage that austerity policies would do, particularly in Greece. Despite the problems caused by
neoliberal polices, international institutions continue to impose neoliberal ideas on developing countries. Loewenstein (2013) argues that residents of Haiti continue to suffer due to aggressive, Washington-based, pro-business policies that have alienated workers, slashed wages and cemented permanent poverty: “The neo-liberal, exploitative economic model currently being imposed on the nation has failed many times before and leaves millions of citizens in a state of despair and daily desperation”. According to Harvey (2005), part of the genius of neoliberal theory is its ability to present ‘a benevolent mask full of wonderful-sounding words like freedom, liberty, choice, and rights’ which hide the grim realities beneath (p. 119 Hardin, 2012). Rather than pushing neoliberal ideology on developing countries and accommodating its theories to suit global trends, neoliberal advocates would be better served testing the core assumptions of neoliberalism. It is these flawed assumptions at the root of neoliberalism where the seeds of its downfall can be seen.

This essay argues that neoliberalism does not provide the best overall welfare for society and that neoliberal theories do not offer an ideal which newly developing states should strive to pursue. This essay has attempted to show why neoliberalism should not be allowed to continue unquestioned. It is merely an ideological and political project rather than fact. Its theories rest on inaccurate assumptions and the principles associated with neoliberalism have been shown to produce detrimental consequences for economies, individuals and communities. The assumptions are the seeds, the flaws are numerous and constantly growing as theory interjects with reality and an inevitable downfall is on the horizon.
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The veil and its disproportionate symbolic significance both within and outside Muslim communities has led to heated debates on how it should be considered in domestic and foreign policy. Today the veil takes many physical forms—ranging from the hijab to the chador to the burqa—and has varying personal, cultural and religious connotations across the Muslim world. Although the veil is linked with the spread of the Muslim faith, the veil has its origins in ancient, pre-Islamic Indo-European cultures - the first reference to veiling dating to a 13 B.C. Assyrian text, its usage denoting high social status (Hoodfar, 2003). For some, observing the veil is an expression of female agency and empowerment, and is valued as a symbol of choice, religious devotion, modesty, and solidarity with Muslim sisters worldwide (Wadud, 2006). However, the veil can also be utilised as a patriarchal vehicle of subjugation—especially when imposed on women. On the international stage, the veil has even been used as a justification for war, most notably by the U.S. in its invasion of Afghanistan to liberate the burqa-clad Afghani women.

In this essay, we will explore Afghanistan, Iran, and France’s respective laws on compulsory veiling and unveiling, through which women have become instruments of the state, the objects and victims in political power plays. Regardless of the state’s intentions in subjecting women to bodily and behavioural control—whether these policies are in the “name of the nation, in the name of liberation and progress, or in the name of God”—women simultaneously become “captive to the structures and ideologies of patriarchy” (Joseph, 2000, p. 6-7). Through exploring the complexities of different political perspectives on the veil in these countries, I will argue that forced veiling and unveiling alike are forms of patriarchal control over women’s bodies, and I advocate for each individual woman to be allowed to decide for herself whether or not she observes the veil, free from government interference.

**Forced veiling**

Islamists in Iran and Afghanistan have sought to impose the veil on their countries’ female population, grounding their rationale in Islamic doctrine and traditional cultural practices. For the purposes of this essay, Islamists will be defined as those who advocate for, or support, Islamic militancy or fundamentalism. They justify these policies even though the four
main legal schools of Islamic jurisprudence agree that the veil falls into the category of appropriate Islamic behaviour (*wajib* and *abad*) rather than legally required conduct (*fard*) (Center for European Studies, 2018). Mandatory veiling can be considered an attempt to impose one interpretation of Muslim female morality, whose main components are “segregation and quiet domesticity; modest comportment, indeed, invisibility through veiling” (Stowasser, 1994, p. 118). The veil objectifies women as possessions of men when forced upon them, its primary function being to “keep that which symbolizes the private realm—that is, woman and anything associated with her—hidden. In fact, the veil can readily be compared to a portable wall, a strategic mobile segregation” (Farzaneh, 2008, p. 21). Milani Farzaneh notes that similar to the concept of controlling the hymen, the veil “reasserts men’s control over the gateway to women’s bodies”, an expression of a male-dominated society (Farzaneh, 2008, p. 23).

In seeking to institutionalise traditional gender roles and assign women the status of second class citizens, the obligatory veil can be considered a symbol of a larger pattern of control over women’s bodies (Carr, 2016, p. 49). The imposition of the veil often stems from “the belief that the chaste behaviour of women represents the moral fibre of society, that women are the repositories of a society’s mores”—and the resulting need to exert control over it (Shaheed, 1986, p. 224). As feminist scholars Leila Ahmed and Pardis Mahdawi note, “women have been symbols of culture, values, and morality in many Muslim societies, and therefore they have been the subject of struggles for control and authority by men who seek power over the very aspects of society that women represent” (Mahdavi, 2009, p. 7). As a result, forces seeking to establish power and legitimacy have politicized the bodies of women—and consequently the veil—to fulfil their agendas. Ruling Islamists in Iran after the 1979 Revolution gained moral legitimacy and popular support by “pointing out the dangers of women’s bodies and sexualities and painting women’s sexualized bodies as a threat to the productivity of men and by extension society” (Mahdavi, 2009, p. 7). The veil had become a symbol of opposition, nationalist pride, a political statement: a rejection of the Shah and western domination. The new Islamic Republic of Iran inserted regulations on women’s bodies, interactions, activities, and behaviours into national law—including compulsory veiling for all women in April 1983 (Farzaneh, 2008). The Ayatollah justified this policy by maintaining that the veil supports women’s welfare and helps them reach their full potential by facilitating their access to social institutions without having to fear sexual objectification. Although the Ayatollah had hoped to avoid making “woman an object, a puppet in the hands of men”, it arguably does the
opposite (Farzaneh, 2008, p. 38). As Islamic feminist scholar Amina Wadud acutely notes, in this way the veil forces women to “assume the responsibility of curtailing male temptation... If men respected women as equal human beings and not as objects of their sexual fantasies, then even a naked woman should be safe from male abuse” (Wadud, 2006, p. 220). Likewise, in Afghanistan, women have become markers of political goals and cultural identity during periods of transformation and contestation. The Taraki regime, which sought to extend equal rights to women, end exploitation in the economic sphere and outlaw traditional cultural practices such as forced marriage, is a stark contrast to the later Taliban, who subscribed to an “orthodox brand of Islam, one that opposed education for girls and employment for women and that called for compulsory, and very heavy, veiling” (Moghadam, 2003, p. 265). Afghan women have evidently been linked “either to modernization and progress or to cultural rejuvenation and religious orthodoxy” (Moghadam, 2003, p. 271).

The compulsory veil has been used as a tool of repression by government actors who utilize “Islam to justify a well-orchestrated move to deprive all women of their rights” for conservative political purposes (Shaheed, 1986, p. 224). However, these traditionalist voices in Muslim countries have failed in their quest to relegate women to the private sphere, as many women from these communities have organized among themselves, advocating for their rights and refusing to be silent. In Iran, for example, “women are neither eliminated from communal life nor relegated to the domain of the private. They are voiced and ever so present in the public scene”; the One Million Signatures campaign demonstrates how “veiled/silent/absent” is no longer applicable to modern women (Farzaneh, 2008, p. 380). Within this context, the imposed veil in itself is not women’s greatest issue, but rather what it represents: a patriarchal structure which invokes male interpretations of Islamic doctrine to justify characterizing a male-dominated social and political system as divinely instituted, and subjects women to unequal rights in varying degrees across Muslim countries. Women’s movements across the Muslim world have fought against their de facto and de jure second class status, which is demonstrated by discriminatory personal status codes and citizenship laws, marriage and family laws that include permit practices of polygyny and unilateral repudiation rights for men, and limit women’s divorce, child custody, and property rights (Fazaeli, 2017). They have also pointed to repressive cultural practices which hinder access to education, health care, the economic marketplace, and political decision-making as sources of oppression (Moghadam, 2003). Women’s rights activists have clamoured for the right to be heard by their governments, and to be given the chance to “challenge publicly the androcentric ‘Muslim’ ideology.
that pervades Islamic institutions” which has historically been denied them (Farzaneh, 2008, p. 43).

**Forced unveiling**

Liberal voices in both Muslim-majority countries and in the West have sought to forcibly unveil women as a mechanism of ‘liberating’ them (Najmabadi, 2006). The unveiled woman has been used as a political symbol for leaders of Middle Eastern nations seeking to demonstrate their modernity and alliance with the West. Nationalist reformers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, such as Ataturk in Turkey, the Baathist of Iraq, Reza Shah in Iran, and Qasim Amin in Egypt, all believed that “it was in the interests of the ‘nation’ to educate women, to recruit them into the labour market, to transform their dress-wear and symbolically integrate them into the political process as emblems of modernity” (Joseph, 2000, p. 6). In Iran, Reza Shah ordered mass unveiling on January 7, 1936 to emancipate women. He viewed “women’s backward status and especially their veiling as a major obstacle in its drive toward modernization” (Farzaneh, 2008, p. 33). Depending on one’s political inclinations, this historic moment is remembered as either the day of women’s emancipation or as a day of shame “in which allegedly corrupt Western values and norms were imposed forcefully and brutally upon Muslim women” (Farzaneh, 2008, p. 34). Although unveiling encouraged positive changes such as a greater participation in the public sector and an increase in literacy and employment, the Shah’s forcible unveiling simultaneously “inflicted pain and terror upon those women who were not willing or ready to unveil. To them, the veil was a source of respect, virtue, protection, and pride”, as well as honour (Farzaneh, 2008, p. 35). Milani Farzaneh describes how some Iranian women undermined the veil ban by taking extreme measures to avoid compliance, including refusing to go out in public, divorcing husbands whose jobs required their attendance at public functions, and even fleeing the country (Farzaneh, 2008, p. 35).

The debate on the veil has returned to the centre-stage in national conversations in recent years. France became the first European country to legislate against Islamic head coverings with its March 2004 law banning conspicuous religious symbols in public schools in order to uphold the French Republic’s principle of laïcité, or secularism (BBC, 2017). Although the March 2004 law does not specifically reference any particular religious symbol, it affects the two most historically oppressed confessional minorities in France—Muslims and Jews, who both have externally conspicuous symbols of religious devotion (unlike Christians). France’s ban of religious attire in public schools
has been criticised by its opponents as a form of discrimination masquerading as equality (Singh, 2004). Feminist scholar Afsaneh Najmabadi applies Wendy Brown’s work to France’s anti-veiling laws in schools: these transnational minority populations—Jews in the twentieth century, now Muslims in the twenty-first century—have come to constitute the “radical Other to liberalism”. They represent the “enemy within’ civilization as well as civilization’s external enemy” and therefore constitute a threat to the ideals of the nation (Najmabadi, 2006, p. 241). For the French government, “the head scarf is a tangible sign of intolerable difference... It stands for everything that is thought to be wrong with Islam”, including the supposed “degradation of female sexuality and subordination of women” (Najmabadi, 2006, p. 224). In addition to espousing a singular vision of the French population, the ban further contributes to the social exclusion of French Muslims and aggravates the tensions that divide French society. Although forced unveiling in public schools may not be entirely comparable with the actions of the Islamic Republic of Iran or by the Taliban, by determining how women may or may not dress and associating or disassociating French identity with this dress code, it could be argued that the French government too has politicised women’s bodies and indicated its preoccupation with them.

In dismissing positive views on the veil and ignoring the possibility that the veil can also be an expression of agency and emancipation for female Muslims, this French law acts upon the presuppositions that women are unable to make their own choices and therefore the state needs to assist them to resist intense familial or societal pressure to observe the headscarf. This essay is in concurrence with the mass of contemporary scholarship which argues that the French state functions as a paternalistic actor by controlling Muslim women’s behaviours and dress in order to ‘protect’ her from her religious community and making this deeply personal decision for her. It is a harmful stereotype to presume that the Muslim woman is not an autonomous entity, that she is automatically an oppressed victim of patriarchal practices by virtue of being Muslim (Najmabadi, 2006, p. 242). The French interpretation of the veil often ignores the voices and individual choices of Muslim women themselves. It infantilizes their points of view “as if they are mere objects of the contestation between men of state and men of religion, their headscarves but a transparent and ahistorical sign of a threat to secularism” (Najmabadi, 2006, p. 252).

**Conclusion**

As seen through the above analysis of state policy and practices in Afghanistan, Iran, and France, the veil has acquired various meanings
ranging from piety, honour, dignity, femininity, and national pride to oppression, patriarchy, and a threat to secularism. Regardless of whether one believes the veil is a tool of liberation or a symbol of oppression, it is evident that efforts to impose or prohibit the veil for political intents have generally proven to be unsuccessful in their latent purpose—and should therefore be considered fruitless (Farzaneh, 2008). As demonstrated by Iran’s compulsory unveiling in 1936 and forced veiling of 1983, although “authorities in both cases managed to coerce women to unveil or veil themselves in public... they failed to suddenly revolutionize women’s beliefs or to alter the underlying social structure according to their intentions... the gestures, behaviours, and worldviews attached to years of wearing or not wearing cannot be so transformed so easily and overnight” (Farzaneh, 2008, p. 45). Just as imposed veiling does not automatically segregate women from the political sphere, forced unveiling does not eradicate underlying social problems, and may even serve to exacerbate them. When liberal, Western governments are debating how best to govern Muslim minority populations within their own borders and how to shape foreign policy interactions with Muslim communities abroad, it should be understood that a simplistic focus on the veil alone ignores more complex problems and pressing issues within patriarchal societies.
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Introduction

Interactive service work, the direct face-to-face or voice-to-voice provision of a service from worker to customer, has become not only a leading market force in post-industrial economies, but also the dominant means by which emotional labour is provided in the public sphere (Leidner, 1993). As predicted by Braverman in his 1974 work Labour and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century, the marketisation of social relations has resulted in commercial mediation of not only tangible and service needs, but also of emotional ones. Yet, as emotionality fails to fit neatly into the home/work divide arising from industrialisation, states, corporations and organisations largely neglect its central role in service delivery (Guy and Newman, 2004). Despite this, Fineman (2000) describes emotionality as not merely a key component of, but central to, the functioning of any organisation. This article aims to explore the complexities, consequences, and nuance of workplace emotion management. In doing so, Hochschild’s (1983) seminal work, The Managed Heart, will first be outlined and evaluated, its limitations highlighted by means of discussing alternative forms of emotion management, as theorised by Bolton (2005). In order to establish the salience of emotional labour, along with its negative effects, impact on hiring and disciplinary practices, and division along gendered lines, the results of a number of empirical studies will be reviewed. Means of negating the negative effects of workplace emotion management, such as employee autonomy, ‘bounded emotionality’ (Putnam and Mumby, 1993), and ‘communities of coping’ (Korczynski, 2003) will also be critically discussed, with particular attention drawn to their limitations and inapplicability to all interactive service workers (ISWs). To conclude, the homogeneous category of ‘women’ often employed in discussions of emotionality will be problematised, following feminist writers of colour such as Kimberlé Crenshaw (1991), bell hooks (1984) and Lelia Ahmed (1992) who, in their work, have noted that, when an intersectional approach to research, policy and history is neglected, the resulting discourse serves to privilege the White woman’s experience, further silencing marginalised women. While class is another important factor in the study of interactive service work, its discussion is considered to be beyond the scope of this article.
Hoschild’s *The Managed Heart* and its limitations

Until the 1983 publication of Arlie Russel Hochschild’s *The Managed Heart*, emotionality, in the contexts of both home and work, was largely understudied, due in no small part to its naturalisation in all areas of life, and its social construction as natural to the female disposition. Drawing on Goffman’s (1956) *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* and Marx’s theory of alienation, Hochschild’s (1983) foundational study of emotion management distinguishes between two forms of emotionality: emotion work and emotional labour. While the author describes emotion work as the product of socialisation, and confined to the private sphere, involving the self and one’s family, friends and partner, she argues that private service industry capitalises on a worker’s emotionality in the interest of increasing profit, forcing ISWs to perform emotional labour. Hochschild argues that it is this profit motive which makes capitalist emotional labour, exemplified by her study of air hostesses, fundamentally different from other forms of workplace emotionality, such as those displayed by nurses, as the latter are not forced to work in accordance with the logics of capitalism. In the interest of profit generation, emotional labour forces ISWs to go beyond surface performances and employ ‘deep acting’, ordinarily confined to private relationships. Deep acting involves ISWs’ evocation of genuine emotions, enacting a convincing emotional performance, and thus eliciting the desired emotional response in the customer. A profit motive, teamed with training and surveillance by management, transforms everyday ‘emotion work’ to commercialised ‘emotional labour’. Hochschild argues that this shift causes a ‘transmutation’ of feeling, hazardous to the wellbeing of ISWs, triggering alienation from true feelings, inauthenticity, emotional burnout, and stunted intimate relationships in private life. According to Hochschild, emotional labour is highly gendered, with skills generally viewed as innately female. By means of their naturalisation, emotion management techniques are not considered to require any ‘real’ work; rather, emotional competencies are considered a matter of personality and femininity. Unlike masculinised personality-based skills, such as leadership, which are rewarded in the workplace, professions involving high rates of emotional labour are both underpaid and socially undervalued.

Discussed further on, critics see this theory’s commercial focus as limiting (Bolton, 2005; Wouters, 1989); however, capitalist influence is particularly relevant to the luxury-orientated service industry (Bosch and Lehndorff, 2004), with patriarchy alone failing to explain the phenomenon of emotional labour (Taylor and Tyler, 2000). Indeed, Hoschild’s writings have provided the foundation for the sociological examination of workplace...
emotionality. As central to service delivery and thus “fair game” for employers (Leidner, 1993:215), ISWs’ emotions are frequently “harnessed” and socialised towards company loyalty, ensuring efficiency (Bolton, 2000:47), and profit generation (Bolton and Boyd, 2003; Martin et al., 2000). Flight attendants’ customer service training is as comprehensive as that of safety, and prioritised over personal wellbeing (Boyd and Bain, 1998), reflecting a standardisation of speech, appearance, and emotional responses that simultaneously encourages suppression of felt emotions and ‘natural’ display of those that are sanctioned (Bryman, 2009; Cameron, 2000; Korczynski, 2003, Sutton, 1991). The insidiousness of emotional labour described by Hochschild is evident in McDonald’s active manipulation of ISWs’ emotions, encroaching into their employees’ private sphere. This saw employees advised to “get away from [people] who are giving you a hard time” in their private lives, customers constructed as ‘guests’ to encouraging natural deferential politeness, and ‘being yourself’ defined not as individuality, but fluidity of performance (Leidner, 1993:113). In line with capitalist norms which see workers coerced rather than forced into accept company regulations (Burawoy, 1979), ISWs are acutely aware of the association between pay and customer satisfaction (Leidner, 1993; Taylor and Tyler, 2000) and the risk of dismissal for women who fail to comply with unwritten company emotion rules (Pierce, 1996).

While Hoschild’s theory has provided the foundation for studies of workplace emotion management, her definition of ‘emotional labour’ has proven too narrow when utilised in later research. As such, other academics have expanded the definition of ‘emotional labour’ to incorporate both public and private industry, to remove the requirement for active manipulation of feelings by management, thus accounting for self-regulation, and to argue that workplace emotions do not need to be genuinely felt in order for ISWs to enact a convincing emotional display (Ashforth and Humphrey, 1993; Leidner, 1996; Wharton, 1999). Furthermore, Hochschild’s dichotomous construction of a true private and false public self-ignores how women’s emotional labour reflects gendered care roles in the home (Wharton, 1999), thus creating “perfect company robots”, emotionally distant from their customers (Wouters, 1989:99). Constructing the personal as the only space for true autonomy disregards the oppressive family structures within which many women live (Wouters, 1989), and depicts ISWs as “emotionally crippled actors”, problematic in assuming company dedication and lack of autonomy (Bolton and Boyd, 2003:290). Instead, viewing ISWs as owners of their means of production allows their reconstruction as “skilled emotion managers” who control whether the performance is sincere or cynical; deftly juggling job demands

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and deciding the nature and extent of their emotional performance (Bolton and Boyd, 2003:289), with ultimate responsibility for the success of the service interaction (Gatta et al., 2009). Indeed, debt collectors often abandoned scripts, evoking anger or irritation to achieve the “cold and harsh” approach required to secure payments (Sutton, 1991:261), and emotions of male employees and rude customers can be managed by female bookmakers’ sexuality (Filby, 1992). Such autonomy in emotional performance and investment protects ISWs from Hochschild’s theorised emotional alienation (Bolton and Boyd, 2003; Lewis, 2005; Mann, 1999; Sharma and Black, 2001; Wharton, 1996).

**Beyond Hoschild: Bolton’s typologies of emotion management**

Critiques, along with the vague, broad-ranging “bandwagon” application of Hochschild’s theory, led Bolton (2005:53) to develop a more complex framework for understanding workplace emotion management. In line with Goffman’s (1956) theorisation of multiple ‘selves’, enacted depending on the social situation, Bolton identifies four types of emotion management: presentational, pecuniary, philanthropic and prescriptive; drawn on by ISWs as appropriate. Presentational and pecuniary emotion management correlate loosely to Hochschild’s theories of emotion work and emotional labour. Philanthropic goes beyond the private sphere of Hochschild’s ‘gift exchange’ to incorporate ISWs giving a “little extra” (Bolton and Boyd, 2003:291), without the expectation of reciprocity or personal gain. Enacting prescriptive emotion management reinforces social or professional status, or complies with unwritten organisational display rules common in the public sector. As autonomous, skilled emotion managers, ISWs can switch between forms of emotion managements relative to the social situation, for example adjusting the call centre script to ‘help’ elderly customers (Callaghan and Thompson, 2002), thus shifting from pecuniary to philanthropic. Contrary to Hochschild, Bolton and Boyd (2003) find movement between emotion management styles facilitates ISWs’ differentiation between real and prescribed emotions.

**The role of the customer in interactive service work**

Bolton (2005) argues that diversity of customer attitude and service contexts necessitates ISWs’ drawing on multiple forms of emotion management, as opposed to solely emotional labour, as claimed by Hochschild. Indeed, operating within an employee-customer-manager “triad”, customers cause ISWs’ roles to be more complex than those of traditional ‘low skilled’ workers, such as car manufacturers (Leidner, 1996:39). When understood as a natural exchange, referring to “this old man...this nice woman” (Korczynski, 2009:75), customer service is a source of pride (Bolton and Houlihan,
2005), contributing to positive identity formation (Forseth, 2005), and often resulting in a “genuine relationship” with regulars (Furman, 1997; Hodson and Sullivan, 1997:280). However, best characterised as “our friend, the enemy” (Benson, 1986), customer relations also cause a great deal of tension, reflected in Williams’ (1987:106-7) flight attendants, for whom “working with people” was an occupational pull factor, while “passenger attitude” correlated strongly with job dissatisfaction. As an “assembly line in the head” (Taylor and Bain, 1999), call centre workers find it difficult to build relationships, or gain satisfaction from customer interactions. A “fetishised embrace” in which customers expect to be “respected” and “valued” by staff, regardless of whether it is earned (Brook, 2009:20), the ‘customer is always right’ aspect of interactive service work invites customers to exercise power over the both the exchange (Korczynski, 2009) and dictation of suitable ISW mood and tone (Bolton and Houlihan, 2005), often raising customer expectations to an unachievable standard (Ashforth and Humphrey, 1993), leaving many ISWs vulnerable and “sort of at [customers’] mercy” (Leidner, 1996:41). As the ‘face’ of the organisation, and thus its customers’ first point of contact, ISWs bear the brunt of “flak” (Korczynski, 2003:64), managing both their own and customers’ emotions in often tense exchanges. Such interactions take a huge toll on ISWs’ emotional wellbeing, with one employee stating:

“Abusive calls are very hard not to take personally. Once or twice I’ve been in tears...Two bad calls can kill a day” (Korczynski, 2003:64).

Customer abuse is particularly prevalent among call centre workers, enabled by technological distance (Korczynski, 2003), and is often highly gendered, with derogatory terms such as “little girl” and “old biddy” employed, and male employees commanding greater respect from customers (Forseth, 2005:454). While many ISWs manage strain using dehumanisation tactics (Mann, 1999), this often serves to further aggravate customers whose volatility arises from their powerlessness within routinised work (Bolton and Houlihan, 2005). The “customer-oriented bureaucracy” forces ISWs to contend with opposing “logics”: cost-time efficiency, and high-quality, customer-focused service provision, resulting in tenuous “contradictory lived experiences” (Korczynski, 2009:78). Scripts, targets and emotion rules imposed by management worsen this situation, creating an “unequal exchange” in which ISWs are emotionally exploited (Bolton, 2005:3,115). Indeed, Harvard clerical officers told to “think of yourself as a trash can”, passively accepting abuse throughout the day which they could “dump” after work (Cobble and Merrill, 2009:164), reveals the extent of routinised self-dehumanisation expected of ISWs. Customers engage
in surveillance, operating as supervisors on management’s behalf (Leidner 1996), and control, using satisfaction reports, an effective means of disciplining and controlling ISWs (Fuller and Smith, 1996). While management market emotion-intensive, high quality customer service as a “win:win:win”, ISWs rarely reap benefits equivalent to those of employers and customers (Korczynski, 2009:86). Despite this, ISWs are quick to blame ‘unreasonable’ or ‘demanding’ customers for the strain under which they are placed, ignoring the role of management, thus becoming vulnerable to increased emotional manipulation (Bolton and Houlihan, 2005; Leidner, 1996).

“All emotion work is not created equal”: gender and sexuality in hiring, managing, and reprimanding interactive service workers

As much emotion management is considered difficult to teach, service industry employers often adapt their hiring techniques to prioritise ‘personality’ over specific job requirements. Having surveyed a range of recruiters from retail outlets, hotels, bars, restaurants, and cafés in Glasgow, Nickson et al. (2004: 22) reported that 99% of interviewers valued social and interpersonal skills, while technical skills were considered important to only 48% (Gatta et al., 2009). Indeed, Korczynski (2003) has found that employers actively recruit workers whose personalities match the style of required emotional labour, whether it be enthusiastic and agreeable (Taylor and Tyler, 2000) or urgent, aggressive and “a bit snide” (Sutton, 1991:255). These hiring practices are highly gendered, with women viewed as better suited to interactive service work (Belt et al., 2002; Bolton and Boyd, 2003), being more “patient”, “caring” and “thoughtful” than men, and with a “higher tolerance” for customer service (Taylor and Tyler, 2000:84-86). Assumed natural, and thus of less value, roles that require emotional labour are poorly paid (Bosch and Lehndorff, 2004; Gatta et al., 2009), and are viewed by some males as emasculating (Lindsay and McQuaid, 2004). Even among ISWs “all emotional labor is not created equal” (Guy and Newman, 2004:292), with female emotion workers both underpaid and undervalued relative to their male counterparts. Women are expected to “play mom” (Guy and Newman, 2004:292), or become a “therapist” for their male superiors (Pierce, 1996:197), creating a “double bind” in which female ISWs are required to either reproduce gendered social norms, thus devaluing their own work, or face social and financial sanctions (Guy and Newman, 2004: 293). Male ISWs consciously construct their work identity in opposition to female colleagues, mirroring masculine identity construction in opposition to the mother, the embodiment of all that is feminine (Chodorow, 1978 in Pierce, 1996). Thus, masculine emotional labour is assertive and self-promoting, using
egocentric language such as “I think”, surface acting as opposed to deep acting, politeness rather than niceness, and selective isolation from female-dominated social groupings (Pierce, 1996:199-200). Workplace gender roles are also largely heteronormative, with lesbian flight attendants pressured by management into heterosexual displays of femininity, and straight males opting to play the “cabin crew queer”, adapting to the feminised role by adopting a ‘feminised’ persona, thus facilitating separation of the public and private self (Taylor and Tyler, 2000:90). Sanctioning of inappropriate emotional responses is also gendered; men are simultaneously expected to “put up” with less abuse from customers and rewarded for weaker emotion management skills if considered a “good seller” (Taylor and Tyler, 2000:85-86). While women were harshly reprimanded for simply not smiling, men only faced such consequences when they “blew up” in anger (Pierce, 1996:198).

Although gendered in their implementation, systems of reward and punishment are common to many ISWs, with raises, warnings, firing, promotion, and demotion used to actively control one’s emotional state (Putnam and Mumby, 1993; Sutton, 1991). Taylor and Tyler (2000) even reported that call centre workers were judged equally on productivity and call quality, with pay directly impacted. As quality control of a tangible end product is not possible, surveillance and socialisation into company norms are an effective means of ensuring high quality emotional labour (MacDonald and Sirianni, 1996; Taylor and Bain, 1999), either mediated through formal behavioural regulations (Korczynski, 2003:64), or codified as ‘attitude’ in workplaces without strict display rules (Eaton, 1996). Sutton’s (1991:261) experience of being interrupted and “scolded” by a co-worker for speaking too kindly to an injured debtor reveals a Foucauldian culture of self-surveillance, in which debt collectors were highly critical of co-workers in breach of prescribed emotions.

**Inauthenticity or a lack of autonomy? The negative effects of interactive service work and their root causes**

Autonomy and role identification greatly impact the ISW’s experience of emotion management, with care workers viewing emotion work as integral to their identity, and thus a source of meaning (Macdonald and Merrill, 2002). However, strong role identification correlates with both feelings of authenticity and high risk of burnout (Ashforth and Humphrey, 1993), and causes increased strain when emotion work is devalued (Benner and Wrubel, 1989). With assumed professionalism granting beauty therapists high levels of autonomy and minimal surveillance, Sharma and Black (2001) find no negative effects of emotional labour, likely due to the fact that emotion management is in the
interest of developing good relations with clients, who will then move with the therapist when setting up her own practice. In contrast, ISWs engaging in large-scale and highly routinised work tend to have little autonomy, with standardised emotion rules stemming from the assumption that ‘low-skilled’ workers are unwilling or unable to perform such work independently (Leidner, 1993). Nevertheless, Leidner (1993) found that the extent to which such standardisation could be enforced varied greatly depending on customer and employee preferences. While some resisted emotional control, other workers found scripting and routinisation helpful in dealing with customers. Indeed, restricting autonomy and thus forcing inauthenticity onto ISWs, creating tension between real and displayed emotions, is thought to be more harmful than the performance of emotional labour itself (Ashforth and Humphrey, 1993; Leidner, 1993; Mann, 1999; Rafaeli and Sutton, 1987; Sutton, 1991; Wharton, 1999). Intense emotional displays (Morris and Feldman, 1996) and the cumulative effect of workplace and family emotional labour (Wharton and Erickson, 1995) further increase risk of emotional burnout, with higher levels of emotional dissonance leading to more severe consequences, including identity confusion (Fineman, 2000), increased coronary risk resulting from the release of stress hormone cortisol (Mann, 1999), and cancer development instigated by emotional suppression (Cox and McCay, 1982).

Bounded emotionality: easing the emotional burden?

Taking a feminist approach, Putnam and Mumby’s (1993) theory of ‘bounded emotionality’ combines the concepts of emotional labour and bounded rationality. By centralising emotions in workplace management, and with authentic emotions and the true self expressed at work without interference by management, space is created for contradictory emotions. Divorced from profit, feeling rules should facilitate emotional understanding of the self and others, creating a close-knit workplace community, and easing emotional tensions that would otherwise cause alienation. Its implementation at The Body Shop (Martin et al., 1998, 2000), however, revealed conflict between profit and the company’s ‘feminine principles’ of love, care, and intuition, with capital winning out. ISWs deprived of time with their family were refused a reduction in working hours, yet counselling and childcare were provided. In aggressively avoiding traditional bureaucracy, ISWs were actually forced to enact “extreme forms of emotion” management (Martin et al., 2000:124), at times crying in order to secure sales. The company’s founder stated: “we always tried to break [employees’] hearts” (Martin et al., 1998:451) by showing emotive videos to promote the store’s charitable cause. While a tight-knit community of passionate and emotionally intimate workers was existed, ISWs were often
compelled by colleagues to be more emotionally expressive, by means of either casual jest or formal sanctions; such profit-orientated emotional management harking back to Hochschild’s commercialisation of feeling.

**Strategies of resistance and ‘communities of coping’**

Nevertheless, drawing on bounded emotionality’s communalism, Korczynski (2009:58) explores how informal ‘communities of coping’ simultaneously provide a means through which employees can deal with the pains of interactive service work, and maintain the workplace’s “fragile social order”, thus reducing staff turnover and stifling management’s control over ISWs. Support networks have also facilitated unionisation among Harvard clerical officers (Cobble and Merrill, 2009), and established one-to-one, private, reciprocal support between nurses who must otherwise tightly control emotional performance in the interest of maintaining professional status (Lewis, 2005), refuting Hochschild’s contention that emotional labour inhibits development of meaningful private relationships. The creation of these “unmanaged spaces” allows for “moment of truth” (Bolton, 2005:102), facilitating autonomy (Korczynski, 2009) and humour (Bolton and Boyd, 2003; Sutton, 1991), thus creating space for alleviation of work pressure and resistance of display rules (Ashforth and Humphrey, 1993; Leidner, 1993; MacDonald and Sirianni, 1996; Sutton, 1991; Taylor and Tyler, 2000). Such communities do not, however, protect junior female employees from being required to perform emotional labour for “internal customers” (Guy and Newman, 2004:292), such as attorneys whose egos were massaged, and confidence boosted by female paralegals’ coerced “deference and caretaking” (Pierce, 1996:192).

**‘Women’ and service work: unpacking the homogeneity of gender**

Reconceptualisation of “skilled work” (Gatta et al., 2009), unionisation (Cobble and Merrill, 2009), professionalisation of care work (Macdonald and Merrill, 2002), and regulation of emotional labour (Mann, 1999) could go some way in alleviating negative consequences of emotional labour. However, to prevent marginalised women from being silenced, the female experience of emotional labour cannot be viewed as homogeneous (Gatta et al., 2009). As both slaves and domestic workers, ethnic-racial women have enabled the personal and professional development of middle-class White women (Tronto, 2002). Today, White women dominate interactive service work as the sector’s ‘public face’, while ethnic-racial women are confined to lower-paid, lower-status backroom roles (Nakano Glenn, 1996; Sherman, 2007). The growing distinction between reproductive labour (cooking, cleaning) and nurturance
(interactive care), along with the professionalization of care work, is thought by Duffy (2005) to risk further devaluing and concealing the experiences of ethnic-racial women. Indeed, the term ‘ethnic-racial women’ it itself problematic, with Black, Hispanic, and Asian/Pacific women experiencing varying levels of overrepresentation in nonnurturant care relative to White women (Duffy, 2005:77), and Black and Latina women more likely than White and Asian women to lack autonomy in workplace emotion management (MacDonald and Merrill, 2009).

Such findings are again complicated by role- and context-specific “ethnic and gender ‘logics’” (MacDonald and Merrill, 2009:125), assumptions of customer preference and employee behaviour which influence hiring practices and reify cultural stereotypes. Regarding interactive service work, application of such logics requires us to move away from generalisations, instead of studying the challenges faced by individual ISWs relative to their context-specific experience as a raced, gendered, classed social actor. For example, while it has been stated that ethnic-racial women are often confined to the backroom roles of reproductive labour, in her examination of the Western care industry, Rhacel Salazar Parreñas (2009) discusses the sector’s overrepresentation of South-East Asian women. While it is true that White Western nannies and carers are losing out to migrant workers, this is a direct result of the logics of the Western care industry. Parreñas found that Western mothers considered migrant women, particularly Filipina workers, to have a ‘natural’, ethno-racial disposition to nurturance, a constructed logic which sparked demand for South-East Asian care workers. These women migrate in increasing numbers in order to fulfil the “care gap” created by a rise in Western female employment, with their own daughters left behind to care for siblings, resulting in the creation of “global care chains” (Parreñas, 2009: 136). While Parreñas found that many migrant nannies did indeed form strong bonds with their charges, this was not, as Western mothers often assume, a product of their more ‘authentic’ and ‘community-based’ cultures. Rather, Parreñas (2009: 139) argues that these migrant women simply impart the love they cannot express for their own children onto those they care for. This could be viewed as a version of Hochschild’s (1983) transmutation of feelings, albeit not as a result of active emotional manipulation for profit, but rather the expression of otherwise repressed ‘true’ emotions.

In discussing the homogeneous category of ‘women’ in the discourse of interactive service work, we risk silencing these women who are torn away from their families as a result of Western societies’ inability to reconcile
female employment and care work through state policy and adequate welfare provision. Furthermore, while familiar with the broader societal consequences of adhering to gender logics in hiring and workplace practices, the risks of accepting racial-ethnic logics, and reification of cultural stereotypes, is rarely discussed. Indeed, Parreñas (2009: 140) found that the assumed docility of South-East Asian women to which Western employers were attracted also resulted in their exploitation, with these women often housed in poor conditions, underpaid, overworked, or even beaten and sexually assaulted. Yet, again drawing on the cultural logic of docility, many Westerners argued that their nannies did not mind being underpaid, as it was more than they would earn in their native country, or being overworked, as they ‘genuinely’ enjoyed spending time with children. The fact that nannies’ compliance often stemmed from the precariousness of their work situation, and a resulting fear of unemployment, homelessness, and deportation, failed to cross most Western women’s minds (Parreñas, 2009: 139).

Conclusion

The aim of the above discussion has been to explore the complexity of emotionality in interactive service work, and to reinforce the paramount importance of the adoption of an intersectional approach to its study. In outlining theories of emotionality put forward by Hoschild (1983), Bolton (2005), Korczynski (2003), and Putnam and Mumby (1993), and critically analysing their application to empirical research, limitations of each approach were highlighted, with gendered disparities in the hiring, management and sanctioning of emotionality emerging as a common theme. Consideration of the roles played by worker autonomy, along with that of the customer, allowed for greater nuance in examining the differing lived experiences of ISWs in a variety of occupations. Despite a wealth of literature identifying ‘women’ or ‘female employees’ as the primary victim of interactive service work, this article has attempted to problematise the study of ‘women’ as a homogeneous categorisation. Following feminist scholars of colour, an intersectional approach was adopted whereby the experiences of ethnic-racial women were contrasted with dominant narratives of interactive service work, reflecting experiences of White women, with variation within the ‘racial-ethnic’ categorisation also noted. In augmenting the argument for more serious consideration of the consequences of adherence to racial ‘logics’ in the service industry, evidence from Parreñas’ study of migrant care workers was put forward in order to bring into sharp relief the complicity of (White) Western women in global female oppression. Going forward, it is imperative that in-depth, context-specific qualitative studies, such as that of Parreñas, complement large-scale
quantitative research which too often serves to whitewash the narratives of marginalised women.
Bibliography


Introduction

When Kanye released his latest album, The Life of Pablo (2016), he painted a picture of a man defined by the internet, as reflected in his ‘Saint Pablo’ lyrics: “Checkin’ Instagram comments to crowdsource my self-esteem”. In outlining modern hip hop’s mediation through the internet, this article will argue that the effects of social media and web-based platforms are not exclusive to Kanye, but are felt by most of the fans and artists involved in today’s hip hop subculture. According to Morozov (2012), when discussing new media there is a tendency for authors to either take an overly optimistic ‘cyber-utopian’ view, or an overly pessimistic ‘cyber-dystopian’ view. Keeping this in mind, both optimistic and pessimistic interpretations of each topic I breach will be considered, in an attempt to maintain balance. First the historical background of hip hop as a subculture will be contextualised in the broader sociological theories of subcultures. In the second section, I will discuss the online hip hop producer, specifically the use of free streaming websites such as SoundCloud by underground rap artists to form a fan base, and question whether this is a direct extension of mixtape culture (Ball, 2011), or rather an exploitation of artists’ creative labour (Hesmondhalgh, 2010; Morozov, 2016). Thirdly, the online rap consumer will be examined through the lens of two prominent platforms: the reddit hip hop forum ‘www.reddit.com/r/hiphopheads’, and ‘rapgenius.com’, a website that provides user-generated annotations to rap lyrics. Regarding hip hop forums I will argue that that, although empirical data on this topic is sparse, these forums mainly consist of white listeners. Considering hip hop exists as a primarily black art form, I will evaluate whether such forums increase the inclusivity of hip hop and allow emancipatory messages to reach a wider audience, or whether they serve as spaces in which white hip hoppers can perform what Nakamura (2007) terms ‘identity tourism’, in which case the forum may dilute hip hop’s countercultural power. Similarly, interpretations of RapGenius as either a source of subcultural capital and an ‘archive of Black cultural memory’ (Bradley, 2014), or an area in which the countercultural elements of hip hop are sublated into capitalism will be debated, noting also the potential for ‘translating’ rap lyrics to be understood as inherently racist (Sargent, 2012).
Subcultures and the historical context of hip hop

Before analysing the impact of the internet on hip hop, it is important to first contextualise subcultures in general, and hip hop in particular, within wider sociological theory. A subculture is a small ‘niche’ of people within a society who reject the values of mainstream culture and adopt new values (Hebdige, 1979). Hebdige argues that, as a subculture is made up of those who reject mainstream culture out of a sense of anomie, they are inherently countercultural. However, using the example of punk in the UK, he shows that countercultural subcultures will, in his opinion, inevitably become assimilated into mainstream culture and therefore lose their countercultural power. Other theorists like Sarah Thornton (1997) argue that this is overly optimistic. Subcultures, she argues, are simply ways for people to understand themselves in relation to their parent culture, or other groups in society, and to assert their identity as more than an ‘anonymous’ member of society. Therefore, a subculture does not need to be political, and can simply be an expression of shared taste.

What, then, makes hip hop a political subculture, besides the obvious political messages contained in much of its music? Most simply, it is political in that it involves valuing the most devalued minority in American culture – black, poor Americans. As Crenshaw (1991) argues, even when artists like 2 Live Crew are releasing so-called ‘porn rap’ (which Crenshaw admits is undoubtedly misogynist), they are doing so as part of a tradition of rejecting the racist stereotype of black male sexuality as a threat to white women and therefore as an excuse for anti-black violence, most famously evidenced by the murder of Emmet Till. Secondly, as Mason (2006) shows, the ‘For Us, By Us’ nature of hip hop allowed those in disenfranchised communities to create a culture that was not built upon their rejection, and to create economic, social and cultural capital from which they could benefit. It is by nature of its function as a black art form, as opposed to the political messages contained within it, that hip hop can be considered inherently countercultural.

SoundCloud and the online rap artist

Historically, the mixtape has been a major part of hip hop culture. A mixtape is a collection of songs put together using ‘samples’ from other songs, which are often used without permission. As this makes mixtapes illegal to sell, they were traditionally distributed for free or sold very cheaply on the street (Ball, 2011). The purpose of mixtapes is complex. For some, it is a way of building a fan base in the hopes of making money from hip hop (Mason, 2008). For others, it represents the emancipatory nature of hip hop, since it
allows artists to create art outside the influence of capitalist pressures (Ball, 2011). With technological development and widespread use of the internet, the method of distributing free music has changed dramatically in a number of ways, two of which I will discuss here. First, websites such as SoundCloud allow artists to create global fan bases from their own rooms, thus continuing ‘mixtape culture’ and allowing hip hop to continue to evolve. However, following academics such as Hesmondhalgh (2010) and Morozov (2016), it can also be argued that, except for the few who are signed to major labels, artists are having their labour exploited for free.

While SoundCloud is not the only online platform on which musicians can distribute their music for free, it is one of the biggest, with approximately 175 million unique listeners per year and around 12 hours of audio uploaded every minute (Walker, 2015). Registered users can upload up to 180 minutes of audio for free, and listen to an unlimited amount of audio. To upload more music and gain access to statistics on their listeners, users can choose to pay between six and nine euro. Established artists such as Chance the Rapper (Wang, 2017), as well as a rising subgenre of ‘SoundCloud rappers’ (Holmes, 2017), upload all or most of their music to this platform. This means that they are not being paid for their music in the traditional sense. Rather, some artists like Chance the Rapper make money from selling merchandise, touring, and other ventures. Other artists use services like SoundCloud to create a fan base before signing to a major label and going on to sell their music. As such, there are two ways to understand SoundCloud’s place in hip hop subculture. The first is as a tool through which artists create and demonstrate ‘subcultural capital’ (Thornton, 1997) in order to convert it to economic, social, and political capital. Subcultural capital is a re-interpretation of Bourdieu’s (1986) theory of cultural capital. While cultural capital is any cultural asset valued by mainstream society which can be instrumentalised for social mobility, subcultural capital is any cultural asset valued by a specific subculture that can be instrumentalised for value only within the subculture (Thornton, 1997). For example, while a third-level degree is valued socially, and as such can be considered cultural capital, knowledge about hip hop is only valuable within the context of hip hop subculture. This in no way implies that subcultural capital can’t be instrumentalised for economic or social capital and social mobility, but rather implies that subcultural capital only has inherent value for those within the subculture.

In their mixed methods study of electronic music subcultures on SoundCloud, Allington et al. (2015) argue that the purpose of SoundCloud is
very similar to the purpose of music distribution in general - valuing. This, they explain, is an individual-level process of reifying the cultural (or more accurately subcultural) value of certain semiotic forms to create capital of different forms. However, changing patterns of distribution have affected the processes of valuing. Originally, underground music distribution was limited to the distributor’s physical location. Allington et al. (2015) refer to this as the ‘place’. Art was created and consumed in the ‘place’, and was therefore intrinsically linked to the ‘place’. This is no longer true, as, with large companies like SoundCloud installing servers all over the world, anyone with internet access can download music from anywhere. Using both qualitative interviews and social network analysis, Allington et al. (2015) show that evolving distribution patterns have not caused place to become unimportant in terms of valuing the art, but has allowed the valuing process to happen everywhere. Therefore, the researchers show that, while London Grime is a genre listened to all over the world, it is valued more when made in London. This is also true of hip hop. As many authors show, for a hip hop artist to succeed they must show their authenticity (Cutler, 2003; Hess 2005; Muhammad, 2015). Markers of such authenticity include race (Cutler, 2003), lived experiences of social adversity due to race or class (Hess, 2005), or nuanced knowledge and respect for ‘The Culture’ (Muhammad, 2015; Hess, 2005). These authors show that those within hip hop fear the subculture is being sublated by white capitalist pressures and losing its use as a means of emancipation and societal critique, as was the fate of Jazz and Rock (Hebdige, 1979). Subcultural capital serves as a tool of identification – those who demonstrate the proper capital demonstrate that they are part of, and not a threat to, ‘The Culture’. Essentially, a performer must show their subcultural capital as a marker of their authenticity in order to be valued, if they wish to succeed as an artist. Therefore, although they distribute to people all around the world, the hip hop artist must link themselves with subcultural capital that comes from physical place and race. While this means that, broadly speaking, hip hop still only values those with real-world authenticity, its international consumption via platforms like SoundCloud allows artists to build an audience far beyond the scope of original mixtapes.

However, it is, perhaps, naïve to view the situation with such optimism. Taking a more critical approach, it could be argued that artists’ labour is being exploited. Of course, many prominent artists have succeeded in making money using SoundCloud and other streaming services. Monetisation is available to these artists through advertising or paid streaming. However, the debate over whether paid streaming adequately pays even the most successful
artists is still raging (Marshall, 2015). Furthermore, although SoundCloud allows underground artists to gain a following, there are plenty of artists who never profit either directly or indirectly from the service (Marshall, 2015). Considering around 90% of all audio uploaded to SoundCloud is listened to at least once (Walker, 2015), it could be argued that SoundCloud is making money using art that has been created for free. Despite currently losing money, SoundCloud are likely to change their monetisation practices in the near future to a system that consistently turns a profit (Gifford, 2017), potentially furthering the exploitation of artists who do not hold a stake in company earnings. Indeed, it has previously been argued that we live in a new, digital economy whereby people work for free in exchange for access to a service (Hesmondhalgh, 2010; Morozov, 2016). In the long term this is increasing social inequalities. SoundCloud has inarguably allowed some underground artists to build a fan base and become successful. However, when one considers the exploitation of the majority of SoundCloud ‘creators’ and the resulting inequalities, online distribution cannot be understood as an evolution of the physical mixtape. While the mixtape was inherently countercultural and anti-capitalist (Ball 2011), SoundCloud is a capitalist enterprise. Therefore, the company adheres to and maintains capitalist norms. As Berman (1988, p.118) argues, radical and anti-capitalist thought has a place in capitalism insofar as it can be sold. However, modernity in capitalism is constantly driving for destruction and development. Art under capitalism is inherently doomed to eventually ‘melt’ into bourgeois society. Since the aim of SoundCloud is to sell the labour of the artists rather than promote their message, the message will inevitably be sublated into the mainstream under capitalism.

The online rap consumer - r/hiphopheads and Rap Genius

I will now examine the mediation of hip hop consumption by the internet using two key examples: reddit.com/r/hiphopheads, hereafter referred to as r/hiphopheads, and Rap Genius, recently rebranded as Genius. Despite being the 119th largest subreddit, and the largest subreddit dedicated to any single cultural genre (redditmetrics.com, n.d.), r/hiphopheads are yet to be studied in an academic context. Yet, the inclusivity of this forum warrants its discussion. While some believe inclusivity is at the core of hip hop, others argue that hip hop must be exclusive by nature in order to be political (Muhammad, 2015). Rap Genius is a website providing annotations of song lyrics, primarily hip hop. This process, I argue, can be interpreted as either a tool for the collection of subcultural capital, or as a means through which hip hop is ‘translated’ for the mainstream, raising questions of cultural appropriation and racism.
Before discussing r/hiphopheads, it is important to draw attention to the difficulty of performing social research about online communities. This is a new field, and there is not much literature detailing how to go about it (Kozinets, 2010). The best study on the demographics of reddit was performed by the Pew Research Centre (Barthel et al., 2016). However, only American reddit-users were surveyed. Furthermore, the sample size of only n=268 represents a tiny fraction of reddit’s 261 million unique visitors (alexa.com, n.d.). Finally, this is a study of reddit in general, not r/hiphopheads. There is a user-created survey available (r/hiphopheads, n. d.), but issues of reliability and sampling would ordinarily deem it to be academically invalid. Yet, as the best available information, some conclusions can be drawn from synthesising the results of each survey. Both survey populations are around 70% white non-Hispanic, 10% black, 10% Hispanic and 10% ‘other race’. While Reddit’s ‘total population’ is around 60% male (Barthel et al., 2016), the ‘r/hiphopheads population’ as found by the community is 96.7% male. A pervading hostility towards women in hip hop communities could be one explanation for this disparity (Muhammad 2015, pp.432-438; Crenshaw, 1991).

The above results suggest that, even though hip hop is still largely a black art form (Muhammad, 2015), the majority of its online consumers are white. However, white consumption of black art has been a subject of contention since the 1950s (Hebdige, 1979; Harrison, 2009). In essence, Hebdige’s claim is that white people form subcultures using elements of black culture out of a sense of anomie – a feeling of not being adequately able to express oneself in mainstream culture, and a desire to be ‘outside of society’. This pushes them to identify with those rejected by society. However, despite the closing of a cultural gap that may be the assumed result of such actions, Hebdige shows that white appropriation of black art does not necessarily foster solidarity between young white people and black people. In fact, groups that drew on black culture, such as skinheads, were often responsible for violence against black people. Hebdige further points out that white subcultures are more accepted into the mainstream, and therefore white consumption of black art speeds up its acceptance into the marketplace, diluting its power as a countercultural force.

In applying Hebdige’s findings to r/hiphopheads, one must first consider the argument that the internet is raceless (Christopherson, 2006). Stuart Hall (1996) argues that race is discursively constructed through ‘floating signifiers’ like skin colour. Online, none of these signifiers are immediately visible. However, as Lisa Nakamura (2007) shows, race can be performed online
through use of race-typed signifiers such as African-American Vernacular English (AAVE) (Rickford, 1999), profile pictures, and emojis to name but a few. Unlike in the real world, one can easily ‘perform’ a different race (or identity) online. Nakamura (2007) describes this process as identity tourism. While there are no studies of language use on forums like r/hiphopheads, it is perfectly possibly that online forums like this give white fans the opportunity to perform an identity they cannot perform offline. Concrete conclusions would require further research, such as utilising different statistical software to analyse large datasets such as reddit comments, as explained by Kozinets (2010). This could be take the form of qualitative methods, drawing on the techniques seen in interviews conducted by Cutler (2003) in her study of white ‘hip-hoppers’ use of language, to establish whether r/hiphopheads users adopt racially typed language they wouldn’t use offline. Should it be found that hip hop forums are a place for those without the required subcultural capital to be ‘real’, and freely identify as hiphopheads, associations could be drawn with the divide between the local ‘underground’ and the ‘rap industry’ described by Muhammad (2015, pp.438-441), particularly in his ethnography of ‘Tech Headz’.

**Rap Genius**

In providing annotations to rap lyrics, Rap Genius arguably also facilitates the accumulation of subcultural capital and enactment of identity tourism. While these annotations can take the form of analyses of song meanings, often they simply ‘translate’ terms that would be unintelligible without a certain amount of subcultural capital into ‘easy to understand’ terms. For example, if a rapper were to refer to a line from a different song, the site would link the song the line came from, but also provide an explanation for why the rapper made the reference. There are two possible understandings of this process. The first is that the site acts as a source of subcultural capital. It could be argued that people go to the website to better understand hip hop culture, and therefore gain subcultural capital and become more ‘real’. A positive interpretation of this process could be that the use of the website allows one to better understand and acknowledge the lived experience of black people in America, and thus potentially bring about greater racial equality. This interpretation is largely absent from academic literature, with the exception of Bradley (2014), who argues that Rap Genius is an ‘archive of black cultural memory’, effectively a source of subcultural capital. From an alternative perspective, the ‘translation’ of lyrics on Rap Genius arguably dilutes the countercultural elements of hip hop culture. Furthermore, allowing those in the mainstream to ‘understand’ hip hop and, by extension, ‘black cultural memory’, in a superficial way falls
short of the nuanced understanding necessary for solidarity. In ‘translating’ lyrics from AAVE into ‘standard English’, there is also the implication that AAVE is somehow wrong (Sargent 2012). While the cultural repercussions of appropriating language in the context of online forums have not featured in academia, capitalist services ‘monetizing’ and thereby diluting counterculture is widely criticised, in relation not only to hip hop, but other countercultures as well (Hebdige, 1979; Mason, 2008; Harrison, 2009).

**Conclusion**

In this essay I have discussed how the internet has shaped hip hop consumption in terms of how producers create art and how consumers relate to art and form subcultural capital from the art. Following on from a tradition in discussions of new media of balancing cyber-utopianism with cyber-dystopianism (Morozov, 2012), I have outlined both the benefits and shortcomings of online influences on hip hop as a subculture, and its potential for continued countercultural salience and racial emancipation. Questions of cultural performance on the internet are both new and constantly changing alongside changing media structures. This presents a challenge to any academic study of these concepts, as the often-slow process of social research cannot hope to keep up with the speed of these changes. However, in the case of hip hop, questions of identity tourism, artist exploitation and the growing commodification of hip hop art are politically salient for the reasons I have outlined above. Research in the area will shape our futures and is therefore paramount.
Bibliography


Although it is often seen as an inevitable companion of war, rates of occurrence of rape actually vary wildly between wars, and in many cases even within wars across regions, or over time. Focussing on rape of civilians by rebel and state forces, this essay will explain these differences in the overall levels of rape. Understanding them is important, not only for predicting the danger of rape to civilians in any particular conflict, but even more significantly, for taking steps towards reducing the mechanisms contributing to its frequent occurrence. I argue that the incidence of rape in civil war is determined mostly by the commitment of military leaders to either preventing or encouraging it; and their ability to enforce this commitment, which is largely dependent on group organisation, and tends to be greater in hierarchical, ideological organisations. First, I show that there are often strategic reasons for which armies decide to commit rape, in which case an especially high incidence is expected. However, even in the absence of such motivations there are also structural reasons that make “rape as practice” (Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood, 2006) in war likely. This is why I argue that rape will occur in civil wars to varying degrees unless troops have a good, and (crucially) well-enforced, reason not to commit it. Its frequency will thus depend on (i) leaders’ actions encouraging or preventing rape, which will depend on commanders’ normative values and strategic considerations, and (ii) on how well leaders are able to enforce their commitment, which, drawing on Weinstein’s activist/opportunist distinction, will depend on the army’s organisational structure and its culture. I conclude that both for state forces and rebel troops, rape will occur at the highest rates where it is strategically incentivised, and where the strategic and structural reasons conducive to it are not checked by a clear, strongly enforced top-down commitment to prohibiting it.

First, there are conflicts in which rape is promoted by leaders, at least locally, as a strategic instrument towards their goals. Wood (2012, p.403) categorises these strategic uses into four broad forms of sexual violence: torture against detained civilians to extract an immediate advantage, sexual slavery, terror or punishment against a particular group, or incentive for participation and reward for troops. For example, Goldstein (2001, pp.364) argues that rape is extremely effective at terrorising and humiliating the civilian population,
and cites examples of several Latin American state militaries raping individual women who opposed the regime in an efficient policy to intimidate both the woman and her whole community. Similarly, the Sierra Leone Army strategically abducted women believed to have collaborated with the RUF and held them in detention specifically to sexually abuse them (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Vol.3, Ch.3, para.370). Because of rape’s unique characteristic, being at once polluting and occupying the territory of the nation, it is also an obvious instrument of ethnic cleansing (Goldstein, 2001, p.362-3). In fact, MacKinnon (1994, p.12) called for the widespread rape in Bosnia to be recognised as genocide, since she argues it was used as an official policy of war to “drive a wedge through a community, to shatter a society, to destroy a people”. In such extreme cases of official endorsement of sexual violence as a strategy, especially high rates of it are more likely. However, even in campaigns of ethnic cleansing, rape can be prevented by a commitment of the leadership against it, as will be illustrated by the Sri Lankan example below.

Another instrumental explanation of rape has been advanced by Cohen (2013). She observes that groups who forcibly recruit soldiers through abduction by rebels or press-ganging by the state, show higher rates of rape, and specifically gang rape. From this she goes on to argue that the forced, random recruitment leads to a group of frightened strangers with low social cohesion, who have to be made into loyal members of their new army through extreme socialisation in the form of collective rape. The performative nature of gang rape in front of an audience of other perpetrators is seen as key for military cohesion since it creates a strong sense of bonding among the men. The sense of collective responsibility for violent acts fosters a sense of loyalty to the group, and the performance of abhorrent acts makes it harder for an individual recruit to desert and go back to their normal life (Cohen, 2013b, p.392). However, the mechanism in Cohen’s theory is not quite clear: it could well be that it is not abduction that is the key characteristic leading to increased sexual violence, but rather the military culture in the organisations that do recruit their members through such channels. Forces that resort to abduction will likely not hold very high standards of behaviour for their soldiers, and levels of discipline will probably be lower because individuals have no normative values inspiring them to “be a good soldier to the cause”, and might desert if punished for transgressions. Thus, it might be the nature of the institutional culture in the group that matters, rather than the manner of recruitment directly.

Moreover, even in the absence of strategic rape, there will still be
what Wood (2012, p.394) terms “rape as a practice of war”: sexual violence that is not ordered but instead originates spontaneously in the field and is tolerated by commanders. Contributing to this are wartime dynamics such as a desensitisation to violence, the routine dehumanising of victims, and the displacement of responsibility both onto the group and the enemy who “deserves what they got” (Wood, 2009, p.139). Group dynamics seem to play an especially important role here. Morris (1996, pp.698-703) argues that many majority male groups cultivate their own set of norms, which lower inhibitions to sexual violence. These include stringent standards of aggressive, dominant masculinity and hostility towards stereotypically female characteristics (such as gentleness), as well as towards women in general. Goldstein (2001) argues that such aggressively constructed standards of masculinity are found in all armies, because they are necessary to create warriors from reluctant recruits. Combined with Franklin’s (2004, p.26) analysis of group violence, this makes wartime rape less of a puzzle. She argues that group crimes happen as collective action over which individuals feel little control, because they believe all other members of the group to be more committed to the violent act than they really are. Wood (2006, p.326) somewhat dismisses these explanatory approaches for not accounting for variations in the incidence of rape unless one were able to show the different degrees to which these norms are present in different armies. However, this is not necessarily the case. The degree of these norms could well be the same in all armed forces, because the leeway fighters are given to act on them is not. As I will show, in the face of all of the above reasons conducive to rape, the actual occurrence of it depends largely on the formulation and enforcement of a commitment against it by group leaders.

Military leaders may have a variety of reasons to prohibit sexual violence against civilians. These can be practical, since many commanders fear the kind of loss of control that comes along with fighters engaging in rape, as they might be difficult to get back under control and could be vulnerable to surprise attacks during the act (Wood, 2009, p.140). Alternatively, they could be strategic, such as not wanting to antagonise a civilian population or international allies that the group relies on for resources and intelligence (Ibid). Similarly, a high proportion of female fighters has been argued to make rape less likely because the use of it might alienate them, but the evidence for this is mixed (Cohen, 2013b). Significantly, an insurgency could be more reluctant to use rape against the civilians they aim to govern once the war is over, especially if they portray themselves as fighting for a more just social order (Wood, 2009, p.141). Most importantly, leaders can prohibit rape for normative reasons even if there are no practical considerations against it, and
it would be strategically advantageous. This is where group ideology plays a key role. For example, the civil war in Sri Lanka shared similar initial conditions with the one in Bosnia, specifically that they were both secessionist conflicts along ethnic lines in small countries (Wood, 2006, p.313). However, in contrast to Bosnian forces, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) committed virtually no rape, even as they otherwise employed extremely brutal methods against the civilian population (Ibid). Not even during their campaign of forced displacement, the most “typical” setting for strategic rape, did they resort to sexual violence (Wood, 2009, p.143). The reason for this is that the group leadership demanded a strict puritanical code of conduct from their cadre. Members had to devote themselves completely to the organisation and sacrifice their private lives, including sexual relations, until the goal of a sovereign Tamil state was achieved (Ibid, p.149). However, banning rape alone was not enough to prevent it, the leaders also needed to have the structural capacities to enforce that ban. The LTTE was a highly centralised organisation, with constant review of the behaviour of each member in the field, and did not hesitate to draconically punish members if they broke the code of conduct (Ibid, p.151). Their values prohibited the use of rape as a strategy, while their strict discipline prevented its opportunistic occurrence as a practice.

These features make the Tamil Tigers a textbook case of what Weinstein (2006) describes as activist rebellions, with members highly committed to the cause and dedicated to the normative values embodied by the group. Activist rebellions can in general be expected to commit less civilian rape for two reasons. First, they are more likely than opportunistic groups to have an ideological commitment to protecting civilians, as well as a practical need for civilian support in the absence of lootable resources or outside funding. Secondly, they are more likely to have sufficiently strong hierarchies to monitor the behaviour of their members and do not hesitate to punish transgressions for fear of defection (Weinstein, 2006, p.12). Of course, with their superior ability to enforce orders regarding the level of violence, activist groups could conceivably commit exceptionally high levels of rape, if it were to align with their strategic and normative goals, for example in the case of genocide against an enemy population, which could be claimed to have happened among certain militias in the Bosnian war.

However, while Weinstein’s categorisation is useful for understanding this issue, his proposed causal mechanism is more problematic. It is possible that the differences between the behaviour of activist and opportunistic insurgencies are less due to them drawing on totally distinct pools of recruits to
begin with, and more due to the different ideologies and different institutional cultures within the group. For example, the RUF, which Weinstein cites as a prime example of an opportunistic rebellion (p.303), and which committed shocking rates of sexual violence, was largely made up of kidnapped fighters rather than individuals who joined in the pursuit of private goals (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008, p.438). There is empirical evidence to back up the importance of activist ideology in protecting civilians from sexual violence from case studies for example in Sri Lanka (Wood, 2009) and El Salvador (Wood & Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2014). Hoover Green (2016) shows that communist rebels commit lower levels of rape than other insurgencies, and explains this by the extremely high level of political education they receive. She finds that the more formal instruction fighters receive on the social or political purposes of the conflict, the less likely they are to commit sexual violence. Moreover, the opportunistic counterargument is supported by Cohen’s (2013, p.471) findings that lootable resources are significantly associated with rape. The Civil Defence Forces (CDF) in Sierra Leone makes for an interesting case study regarding the importance of activist ideology. At the beginning of the conflict, members were drawn mainly from pre-existing structures of secret hunters’ societies who volunteered to defend their communities (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008, p.442). In the years before 1996, allegations of sexual violence against them were basically non-existent (TRC, Vol.3, Ch.3, para.348), since these societies have strict rules that prohibit members from having sexual intercourse while performing their duties, any breaking of which was strictly taboo (Ibid, para.349). However, as the war escalated, the CDF had to rapidly increase the number of men in its ranks, which resulted in a loss of initiation into the group’s ethics (Ibid, para.351), and in a new generation of recruits focussed on the benefits they could gain from the war. This was followed by a massive increase in sexual violence towards civilians, approaching the same level of brutality as the RUF (Ibid, para.352).

In conclusion, I have shown that rape will occur in civil war both as a strategy and, if unchecked, as a practice of war, which means that its incidence depends on the stance the leadership takes on it and their capability to enforce their stance. The highest incidence is expected where it is strategically incentivised, and where there is no strongly enforced top-down commitment to prohibiting it. The same twofold model of leadership commitment and enforcement can be assumed to apply to both rebel and government forces. In activist rebellions, such a commitment seems more likely to occur due to both their stronger organisational structure and their ideological culture. These findings are important because they establish rape as the “default setting” of an
army unless prevented by its commander, which means that the responsibility to prevent it lies firmly with the leadership and cannot be shirked.


Dublin city centre 2017, a sticker read “TYLKO DLA BIALYCH”, something which may easily go unnoticed to many of those passing. It translates as “for whites only”. The statement, written in Polish, declared an aggressive racialised message. An immigrant Other, liable to receive anti-immigrant sentiments themselves (McGinnity and Kingston, 2017), displayed an overt declaration of racial prejudice towards the non-white population, immigrants and Irish citizens alike.

Introduction

This article will set out to explore the theoretical explanations of the, often negative, reception of immigrants in immigrant-receiving countries. Prior to such discussion, a foundational comprehension of the main theoretical explanations is essential. The three approaches to be considered in this article are: social contact theory (Allport, 1954), group conflict theory (Blumer, 1958), and marginalisation theory (Betz, 1993). The first of these, social contact theory, suggests that meaningful contact between racial groups reduces negative sentiments towards alternative groups (Allport, 1954). The second, an approach proposed by Blumer (1958), posits negative sentiments towards immigrant groups as a collective process of group position, based on a necessary racial conception of the immigrant receiving state’s national identity. Finally, marginalisation theory operates on the principle of marginalised groups within a given society displaying a higher rate of positive sentiment towards immigrant groups than those expressed by dominant native groups. This is deduced from voting patterns of populist-right parties, driven primarily by concerns surrounding immigration by dominant groups in society (Betz, 1993). With a basic understanding of these approaches, the article will examine their capacity to account for anti-immigrant sentiments in the context of the Republic of Ireland. The experience and acknowledgement of mass inward-migration is relatively recent for the state, having been identified as significantly mono-cultural prior to this trend (Lentin and McVeigh, 2006). Over the course of the discussion, comparisons will be drawn with Northern Ireland, as well as with other international examples. In exploring each of these main theories, the article will posit that, by means of policy and legislation, the Irish state has manufactured conditions which inhibit the
social cohesion of immigrant groups, which in turn, heightens the negative reception of such groups (Fanning, 2009).

Contextualising Ireland: culture and migration flows

It is well documented that the Republic of Ireland, hereupon referred to as Ireland for simplicity, has not, until recently, been exposed to trends of mass inward-migration (Lentin and McVeigh, 2006). The lack of such heterogeneity, excluding the minority Protestant, Jewish and Irish Traveller communities (Fanning, 2010), combined with a post-colonial cultural revival which influenced policy from the foundation of the state to the latter half of the twentieth century, led to a distinctly homogenous view of Irish national identity with much emphasis being placed on a form of ethno-nationalism preoccupied with religion and language. This was reproduced by means of state educational institutions which, prior to educational expansion in the 1960’s, paid significant attention to the adherence of strong Catholic beliefs (Fanning, 2010). The educational expansion was one example of a shift in the focus of the state to facilitate the achievement of economic and social improvement, the position of Ireland in the global market being given consideration in education for the first time. This, along with removal of isolationist protectionism, was described as the Lemass government opening Ireland to the rest of the world (Office of Minister of Integration, 2008). This period of modernisation, which actively recruited immigrant labour by the 1990’s, came with a threat of displacing unskilled Irish workers from belonging to this modern Ireland, a point which will be returned to in due course (Fanning, 2010).

The opening of Ireland described above led to the inward-migration of numerous types of migrants from various areas of the world. This article will now focus on two categories of immigrant to Ireland, and their respective periods of immigration, namely asylum seekers who arrived in Ireland after the passing of the 1996 Refugee Act (Fanning, 2009), and economic migrants from the 10 EU-Accession states, whose arrival came after Ireland allowed unrestricted immigration from these states in 2004, being just one of three EU member states to do so (Fanning, 2010). These two categories of immigrant will initially be explored separately, before being analysed comparatively. Both the initial separate analysis, and the comparative inquiry, will draw upon the main theories outlined above, as well as international comparisons.

Asylum seekers, Direct Provision, and the 2004 citizenship referendum: A threatening Other

The passing of the Refugee Act in 1996, and the subsequent arrival
of just under two thousand people seeking asylum in Ireland, a figure which nearly doubled the following year, was seen by politicians and policy makers as a problem: an inconvenience which needed to be controlled (Lentin and Moreo, 2013). Contrary to the portrayal of a now open Ireland, one which actively recruited migrant workers, the government responded to this problem with radical policy changes. In 1997, amendments were made to the 1935 Aliens Act, increasing the powers of immigration authorities, which allowed Ireland to respond to the phenomenon much like other nation states – with refusal of entry and deportation (Fanning, 2010; Lentin and Moreo, 2013). However, the state was quickly inhibited in the continuation of this policy due to administrative difficulties as well as a growing pressure to comply with liberal norms (Lentin and Moreo, 2013). The pressure of liberal norms on deportation policy similarly affected the UK following the 1998 Human Rights Act (Gibney, 2008).

Ireland, faced with persisting increases in asylum applications, turned to policy to deal with the problem, namely the dispersal of asylum seekers around the country to direct provision centres. In these centres, social welfare for asylum seekers was replaced with meal provision and an additional income of €19.10 for adults and €9.60 for children, an income first instated in 2001, which went on to remain stationary for 9 years, despite a growing cost of living and the inflation of other forms of social welfare (Lentin and Moreo, 2013). This, unlike the welfare provision of asylum seekers prior to the introduction of direct provision, which was based on the needs of those seeking asylum much like any other individual in receipt of social welfare in Ireland, constructed the needs of asylum seekers as different to those of Irish citizens. Those in direct provision constituted an Other, excluded from the rights availed of by those who constitute the Irish. Aside from the negative psychological effect on residents which direct provision has caused, and continues to cause (Ogbru et al., 2014), the dispersal of asylum seekers, their institutionalisation in centres, and the legal barriers which keep them separate from the labour market and Irish society in general, all contribute to the negative sentiments held towards them (Lentin and McVeigh, 2006). An explanation for such sentiments lies in the previously outlined social contact theory (Allport, 1954). The separation of asylum seekers from the day-to-day lives of Irish citizens removes the potential for meaningful contact, a factor which is found to influence the sentiments held towards immigrants. The importance of such contact, prevented in an Irish context, is supported by the research of Ellison and Powers (1994), as well as within the context of Northern Ireland (Hayes and Dowds, 2006).
The dispersal and intense control of asylum seekers, along with the enforced adherence to strict conditions on which their continued stay in the system relies, functions as an ever-present status of deportability (Lentin and Moreo, 2013). Lentin and Moreo’s (2013) exploration of this status notes it to be a biopolitical form of discipline, the explicit vulnerable position of an individual’s deportability serving to, in relation to the rest of Irish society, keep them to one side. The authors further note this acts as an efficient way of circumventing the practical difficulties associated with actual deportation. Large portions of asylum seekers simply ‘disappeared’ from the system upon issue of a deportation order, either leaving Ireland without need for official deportation, or covertly remaining, either of which ensure their continued detachment from Irish society (Lentin and Moreo, 2013). Despite these functions of the direct provision system, the immense threat posed to Irish society by asylum seekers, had seemingly not subsided. And so, four years after the system was put in place, a referendum was brought before Irish citizens, one which was defended as “rational and necessary” by then Minister for Justice Michael McDowell (McDowell, 2004). The referendum, which passed by a considerable margin, facilitated the removal of the jus soli aspect of Irish citizenship, that is, right to Irish citizenship by birth (Crowley et al., 2006). The effect of this referendum, specifically the discourse which defined it, provided fertile ground for further anti-immigrant sentimentality towards asylum seekers in Ireland. Blumer’s (1958) theory of group conflict can be employed in explaining this process. This approach to anti-immigrant sentiments, which posits such prejudice as a sense of group position, requires a racially defined concept of national identity on behalf of the racially prejudiced group (Blumer, 1958). It is proposed that, in addition to the previously discussed conception of Ireland as a mono-cultural state (Lentin and McVeigh, 2006), the discourse present in the period surrounding the 2004 citizenship referendum both endorsed such a construction of Irish national identity, and framed those seeking asylum as a threat to this national identity.

Analysis of discourse surrounding the 2004 citizenship referendum gives weight to the above suggestion. The referendum was described by politicians as a way by which the Irish could ensure citizenship to only those who deserved it, clearly implying the presence of a substantial number of undeserving immigrants who sought ‘belonging’ in Ireland (Crowley et al., 2006). This open questioning of asylum seeker’s legitimacy framed the group as an entity the Irish public should consider a threat. Indeed, it was not only the dilution of national identity that asylum seekers were said to threaten. Debates leading up to the referendum centred around the alleged threat to
the Irish maternal health system posed by immigrant mothers, keen to utilise the birth right to citizenship as a legal loophole (Lentin and McVeigh, 2006). This alleged threat, a challenge to the deportability of such ‘threatening’ immigrants, was regularly recounted by politicians across various forms of national media. To view the analysis of Lentin and McVeigh (2006) in accordance with Blumer’s (1958) theory, Irish politicians operated via public media, positioning themselves as spokespeople of the constructed Irish racial group, characterising themselves in relation to a threatening racial group, suggesting a supposedly legitimate threat about which Irish citizens should be concerned. The statistical myths brought to public knowledge during the referendum were largely found to be baseless by Lentin and McVeigh (2006, p.103), for example it was claimed by Kevin Myers of the Irish Times that foreign national mothers accounted for 40% of Irish births in an attack launched towards the “uncontrollable number of Nigerians” in Ireland, a figure almost double that which had been released by the nation’s maternity hospitals. Similarly, Gemma O’Doherty of the Irish Independent painted a picture of an over-crowded hospital resembling an airport arrivals gate, highlighting the risk of tropical disease to both expecting Irish mothers and vital hospital resources, this of course ignoring the fact that of the 22% of births to foreign nationals in Dublin, a mere 8% were to be accounted for by non-EU mothers who may potentially test positive for “tropical disease” as contested by O’Doherty (Lentin and McVeigh, 2006, p.102).

It is thus suggested here that social contact theory (Allport, 1954), and group conflict theory (Blumer, 1958), worked in an unconventional complimentary fashion regarding the anti-immigrant sentiments constructed during this period of intense debate surrounding the legitimacy of asylum seekers in Ireland. While construction of the proposed threat of asylum seekers in public discourse facilitated prejudice towards this group, as proposed by Blumer (1958), the removal of asylum seekers from Irish society by means of direct provision inhibited the potential for meaningful contact between the two groups (Allport, 1954), something which may have aided in discrediting the myths put forward prior to the citizenship referendum.

Paradoxical Policy: EU-Accession and sustaining economic growth

The citizenship referendum was just one of the major policy changes concerning immigration made by the Irish state in 2004. The previously noted access, without restrictions, to individuals from the 10 EU-Accession states was another major policy change in this area, Ireland being just one of three EU member states to make permeable their national boarders in
this manner (Fanning, 2010). The contradictions in state policy here are glaring; immigration was constructed as a threat to Irish national identity and the integrity of the welfare state, while also actively sought to provide much needed workers for a growing labour market. Just one year after a declaration of the citizenship referendum as a necessary amendment, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Michael McDowell, cited the need for continued inward-migration to allow for persistent economic growth (Lentin and McVeigh, 2006). This position of the Irish government further exemplifies the state’s feelings towards asylum seekers, a heterogeneous group of varying socio-economic positions, which it depicted as a homogenous group which were to be viewed as a threat. Though, it is the migrants which Ireland sought from the 10 EU-Accession states on which focus will now be given.

The newly established free movement of people from these states led to new social security numbers being presented to over one-hundred and fifty thousand people, just under eighty-seven thousand of these being issued to immigrants from Poland alone (Fanning, 2009, p.277). It must be noted that very little consideration was given to the potential integration of these migrants in Irish society, labour market participation was the sole focus. Specifically, regarding gaps in the low-skilled labour market, immigrants were considered by government officials to be more flexible than the indigenous population, and, as such, more likely to take up precarious work (Fanning, 2010). Here we return to Fanning’s (2010) concerns relating to the displacement of indigenous workers with low human capital. As the newly arrived workforce of Eastern European migrants were willing to work at a much lower rate of pay than indigenous workers, a replacement of the native workers in low-skilled positions was said to have taken place. An example of such replacement was the planned dismissal of Irish Ferries employees whose positions would be offered to migrant workers for a lower wage. In opposition to this, industrial action took place (Fanning, 2010). While affective terms such as displacement were avoided by union officials during these demonstrations, lest such terminology insinuate that migrant workers were to blame for the company’s decision, it would be disingenuous to suggest that such negative sentiments towards migrant workers were absent amongst workers facing redundancy and other members of Irish society (Fanning, 2010).

McGinnity and Kingston’s (2017) analysis of European Social Survey data, in accordance with the central theories of anti-immigrant sentiment, illuminates a fluctuation in attitudes towards migrants over the course of Ireland’s period of immigration, accounted for by the wavering economic
climate. This data shows that during the period of high inward migration following the 2004 changes to access for Eastern European migrants, once economic climate is controlled for, increased rates of immigration coincided with an increase in positive sentiments towards immigrants in Ireland. This supports social contact theory, demonstrating that as contact between groups grew, favourable attitudes towards immigrant groups equally flourished (Allport, 1954). Though, on accounting for the deteriorating economic climate, these sentiments became negative, particularly amongst respondents with lower levels of educational attainment (McGinnity and Kingston, 2017). This highlights the salience of Blumer’s (1958) group conflict theory, suggesting Irish workers who became vulnerable during the economic downturn began to view immigrant workers as a threat. Zygmunt Bauman’s (2000) work on the uncertainty of identity in the face of insecurity. Insecurities, such as the precarious stability of work during economic strife, increases uncertainty regarding one’s identity, leading the individual to seek sanctuary in presupposed collective identities, such as national identity (Bauman, 2000). While discourse surrounding national identity during the recruitment of migrant workers took on a more developmental sense of belonging which focused on labour market participation and association with the ongoing economic prosperity (Fanning, 2010), the foundations for a more ethno-national concept of national identity had long been a feature of Irish national identity reproduction. This ethno-national conceptualisation of national identity is one which had prominently featured in the construction of the proposed threatening Other during the 2004 citizenship referendum (Crowley et al., 2006). The internalisation of such constructions are not easily shaken loose, as demonstrated by the growth in negative sentiments towards the threatening immigrant Other as economic instability increased (McGinnity and Kingston, 2017). Of the three central theories introduced in this article, the pertinence of social contact theory (Allport, 1954) and group conflict theory (Blumer, 1958) in explaining sentiments towards migrants in Ireland has been evident. Specifically, social contact theory accounted for positive immigrant sentiments towards EU-Accession migrants, when controlling for economic change (McGinnity and Kingston, 2017). Though, such social contact was inhibited between Irish citizens and asylum seekers by means of structural barriers put in place by direct provision, something which may have contributed to anti-immigrant sentiments which were exhibited towards this group (Lentin and McVeigh, 2006; Lentin and Moreo, 2013). Group conflict theory explained both the anti-immigrant sentiments displayed concerning EU-Accession migrants during economic struggle as indigenous Irish workers perceived the group to be a threat (McGinnity and Kingston, 2017), as well as those sentiments regarding
asylum seekers with elected representatives, accepted as spokespeople of the racially constituted Irish, utilising national media to construct an Irish identity in relation to this threatening immigrant Other (Lentin and McVeigh, 2006).

**Marginalization theory: applicable to the Irish context?**

Thus far, the third central theory, marginalisation theory (Betz, 1993) has been absent from analysis. This will now be addressed with reference to the noted periods of immigration in Ireland, while drawing comparisons with international examples. The premise for this theory that marginalised groups in any given society are less likely to express anti-immigrant sentiments, by virtue of this marginalised position, is deduced from voting patterns for populist-right political parties. These patterns see women, traditionally a more marginalised group than men, less likely to give such parties electoral support (Betz, 1993). Such populist radical-right parties adhere to a central ideology which advocates both nativism and authoritarianism, and increases in their electoral success have largely been attributed to the politicisation and securitisation of immigration (Mudde, 2013; Fanning, 2009). Hayes and Dowds’ (2006) analysis of anti-immigrant sentiments in Northern Ireland has also highlighted an apparent bearing for such thought. Here, Catholics were found to be far less likely to hold anti-immigrant attitudes than Protestants, with Catholics in Northern Ireland being considered to be a sociocultural minority, and politically marginalised.

While there have been attempts to establish a radical-right in Ireland, the effect of such parties on Irish politics has been all but significant. The parties have gained considerable electoral success across Europe (Mudde, 2013), though the attempts in Ireland include both the unsuccessful launch of an Irish branch of European anti-immigration group Pegida by Identity Ireland’s Peter O’Loughlin (Roche, 2016), and Justin Barrett’s National Party, whose recent annual conference took place in the company of just fifty delegates (McCarthy, 2017). The research of Betz (1993) suggests that such parties enjoy the support of dominant groups within a society, as opposed to groups considered marginalised. Though, it is suggested here that, if such a party were to gain credible electoral influence, Ireland may prove to be contradictory to this evidence. The basis for this potential outcome is both the attitude displayed by the, thus far insignificant, populist radical-right parties in Ireland towards specific types of immigrant, as well as the evidence given above regarding the respective categories of immigrant. The discussion above has centred around Irish state policy which has categorised non-EU migrants, specifically asylum seekers, as outside of the ‘national family, and,
as such, not worthy of belonging in Ireland (Lentin and McVeigh; Fanning, 2009; Lentin and Moreo, 2013). Whereas migrants from the EU Accession states who have arrived in Ireland since 2004 have been deemed to belong in Ireland, albeit depending on the economic position of the state, a status which has influenced sentiments towards this group (Fanning, 2009; McGinnity and Kingston, 2017). Of late, other Western states have displayed similar attitudes towards non-EU asylum seekers, attitudes which have been preyed upon by the affective politics of the populist radical-right parties whose recent electoral success has been described above (Mudde, 2013). These parties advocate a form of European nativism, while remaining sceptic of EU politics, and their support has peaked at times when ‘European identity’ was under threat, such as the refugee crisis of 2016 (Mudde, 2017).

To consider the evidence presented here in accordance with Blumer’s (1958) group conflict theory would suggest a racialized European identity, one which views non-EU asylum seekers as a threatening Other. It is this type of sentiment which, when internalised, contributes to the electoral success of populist radical-right parties which has been seen across Europe (Mudde, 2013). One country which has seen recent electoral success of the populist radical-right is Poland (Cervinkova, 2016). The Polish community in Ireland, born of 2004 EU accession, is the largest foreign national group according to the latest census data (CSO, 2016). As discussed above, the current focus of the populist radical-right is non-EU asylum seekers, a group which faces significant discrimination in Ireland due to structural policy, something which has also been outlined in this article (Mudde, 2016; Lentin and Moreo, 2013). Bauman’s (2000) writings on the insecurity of identity, such as the sense of belonging for Polish immigrants in Ireland and its factors of influence which have been shown to vary under economic change (McGinnity and Kingston, 2017), can once again be employed here. With the success of populist radical-right groups in Poland, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that, faced with a precarious status of belonging in Ireland, the Polish community may be tempted to seek refuge in the collective identity offered by European far-right groups, such as Pegida who have attempted to establish a foothold within Ireland (Cervinkova, 2016; Fanning, 2009; Bauman, 2000).

Were a populist radical-right group to be established in Ireland, considering its potential influence on Ireland’s Polish community, the effects of both social contact theory (Allport, 1954) and group conflict theory (Blumer, 1958) would contradict the solidarity between minority and immigrant groups proposed by marginalisation theory (Betz, 1993). This outcome would suggest
members of the Polish community, seeking the sanctuary of collective identity as inferred by Bauman (2000), may internalise the European group conflict discourse of the populist radical-right in relation to non-EU asylum seekers, a group which they are unlikely to achieve meaningful contact with due to Ireland's direct provision system. Thus, despite being a marginalised group in Irish society, Polish residents could be at risk of displaying anti-immigrant sentiment towards fellow immigrants to Ireland, namely non-EU asylum seekers. While the lack of research and empirical data in this area must be acknowledged, the discussion of graffiti which opened this essay could be considered evidence of the process outlined above. That is, an immigrant group who themselves face sentiments of prejudice, expressing anti-immigrant sentiments towards another category of migrant in Ireland, in accordance with theories of social contact and group conflict.

**Conclusion**

This article has discussed and utilised the central theories of social contact (Allport, 1954) and group conflict (Blumer, 1958) to provide explanations for anti-immigrant sentiments which have proven evident in the Republic of Ireland. The article has demonstrated that in manipulating these theories, Irish migration policy has caused an expression of anti-immigrant sentiment towards two immigrant groups: non-EU asylum seekers and EU-Accession migrants. Contested understandings of belonging as a result of state policy have caused such sentiments to be expressed towards asylum seekers, while conditions of the labour market and national economy dictate the experiences of European economic migrants. The article has also utilised these two central theories, along with Bauman’s (2000) discussion of identity, to demonstrate a potential weakness of marginalisation theory, by means of a theorised gravitation of members of the Polish immigrant community towards the populist radical-right groups which attempt to establish themselves in Ireland. Nevertheless, the absence of empirical data to validate claims of Polish diaspora support for such right-wing groups must be once again highlighted and acknowledged.
### Bibliography


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Introduction
In this paper I examine the different positions taken by the US and European general publics on the issue of capital punishment and seek to uncover a coherent account of the origin of this difference. I firstly illustrate the current divergence in public opinion and identify it as quite recent, beginning in the 1970s. I then explore the historical, institutional and social factors that helped to shape the US public’s approval and Europe’s simultaneous rejection of capital punishment. I conclude that while an apparent convergence is possible, the deep-seated moral frameworks of both peoples, so heavily influenced by the factors I explore, will likely leave a legacy of divergent fundamental values.

The Importance of the Issue of Capital Punishment
The moral importance of capital punishment is, of course, subjective. The fact that the level of ethical concern shown for the execution of criminals varies hugely across regions is the very premise for this essay’s exploration of the divergence in these values between the United States and Europe. From a logical stand point it is difficult to explain the importance of capital punishment on moral grounds, given that the heuristics that readers use to judge its importance will surely diverge from my own. Therefore, instead of highlighting the importance of capital punishment in terms of morality, I will do so in terms of academic usefulness. Kleinfeld in ‘Two Cultures of Punishment’ convincingly argues that the stance taken by an individual or state on this issue can offer an incredibly useful insight into their fundamental values.

“Capital punishment says something about where a culture stands on matters of violence, evil, wrongdoing, and rights - something we feel intuitively but that is extremely difficult to identify and articulate...what does capital punishment represent?” (Kleinfeld, 2016, p.987)

It is important to note that the debate on capital punishment is anchored in much more than issues of effectiveness and instrumentality: the European/American disagreement on the death penalty represents “a clash between two visions of justice” (Kleinfeld, 2016, p.991). What was at stake in
relation to these debates was how post-Enlightenment society ought to conceive of a doctrine of right and wrong. This difference, according to Kleinfeld, “has something to teach us about the great divergence writ large” (Kleinfeld, 2016, p.991). I introduce capital punishment as a matter of utmost importance, not just due to its moral gravity which is difficult to highlight without appealing to personal bias, but because exploring this divergence in public opinion offers us the chance to understand the divergences between US and European moral perspectives on a more general level. This, in the context of a growing need for influential actors on both sides to cooperate in order to address unrelenting political issues today, is indisputably a worthwhile end towards which we should work.

US and Europe’s Positions on Capital Punishment: Current Divergence and Historic Alignment

The current difference between the positions of the European and US publics is dichotomous and, to draw on Hammel (2010), easily demonstrated by policy and survey data. At present, every country in Europe but Belarus prohibits capital punishment. Protocol 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights requires signatory states to prohibit capital punishment with the exception for crimes committed “in time of war or imminent threat of war” (Hammel, 2010, p.9). Protocol 13 built on this with a flat prohibition without exception. Furthermore, as was communicated to former Eastern Bloc nations in the early 1990s, it is currently stipulated that the immediate institution of a moratorium of the usage of the death penalty with a view to complete abolition within three years is a condition for being admitted to the European Union. Not only is Europe now a death-penalty-free zone, but the likelihood of a return of the death penalty is practically null since, psychologically, it has become as unthinkable as slavery in the European psyche. Contrastingly, in the US capital punishment remains legal in almost forty states and is also provided for by federal law. To be sure, many of these states, although they may have death penalty on the books, apply it extremely sparingly (apart from outlier states such as Texas and Virginia). Despite this, it remains unlikely that the US may achieve a clean, unconditional, definitive abolition like that reached by Europe – the Death Penalty Information Centre reports that seventy percent of the American public favour the retention of capital punishment (Hammel, 2010). Conversely, in the mind-set of Europeans, capital punishment is “a human rights abuse of the first order... the kind of thing that to the European mind falls outside the pale of civilized state conduct” (Kleinfeld, 2016, p.889), an ingrained, unchallenged view completely opposite to that of their American
It is important to note that the transatlantic positions have not always been so opposed. Popular support for the death penalty has historically hardly been particular to America. On both sides of the Atlantic at the time of European abolishment, opinion polls indicate that the vast majority were in favour of capital punishment in virtually every nation globally (Garland, 2012). Even after legal abolishment, public support for the death penalty persisted. For example, in Germany, the 1949 constitution prohibited the death penalty despite the fact that two-thirds of the general public supported its retention (Garland, 2012). Moreover, abolitionism was far from alien to the US around the time that it was being outlawed in Europe; mid-twentieth century America saw a surge in support for abolition, with a Gallup poll reporting that opponents of the death penalty actually temporarily held a slight majority in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Heard, 2011). This culminated in the landmark 1972 Supreme Court decision in Furman v. Georgia that the “practice of capital punishment as it stood in the cases before them violated the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause” (Heard, 2011, p.1440). Thus, for four years until the reinstatement of the death penalty with 1976’s Gregg v. Georgia Supreme Court case, the positions of both US and European policy were aligned and en route to fully converge on total abolition (Heard, 2011). The search for the origin of this current divergence between US and European people, does not, therefore, date back throughout history indefinitely, but rather to a recent schism in the late 1970s. This recent split is representative of the present cultural, ideological gap between the US and European perspectives, evidenced by the opposing reactions of the European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, Louis Michele, and President George W. Bush to the execution of Saddam Hussein on 30. December 2006. While Bush regarded the killing as an “important milestone on Iraq’s course to becoming a democracy that can govern, sustain, and defend itself”, Michele, who arguably represented the European Union’s stance as a whole, declared that “the death penalty is not compatible with democracy” (Heard, 2011, p.126), and ultimately stated that “[t]he EU is in fierce opposition to the death penalty and there is no exception to that fundamental principle” (Kanaal Z, 2006). This cultural divergence is phrased alternatively by Kleinfeld:

“On one side of the European/American division is the belief that the right to life is, as a matter of justice, is forfeit for the worst wrongdoing; on the other is the belief that the right to life is, as a matter of justice, inalienable no matter
This analysis of the present and historical positions of the two sides leads us to the following questions: What caused the US public to revert back to retentionism rather than continuing to pursue abolitionism, as their European counterparts eventually came to do? And from where can one locate the origins of this ideological opposition?

Investigating the Origin of the 1970s Divergence

I begin exploring the root causes of this divergence by looking at two principal historical factors - the impact of British colonial rule on the US and the differing experiences of the US and Europe of World War II. I argue these two factors caused politicians on the two sides to develop differing conceptions of sovereignty which in turn affected the future of capital punishment policy and public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic. Anckar’s (2014) empirical analysis highlights a statistically significant relationship between British colonial heritage and a state’s retention of capital punishment with 57 percent of current retentionist countries being former British colonies. He suggests that this relation is due to the fact that the death penalty was applied more widely in Britain than in countries in continental Europe (Anckar, 2014). Whilst this may be reasonable, I claim that a much more detailed account of the impact of Britain’s colonial legacy on the US position on capital punishment can be traced. Garland holds that the high level of decentralisation and fragmentation in the US political system by comparison with the European model can be traced directly to the revolutionaries’ categorical opposition to absolute sovereignty as a reaction to its suffering under archaic, undemocratic colonial rule (Garland, 2012). Furthermore, behind these ideals of republicanism and federalism that followed the War of Independence was the “hard realism of politicians seeking a formula of confederation that would be acceptable to the thirteen former colonies ... each of them protective of their autonomy” (Garland, 2012, p.155). This approach to nation-building had far-reaching consequences as it prevented the American central government from constructing the sort of institutional infrastructure that states elsewhere could, restricting its long-term role in legislative and economic development (Garland, 2012). Paired with the post-colonial mentality that opposed the unchecked consolidation of power, the type of which it had suffered under as a collection of colonies, this approach resulted in the enshirning of a pluralist, federated structure which ensured power balances and legal restraints in its constitution, rather than a model of absolute sovereignty like in Europe (Garland, 2012).
Capital punishment fit into the federal system at the state level, which was a further result of British colonial rule as American executions originated from practices of local colonial authorities rather than imperial forces (Garland, 2012). From the earliest days, capital punishment was “less a ceremony of state power than a local, religiously inflected, community undertaking” (Garland, 2012, p.187). The preservation of these patterns help us to comprehend why many Americans rarely associate the death penalty with overarching state power, while their European counterparts characterise it as an undeniable symbol of tyrannical rule (Garland, 2012). Further impacts of colonialism included differing conceptions of criminals - Europe had long conceived of the possibility of criminals retaining their humanity since ‘high-status’ inmates convicted for political offenses had historically been treated with dignity (Hammel, 2010). Conversely colonialism in the US meant that conviction for political offenses of ‘high-status’ individuals did not occur - humanity and dignity remained completely separate to criminality, and thus “no culture had grown up to foster respectful treatment of the prison population” (Hammel, 2010, p.192). Exacerbating this asymmetry of opinion was a later historical factor - the influence of differing experiences of World War Two, particularly the Holocaust. Since Americans never experienced the Nazi era in the way that Europe did, they arguably never came to see as clearly the sheer extent to which the legality of capital punishment can be exploited to cause unimaginable atrocities by powerful minorities (Garland, 2012). In Europe, the conditional legality of capital sentences provided for by Article 48 was shown to be a gateway to previously unfathomable levels of human suffering as the mechanisms provided by it were utilized by Hitler to instigate the Holocaust (Yorke, 2011). In post-war Europe the old arguments of retribution, deterrence, and the protection of the state were no longer as easily accepted as in the past (Yorke, 2011, p.250). In the US, without the powerful collective memory of the Holocaust or the perception of the death penalty as overbearing levels of state power and the unfamiliarity of treating inmates with dignity, these arguments supporting capital punishment continued to hold. Ultimately, the perception of the death penalty as an ordinary part of local punitive policy, rather than an abuse of human rights, persisted.

As already mentioned, the schism in policy and public opinion only dates back to the 1970s, and so it is important to view these historical factors as seeds being planted which would exert their influence later down the line. These historical factors transpired into institutional factors, which furthered the divergence between US and European positions on capital punishment in unprecedentedly overt ways. US rejection of absolute sovereignty caused
the construction of the Bill of Rights, the creation of the Senate and the introduction of the electoral college, all of which added explicit prohibitions limiting federal power over states, on top of constitutional provisions. Whereas in the US the growth of state institutions was consistently limited, resulting in the absence of nonpartisan institutions and a highly politicized state sector, the process in Europe was quite the opposite. In Europe, states generally first formed, extended and consolidated legitimate power, which was followed by the gradual emergence of bureaucratic rationalization and the introduction of popular participation (Garland, 2012). The resulting directionalities of influence over policy on both sides are completely opposite:

“...Europe is typically directed by national political elites who, backed by a parliamentary majority, are often capable of imposing their policy preferences on the nation as a whole despite hostility to particular measures. In contrast, the American polity rarely permits top-down, counter-majoritarian processes.”(Garland, 2012, p.162)

The ‘European model’ of criminal justice policy, as illustrated by Hammel (2010), gives a meritocratic commission of trained experts the task of devising a state’s penal code, with minimal involvement from the general public. In stark contrast, US criminal justice policy arguably follows quite closely the shifts in public opinion due to its lack of bipartisan institutions and its highly decentralised and populist structure as laid down by the constitution. This institutional factor was a huge contributing factor to the divergence that took shape in the 1970s. Post-Furman, it seemed as though US and European positions on capital punishment could have converged towards abolition. The crucial difference to these two mirrored situations was that while in Europe national-level and supra-national level elites were in control of policy, in the US it was the general public who were most influential. Thus when the public mood reverted back in favour of capital punishment, it was through the only viable avenue that it exerted its influence - the Supreme Court. When the constitutionality of capital punishment in 1976’s Gregg v. Georgia was reconsidered in the context of a surge in public retentionism, it was decided that the principles of crime deterrence and victim retribution justified the reinstatement of state-sanctioned executions, evidencing the power of the public to shape policy in the US’ highly populist, bottom-up system (Heard, 2011). The task at hand however is not to identify the origin of the policy differences, but of the differences in public opinion. Thus, in order to address this I turn to look at the influence of social factors, in particular crime.
The spark that ignited the American public’s return to legal capital punishment was the intensification of the problem of crime in US society. As the 1973-1975 recession struck following the post-war boom, crime rates ballooned exponentially (Rankin, 1979). Importantly, survey data provided by the National Opinion Research Centre (NORC) show that concern for crime among the general public similarly ballooned, arguably catalysed by hysteric tabloid media (Rankin, 1979). This resulted in the US public seeking a tightening in punitive policy in order to feel secure, which materialised in their reversion back to supporting the death penalty. Rankin’s statistical analysis supports this thesis, concluding that a “strong, positive, nonlinear relation between support for capital punishment and the violent crime rate was revealed” (Rankin, 1979, p.207). Despite crime increasing at a relatively similar rate across the Atlantic, the corresponding European response was a moderate increase in incarceration, a minute adjustment in comparison to US reintroduction of capital punishment (Hammel, 2010). It was the institutional factors that I have mentioned above that shaped US public opinion. As the US public suffered ‘moral panics’ at the social instability during the economic crash, a deep-seated distrust in the elite set in and “disgust at the seeming powerlessness of courts and police to protect the public undermined public confidence in expert control” (Hammel, 2010, p.218). Thus, when intellectual and arguments sprung from liberal abolitionist elites that the death penalty is ineffective as a deterrent against crime and terrorism (Yorke, 2011), the public offered little attention or credit, and thus the populist political infrastructure I described earlier responded accordingly, retaining capital punishment which remains constitutional today. Contrastingly, in Europe, the public had no choice but to live in a capital-punishment-free society as constructed for them without their input by ‘enlightened elites’. They therefore had time to witness for themselves first hand that eventually a safe society with a flourishing economy was not mutually exclusive with the abolition of the death penalty (Hammel, 2010). The fear amongst the American people in the face of rising crime-rates crowded out any moral willingness they once had to refrain from capital sentencing that surfaced momentarily during the moratorium. Meanwhile the European people’s moral condemnation of the routinised killing of fellow citizens was free to intensify, unrestricted by fear as they saw first-hand that a stable society was achievable without capital punishment present as an instrument of control, due to the initial counter-majoritarian abolition.

Conclusion: Can we expect a convergence of views?

Immediately ruling out the possibility that Europe could return to supporting the death penalty due to its entrenched position in the public
mind-set as a grave human rights violation, the question of convergence now becomes: is there compelling reason to believe the US public can come to similarly reject it? In Europe, the public mood was convinced after it was brought against its will to accept the abolishment of capital punishment by political elites in power, an impossible eventuality for the US, given its structures of power devolution. Thus, the US public’s position would need to change without ever experiencing first-hand the realities of a society free of capital sentences. This is unlikely to be due to the long-enduring consequences of their colonial past and their distance from Nazism, which prevents the characterisation of the death penalty as the undermining of humanity as Europeans do. This is not to say that Americans do not see capital punishment as a moral issue - US sensitivity to crime and their concern for public order, similar to that of Europeans in the pre-abolition period, crowds out their latent moral convictions that were exposed post-Furman during those years of social stability and economic prosperity. Thus, it is reasonable to expect another drop in crime to translate into approval for abolition. But would this represent a true convergence? I argue that it would not - while it is highly likely that a surface-level convergence in this way may occur, a deeper difference in moral doctrine will persist. Europeans now hold the moral value of each individual’s right to life to be immutable. However, this perception was induced, at least partially, by the ability of the political elite to impose abolition on the disapproving public who subsequently had their preconceptions of a society without the ability to execute as chaotic and threatening, invalidated by direct experience. This mechanism is unavailable in the US, owing to the structural and constitutional commitment to bottom-up policy making. For this reason, I conclude that while convergence is absolutely possible, evidenced by the near-alignment of the 1970s, the fundamental moral convictions underlying the views of both sides will likely continue in their asymmetry.
Bibliography


“If the global commitment to eradicate inequality for all people is truly unequivocal, as leaders promoting the SDGs claim it to be, the implementation of the SDGs needs to take into account the voices of those people who, because of their sexual orientation or gender identity and expression, have historically been excluded from the benefits of development policies and programmes” (Mills, 2015).

Introduction

International development has progressed significantly over the last several decades on the subject of gender, moving from the binary theoretical framework of Women in Development to the Gender and Development framework and subsequently on to the hallmark Beijing Platform for Action (BPfA), which ultimately served as a catalyst for gender mainstreaming (Cornwall et al., 2008). There have, however, been critiques regarding the extent to which the development industry has challenged—or even reinforced—gender norms and stereotypes. This essay will begin by positing that the development industry remains largely heteronormative. It will then establish the problematic implications of this and explore arguments whether such heteronormativity is “supply” or “demand” driven. Establishing the heteronormativity of development provides a precise lens for analysing whether development reinforces or challenges gender norms, and indeed what types of gender norms it likely reinforces or challenges. This paper will argue that while the development industry risks reinforcing and reproducing heteronormative discourse on international, national, and local levels, it remains possible that the industry nevertheless challenges gender norms which exist less contentiously within a heteronormative framework. In response, a growing group, both academics and practitioners alike, are calling for increased focus on sexuality and sexual rights discourse in order to better frame contemporary international development topics and increase inclusivity in programming.

The development industry and heteronormativity: terminology

According to Jolly (2006, p.80), the development industry is “all those involved in giving or spending international development funding. This
includes United Nations Agencies, donor governments, recipient governments, international foundations, consultants, non-governmental organisations, activists, and development studies institutions”. For the purpose of this essay, such a broad definition facilitates the exploration of normativity across a number of actors and sectors. Whilst organisations and programmes which are less heteronormative (or indeed not heteronormative) in their ethos and mission, exist within the development industry, these organisations remain niche in a largely heteronormative sector. Indeed, as Wieringa (2015, p.26) notes, while “the heteronormative sexual mainstream is no longer self-evident...it is still dominant...”. However, before considering examples illustrating the ubiquity of heteronormativity in international development, the term itself should be discussed.

Coined in 1993 by Michael Warner, heteronormativity found its origins in “critiquing social theory for its monolithic heterosexual culture” (Jolly, 2011, p.20). The word was not defined more explicitly, though, until Warner and Berlant wrote the following in 1998: “By heteronormativity we mean the institutions, structures of understanding and practical orientations that make heterosexuality seem not only coherent – that is, organised as a sexuality – but also privileged. Its coherence is always provisional, and its privilege can take several (sometimes contradictory) forms...” (Berlant and Warner, 1998, p.548). The understanding of heteronormativity has since evolved to de-emphasise the link to heterosexuality or interactions between individuals of the opposite sex, per se, and stress the dominant and privileged norms organising sexuality and society more broadly. As Wieringa (2012, p.518) writes, “[h]eteronormativity is more than a reference to a normalised [hetero] sexual practice; it informs the normativity of daily life, including institutions, laws and regulations that impact on the sexual and reproductive lives of members of society as well as the moral imperatives that influence people’s personal lives”. In this regard, heteronormativity thus “not only establishes a heterosexual/homosexual hierarchy but also creates hierarchies among heterosexualities’, producing “hegemonic and subordinate forms of heterosexuality” (Seidman, 2005, p.40).

Is the development industry heteronormative?

This section will establish the ways in which the development industry is largely heteronormative through a few examples regarding theory, methodology, and programming. First, in her essay “Querying feminist economics’ straight path to development: Household models reconsidered,” Bergeron (2010) reviews the history of the household economic model, outlining the ways in which the model has evolved since the 1960s and highlighting
how it has remained heteronormative. During the post-World War II era, economists theoretically framed the household model as a harmonised unit, containing a benevolent patriarch, and they disregarded quantification of any non-commercial, domestic labour within the home (Bergeron, 2010, p.56). Only decades later, in the 1960s and 1970s, this unitary model had “gained significant traction in development economics”, and its tenants of efficiency, conveniently based upon marriage, were implemented into policy globally (Ibid, p.57). However, by the 1980s, certain economists (not least due to the persistence of feminist opposition) were starting to question the framing of the household and began developing theories on bargaining and negotiation based on game theory. This model has since become dominant in gender and development research by economists in particular (Ibid, p.58).

While Bergeron admits that these newer theories have successfully drawn attention to the ways in which female possession of financial resources can increase negotiation power in the household and potentially reduce gender inequality, she argues that they simultaneously “help to normalise dominant notions of heterosexuality in a variety of ways” (Ibid, p.59). First, she notes that several economists have used the terms “family”, “married couple”, and even “husband and wife” as synonyms for “household” in journal publications. She also takes issue with the ways in which female-headed households have either been rendered invisible in data sets or, when they are featured prominently, are likened to failures to the norm, cast as potential sites of promotion for the family model. Bergeron states that “while it is not a methodological error in itself to focus on heterosexual partner households, without context this focus lends itself to normalised and naturalised conceptualisations of sexuality, domesticity, and social reproduction that renders other alternatives invisible” (Ibid, p.9). In summary, Bergeron calls into question the heteronormativity of contemporary development economic theory and the subsequent effects it may have. Such critique is powerful considering that the household model as it stands undergirds both development policy and development programming across a number of sectors and actors.

Jolly (2011, p.19) also outlines a household-related problem, although her example is related more to methodology than theory. Recalling her time working on an industry-funded project on gender and poverty in rural China, she tells a story about how the survey questions with which she had been provided asked for a head of household, implicitly understood to be a male, as the “other family members” category included “wife”. Jolly points out that she and her researchers “…quickly found that [their] questionnaires were a poor
match for the realities of people’s family set-ups” (Jolly 2011, p.19). In some married couples, one spouse had migrated. Many men were single, apparently because they were too poor to attract a wife. The poorest family we met was made up of a single father whose wife, according to their neighbours, had left him with the two children because she could not cope with the poverty. A few young couples described themselves as ‘illegally cohabiting’, meaning that they had not registered their ‘marriage’ with the local government, because they were younger than the legally permitted age of marriage” (Ibid, p.19). In this example, we see methodological instruments based on a heteronormative assumption of the family, instruments which were not able to capture more complex realities in the intervention area. While Bergeron had admitted that it is not a methodological error to focus on heterosexual households, in this example we see how the methodological tools did not align with the context in the research area, a different issue and one which possibly constitutes an error if left un-remedied.

Considering it can be argued that certain development theories and methodologies are heteronormative in nature, it is unsurprising that the same critique applies to programming. Consider USAID’s President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), approved in 2003 under the George W. Bush administration to be rolled out in 14 sub-Saharan African countries (Sessions, n.d.). While the HIV/AIDS development sector is typically one associated with addressing sexualities more comprehensively than most development interventions (Jolly, 2011; Lind, 2010, pp.8-9), PEPFAR, in its inception, represented a controversy in the battle against HIV/AIDS (Parkhurst, 2012). Twenty percent of PEPFAR’s funding went toward HIV prevention, and within that, one-third of funding was required to be spent on abstinence until marriage (AUM) programming (Sessions, n.d.), falling under the larger PEPFAR mantra of “abstain, be faithful, or use condoms” (ABC) ("or use condoms" was billed for “high-risk” populations). ABC and AUM are heteronormative in several senses, particularly in regard to the abstinence until marriage component.

First, ABC and AUM exclude those not fitting within the heteronormative framework of marriage or intended marriage. Considering that same-sex sexual acts and relations are illegal in all of the countries in which ABC was implemented (save for South Africa, which legalised gay marriage in 2006), under ABC reasoning, those who do not have the legal right to marry never have legitimate grounds to have sex. Of course, this notion is absurd, and one that does not capture the nuanced realities of how
people navigate their sexuality and/or engagement in sexual acts. In regard to abstinence-only programming in Uganda, an activist said, “LGBT communities are ‘erased from all HIV programmes…The Uganda AIDS Commission does not want to hear about them’” (Human Rights Watch, 2005). Secondly, in addition to the erasure of non-heterosexual sexuality, the tenants “abstain” and “be faithful” fail to capture the realities of sex workers, a group which theoretically includes married and unmarried people alike, across a spectrum of sexualities, both heterosexual and not. While some may argue that only a small percentage of resources went to abstinence-only programming—one third of 20% of total funding amounts to approximately 6%-7%—it is worth noting that PEPFAR initially pledged up to $15 billion in only the first five years (Parkhurst, 2012, p.17) and since 2003, PEPFAR has spent $70 billion on HIV/AIDS prevention (AVERT, 2017). Seven percent of $70 billion is no insignificant number, giving the programming a financial clout and prowess with which to control discourse and programme interventions.

The three examples provided in this section serve not to indict the entire development industry, but rather to illustrate broadly the ways in which the development industry—across theory, methodology, and programming—is largely heteronormative. What the examples of heteronormativity have in common is that they fail to capture more complex realities, and with such failing come consequences. To return to Bergeron’s example, her largest critique of the contemporary modelling of households is that they rest within an essential framework of gender. She posits that the “arguments for equality that rely on a narrative that those predisposed to care (women) will use resources more efficiently than those who are not (men)...reflect a slippage in which arguments for gender equality are linked to maintaining heteronormative gender roles—hardly a goal one would think might be espoused by a feminist approach” (Bergeron, 2010, p.60). Moreover, she worries that “the conceptual framework of household bargaining models, when translated into policy...contributes to the lack of visibility of non-normative sexual and household arrangements” (Ibid, p.62). Indeed, in the cases of Bergeron and Jolly’s theoretical household modelling and household survey examples, respectively, the risk to non-heteronormative identities is erasure.

While such “non-normative blindness” may not appear problematic to the sceptical reader, returning to the example of abstinence-only HIV programming crystallises the danger of erasure. In the case of HIV, disregarding or not adequately including non-heteronormative identities poses significant moral and ethical questions which have more imminent
consequences. One Human Rights Watch report, for example, points out how touting the heteronormative ideal of faithfulness in marriage “may amount to a death sentence for women and girls. Ugandan women face a high risk of HIV in marriage as a result of polygyny and infidelity among their husbands, combined with human rights abuses such as domestic violence, marital rape, and wife inheritance” (Human Rights Watch, 2005). For many health professionals, abstinence-only interventions “fail to meet the ethical standards of health professionals who believe in the importance of informed consent and the right of young people to information needed to maintain health” (Santelli et al., 2006, p.4). Furthermore, “both human rights groups and medical professionals...have described the scientific and human rights problems with promoting abstinence as a sole option for young people. These include...the promotion of sexist and racist stereotypes; and insensitivity and unresponsiveness to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgendered, and questions (LGBTQ) youth” (Ibid.).

“Why is development work so straight?” (Jolly, 2011)

There are a number of hypotheses which respond to Jolly’s facetious essay title, above, and it is important to consider why the development industry is heteronormative in order to strategise about how it could become less-normative in the future. One possibility is that heteronormativity is demand driven. The development industry operates largely in countries in which homosexuality and non-normative gender identities are illegal and/or highly taboo, and in recent years there has been a wave of specifically anti-gay conservatism manifested through laws or increased policing (Beyrer, 2014, p.1). There thus exists the argument that certain international development work cannot fall outside of the heteronormative framework because the legal climate does not allow for it and that avoiding the topic of sexuality is the most respectful thing to do, culturally speaking (Jolly, 2011). This argument seems oversimplified, though, when one considers the history of existing “anti-sodomy” laws, often influenced by former western colonial law (Hepple, 2012). Furthermore, it is well known among practitioners that not only are there of course non-normative populations in development intervention countries but there are also local NGOs who are advocating on their behalf (or on behalf of sexual rights more broadly) and are interested in coordinating with international organisations (Jolly, 2000, p.83). This indicates that the demand on the ground is far from homogenous.

Contrastingly, the supply argument can be considered, the idea that the heteronormative approach suits or reproduces the donor or implementer
country’s own institutional interests and beliefs. Returning to the example of PEPFAR, Human Rights Watch reports that prior to USAID’s ABC programming, abstinence was not a primary feature of HIV programming in Uganda and that following PEPFAR’s involvement, school teachers were instructed to stop discussing condom use in the classroom, as it could convey “contradictory messages” (Human Rights Watch, 2005). In contrast to Uganda, Brazil actually rejected USAID’s PEPFAR funding due its abstinence-only conditionality. In these instances, it is somewhat clear that PEPFAR’s implementers had some of their own ideological interests—indeed, certain conservatives in the USA support abstinence-only education, with many states implementing it in state curricula, despite lack of evidence that such methods are effective (Santelli et al., 2013, p.5). Further bolstering the argument that PEPFAR was/is ideologically driven is the fact that funding has changed throughout presidential administrations. Following a change of administration in 2008, the percentage of PEPFAR funding going to AUM was cut in half, dropping from a third to a sixth of total HIV prevention spending (Ibid, p.11). In this regard, we see the ways in which interventions are embedded with ideology from the donor country, and in the case of PEPFAR, particularly under their George W. Bush administration, there was a reinforcement of heteronormative ideals of development, which quite possibly failed populations in need.

The idea that the heteronormativity of the development industry is strictly supply- or demand-based, however, does not stand up to scrutiny—the reality is much more complicated. Consider again that heteronormativity “not only marginalises those who fall outside of its norms but also patrols those within its constraints”: heteronormativity “is represented as normal and natural, and functions as an ideal—something not there yet but to be aspired to” (Wieringa, 2015, p.27). In this regard, heteronormativity is both supplied and demanded, in implicit and explicit ways. Indeed, the theory on heteronormativity acknowledges that it is in the interest of those in power to maintain the societal order constructed by and around heteronormativity. A recent example illustrates this complexity well.

In June 2017, President of Tanzania John Magufuli declared that pregnant adolescents would no longer be allowed to return to school following the delivery of their baby, stating that “the idea of allowing teen mothers back to school was a foreign concept ‘championed by NGOs and those who do not wish the country well’” (The Citizen Reporter, 2017). In the postcolonial era, western organisations have indeed repeatedly been accused of exporting liberal
ideas about gender roles into former colonies (Jolly, 2000), and while such claims and concerns should be analysed and taken seriously, in this particular case it remains unclear whether there is substance to Magufuli’s claim or whether the postcolonial narrative is being exploited to maintain a patriarchal status quo, especially when many locally-based NGOs have long supported unhindered access of girls to school. In the Tanzanian case, leaders may view pregnant girls returning to school as outside of the norm; a norm which dictates that mothers stay at home. Indeed, in the conversation about the development industry and normativity, many academics and practitioners have pointed out that girls’ and women’s lives existing even within more normative spaces such as education and marriage, are still ones in which human rights are jeopardised or violated, as in the latest example given: these practitioners have defended “non-normative blind” interventions on such grounds, adding further complexity to Jolly’s question, why is the development industry so straight?

And yet, as will be discussed in the final section, others would counterargue that failing to recognise the inherent sexual politics which underlie decisions such as President Magufuli’s will ultimately result in incomplete, unfruitful development interventions. As Wieringa (2015, p.24) notes, “[o]ften ignored in studies of family life and socio-cultural life, sexual politics underpin the hegemonic, patriarchal family that is consistently invoked as the cornerstone of society. While sexuality is generally perceived as a personal and private subject, it has wide ranging political implications in its broader connotation as sexual politics”. Increasingly, academics and development practitioners are discussing the need to acknowledge the sexual politics underpinning economic and social welfare in order to move forward in acknowledging the role that sexual rights discourse has to play in development. Until that point, though, it is likely that heteronormativity will continue to be an umbrella of norm change.

**Does (heteronormative) development reinforce or challenge gender stereotypes?**

If we accept that the development industry is heteronormative, how do we answer the question of whether development reinforces or challenges gender norms and stereotypes? Is it fair to assume that what is reinforced is necessarily heteronormativity? Or is it possible that heteronormative development challenges gender norms and stereotypes nonetheless? Marcus and Harper (2014) from the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) offer a comprehensive literature review of social norm change, suggesting that norm
change is complex, which helps to answer our questions in a nuanced manner. Marcus and Harper draw on the work of social science theorists Cooper and Fletcher (2012) as well as Paluck and Ball (2010), who delineate between “descriptive norms”—people’s sense of what women and men usually do—and “injunctive norms”—how society should be organised. While descriptive norms capture gender roles, injunctive norms address gender ideologies (Marcus and Harper, 2014). Marcus and Harper also importantly compile a list of conditions in which gender norms are most likely and least likely to change (Ibid, p.29), as well as empirical studies which have focused on various drivers to norm change, including: economic change, education, exposure to ICT, conflict and displacement, political campaigning, legal change, policy, urbanisation (Ibid, pp.15-23). Although an in-depth discussion of social norms theory is beyond the scope of this paper, the main points of their literature review are that norms consist of both roles and ideologies, some norms are stickier than others, and drivers of social norm change are complex and many (Marcus and Harper, 2014).

In regard to household and female economic activity, for example, literature shows that norm changes are many—increased economic activity can change dynamics within the household, potentially even challenging heteronormative ideals (Hossain, 2011). Similarly, access to education may affect long-term changes, which ultimately broaden gender roles or ideologies in society. It is difficult to foresee or control the ways in which certain interventions may reinforce or challenge gender norms, where interventions solidify the norm or lead eventually to subversion. In that regard, it is argued that while one can anticipate and develop a hypothesis about the ways in which heteronormative development interventions may reinforce or challenge gender stereotypes, it is incredibly difficult to generalise about how the norms may change in practice. But empirical effects are one thing, and discourse is another. Bergeron’s (2010, p.55) critique of economics, for example, still stands: to the extent that feminist economics participates in a broader discourse of producing heteronormative ideologies and conventions, making them seem natural and universal, it may be underwriting rather than subverting the gender order that it is attempting to challenge.

Therefore, regardless of empirical evidence which shows that gender norm change is occurring, Bergeron’s concern, which is also held by other academics, regarding the heteronormativity of discourse remains an important one when considering the ways in which the development industry reinforces or challenges gender norms. Indeed, even within Marcus and Harper’s
insightful document, the element of sexual politics remains underexploited. The word “sexual” is reserved for “sexual and reproductive rights.” The word “sexuality” is used a few times in relation to one discussed study about the framing of sexuality among migrants to Sweden from areas in which FGM/C is practiced (Marcus and Harper, 2014, p.21). On the matter of discourse and theory, which has effects on development practice, an increasing number of academics and practitioners alike advocate for the acknowledgement and use of sexual rights in order to render development less heteronormative in its understanding.

Jolly (2006, p.77) aptly notes that “there is a myth that the development industry is not engaged with sexuality...” but “…in fact the development industry has always dealt with sexuality-related issues, although usually only implicitly, and negatively, in relation to population control, disease or violence...many in the development industry still see sexuality as secondary to ‘survival’ issues such as poverty”. And yet, recent findings “reveal that policy and legal discrimination against individuals on the basis of their sexuality and gender have a direct impact on multi-dimensional poverty, and need to be taken into account in the next development era” (Mills, 2015). The problem of heteronormativity in the development industry, one primarily of discourse and decision-making, is not without its consequences, as this essay has spent much time establishing. In the era of intersectionality, sexuality has yet to be meaningfully incorporated, but many are attempting to change that.

Human rights advocates and philosophers have made the most significant contribution to the advancement of sexual rights in international development. The 1990s were considered progressive years insofar as the conceptualisation of gender extended to acknowledgment of structural power, as well as opportunities, capabilities, and freedoms (Cornwall et al., 2008, p.6). The 1995 BPfA states that “the human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide freely and responsibly on matter related to their sexuality,” which represented significant progress, even if the sentence which followed about “equal relationships between men and women” reflected a heteronormative vision of sexuality (UN, 1995). Nussbaum (1999, p.78) included “having opportunities for sexual satisfaction” in her list of capabilities, under the third category of “Bodily Integrity”. More recently, in 2009, the Human Rights Council succeeded in including the terminology “other status” in the language of non-discrimination in the August 2015 SDG outcome document (Mills, 2015; United Nations, 2015), which was the product of two resolutions: “the first resolution states that ‘other status’ includes sexual orientation and
the second resolution extends this to include gender identity” (Mills, 2015).

Jolly, meanwhile, has focused more on particular sectors in which it is essential to recognise sexualities and sexual politics, suggesting that a “heteronormativity analysis” could help practitioners understand where their assumptions may not match reality or where they may reinforce rather than challenge certain power structures (Jolly, 2011, p.27). Also offering pragmatic tools for change, Mills (2015) provides a list of suggestions for the development industry on how it can be more inclusive, including consulting with non-normative populations and organisations in countries, lobbying for increased attention for non-normative populations and sexualities in international fora, and drawing on the SDG framework to establish programmes and projects that address LGBTQ concerns in whatever way possible. There remains, however, uncertainty on the part of non-normative-supporting activists and academics about how to best unravel the heteronormativity of the international development industry. Some, for example Cornwall et al, (2008, p.7), look to the gender mainstreaming model as a failure that is not worth repeating for sexuality. Still, others ask questions about representation, wondering whether the presence of those who identify as non-normative within the international development industry would yield less normative outputs regarding discourse and interventions (Gosine, 2010).

Conclusion

In order to address the question of whether development interventions reinforce or challenge gender norms, this essay sought to take a step back and look at what types of norms the development industry itself projects. This paper establishes the heteronormative nature of development, as well as its accompanying negative consequences, in theory, methodology, and programming. The development industry as it stands reproduces, acquiesces to, and reinforces heteronormativity, but given that social change is highly complex, the industry also likely subverts norms, both within and outside of dominant conceptions of normativity. Increased recognition of the sexual politics pervading all elements of development, however, could unlock future gender transformations and subversions. In the face of a growing wave of conservatism, researchers and practitioners must consider sexuality a key element within intersectionality and think creatively and responsibly about how to incorporate discourse into theory, methodology, as well as programme interventions. It is such discourse and action which will truly challenge gender norms globally.
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