

23 1 Introduction

24 Economic statistics are essential for guiding local, state, and federal authorities
25 on strategies for balancing economic losses with the social costs of the COVID-
26 19 pandemic. Authorities tend to focus mainly on regional and national GDP,
27 but other regional, industry, and national statistics can also be utilized to improve
28 our understanding of how economic activity influences COVID-19 dynamics. In
29 this paper, we extend the domain of relevance for national economic statistics by
30 studying how differences in work context and industrial composition determine
31 the epidemiological responses to scenarios aimed at restoring economic activity.
32 We consider differences in work contact and capacity to telework to character-
33 ize risk variation across industries. We introduce this risk variation into a multi-
34 group susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model to capture the dynamics of con-
35 tagion across different industries. We then offer an aggregation result that links
36 the population-level contact rate of our SIR model with parameters that govern
37 the recovery of the economy.

38 With the model, we compare outcomes under two different economic scenar-
39 ios: (i) a fiscal stimulus package and (ii) the complete re-opening of locked down
40 industries. The economic scenarios in this paper are stylized and do not represent
41 analysis of current economic conditions. Instead, we consider these scenarios as
42 they are representative of and motivated by our main theoretical results. Under
43 fiscal stimulus, resources are injected in the economy and labor expands in indus-
44 tries that serve the economy under lock down. The risk profile across industries re-
45 mains the same as in lock down, but the population contact rate increases as more
46 people are hired back into the economy. In contrast, re-opening returns workers
47 back to their initial industries, altering the risk profile relative to lock down. As
48 the composition of employment in the economy adjusts from re-opening, the pop-

49 ulation contact rate can adjust upward or downward depending on the nature of
50 the composition change. However, we find currently locked down industries have
51 higher contact rates in the absence of complementary mitigation strategies. Conse-
52 quently, re-opening these industries shifts the composition of employed workers
53 toward industries with higher contact rates, increasing the population level contact
54 rate. We find this effect is strongest for Food Service and Drinking Places, Cloth-
55 ing and Clothing Accessories Stores, and Amusement, Gambling, and Recreation
56 industries.

57 The main insight of the paper is how different pandemic responses interact
58 with work context and industrial composition and affect the population contact
59 rate and change the dynamics of COVID-19. For both scenarios, we calculate the
60 number of new infections relative to the number of employed workers in the econ-
61 omy. New infections quickly increase relative to the case of lock down, but a fiscal
62 stimulus package generates fewer infections compared to the re-opening of cer-
63 tain locked down industries. We find a fiscal stimulus package leads to fewer new
64 infections when Food Service and Drinking Places, Clothing and Clothing Acces-
65 sories Stores, and Amusement, Gambling, and Recreation Industries remain under
66 lock down. We find re-opening these industries leads to a larger shift in the popu-
67 lation contact rate than under a fiscal stimulus scenario, where the same number of
68 workers are added back to the post lock down industrial mix of economic activity.

69 Our multi-group SIR model is related to the models in Acemoglu et al. (2020),
70 Baqaee et al. (2020), Çakmaklı et al. (2020), and Favero et al. (2020). The multi-
71 group SIR model extends the canonical single group model of Kermack and McK-
72 endrick (1927) to account for heterogeneous risks across multiple groups. Çakmaklı
73 et al. (2020) construct a similar multi-group SIR model that accounts for hetero-
74 geneity in physical contact at work, but they do not link their model with economic

75 parameters that describe aggregate economic activity. Complementing their study,
76 we illustrate how the population SIR model can be represented as disaggregated
77 industry-specific SIR models. Acemoglu et al. (2020) provide a similar aggrega-
78 tion result in their model, where groups correspond to different age classifications.
79 After aggregating the industry SIR models to the population-level, we show the
80 population-level contact rate used in the standard SIR model is determined by
81 industry-specific contact rates, industry composition, and spending levels in the
82 economy.

83 Some recent papers deal with optimal policy responses to COVID-19 under dif-
84 ferent economic and epidemiological settings (Alvarez et al. 2020; Jones et al. 2020;
85 Eichenbaum et al. 2020; Farboodi et al. 2020; Piguillem and Shi 2020; Gonzalez-
86 Eiras and Niepelt 2020). Given the large uncertainties surrounding the current
87 epidemic, we intentionally abstain from optimal policy analysis and instead focus
88 on the trade-offs inherent in stylized economic scenarios. We choose this approach
89 for several reasons. First, we do not consider complementary mitigation strategies,
90 such as social distancing, mask mandates, or required testing. Recent research in
91 this area shows a bundled mitigation approach can limit virus transmission (Wang
92 et al. 2020). With these complementary strategies in place, re-opening high contact
93 industries, such as Food Service and Drinking Places, may have a less profound
94 impact on COVID-19 dynamics than our model would suggest.

95 Second, our simulation exercises do not account for consumer avoidance be-
96 havior, e.g. voluntarily avoiding large public gatherings, during a virus outbreak
97 (Yoo et al. 2010; Alfaro et al. 2020; Gupta et al. 2020). While some early evidence
98 suggests re-opening increases mobility (Nguyen et al. 2020), consumer percep-
99 tion of virus risk may reduce, or hold constant, the transmission risk posed by
100 re-opening certain industries. Since our analysis does not consider this a possibil-

101 ity, our estimates may overstate the impacts of re-opening on virus contagion.

102 Lastly, we stress that our model is best viewed as a method for calibrating
103 macroeconomic models to account for feedback loops between industrial struc-
104 ture and virus dynamics. By now, there is a large literature on the macroeconomic
105 impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Of this literature, several papers, including but
106 not limited to Eichenbaum et al. (2020), Jones et al. (2020), Farboodi et al. (2020),
107 Garibaldi et al. (2020), and Krueger et al. (2020), study how behavioral responses
108 to epidemics influence virus dynamics by changing key underlying parameters of
109 epidemiological models. We complement these studies by focusing on how the
110 population contact rate in the standard SIR model is affected by varying key eco-
111 nomic parameters. This allows us to keep the focus on how changes in the eco-
112 nomic landscape during the pandemic could potentially alter the dynamics of the
113 COVID-19 pandemic.

114 The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the multi-group SIR
115 model used in the analysis. We illustrate how fiscal stimulus and re-opening affect
116 the population level contact rate. Importantly, we also show how the composition
117 of economic activity and differences in industry-specific contact rates can be incor-
118 porated directly into a standard SIR model. Section 3 provides the details of the
119 model’s calibration. We discuss the data and methods used to estimate industry-
120 specific contact rates, potential contacts, industrial composition in the post lock
121 down period, and the multi-group SIR model.¹ We present the main results of our
122 analysis in section 4. In this section, we compare the epidemiological outcomes
123 under the fiscal stimulus and re-opening scenarios. Section 5 discusses important
124 caveats with respect to the interpretation of our results. We offer our conclusions
125 and suggestions for future research in Section 6.

¹In this section, we present simulated estimates for GDP in 2020 Q2. We note here and in presentation of the result that these estimates *are not* official forecasts from the BEA. The estimates presented in the paper are solely for the purposes defined in our study.

126 2 The Multi-Group SIR Model

127 We use a multi-group SIR model to capture how heterogeneous working environ-
128 ments and industrial composition affect the spread of COVID-19 among the popu-
129 lation. We assume a population of individuals of size P can be divided into $N + 1$
130 groups, where N corresponds to the number of operational industries, and the
131 final group consists of the “at-home” population. We define the “at-work” popu-
132 lation as employees that cannot work from home, while the “at-home” population
133 corresponds to children, retired, or unemployed individuals plus those telework-
134 ing. We show how the model integrates changes in economic activity with the
135 virus dynamics in an aggregate population level SIR model.

136 2.1 Model Setup

In the canonical SIR model, at any given time, the population is divided into three groups: a susceptible group of individuals who have not yet contracted the virus, a group of infected individuals, and a group of recovered individuals who previously contracted the virus but are no longer contagious. The multi-group SIR model implemented in this paper consists of a collection of dynamic processes that represent the dynamics of infection and spread within and between groups. The model accounts for heterogeneity in contact rates and susceptible populations and is given by the following system of differential equations

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{d\mathbf{S}}{dt} &= -\text{diag}(\mathbf{S}) \mathbf{B}\mathbf{I} \\ \frac{d\mathbf{I}}{dt} &= \text{diag}(\mathbf{S}) \mathbf{B}\mathbf{I} - \gamma\mathbf{I} \\ \frac{d\mathbf{R}}{dt} &= \gamma\mathbf{I}\end{aligned}$$

137 where \mathbf{S} is an $N + 1 \times 1$ vector containing the number of susceptible individuals
 138 S_{jt} in each industry j and time period t . The transmission of the virus is governed
 139 by an $N + 1 \times N + 1$ matrix of transmission coefficients \mathbf{B} . The element β_{jk} is
 140 the contact rate between group j and k . The number of infected individuals in
 141 each industry and time step, I_{jt} , is contained in the $N + 1 \times 1$ vector \mathbf{I} . Similarly,
 142 the number of recovered individuals in each industry and time step is given by
 143 the $N + 1 \times 1$ vector \mathbf{R} . Individuals recover at the rates given by the matrix γ ,
 144 where the diagonal elements γ_j correspond to the recovery rate of group j and
 145 off-diagonal elements are zero.

We assume the row entries in \mathbf{B} are constant within an industry, so that $\beta_{j,1} =$
 $\beta_{j,2} = \dots = \beta_{j,N+1}$ for each industry j . Furthermore, we assume the recovery rates
 in γ are identical for all groups. Under these assumptions, the virus dynamics
 within a particular group can be written as follows

$$\begin{aligned}
 \frac{dS_{jt}}{dt} &= -\beta_j S_{jt} \sum_{j=1}^{N+1} I_{jt} \\
 \frac{dI_{jt}}{dt} &= \beta_j S_{jt} \sum_{j=1}^{N+1} I_{jt} - \gamma I_{jt} \\
 \frac{dR_{jt}}{dt} &= \gamma I_{jt}
 \end{aligned}$$

Heterogeneity in risks comes from differences in contact rates at work across
 industries. For each of the N industries in the economy, we define the contact
 rate of the industry, β_j to be a combination of the at-home rate β and the industry
 contact index ρ_j . The industry contact rate $\rho_j \beta$ reflects the contact rates of workers
 in industry j who must be physically present at their jobs. Formally, the at-work
 contact rate is given by $\beta_j = (h_j + \omega_j \rho_j) \beta$. In this formulation, we use h_j to denote
 the amount of hours a worker is at-home and ω_j to account for the amount of hours

spent at work, where $h_j = 1 - \omega_j$ to reflect the idea that a worker's time is spent either at-work or at-home. With these definitions and assumptions in mind, we can write the dynamics of the virus at the population level as

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{dS_t}{dt} &= \sum_{j=1}^{N+1} \frac{dS_{jt}}{dt} = -\tilde{\beta}_t S_t I_t \\ \frac{dI_t}{dt} &= \sum_{j=1}^{N+1} \frac{dI_{jt}}{dt} = \tilde{\beta}_t S_t I_t - \gamma I_t \\ \frac{dR_t}{dt} &= \sum_{j=1}^{N+1} \frac{dR_{jt}}{dt} = \gamma I_t\end{aligned}$$

After aggregating to the population level, the dynamics of the multi-group SIR model resemble the dynamics of a standard SIR model, but with one important difference. In the population version of the multi-group SIR model, the effective population-level contact rate $\tilde{\beta}$ is a weighted sum of the group-level contact rate and it is proportional to the at-home contact rate β . Specifically, the population contact rate is given by the following expression

$$\tilde{\beta}_t = \left[\sum_{j=1}^{N+1} (h_j + \omega_j \rho_j) \frac{S_{jt}}{S_t} \right] \beta$$

146 This expression illustrates how both the transmission coefficients for each group,
 147 $(h_j + \omega_j \rho_j) \beta$, and the composition of susceptible individuals across the $N + 1$
 148 groups, S_{jt}/S_t , influences the contact rate in the economy. Intuitively, this expres-
 149 sion dictates that when a higher fraction of susceptible individuals are in high
 150 contact industries, the overall contact rate of the economy increases, and thus the
 151 progression of the virus accelerates in the population.

152 2.2 Connecting the Model to the Economy

153 In this section, we connect the multi-group SIR model with parameters that de-
154 scribe the state of the economy. We illustrate how variations in these parameters
155 influence the population-level contact rate, changing the contagion dynamics of
156 the virus. We then link variations in these parameters with different economic
157 scenarios during the COVID-19 pandemic.

We assume the initial susceptible population within an industry is proportional to the non-teleworking labor force in the industry, thus

$$S_{j0} = (1 - \tau_j) L_{j0}$$

where τ_j corresponds to the fraction of workers in an industry that are capable of teleworking and L_{j0} represents post lock down employment in industry j . The initial number of susceptible individuals in the at-home population is given by

$$H_0 = P - \sum_{j=1}^N (1 - \tau_j) L_{j0} = P - \bar{L}_0$$

where \bar{L}_0 is the total number of employed, non-teleworking workers in the economy. We re-write each industry's initial labor force as a function of economic parameters as follows

$$\begin{aligned} L_{j0} &= \frac{1}{w_{j0}} \left(\frac{w_{j0} L_{j0}}{X_{j0}} \right) \left(\frac{X_{j0}}{C_0} \right) C_0 \\ &= \frac{\gamma_{j0} \delta_{j0}}{w_{j0}} C_0 \end{aligned}$$

158 where γ_{j0} is the labor cost share in industry j , X_{j0} is nominal gross output, δ_{j0} is the
159 Domar weight of industry j , w_{j0} are averages wages in the industry, and C_0 is GDP.

160 Throughout the remainder of the paper, we assume industry average wages w_{j0}
 161 and industry labor shares γ_{j0} remain constant at the baseline value. The former
 162 is meant to reflect wage rigidity, and the latter assumes the industry production
 163 function remains unchanged over the time horizon of study. In contrast, we treat δ_j
 164 and C as economic objects that are affected by our scenarios. With this in mind, we
 165 drop the time subscripts on the economic parameters for cleanliness of notation.

Substituting this into the expression for the initial susceptible population in the
 at-home group implies

$$H_0 = P - C \sum_{j=1}^N (1 - \tau_j) \frac{\gamma_j \delta_j}{w_j}$$

Substituting these expressions into the initial value of the population-level contact
 rate, we connect the population SIR model to economic activity as follows

$$\tilde{\beta}_0 = \frac{1}{S_0} \left[H_0 + \sum_{j=1}^N (h_j + \omega_j \rho_j) (1 - \tau_j) \frac{\gamma_j \delta_j}{w_j} C \right] \beta$$

166 Using this expression, we introduce two effects to explain how the population-
 167 level contact rate $\tilde{\beta}$ adjusts in response to new economic conditions. While we
 168 present these results as separate theoretical effects, the distinction is primarily for
 169 the purpose of parsimonious presentation. In practice, these effects are likely to
 170 occur simultaneously.

171 **The Composition Effect.** We define the composition effect as the change in
 172 the population-level contact rate caused by a shift in consumer spending patterns
 173 while holding income constant. Formally, a change in the composition of the econ-

174 omy affects the initial population contact rate as follows

$$d\tilde{\beta}_0 = \frac{\beta}{S_0} \sum_{j=1}^N \omega_j (\rho_j - 1) (1 - \tau_j) L_j \frac{dX_j}{X_j} \quad (1)$$

175 This effect arises when industries previously closed due to lock downs, e.g. restau-
176 rants, gyms, and salons, are re-opened. As consumers re-allocate spending to these
177 industries, producers in these industries hire back unemployed workers, thereby
178 increasing the total number of potential interactions. Consequently, the contact
179 rate in the population adjusts due to a change in the mixture of interactions in the
180 economy.

181 **The Stimulus Effect.** The stimulus effect is defined as the change in the pop-
182 ulation contact rate caused by an increase in consumer spending. Formally, the
183 stimulus effect adjusts the population-level contact rate in the following way.

$$d\tilde{\beta}_0 = \frac{\beta}{S_0} \sum_{j=1}^N \omega_j (\rho_j - 1) (1 - \tau_j) L_j \frac{dC}{C} \quad (2)$$

184 In contrast to the re-opening effect, the stimulus effect does not result in a change
185 in the composition of spending but rather the scale of spending, as we assume the
186 fiscal stimulus package is implemented without lifting any current lock downs.²
187 Instead, the fiscal stimulus increases overall spending, driving up employment
188 under the post lock down industry composition.³ In this scenario, higher employ-
189 ment increases the total number of potential contacts at work, which raises the

²Our analysis implicitly assumes the economic scenarios occur over short time horizons to avoid changes in composition arising from non-homothetic preferences. We thank Brian Sliker at the Bureau of Economic Analysis for pointing this out.

³In the analysis, we remain agnostic on the spending levels required to raise employment to pre-lock down conditions, especially since households may have enhanced precautionary savings motives during the lock down period. Consequently, spending levels would need to be much higher than our economic model suggests. However, in any case, the same number of workers will return to work under the post lock down composition.

190 population-level contact rate holding constant the post lock down composition.

191 These effects underpin the main differences across the economic scenarios we
192 explore in this paper. The first scenario we examine is re-opening the economy.
193 In the model, the re-opening scenario alters the composition of spending in the
194 economy, and the change in composition adjusts the weights on each industry's
195 contact rate, leading to an overall adjustment in the population-level contact rate.
196 The second scenario we examine is a fiscal stimulus designed to increase consumer
197 spending in the economy. The stimulus effect reflects how the population-level
198 contact rate adjusts from the implementation of such a measure. While we examine
199 these scenarios discretely, we expect some combination of these scenarios to be
200 implemented simultaneously in practice.

201 **3 Model Calibration**

202 This section presents our methodology for calibrating the multi-group SIR model
203 and the economic parameters required for our analysis. We begin by presenting
204 the data and methods behind our estimates for industry-specific contact rates. We
205 follow this presentation with a brief overview of the method used to simulate the
206 economic response to COVID-19 and subsequent lock down measures. We con-
207 clude the section with a discussion of the parameters and assumptions within the
208 multi-group SIR model.

209 **3.1 Industry Contact Rates**

210 The industry-specific contact rates, β_j , dictate the behavior of the population-level
211 contact rate when fiscal stimulus and re-opening are introduced. To calibrate these
212 parameters, we rely on attributes of an occupation's work context to capture the

213 ability of a worker to social distance while still performing key job-related func-
214 tions.

215 We use a combination of data sources for the calibration. First, we construct an
216 *unadjusted physical contact index* using work context characteristics from the Occu-
217 pational Network (ONET) database. From the ONET database, we identify three
218 relevant work context elements that are relevant for this ranking: (i) Face-to-Face
219 discussions, (ii) Contact with others, and (iii) Physical proximity. For each of these
220 elements, ONET reports an importance score between 1-5, where 5 represents the
221 highest level of contact. We compute the product of the importance scores to yield
222 a value for each occupation, where the minimum possible value is 1 and the largest
223 possible value is 125. We then compute the median of this series and use the me-
224 dian to re-scale each occupation's unadjusted contact index, where the median in-
225 dex value is equal to one. This computation yields the physical contact index for an
226 occupation, denoted as ρ_o . Occupations with higher values in the index are more
227 likely to engage in face-to-face discussions, contact with others, or work in close
228 physical proximity with co-workers. We report the results of this computation in
229 Tables 4-11 in Appendix B.

230 Lock downs encourage telework capable employees to work from home. Hence,
231 our second step is to construct the *adjusted* physical contact index, ρ_j , that reflects
232 the contact rates of workers in industry j who must be physically present at their
233 jobs. To make this adjustment, we use data on telework capable occupations from
234 Dingel and Neiman (2020) and remove these occupations from our calculation.
235 This data allows us to compute τ_j for each industry. We pair our occupational con-
236 tact data with the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Occupational Employment Statistics
237 to compute occupational employment shares for each industry. We then use these
238 shares to construct the adjusted physical contact index at the 3-digit NAICS level




Figure 1: The Unadjusted Contact Index, Telework Index, and Adjusted Contact Index

239 to match the level of detail in our underlying industry data. In what follows, when
 240 we reference an industry’s contact index, we are referring to the adjusted contact
 241 index unless otherwise stated.

242 We display the physical contact indices in Figure 1. In the first panel, we show
 243 the relationship between an industry’s unadjusted contact index and teleworking
 244 capacity, including the distributions for each index. We cluster the industries into
 245 four categories using a simple k -means clustering routine. We note these clusters
 246 have no bearing on the subsequent analysis, but help us during the presentation
 247 and analysis of our results. The first cluster includes industries with low tele-
 248 work capacity and a low unadjusted physical contact index. This cluster tends to

249 include manufacturing and construction industries, where teleworking is not gen-
250 erally possible and contact with others tends to remain low. The second cluster
251 includes industries with low teleworking capacity and high unadjusted physical
252 contact indexes. These industries include many retail and health service indus-
253 tries. Hospitals (621) and Nursing Facilities (622) are the most salient examples,
254 exhibiting the highest unadjusted physical contact indexes. This cluster also in-
255 cludes industries affected by the lock down, such as Food Services and Drinking
256 Places (722). The third cluster includes industries with an average telework capac-
257 ity, i.e. $\tau_j = 0.5$, and average physical contact index. The composition of industries
258 in this cluster is less clear, spanning from Oil and Gas extraction (211) to Electronics
259 and Appliance Retailers (443). The final cluster includes industries with high tele-
260 working capabilities and average contact rates. A typical industry in this cluster
261 are financial service industries, such as Central Banks (521) and Insurance Carriers
262 (524), but includes one outlying high telework capacity and high contact industry,
263 Educational Services (611).

264 In the second panel to the right, we show the relationship between the unad-
265 justed and adjusted contact index for each industry. This figure illustrates how
266 removing teleworkers from the at-work pool of employees changes the contact in-
267 dex for the industry. Industries below the 45-degree line experience an increase in
268 their contact index, meaning the typical worker is more likely to come into physi-
269 cal contact with others. In effect, by removing teleworkers, workers who must be
270 physically present to perform their duties are generally more susceptible to con-
271 tracting and transmitting the virus since they are more likely to come into contact
272 with others. However, at the same time, the pool of at-risk workers is lower so
273 the net change in total infections is ambiguous. This is particularly prevalent in
274 high contact, low telework industries, such as restaurants and hospitals. By send-

ing teleworkers home, the average contact index is higher. This can be seen when comparing the distribution of the unadjusted contact index (mean = 1.0) and the adjusted contact index (mean = 1.2).

3.2 Industrial composition under lock down

We take lock down as our starting point and calibrate our model accordingly. Our calibration of the economic parameters in the model uses the standard demand-driven input-output model framework (Leontief 1936; Miller and Blair 2009) along with detailed industry data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis to estimate industry output, employment, and aggregate value added in the lock down period. This section provides the general details of the approach along with some of the main results from the calibration and simulation of economic activity. We list the data sources for calibrating the model’s parameters in Table 1, and we relegate the details of the simulation to Appendix A.

Table 1: Calibrated Parameters of the Model

Parameter	Description	Source
<i>Households and Producers</i>		
γ	Labor cost shares	2018 BEA Industry Account
\mathbf{M}	Leontief inverse	2018 BEA Detailed Use Table
α	Expenditure shares	2018 BEA Detailed Use Table
<i>Re-opening Parameters</i>		
θ_t	Final demand impacts	Dunn et al. (2020)

In our simulation we made several important assumptions. For instance, the model holds capital fixed and abstracts away from exports, imports, and changes in inventories. Furthermore, we do not consider how virus dynamics affect economic output and assume all economic impacts are the result of the lock down.




Figure 2: Simulated Percentage Change in Quarterly GDP

292 Figure 2 presents our estimated impacts of lock downs on quarterly GDP. To pro-
 293 duce the range of estimates, we use the estimated 95 percent confidence intervals
 294 for the impacts of lock downs on final demand spending from Dunn et al. (2020)
 295 and conduct 10,000 simulations using independent draws from their implied dis-
 296 tributions. In the first quarter, our estimates range from -2.5% to -6.0%, where the
 297 average estimate is -4.1%. According to revised estimates from the Bureau of Eco-
 298 nomic Analysis, GDP in the first quarter contracted at an annualized rate of -5.0%.
 299 For the second quarter estimates, we conduct the simulation exercise under the as-
 300 sumption that lock downs are lifted on June 1st, and economic activity recovers to
 301 the pre-lock down levels immediately. The range of estimates for second quarter
 302 GDP are more pessimistic, reflecting the longer shutdown period. The range of
 303 estimates span from -8.9% to -23.1%, and the average estimate is -15.8%. We note
 304 these estimates are not official forecasts from the BEA. Instead, these are simula-
 305 tions used to only inform the key parameters in the multi-group SIR model, and,
 306 therefore, developed only for the purposes of this paper.

307 Next, we simulate the employment impacts of the lock down scenario. Figure
 308 3 presents the results of our unemployment estimates. We select the minimum, av-
 309 erage, and maximum estimate (in absolute value) from our GDP simulations and
 310 compute the number of unemployed workers in each quarter. The gray shaded




Figure 3: Unemployment Estimates versus Observed Unemployment Insurance Claims

311 bars correspond to our estimates, while the blue bar corresponds to actual unem-
 312 ployment insurance (UI) claims. At the time we were writing this paper, contin-
 313 ued weekly UI claims totaled 34.5 million following the start of lock down in the
 314 United States. Evaluated at the maximum impact, our model estimates a total of
 315 26.8 million unemployed workers in the first and second quarter of 2020. Since
 316 the maximum impacts better reflect reality, we use these estimates to calibrate the
 317 multi-group SIR model.

318 We present the results of our employment calibration in Table 2 for selected

Table 2: Actual versus Estimated Unemployment by Industry (thousands)

Industry	February Employment	April Employment	Actual Losses	Estimated Losses	Difference
Clothing and Accessories Stores (448)	1289	530	759	589	-170
Transit and ground transportation (485)	508	318	190	174	-16
Performing arts, spectator sports, related (711)	511	279	232	140	-92
Museums, historical sites, similar (712)	175	129	45	97	52
Amusement, gambling, and recreation (713)	1785	715	1070	940	-130
Accommodations (721)	2091	1206	885	989	104
Food Service and Drinking Places (722)	12303	6384	5919	4255	-1664

319 industries. We will be focusing on these industries in our analysis below to show-
320 case the logic of our argument. This table also shows one of the primary inputs for
321 the simulation. First, we can see large variation in employment across industries.
322 Food Service and Drinking Places (722) employed more than 12 million people in
323 February while Museums, Historical sites, and Similar (712) employed only 172
324 thousand people. The table also shows that employment losses were not uniform
325 in April. While Museums, Historical Sites, and Similar (712) lost 25% of employ-
326 ment, Food Service and Drinking Places (722) lost 48% and Amusement, Gam-
327 bling, and Recreation (713) almost 60% of workers. Our discussions below amount
328 to reinstating lost jobs back into the economy. As such, we will be recovering our
329 predicted losses and not the real losses suffered in the economy.

330 3.3 Potential Contacts

331 Industry composition and work context interact to determine the population-level
332 contact rate. In section 2, we show how industry-specific contact indexes, ρ_j , in-
333 teract with at-work employment levels, $(1 - \tau_j) L_j$, across industries to influence
334 the population-level contact rate. We refer to the term $\rho_j (1 - \tau_j) L_j$ as the *potential*
335 *contacts* in an industry to reflect the idea that industry-specific contact rates and
336 employment levels dictate the number of possible interactions between individu-
337 als. In the analysis, we assume $h_j = 2/3$ and $\omega_j = 1/3$ across each industry to

338 reflect the idea that only 8 hours of a day are spent at-work. From this assumption,
339 a combination of a high contact rate with a large number of non-teleworking work-
340 ers, i.e. a high number of potential contacts, increases the risk of virus contagion
341 in both the industry and population.

342 Figure 4 displays the relationship between industry-specific contact rates, at-
343 risk employment, and potential contacts. We use the term “at-risk” employees to
344 denote non-teleworking employees. The colors match those we presented in Fig-
345 ure 1 while the size of the circle captures the product between the physical contact
346 rate and the employment size during the lock down period. We label the indus-
347 tries that will be the focus in our simulations below. This figure shows that risk
348 is not only determined by the physical contact index within an industry; instead,
349 the number of at-risk employees also determines overall risk posed to the popula-
350 tion by an industry. For example, Food Services and Drinking Places, by employ-
351 ing the most people, also has the largest number of potential contacts that leads
352 to the highest level of risk for virus contagion. Comparatively, the Amusement,
353 Gambling, and Recreation industry has a similar contact index as Food Service
354 and Drinking Places, but employs substantially less people. Consequently, this in-
355 dustry poses less risk to the overall population in our model since the potential
356 contacts within the industry are lower than Food Service and Drinking Places.

357 **3.4 The Multi-group SIR model**

358 To calibrate our multi-group SIR model, we start by using data on the cumulative
359 infections in the United States. At the time this paper was written, approximately
360 1.485 million people in the United States have contracted the virus. Although these
361 figures likely underestimate the actual number of cases, we calibrate the initial sus-
362 ceptible and recovered population to these numbers. We normalize population to




Figure 4: Industry Contact Rates, Employment, and Potential Contacts

363 one, such that $S_0 = 0.995$ and $R_0 = 0.0035$. In line with the literature, we set
 364 $\gamma = 1/18$ implying 18 days of recovery time on average. Using this value, we
 365 calibrate the initial number of infected individuals as $I_0 = 1 - S_0 - R_0 = 0.0015$,
 366 which pins down the average number of new daily infections for the past 18 days
 367 at 27,500. Unfortunately, we do not have detailed data on susceptible populations
 368 by industry. Thus, for our calibration, we assume the fraction of susceptible indi-
 369 viduals, S_0 , to weight each industry's estimated lock down employment. Hence,
 370 we calibrate $S_{j0} = S_0(1 - \tau_j)\hat{L}_j$ for each industry, where we use the hat to empha-
 371 size this quantity is estimated from data.

372 We set $\tilde{\beta}_0 = 0.2$ to reflect an $R0 = 3.6$. The value of $\tilde{\beta}_0$ is highly uncertain,
373 and estimates of $R0$ range from 2-3 (Atkeson 2020). We elect to set $\tilde{\beta}_0 = 0.2$ to
374 align with the simple calibration in Acemoglu et al. (2020), although our main
375 conclusions are robust to this choice. We use the population-level contact rate to
376 calibrate the at-home contact rate of β . Using our estimates for ρ_j , S_{j0} and H_0 , we
377 calibrate the at-home population's contact rate to be $\beta = 0.15$, only slightly lower
378 than the average population contact rate.

379 Figure 5 illustrates the mechanics of the calibrated multi-group SIR model. To
380 construct this figure, we artificially remove one person from the at-home group
381 and place them at-work in any given industry and then simulate the additional
382 infections caused by this movement. The colors match the industry clusters we
383 identified in Figure 1. The top panel in the figure depicts the change in daily infec-
384 tions, and the bottom panel shows the change in cumulative infections. Sending a
385 single worker from home to Hospitals, a high contact industry, increases daily in-
386 fections by approximately 0.1 at the peak and generates 5 new infections after 200
387 days. In contrast, sending the same person to work in Forestry and Logging, a very
388 low contact industry, will actually lead to fewer infections per day and around 4
389 fewer infections after 200 days. As the figure indicates, darker color industries,
390 corresponding to high contact industries, add more infections over time, whereas
391 lighter color industries, with lower contact rates, reduce infections over time.

392 The intuition behind this result is that a worker moving from the at-home group
393 to work in a high contact industry will increase the population contact rate since
394 $\beta_j > \beta$ for these industries, and vice versa. As a consequence, the number of infec-
395 tions increases because the population contact rate increases from this movement.
396 In Figure 5, we show the change in infections is highly correlated with the contact
397 rate within an industry. We discuss the impact of this movement on the population




Figure 5: New Infections per Worker

398 contact rate in more detail in section 4.3.

399 **4 Results**

400 We analyze two, potentially complementary, approaches that aim to stabilize the
 401 economy during the pandemic. Re-openings, as their name indicates, return cur-

402 rently at-home, unemployed workers to work in the industries that employed
403 them before the lock down. In contrast, fiscal stimulus aims to stabilize or increase
404 aggregate demand via direct resource injections into the economy. In our scenario,
405 we consider fiscal stimulus that directs payments directly to households, allowing
406 consumers to purchase goods and services under the post lock down industrial
407 mix. While the results are presented separately and contrasted, we emphasize
408 these economic scenarios are likely to occur within a broader landscape of eco-
409 nomic conditions that we do not consider. Moreover, we do not analyze situations
410 where the two scenarios are combined.

411 In our simulations, we consider the re-opening of seven industries where pro-
412 ducers face either capacity restrictions, forced closure under lock down, or reduced
413 demand from social distancing. The industries we consider are: Food service and
414 Drinking Places (NAICS 722); Clothing and Clothing Accessories Stores (NAICS
415 448); Amusement, Gambling, Recreation (NAICS 713); Accommodations (NAICS
416 721); Transit and Ground Transportation (NAICS 485); Performing arts, Spectator
417 sports, and Related (NAICS 711); Museums, Historical sites, and Similar (NAICS
418 712). Throughout the paper, we have illustrated how these industries vary in con-
419 tact rates, potential contacts, and unemployment rates following the lock down.
420 Variation in these quantities will be useful for highlighting the main results of our
421 analysis.

422 **4.1 Re-opening Scenario**

423 When an industry re-opens, three quantities will determine how the population-
424 level contact rate changes after reopening. First, the physical contact rate of the
425 re-opened industry will directly affect the population contacted rate since the in-
426 dustry's contact rate reflects the probability of interacting with someone who is

427 potentially infected. When this probability increases, workers are more likely to
428 contract the virus and expose others, increasing overall infections. We illustrate
429 the importance of industry contact rates in Figure 5. Second, the number of at-risk
430 employees in re-opened industries has an important bearing on the population-
431 level contact rate because more at-risk employees increase the number of interac-
432 tions an additional worker can have per day. For the same industry contact rate,
433 more at-risk employees implies more infections occur in the population since more
434 potential contacts would occur. Finally, we need to consider the change in indus-
435 try revenues following re-opening. As revenues increase, employers will hire back
436 workers from the unemployed, at-home population. When an industry hires back
437 more workers, the population contact rate will shift toward this industry's contact
438 rate, potentially leading to an increase in the population contact rate. When an
439 industry's contact rate is higher than the at-home contact rate, hiring workers back
440 into this industry will increase infections.

441 The interaction of these three quantities determines the level of risk to the pop-
442 ulation when we re-open the economy. We present the results of the simulation
443 in Figure 6. On the primary (left) y-axis, we present the cumulative number of
444 *additional* infections per employed worker to illustrate the trade-offs between re-
445 opening and total infections. We plot the additional cumulative infections caused
446 by re-opening on the secondary (right) y-axis. The figure reveals the important
447 trade-offs between strategies for jump starting the economy and the dynamics of
448 COVID-19. First, the figure shows adding workers back to the economy will gen-
449 erate new infections relative to the lock down baseline under any re-opening sce-
450 nario. Second, the number of infections generated per employee continues to in-
451 crease until peak infections are reached. This behavior of the model has important
452 implications for managing the trade-offs between economic activity and the social




Figure 6: Epidemiological Responses to Re-opening Select Industries

453 costs of the virus. As cumulative infections increase over time, the economic ben-
 454 efits of adding workers to the economy will decline relative to the social costs of
 455 managing the virus and, at some point, reach a minimum. Finally, adding workers
 456 back to the economy leads to a peak number of additional, cumulative infections,
 457 suggesting peak infections occur sooner when economic activity increases. This fi-
 458 nal result suggests adding workers to the economy changes the population contact
 459 rate, a result we discuss in further detail below.

460 Consider the impact on infections when the Food Service and Drinking Places
 461 industry is re-opened. We illustrate the impact in dark blue in Figure 6. Before lock
 462 down, the Food Service and Drinking Places industry employed around 12 million
 463 people and continues to employee over 6 million people during the lock down. As
 464 shown in Figure 4 the physical contact index is around 1.2, or 20% higher than the

465 at-home contact index. Reopening the Food Service and Drinking Places industry
466 in our simulation removes 4 million people from their at-home environment and
467 locates them in their work environments. The Food Service and Drinking Places
468 industry is a high-contact industry, with a large number of employees currently at
469 work, receiving a large number of people back into their jobs. As indicated in 6, re-
470 opening the Food Service and Drinking Places industry adds an additional 175,000
471 cumulative infections to the economy up to when the peak difference occurs in the
472 figure. This is equivalent to 22 new infections per 10,000 workers.

473 Next, let's consider the number of new infections generated by re-opening the
474 Museums, Historical sites, and Similar industry. The Museums, Historical sites,
475 and Similar industry employed around 175,000 people before the pandemic and
476 lost 45,000 people following the implementation of lock downs (see Table 2). The
477 average contact rate in the industry is around 10% higher than the at-home con-
478 tact rate, which is lower than Food service and Drinking Places. Re-opening the
479 Museums, Historical sites, and Similar industry adds a relatively small number of
480 people to an industry currently employing relatively few, at-risk workers. As a re-
481 sult the number of additional cumulative infections up to the peak difference only
482 reaches 1,200, implying only 0.162 new infections per 10,000 workers.

483 **4.2 Fiscal Stimulus**

484 In our economic model, fiscal solutions stimulate aggregate demand in the econ-
485 omy. When fiscal stimulus increases aggregate demand, consumers purchase goods
486 and services under the post lock down industrial mix. As businesses revenues
487 increase, unemployed workers are hired back into the economy. Unlike the re-
488 opening scenario, these workers go back to industries serving the economy under
489 lock down conditions. That is, the composition of the economy does not change

490 from the post lock down mix of activity. To compare the results with the re-
 491 openings, we simulate fiscal stimulus scenario that results in the addition of the
 492 same number of workers as if we were re-opening the same industries. For ex-
 493 ample, under the Food Service and Drinking Places fiscal stimulus, the stimulus
 494 results in the employment of around 4 million unemployed workers. We do not
 495 add workers directly into the Food Service and Drinking Places industry, but in-
 496 stead in a combination of industries that maintain the same industrial composition
 497 of the economy under lock down.




Figure 7: Epidemiological Responses to Fiscal Stimulus

498 We present the results of this exercise in Figure 7. Many of the conclusions we
 499 discussed in the previous section remain true for the fiscal stimulus scenario. In
 500 particular, we find restoring economic activity increases total infections, generates
 501 an upward trajectory for infections per worker, and leads to an earlier peak infec-

502 tion time frame. However, the implications for virus dynamics differ from the re-
503 opening scenario. For example, under the Food Service and Drinking Places fiscal
504 stimulus, the addition of more workers to the pool of at-risk employees increases
505 the risk profile of the economy, adding up to 90,000 cumulative infections at peak,
506 corresponding to 7 infections per 10,000 workers. By comparison, if fiscal stimulus
507 was instead crafted to hire back unemployed workers from the Museums, Gam-
508 bling, and Recreation industry, the addition of these unemployed workers into the
509 post lock down industrial mix would result in 2,000 cumulative infections at peak,
510 corresponding to 0.162 infections per 10,000 workers. In the next section, we com-
511 pare the epidemiological outcomes from each scenario and discuss the mechanics
512 driving these outcomes.

513 **4.3 Discussion**

514 Comparing the results in Figures 6 and 7 reveal important insights. We summa-
515 rize these results in terms of total additional infections at the peak in Table 3. Our
516 results indicate the fiscal stimulus approach results in fewer infections than re-
517 opening in several key industries. First, we find that by adding back the same
518 workforce that lost their jobs in the Food Service and Drinking Places industry
519 under the lock down industrial composition leads to fewer infections over time.
520 This implies that for each worker added back to the economy, these workers in-
521 fect fewer people than if added directly to the Food Service and Drinking Places
522 industry. The same is true for Clothing and Accessories stores and Amusement,
523 Gambling and Recreation. This, however, is not always the case. For other in-
524 dustries, adding the same amount of workers via fiscal stimulus would result in a
525 higher number of infections. The main reason for this is these industries present
526 lower risk to the population than the average industry under lock down. As we

527 illustrated before, Transit and Ground Transportation, Museums, Historical Sites,
 528 and Similar, Performing Arts, Spectator Sports, and Related, and Accommoda-
 529 tions employ very few people and have a relatively low contact index, compared
 530 to other industries under lock down, such as Food Service and Drinking Places
 531 and Clothing and Clothing Accessories Stores. Consequently, these industries also
 532 have less potential contacts who can spread the infection. Thus, adding workers
 533 to industries with lower potential contacts can result in fewer infections than in-
 534 creasing employment in proportion to lock down composition.

Table 3: Peak Infections under Alternative Scenarios

Industry	Peak Infections		Difference
	Re-opening	Fiscal Stimulus	Re-opening Less Fiscal Stimulus
Clothing and Accessories Stores (448)	37,646	12,384	25,261
Transit and ground transportation (485)	2,926	3,547	-621
Performing arts, spectator sports, related (711)	2,599	2,829	-230
Museums, historical sites, similar (712)	1,216	1,923	-707
Amusement, gambling, and recreation (713)	29,430	19,868	9,562
Accommodations (721)	9,218	20,903	-11,685
Food Service and Drinking Places (722)	175,218	90,502	84,716






Figure 8: Population Contact Rate under Different Scenarios

Variation in potential contacts changes the risk profile of the economy over time because they affect the population contact rate differently under our two scenarios. In Figure 8, we illustrate how re-opening and fiscal stimulus affect the population contact rate. When we add workers to the economy, initially we see an increase in the contact rate and it eventually decreases and becomes negative as the virus moves through the population at a faster pace, reducing susceptible populations and placing them in the recovered population. Panel (8a) shows how re-openings affect the population contact rate under different opening scenarios. In our simulations, re-opening Food Service and Drinking Places leads to the largest increase in the population contact rate, followed by Clothing and Accessories Stores and Amusement, Gambling, and Recreation. Comparing the outcomes in (8a) with those in (8b) illustrate how regaining employment losses with either re-opening or fiscal stimulus affects the population contact rate.

We break down the driving forces behind the differences presented in Figure 8 by using our theoretical prediction from section 2. We show the core theoretical relationships in Figure 9, where we have labeled select industries. We show the re-opening scenario in Panel 9a. On the y-axis, we present the re-opening elasticity of the population contact rate, which gives the percentage change in the population contact rate relative to the percentage change in revenues in re-opened industries. We choose this normalization to highlight how potential contacts dictate changes in the population contact rate under re-opening. Aligned with the theoretical predictions in section 2, the figure shows a positive correlation between the contact rate elasticity and the industry's potential contacts. For the same percentage change in gross output, re-opening an industry with higher potential contacts will lead to a larger shift in the population contact rate. This occurs because workers are either being added to a larger pool of at-risk employees or to an industry



(a) Re-opening Elasticity and Potential Contacts



(b) Fiscal Stimulus and the Change in Population Contact Rate

Figure 9: Relation between population contact rate and economic scenarios

561 with a higher contact rate. Adding workers to industries with more potential con-
 562 tacts raises the risk to the overall population by increasing the population contact
 563 rate by a larger magnitude.

564 In Panel 9b, we present the results from the fiscal stimulus scenario. In con-
 565 trast to Panel 9a, we present the percentage change in the population contact rate

566 on the y-axis and the percentage change in spending on the x-axis. The percent-
567 age change in spending reflects the size of the fiscal stimulus package necessary
568 to recover lost employment in our model. The panel shows the size of the fiscal
569 stimulus package correlates strongly with the percentage change in the population
570 contact rate. The positive correlation aligns with the predictions from our theoret-
571 ical model, where the composition of economic activity is fixed. In this case, the
572 magnitude of re-employment, captured by the size of the stimulus package, is the
573 source of variation in the population contact rate.

574 These two panels illustrate our theoretical predictions from section 2. For re-
575 opening, variation in potential contacts (including the percentage change in gross
576 output), will dictate how much the population contact rate increases. However,
577 for the same percentage change in gross output, the only factor influencing the
578 population contact rate is the potential contacts of the industry when we re-open
579 certain industries. For fiscal stimulus, the population contact rate is only affected
580 by the size of the fiscal stimulus package, which proxies the number of employ-
581 ees added back to the economy, since the composition of hiring across industries
582 remains unchanged.

583 **5 Limitations**

584 In this section, we summarize the key assumptions underlying our theoretical
585 model and simulation. Our objective for this section is to convey the key assump-
586 tions of our analysis and relate them to our findings in order to bound the inter-
587 pretation of our results. In section 3, we introduce an extension of the canonical
588 susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model, which accounts for heterogeneity in
589 contact rates within occupations and the composition of output across industries.
590 For analytical tractability, we make some simplifying assumptions in the model

591 framework. First, we make a simplifying assumption that the transmission coeffi-
592 cients for group j are equivalent across each group. This assumption simplifies the
593 presentation of the main theoretical results but it is done without loss of general-
594 ity. Furthermore, this assumption is in accord with our calibration strategy, where
595 data on between group transmission coefficients are unavailable.

596 Second, we assume certain parameters of the model are not affected by the eco-
597 nomic scenarios we analyze. That is, our theoretical results do not account for how
598 variations in economic activity, either through stimulus or reopening, affect the un-
599 derlying parameters governing industry contact rates or hours spent at-work. This
600 assumption is not only for analytical convenience. Instead, we choose to not take a
601 stand on how contact rates adjust following changes in the economic environment
602 since we are analyzing stylized scenarios. Our theoretical framework, however,
603 can be used to assess how variations in these parameters might impact COVID-19
604 dynamics alongside concomitant changes in the economic environment.

605 Section 4 introduces the calibration strategy used for simulation. There are
606 a few important caveats to consider. First, industry-contact rates are computed
607 using the most recent data from the ONET “Work Context” database. However,
608 the industry-specific contact rates are static in the simulation and, therefore, do not
609 adjust in our stylized economic scenarios. The static nature of these parameters
610 implies our model does not capture the full impacts of the economic scenarios
611 under investigation, and the total effect on infections would necessarily require
612 data on how contact rates adjust within these different economic environments.
613 Nevertheless, the model still provides insight on how COVID-19 dynamics are
614 conditioned by the current economic environment.

615 Second, our approach for calibrating the multi-group SIR model is somewhat
616 rigid. We calibrated the model using the best available data at the time the paper

617 was written. However, new data is available daily and one is faced with a plethora
618 of options for calibrating initial conditions. Because of this, we calibrate the model
619 using a single set of initial conditions, including a single choice for the reproduc-
620 tion rate. This allows us to focus on the underlying mechanical details of the multi-
621 group SIR model. With this approach, we find our simulation results accord with
622 our theoretical predictions. When the composition of the economy adjusts toward
623 high contact industries, the population-level contact rate rises more than a shift in
624 economy activity toward low contact industries. Moreover, we find more infec-
625 tions occur when activity jumpstarts in industries with high contact rates and high
626 employment.

627 **6 Conclusions**

628 In this paper, we introduce a multi-group SIR model that accounts for heterogene-
629 ity in physical contact across industries and industrial composition. We use the
630 model to illustrate a new application of economic statistics to the COVID-19 pan-
631 demic. On the theoretical side, we show how a disaggregated multi-group SIR
632 model can be reduced to a population SIR model and link the population-level
633 contact rate with key economic parameters used to maintain and restore economic
634 activity. We show fiscal stimulus influences the population-level contact rates by
635 increasing the number of workers who must be physically present at work. In con-
636 trast, we find re-opening scenarios both increases the number of physically present
637 workers but also adjusts the distribution of economic activity toward higher con-
638 tact industries.

639 On the numerical side, we calibrate the parameters of the multi-group SIR
640 model using a combination of novel data sources and economic statistics. First,
641 we construct a physical contact index for each industry that reflects variation in

642 contact and telework capacity across occupations in the industry. We highlight
643 that certain locked down industries, such as Food Service and Drinking Places, are
644 usually high contact industries with low capacity to perform operations remotely.
645 Second, we use detailed industry data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis to
646 simulate economic conditions after lock down orders were enacted. Our simula-
647 tions predict a precipitous drop in the United States' GDP in the first and second
648 quarters of 2020. The drop in GDP is accompanied by substantial employment
649 losses, amounting to more than 20 million workers across a host of industries.

650 Using our calibrated model, we simulate the epidemiological responses to dif-
651 ferent economic scenarios during the lock down period. In this paper, we focus on
652 fiscal stimulus and re-opening scenarios. We find fiscal stimulus scenarios result
653 in fewer infection than the re-opening scenarios with high-contact, low telework
654 capacity, and high employment industries. We find re-opening these industries
655 leads to a larger increase in the population-level contact rate than an equivalent
656 stimulus scenario, since allocating workers to re-opened industries leads to a new
657 industrial mix of activity in the economy.

658 Our results should be interpreted with caution because our analysis does not
659 account for several important features that might affect virus dynamics. First, we
660 do not consider what happens when teleworkers also return to work. Instead, we
661 assume teleworkers are allowed to remain at-home for the foreseeable future. We
662 illustrate that the contact index within most industries increases as a result of re-
663 moving teleworkers from the pool of at-risk employees. Adding teleworkers to
664 the mix of at-risk employees may increase infections, but the net effect is unclear.
665 Second, we do not consider the implications for the at-home group when certain
666 industries are allowed to re-open. For example, large event venues are likely to
667 be a major transmission pathway for the virus, but our analysis does not account

668 for this possibility. Third, we do not account for the supply chain impacts from re-
669 opening certain industries. Re-opening Food Service and Drinking Places would
670 likely have an impact on employment in the agriculture sector, but these employ-
671 ment impacts are not accounted for in our analysis. Finally, our analysis does not
672 consider additional investments and/or precautions taken by businesses to mini-
673 mize contact between customers at their locations.

674 With these caveats, the main qualitative conclusions of the analysis support
675 extending the use of economic statistics into novel domains to inform relevant
676 stakeholders during the COVID-19 pandemic. Future work can build upon the
677 data and methods presented in this paper and further extend this research. For
678 example, we do not consider any feedback effects between virus dynamics and
679 economic activity. As more workers are infected with the virus, they are also not
680 likely to be able to perform work-related functions. Because of this, the virus may
681 also lead to supply-side effects that further influence virus dynamics. Our research
682 sets the stage for using economic statistics as a comprehensive input to numerical
683 models that estimate the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.

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749 **A Model Setup for Economic Simulation**

The model starts with the typical market clearing conditions for goods and services. In equilibrium, each industry i 's (gross) output, X_i in value terms is distributed as an intermediate input to other industries, denoted as z_{ij} , or as a final good to the household, denoted as f_i . The equilibrium market clearing conditions of the model are summarized by the following system of equations for all N industries

$$X_i = \sum_{j=1}^N z_{ij} + f_i$$

750 The standard approach to demand-driven input-output models is to re-write the
751 goods market clearing condition using the technical coefficients, $a_{ij} = \bar{z}_{ij} / \bar{X}_j$, where
752 we use the bar to symbolize that the technical coefficients are calibrated to base pe-
753 riod data and held constant in the analysis. To calibrate the technical coefficients,
754 we use the unpublished, highly detailed 2018 Use Table from the Bureau of Eco-
755 nomic Analysis. We aggregate the table to the 3-digit NAICS level to match the
756 industry detail of our contact index.

Re-writing the market clearing conditions using the technical coefficients yields

$$X_i = \sum_{j=1}^N a_{ij} X_j + f_i$$

757 This is the standard setup for demand-driven input-output analysis. In this setup,
758 there are N equations for gross output by industry, and each industry's gross out-
759 put depends on gross output in each downstream industry and own final uses.
760 Solving the system of equations for equilibrium output yields the familiar equa-

761 tion (in matrix notation)

$$\mathbf{X} = [\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A}]^{-1} \mathbf{f} \quad (3)$$

762 where the quantity $\mathbf{L} = [\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A}]^{-1}$ is the Leontief inverse. The Leontief inverse ac-
763 counts for all direct and indirect interactions between industries in the economy's
764 input-output network. Equation (3) captures how variations in an industry's final
765 demand transmit upstream through the economy's supply chain to affect output
766 in other industries.

767 **A.1 Impact of COVID-19 on Final Demand Spending**

768 We adjust the standard model in the following way. Let $\bar{\alpha}_i$ be the share of industry
769 i in the household's consumption bundle. We assume these share parameters are
770 stationary in the model, and compute the final demand share $\bar{\alpha}_i$ using the 2018 Use
771 table. Using these shares, we re-write equilibrium industry output as

$$X_i = \bar{C} \sum_{j=1}^N l_{ij} \bar{\alpha}_j \quad (4)$$

where l_{ij} corresponds to the (i, j) - *th* element of the Leontief inverse, and \bar{C} is base period GDP. We calibrate \bar{C} using 2019Q4 GDP estimates from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Adjusting the model in this way allows us to apply final demand shocks to industry that emerge in the model as change in the composition of spending while holding income in the economy constant. Based on this setup, *estimated* final demand spending in a shocked industry is given by the following

$$\hat{f}_i = \hat{\theta}_i \bar{\alpha}_i \bar{C}$$

where we use hats to denote estimated values. The parameter $\hat{\theta}_i$ corresponds to the estimated impact of lock downs on final demand. To calibrate this parameter, we use the estimates from Dunn, Hood, and Driessen (2020). Incorporating this relationship into the model for gross output yields an estimate for gross output at the industry-level

$$\hat{X}_i = \bar{C} \sum_{j=1}^N l_{ij} \hat{\theta}_j \bar{\alpha}_j$$

It should be noted that overall income in the economy \bar{C} has not adjusted from the containment policy shock in this estimate. This is to reflect the reality that income did not adjust immediately following the introduction of social containment. Instead, lock downs immediately affected the composition of consumer spending, and the change in spending patterns instantiated a subsequent drop income. Using the estimate for industry gross output, we estimate employment at the industry-level using the following

$$\hat{L}_i = \frac{\tilde{\gamma}_i}{\bar{w}_i} \hat{X}_i$$

where γ_i is the labor cost share of industry i . We calibrate this parameter from the 2018 Use table from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. In the analysis, we hold wages and salaries fixed. Industry wages and salaries, \bar{w}_i , are computed using the 2019 Occupational Employment Statistics. Hence, by re-arranging this expression, we estimate GDP as follows

$$\hat{C} = \sum_{i=1}^N \bar{w}_i \hat{L}_i$$

772 **B Contact by Occupation**

Table 4: Top 25 Occupations for Face-to-Face Discussions

Title	Data Value
Internists, General	5.0
Recreational Therapists	5.0
Hospitalists	5.0
Neurologists	5.0
Locomotive Firers	5.0
Ophthalmologists	5.0
Special Education Teachers, Preschool	5.0
Nuclear Power Reactor Operators	5.0
Urologists	5.0
Healthcare Social Workers	5.0
Physician Assistants	5.0
Biomass Power Plant Managers	5.0
Dentists, General	5.0
Physical Therapists	5.0
Quality Control Systems Managers	5.0
Patternmakers, Metal and Plastic	5.0
Nurse Anesthetists	5.0
Orthotists and Prosthetists	5.0
Electromechanical Engineering Technologists	5.0
Nuclear Equipment Operation Technicians	5.0
Genetic Counselors	5.0
Counter and Rental Clerks	5.0
Counseling Psychologists	5.0
Prosthodontists	5.0
Chemical Plant and System Operators	4.99

Table 5: Last 25 Occupations in Face-to-Face Discussions

Title	Data Value
Tire Builders	2.55
Poets, Lyricists and Creative Writers	2.56
Cutters and Trimmers, Hand	2.89
Animal Breeders	3.14
Telephone Operators	3.18
Fine Artists, Including Painters, Sculptors, a...	3.23
Models	3.40
Hunters and Trappers	3.45
Refuse and Recyclable Material Collectors	3.47
Conveyor Operators and Tenders	3.48
Dishwashers	3.48
Shoe Machine Operators and Tenders	3.48
Rock Splitters, Quarry	3.48
Sewing Machine Operators	3.52
Insurance Claims Clerks	3.53
Textile Knitting and Weaving Machine Setters, ...	3.54
Craft Artists	3.56
Musicians, Instrumental	3.57
Meter Readers, Utilities	3.58
Cooks, Private Household	3.58
Potters, Manufacturing	3.60
Music Composers and Arrangers	3.64
Transportation Attendants, Except Flight Atten...	3.65
Coin, Vending, and Amusement Machine Servicere...	3.66
Outdoor Power Equipment and Other Small Engine...	3.67

Table 6: Top 25 Occupations for Contact with Others

Title	Data Value
Orthoptists	5.00
Physical Therapist Assistants	5.00
Spa Managers	5.00
Ophthalmologists	5.00
Chiropractors	5.00
Dental Hygienists	5.00
Respiratory Therapy Technicians	4.99
Speech-Language Pathology Assistants	4.99
Telemarketers	4.99
Reservation and Transportation Ticket Agents a...	4.99
Medical Secretaries	4.99
Education Administrators, Preschool and Childc...	4.98
Receptionists and Information Clerks	4.98
Obstetricians and Gynecologists	4.98
Physical Therapists	4.98
Allergists and Immunologists	4.98
Dermatologists	4.98
Special Education Teachers, Preschool	4.98
Airline Pilots, Copilots, and Flight Engineers	4.97
Gaming Cage Workers	4.97
Loan Interviewers and Clerks	4.97
Radiation Therapists	4.97
First-Line Supervisors of Personal Service Wor...	4.97
Radio Operators	4.96
Credit Checkers	4.96

Table 7: Last 25 Occupations in Contact with Others

Title	Data Value
Mathematical Technicians	2.00
Farmworkers and Laborers, Crop	2.58
Poets, Lyricists and Creative Writers	2.74
Painters, Transportation Equipment	2.83
Fallers	2.84
Meat, Poultry, and Fish Cutters and Trimmers	2.85
Pourers and Casters, Metal	2.89
Geological Sample Test Technicians	2.90
Potters, Manufacturing	2.97
Music Composers and Arrangers	2.98
Shoe Machine Operators and Tenders	2.99
Sewers, Hand	3.04
Fine Artists, Including Painters, Sculptors, a...	3.04
Craft Artists	3.12
Welding, Soldering, and Brazing Machine Setter...	3.13
Textile Knitting and Weaving Machine Setters, ...	3.13
Lathe and Turning Machine Tool Setters, Operat...	3.17
Rock Splitters, Quarry	3.18
Landscaping and Groundskeeping Workers	3.19
Separating, Filtering, Clarifying, Precipitati...	3.21
Laundry and Dry-Cleaning Workers	3.23
Hunters and Trappers	3.23
Photonics Technicians	3.24
Refuse and Recyclable Material Collectors	3.24
Glass Blowers, Molders, Benders, and Finishers	3.27

Table 8: Top 25 Occupations for Physical Proximity to Others

Title	Data Value
Sports Medicine Physicians	5.00
Choreographers	5.00
Physical Therapists	4.99
Dental Hygienists	4.99
Urologists	4.97
Dentists, General	4.97
Oral and Maxillofacial Surgeons	4.96
Surgical Technologists	4.95
Skincare Specialists	4.95
Dental Assistants	4.94
Respiratory Therapy Technicians	4.93
Radiation Therapists	4.92
Dermatologists	4.92
Dancers	4.91
Prosthodontists	4.91
Surgeons	4.89
Nurse Midwives	4.89
Obstetricians and Gynecologists	4.88
Cardiovascular Technologists and Technicians	4.88
Surgical Assistants	4.87
Emergency Medical Technicians and Paramedics	4.86
Orderlies	4.86
Radiologic Technicians	4.84
Chiropractors	4.84
Flight Attendants	4.82

Table 9: Last 25 Occupations in Physical Proximity

Title	Data Value
Fallers	1.29
Fine Artists, Including Painters, Sculptors, a...	1.37
Logging Equipment Operators	1.55
Poets, Lyricists and Creative Writers	1.56
Hunters and Trappers	1.68
Wellhead Pumpers	1.74
Cooks, Private Household	1.83
Farmworkers and Laborers, Crop	1.94
Dredge Operators	2.09
Bridge and Lock Tenders	2.10
Pesticide Handlers, Sprayers, and Applicators,...	2.14
Environmental Economists	2.14
Petroleum Engineers	2.20
Refuse and Recyclable Material Collectors	2.22
Political Scientists	2.23
Astronomers	2.25
Music Composers and Arrangers	2.26
Forestry and Conservation Science Teachers, Po...	2.26
First-Line Supervisors of Logging Workers	2.28
Compensation and Benefits Managers	2.29
Pathologists	2.29
Compensation, Benefits, and Job Analysis Speci...	2.29
Cleaning, Washing, and Metal Pickling Equipmen...	2.29
Computer and Information Research Scientists	2.30
Animal Breeders	2.30

Table 10: Top 25 Occupations for Physical Contact Index

Title	Contact Index
Physical Therapists	1.87
Sports Medicine Physicians	1.85
Dental Hygienists	1.83
Obstetricians and Gynecologists	1.83
Chiropractors	1.82
Respiratory Therapy Technicians	1.80
Oral and Maxillofacial Surgeons	1.79
Dermatologists	1.79
Dentists, General	1.78
Urologists	1.77
Physical Therapist Aides	1.76
Nurse Midwives	1.76
Ophthalmologists	1.76
Radiation Therapists	1.74
Acute Care Nurses	1.73
Occupational Therapists	1.73
Cardiovascular Technologists and Technicians	1.72
Prosthodontists	1.72
Orthodontists	1.72
Athletic Trainers	1.72
Surgeons	1.72
Orthoptists	1.71
Respiratory Therapists	1.70
Dental Assistants	1.70
Anesthesiologists	1.69

Table 11: Last 25 Occupations in Physical Contact Index

Title	Contact Index
Poets, Lyricists and Creative Writers	0.16
Fine Artists, Including Painters, Sculptors, a...	0.20
Fallers	0.21
Hunters and Trappers	0.28
Farmworkers and Laborers, Crop	0.34
Cooks, Private Household	0.35
Cutters and Trimmers, Hand	0.35
Animal Breeders	0.36
Music Composers and Arrangers	0.37
Refuse and Recyclable Material Collectors	0.38
Craft Artists	0.40
Logging Equipment Operators	0.43
Conveyor Operators and Tenders	0.45
Sewers, Hand	0.45
Rock Splitters, Quarry	0.45
Potters, Manufacturing	0.45
Tire Builders	0.46
Textile Knitting and Weaving Machine Setters, ...	0.46
Wellhead Pumpers	0.47
Environmental Economists	0.47
Pesticide Handlers, Sprayers, and Applicators,...	0.49
Meter Readers, Utilities	0.50
Geological Sample Test Technicians	0.50
Astronomers	0.51
Pressers, Textile, Garment, and Related Materials	0.51