Democracy by mistake

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Abstract

How does democracy emerge from authoritarian rule? Certain influential theories contend that incumbents deliberately choose to share or surrender power. They do so to prevent revolution, motivate citizens to fight wars, incentivize governments to provide public goods, outbid elite rivals, or limit factional violence. Examining the history of all democratizations since 1800, I show that such deliberate choice arguments may help explain up to about one third of cases. In more than two thirds, the evidence suggests democratization occurred not because incumbent elites chose it but because, while trying to prevent it, they made mistakes that weakened their hold on power. Common mistakes include: calling elections or starting military conflicts and losing; ignoring popular unrest or military discontent and being overthrown; using the wrong combination of carrots and sticks against potential opposition; and choosing a clandestine democrat as leader.

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1 Introduction

The emergence of democracy from dictatorship is puzzling at first sight. Such transitions replace the dominance of an individual or narrow group with a broader sharing of power. Incumbent leaders suffer an unambiguous loss—one that, given the initial imbalance, they should have been able to prevent. And yet democratization happens.

A number of theories purport to explain why. Elites are said to embrace democracy as a way to: commit to future income redistribution, forestalling revolution (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006)("AR"); motivate citizens to fight foreign attackers (Ticchi and Vindigni 2008), or nudge future governments away from patronage (Lizzeri and Persico 2004). One elite faction might liberalize to win support against its competitors (Llavador and Oxoby 2005). Or democracy might represent a "great compromise" between deadlocked social groups (Rustow 1970), perhaps formalized in a "pact" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 37-9).

One thing these arguments share is the assumption incumbents democratize *intentionally*. Given prevailing conditions, rulers think doing so is in their interest. Surrendering or dividing power is the cost they have to pay to prevent revolution, field an army, improve public services, sideline an elite rival, or limit social conflict. In Huntington's (1991, 108) words, for democracy to emerge "some political leaders have to want it to happen or be willing to take steps… that may lead to it happening." In Rustow's (1970, 355), democratization requires a "deliberate decision on the part of political leaders."[2] While not all accounts share this assumption, the deliberate choice approach has been influential.

Examining all cases of democratization between 1800 and 2015, I document that some may, indeed, fit each of these arguments. Certain incumbents—such as King Frederick VII of Denmark, who accepted constitutional monarchy in 1848—have quite consciously chosen reform.

[2] Some arguments—e.g. Lizzeri and Persico (2004)—focus on franchise extension rather than democratization in general; still, it seems worth examining whether their logic applies more broadly.

Yet, most cases look messier. To Lord Derby, Disraeli's 1867 franchise bill seemed "a leap in the dark." Scholars have reapplied this phrase to Bismarck's reforms a few years later and those of Franco's heirs in Spain (Anderson 1993, Hopkin 1999, 162). Italy's Giolitti made a "jump in the dark" in 1912, while Poland's rulers after World War I took a "leap *into* the dark."[3] Rather than intentionally democratizing, one ruler is described racing to "take ship for England from a lonely beach," after rebels seize his palace.[4] Another flees to exile without medicine or glasses; many end up in jail.[5] Asked if he is moving left or right, one bemused authoritarian confesses to "going around in circles."[6] France's Louis-Philippe in 1848 is, in Tocqueville's (1964, 86-7) phrase "like a man awakened at night by an earthquake… knocked flat before he had understood." Chaos, myopia, and miscalculation loom larger in these accounts than rational decisions.

In this paper, I conjecture that democracy often emerged not because incumbent elites chose it but because, while seeking to prevent it, they made critical mistakes. To explore this, I examined each of 294 historical episodes that qualify as democratization under six common definitions.[7] From a range of sources, I composed a synopsis of each, noting key facts and interpretations of historians and analysts. I evaluated whether each deliberate choice argument could explain what happened and also whether significant mistakes by incumbents contributed. Based on the strength of evidence, I rated my confidence in each judgment on a 5-point scale from "very probably yes" to "very probably no," and recorded the reasoning and evidence behind each.

Depending on the democratization measure, the historical evidence "probably" or "very probably" fit each intentionalist theory in from 1-3 percent of cases (nudging governments to reduce patronage) to 14-20 percent of cases (compromise between deadlocked groups). In 24-36 percent, it "probably" or "very probably" fit at

[3] *Corriere della Sera*, May 4, 1912, quoted in Larcinese (2011, 9); Biskupski, Pula, and Wróbel (2010, 120).

[4] King Manuel II of Portugal (Birmingham 1993, 148).

[5] Tunisia's Ben Ali (Tunisie Secret 2013).

[6] Mikhail Gorbachev (Remnick 1991).

[7] Correcting certain codings reduces the total to 267. All synopses and classifications will be posted on line.

least one of these. However, mistakes appear to have played a far greater role. One or more incumbent missteps “probably” or “very probably” contributed to the outcome in 66-85 percent of cases.

The type of mistake varies, but hubris is a common thread. Some—like Louis-Philippe—underestimate the strength of opposition, fail to compromise or repress until too late, and are overthrown. Their revolutionary successors then introduce reforms. Others—like Augusto Pinochet in Chile—overestimate their popularity, call an election or referendum, fail to manipulate sufficiently, and lose, splitting the elite and empowering opponents.

Certain incumbents—such as Leopoldo Galtieri in Argentina—begin military conflicts, expecting victory, but lose not just the battle but political power, as colleagues defect and rivals mobilize. Still others slide—like Mikhail Gorbachev after 1985—down the “slippery slope,” making concessions they think will strengthen the regime but that in fact undermine it.

In each of these cases, the ruler does not mean to surrender authority. But his misstep destroys the status quo. In another scenario, others in the ruling group miscalculate. They choose a leader—like Juan Carlos or Adolfo Suárez in post-Franco Spain—whom they trust to preserve the system but who destroys it.

Of course, not *all* incumbent errors lead to democratization. And those that do initially trigger only the fall of a dictator or authoritarian regime; democracy emerges if other conditions permit. Nor is democracy a mistake for those empowered by it. While understanding the causes of leader errors is important, and I offer thoughts on this in the final section, this project—examining just cases in which democratization occurred—has limited purchase on that question. I do not make any general, abstract, causal claims. What I do argue, based on the historical evidence, is that in most democratizations to date rulers did not mean to cede power; democracy emerged when they failed to choose the course most likely to avoid it.

That democratic transitions involve uncertainty is not a new point. O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986, 3-4) emphasized the atmosphere of confusion in which decisions are made. They mentioned in passing some missteps I examine here. For Przeworski (1991, 14), democratization is itself “an act… of institutionalizing

uncertainty." He showed how misperceptions can lead liberalizers down what I call the "slippery slope" (Przeworski 1991, 66). I demonstrate the enduring aptness of these insights. But I also push the point further. While myopia and miscalculation feature in both these works, their main focus is on how transitions can emerge from rational negotiation. In the dominant narrative, regime "softliners" strike deals with opposition moderates against incumbent "hardliners." Capoccia and Ziblatt (2010, 938) also note the "potential causal importance of political mistakes, misperceptions, and unintended consequences on both strategic behavior and institutional outcomes," but do not pursue this observation.

My argument relates to several additional literatures. Certain works have sought to check aspects of the AR argument against the historical record. Art (2012) examined 16 Western democratizations from the 19th and early 20th centuries, exploring whether fear of revolution prompted franchise expansions. He found significant evidence in only two of the 16 and ambiguous support in another three. Haggard and Kaufman (2012, 2016) studied 78 "third wave" democratic transitions (and 25 reversions) between 1980 and 2008 and found about half occurred amid "distributive conflict," one element of AR's argument. (They did not assess whether these reforms aimed to—or in fact did—commit the elite to future redistribution, AR's key claim.) Analyzing 348 franchise extensions, Przeworski (2009) found these were more frequent after political unrest.[8] Aidt and Jensen (2014), in a narrower European sample, found franchise expansions increased after revolutionary events anywhere in Europe, a plausible proxy for revolutionary threat. I also find unrest was common before democratization; however, few episodes fit other elements of AR's account.

Methodologically, the paper is an exercise in congruence analysis, a technique for "drawing inferences from the (non-)congruence of concrete observations with specified predictions from abstract theories to the relevance or relative strength of these theories" (Blatter and Blume 2008, 325). It also aims to contribute to the "historical turn" in democratization studies (Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010, Kreuzer 2010).

[8] He reports weak or no statistical evidence for the Lizzeri Persico argument about patronage and for the claim that franchise extensions aimed to motivate citizens to fight wars.

The next section reviews deliberate choice and unintentional explanations of democratization and clarifies what I mean by democratization by mistake. Section 3 discusses the method of analysis. Section 4 presents results for deliberate choice arguments and Section 5 results for democratization by mistake. Section 6 discusses the findings.

2 Theory

2.1 Democratization by choice

What might induce authoritarian rulers to surrender or share power? Various arguments suppose they do so deliberately.

In one approach, democracy emerges from a bargain, usually between rich and poor. One version casts democratic institutions as the enforcement mechanism (AR 2006). The poor wish to expropriate the rich. Usually, they cannot coordinate a revolt, but occasionally some shock such as economic crisis galvanizes them into action. The wealthy would like to coopt the rebels by promising future income. However, both sides know the rich will be able to renege. Establishing a parliament and enfranchising the poor creates a mechanism to enforce such promises, preventing revolution.

This account has several observable implications. Democratization should follow or coincide with anti-elite mobilization—protests, strikes, other mass actions—motivated by economic or redistributive demands. In response, incumbents should incorporate the poor into politics, for instance giving them voting rights. These reforms should, in turn, increase redistribution from rich to poor and prompt the poor to demobilize. And—since democracy supposedly makes the commitment *credible*—the rich should not cancel redistribution or re-impose autocracy soon afterwards.[9]

[9] AR (2006, p.231) assume that "democracy has at least some window of opportunity before a coup can occur."

AR (2006, 38-9) also suggest two variants featuring the middle class. If the threat comes from the middle class—or the poor require its leadership—it may suffice to enfranchise the former, creating "partial democracy." Alternatively, if redistribution to the middle class also benefits the poor, allowing the middle class to choose policy may appease the poor without alienating the rich.

A second bargain concerns national defense. When their country is attacked, the rich need citizens to take up arms. By granting political rights, they motivate the poor to fight—and, afterwards, to put their weapons away. Democracy triumphed in Europe, Weber wrote, because the elite needed "the cooperation of the non-aristocratic masses and hence put arms, and along with arms political power, into their hands" (Weber 1927, 324-5, Ticchi and Vindigni 2008, Ferejohn and Rosenbluth 2017). This requires that democratization occur around the time of war or significant threat of it. The elite must consciously choose to extend rights—and to those needed to fight, or, later, those it seeks to demobilize.

Another approach traces democracy not to compacts between rich and poor but to splits within ruling circles. Lizzeri and Persico (2004) view democratization as a way growth-oriented factions incentivize officials to buy support with public goods rather than patronage. Since public goods are non-rival, their usefulness for attracting votes increases with the electorate's size. Broadening the franchise prompts politicians to substitute public goods for transfers. Evidence might include claims by reformers that democratization would reduce patronage or corruption.

Alternatively, political reforms might reflect partisan competition. One party might enfranchise new voters to boost its support against a rival (R. B. Collier 1999, Llavador and Oxoby 2005, Ghosal and Proto 2009).[10] In this case, the record should show reformers expected to benefit electorally.

A third approach sees democracy as a peace-making device. It emerges, according to Rustow (1970, 352-5), as a "great compromise" after "prolonged and inconclusive political struggle" between social forces. These

[10] See also Przeworski (1986, 56).

might be elite and masses, social classes, or ethnic groups. In some cases, groups conclude an explicit "pact" defining rules to resolve conflicts (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 37-9) Observable implications include a history of "prolonged and inconclusive" conflict and a reconciliation between factions that coincides with democratization.

In all these accounts, democracy is consciously chosen by the ruling group or some subset of it. But is that how democratization typically occurs? Consider another possibility.

2.2 Unintended democratization: previous literature

Another tradition sees democratization not as a choice of the incumbent elite; rather, it arises after the old elite is overthrown. From Marx to Barrington Moore, writers have described parliamentary rule as resulting from a bourgeois revolution that displaced—or at least weakened—an agrarian aristocracy.[11] More recently, Huntington (1991) distinguished between, first, transitions the elite initiated unilaterally or negotiated with outsiders, and, second, "replacements," in which democracy followed the incumbents' forcible eviction.

I document that such replacements did, indeed, occur in up to 40 percent of democratizations. I also explore *why* they did. Class theorists relate this to economic development and the evolving social structure. While these may matter, they rarely explain the exact timing and mode of transition. I explore how incumbents' errors contribute.[12] Although structural factors may make revolution more likely and determine what comes after, leaders' missteps often light the fuse. Indeed, among democratizations that followed the incumbent's overthrow, my data suggest the revolt was almost always triggered or rendered lethal by a mistake.

A second literature, although presenting democratization as a deliberate choice, emphasizes the confused environment in which it occurs. O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986, 3-4) noted the importance of "elements of

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[11] See, e.g., Moore on French Revolution of 1830 (1966, 106).

[12] Huntington (1991, 143-4) mentions various factors that weakened incumbents in Third Wave cases, but does not generalize about them.

accident and unpredictability, of crucial decisions taken in a hurry with very inadequate information." I document how right these authors were. Still, in O'Donnell and Schmitter's account, ignorance and uncertainty are primarily obstacles to democratization rather than catalysts of it. Regime reformers must overcome such problems to unite with moderate outsiders. It takes "the talents of specific individuals (*virtù*)" to defeat the vagaries of *fortuna* (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 5). In my argument, *fortuna* is not an obstacle but the hero of the story: reform occurs when *fortuna* overcomes the *virtù* of autocracy's defenders.

In recent work, Weyland (2008, 2012, 2014) shows how bounded rationality, cognitive heuristics, and loss aversion explain various political decisions. For instance, the fall of Louis-Philippe in 1848 France led citizens elsewhere to expect similar outcomes in their quite different settings. They took to the streets—only to be crushed. Weyland shows how mistakes of citizens caused democratization attempts to fail, in both 1848 and the Arab Spring. I show here how mistakes of leaders explain democratization *successes*.

The closest parallel to my argument is Przeworski (1991, 63-6), who describes two paths to democracy based on "mistaken assumptions." In both, incumbents introduce partial reforms that then get out of hand. In the first, hardliners misread their reformist allies, thinking they favor preserving the regime when in fact they prefer full democratization. In the second, (reformist) incumbents overestimate their ability to halt a revolution midway by threatening repression. These correspond to two of the 10 types of mistake I identify: empowering secret democrats within the regime and making inopportune concessions that lead to a "slippery slope." I show that the first probably or very probably occurred in 8-10 percent of democratizations, and the second in 10-15 percent.[13]

[13] Some work has adapted the Przeworski model, making its implicit use of incomplete information explicit. Gates and Humes (1997) analyse a game in which the public knows the state's repressive capacity and the regime infers it from the public's actions. Blaydes and Lo (2012) adapt it to a case in which the public may favor either democracy or theocracy. In a similar vein, Casper and Taylor (1996, 21-22) assume incumbents and challengers lack information

I build on these various works. While authors such as Przeworski have noted the role of particular errors, I show that these feature in a broader spectrum of miscalculations and missteps. I organize these into a typology that is rooted in current theories of authoritarian governance. I document the contribution of 10 varieties of mistake, across settings and eras, and show how the balance has changed over time. The results suggest that in most past cases—and far more than prominent deliberate choice arguments can explain—rulers' missteps were key to the causal mechanism that produced regime change.

2.3 Democratization by mistake

If democracy sometimes results from incumbents' mistakes, what constitutes a mistake? By this I mean the choice of a course of action or inaction, the expected payoff of which is less than that of another feasible course, where expectations are based on objective probabilities. In short, a mistake is a non-optimal choice.

Mistakes come in two main forms. A mistake of *information* occurs when the actor chooses a non-optimal action because he has incorrect or imprecise beliefs. The actor's reasoning may be perfect. "We must not say," Cicero wrote, "that every mistake is a foolish one" (Cicero 44 BC). But this reasoning is based on faulty information. A mistake of *calculation* occurs when, despite accurate and precise beliefs, the actor optimizes incorrectly. He fails to see that a different action yields a higher expected payoff.

Not all actions with undesired outcomes are mistakes. One may lose a gamble that was, nevertheless, optimal ex ante. Or, faced with only bad options, one may choose the "lesser evil." Conversely, an action may be a mistake even if all options were bad. All that is required is that one other feasible course have a higher expected payoff. It might seem odd at first to call a choice that is logical given current beliefs a "mistake." Hindsight, in the cliché, comes with 20/20 vision. But "mistakes of information" do, in fact, conform with

about public opinion; they respond as protests or election results reveal it. Colomer (2000, 106-7) shows how—as in the Polish case—incumbent misreading of public opinion can undermine a partial democratization equilibrium.

common usage and dictionary definitions.[14] The sentence "If I'd known X, I would not have made that mistake" makes perfect sense.

Democratization by mistake occurs if the regime becomes democratic because of one or more mistakes by the authoritarian incumbent. Of course, democratization results from a series of actions rather than a single choice. To say a mistake led to democratization is not to say that *all* the ruler's actions, including his last as ruler, were non-optimal—only that at least one important action in the chain was. Finally, I do not assume leaders always prioritize staying in power. If they democratize because they expect to dominate under a competitive order (Slater and Wong 2013) or to avoid bloodshed, that is not a mistake.[15] Thus, transition can occur by three paths: a deliberate choice by the incumbent; a failure by the incumbent to prevent democratization despite choosing optimal actions—"unintended but unavoidable democratization"; and a failure to prevent it after at least one non-optimal action—"democratization by mistake."

More concretely, what do such mistakes of authoritarian rulers look like? To identify departures from optimality, one must know what the optimal strategy for preserving an autocratic regime is. Recent literature decomposes this into three key tasks. First, the ruler must deter or defeat challenges from domestic outsiders; Svolik (2012) calls this the problem of "authoritarian control." Second, he must avoid conflict among insiders—the problem of "authoritarian power-sharing" (Ibid). Third, he must manage relations with foreign actors. Mistakes are non-optimal actions in pursuit of these three tasks. Figure 1 disaggregates further.

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[14] The *Oxford English Dictionary* includes among meanings "a regrettable choice" and illustrates with a quote from Eliot's *Middlemarch*: "How could I know, when I was fifteen, what it would be right for me to do now? My education was a mistake." Not having known something, while perhaps excusing a mistake, does not make it not a mistake.

[15] Another question is how long before democratization the mistake can occur. I rarely considered actions more than a few years prior to the reform. Earlier mistakes might have been important—so my estimates are conservative—but it is harder to be confident distant events were influential.

Figure 1: Typology of Paths to Democracy



The main tactics for controlling domestic outsiders are co-optation and repression (often combined with surveillance and censorship). Broadly speaking, incumbents can use these non-optimally in four ways. They may make excessive or poorly targeted concessions that in fact strengthen opposition (Rasler 1996). Partial reforms, in some settings, increase pressure for more, pushing leaders down the proverbial "slippery slope." Or rulers may *fail* to make concessions that would have divided and weakened the opposition or co-opted new allies (Goldstone and Tilly 2001, 188). Likewise, excessive or poorly targeted repression can backfire, exposing the regime's brutality and inciting the previously apathetic to revolt (Sutton, Butcher and Svensson 2014). Or rulers may fail to repress—or monitor, or censor—the opposition in ways that could have deterred or disrupted its challenges (Tilly 1978).

Besides misusing carrots and sticks, autocrats can discredit themselves through domestic policy failures—destabilizing the economy, hiking food prices, tolerating extreme corruption, and so on. (For such policies to be a *mistake*, a superior alternative must have been feasible.) Overconfident leaders may also call an election or referendum, only to find they are less popular than believed. Such revelations embolden the opposition and often prompt insider defections. A related mistake is to falsify results so brazenly that it provokes rebellion. An incumbent may have no better option. But if he could have increased his survival odds by postponing, canceling, or never calling the election; campaigning more effectively; or manipulating results more adroitly, then his action constitutes a mistake.

Besides controlling the population, rulers must control themselves. Internal conflict often triggers regime breakdown. Mistakes by incumbents can cause this in three main ways. First, the leader may avoidably alienate key members of the ruling coalition such as the Church or business elite. Second, he may provoke disloyalty in the armed forces or security services, weakening repressive capacity or prompting a coup. Third, a dictator may choose as successor—or insiders may select as leader—a covert reformer who undermines the regime or an incompetent who fails to defend it.

The third challenge is to manage international relationships. A common mistake, in this regard, is to enter or initiate military conflict—and do poorly. This may end in invasion or, at least, discredit the ruler domestically, prompting elite defections and mass protests. As always, failure only indicates a mistake if avoiding the conflict, or commanding more ably, would have increased survival odds.

Since democratizations consist of processes rather than single events, each episode may contain more than one mistake. One may lead to another—for instance, alienating the army may result in non-optimal use of repression—or an underperforming leader may err in multiple ways. Similarly, actors in deliberate choice cases may have multiple motives—perhaps seeking to stabilize a prolonged struggle while increasing their faction's support. Complicating matters further, mistakes may combine with elements of deliberate choice (hence, the dashed arrows in Figure 1). In Spain under Franco, the dictator and his cronies entrusted future power to individuals disloyal to the regime (a mistake), who later democratized by forging a multilateral pact

(deliberate choice). Still, I label an episode "democratization by mistake" if—as in the Spanish example—the incumbent deliberately chose reform only *after* prior mistakes.

3 Method

3.1 Identifying cases

How one defines democratization depends on how one thinks about democracy. One tradition places political regimes on a continuum, from pure autocracy to pure democracy (Bollen and Jackman 1989). Democratization is then any reform that moves the country a certain distance in the democratic direction (some instead label this "political liberalization"). I call this a *directional* definition. A second tradition sees democracy as a binary category—either a system is one or it is not; democratization is then a reform, however large or small, that moves the country across the definitional threshold (Przeworski, Alvarez, et al. 2000). I call this a *qualitative* definition. A third *hybrid* concept combines the first two. Such definitions require both a certain movement in the democratic direction and the crossing of some qualitative threshold.

Which definition is appropriate depends on the purpose (Collier and Adcock 1999). Fortunately, we need not privilege one here. I adopt definitions of each type and show similar conclusions follow whichever is used. My directional definition is an increase of six or more points on the 21-point Polity2 scale, completed within three years.[16] My first qualitative definition employs data of Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013)(BMR). They define democracy as a system in which: elections are free and competitive, the head of government is either directly elected or answerable to an elected parliament, and at least half the male population has the right to vote.[17] Democratization is a change from non-democracy to democracy. Two additional definitions come from the Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy database, which identifies objective thresholds for different

[16] Used, for instance, in Kapstein and Converse (2008). Since I am concerned with the initiation of democratization, where an extended rise in Polity2 contains several such cases, I focus on the first.

[17] Used in Boix and Stokes (2003).

levels of electoral democracy (Skaaning, Gerring and Bartusevičius 2015). Specifically, the first concept (LIED4) records when a country began to hold at least "minimally competitive, multiparty elections for legislature and executive" (movement from below 4 to 4 or higher on the index); the second (LIED5) records when a country began to hold such elections with at least "full male suffrage" (movement from below 5 to 5 or higher).[18] Finally, my first hybrid definition adopts the Polity team's concept of a "major democratic transition." This occurs when: A) a country's Polity2 score rises by six or more points within three years, and B) its Polity2 score moves from the interval [-10, 0] to (0, 10] or from (0, 6) to [6,10].[19] My second, more demanding, hybrid definition requires that: A) a country's Polity2 score rise by six or more points within three years, and B) its Polity2 score end at 6 or higher.

The broad coverage of these datasets permits examination of all democratizations between 1800 and 2010 (BMR) or 2015 (Polity IV, LIED). Applying these definitions yields a preliminary list of 294 cases. For various reasons, 27 turn out not to coincide with any identifiable political reform (see Table A1). Excluding these leaves 267 episodes—153 fitting the directional definition, 131-183 the qualitative definitions, and 80-140 the hybrid definitions; as is evident, the cases overlap (Table A2).

3.2 Sources and classifications

The method I use here is congruence analysis (Blatter and Blume 2008, Beach and Pedersen 2016, 269-301, Møller 2017). The goal is to check whether historical evidence in particular cases matches the observable implications—usually about causal mechanisms—of given theories. The main theories examined are the deliberate choice theories discussed in Section 2.1. At the same time, I sought to explore the role of incumbent mistakes. For each case, I examined the mechanism that led to democratization and evaluated, to

[18] I did not use a criterion requiring full female suffrage since different factors likely influenced the enfranchisement of women; causal heterogeneity would make testing Rustow's (1970) or AR's (2006) theories on such data problematic.

[19] Used, for instance, in Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005). I correct some anomalies in Polity's coding (see Table A1).

the extent possible given available evidence, whether this included only optimal choices by incumbents or at least one significant mistake. If the latter, I classified the observed mistakes using the typology of Section 2.3.

For each episode, I prepared a synopsis of events and historians' interpretations. I assessed the extent of evidence for each observable implication of each deliberate choice theory. To increase analytic transparency, I articulated the reasoning behind each non-trivial judgment in an accompanying table, along with relevant quotations from sources (Moravcsik 2014). I summarized evidence of mistakes in the same tables.

The sources—more than 2,000 in all—included history books and articles, newspapers, magazines, web publications, diplomatic cables, biographies, memoirs, diaries, and published interviews of participants, in multiple languages and formats. I sought a range of sources for each case, following leads suggested by the sources themselves to locate missing information or resolve apparent disagreements. Each type is vulnerable to particular biases. Historians may be influenced by their political beliefs or worldview. Newspapers and magazines target specific audiences. Memoirs and interviews, while offering unique insight into actors' motivations, are distorted by self-justification. (Since admitting mistakes is embarrassing, this should work *against* the conjecture that mistakes mattered.) Private diaries are less self-serving but may be partial, episodic, or esoteric. Temporally proximate primary sources are more likely to contain direct observation and unfiltered evidence of actors' thinking (Lieberman 2010, 41). Still, heeding Kreuzer's (2010, 383) call to "take not only history, but also historians seriously," I also paid attention to historical interpretations.

I adopted standard techniques to combat potential biases (e.g., Howell and Prevenier (2001)). First, for each source I considered, based on identity of producer and context, what type of bias was plausible and discounted evidence that aligned with that bias, often noting this in the synopsis source notes. Second, I used multiple sources to cross-check facts and compare interpretations.

To minimize confirmation bias, Møller and Skaaning (2018, 4) recommend "giving less weight to historical works of other social scientists and to work by historians with similar theoretical claims as the one under consideration." For each source, I therefore recorded in a table whether it embraces some social science

theory—and, if so, how this relates to those I examine. I relied mostly on atheoretical sources and discounted (or excluded) sources committed to a theory similar to the one I was examining. I also heeded Møller and Skaaning's recommendations to attend to possible differences in the meaning of concepts across eras and contexts and to prioritize sources that incorporate updated evidence.

As suggested by Lieberman (2010, 45), I graded the quantity and quality of sources available for each case and incorporate these judgments into the analysis. Specifically, I classified the materials: A) "a lot of information; no serious disagreement on relevant points," B) "moderate amount of information; no serious disagreements on relevant points," C) "significant disagreement or ambiguity among sources on some relevant points, or key pieces of information lacking," D) "very little information." This makes it possible to check—as I do—whether results differ excluding cases with sketchier source material.

Beyond the quantity and quality of source material, the evidence may be clearer in some cases and more ambiguous in others. Therefore, I also recorded an estimate of the confidence with which I reached each conclusion. (I used a 5-value scale: 1 "very probably no"; 2 "probably no"; 3 "maybe/unclear"; 4 "probably yes"; 5 "very probably yes."). This allows evaluation of the sensitivity of conclusions. Presenting results, I focus on the proportion graded 4 or 5 ("probably" or "very probably" yes), but I also list proportions for narrower (just 5) and broader (≥ 3) criteria.

Having scoured the historical record, the final step was often a thought experiment. Was there an alternative course more likely to preserve the regime that the incumbent could have chosen? Of course, such an alternative might not have prevented democratization; my definition of mistake requires only that it would have lowered the odds, at least for a while. Nor can one be sure the incumbent would have preferred it; I aimed to be conservative, coding "maybe/unclear" when there was doubt.

However, in many cases, limited inferences seemed reasonable. For instance, various incumbents were deposed—and killed or exiled—by coups that a little more surveillance or attention to military grievances could have prevented. In other cases, "emperors" advertised their "nakedness," as when Ceausescu's state

television showed demonstrators booing the dictator at a rally days before his overthrow. (Broadcasting *live* was a completely unnecessary risk.) Again, to increase analytic transparency the synopsis tables specify the posited alternative course.

Subsequent assessments of leaders themselves or their close associates sometimes cast light on this (although, of course, these require critical evaluation). Some openly admit error. Mikhail Gorbachev, asked in 2011 whether he had made any mistakes in office, listed five (Steele 2011). Turkey's General Evren later lamented not having created a pro-military party after the 1980 coup. "We made a mistake," he confessed. "We've walked this sheep to market and now we are presenting the meat to somebody else" (Pope and Pope 1997, 155). Quick reversals of policies that had proved costly also offer prima facie evidence of an error.

Accounts of contemporaries offer insights into incumbents' states of mind. Tocqueville portrays Louis-Philippe as obtusely blundering into revolution. Louis-Philippe's son, the Prince of Joinville, described his father as "at an age at which a man no longer accepts criticism" (Bourgeois 1919, 285-6). Such sources also suggest feasible alternatives. For instance, Tocqueville warned of rising popular anger and proposed concessions he thought would preserve stability (Tocqueville 1964, 32-3).

Confidence in the classification of cases as "democracy by mistake" is enhanced by major redundancy. Among incumbents who "probably" or "very probably" made at least one mistake, 73-6 percent made two or more, and 40-9 percent three or more. One could, thus, reject one or even two "mistakes" for many cases without invalidating the overall classification. It would take a comprehensive reinterpretation of multiple episodes to threaten the conclusion that missteps played a significant role.

The ultimate test, as with any historical research, will be examination by critical readers. To maximize transparency, the synopses (covering 2,407 pages) include lengthy quotations from sources. Sources are fully annotated with page numbers and web addresses where possible. To illustrate, Table A3 and Box 1 in the appendix show the coding—and reasoning behind it—for one example.

4 Evidence for deliberate choice explanations

Table 1 shows aggregate results for the deliberate choice arguments. I focus here on the percentage of cases in which a given argument "probably" or "very probably" fit the available evidence. Depending on the democratization concept, at least one of the five arguments "probably" or "very probably" fit the evidence in 24-36 percent of cases.

Table 1: Democratizations for which deliberate choice arguments may fit (percentage of cases)

	Democratization concept					
	Polity	MDT	MDTP6	BMR	LIED4	LIED5
Democracy as commitment to redistribute, preventing revolution	5 (0, 12)	5 (0, 13)	4 (0, 14)	7 (1, 17)	5 (0, 14)	7 (1, 16)
Democracy to motivate citizens to defend regime in war or civil war	3 (1, 7)	3 (1, 7)	1 (0, 6)	4 (1, 8)	3 (1, 5)	4 (1, 7)
Democracy to reduce patronage	3 (0, 3)	1 (0, 2)	1 (0, 3)	3 (0, 5)	3 (0, 5)	3 (0, 5)
Democratization to increase support for incumbent party	3 (0, 10)	3 (0, 9)	3 (0, 11)	9 (2, 15)	7 (0, 16)	8 (1, 18)
Democracy result of "great compromise" after "prolonged and inconclusive struggle"	15 (6, 17)	16 (6, 19)	20 (9, 21)	20 (7, 25)	14 (5, 20)	17 (7, 22)
At least one of these arguments	24 (7, 37)	25 (7, 37)	29 (9, 41)	36 (9, 47)	28 (5, 41)	33 (9, 46)

Source: Author's assessments. See online appendix for historical sources.
Note: BMR: Boix, Miller, Rosato definition; MDT: "Major Democratic Transition" under Polity definition; MDTP6: "Major Democratic Transition" ending at Polity2 ≥ 6; LIED4: Transition to minimally competitive, multiparty elections (LIED); LIED5: Transition to at least full male franchise (plus minimally competitive, multiparty elections) (LIED). Main figure is percentage of cases for which evidence "probably" or "very probably" consistent. Figures in parentheses are: first, percentage of cases for which evidence "very probably" consistent, then percentage for which at least "maybe" consistent.

4.1 Credible commitment to redistribution

In one case—South Africa in 1994—the evidence "very probably" fits this argument: the Afrikaner elite may indeed have feared revolution, and the transition agreement explicitly included redistribution. In another 4-6 percent of cases, evidence is "probably" consistent. For instance, in Belgium in 1848, a Liberal government, alarmed by socialist agitation and food riots, broadened the franchise to coopt the lower and middle

bourgeoisie, splitting them from the radicals (Witte, Craeybeckx and Meynen 2009, 55-6). Before passage of Britain's Third Reform Act of 1884, rural demonstrations had alarmed "some of the more nervous minds" in parliament (Hayes 1982, 276). Other cases rated "probably" include Denmark (1848-9), Malawi (1993-4), South Korea (1987-8), and Sweden (1917-9).

Why does this argument, which seems plausible, not fit more cases? Like other scholars (Przeworski 2009, Aidt and Jensen 2014, Haggard and Kaufman 2016, 2012), I find that mass unrest did often precede democratization: historical accounts mention popular mobilization in 75-81 percent of cases. However, mass unrest can lead to democratization by paths other than the one AR describe.

First, some incumbents, rather than democratizing to preempt revolution, are overthrown by one (recall Huntington's "replacements"). New incumbents then do the democratizing.[20] In 1848 Paris, the journalists, socialist agitators, middle class notables, and one romantic poet who declared the republic were certainly not the July monarchy's elite. Second, some popular mobilizations have nothing to do with redistribution; in Armenia in 1997-8, for example, a non-democratic leader fell over policy on Nagorno-Karabakh. In other cases, what triggered unrest was military defeat or electoral fraud.

Even when protesters have redistributive demands, the incumbent does not always democratize to commit to redistribution. Sometimes reforms aim to *reduce* redistribution. The rich overthrow left-wing dictators to protect their wealth (cf. Ansell and Samuels (2014)). Or political reform may substitute for material benefits. Poland's Communists thought incorporating Solidarity might "get opposition support for … painful measures (particularly price rationalization)" (Domber 2013, 68). New democratic leaders often do *not* redistribute to the mobilized groups—and these groups do not demobilize. In short, many episodes that superficially resemble AR's story actually followed a different logic.

[20] The AR (2006) model includes revolutions, but they are not supposed to lead to democracy.

4.2 Motivating citizens to defend in war or civil war

Up to 4 percent of cases show evidence of this. Giolitti's franchise extension is often linked to Rome's Libya campaign: "In 1912, as Italy's conscript soldiers faced death in the Libyan desert, it was impossible to deny them the vote any longer" (Clark 1984, 188). In 1984 El Salvador, the junta's limited reforms sought to buy citizens' help against an insurgency. As President Duarte, put it: "officers were afraid the armed forces might not be able to put out the fires of revolution. To save the armed forces, they would have to break their alliance to the oligarchy and realign with political forces that could win popular support" (Duarte and Page 1986, 97).

Although elites rarely democratized for this reason, war mattered in other ways. Some had freer institutions imposed on them after losing. Take Hungary in 1920. "The French insisted on the formation of a 'democratic' government," General Horthy sniffed. "Against my emphatic advice, Károlyi submitted to this demand" (Horthy 2000, 120). Japan and the Philippines installed democracy under US occupation. Oddly enough, France democratized in 1871 after defeat by an *authoritarian* power. Bismarck feared an agreement with unelected leaders would not last. "Negotiating with this Government, can we hope to achieve something solid?" he asked Thiers. "[T]o treat of peace, an Assembly elected by the nation is better than a restoration of the Empire" (Thiers 1915, 35, 76).

Elsewhere, military defeat delegitimized an incumbent. Argentina's Falklands War hastened its transition not because the generals wished to reward conscripts but because their failure discredited them. In the longer run, war may advance democracy by "building administrative capacity, boosting the economy, or integrating the nation" (Mansfield and Snyder 2010, 25). Yet, support remains equivocal. Among 38 cases in which war preceded democratization, historical evidence suggested war *caused* the reforms in only five, and was "ambiguous or dubious" in 12 (Ibid.).

4.3 Nudging governments to choose public goods over patronage

In December 1875, the Turkish reformer Midhat Pasha complained of widespread corruption.

> [T]he service of the State was starved, while untold millions were poured into the Palace, and the provinces were being ruined by the uncontrolled exertions of governors who purchased their appointments… The only remedy… lay, first, in securing a control over the sovereign by making the Ministers—and especially as regarded the finances—responsible to a national popular Assembly (Midhat (1903, 80)).

The next year, at Midhat's urging, a new sultan enacted a constitution guaranteeing personal liberty and rule of law, with a bicameral parliament. This appears to fit the Lizzeri Persico argument.[21]

Even interpreting loosely to include all democratic reforms aimed at supporting modernization or reducing corruption, I found few others—up to 3 percent. Early 19th century Britain may fit, as Lizzeri and Persico suggest. In Bolivia in 1880, mining elites hoped civilian government would attract investment in railways. Gorbachev's introduction of competitive elections aimed in part to render apparatchiks accountable to the public.

4.4 Recruiting new voters to out-compete elite rivals

The UK's Third Reform Act is among 3-9 percent of cases that "probably" or "very probably" fit the elite competition argument. Historians have characterized Gladstone's bill to enfranchise rural householders as a piece of "cold political calculation" (Wright 1970, 13), which his colleague Joseph Chamberlain believed "would give the Liberals a majority in the next elections" (Jones 1972, 28). Others include Luxembourg (1919), the Netherlands (1897), and Sweden (1911).

4.5 A "great compromise" between deadlocked factions

Evidence for this exists in 14-20 percent of cases. These include classic "democratization pacts" such as

[21] It ended badly. The following year, Sultan Abdülhamid banished Midhat, dissolved parliament, and indefinitely suspended the constitution (Howard 2001, 68).

Venezuela's 1958 "Pact of Punto Fijo," Colombia's "National Front" agreements of 1956-8, and Uruguay's 1984 "Naval Club Agreement" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 37-47, Przeworski 1991, 90). I accept Rustow's characterization of Sweden's 1911 reform as a "great compromise," although a pact-less one. Additional examples include Poland (1989), the Netherlands (1917), and Comoros' Fomboni Accord (2000).

4.6 Change over time and robustness

Do these arguments fit better in particular periods? Tables A4-A6 analyze the three "waves" of democracy separately.[22] Most explanations perform somewhat better in the first. Still, except for elite party competition—which may have contributed in six of the 16 BMR cases—no single argument can explain more than one quarter of cases. In the second wave, the first three explanations lose almost all power; party competition and "great compromises" continue to fit part of the time. The "great compromise" argument is also relatively salient in the third wave, while most others hardly ever apply.

Many "democratizations" studied here were subsequently reversed. Do deliberate choice arguments better explain those that proved permanent? Table A7 includes only cases for which the Polity2 score never fell below the level achieved at democratization (Polity2 and MDT definitions); which never reverted to non-democracy (BMR); or never fell below the relevant LIED threshold. Support increases a bit for the "great compromises" argument. Still, in 58-69 percent of cases none of the arguments fits.

Could results be distorted by inadequacies in the sources? One rough check is to see whether patterns change excluding episodes for which sources were less plentiful and revealing. Table A8 uses only the 66-75 percent of cases for which I graded the source set A or B ("no serious disagreement on relevant points" and "a lot" or "a moderate amount" of information). Results are very similar.

[22] I use Huntington's (1991) periodization: 1st wave: 1828-1926; 2nd wave: 1927-1962; 3rd wave: 1963-.

5 Evidence of democratization by mistake

How often did democratization follow from incumbents' errors? Table 2 summarizes the findings. In 66-85 percent of episodes, the mechanism leading to democratization ("probably" or "very probably") included one or more incumbent mistakes. What sorts of mistakes?

Table 2: Democratization as result of incumbents' mistakes (percentage of cases)

	Democratization concept					
	Polity	MDT	MDTP6	BMR	LIED4	LIED5
Relations with regime outsiders						
Excessive or poorly targeted concessions that strengthen the opposition: "slippery slope"	14 (2, 19)	12 (1, 17)	15 (1, 21)	12 (4, 18)	10 (3, 14)	11 (3, 15)
Failure to make concessions that would likely have divided and demobilized the opposition or coopted allies	15 (1, 20)	15 (1, 21)	19 (3, 26)	15 (2, 20)	16 (3, 22)	14 (2, 20)
Excessive or poorly targeted repression that catalyzes opposition: "counterproductive violence"	27 (15, 31)	26 (16, 31)	31 (20, 38)	27 (16, 31)	23 (15, 27)	21 (13, 25)
Failure to use repression (and surveillance or censorship) that would likely have weakened or disrupted the opposition	10 (3, 15)	11 (3, 16)	15 (4, 23)	14 (4, 18)	12 (4, 17)	13 (4, 18)
Major domestic policy failure that discredits incumbent or avoidably alienates key groups	24 (8, 30)	24 (8, 30)	26 (9, 35)	21 (6, 28)	21 (7, 28)	20 (7, 28)
Mishandling election or referendum (e.g., calling when could be avoided/postponed; campaigning and/or manipulating results non-optimally; falsifying too blatantly)	23 (11, 26)	24 (11, 27)	29 (15, 33)	24 (11, 31)	22 (8, 28)	21 (9, 28)
Relations with regime insiders						
Choosing policies or actions that split the civilian elite, leading to victory of outsiders	12 (6, 14)	13 (6, 14)	19 (9, 21)	12 (8, 16)	10 (5, 14)	10 (5, 14)
Avoidably alienating army or security services (or part of them), leading to overthrow or erosion of repressive capacity	35 (17, 43)	36 (18, 44)	35 (15, 49)	29 (15, 37)	27 (13, 33)	26 (12, 32)
Delegating to agent who turns out to be more motivated to pursue democratization than ruler is (or unexpectedly weak in resisting demands for it)	8 (5, 10)	8 (4, 9)	9 (4, 11)	9 (5, 13)	9 (4, 12)	10 (4, 13)
Relations with international actors						
Major foreign policy failure that provokes foreign intervention or discredits incumbent (e.g., entering or initiating avoidable international conflict, then performing poorly)	18 (11, 18)	19 (11, 19)	24 (14, 24)	18 (13, 19)	17 (10, 19)	17 (11, 19)
At least one mistake	75 (59, 77)	75 (61, 78)	85 (68, 89)	68 (57, 74)	69 (52, 74)	66 (51, 70)

Source: Author's assessments. See online appendix for historical sources.
Note: BMR: Boix, Miller, Rosato definition; MDT: "Major Democratic Transition" under Polity definition; MDTP6: "Major Democratic Transition" ending at Polity2 ≥ 6; LIED4: Transition to minimally competitive, multiparty elections (LIED); LIED5: Transition to at least full male franchise (plus minimally competitive, multiparty elections) (LIED). Main figure is percentage of cases for which evidence "probably" or "very probably" consistent. Figures in parentheses are: first, percentage of cases for which evidence "very probably" consistent, then percentage for which at least "maybe" consistent.

5.1 Controlling domestic outsiders

5.1.1 Carrots and sticks

Incumbents undermined their position by offering excessive or poorly targeted concessions in 10-15 percent of cases. Take Mikhail Gorbachev. His memoirs make clear he aimed for a kind of humane socialism, led by a reinvigorated Communist Party, within unchanged borders (Gorbachev 1996). But his reforms created forces and conflicts he could not manage. Others who slid down the "slippery slope" include Turkey's General Evren, who complained that opposition parties "sprang up like mushrooms" after he relaxed his grip (Pope and Pope 1997, p.155), and General Abboud, who thought free debates would allow Sudanese students to let off steam. Weeks later, he was a private citizen, buying oranges in the *suq* (Collins 2008, 81).

Others refused all concessions when a timely compromise could have defused unrest (14-19 percent of cases). Recall Louis-Philippe, who turned a series of reform banquets into a revolution by vetoing even mild reforms. Thiers, his premier, pleaded with him to add "fifty or a hundred thousand new electors." "Impossible!" he retorted. "I cannot part with my majority" (Senior 1878, 6). Instead, he parted with his crown. Mali's Moussa Traoré accused ministers of "panicking for nothing" when they warned of unrest and rejected even retractable promises that might have calmed rioters (Jeune Afrique 2011). There is no guarantee compromises would have saved either regime; but, if made early enough, they would have improved the odds at least temporarily.

In the right circumstances, violent repression can crush opposition. In the wrong ones, it backfires, catalyzing protest, prompting insiders to defect, or intensifying foreign pressures (Sutton, Butcher and Svensson 2014). In Bangladesh in 1990, the shooting of several students and one professor sparked nationwide demonstrations that led to the arrest of President Ershad for corruption (Crossette 1990). Such counterproductive violence preceded 21-31 percent of democratizations. Conversely, *failing* to use repression—or surveillance or censorship—can also doom the incumbent (10-15 percent of cases). Leaders are assassinated in plots they failed to detect. They go on vacation as unrest spreads. Or they neglect to police protests that then metastasize into revolutions.

5.1.2 Major policy failures

In 20-26 percent of episodes, some domestic policy blunder discredited the incumbent or alienated key groups. Economic mismanagement and ostentatious corruption are common examples, but there are many. Leaders mishandle defense against insurgencies or foreign attacks; bungle responses to natural disasters; and increase government salaries at times of hardship. Baby Doc Duvalier probably regretted his decision to televise his wife's opulent "May Ball" to his country's hungry citizens. It provoked immediate riots (Powers 2012, 227).

5.1.3 Mishandling election or referendum

Authoritarian leaders call elections and referenda, hoping to demonstrate strength or bolster their legitimacy (Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009)). Yet some overestimate their popularity and fail to manipulate adequately. Insiders quarrel among themselves, weakening their candidates. After an electoral defeat, the elite often splits or abandons the dictator. The opposition, energized by the result—or, alternatively, by evidence of fraud—acquires a focal point around which to mobilize.

Such electoral miscalculations preceded democratization in 21-29 percent of cases. Pinochet, certain he would win his plebiscite, was "stunned and enraged" when he lost, roaring: "It's a big lie… Here there are only traitors and liars!" (Constable and Valenzuela 1991, 309, Muñoz 2008, 199). Other junta members say he demanded a state of emergency; blaming him for the crisis, they refused (Spooner 1994, 243-4). Sometimes overconfident incumbents deliberately under-do electoral manipulation or invite international monitors to legitimize their expected victory. Pinochet's team, "shaken by the spectacle of the Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos's disgrace in the fraudulent 1986 elections" thought "their best defense was to make fraud impossible" (Constable and Valenzuela 1991, p.304). Others *over*-do it. When in Guatemala's congressional election of 1944 the government slate received about 4,000 more votes than had been cast, disgusted officers overthrew the country's dictator (Stanfield 2004, 20). Additional victims of electoral missteps include: Mate

Granic (Croatia 2000)[23], Nicaragua's Sandinistas (1990)[24], Poland's Communists (1989)[25], and Abdou Diouf (Senegal 2000)[26].

5.2 Managing regime insiders

5.2.1 Splitting the civilian elite, leading to victory of outsiders

Many democratizations involve divisions within the ruling elite (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 19). Often, such rifts could have been avoided. Several mistakes can be distinguished. A first occurs when the leader's actions split the regime's civilian supporters, prompting its defeat by outsiders (10-19 percent of cases). For example, the "active support of the Church had been a factor in [Argentine strongman Juan] Perón's victory in 1946" (Crassweller 1996, 270). Yet, in a "critical mistake," Perón picked a fight with the Church in 1955 (Rock 1987, p.317). "The battle with the Church accomplished what ten years of political opposition by Perón's enemies had singularly failed to do: it united them for a moment" (Crassweller 1996, 276). Other dictators alienate colleagues through narrow cronyism or by mishandling plans for succession.

5.2.2 Avoidably alienating army or security forces

A second danger (26-36 percent of cases) is to run afoul of the regime's enforcers. Often, this could have

[23] "Rarely has an election that was so closely monitored by the domestic press and overseas observers produced such a surprising result" (Bellamy 2001, 28).

[24] "[W]hen the voting stations closed Sunday evening President Daniel Ortega was calmly writing his acceptance speech, having been lulled into unfounded optimism by a series of polls that gave him a huge percentage lead… 'But the polls,' people kept saying. 'The polls'" (Guillermoprieto 1990, 83).

[25] "'Never in our darkest nightmares did anyone predict such a shameful rout,' [one high party official] spluttered, gulping whiskeys and shaking his head in astonishment" (Meyer 2009, 81).

[26] "Shut up in his palace, he did not see in time the ground swell that would sweep him away" (Diop, Diouf and Diaw 2000, 174).

been avoided through more sensitive leadership or prevented through surveillance and reassignments. Serbia's young officers, feeling dishonored by King Aleksandar Obrenović's marriage to a woman of ill repute, murdered him in 1903. General Stroessner angered army colleagues by grooming his distrusted son Gustavo to succeed him; then, in a "grave strategic error," he reshuffled disloyal officers without removing their command of troops (P. H. Lewis 2006, 180). They took advantage of this oversight to oust him.

5.2.3 Delegating to a covert democrat—or weak regime defender

A third mistake usually involves not the ruler but the other insiders. In 8-10 percent of cases, they choose a leader they think is committed to preserving the regime—but who undermines it. He may have always been a secret reformer; he may become one; or he may just be particularly ineffective at defending the old order.

In Spain, Generalisimo Franco packed corporatist bodies with hardliners to preserve dictatorship after his death. As he said: "Everything is tied up, and well tied" (Cercas 2012, 30). But he made two mistakes. First, he chose Prince Juan Carlos as successor. As King, Juan Carlos sought to preserve not the Francoist state but the monarchy, which he thought required modernizing political institutions. Second, Franco tolerated the rise of an apparently loyal careerist, Adolfo Suárez, despite noticing Suárez's "dangerous" ambition (Ibid., 301). As Juan Carlos's prime minister, Suárez dismantled the autocracy.

To colleagues who appointed him General Secretary, Gorbachev also came to seem a traitor. "We believed in Gorbachev for a very, very long time," wrote one Politburo member, Vitaly Vorotnikov. "Alas, we realized what was happening far too late" (Dobbs 1997, 262). In Taiwan, furious KMT veterans expelled the reformist president Lee Teng-hui from the party after his term ended (Kagan 2007, 12). Other "traitors" include B. J. Habibie, Suharto's hand-picked successor in Indonesia, who "had never intimated any special fondness for liberal democracy" (Horowitz 2013, 43), but who began reforms that enraged the Golkar bosses and generals.

5.3 Dealing with foreign actors

Finally, leaders blunder in the international arena (17-24 percent of cases). Some start military conflicts, expecting to rally citizens behind them, but then lose, humiliating the country and splitting the regime (Oakes 2012). Argentina's General Galtieri was determined *not* to democratize. "In the last fifty years other military procesos… took the wrong path and thought elections were the solution to the political problem," he said in 1981. "[W]e must not make the same mistake" (Stohl 1987, 229). So he made a different one.

In invading the Falklands, Galtieri hoped to divert attention from economic and human rights problems and restore military honor (Robben 2007, 313). Critically, he assumed Britain would not fight. "Personally, I judged any response from the English scarcely possible, indeed absolutely improbable," he admitted (Rock 1987, 378). In fact, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher sent a fleet to reclaim the islands. Argentina's surrender three months later prompted violent protests, which divided the military and forced Galtieri's resignation. His successor, General Bignone, saw no option but a retreat to the barracks.

Other international mistakes include the Greek colonels' in 1974, Paraguay's war with Brazil in 1864, and Idi Amin's invasion of Tanzania. Not all are military. Some, like President Bakiyev of Kyrgyzstan, provoke a neighbor to destabilize their regime with propaganda, trade tariffs, or sanctions. Others, like Guinea-Bissau's Gen. Antonío Indjai, run into problems after aides offer drugs to undercover DEA agents (Shaw 2015).

5.4 Change over time and robustness

Mistakes were important in all waves, with the frequency generally increasing over time (Tables A9-A11). The proportion ranges from 42-75 percent in the first wave to 70-89 percent in the third. In the first wave, leaders blundered mostly in foreign policy (usually through reckless bellicosity) or in failing to conciliate domestic actors. Later, the focus shifts to electoral miscalculations, counterproductive violence, and alienating the armed forces. The role of mistakes is *higher*—74-88 percent—if one focuses on just high information cases (Table A12), and about the same—65-87 percent—among democratizations that were not reversed (Table A13).

6 Conclusions

Since the early 1800s, democracy has spread from a handful of countries to almost 60 percent, by some measures. Seeking to explain this, scholars have asked whether political rights were "conquered" or "granted" (Przeworski 2009). Was power wrenched from the elite by a rising class or bestowed from above in an act of enlightened self-interest? Evidence reviewed here suggests—in many cases—a third possibility. Elites fumbled power into the hands of their adversaries much as one team may fumble a football. Neither conquered nor granted, democracy emerged in such cases after an incumbent blundered and lost control. Structural factors, strategic choices, and sometimes luck then did the rest.

Given the high stakes, it seems puzzling at first that so many autocrats miscalculate. Yet, their task is mind-bogglingly difficult. They must calibrate repression and concessions, manage elites, pay and promote enforcers, detect disloyalty, and deter foreign rivals without provoking them. And they must do all this day after day, amid changing conditions, never succumbing to fatigue, illness, or distraction.

Acquiring accurate information is unusually difficult. Even those who do not surround themselves with "conmen" (Zambia's Kaunda), rely on "sycophants and third-rate generals" (Venezuela's Pérez Jiménez), or consult fortune tellers (Pinochet, Marcos, Bokassa, Than Shwe, Idi Amin, and Francisco Macías Nguema), can easily miscalculate (Dowden 1991, Burggraaff 1972, 157, Muñoz 2008, 199, Romulo 1987, 198, Daily Telegraph 2007, Decalo 1985, 224). Polls mislead if fear prompts high non-response rates or preference falsification. Attitudes can change dramatically if censorship is loosened. Apparently solid support when a ruler calls a semi-free election can melt into an opposition landslide as informational cascades unfold. Regime agents, although seeming loyal, may defect en masse amid their own cascades (Rundlett and Svolik 2016). Seen in this light, the puzzle is not that many autocrats fail sooner or later, but that some survive so long.

Two caveats require mention. First, the limited historical purchase of deliberate choice arguments does not render them irrelevant. They *do* fit certain celebrated cases and perform somewhat better in the first wave. Moreover, mistakes may combine with elements of deliberate choice. Chile's General Pinochet, after

stumbling into a humiliating referendum defeat, spent the next years negotiating a compromise to protect the military. Still, the scope remains narrow. The roughly one third of episodes consistent with deliberate choice models already includes cases such as Chile that began from incumbent mistakes. Deliberate choice cases *without* ruler missteps constitute only 5-11 percent.

Second, the frequency of errors does not mean rationalist methods such as game theory are not useful. On the contrary, to identify mistakes requires a prior conception of optimal action; the typology I develop derives from a rationalist view of authoritarian governance. Rather, the findings suggest the need to take seriously—as some existing models do—the severe and sometimes self-inflicted information constraints under which rulers operate and to consider approaches (such as trembling hand perfection) that incorporate the possibility of off-equilibrium-path play.

Recognizing the role of mistakes in democratization is important for several reasons. First, it casts a somewhat new light on the last two centuries. The processes generating democracy's spread were complex. This paper's findings should remove any temptation to over-rationalize these into a "Whig history" narrative of enlightened elite compromises.

More generally, the results have implications for theories of regime change. Some theories relate democratization to characteristics of countries—economic development, inequality, international integration ("structure"). Others focus on actions of players in the political game ("agency"). Most scholars now agree neither is by itself sufficient. While structural factors may explain *why* countries become democratic, choices of political actors help determine *when* and *how* they do so.

Recent papers suggest that certain events—economic crises, violent coups, leader turnover—serve as triggers, activating the pro-democratic effect of economic development (Kennedy 2010, M. K. Miller 2012, Treisman 2015). I conjecture that incumbent mistakes can also serve as triggers. Indeed, they may prove to be a common cause of the others. As the synopses show, economic crises, violent coups, and leader turnover—although sometimes exogenous—often result directly from incumbent errors.

One way to understand such structure-agency interactions is in terms of a model with multiple equilibria. Structural variables determine what equilibria are possible. For some values of these, both authoritarian and democratic equilibria exist. Which occurs may then depend on coordination and beliefs, which respond to contingent actions. A major mistake by the ruler can prompt sudden belief changes, undermining a previous coordination scheme. When structural parameters permit only a democratic or authoritarian equilibrium, such missteps, at most, prompt leader turnover. But when parameters are intermediate, the same errors can tip participants from one mode of politics to the other.

Methodologically, the findings suggest the value of examining evidence for posited causal mechanisms in individual cases (Kreuzer 2010). Rough proxies can mislead. For instance, in 75-81 percent of cases the AR argument would pass a test that looked for just anti-elite mobilization. Requiring consistency with the *other* observable implications, however, lowers the pass rate to 4-7 percent. Do elites enfranchise citizens to persuade them to defend the country? Democratization did occur at times of war, civil war, or serious threat in 23-31 percent of cases. But in only 1-4 percent did the elite extend political rights to motivate those needed to fight (or demobilize).

Further work may uncover what factors—individual or structural—make mistakes more likely. Both leaders' age and tenure may matter. Age increases odds of mental impairment. It also raises issues of succession, with their associated dangers: the chosen heir may be a secret reformer or unpopular, splitting the elite or alienating the armed forces. However, age also discourages risk-taking, which could reduce mistakes (Truett 1993). Tenure might have contrasting effects. Experience accrues with years in office and more competent incumbents will survive longer, so new leaders should make more mistakes. Consistent with this, dictators are most likely to lose power early on (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010, 941). However, hubris and informational filters tend to develop over time, so the relationship could be non-linear, with mistakes likelier both early and late in a leader's tenure.

Some subtypes of authoritarian regimes may be more prone to blunders. Those with collective leadership—some single-party and military regimes, oligarchical proto-democracies—may vet policies better than

personalistic dictatorships or monarchies (Weeks 2014). (Single-party regimes are particularly resilient (Geddes 1999, 132).) Those that hold elections risk mismanaging them, although *not* holding elections has its own drawbacks.

Errors should also be more likely when dictators face critical economic or political challenges and at moments of social change. Confronting crises, they may risk experimenting with potentially destabilizing innovations. Social change makes it harder to judge the optimal mix of concessions and repression. Rulers facing complex international threats are more likely to blunder abroad.

Mistakes matter also for other institutional reforms. Rational accounts of electoral rule selection have sparked debate (Boix 2010, Cusack, Iversen and Soskice 2010, Kreuzer 2010). Such accounts have trouble explaining why in both early 20th Century Western Europe and postcommunist Eastern Europe incumbents often "supported electoral rules that later eliminated them from politics" (Andrews and Jackman 2005, 65).

Another example is the global spread of human rights treaties. Why egregious offenders would ratify these is puzzling. The year before Pinochet's plebiscite, his government signed the UN's Convention Against Torture. Eleven years later, it would be used against him. "[I]n a period of rapid flux," writes Sikkink (2011, 40), "states may misunderstand the implications of their actions. They make mistakes." African leaders whose countries quickly ratified the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court were among the court's early targets.

Future studies could explore the role of mistakes in other types of regime change. As well as facilitating democratization, errors can trigger democratic breakdowns. Failures in the interwar period often occurred because participants "were mistaken in their analysis of the situation" (Linz 1978, 81). The fatal missteps of democratic leaders—domestic policy failures, concessions that embolden the opposition, appointment of covert (or overt) regime opponents—clearly overlap with those of autocrats.

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Online Appendix

Table A1: Notes on excluded cases

Country	Year	BMR cases
BMR's measure turns positive when democratic countries acquire full sovereignty, even if institutions are otherwise unchanged. Three such cases excluded.		
Cuba	1909	Return to sovereignty after withdrawal of US troops.
Pakistan	1950	Coding apparently based on establishment of sovereignty, not democratization.
Luxembourg	1890	No democratization. Just change of royal dynasty from the House of Orange-Nassau to the House of Nassau-Weilburg, ending the "personal union" with the Netherlands and thus firmly establishing the Duchy's independence.
BMR's definition includes requirement that 50 percent of males have vote; when literacy requirement for voting exists, countries can pass this threshold due to literacy increase (without any political reform). One case excluded.		
Chile	1909	No political reform—just demographic change. "For example, in Chile, where being literate was a necessary requirement to vote until the mid-20th century, it was only by 1909-10 that a majority of adult males were recorded as being literate. Accordingly, we code Chile as fulfilling condition (3) at that point in time" (Boix, Miller, Rosato 2013).
Reason for coding as a significant increase in democracy unclear, so excluded		
Panama	1950 & 1952	Does not appear to have been any democratization in these years. Politics remained dominated by the caudillo José Antonio Rémon. "[T]he immediate postwar period saw a temporary shift in the locus of power from the civilian aristocracy to the National Police under Commander José Antonio Rémon. Between 1948 and 1952 he installed and removed presidents with unencumbered ease. Among his behind-the-scenes manipulations were the denial to Arnulfo Arias of the presidency he apparently had won in 1948, the installation of Arias in the presidency in 1949, and the engineering of his removal in 1951. Meanwhile, Remón increased salaries and fringe benefits for his men and modernized training methods and equipment; in effect, he transformed the National Police from a police into a paramilitary force. In the spheres of security and public order, he achieved a long sought goal by transforming the National Police into the National Guard and introduced greater militarization into the country's only armed force" (Nyrop 1980, p.33). "In July of 1948, the commandant's support for yet another scandalous vote swindle prepared the way for Domingo Díaz Arosemena's assumption of the presidency, to the detriment of Arnulfo Arias. Following President Díaz's death the next year, his successor Daniel Chanis requested Remón's resignation based on the latter's graft-related activities… Remón responded by overthrowing Dr. Chanis and handing over power to Second Vice-President Roberto Chiari (who, incidentally, was a first cousin to the police chief). But when the Supreme Court (remarkably) sustained Daniel Chanis' right to the presidency, Acting President Chiari notified the commandant that he would honor the ruling" (Mann 1996, p.68). A protest strike "paralyzed urban life" (Mann 1996, p.68). "Seeking a way out of the crisis, Remón opportunistically fetched Arnulfo Arias and installed him in the presidency… This action was justified with a recount of the ballots cast in 1948. It turned out that the *caudillo* had in effect won the election, but Domingo Díaz had 'mistakenly' been declared victor" (Mann 1996, p.68). "By 1951 President Arias had once more antagonized substantial segments of the population, not least because he decreed the replacement of the 1946 Constitution with his 1941 charter. On 8 May a large crowd demanded that the police chief remove the president. Remón hesitated until the National Assembly impeached Arias and elevated Vice-President Alcibíades Arosemena to the presidency, in a move sustained by the Supreme Court." After a gun battle with Arias' supporters, Arias was deposed (Mann 1996, pp.68-9). "The strongest opposition to Remón's 1952 election bid came from Harmodio Arias and the students, while the police provided his most valuable support. Remón was unpopular because of his repression of students and torture of prisoners since becoming police chief in 1947…. He was connected through family or business with about a quarter of Panama's elite" (Conniff 1990, p.628). After his election in 1952, "Remón reduced his possible future opposition by instituting a law, called the *Ley de 45,000*, which required that particular

		number of registered followers before a party would be officially recognized. This left Remón with only the weakened *Partido Liberal* to oppose him, leaving essentially a one-party, military-based, or, at least, military-led, system in place" (Harding 2001, pp.38-9). "Remón followed national tradition by enriching himself through political office. He broke with tradition, however, by promoting social reform and economic development. His agricultural and industrial programs actually reduced, temporarily, the country's overwhelming economic dependence on the canal and the zone" (Nyrop 1980, p.34). Remón required 45,000 signatures for legal recogition of parties, "prohibited strikes, outlawed radical groups, jailed Communists and imposed a 'voluntary' censorship on the press. At the same time, the judiciary was weakened through political appointments and intimidation. These changes created a quasi-dictatorship not unlike that of Remón's fellow strongman Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua" (Conniff 1990, p.629) Remón was assassinated in 1955.
Paraguay	2003	Does not seem to have been any clear improvement in the quality of the 2003 election or other evidence of democratization that year. See, for instance, Abente-Brun: "for the last century [Paraguay] has had a largely noncompetitive two-party system dominated alternatively by the Colorado Party (1887–1904 and 1947–2008) and the PLRA (1904–40), with two brief military interludes in 1936–37 and 1940–47. The Colorado Party ruled as a civilian hegemonic party between 1947 and 1954, then evolved into a military-civilian authoritarian regime under General Alfredo Stroessner (1954–89), and after a coup in 1989 transitioned back to a civilian hegemonic party for the next nineteen years until its defeat in 2008. Hence, civilian and military presidents came and went, and authoritarian, transitional, and democratic regimes alternated, but the Colorado Party always remained on top" (Abente-Brun 2009, p.144). Or Nickson, who doesn't distinguish 2003 from previous elections: "Previous 'democratic' elections [were] held in 1989, 1993, 1998, and 2003. Although they were multiparty elections, accusations of vote-buying and vote-rigging continued" (Nickson 2009, p.145). Perhaps one could make a case that the 2008 election—in which the Colorado Party lost for the first time—was a major political liberalization; see Nickson (2008): "The victory of Fernando Lugo in Paraguay's presidential election on 20 April 2008 marks an unforgettable turning-point to rank with any in the country's tortured history…. the real triumph and joy belongs "inside", in the dignified achievement of a fair election and the prospect of a peaceful transition of power in an environment where effective one-party rule has unbalanced the institutional and political culture for so long…. The good news is that Paraguay is finally embarking on a genuine democratic process, one that had been postponed for nearly twenty years since the Stroessner dictatorship ended in 1989" (Nickson 2008). But nothing comparable in 2003.
Zambia	2006-2008	*The rationale for coding Zambia as significantly more democratic in 2006 or 2008 is presumably that the elections held in those years were perceived to be somewhat fairer than the previous one in 2001.* According to Larmer and Fraser (2007, p.620), for instance: The 2006 elections marked a high water mark for the expression of democratic opinion in Zambia. A new electoral roll significantly increased the number of registered voters to 3,941,229. There was also a particularly high turnout of 71 percent. This reflected a continued steady increase in voter registration and turnout seen since democratization. Data from 1991 are unreliable. However, using as a baseline the earliest set of reliable data, in 1996, the voters' roll increased from 2.2 million then to 3.9 million in 2006, with the total number of votes cast more than doubling over the same period. The percentage of registered voters that turned out also increased from 58 to 71 percent. Secondly, whilst the 1996 and 2001 elections were marked by significant rigging, much of it organized from State House, the 2006 poll was widely recognized as free and fair. Although the verification process revealed some anomalies, and a few parliamentary results have since been nullified by the courts, for the first time since 1991 defeated presidential candidates did not dispute the results in the courts. *There are several points here.* *A) More voters were registered in this election than previously.* A total of 3,940,053 people were registered to vote in the 2006 elections; 2,604,761 voters were registered in 2001 (European Union 2006, p.14). Based on available demographic statistics, this

means that the registration rate of eligible voters was *roughly* 28 percent in 2006, compared to 17 percent in 2001. (Only *roughly*, since all those 18 and older were eligible to vote, but population statistics were only available for 20 and older. From Statistics Zambia: Population aged 20 and older in 2001-2: 14.9 million. https://www.zamstats.gov.zm/index.php/publications/category/30-demography?download=747:zdhs-repot-2001-2. Population aged 20 and older in 2007: 13.9 million. https://www.zamstats.gov.zm/index.php/publications/category/30-demography?download=539:demography.) Although this is progress, it still suggests that the vast majority of citizens legally eligible to vote were not registered. The question is whether the increase from 17 to 28 percent represents a qualitative change.

B) Turnout was higher than in 2001.
While high turnout is desirable, it is not usually taken to be a defining characteristic of democracy—especially when it is high turnout within the small minority registered to vote.

C) "[W]hilst the 1996 and 2001 elections were marked by significant rigging, much of it organized from State House, the 2006 poll was widely recognized as free and fair."
Within Zambia, the opposition certainly did not consider the 2006 election free and fair. The incumbent's rival accused him of "stealing the election," claiming that "400,000 votes in his strongholds" had gone missing, and his supporters rioted for several days (Wines 2006).

With regard to international observers, one group that had been particularly critical of the 2001 election, the Carter Center, declined to observe the election at all out of "disappointment over Zambia's failure to enact meaningful electoral and constitutional reforms" (Carter Center 2006). The EU did send observer missions to both elections. It had been critical of the 2001 election, but was more positive about the 2006 one (European Union 2006). In the monitors' view, the 2006 elections "demonstrated improvement in comparison to the elections of 2001." Still, its 2006 report was also critical. It did not contain the words "free and fair." And it noted that "the counting, tabulation and transmission of results processes encountered numerous problems," which resulted in "decline in confidence among some stakeholders during the final stages of the elections" (European Union 2006, p.1).

Moreover, a member of the EU's 2001 observer mission later denounced the international monitors who observed Zambia's 2001 election for distorting the perception of that election: "There is consensus amongst election monitors and official observers that the 2001 Zambian general elections were flawed and did not express the preferences of Zambian voters. This article argues on the basis of participant observation in the EU Observer Mission that this consensus was more a socially constructed narrative than a reasoned judgement based on observation" (Van Donge 2008, p.296).

D) "[F]or the first time since 1991 defeated presidential candidates did not dispute the results in the courts."
This was not because opposition leaders had no claims of fraud—on the contrary, they complained of massive fraud—but because they had given up on bringing cases to a court that they considered to be biased. "Both Mr Sata and Mr Hichilema have voiced unhappiness about the counting process, with the Patriotic Front alleging that some 400 000 ballots had gone missing. But Mr Sata's campaign manager said yesterday that the party saw no point in pursuing the case through the courts. "There are some rural areas were there has been massive fraud (but) experience has shown that the Supreme Court fails to provide remedy in a timely manner for fixed elections," Mr Guy Scott, the campaign manager, said in a radio interview" (Africa News 2006).

After 2001, the incumbent, President Mwanawasa, had appointed a Constitutional Review Commission, which had made recommendations for changes to the constitution and electoral law. But Mwanawasa failed to act on most of these. This was one reason why the Carter Center refused to observe the 2006 election. In the view of local analysts, writing before the 2006 election:

> "The government's decision not to introduce a new republican constitution and electoral reforms prior to these elections… has cast serious doubts on the integrity of the electoral process and the probable legitimacy of the outcomes… Irrespective of who wins power in Lusaka, it is painfully clear that Zambia's democracy will, yet again, emerge as the net loser in the polls… Plunging into the 2006 polls under the old undemocratic constitutional

		framework dealt a fatal blow to the overall integrity of the electoral process and stoked the ire of domestic and international actors… Apparently, the shelving of the constitution is part of a grand strategy by the ruling elite to exploit divisions within the opposition to snatch a narrow victory by retaining the current simple majority system” (Kagwanja and Mutahi 2006, pp.1-2). *On the 2008 election, Cheeseman and Hinfelar (2010, p.69) write:* “Zambia is far from a consolidated democracy, as the stalled constitutional review process, state-dominated media, and the use of government resources to support the MMD’s election campaign ably demonstrate. While the polls were no doubt far cleaner than the controversial election of 2001, representatives of foreign governments have admitted in private that they saw evidence of vote buying on both sides, and have grave doubts about the reliability of the results. As in previous elections, credible opinion polls suggested that Sata was set for a substantial victory, and the announcement of his defeat was met with incredulity in urban areas.” *A tough call, but it is hard to see either the 2006 or 2008 elections as representing a significant jump in the democracy level in Zambia. In both, the incumbent was reelected, in a flawed and incompletely credible election. The claims of international observers that the quality improved between 2001 and 2006 have been subjected to scathing criticism by a member of the EU team. If the quality did, in fact, improve, the change was probably marginal.*
Dominican Republic	1966	No evidence of democratization. I think BMR judge this to be democratization because there was an election in 1966. But much evidence suggests this election should not be considered sufficiently free and fair. “The elections of 1966 took place while the country was under military occupation by U.S. Marines, an occupation that had come about precisely to prevent a victory by the Constitutionalists (of Bosch) and the reinstatement of Bosch in the presidency. A former CIA officer, Ray Cline, has recounted a meeting with President Johnson in which he described Balaguer… Johnson’s response, he says, was, ‘Get this guy in office down there!’” (Knippers Black 1986, p.41). “[T]here were reports, generally overlooked by the major media in the United States, of irregularities at the polls: of voters being transported from one place to another, of widespread forgery of identification cards, and of commandeering and switching of ballot boxes. It was also reported that soldiers and policemen staged an impressive show of force in every sizable town on election day and that some PRD supporters spoke of feeling intimidated” (Knippers Black 1986, p.41). “The overall total of votes cast in 1966 was 25 percent higher than the total for 1962 and 87 percent higher in Santo Domingo, where Bosch’s 80 percent margin in 1962 was shaved to 63 percent. Balaguer’s margin of victory corresponded almost exactly to the increase in the overall vote, as officially reported.” The pro-Balaguer faction was “exercising a monopoly on armed force” and was backed by US Marines. “In the countryside and in lower-income districts of Santo Domingo, thousands of PRD activists were beaten and/or imprisoned during the electoral campaign, and several hundred were murdered. Many more were deported or fled into exile. Those who remained had good reason to be cautious” (Knippers Black 1986, p.42). One of Bosch’s bodyguards was killed and his son was shot, which led him to eschew active campaigning; “he had good reason to fear for his life” (Knippers Black 1986, p.42).
Cyprus	1977	Not clear what happened in 1977 to explain this. Makarios, the elected president had been restored in 1974 after the coup collapsed. Nothing major changed in 1977; a vague declaration of goals by Makarios and Denktash, but no institutional reform. Then Makarios died. Election to replace him held only in early 1978. The restoration of Makarios in 1974 was a return to the status quo ante after a short-lived coup period, not a democratization.
Solomon Islands	2006	No evidence of democratization. After ethnic civil war breaks out, the prime minister invites an Australian-led military and police intervention to restore order. After the militias are disarmed, an election is held in 2006. Initially, the bargaining in parliament results in a prime minister from the same faction as before. But rioting leads parliament to reject that candidate and pick another. The 2006 election is apparently not more democratic than the 2001 election. So a case of restoration of (imperfect) democracy after civil war interlude and foreign intervention, not a move from autocracy to democracy.

Country	**Years**	**Polity2 change**	**Notes**

Polity I notes say the given year is an "arbitrary date"			
Yugoslavia	1937-9	from -9 to 2	Could find no *non*-arbitrary date around that year, so excluded.
Colombia	1930	from -5 to 5	Re-dated to 1936, when López Pumarejo's 1936 constitutional reform granted voting and citizen rights to all male citizens over the age of 21, regardless of literacy level or income (Osterling 1989, p.82). Note that levels of fraud remained high after 1936.
Belgium	1853	from -4 to 6	Re-dated to 1848, when the government expanded the fanchise, extending the right to vote to all men who paid 20 florins (42.2 francs) in tax. This increased the electorate from 46,000 to 79,000 (Witte et al. 2005, part 2, pp.24-5).
Could not find any evidence of democratization, so excluded			
Venezuela	2012-13	from -3 to 4	Polity, which codes "authority patterns," apparently increased the country's Polity2 score because of the weaker authority position of Maduro compared to Chavez, based on the former's lack of charisma. However, for my purposes, the replacement of a more charismatic with a less charismatic leader does not constitute a case of democratization. No evidence that political institutions and practices became more democratic under Maduro. "This irregularity-prone electoral environment has only deteriorated since Chávez's death in March 2013, beginning with the election for his successor the following month. In that contest, Maduro, who was then acting president, prevailed over his opponent, Henrique Capriles Radonski, by a mere 235,000 votes (a 1.5 percent margin). The opposition claimed that, in the run-up to the election and on election day itself, there were repeated and new irregularities (for example, PSUV sympathizers were seen escorting voters to polls under the pretense of assisting them; harassing electoral observers and voters; paying citizens to bring people to the polls; and maybe even engaging in fraud at a few polling centers), which gave Maduro his narrow victory. After the results were announced, protests broke out in Caracas and several other cities. The government put down the demonstrations; in the end, seven people were killed and dozens were injured. The opposition called for a full audit, which was refused (although the CNE did conduct an audit of the electronic tallies versus the paper ballots), and then—for the first time since 2005—the opposition challenged the election, formally calling for the election either to be annulled or done over in roughly 5,700 voting tables (in Venezuela, each voting table or mesa electoral is associated with a particular touchscreen voting machine)" (Corrales 2015, p.43).
Djibouti	1998-9	from -6 to 2	The long-time dictator retires because of poor health in 1999 (Alwan and Mibrathu 2000, p.62); his nephew and former security service chief is then elected with 74% of the vote in what international observers say is a relatively fair election (U.S.A State Department 2010); a few months later, police arrest the new president's single challenger and jail him for four months (later released with amnesty)(Europa Publications 2002, p.336). In the next legislative election in 2003, the incumbent's party wins 100% of the seats, amid accusations of rigging (IRIN News 2005a); the opposition boycotts subsequent presidential elections, so the incumbent wins unchallenged (IRIN News 2005b). Not clear that any kind of democratization occurred.
Uruguay	1951-2	from 0 to 8	The only change was the replacement of a strong presidency with a collegial executive, modeled on that of Switzerland. Since we do not usually consider a non-collegial executive to be undemocratic, this does not seem enough to merit the characterization of democratization.
Gabon	2008-9	from -4 to 3	The only thing that seems to have changed in 2009 is that the authoritarian leader of 42 years, Omar Bongo, died and was replaced by his son, Ali Bongo, who won the presidency in an election that does not seem to have been more honest than the previous elections in which his father repeatedly won.
Pakistan	1947-9	from -4 to +4	Polity, focusing on "authority patterns," appears to have coded an increase in Polity2 based on the lower charisma of the leaders that succeeded Jinnah. For present purposes, given the lack of institutional changes, this does not seem to constitute a case of democratization. A new constitution was only enacted in 1956, and the first national election occurred in 1970.
Date corrected			

<table>
<tr><td>Yemen North</td><td>Was 1962, now 1967-71</td><td>from -6 to 0</td><td>Polity, which codes “authority patterns,” not democratization per se, codes Yemen’s “executive recruitment” score as increasing in 1962 because a coup replaces hereditary monarchy with a military regime. I do not consider this an instance of democratization. However, there is a plausible case of political reform in 1967-71, when the new leader, al-Iryani, introduces a new constitution based on post-civil-war reconciliation.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Argentina</td><td>Was 1937, now 1939</td><td>from -8 to 5</td><td>Unclear what happened in 1937, other than the election of a slightly more scrupulous president, who took office in 1938. The election was manipulated to ensure Ortiz’s victory. “Opposition candidates… had their efforts repressed by violence and fraud” (Lewis 2003, p.89). “[I]n many districts the number of votes cast significantly outnumbered registered voters” (Hedges 2011, p.50). If the increase in Polity2 is meant to capture Ortiz’s reforms, the date should be 1939 or 1940.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Country</td><td>Years</td><td colspan="2">LIED cases</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">LIED cases where reason for coding as increase in democracy unclear to me</td></tr>
<tr><td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td><td>2008</td><td colspan="2">LIED shows a jump from 2 to 6 for Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2008, along with jumps from 0 to 1 for competitiveness and for executive selection. This implies that the head of executive went from being not elected to elected that year and that the elections are competitive, “characterized by uncertainty” (Skaaning et al. 2015, p.1501). However, there were no elections for the chief executive that year or change in the manner of his/her election. Nor could I find any evidence of change in competitiveness of executive elections around that time. Perhaps Bosnia was coded in this way because the question was raised in 2007 of ending the institution of the High Representative for B-H, a position created by the Dayton Peace Agreement, and externally appointed. Since 1997, the High Representative has had the authority to impose legislation and dismiss elected officials. However, the High Representative office has not yet (as of July 2018) been closed, and continues to function, with the same powers (see http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=1161). Therefore, I was unable to discover the reasoning for this coding.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Canada</td><td>1897</td><td colspan="2">LIED codes Canada as moving from restricted suffrage to universal male suffrage in 1897. This appears to be based on the PIPE dataset, which codes Canada as acquiring universal male suffrage in 1897. The only source specifically related to Canada referenced in the PIPE codebook is Elections Canada On-Line (Elections Canada N.d.). From the materials on this website, this appears to be a miscoding.

Before 1885, the provinces had determined eligibility to vote in both provincial and federal elections. Almost all provinces had property requirements and exclusions based on race (Indians, Chinese immigrants) and/or occupation. An act passed in 1885 under the Conservative government of John Macdonald asserted federal authority to set voting requirements for federal elections and imposed comprehensive property requirements (although exempting existing voters in British Columbia and Prince Edward Island, which had not had property requirements before, imposing the property requirements only on new voters there). In 1896, a new act passed by the Liberal government of Wilfrid Laurier returned responsibility for setting voting eligibility in federal elections to the provinces and prohibited disqualifying voters on the basis of occupation or belonging to a particular class of people. This led to the enfranchisement of Chinese and Japanese men in British Columbia. But it did not lead to universal enfranchisement of Indians. Moreover, property requirements remained in four provinces.

<blockquote>… the federal government refused Indian persons the right to vote in the Northwest Territories and Yukon, both of which were under direct federal control… In 1898, most provinces already applied significant restrictions on Indians' right to vote. No Indian was allowed to vote in British Columbia or New Brunswick. In Manitoba, the right to vote was reserved for Indian persons who received no benefit from the Crown and had received no such benefit during the three years preceding an election. In Ontario, the right was given only to enfranchised Indians or Indians living outside a reserve, on condition that the latter own real property assessed at $200 or more in a city or town or $100 or more in a village or township… The situation did not improve in the years that followed. In 1915, Quebec withdrew the voting rights of Indians living on reserves, and by July 1919, Indians living on reserves anywhere in the country were no longer entitled to vote in federal by-elections.</blockquote></td></tr>
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		Before adoption of the 1898 act, property-based qualifications were the main curb on expansion of the electorate. At that time, this restriction still existed in only four provinces: Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Quebec. In Prince Edward Island, property-based qualifications affected only persons 60 years of age or over, who were required to own real property assessed at at least $100 or generating a minimum annual income of $6. In 1902, the province achieved universal male suffrage when it abolished the requirement. To qualify to vote in New Brunswick, it was necessary to own real property assessed at $100 or more, or real property and personal property with a combined value of $400. Persons earning an annual income of $400 were also qualified to vote. This threshold was very high; at the turn of the century, a textile worker, for example, earned an average of $240 per year. New Brunswick abolished property- and income-based qualifications in 1916. In Nova Scotia, the situation had remained unchanged since 1885. To be qualified to vote in the province in 1898, it was still necessary to own, rent or occupy property assessed at $150 or more. Furthermore, an individual who owned personal property and leased or occupied property whose value, added to that of the personal property, totalled $300, was qualified to vote. Co-owners, co-tenants, sons of men qualified to vote and widows who owned, occupied or leased property with a value sufficient to confer the right to vote could vote under the same conditions as those that existed before 1885. The province later qualified as electors persons earning an annual income of at least $250 and fishermen who owned real property, boats, nets and fishing tackle with a combined value of $150 or more. Property- and income-based qualifications were eventually eliminated in the province in 1920. In Quebec, where urbanization was in full swing, the property-based qualifications in force in 1898 still favoured residents of rural areas. In urban areas, owners or occupants in good faith of premises assessed at $300 could vote; in rural areas, the minimum required value was just $200. A similar disparity existed between tenants in urban areas, where the minimum annual rent was $30, and tenants in rural areas, where it was $20. Persons receiving a minimum annual income of $300 were also qualified to vote. Fishermen could vote if they owned boats, nets, seines and fishing tackle worth a total of $150 or more. Furthermore, retired farmers and property owners (referred to as life annuitants) could also vote if their annuity – in cash or in kind – was $100 or more. Teachers were exempt from any property-based requirement. In 1912, Quebec substantially reduced financial qualifications, a measure that gave the right to vote to the great majority of men in the province. Based on this, it appears that the male franchise, although it may have increased after 1898, was not universal. Property requirements were variously eliminated between 1902 and 1920, although disqualifications of Indians may have remained.
Colombia	1880	Colombia appears to be coded as not a minimally competitive electoral democracy in the years 1878 and 1879 because the president elected in 1878 had run unopposed (the PIPE dataset gives such cases a score of 0 on its “OPPOSITION” variable). In 1876-7, a civil war in Colombia had pitted the Liberals against the Conservatives. The main issue was education: the Conservatives favored entrusting education to the Catholic Church, while the Liberals favored public education. The Liberals won. In the 1878 election, the only candidate was General Julián Trujillo, who got support from both Liberal factions. In 1880, the next presidential election was held, this time with two Liberal candidates (still no Conservative). This is coded as an increase in democracy on the LIED index from 1 to 5. (Again, in 1882 and 1884, both candidates were Liberal, with no Conservative.) *Thus, although the coding rule makes sense and is not misapplied, it is hard to see 1880 as a case of any kind of political liberalization or democratization that might require explanation in terms of any of the theories examined. It just appears to be one because the two factions of the Liberal party had agreed on a single candidate in 1878. There was no change in institutions or practices other than that. I therefore exclude this case.*

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<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>*It is not clear why the 2010 election was considered competitive but the December 2005 election was not. The main difference seems to be that voters voted strongly on the basis of ethnic identity in 2005, but less so in 2010. But such voting—although perhaps undesirable—does not contradict any definition of democracy (definitely using the electoral competition threshold of LIED). Another possibility is that in 2010 the top vote-getting party was not that of the incumbent PM. However, the incumbent PM still managed, by reassembling a coalition, to remain as PM. There were claims of fraud after both elections, but the electoral commissions ruled in both cases that fraud had not significantly affected the outcome. In both cases, there were still significant numbers of US troops occupying the country.*

“Both the 2010 and 2005 elections were unquestionably genuine (notwithstanding allegations to the contrary from many interested parties inside Iraq)” (Makiya 2010, p.2).

On the 2005 election:
“[I]n the previous general election, held on 15 December 2005 amid pervasive instability and recurrent violence, voters en masse turned to their primordial loyalties, with the secular al-Iraqiya coalition of former premier Ayad Allawi receiving barely 8 percent of the total vote. The largest vote getter (46.5 percent) was the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), a coalition defined solely by Shia solidarity. The Kurdistan Alliance received its votes almost exclusively from the Kurds who predominate in the northernmost trio of Iraq’s eighteen provinces, and the Sunni-sectarian Tawafuq group (also known as the Iraqi Accord Front) ended up with over 80 percent of the Sunni vote. The spectacle of an election in which the vote breakdown almost perfectly mirrored Iraq’s major ethnic and sectarian cleavages left analysts less than sanguine about democracy’s prospects there” (Dawisha 2010, p.26).

In December 2005: “To ensure the integrity of the elections, the IECI deployed 126,125 observers in all 18 provinces... As the chief electoral officer remarked, ‘This election has been one of the most observed in the whole world’” (Dawisha and Diamond 2006, p.99).

“[W]hen partial results were announced a few days after the election, showing a victory for the UIA, a deluge of complaints alleging widespread fraud erupted in Baghdad and Sunni areas. Thousands of demonstrators took to the streets denouncing the IECI and accusing it of doing the UIA’s bidding. The pressure became so intense that the IECI refrained from publishing the full and final results until an international commission, which arrived in Baghdad in late December, looked into the 1,985 complaints received by the IECI. The international commission decided that while infractions had indeed occurred, they had been mostly minor and would not affect the final distribution of Assembly seats” (Dawisha and Diamond 2006, p.99).

In 2009: “Maliki now faced a new challenge: opposition from all of his other mainstream competitors. His successful manipulation of appointments and his moves to dominate the political process during the previous two years had alienated all of his rivals. The Sadrists, originally his key supporters, had borne the brunt of his military attacks and were unwilling to support him again. The Sahwa forces were alienated by his foot-dragging on hiring them and his weak efforts at national reconciliation. The Kurdish parties, openly opposed to his efforts to push them out of disputed territory in the north, had taken to calling him ‘a new Saddam.’ ISCI and its chief foreign supporters in Iran also had reason to turn against him because they had been weakened by his refusal to join them in a common Shi’i front” (Marr 2018, pp.265-6).

There had been a reduction in violence, although there were still some major terrorist attacks. “The Iraqi death toll declined dramatically” (Marr 2018, p.266). But spectacular attacks suggested ISIS was a threat. “A second continuing challenge for Maliki, as for all previous governments, was corruption, which ate away at economic development, prospects for increased investment, and confidence in the government and its legitimacy” (Marr 2018, p.266).

A withdrawal of US troops from cities took place on schedule by mid-2009.

Discussions of a new electoral law “soon stalled and elections were postponed until 7 March 2010, five weeks later than constitutionally mandated” (Marr 2018, p.267). The main groupings were “Maliki’s State of Law, Shi’i Islamists [including the Sadrists], the Kurdish parties, and finally a combination of secularists and Sunnis” (Marr 2018, p.268). “The Arab Shi’i parties were divided between Maliki’s State of Law and the rival INA coalition. The Arab Sunni parties were divided between the Iraqiyya, headed by Allawi, a secular Arab Shi’a, and the IAF. The Kurdish</td>
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		parties were divided among the traditional KDP-PUK alliance and the opposition Gorran party" (Marr 2018, p.271). "The most important controversy occurred in mid-January 2010 when the supreme National Commission for Accountability and Justice…, charged with vetting candidates associated with the Ba'ath Party, disqualified over five hundred candidates, almost a sixth of the total. The charge reopened the wounds of sectarianism and raised countercharges by Sunnis that the move was targeting them" (Marr 2018, p.271). "Some violence ensued before, during, and after—between 12 February and 7 March, some 228 people were killed—but that did not stop people from all areas and provinces from going to the polls" (Marr 2018, p.271). "Four major blocs emerged as dominant, but the winner was unexpected. The top vote-getter, by a razor-thin, two-seat margin was Allawi's Iraqiyya coalition with ninety-one seats (28 percent). Maliki's State of Law took eighty-nine seats (27.4 percent). The INA came in third with seventy seats (21.5 percent). The Kurdistan Alliance, in fourth place, garnered forty-three seats (13.2 percent)" (Marr 2018, p.271). "At its most basic level, this election was free and fair. As already pointed out, there were a number of complaints from parties and coalitions about irregularities, even fraud, but on the whole these were dismissed by independent local and outside organizations that monitored the election. Governmental engineering of election outcomes, so rampant in electoral authoritarian regimes, was simply not an issue" (Dawisha 2010, p.38). "Overall, the most striking result of the election was fragmentation… A postelections stalemate went on for months" (Marr 2018, pp.272-3). Maliki and others demanded a recount, but this found "no signs of fraud" (Marr 2018, p.273). "After the 2009 provincial balloting, Maliki had expected to sail through to victory in 2010, garnering enough votes to let him dictate coalition terms or even, with a bit of luck, win an outright majority. But it soon became clear, once the election date was set, that the final outcome was genuinely in doubt" (Dawisha 2010, p.38). Shi'a parties re-coalesced to claim the largest bloc. The Supreme Court agreed that this should give Maliki the right to form a coalition on this bloc's support (Marr 2018, p.273). The bargaining over the prime minister's job "went on for a record eight months after the election and was only settled in mid-November 2010" (Marr 2018, p.273).
Lebanon	2009	*It is not so clear what changed in 2009 to explain the upward coding in LIED from uncompetitive to competitive. A parliamentary election had already been held in 2005 after the Syrian troops withdrew. It may be that the coding relates to the change in the electoral law that occurred between 2005 and 2009, responding to the recommendations of a special commission (the Boutros Commission). This new law, passed in September 2008, included some reforms of campaign finance and media regulations.* "On September 29, 2008, the Parliament adopted a new electoral law after it was thoroughly studied in the Justice and Administration Committee during 35 meetings… the law that ultimately passed included some of the reforms recommended by the Boutros Commission—campaign finance and media regulations and a single-day election" (NDI 2009, p.15). "Newly introduced reforms included in the 2008 Electoral Law are outlined below: • Lebanon is divided between 26 electoral districts, an increase from 14 electoral districts mandated by the 2000 Electoral Law. • Elections are held on one day in all districts. All post-war parliamentary elections in Lebanon were held over multiple consecutive weekends due to security concerns. • The Supervisory Commission for Electoral Campaigns (SCEC) is created and charged with supervising compliance with campaign finance, media, and advertising regulations. • National identification cards and Lebanese passports replace the voter card used in past elections to identify voters on election day. • A campaign silence period is introduced starting midnight the day before the election.

		• Domestic and international election observers are invited to observe election day as well as the pre- and post-election periods. • The MOIM is required to publish the voter register on the Internet. • Polling stations are required to be accessible for people with disabilities." (NDI 2009, p.16). *While these seem generally worthwhile changes, they are mostly technical and do not seem to constitute a qualitative jump in the competitiveness of elections.* "Another significant change in the electoral law was the return to districting based on the 1960 law, creating smaller districts that had the effect of increasing the ability of Christian communities to elect their own leaders. Under the 2000 electoral law, which also governed the 2005 parliamentary elections, Christian communities were grouped into larger Muslim districts. The redistricting, however, had the effect of creating districts of very different sizes, which resulted in significant disparities in the number of votes required to be elected in different constituencies" (NDI 2009, p.16). *It is not immediately clear that small, religiously homogeneous districts are more or less democratic than larger, religiously heterogeneous ones.* *At the same time the politically controversial recommendations of the Boutros Commission were not included in the law:* "While the law that ultimately passed included some of the reforms recommended by the Boutros Commission—campaign finance and media regulations and a single-day election—MPs defending elements of the status quo from both the governing and opposition coalitions prevented the adoption of other amendments. Proportional representation, a quota for women, lowering the voting age from 21 to 18, and the adoption of a pre-printed, standardized, and official ballot failed to make it into law" (NDI 2009, pp.15-16). *It is hard to see these technical changes as a case of political liberalization or democratization that might require explanation in terms of any of the theories examined.*
Nepal	2013	*LIED codes Nepal as 6 in 2011 and 2013 but 0 in 2012. This is because in 2012 the elected Constituent Assembly reached the end of its term and dissolved without agreeing on a draft constitution. Thus, the electoral basis of the government was no longer clear. An election for another constituent assembly was held in 2013. In the interim, the previous prime minister at first continued in power and then, by agreement of the main parties, a "caretaker" technical government was appointed to administer the election. Since this was more a technical gap than a change of regime, I do not include this as a case of democratization.* In 2012, the elected Constituent Assembly that had been formed in April 2008 after the monarchy was abolished, dissolved without managing to agree on a draft constitution (Kantha 2014, p.206). The Supreme Court had refused to once again extend its deadline. The incumbent prime minister, Baburam Bhattarai, "said that he would remain in power and that his government would hold November elections for a new assembly." He said this option "was consistent with options outlined by the Supreme Court, in case the deadline was missed" (Chapagain and Yardley 2012). However, opposition politicians "quickly denounced the plan as a power grab" (Chapagain and Yardley 2012). Eventually: "On March 14 [2013], Nepal's four major political forces—the UCPN-Maoist, the NC, the CPN-UML, and the United Madhesi Democratic Front (UMDF)—inked an 11-point deal to form an ''election government,'' i.e., a government with a mandate to hold elections. This election government's chair is held by sitting Chief Justice of Nepal's Supreme Court Khil Raj Regmi; his cabinet's members were drawn from the ranks of Nepal's retired senior bureaucrats" (Kantha 2014, pp.206-7). "The election to choose the Second Constituent Assembly was held at last in November 2013 under an interim government headed by the sitting chief justice of Nepal's Supreme Court (who refused to resign from his judicial post despite widespread urging to do so in the name of separation of powers). The caretaker arrangement was preferred because the opposition parties refused to take part in any election while the government was in Maoist hands" (Lawoti 2014, p.140).

		"The successful CA elections on November 19, 2013, defied pre-poll projections in many respects. A nationwide voter turnout of over 70% proved that concerns over voter apathy was unfounded, delivering a blow to boycotting parties. The elections were hailed as fair by most observers despite allegations of irregularities issued by the UCPN-Maoists and some Madhesi parties" (Kantha 2014, p.209). The NC and the CPN-UML parties came first and second. "The UCPN-Maoists, the largest party in the first CA, saw its popular vote plummet to 15% from 30% in the first CA… The voters' wrath fell even more harshly on the fractured Madhesi parties, which together won less than 50 seats in the new CA" (Kantha 2014, p.209).
Philippines	2011	*LIED codes the Philippines as dropping from 1 to 0 in competitive_elections in 2007 and rising back to 1 in 2011. It was not clear to me what accounts for this. I therefore exclude this case.* There was a midterm election (of House and Senate) in 2007. It resulted in a good performance for allies of President Arroyo in the House but a big defeat in the Senate. "Despite having the machinery of government at its disposal, including the active support of the senior military leadership, the administration's alliance, TEAM Unity, captured only three of 12 Senate seats up for grabs—an unprecedented defeat for a sitting president" (Hicken 2008, p.77). There was considerable electoral violence, but that is not unusual: "As in past elections, the 2007 contest was a violent affair, with 126 people killed and 148 injured in election related violence" (Hicken 2008, p.77). Hicken does not mention significant fraud. Another possible explanation for the downgrading is the revelation of an extensive attempt by the presidential administration to use bribery of House members to prevent the president's impeachment. "Invited to the meeting were the speaker of the House, Jose De Venecia, Jr., and nearly 200 members of the president's party, Kabalikat ng Mamamayang Pilipino (Kampi). Those present were reportedly given bags of cash ranging in value from $1,200 to $12,000 in exchange for their support of the president. This included supporting and then derailing a "sham" presidential impeachment proceeding in a bid to ensure that a more threatening legitimate attempt would not unfold. Most alleged recipients of the cash denied receiving the gifts or asserted that the money was intended for their constituents, and Arroyo denied any role in or knowledge of the cash payouts. Nonetheless, the belief that the president was involved was bolstered by the fact that the handouts took place in the presidential palace and allegedly involved top officials in Kampi" (Hicken 2008, pp.76-7). While this suggests high level corruption, it's not clear why it would motivate a downgrade for electoral competitiveness in the absence of some link to elections. Hicken (2009, p.196) notes that attempts by opponents to impeach the president are "near-annual" events. In 2006, a movement of citizens and army rebels had sought unsuccessfully to overthrow the president. "Gloria Macapagal Arroyo… moved quickly to frustrate attempts in 2006 to oust her. She got the armed forces top brass on her side and declared a state of emergency on the morning that rebel soldiers and their civilian sympathizers were to march from their camps to the People Power monument on Edsa" (Coronel 2007, p.176). "The attempted uprising fizzled as water cannons and truncheons were unleashed on protesters. The state of emergency lasted only three weeks: Arroyo faced widespread opposition to repressive measures. Months later, the Supreme Court declared illegal the official acts committed under the emergency proclamation" (Coronel 2007, p.176). Not clear, either, why this would lead to a downgrading of electoral competitiveness for the next four years. An unpopular but elected president survives an attempt at unconstitutional overthrow.
Switzerland	1879	The source of this entry seems to be the Przeworski et al. PIPE dataset, which codes Switzerland as passing in 1879 from restricted male suffrage to unrestricted male suffrage (6 to 7). The codebook does not provide any information on this change. This appears to be an error. I could find no report of an electoral reform in 1879. Switzerland had had universal and equal male suffrage since 1848. In 1872 a unified confederal electoral law had been passed, including adoption of the secret ballot. (Subsequent parliamentary elections were held in 1875 and 1878).
Tanzania	2010	*LIED codes Tanzania as non-competitive until 2009, but competitive from 2010. Freedom House also raised its rating of Tanzania that year from 4 to 3. For the reasons explained below, I do not find evidence of a significant political liberalization or democratization in this year.* *Why is the 2010 viewed as marking an advance in democracy?* Freedom House notes: "While the CCM retained its majority in concurrent legislative elections, winning 186 seats, the results gave the opposition its largest representation in parliament in Tanzania's history" (Freedom House 2011).

<table>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td>However:
a) the exact level of opposition representation is not, in itself, a good measure of competitiveness since this changes in part because of changes in voters' preferences, party organization, etc. Babeiya (2011, p.84) sees the 2010 result as fitting into the "unstable and zigzagging trend of opposition parties since Tanzania reintroduced multiparty politics"—in other words, consistent with the pre-existing regime, not an indicator of major regime change.
b) the level of opposition representation in 2010 was roughly the same as in 1995—but that year was coded "non-competitive,"
c) the percentage of the vote going to opposition presidential candidates was also about the same as in 1995,
d) the level of opposition representation in the parliament was still only 25%.

Freedom House also notes: "While there were some protests alleging vote rigging and poor administration of the elections, the 2010 polls represented a considerable improvement over previous elections" (Freedom House 2011).

However:
a) reports suggest that claims of vote rigging and problematic election administration were significant. "CCM's victory was… vehemently challenged by CHADEMA who claimed that the elections were rigged" (Babeiya 2011, p.87). The 2010 vote was "marred by relatively poor turnout, unusual delays, street protests and accusations of vote rigging" (Gettleman 2010).
b) The week after the election witnessed "riots," and unexplained delays in counting the votes. "The elections were held Sunday, and it took a full workweek to count the votes. On Monday, opposition supporters rioted, accusing the government of intentionally delaying. On Tuesday, European observers said the delays were creating suspicion and that the tallying process was hardly transparent…. On Wednesday, Willibrod Slaa, the former Roman Catholic priest running against Mr Kikwete, accused Tanzania's secret police of helping steal votes for the president and called for a recount. On Thursday, other opposition parties echoed that call and said the election had been rigged. The election commission, which many Tanzanian analysts contend is beholden to the president, swatted away the complaints" (Gettleman 2010).
c) reports of greater intimidation by security forces than in the past. Babeiya points to "an increase in reliance on security forces to silence the opposition, as has been the case in other African countries such as Zimbabwe, Uganda, Cameroun, Ivory Coast and Gambia, where the ruling parties are not willing to leave office peacefully. It was observed that in most of the constituencies where opposition parties were popular excessive force was used to silence pro-opposition supporters who were dissatisfied with the processes of counting and declaration of results" (Babeiya 2011, pp.98-99).
d) huge drop in turnout suggests something was discouraging voters from voting: "turnout, which had been 72.4 per cent in 2005, was this time only 42.84 per cent" (Reith 2011, p.111). "'I'm not surprised,' said Azaveli Lwaitama, a political analyst at the University of Dar es Salaam. 'If the turnout was low… that means the incumbent party managed to scare many voters into not even voting'" (Gettleman 2010).

In sum, this is a case of an election in which the ruling party won both the presidency and control of the legislature—both by margins similar to those in a previous (although not directly preceding) election. The victory was followed by accusations of election rigging and by rioting. Turnout was very significantly reduced from previous elections—according to one local expert, because voters were intimidated by the incumbent party. There may have been less electoral violence than during previous elections, particularly in Zanzibar. However, that could be due to a noted "increase in reliance on security forces to silence the opposition." So it is hard to see the 2010 election as significantly different from the previous elections in 1995, 2000, and 2005.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">LIED cases that seem to refer to establishment of full sovereignty, rather than political liberalization</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Kosovo 2012, Solomon Islands 2014 (after Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands troops withdraw).</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Apparent miscodings of "Major Democratic Transition"</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Guatemala 1879, coded as "minor democratic transition" meets the definition for "major democratic transition"; Burundi 2005, Cambodia 1993, Democratic Republic of Congo 2006, Denmark 1915, Ethiopia 1995, France 1877, Iraq 2010, Japan 1868, Japan 1952, Liberia 2006, Mexico 1997, Pakistan 1973, Philippines 1944, Somalia 2012-14, Spain 1871 and 1879, Sweden 1917, and West Germany 1949 all coded as "major democratic transitions," do not meet the criteria unless transition years ignored.</td></tr>
</table>

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Table A2: Cases of Democratization

Country	*Year*	*Democratization concept*	*Country*	*Year*	*Democratization concept*
Albania	1990-92	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Kyrgyzstan	2010-11	P MDT
Albania	1997	BMR L4 L5	Latvia	1920	L4 L5
Algeria	1989	P	Latvia	1993	BMR
Antigua and Barbuda	2004	BMR L4 L5	Lebanon	1951-2	L4 L5
Argentina	1912	BMR L4 L5	Lebanon	1971 [i]	BMR
Argentina	1939 [a]	P MDT	Lesotho	1993	P MDT
Argentina	1946	L4 L5	Lesotho	2002	BMR L4 L5
Argentina	1955-8	P BMR L4 L5	Liberia	2006	BMR L4 L5
Argentina	1963	BMR L4 L5	Libya	2012	L4 L5
Argentina	1973	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Lithuania	1920	L4 L5
Argentina	1983	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Lithuania	1992	BMR L4 L5
Armenia	1998	P MDT	Luxembourg	1919	L5
Austria	1918-20	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Madagascar	1991-3	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Austria	1940-46 [b]	P BMR MDT	Madagascar	2013	L4 L5
Bangladesh	1986	L4 L5	Malawi	1993-4	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Bangladesh	1991	P BMR MDT	Maldives	2009	BMR L4 L5
Bangladesh	2008-9	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Maldives	2013	L4 L5
Belarus	1994	L4 L5	Mali	1991-2	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Belgium	1848-53 [c]	P MDT	Mali	2013	L4 L5
Belgium	1894	BMR L5	Mauritania	2005-7	P MDT
Benin	1990-91	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Mexico	1997-2000 [j]	BMR L4 L5
Bhutan	2008	P MDT L4 L5	Moldova	1994	L4 L5
Bolivia	1880	P MDT	Mongolia	1990-92	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Bolivia	1931	L4	Mozambique	1994	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Bolivia	1956	L4 L5	Myanmar	1960	BMR L4 L5
Bolivia	1979	BMR L4 L5	Myanmar	2015	L4 L5
Bolivia	1982	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Nepal	1957-9	P MDT
Brazil	1945-6	P BMR MDT L4	Nepal	1981	P
Brazil	1979-85	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Nepal	1990-91	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Bulgaria	1918-19	P MDT L4 L5	Nepal	2006-8	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Bulgaria	1931	L4 L5	Netherlands	1848	L4
Bulgaria	1990	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Netherlands	1897	BMR
Burkina Faso	1977-8	P MDT	Netherlands	1917-18	P MDT L5
Burkina Faso	2015	P MDT L4 L5	Nicaragua	1929	L4 L5
Burundi	2005	BMR L4 L5	Nicaragua	1984	BMR L4 L5
Cambodia	1998	P MDT	Nicaragua	1990	P MDT
Cape Verde	1990-91	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Niger	1991-3	P BMR MDT L4 L5
CAR	1993	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Niger	1999	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Chile	1894	L4	Niger	2010-11	P MDT L4 L5
Chile	1932-4	BMR L4	Nigeria	1978-9	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Chile	1970	L5	Nigeria	1999	P MDT
Chile	1989-90	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Nigeria	2011	L4 L5
China	1911-12	P MDT	Norway	1898	P MDT
Colombia	1867-8	P MDT L4 L5	Pakistan	1962	P MDT
Colombia	1936-7 [d]	P BMR MDT	Pakistan	1972-3	BMR L4 L5
Colombia	1957-8	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Pakistan	1988	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Comoros	1990	P MDT	Pakistan	2007-8	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Comoros	1996	L4 L5	Panama	1932	L4 L5
Comoros	2000-06	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Panama	1956	L4 L5
Congo, Rep.	1991-2	P MDT	Panama	1989-91	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Costa Rica	1890	L4	Paraguay	1869-70	P
Costa Rica	1894	L4	Paraguay	1937	P MDT
Costa Rica	1919	L4	Paraguay	1989	P MDT L4 L5
Costa Rica	1949	BMR L4 L5	Peru	1824-8	P MDT
Croatia	1999-2000	P BMR MDT	Peru	1912	L4
Cuba	1940	BMR L4 L5	Peru	1915	L4
Czechoslovakia	1920	L4 L5	Peru	1930-3	P MDT L4

Czechoslovakia	1989-90	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Peru	1939	L4
Denmark	1849	P MDT	Peru	1956	P BMR MDT L4
Denmark	1901	BMR L4	Peru	1963	P BMR MDT L4
Denmark	1915	L5	Peru	1978-80	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Dom. Rep.	1961-2	P MDT	Peru	2001	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Dom. Rep.	1978	P MDT L4 L5	Philippines	1944-46	BMR
Dom. Rep.	1996	L4 L5	Philippines	1986-7	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Ecuador	1934	L4	Poland	1919	L4 L5
Ecuador	1944	L4	Poland	1989-91	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Ecuador	1948	BMR L4	Portugal	1908-11	P BMR MDT
Ecuador	1968	P MDT L4	Portugal	1974-6	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Ecuador	1979	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Romania	1919	L4 L5
Ecuador	2003	BMR	Romania	1928	L4 L5
Egypt	1934-5	P MDT	Romania	1989-92	P BMR MDT L4 L5
El Salvador	1930	L4 L5	Russia	1991-93	BMR L4 L5
El Salvador	1979-84	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Samoa	1990	L4 L5
Estonia	1919	L4 L5	Sao Tome & Principe	1991	BMR L4 L5
Fiji	1990-93	P MDT L4 L5	Senegal	2000	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Fiji	2001	L4 L5	Serbia	1838 [k]	P MDT
Fiji	2014	P MDT L4 L5	Serbia	1860-1	P
Finland	1919	L4 L5	Serbia	1903	P MDT
Finland	1944	P MDT	Serbia	1920	L4 L5
France	1848-51	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Seychelles	1993	L4 L5
France	1870-77	BMR L4 L5	Sierra Leone	1968	P MDT
France	1944-46	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Sierra Leone	1996	P MDT
Gambia	1970-72 [e]	BMR L4 L5	Sierra Leone	2001-2	BMR L4 L5
Georgia	2004	BMR L4 L5	South Africa	1994	BMR L5
Georgia	2012	L4 L5	South Korea	1960	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Germany	1919	BMR L4 L5	South Korea	1963	P MDT
Germany, West	1947-9	P BMR MDT	South Korea	1987-8	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Ghana	1969-70	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Spain	1930-31	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Ghana	1978-9	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Spain	1975-8	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Ghana	1991-7	P BMR L4 L5	Sri Lanka	1989-91	BMR L4 L5
Greece	1862-4	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Sri Lanka	2015	L4 L5
Greece	1926	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Sudan	1964-5	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Greece	1941-6	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Sudan	1985-6	P BMR MDT
Greece	1974-5	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Suriname	1988	BMR L4 L5
Grenada	1984	BMR L4 L5	Suriname	1991	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Guatemala	1879	P MDT	Sweden	1911 [l]	BMR
Guatemala	1921	P MDT	Sweden	1917-19	L4 L5
Guatemala	1944-5	P BMR MDT L4	Switzerland	1848	L4
Guatemala	1958	BMR	Syria	1950	P MDT
Guatemala	1966	P BMR MDT	Syria	1954	P MDT
Guatemala	1984-6	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Taiwan	1987	P
Guinea-Bissau	1994	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Taiwan	1992-6	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Guinea-Bissau	2000	L4 L5	Thailand	1969	P MDT
Guinea-Bissau	2005	P MDT L4 L5	Thailand	1973-5	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Guinea-Bissau	2014	L4 L5	Thailand	1977-8	P MDT
Guyana	1992	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Thailand	1983	BMR L4 L5
Haiti	1986-90	P MDT	Thailand	1992	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Haiti	1994	P MDT L4 L5	Thailand	2007-8	P MDT
Haiti	2004-6	P MDT L4 L5	Thailand	2011	L4 L5
Honduras	1852	L4	Tonga	2010	L4 L5
Honduras	1894	P MDT	Tunisia	2011-14	P MDT L4 L5
Honduras	1929	L4 L5	Turkey	1876	P
Honduras	1957	BMR L4 L5	Turkey	1908-9	P
Honduras	1971	BMR L4 L5	Turkey	1946	P MDT
Honduras	1980-2	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Turkey	1961	BMR L4 L5
Honduras	2010-13	BMR L4 L5	Turkey	1973	P MDT
Hungary	1920	P	Turkey	1983	P BMR MDT L4 L5

Hungary	1988-90	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Uganda	1980	P BMR MDT
Indonesia	1946-55 [f]	P BMR MDT	Ukraine	1994	L4 L5
Indonesia	1998-9	P BMR MDT L4 L5	UK	1832	L4
Iran	1941	P	UK	1885	BMR
Iran	1997	P MDT	UK	1918	L5
Ireland	1922-23	BMR	United States	1965	L5
Italy	1913-19 [g]	BMR L4 L5	Uruguay	1903	L4
Italy	1943-8	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Uruguay	1918-19	BMR L5
Ivory Coast	1999-2000	P MDT	Uruguay	1938-42	BMR L4 L5
Ivory Coast	2011	L4 L5	Uruguay	1985	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Japan	1918	L4	USSR	1988-90	P
Japan	1925	L5	Venezuela	1946	L4 L5
Japan	1952	BMR	Venezuela	1957-9	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Jordan	1951-2 [h]	P	Yemen, North	1967-71 [m]	P MDT
Kenya	2002	P BMR MDT L4 L5	Yugoslavia	2000	P BMR MDT L4 L5
Kenya	2013	L4 L5	Zambia	1991	P MDT L4 L5
Kyrgyzstan	2005-6	P MDT			

Sources: Polity IV; Boix, Miller, Rosato (2013), Skaaning et al. (2015).
Notes: P: Increase of 6 or more points on Polity2 scale within 3 years; BMR: Movement from “Non-democracy” to “Democracy” (Boix, Miller, Rosato 2013); MDT: “Major Democratic Transition” (Rise of at least 6 points on Polity2 within three years and move from [-10, 0] to (0, 10] or from (0, 6) to [6,10].); MDT6: Rise of at least 6 points on Polity2 within three years and move from [-10, 6) to [6, 10].); L4: Increase from < 4 to ≥ 4 on Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy; L5: Increase from < 5 to ≥ 5 on Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy. Dating of episodes is approximate, based on the start of the Polity2 6-point increase, the BMR date of change to democracy, the LIED date of score changes, and an examination of the history.

[a] Polity says 1937, but I adjust to 1939 to coincide with Ortiz reforms.

[b] Interpolating through the wartime interregnum, the year of “democratization” comes out as 1940. Based on the history of the case, 1946, the first year after “interregnum,” is more appropriate.

[c] Polity date is 1853; Polity III notes say “1853 is an arbitrary date.” I was unable to find any act of democratization in 1853. In a comprehensive chronology of political events during 1846-78 (Witte et al. 2005, part 2, pp.199-200), 1853 has no entry. Major reforms were made in 1848, so I treat it as the year of change.

[d] Polity says 1930 is “an arbitrary date.” I change to 1936, year of López Pumarejo’s 1936 constitutional reform, which granted voting and citizen rights to all male citizens over 21, regardless of literacy or income. BMR records democratization in 1937. Note that considerable electoral fraud throughout this period.

[e] Apparently BMR code democracy as beginning in 1972 because this was the date of the first national election after the head of state changed from Governor General on behalf of Queen Elizabeth to president indirectly elected by parliament. But the referendum on republic status and the change of head of state occurred in 1970. And independence was granted in 1965, when executive power passed to a prime minister, who won a parliamentary majority in election of 1966. 1970 seems more appropriate.

[f] BMR date this at 1955.

[g] Dating controversial. In 1912, reforms under Giolitti established almost universal male suffrage. This increased the electorate from 3 to 8.5 million, leaving disenfranchised “only about half a million adult males” (Larcinese 2011, p.2). However, some scholars consider 1913 election too corrupt to be considered democratic, while 1919 election was less corrupt. BMR use 1919 as date.

[h] Polity calls 1951-2 an “arbitrary date,” but it actually makes some sense.

[i] Perhaps should be 1970, when the legalization of parties occurred.

[j] BMR go by date of election in which their conditions first met, 2000, but changes that produced this outcome came in 1996-7.

[k] Dating complicated. In 1835, there was a move towards more democratic government, quickly reversed. In 1838, there was an increase in checks on the executive—a move from absolute monarchy to oligarchy. In the early 1840s, principle of local election of prince was established. In general, the dates for Serbia are quite arbitrary: one could justify a different set of turning points.

[l] The reform occurred in 1907-9; in 1911 was the first election under broader franchise.

[m] Polity has 1962; but this is largely due to change from hereditary monarchy to military regime, which it grades higher. No evidence of democratization in 1962. “The new regime, led by Brig.-Gen. Abdullah al-Sallal, was a republic in name only. Dominated by the military and faced with a royalist uprising in the northeastern part of the country, the regime did not initially provide for a legislature that might restrict the powers of the executive” (Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg 1999, p.203). However, significant reforms occurred in 1967-71.

Box 1: An example: Greece in 1974

In 1974, Greece returned to civilian rule after the colonels who had seized power in 1967 lost control amid Turkey's invasion of northern Cyprus (Diamandouros 1986). (This qualifies as democratization under all six definitions.) Did a rich elite democratize to commit to redistribute to the poor? First, the incumbents were not a rich elite, but a military faction. Second, the junta—under Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannidis—had no intention of democratizing. Ioannidis had ousted his predecessor, Giorgios Papadopoulos, fearing the latter might begin liberalization. Large protests did occur, led by students rather than the poor. Far from conceding political rights, the colonels sent tanks to crush them (Gallant 2001, 203-4). As the Cyprus disaster sapped Ioannidis's military support, other officers mutinied and recalled Konstantinos Karamanlis, a charismatic, center-right politician, to serve as prime minister. Nothing here suggests a commitment to redistribute.

Did democratization aim to motivate citizens to fight? The conflict with Turkey did trigger the junta's collapse. However, the military did not democratize to persuade citizens to fight because, after Ioannidis's overthrow, those in charge were determined to avoid war. The joint chiefs "agreed that war was impossible" (Woodhouse 1985, 157). Karamanlis "made it clear that there could be no question of a military confrontation with Turkey" and ordered demobilization (Clogg 1975, 341). Did one elite faction broaden access in the hope of winning votes? The junta was certainly not angling for votes, and, again, it did not mean to democratize. Nor was it motivated to reduce patronage. A "great compromise"? Karamanlis did initially form a government of national unity—but totally excluding the left (Diamandouros 1986, 159-60). He made decisions "explicitly avoiding reaching any 'settlement'—let alone a 'pact'—with other democratic political leaders" (Sotiropoulos 2002, 164). I coded "very probably no" on all deliberate choice arguments.

Did incumbent mistakes prompt the return to democracy? I answered "very probably" for two mistakes and "maybe" for a third. When troops crushed student protests in 1973, killing at least 34, this sparked "widespread revulsion" for the junta (Clogg 1992, p.197). Its unpopularity helped nudge top generals toward democratization the next year. Still, in the short run, the clashes led only to Papadopoulos' replacement by an even tougher hardliner—hence "maybe/unclear." However, Ioannidis' support for the Greek nationalists' coup in Cyprus that provoked the Turkish invasion "very probably" contributed to the junta's fall. Ioannidis himself admitted to a US diplomat that "his hasty decision… might have been stupid" (US Embassy, Greece 1974). The day before the Turks invaded, he brushed off US attempts to negotiate a way out that might have saved his regime (Stern 1975, p.63). And Ioannidis' order to attack the Turks both in Cyprus and along the Greece-Turkey land border was so desperate and inconsistent with Greek capacities that it triggered his colleagues' mutiny, "very probably" precipitating the final collapse. Had Ioannidis instead forged a plan with the military commanders, the regime—if not, his position in it—would have had better survival odds.

For more details, see the synopsis table reproduced below (and the full synopsis).

Clogg, Richard. 1975. "Karamanlis's Cautious Success: the Background." *Government and Opposition* 10 (3): 332-355.

Diamandouros, P. Nikiforos. 1986. "Regime Change and the Prospects for Democracy in Greece: 1974-1983." In *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe*, edited by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, 138-64. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Gallant, Thomas W. 2001. *Modern Greece.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Sotiropoulos, Dimitri A. 2002. "New Approaches to Post-Authoritarian Greek Politics." *South European Society and Politics* 7 (3): 163-168. doi:10.1080/13608740708539638.

Woodhouse, C.M. 1985. *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels.* New York: Granada.

Greece 1974

Congruence with deliberate choice theories	
Democracy as commitment to redistribute, preventing revolution	
1. Did democratization follow or coincide with anti-elite mobilization—protests, strikes, other mass actions?	Yes. From January 1973, students protested and boycotted classes. The regime crushed a student gathering at the Polytechnic University with tanks in November 1973 (Gallant 2001, p.202). "The lead in open opposition to the regime was taken by university students whose initially professional grievances increasingly took on a political colouring" (Clogg 1992, p.196). Later: "[C]rowds… filled the streets of Athens and other major cities on 23 July [1974], when the surrender of power to the civilians was being negotiated" (Diamandouros 1986, p.156).
2. If so, were these mobilizations motivated by economic or redistributive demands?	No—the students had primarily professional and political grievances. "'The reasons are varied and with deep roots,' said Nikolaos, a 20-year-old student of civil engineering.... 'We are tired of decrees against us. We are weary of fraudulent elections for our representatives, who always turn out to be pro-regime. We object to Government commissioners, all ex-generals, sitting in the schools. We want an important voice in drafting the new charter for higher education.'… Several students said that the effort was ideologically mixed, with support from the left, right and center…. [T]he regime, worried about the rising unrest, issued a new decree, signed by Premier Papadopoulos to end military deferment for students who were striking or inciting others to protest… Thus what started out as a campaign involving other issues such as less Government intervention in university life and the desire for a greater say in academic affairs is now centered on the draft decree… 'Bring back our brothers' is one of the current slogans used by groups of demonstrators, who, again on Saturday night, surged into Constitution Square here only to be chased away by the police" (Shuster 1973).
3. In response, did incumbents broaden the political rights of those protesting?	No. Tough repression. "[W]hen the Athens Polytechnic students began broadcasting appeals on a clandestine radio for a worker-student alliance to overthrow the dictatorship, Papdopoulos sent in troops and tanks to crush the students" (Clogg 1992, p.197). "The eviction of the students from the Athens Polytechnic was carried out with extreme brutality, and at least 34 students and others were killed… This ruthless demonstration of force in the centre of Athens caused widespread revulsion" (Clogg 1992, p.197). After the Polytechnic uprising, hardliners in the military overthrew Papadopoulos to prevent him moving in the direction of democracy.
4. Did these reforms credibly commit the elite to redistribute to the protesting groups, demobilizing their protests and protecting the rich from a social revolution?	No reforms until after the junta handed over power to Karamanlis.
5. Does case fit observable implications of theory?	***1: Very probably no***.

***5: Very probably yes*, *4: Probably yes*, *3: Maybe/unclear*, *2: Probably no*, *1: Very probably no*.**	
Democratization to increase representation of incumbent party/control of government	
6. Is there evidence that the incumbents who reformed expected the reform would increase support for their party and, thus, their odds of controlling the government?	The incumbents were military officers, who did not have a party. They did not reform. Reform occurred only after they were forced to give up power.
7. Does case fit observable implications of theory? ***5: Very probably yes*, *4: Probably yes*, *3: Maybe/unclear*, *2: Probably no*, *1: Very probably no*.**	***1: Very probably no*.**
Democracy to motivate masses to defend regime in war or civil war (or demobilize afterwards)	
8. Did democratization occur around the time of war, civil war, or significant threat of these?	Yes. At moment of extreme tension with Turkey.
9. Did the elite consciously choose to extend rights—and to those needed to fight, or, later, those it sought to demobilize?	No. The junta did not choose to extend rights—it was forced out. The remaining officers and the Karamanlis government were determined to avoid war, so they were not democratizing in order to motivate soldiers to fight. On July 20th: "The Chiefs of Staff, meeting separately the same afternoon, agreed that war was impossible… The same afternoon the four of them collectively told Gizikis that operations against the Turkish forces were simply impossible" (Woodhouse 1985, p.157). "Karamanlis's overriding priority was to defuse the risk of war with Turkey" (Clogg 1992, p.166). Since they were determined not to go to war, they did not democratize to motivate soldiers to fight.
10. Does case fit observable implications of theory? ***5: Very probably yes*, *4: Probably yes*, *3: Maybe/unclear*, *2: Probably no*, *1: Very probably no*.**	***1: Very probably no*.**
Democracy to reduce patronage	
11. Did those incumbents who made the decision to democratize claim that democratization would, by requiring broader electoral appeals, reduce patronage or corruption?	The junta did not choose to democratize. I found no evidence that this was a motive after its fall.
12. Does case fit observable implications of theory? ***5: Very probably yes*, *4: Probably yes*, *3: Maybe/unclear*, *2: Probably no*, *1: Very probably no*.**	***1: Very probably no*.**
Democracy the result of "great compromise" after "prolonged and inconclusive struggle"	
13. Did democratization follow a history of "prolonged and inconclusive" conflict between social factions?	Maybe: the military and different civilian political groups.
14. Did a reconciliation between the factions coincide with democratization?	No. Military handed over to right-wing politicians, but excluding the left. "[I]t was the charismatic founder of ND, K. Karamanlis, who single-handedly engineered democratic transition, explicitly avoiding reaching any 'settlement' - let alone a 'pact' - with other democratic political leaders" (Sotiropoulos 2002, p.164).
15. Does case fit observable implications of theory? ***5: Very probably yes*, *4: Probably yes*, *3: Maybe/unclear*, *2: Probably no*, *1: Very probably no*.**	***1: Very probably no*.**

Evidence of mistakes?	
16. Did the incumbent elite intend to democratize when the process that led to democratization began? ***5: Very probably yes**, **4: Probably yes**, **3: Maybe/unclear**, **2: Probably no**, **1: Very probably no**.*	***1: Very probably no**.* The junta certainly did not intend to hand over power. "Western ambassadors are convinced that nothing is farther from the minds of the new leaders [after Ioannides' coup] than elections or representative government. The military men firmly believe their compatriots first need several years of disciplined rule" (Modiano 1974).
17. Was the incumbent overthrown or did he resign under strong pressure from military and/or popular uprising before democratization occurred?	Yes. Ioannides strongly pressured to step down by other military chiefs.
18. Did the incumbent make significant mistakes? That is, would taking some other feasible course(s) of action have reduced the odds of having to give up or share power? Evaluate confidence: ***5: Very probably yes**, **4: Probably yes**, **3: Maybe/unclear**, **2: Probably no**, **1: Very probably no**.*	***5: Very probably yes**.* "Three developments more than all of the others brought down the Colonels. The first was the student movement, the second was the global economic crisis of the early 1970s that plunged the Greek economy into turmoil, and the third was Cyprus" (Gallant 2001, p.202). *A) Alienating society with excessively violent response to Polytechnic students.* "The eviction of the students from the Athens Polytechnic was carried out with extreme brutality, and at least 34 students and others were killed… This ruthless demonstration of force in the centre of Athens caused widespread revulsion" (Clogg 1992, p.197). However, in the short run this merely led to the overthrow of Papadopoulos by a more extreme hardliner. *B) Provoking Turkey into military action over Cyprus.* "On July 6, according to the widely respected Athens correspondent for the *Times* of London, Mario Modiano, Ioannides and his inner circle decided to assassinate [Cypriot leader Archbishop] Makarios through the national guard. The general was quoted by the *Times* as assuring junta officers: 'Don't worry. There will be no consequences if the job is done quickly and neatly'" (Stern 1975, p.55). "Believing that a major nationalist cause would rally the people behind him Ioannides ordered yet another assassination attempt on Makarios. It failed, but it provided Turkey with a pretext to intervene. [Five days after the failed assassination attempt] Turkey invaded Cyprus. Turkish forces swept across the northern part of the island. Ioannides called immediately for a full mobilization of the Greek military: nothing happened. The regime had lost whatever base of support it had previously enjoyed" (Gallant 2001, p.203). "It seems that Ioannidis was desperately seeking to bolster his regime's popularity by bringing about a spectacular nationalist triumph, namely the union of Cyprus with Greece. Fearing precisely that the coup presaged the *enosis* which had been specifically excluded under the terms of the 1960 constitutional settlement, Turkey launched an invasion of the northern part of the island on 20 July…. The Greek mobilization proved to be a shambles and the military commanders refused to carry out Ioannidis' orders to attack Turkey" (Clogg 1992, p.162). In conversation with a US Embassy official on July 16 (before Turkish intervention), Ioannidis admitted that: "his hasty decision on 13 July might have

	been stupid" although he might not have meant this sincerely (US Embassy, Greece 1974). *But he ignored opportunities to negotiate an end to the crisis before the Turks invaded.* On July 19 US special envoy Joseph Sisco "told the Greeks of his contacts with Ecevit and the intolerability of the Sampson regime in Nicosia to the Turks. He asked what steps the Greeks were prepared to take that might lead to a resumption of talks between the two governments… Ioannides excused himself without comment after 15 minutes" (Stern 1975, p.63). On July 20, Turkish troops invaded. C) *Losing support of the armed forces.* • By ordering the military chiefs to attack Turkey in Cyprus and along the Greek-Turkish land border, Ioannides provoked a mutiny against himself. "On the morning of Sunday, July 21, the heads of the Hellenic armed services met in the Pentagon office of General Bonanos when the aide-de-camp to Ioannides, a Colonel Loukoutos, arrived and made a brisk announcement: "Gentlemen," said Loukoutos, "a decision has been taken to attack Turkey on all fronts. Cyprus, Thrace, everywhere. Prepare yourselves, gentlemen, the decision has been made." Army Chief of Staff Andreas Galatsanos was the first to react: "I am not ready to enter an aggressive war," he said. "I'm ready for defense but not for aggression." Others began to express reservations at the decision that was being foisted on them by Ioannides. "The Air Force is ready to carry out its duty," echoed Air Force Chief of Staff Alexander Papanikolaou, "but an air attack would be unwise and have no decisive results." Ioannides had wanted six Phantoms to proceed immediately from Crete to Cyprus to provide air support for the beleaguered Greek forces. The insurrection against Ioannides had begun in those moments" (Stern 1975, p.66). • "Ioannides called immediately for a full mobilization of the Greek military: nothing happened. The regime had lost whatever base of support it had previously enjoyed" (Gallant 2001, p.203). "The Greek military was in a sad state of preparedness and military commanders in the field knew it. Rather than leading their troops into disaster, commanders refused to follow the orders." Soon after, the military regime began to crumble and senior level officers forced Ioannidis out, beginning the return to civilian rule (Roehrig 2002, p.107).
19. Could the episode be seen as one in which the incumbent acted optimally given uncertainty? ***5: Very probably yes*, *4: Probably yes*, *3: Maybe/unclear*, *2: Probably no*, *1: Very probably no*.**	***1: Very probably no*.** It was clear to most military officers that the army was in no shape to attack Turkey. Given this, Ioannidis' provocation of Turkey seems clearly sub-optimal. Failing to use Sisco's assistance to negotiate a way out was sub-optimal.
20. Summary: What type(s) of mistakes? ***5: Very probably yes*, *4: Probably yes*, *3: Maybe/unclear*, *2: Probably no*, *1: Very probably no*.**	A) *Excessive or poorly targeted repression that catalyzes opposition: "counterproductive violence."* ***3: Maybe/unclear*.** "The eviction of the students from the Athens Polytechnic was carried out with extreme brutality, and at least 34 students and others were killed… This ruthless demonstration of force in the centre of Athens caused widespread revulsion" (Clogg 1992, p.197). However, in the short run this merely led to the

	overthrow of Papadopoulos by a more extreme hardliner. Hence, only 3. B) *Major foreign policy failure that provokes foreign intervention or discredits incumbent (e.g., entering or initiating avoidable international conflict, then performing poorly).* ***5: Very probably yes****. The Cyprus coup and mobilization against Turkey.* • "On July 6, according to the widely respected Athens correspondent for the *Times* of London, Mario Modiano, Ioannides and his inner circle decided to assassinate [Cypriot leader Archbishop] Makarios through the national guard. The general was quoted by the *Times* as assuring junta officers: 'Don't worry. There will be no consequences if the job is done quickly and neatly'" (Stern 1975, p.55). • "Believing that a major nationalist cause would rally the people behind him Ioannides ordered yet another assassination attempt on Makarios. It failed, but it provided Turkey with a pretext to intervene. [Five days after the failed assassination attempt] Turkey invaded Cyprus. Turkish forces swept across the northern part of the island. Ioannides called immediately for a full mobilization of the Greek military: nothing happened. The regime had lost whatever base of support it had previously enjoyed" (Gallant 2001, p.203). • "It seems that Ioannidis was desperately seeking to bolster his regime's popularity by bringing about a spectacular nationalist triumph, namely the union of Cyprus with Greece. Fearing precisely that the coup presaged the *enosis* which had been specifically excluded under the terms of the 1960 constitutional settlement, Turkey launched an invasion of the northern part of the island on 20 July…. The Greek mobilization proved to be a shambles and the military commanders refused to carry out Ioannidis' orders to attack Turkey" (Clogg 1992, p.162). • In conversation with a US Embassy official on July 16 (before Turkish intervention), Ioannidis admitted that: "his hasty decision on 13 July might have been stupid" although he might not have meant this sincerely (US Embassy, Greece 1974). • *But he ignored opportunities to negotiate an end to the crisis before the Turks invaded.* On July 19 US special envoy Joseph Sisco "told the Greeks of his contacts with Ecevit and the intolerability of the Sampson regime in Nicosia to the Turks. He asked what steps the Greeks were prepared to take that might lead to a resumption of talks between the two governments… Ioannides excused himself without comment after 15 minutes" (Stern 1975, p.63). On July 20, Turkish troops invaded. *C) Avoidably alienating army or security services (or part of them), leading to overthrow by them or erosion of state's repressive capacity.* ***5: Very probably yes****. By ordering the military chiefs to attack Turkey in Cyprus and along the Greek-Turkish land border, Ioannides provoked a mutiny against himself.* • "On the morning of Sunday, July 21, the heads of the Hellenic armed services met in the Pentagon office of

	General Bonanos when the aide-de-camp to Ioannides, a Colonel Loukoutos, arrived and made a brisk announcement: "Gentlemen," said Loukoutos, "a decision has been taken to attack Turkey on all fronts. Cyprus, Thrace, everywhere. Prepare yourselves, gentlemen, the decision has been made." Army Chief of Staff Andreas Galatsanos was the first to react: "I am not ready to enter an aggressive war," he said. "I'm ready for defense but not for aggression." Others began to express reservations at the decision that was being foisted on them by loan- nides. "The Air Force is ready to carry out its duty," echoed Air Force Chief of Staff Alexander Papanikolaou, "but an air attack would be unwise and have no decisive results." Ioannides had wanted six Phantoms to proceed immediately from Crete to Cyprus to provide air support for the beleaguered Greek forces. The insurrection against Ioannides had begun in those moments" (Stern 1975, p.66). • "Ioannides called immediately for a full mobilization of the Greek military: nothing happened. The regime had lost whatever base of support it had previously enjoyed" (Gallant 2001, p.203). "The Greek military was in a sad state of preparedness and military commanders in the field knew it. Rather than leading their troops into disaster, commanders refused to follow the orders." Soon after, the military regime began to crumble and senior level officers forced Ioannidis out, beginning the return to civilian rule (Roehrig 2002, p.107). *If Ioannidis had agreed a plan of response with the top generals instead of simply ordering them to attack on all fronts he would have had better odds of survival.*

Table A4: Democratizations for which deliberate choice arguments might fit (percentage): First Wave (1828-1926)

	Democratization concept					
	Polity	MDT	MDTP6	BMR	LIED4	LIED5
Democracy as commitment to redistribute, preventing revolution	8 (0, 17)	11 (0, 16)	11 (0, 22)	6 (0, 31)	6 (0, 25)	8 (0, 31)
Democracy to motivate masses to defend regime in war or civil war	4 (4, 17)	5 (5, 21)	0 (0, 22)	13 (6, 25)	9 (3, 16)	15 (8, 23)
Democracy to reduce patronage	13 (0, 13)	11 (0, 11)	11 (0, 11)	6 (0, 13)	6 (0, 13)	4 (0, 12)
Democratization to increase support for incumbent party	4 (0, 17)	5 (0, 16)	11 (0, 33)	38 (6, 44)	13 (0, 28)	15 (4, 38)
Democracy result of "great compromise" after "prolonged and inconclusive struggle"	13 (4, 13)	16 (5, 16)	22 (11, 22)	25 (0, 44)	13 (0, 25)	19 (4, 35)
At least one of these arguments	33 (8, 46)	37 (11, 42)	56 (11, 56)	63 (13, 75)	34 (3, 50)	50 (15, 69)

Source: Author's assessments. See Appendix for historical sources.
Note: BMR: Boix, Miller Rosato definition; MDT: "Major Democratic Transition" under Polity definition; MDTP6: "Major Democratic Transition" ending at Polity2 ≥ 6; LIED4: Transition to minimally competitive elections (LIED); LIED5: Transition to at least full male franchise (plus minimally competitive elections) (LIED). Main figure given is percentage of cases for which the argument "probably" or "very probably" contributed. The figures underneath in parentheses are: first, percentage of cases for which the argument "very probably" contributed and then percentage for which it at least "maybe" contributed.

Table A5: Democratizations for which deliberate choice arguments might fit (percentage): Second Wave (1927-1962)

	Democratization concept					
	Polity	MDT	MDTP6	BMR	LIED4	LIED5
Democracy as commitment to redistribute, preventing revolution	4 (0, 4)	4 (0, 4)	0 (0, 0)	4 (0, 4)	3 (0, 3)	4 (0, 4)
Democracy to motivate masses to defend regime in war or civil war	0 (0, 11)	0 (0, 12)	0 (0, 14)	0 (0, 12)	0 (0, 6)	0 (0, 8)
Democracy to reduce patronage	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	4 (0, 4)	3 (0, 3)	4 (0, 4)
Democratization to increase support for incumbent party	7 (0, 11)	8 (0, 12)	0 (0, 7)	8 (0, 12)	14 (0, 23)	16 (0, 24)
Democracy result of "great compromise" after "prolonged and inconclusive struggle"	11 (4, 14)	12 (4, 16)	21 (7, 21)	19 (4, 23)	17 (3, 20)	24 (4, 24)
At least one of these arguments	21 (4, 36)	24 (4, 40)	21 (7, 43)	31 (4, 46)	34 (3, 49)	44 (4, 60)

Source: Author's assessments. See Appendix for historical sources.
Note: BMR: Boix, Miller Rosato definition; MDT: "Major Democratic Transition" under Polity definition; MDTP6: "Major Democratic Transition" ending at Polity2 ≥ 6; LIED4: Transition to minimally competitive elections (LIED); LIED5: Transition to at least full male franchise (plus minimally competitive elections) (LIED). Main figure given is percentage of cases for which the argument "probably" or "very probably" contributed. The figures underneath in parentheses are: first, percentage of cases for which the argument "very probably" contributed, then percentage for which it at least "maybe" contributed.

Table A6: Democratizations for which deliberate choice arguments might fit (percentage): Third Wave (1963-2015)

	Democratization concept					
	Polity	MDT	MDTP6	BMR	LIED4	LIED5
Democracy as commitment to redistribute, preventing revolution	4 (0, 14)	4 (0, 15)	4 (0, 16)	8 (1, 18)	6 (0, 14)	7 (1, 15)
Democracy to motivate masses to defend regime in war or civil war	3 (0, 3)	3 (0, 3)	2 (0, 2)	3 (0, 3)	3 (0, 3)	3 (0, 3)
Democracy to reduce patronage	1 (0, 2)	0 (0, 1)	0 (0, 2)	2 (0, 3)	3 (0, 3)	3 (0, 3)
Democratization to increase support for incumbent party	1 (0, 8)	1 (0, 7)	2 (0, 9)	4 (1, 11)	3 (0, 10)	4 (1, 12)
Democracy result of "great compromise" after "prolonged and inconclusive struggle"	17 (7, 19)	18 (7, 20)	19 (9, 21)	19 (9, 22)	14 (7, 18)	15 (8, 19)
At least one of these arguments	23 (7, 35)	23 (7, 35)	26 (9, 39)	33 (10, 43)	25 (7, 36)	26 (9, 38)

Source: Author's assessments. See Appendix for historical sources.
Note: BMR: Boix, Miller Rosato definition; MDT: "Major Democratic Transition" under Polity definition; MDTP6: "Major Democratic Transition" ending at Polity2 ≥ 6; LIED4: Transition to minimally competitive elections (LIED); LIED5: Transition to at least full male franchise (plus minimally competitive elections) (LIED). Main figure given is percentage of cases for which the argument "probably" or "very probably" contributed. The figures underneath in parentheses are: first, percentage of cases for which the argument "very probably" contributed and then percentage for which it at least "maybe" contributed.

Table A7: Democratizations for which deliberate choice arguments might fit (percentage): All waves, just democratizations that were not reversed

	Democratization concept					
	Polity	MDT	MDTP6	BMR	LIED4	LIED5
Democracy as commitment to redistribute, preventing revolution	4 (0, 13)	4 (0, 14)	5 (0, 18)	9 (1, 19)	6 (0, 16)	8 (1, 16)
Democracy to motivate masses to defend regime in war or civil war	4 (0, 6)	4 (0, 6)	3 (0, 5)	3 (0, 6)	1 (0, 3)	3 (1, 4)
Democracy to reduce patronage	2 (0, 4)	0 (0, 2)	0 (0, 3)	4 (0, 6)	6 (0, 8)	5 (0, 6)
Democratization to increase support for incumbent party	4 (0, 15)	4 (0, 14)	5 (0, 13)	9 (1, 16)	6 (0, 16)	8 (3, 18)
Democracy result of "great compromise" after "prolonged and inconclusive struggle"	25 (15, 26)	26 (16, 28)	29 (18, 32)	22 (10, 28)	17 (6, 22)	19 (9, 25)
At least one of these arguments	36 (15, 43)	36 (16, 44)	42 (18, 47)	38 (12, 47)	32 (6, 42)	36 (13, 45)

Source: Author's assessments. See Appendix for historical sources.
Note: BMR: Boix, Miller Rosato definition; MDT: "Major Democratic Transition" under Polity definition; MDTP6: "Major Democratic Transition" ending at Polity2 ≥ 6; LIED4: Transition to minimally competitive elections (LIED); LIED5: Transition to at least full male franchise (plus minimally competitive elections) (LIED). Main figure given is percentage of cases for which the argument "probably" or "very probably" contributed. The figures underneath in parentheses are: first, percentage of cases for which the argument "very probably" contributed and then percentage for which it at least "maybe" contributed.

Table A8: Democratizations for which deliberate choice arguments might fit (percentage): All waves, just high information cases

	Democratization concept					
	Polity	MDT	MDTP6	BMR	LIED4	LIED5
Democracy as commitment to redistribute, preventing revolution	5 (0, 15)	6 (0, 15)	5 (0, 15)	9 (1, 20)	8 (0, 18)	9 (1, 20)
Democracy to motivate masses to defend regime in war or civil war	2 (0, 5)	2 (0, 5)	2 (0, 5)	4 (0, 7)	4 (0, 7)	5 (1, 8)
Democracy to reduce patronage	3 (0, 4)	1 (0, 2)	2 (0, 3)	4 (0, 5)	4 (0, 6)	4 (0, 5)
Democratization to increase support for incumbent party	1 (0, 8)	1 (0, 8)	0 (0, 8)	5 (2, 12)	5 (0, 16)	6 (1, 17)
Democracy result of "great compromise" after "prolonged and inconclusive struggle"	16 (7, 18)	18 (8, 20)	22 (10, 23)	21 (9, 25)	14 (7, 20)	18 (8, 23)
At least one of these arguments	25 (7, 38)	26 (8, 39)	30 (10, 42)	37 (12, 47)	30 (7, 44)	35 (10, 49)

Source: Author's assessments. See Appendix for historical sources.
Note: BMR: Boix, Miller Rosato definition; MDT: "Major Democratic Transition" under Polity definition; MDTP6: "Major Democratic Transition" ending at Polity2 ≥ 6; LIED4: Transition to minimally competitive elections (LIED); LIED5: Transition to at least full male franchise (plus minimally competitive elections) (LIED). Main figure given is percentage of cases for which the argument "probably" or "very probably" contributed. The figures underneath in parentheses are: first, percentage of cases for which the argument "very probably" contributed and then percentage for which it at least "maybe" contributed.

Table A9: Democratization as result of incumbents' mistakes (percentage of cases): First Wave (1828-1926)

	Democratization concept					
	Polity	MDT	MDTP6	BMR	LIED4	LIED5
Relations with regime outsiders						
Excessive or poorly targeted concessions that strengthen the opposition: "slippery slope"	13 (4, 13)	11 (0, 11)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 6)	0 (0, 3)	0 (0, 0)
Failure to make concessions that would likely have divided and demobilized the opposition or coopted allies	25 (4, 29)	26 (5, 32)	33 (11, 33)	19 (6, 19)	25 (9, 25)	15 (4, 15)
Excessive or poorly targeted repression that catalyzes opposition: "counterproductive violence"	17 (4, 17)	21 (5, 21)	11 (0, 11)	6 (0, 6)	13 (6, 13)	4 (0, 4)
Failure to use repression (and surveillance or censorship) that would likely have weakened or disrupted the opposition	8 (8, 21)	11 (11, 26)	22 (22, 44)	13 (13, 25)	3 (3, 13)	4 (4, 15)
Major domestic policy failure that discredits incumbent or avoidably alienates key groups	25 (13, 29)	26 (11, 32)	11 (0, 22)	6 (0, 13)	9 (0, 13)	4 (0, 8)
Mishandling election or referendum (e.g., calling when could be avoided/postponed; campaigning and/or manipulating results non-optimally; falsifying too blatantly)	4 (4, 4)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	13 (0, 13)	4 (0, 4)
Relations with regime insiders						
Choosing policies or actions that split the civilian elite, leading to victory of outsiders	4 (0, 4)	5 (0, 5)	11 (0, 11)	6 (0, 6)	3 (3, 3)	0 (0, 0)
Avoidably alienating army or security services (or part of them), leading to overthrow by them or erosion of state's repressive capacity	38 (13, 46)	37 (16, 42)	11 (0, 22)	6 (0, 13)	3 (0, 3)	4 (0, 4)
Delegating to agent who turns out to be more motivated to pursue democratization than ruler is (or unexpectedly weak in resisting demands for it)	4 (4, 8)	5 (5, 5)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 6)	3 (0, 6)	0 (0, 4)
Relations with international actors						
Major foreign policy failure that provokes foreign intervention or discredits incumbent (e.g., entering or initiating avoidable international conflict, then performing poorly)	42 (25, 42)	47 (26, 47)	44 (22, 44)	31 (25, 31)	31 (22, 34)	35 (27, 38)
At least one mistake	75 (67, 75)	74 (68, 74)	67 (67, 67)	44 (44, 50)	59 (44, 63)	42 (38, 42)

Source: Author's assessments. See Appendix for historical sources.
Note: BMR: Boix, Miller Rosato definition; MDT: "Major Democratic Transition" under Polity definition; MDTP6: "Major Democratic Transition" ending at Polity2 ≥ 6; LIED4: Transition to minimally competitive elections (LIED); LIED5: Transition to at least full male franchise (plus minimally competitive elections) (LIED). Main figure given is percentage of cases for which the argument "probably" or "very probably" contributed. The figures underneath in parentheses are: first, percentage of cases for which the argument "very probably" contributed and then percentage for which it at least "maybe" contributed.

Table A10: Democratization as result of incumbents' mistakes (percentage of cases): Second Wave (1927-1962)

	Democratization concept					
	Polity	MDT	MDTP6	BMR	LIED4	LIED5
Relations with regime outsiders						
Excessive or poorly targeted concessions that strengthen the opposition: "slippery slope"	14 (0, 14)	12 (0, 12)	14 (0, 14)	4 (0, 4)	3 (0, 3)	4 (0, 4)
Failure to make concessions that would likely have divided and demobilized the opposition or coopted allies	14 (0, 14)	16 (0, 16)	21 (0, 21)	12 (0, 12)	11 (0, 23)	8 (0, 20)
Excessive or poorly targeted repression that catalyzes opposition: "counterproductive violence"	25 (14, 29)	24 (16, 28)	29 (21, 29)	23 (12, 23)	23 (11, 23)	12 (4, 12)
Failure to use repression (and surveillance or censorship) that would likely have weakened or disrupted the opposition	4 (0, 4)	4 (0, 4)	0 (0, 0)	8 (0, 8)	11 (6, 11)	12 (8, 12)
Major domestic policy failure that discredits incumbent or avoidably alienates key groups	14 (4, 14)	16 (4, 16)	21 (7, 21)	12 (4, 12)	20 (6, 23)	16 (8, 20)
Mishandling election or referendum (e.g., calling when could be avoided/postponed; campaigning and/or manipulating results non-optimally; falsifying too blatantly)	25 (7, 25)	28 (8, 28)	29 (14, 29)	27 (12, 31)	26 (6, 29)	28 (8, 32)
Relations with regime insiders						
Choosing policies or actions that split the civilian elite, leading to victory of outsiders	11 (4, 11)	8 (0, 8)	7 (0, 7)	8 (4, 12)	6 (3, 9)	4 (4, 8)
Avoidably alienating army or security services (or part of them), leading to overthrow by them or erosion of state's repressive capacity	36 (29, 43)	36 (28, 44)	36 (29, 50)	38 (27, 46)	43 (26, 49)	36 (24, 40)
Delegating to agent who turns out to be more motivated to pursue democratization than ruler is (or unexpectedly weak in resisting demands for it)	4 (4, 11)	4 (4, 12)	0 (0, 14)	0 (0, 8)	9 (3, 17)	12 (4, 20)
Relations with international actors						
Major foreign policy failure that provokes foreign intervention or discredits incumbent (e.g., entering or initiating avoidable international conflict, then performing poorly)	18 (18, 18)	20 (20, 20)	36 (36, 36)	19 (19, 19)	11 (9, 11)	12 (8, 12)
At least one mistake	64 (57, 68)	68 (60, 72)	79 (71, 86)	65 (62, 77)	74 (51, 86)	72 (48, 80)

Source: Author's assessments. See Appendix for historical sources.
Note: BMR: Boix, Miller Rosato definition; MDT: "Major Democratic Transition" under Polity definition; MDTP6: "Major Democratic Transition" ending at Polity2 $\geq$ 6; LIED4: Transition to minimally competitive elections (LIED); LIED5: Transition to at least full male franchise (plus minimally competitive elections) (LIED). Main figure given is percentage of cases for which the argument "probably" or "very probably" contributed. The figures underneath in parentheses are: first, percentage of cases for which the argument "very probably" contributed and then percentage for which it at least "maybe" contributed.

Table A11: Democratization as result of incumbents' mistakes (percentage of cases): Third Wave (1963-2015)

	Democratization concept					
	Polity	MDT	MDTP6	BMR	LIED4	LIED5
Relations with regime outsiders						
Excessive or poorly targeted concessions that strengthen the opposition: "slippery slope"	14 (2, 24)	13 (1, 20)	18 (2, 26)	17 (6, 24)	16 (4, 21)	15 (4, 21)
Failure to make concessions that would likely have divided and demobilized the opposition or coopted allies	13 (1, 20)	13 (1, 20)	16 (2, 26)	16 (2, 22)	16 (2, 22)	15 (2, 21)
Excessive or poorly targeted repression that catalyzes opposition: "counterproductive violence"	30 (18, 36)	28 (18, 34)	35 (23, 44)	31 (19, 38)	27 (17, 33)	26 (17, 32)
Failure to use repression (and surveillance or censorship) that would likely have weakened or disrupted the opposition	13 (2, 17)	14 (2, 18)	18 (2, 25)	16 (3, 20)	15 (3, 20)	15 (3, 21)
Major domestic policy failure that discredits incumbent or avoidably alienates key groups	26 (9, 35)	25 (8, 33)	30 (11, 40)	26 (8, 36)	24 (9, 34)	24 (9, 34)
Mishandling election or referendum (e.g., calling when could be avoided/postponed; campaigning and/or manipulating results non-optimally; falsifying too blatantly)	27 (14, 32)	27 (15, 32)	33 (18, 39)	27 (13, 36)	24 (11, 33)	24 (11, 32)
Relations with regime insiders						
Choosing policies or actions that split the civilian elite, leading to victory of outsiders	15 (8, 17)	16 (8, 18)	23 (12, 26)	15 (10, 19)	14 (7, 18)	14 (7, 18)
Avoidably alienating army or security services (or part of them), leading to overthrow by them or erosion of state's repressive capacity	34 (15, 43)	35 (16, 44)	39 (14, 53)	30 (13, 39)	28 (12, 37)	28 (12, 37)
Delegating to agent who turns out to be more motivated to pursue democratization than ruler is (or unexpectedly weak in resisting demands for it)	11 (5, 11)	9 (4, 9)	12 (5, 12)	13 (7, 16)	10 (5, 12)	11 (5, 13)
Relations with international actors						
Major foreign policy failure that provokes foreign intervention or discredits incumbent (e.g., entering or initiating avoidable international conflict, then performing poorly)	13 (6, 13)	14 (6, 14)	18 (7, 18)	15 (9, 17)	15 (8, 17)	14 (8, 16)
At least one mistake	77 (58, 80)	77 (59, 80)	89 (67, 93)	73 (58, 78)	70 (54, 74)	70 (54, 74)

Source: Author's assessments. See online appendix for historical sources.
Note: BMR: Boix, Miller Rosato definition; MDT: "Major Democratic Transition" under Polity definition; MDTP6: "Major Democratic Transition" ending at Polity2 ≥ 6; LIED4: Transition to minimally competitive elections (LIED); LIED5: Transition to at least full male franchise (plus minimally competitive elections) (LIED). Main figure given is percentage of cases for which the argument "probably" or "very probably" contributed. The figures underneath in parentheses are: first, percentage of cases for which the argument "very probably" contributed and then percentage for which it at least "maybe" contributed.

Table A12: Democratization as result of incumbents' mistakes (percentage of cases): All waves, just high information cases

	Democratization concept					
	Polity	MDT	MDTP6	BMR	LIED4	LIED5
Relations with regime outsiders						
Excessive or poorly targeted concessions that strengthen the opposition: "slippery slope"	16 (3, 24)	14 (1, 21)	17 (2, 25)	15 (5, 21)	14 (4, 19)	15 (4, 20)
Failure to make concessions that would likely have divided and demobilized the opposition or coopted allies	15 (1, 20)	15 (1, 21)	17 (2, 25)	17 (2, 22)	19 (2, 24)	17 (2, 22)
Excessive or poorly targeted repression that catalyzes opposition: "counterproductive violence"	29 (15, 35)	29 (15, 35)	33 (18, 42)	31 (17, 37)	30 (18, 35)	27 (16, 32)
Failure to use repression (and surveillance or censorship) that would likely have weakened or disrupted the opposition	13 (3, 18)	14 (3, 20)	17 (3, 25)	17 (4, 23)	15 (3, 22)	16 (4, 23)
Major domestic policy failure that discredits incumbent or avoidably alienates key groups	26 (11, 30)	26 (10, 30)	27 (12, 32)	20 (6, 27)	23 (8, 29)	20 (8, 27)
Mishandling election or referendum (e.g., calling when could be avoided/postponed; campaigning and/or manipulating results non-optimally; falsifying too blatantly)	25 (14, 28)	27 (15, 30)	33 (18, 37)	27 (15, 32)	26 (12, 30)	25 (12, 29)
Relations with regime insiders						
Choosing policies or actions that split the civilian elite, leading to victory of outsiders	12 (7, 13)	12 (7, 13)	18 (10, 20)	15 (9, 17)	12 (8, 14)	11 (7, 14)
Avoidably alienating army or security services (or part of them), leading to overthrow by them or erosion of state's repressive capacity	35 (18, 45)	36 (19, 46)	33 (15, 50)	31 (16, 41)	28 (15, 37)	27 (14, 36)
Delegating to agent who turns out to be more motivated to pursue democratization than ruler is (or unexpectedly weak in resisting demands for it)	11 (6, 14)	10 (6, 12)	10 (5, 13)	11 (5, 14)	9 (5, 12)	11 (5, 12)
Relations with international actors						
Major foreign policy failure that provokes foreign intervention or discredits incumbent (e.g., entering or initiating avoidable international conflict, then performing poorly)	15 (7, 15)	16 (8, 16)	18 (10, 18)	16 (13, 17)	18 (12, 19)	16 (11, 18)
At least one mistake	78 (62, 80)	80 (64, 82)	88 (68, 90)	77 (63, 79)	77 (61, 78)	74 (58, 75)

Source: Author's assessments. See Appendix for historical sources.

Note: BMR: Boix, Miller Rosato definition; MDT: "Major Democratic Transition" under Polity definition; MDTP6: "Major Democratic Transition" ending at Polity2 ≥ 6; LIED4: Transition to minimally competitive elections (LIED); LIED5: Transition to at least full male franchise (plus minimally competitive elections) (LIED). Main figure given is percentage of cases for which the argument "probably" or "very probably" contributed. The figures underneath in parentheses are: first, percentage of cases for which the argument "very probably" contributed and then percentage for which it at least "maybe" contributed.

Table A13: Democratization as result of incumbents' mistakes (percentage of cases): All waves, just democratizations that were not reversed

	Democratization concept					
	Polity	MDT	MDTP6	BMR	LIED4	LIED5
Relations with regime outsiders						
Excessive or poorly targeted concessions that strengthen the opposition: "slippery slope"	15 (2, 19)	14 (0, 16)	13 (0, 16)	16 (3, 22)	14 (3, 19)	14 (3, 18)
Failure to make concessions that would likely have divided and demobilized the opposition or coopted allies	11 (2, 15)	12 (2, 16)	16 (3, 21)	16 (3, 22)	17 (3, 23)	15 (1, 21)
Excessive or poorly targeted repression that catalyzes opposition: "counterproductive violence"	23 (9, 34)	22 (10, 34)	26 (11, 39)	24 (13, 31)	19 (12, 25)	19 (13, 24)
Failure to use repression (and surveillance or censorship) that would likely have weakened or disrupted the opposition	13 (2, 21)	14 (2, 22)	16 (3, 26)	16 (1, 22)	14 (1, 18)	15 (1, 19)
Major domestic policy failure that discredits incumbent or avoidably alienates key groups	21 (9, 23)	20 (10, 22)	24 (13, 26)	22 (10, 28)	19 (8, 26)	19 (8, 25)
Mishandling election or referendum (e.g., calling when could be avoided/postponed; campaigning and/or manipulating results non-optimally; falsifying too blatantly)	23 (15, 26)	24 (16, 28)	29 (21, 32)	26 (12, 34)	23 (12, 29)	23 (11, 28)
Relations with regime insiders						
Choosing policies or actions that split the civilian elite, leading to victory of outsiders	13 (9, 15)	14 (10, 16)	18 (13, 21)	15 (12, 19)	12 (6, 17)	11 (6, 16)
Avoidably alienating army or security services (or part of them), leading to overthrow by them or erosion of state's repressive capacity	34 (13, 40)	36 (14, 42)	37 (13, 45)	26 (10, 34)	30 (10, 36)	29 (10, 35)
Delegating to agent who turns out to be more motivated to pursue democratization than ruler is (or unexpectedly weak in resisting demands for it)	19 (9, 19)	16 (8, 16)	18 (8, 18)	16 (9, 19)	14 (8, 16)	15 (8, 16)
Relations with international actors						
Major foreign policy failure that provokes foreign intervention or discredits incumbent (e.g., entering or initiating avoidable international conflict, then performing poorly)	19 (11, 19)	20 (12, 20)	26 (16, 26)	18 (13, 19)	12 (9, 16)	11 (9, 15)
At least one mistake	75 (60, 75)	76 (62, 76)	87 (71, 87)	72 (57, 75)	66 (52, 69)	65 (50, 66)

Source: Author's assessments. See online appendix for historical sources.

Note: BMR: Boix, Miller Rosato definition; MDT: "Major Democratic Transition" under Polity definition; MDTP6: "Major Democratic Transition" ending at Polity2 ≥ 6; LIED4: Transition to minimally competitive elections (LIED); LIED5: Transition to at least full male franchise (plus minimally competitive elections) (LIED). Main figure given is percentage of cases for which the argument "probably" or "very probably" contributed. The figures underneath in parentheses are: first, percentage of cases for which the argument "very probably" contributed and then percentage for which it at least "maybe" contributed.