Introduction

Stephan Blatti and Paul F. Snowdon

The purpose of this collection is to gather together a group of chapters that are inspired by three central questions: What is animalism? What implications does it have? Is animalism true? The aim is to push the debate about these questions forward. Most of the chapters are new. The two that are not—those by Parfit and by Campbell and McMahan—are recent and highly important essays that raise fundamental questions about animalism, and we feel they deserve a place in this collection. We also wanted to collect together good work from different intellectual centres around the world, in North America, the UK, and Australasia, but also work from philosophers of different ages and at different stages. Some chapters represent forceful and novel presentations of relatively well-known viewpoints, whereas others move the debate along totally new directions. No view is dominant, and different chapters focus on different aspects of the debate. We, the editors, are both animalists (which is not to say that we are animalists of precisely the same kind), but our main hope with this collection is that it will stimulate new discussion, not that we shall make converts to our own view. It takes time for debates in philosophy to deepen and to sort the wheat from the chaff, but we hope this collection will help those things to happen in the next stage of debate about animalism.

In this introduction we shall sketch the background to the current debates and try to relate the chapters here to that background. It is impossible for us to pick out every issue or argument in all the chapters that we regard as important. All we can do is to highlight some of them. As with all philosophical subjects, properly sorting out the issues is a task for those who wish to think about them.

One way to think of animalism is as a view about the relation between us, persons, and animals. According to it we are identical with some animals. We can, then, regard the background question as—what is our relation to animals? It is interesting to note that this general question has risen to prominence not only in the analytic philosophical tradition, but also in the continental tradition (e.g. in the work of Derrida) and in various areas of interdisciplinary inquiry (e.g. animal studies). The issues discussed here, then, provide one example of intellectual convergence between multiple philosophical traditions and areas of investigation.
1.1. ‘Animalism’

As is the wont with -ism’s in philosophy, not everyone will define ‘animalism’ in the same way. But a way that seems true to its use by many people is that it stands for the claim that we, each of us, are identical to, are one and the same thing as, an animal of a certain kind. That kind is what is called Homo sapiens. Putting it less technically, each of us is a human animal. According to this proposal we can say that at various places there is both an animal and one of us, and those things are in fact the same thing.

Now, it is often convenient to have a noun picking out those things that we have so far picked out as ‘us’, or as ‘one of us’. We shall talk of the ‘person’ and of ‘persons’. In using this venerable noun we are not committing ourselves to our usage being the same as that of the normal usage. But using this noun, so interpreted, we can formulate the claim as ‘each person is an animal’.

Formulating it in these ways leaves plenty of important interpretative questions unexplored, to which we shall return, but it suffices to fix the central thesis. And putting the thesis this way renders it an answer to the question ‘What are we?’ or ‘What is our nature?’ These questions are ones that have perennially gripped us, and to which many intellectual traditions have given their answers.

1.2. Recent History

We shall begin with a brief and schematic history of the recent emergence of this approach in philosophical thinking about ourselves.

In post-war analytical philosophy the problem of personal identity received considerable attention from a succession of highly talented and creative philosophers, including Strawson, Williams, Shoemaker, Parfit, Nagel, Mackie, Lewis, Unger, and Noonan, to name only a few of those involved in the debates. One striking thing about these debates was the almost total absence in them of any mention of the notion of an animal. People in the debate simply assumed that an interest in the nature of ourselves was an interest in the analysis of what it is to be a person. The term ‘person’ was, that is, taken to express or stand for our basic nature. With that as a background assumption, thinking about our persistence over time—called, of course, the problem of personal identity—tended to start by considering the proposal that persons are tied to their bodies, a proposal that was defended by Bernard Williams. However, this view was more or less universally rejected by philosophers, a rejection based primarily on the power of brain transplant arguments, initially and very effectively developed by Shoemaker. This dismissal was usually very rapid and taken to be more or less obvious. The debate then resolved itself, very roughly, into a choice between increasingly sophisticated versions of the type of approach originally proposed by Locke—a development led with great ingenuity by Shoemaker and Parfit—and the proposal that we are tied in our persistence requirements to our brains, a view articulated, among others, by Nagel and Mackie. Although the debates continued to regard these as the
two main alternative ways to think about our persistence, they were enriched and complicated by two further developments. The first was the extraordinary popularity within American and Australian philosophy, and subsequently in British philosophy, of thinking about what is called identity over time within a framework of four-dimensionalism. David Lewis’s work had a major influence in moving the debate in that direction, of course. This meant that new ways to formulate the basic ideas were inserted into the debate, and some new and fairly technical issues emerged. The second new direction resulted from the very important work of Parfit who took what was basically a sophisticated Lockean approach and tried to derive from it some radical claims in value theory about the importance of facts about personal identity, captured, no doubt rather crudely, in the slogan that ‘identity is not what matters’. Parfit’s ideas about value and his linking of the personal identity debate to value theory generated a rich discussion, and this linkage remains present in more recent debates, and indeed in some contributions to this volume.

There is an important question that can be raised here, on the assumption that the foregoing is more or less correct: Why was the idea of an animal conspicuously absent in this classical period of debate? To answer this question we need to return to Locke’s famous discussion of personal identity, in which the notion of an animal was central.1 One of Locke’s purposes was to affirm that the person—one example, as we might say, being Locke himself—is not the animal but has persistence conditions which are quite different, and is therefore a different item. Locke exercised great care in specifying the different ideas for which the words ‘animal’ and ‘person’ stood. A reasonable conjecture, or proposal, we suggest, is that Locke’s treatment of these two terms and notions was so effective that it generated in people engaging with the problem the conviction that the notion of a person is the central one fixing the type of thing the problem is about, with the consequence that the notion of an animal was lost to sight. The centrality of the notion of person represented what we might call a basic framework assumption in the very formulation of the problem.2

Whatever the truth in that hypothesis, it is surely hard to escape the conviction that, despite the richness of these debates, the invisibility in them of the notion of an animal represented a gross impoverishment and oversight. This conviction struck a number of philosophers, whose styles and metaphysical inclinations were otherwise quite diverse, more or less simultaneously and independently in the 1980s (or perhaps earlier). Among the philosophers who endorsed this conviction were David Wiggins, Michael Ayers, Paul Snowdon, and Eric Olson in the UK, and Bill Carter and Peter van

1 See Locke 1975, II.xxviii.3, 5–8, 12–15, 21, 29. In these sections Locke regularly alludes to animals and humans in his efforts to settle the nature of personal identity. Currently the interpretation of Locke’s discussion is a matter of considerable controversy, but Locke’s role in relegating the notion of animal can be acknowledged whichever side one is on in this debate.

2 The invisibility of the notion of ‘animal’ in what we are calling the classical period was not of course total. In influential discussions by both Shoemaker and Johnston, the notion does surface. What is striking is how rare this engagement is, and, moreover, how—even when the notion of an animal attracted attention—the assumption was that, of course, the animal is not what we are.
Inwagen in the USA. Although this is not true of all those listed in the previous sentence, the emergence into the debate of the notion of an animal was tied to three basic convictions: first, that where each of us is, there is an animal, a thing belonging to a kind that represents one of our most fundamental categories we operate with; second, that given what seem to be the properties that the animal in question has (in particular, its psychological properties), there is something close to a paradox in denying the identity between the animal and the person, and hence there is something close to a paradox in the major views that the dominant tradition was exploring; third, in the light of the force of that type of consideration, we should search very hard for ways to counter the arguments that philosophers provide for denying the identity, since those arguments give the appearance of leading us astray. The initial and shared reason for thinking that there is something close to a paradox in the denial of the identity acquired the name of the ‘two lives objection’.

These developments in philosophy were driven primarily by responses within that discipline to the arguments that were taken to be powerful by its practitioners, but other disciplines provided what we might call ‘aid and comfort’ for the new ideas. Criticisms of what came to be called ‘anthropodenial’ (i.e. the denial that we are animals) in the writings of such ethologists as Frans de Waal strongly supported animalism.

Once this animalist approach came to the notice of philosophers more generally, and the idea of an animal ceased to be so invisible to philosophers, the debate became much richer, in a way that was dictated by the basic structure of the early animalist writings. One area of debate was the attempt by anti-animalists to discredit the so-called two lives objection. Another area of debate has been the development of anti-animalist arguments that did not surface in the initial period of discussion. However, on the pro-animalist side of the debate, new arguments are emerging and new difficulties in the opposition views are being constructed. We shall spell some of these out in more detail in Section 1.3. The work in the present volume bears testimony to these critical and constructive developments.

1.3. Objections to Animalism

We have emphasized that animalism can be described as an identity thesis (each of us is identical to an animal) and this, we shall argue, illuminates the structure of the debates about it. The fundamental commitment of an identity thesis is that, since the entities in question are supposed to be the same thing, they must have the same properties. So the argumentative strategy of opponents to the claim will be to find a
property which one entity has but the other lacks. If that can be found, then however
closely they are related, they are not identical. Now, if we simply compare in a superfi-
cial way ourselves with the animals located where we are, what is striking is how much
overlap there is in our properties. We would say that the two things have the same
physical properties (e.g. we weigh the same, look the same, etc.), and we share the same
biological features (e.g. the two of us are alive, digest food, breathe, reproduce, and so
on). So, how might someone argue that there is property difference? One cannot argue
that the animal is an animal, but that we are persons, since any animalist will agree with
that but claim that what follows is that there is an animal which is a person, and there is
no obvious reason to object to that as a possibility.

What supposed differences do philosophers think they have located which support
the denial of this identity? One traditional reason for rejecting this identity emerged in
the writings of Descartes. He combined the claim that we rational creatures are
non-physical selves, or egos, with the further claim that animals are purely physical
systems running according to physical-mechanical laws. The conjunction of these
claims implied that we things which are selves are not the self-same things as animals.
However, in the tradition of debate that the chapters in this volume are situated, this
Cartesian conception of an alleged difference in properties has not really had any seri-
ous influence. Further, part of Descartes’ reasons for thinking that we are non-physical
egos is that he believed that a purely physical system is very limited in what it can do,
whereas we are capable of an almost unlimited range of achievements due to our
rationality. This supposed contrast in capacities, however, is doubly unjustified. First,
Descartes really has no good reason to think that he knows what powers purely mater-
ial things can possess. Either he should have held that he was ignorant of the powers of
material things, or, maybe, he should even have inclined to the idea that some matter
has very advanced capacities. This latter idea would have amounted, so to speak, to an
early discovery of that amazing physical thing, the central nervous system. Second,
Descartes had no grounds for supposing he knew what our cognitive powers are.
Maybe they are much more limited than he knew. The anti-animalists in this volume
are not really inspired by such Cartesian reasons.

The supposed property differences between us and the human animal occupying
the same space that have seemed to occur to most philosophers are differences in what
should be counted as happening to us and to the linked human animal in certain

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7 To anyone who has spent any time on safari, what is most obvious is how the activities and processes
that fill the lives of the animals observed there are ones that fill our time too, such activities as cleaning
oneself and others, feeding, drinking and excreting, resting, searching for food, etc. These similarities
between us and them are what is most striking, though the precise way we, for example, acquire food is
different to the way they acquire it. Of course it is also striking that we devote time to things they do not
engage in—like writing philosophy, making clothes, and putting up buildings!

8 Although writers in the present volume do not belong to the Cartesian tradition, there is in current
philosophy an approach to the problem of personal identity, known as the Simple View, which, in many of
its expositions, resembles the Cartesian approach in its conclusions and its style of argument. Presentations
and criticisms of this approach can be found in Gasser and Stefan 2012.
supposedly possible circumstances. Putting it very broadly, these alleged differences between us the animal where we are are modal differences, that is, differences between what is possible for us and what is possible for the human animal. The assumption behind this is that such modal differences are genuine differences in properties. This seems to us, and to most people in the debate, a reasonable assumption.

Now, one way to describe these candidate cases is to say that they represent potential disassociations between us and the animal. In traditional discussions these disassociations are of two basic kinds. In one kind of case, the disassociation takes the form of a potential development allegedly resulting in the presence of the animal but not of the original person. End of life cases supply examples that some would describe this way. Suppose some trauma has resulted in permanent loss of mental capacity. Some describe this result as consisting in the human animal remaining but the person as having gone. There are, of course, other candidate cases that elicit this description from some people considering them.

In the second dominant kind of dissociation case, the idea is that a potential sequence of events results in the presence of the person—the thing of our kind—but not of the animal. The best-known and strongly influential example of this sort of case is that of a brain transplant. When most people think about brain transplant examples, making the assumptions that they do, their verdict is that the process preserves the person with the brain, but the animal does not go with the brain and could even be destroyed if, say, what is left of the body minus the brain were destroyed.

Since brain transplant cases have been so influential, they have been the focus of considerable debate, including debate within this volume. The crucial task for anyone using such an argument against animalism is to persuade us that we can say with confidence that the outcome for the person is different from the outcome for the animal. The task for the defender of animalism is to make a convincing case for supposing that we cannot say this with confidence. Now, one point that has emerged is that it is not at all obvious that concentrating within the debate on what are solely brain cases is justified. It might seem that head transplants ground the same pair of dialectically significant contrasting verdicts about the person and the animal. In Chapter 2, Parfit’s argument starts with a head transplant case, though he also relies on brain transplant cases too. It would also not be inaccurate to describe Chapter 11, by Campbell and McMahan, as centrally concerned with the philosophical consequences of things that can happen to human heads.

Another issue concerns the basis that people who employ such transplant arguments have for making their judgements about the outcome. Standardly and originally the basis was thought of, and described as, intuition. On hearing the description of the outcome, we simply judge that the person is still there but that the animal need not be. Such relatively immediate judgements were called (philosophical) intuitions. Anyone with any inclination to accept animalism will naturally ask whether such intuitions are reliable. A very interesting viewpoint on this is the one developed by Mark Johnston, some aspects of which figure in Chapter 5 in this volume, according to which there is
no good basis to trust our relatively immediate reactions to the description of cases when tracing the fate of the persons involved, but that there are relatively well-established metaphysical principles that support the verdict about the survival of the person upon which the brain transplant argument rests. In contrast, in chapter 9 Rory Madden expresses scepticism about this proposal. It needs pointing out, also, that such transplant arguments rely on our being accurate about what happens to the animal. Are we entitled to be confident about that?

1.4. Animalism and Personal Identity

We have been arguing that animalism can be regarded as an identity thesis, and that this understanding of it illuminates the character of what have been the main types of objections to it. Such dissociation cases are not, of course, the sole type of objection to it, and we shall return to some of those shortly. On the present understanding of animalism, there is a significant contrast between it and what is called Lockeanism (either ancient or modern). The contrast is that animalism is not per se a theory of what is normally called personal identity, whereas Lockeanism is such a theory. When people talk of personal identity, they mean facts about the persistence over time of things that are persons. A theory of personal identity is, then, some attempt to spell out in an informative way what is involved in, or essential for, such facts obtaining. The Lockean answer is that facts about personal persistence are constituted by facts about psychological relations over time. The animalist identity claim does not purport to pick out such essential elements in personal identity. It at most implies that, whatever those facts are, they will be the same as the facts that are constitutive of the animal (with which the person is identical) remaining in existence. Animalists can disagree radically about what those facts are. It is therefore a serious mistake for philosophers to describe a particular approach to personal identity as the animalist approach, even if practically all animalists agree with it. For example, it is in principle an unsettled issue what the relation is between animal persistence and life. Most animalists hold that the end of life marks the end of the existence of the animal, but that is a separate and further claim from the core animalist thesis that the person is identical with the animal. Further, whether or not life is essential for animal, and, therefore, personal survival, it is far from clear to what degree something that is an animal of the human kind can lose its parts and remain in existence. Obviously it can lose parts, such as limbs and some organs, and equally obviously it cannot remain in existence after all its parts, say the atoms of which it made, are separated and dispersed. What can we say about other cases though? A serious task for animalism is to make progress with these questions. However, since the notion of an animal is shared between the supporters of the animalist identity thesis and its opponents, this task is also a shared one. Objections to animalism equally rely on assumptions about animals.
Although drawing the contrast between animalism as an identity thesis and animalism as a thesis about personal identity is important because it makes the central thesis more precise, doing so also encourages us to think about the basic thesis in broader ways. Thus, if each of us is a human animal and we count ourselves as subjects of experience, it is implied that a human animal is a subject of experience. The question then is: Are there conditions on being single subjects of experience that human animals might fail to satisfy? This is the question that Snowdon engages with in Chapter 13, especially in relation to the idea of the unity of experience, and perhaps cognition, that single subjects must enjoy.

We have argued in this section that animalism per se is not a theory of personal identity, but also that it has a generality that certainly makes it a much broader proposal than being merely a theory of personal identity.

1.5. Issues and Motivations

We want to investigate briefly four other aspects of the content of animalism and to make some remarks about its appeal. The first is what its epistemological status is. We can compare it with the supposed status of standard theories of personal identity. In what we have called the classical period of debate, the working assumption was that we can determine in some suitably a priori manner what our requirements for persistence are. The method was that of classical conceptual analysis, in which intuitive verdicts on described cases were taken to be the method of adjudicating between alternative proposals. Mark Johnston engagingly called this ‘the method of cases’. What needs remarking is that the animalist identity thesis is not committed at all to its being an a priori discernible truth. The idea is simply that it is a true identity. One consequence of this status is that proponents of the identity are not committed—when considering supposed counterexamples where there are alleged property differences—to convincing their opponents that simply thinking about their example ultimately will reveal that there is no property difference. The proponent is committed only to convincing the opponent that he or she is not entitled to think they have located a property difference. Requiring more simply reveals a failure to grasp the real status of the proposal.

A second issue concerns the employment of the first person plural pronoun in stating the thesis. Why has that been adopted? One point is that formulating it that way reflects the fact that the basic source of interest in these questions is an interest in our own nature. Each of us naturally asks: What am I? But we also naturally accept that we as a group share a nature, and so we ask: What are we? This represents one justification

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9 See Johnston 1987.
10 The philosopher mentioned earlier as an early animalist who did not see things this way is Wiggins. For him the notion of an animal can be discerned in the best analysis of the notion of a person. His view seemed to be that it is obvious that we are persons, and that philosophy can reveal that the proper analysis of ‘person’ builds the notion around that of a type of animal. Most animalists, by contrast, do not regard the identity as defensible by that sort of reasoning.
for putting the thesis this way. But, further, there is no obvious noun that picks out the
group we wish to talk about. It might seem that the animalist identity could be
expressed by saying that (all) persons are animals. But there is no reason to suppose
that this picks out the right group. One problem is that—at least according to one
standard use of ‘person’ encapsulated in Locke’s famous definition that a person is a
being with reason and reflection that can consider itself the same thinking self in dif-
ferent times and places—there is no ground for supposing there could not be persons
who are not animals (say, gods, angels, pixies, etc.). On the other hand, if we are inter-
ested in what we are, there is no reason to exclude from the extension of ‘we’ creatures
like us who lack the psychological faculties that Locke deems necessary for person-
hood. Of course, there may be other nouns that could be used than ‘person’, but there
seem to be problems with these alternatives as well.

If it is thought that we have a reason to employ the first-person plural pronoun in
stating the identity, then a question needs posing and facing. The problem arises
because pronouns like ‘we’ and ‘us’ do not have strict rules governing their reference. If
a speaker uses the word ‘we’ to pick out a group, it seems that it must include the
speaker, but who else it includes is left open simply given the use of ‘we’. So, a philo-
sophical identity thesis employing the word ‘we’ or ‘us’ raises the question: Which
group is meant by ‘we’? Our aim here is not to answer that question, but rather simply
to highlight it as one that ultimately needs a proper treatment within this debate.

The third issue we want to highlight is that our formulation of animalism as an iden-
tity thesis has made no commitment to the claim, which animalists typically endorse,
that, as we might put it, if something is an animal, then it is essentially and fundamen-
tally an animal.11 This way of speaking is surely familiar, even if it is hard to explain in a
much fuller way if it is challenged. Another way of putting it is that ‘animal’ is a
high-level sortal term. Let us call this the ‘animal as sortal’ thesis.

It is clear that the basic identity thesis does not entail the ‘animal as sortal’ thesis. It is
quite obvious that there is no reverse entailment, since many deniers of the identity
assume that the ‘animal as sortal’ thesis is true. Locke seems to have been a prime
example. It needs, then, to be recognized that it is possible to hold the identity thesis
with or without the ‘animal as sortal’ thesis.

That leaves two important questions to be faced. The first is whether the sortal thesis
is true or not. The second is whether the position that affirms the identity without
affirming the sortal thesis is interesting and important or not. We are not proposing to
answer those questions here, but simply to point them out as ones that hang over the
debate about animalism. Chapter 5 by Mark Johnston engages with this problem.

The fourth area to which we would like to draw attention is the relation between
animalism and value theory. Although the question ‘What are we?’ (and the proposed
answers to that question, for example, that we are animals) are not directly about value,
it is natural to see links between them. There are various examples of philosophers

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11 For an endorsement of this claim see Snowdon 1990, Olson 1997.
proposing links here. For example, Locke’s original discussion of personal identity stresses that ‘person’ is a forensic term, that is, a notion the application of which has implications about responsibility. His arguments frequently appeal to intuitions about responsibility and about concern. More recently Parfit has defended the radical idea that ‘identity does not matter’ on the basis of an argument resting on aspects of a theory of personal identity. In his case, the assumed account of our persistence conditions is neo-Lockeanism. Further, in some discussions of animalism, when defending it against some objections, appeal has been made to such ideas. So, one general theme, currently somewhat limited, in the literature about animalism has been its links to values (in the broadest sense). Several of the chapters in Part III address themselves to these links.

What are the issues here more generally? One general question is whether there are arguments from claims about value which count against animalism, or such arguments which count for animalism. An example of a line of thought against animalism, deriving from Locke’s approach is based on two claims: first, if person \( x \) is the same person as \( y \), then \( x \) is responsible for everything that \( y \) did; and second, to be responsible for an action, a person must be mentally linked to the action, say, by way of remembering it. If both these claims are true, then animalism is in trouble. But in reply it is perfectly reasonable to deny both claims. A person is not necessarily responsible for what he or she did, and there is no rigid prohibition on someone counting as responsible for an action that is not remembered. A further general issue is whether the animalist thesis might clarify our thinking about value. If animalism is correct does that undermine the arguments that Parfit advances to support his claims about value? Or does the idea that we have an animal nature help us to identify what is of value in our lives? These are questions that need investigation. In this volume Chapter 14 by Jens Johansson provides an illuminating and original discussion of some of these issues.

Although it is not our aim to make converts to animalism, nor to argue for the position here, there are some features of the position that seem to us to warrant not simply abandoning it in the face of a few typical philosophical objections. That is to say, we should test such objections thoroughly. Here are four reasons for regarding it this way. First, once one rejects animalism it becomes difficult to propose an account of our nature and persistence conditions that will be complete and intelligible, and which has any chance of generating agreement. Even if neo-Lockeans have satisfactorily answered the standard objections to their view, they seem to have no route to filling in the details of the required psychological links that will look plausible. Those who favour a view based on the notion of the continuance of neural structures enabling consciousness either are tempted to identify us with those inner neural structures, in which we have a self-conception that is more or less incredible, or they identify us in normal times with the larger surrounding entity, but they still face the task of specifying

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12 For one development of the idea that such value concerns are central to Locke, see Strawson 2011.
13 See Olson 1997, ch. 3.
what neural bundles are necessary and sufficient for persistence, which it is hard to believe can be done in a way that generates agreement. It may be that we have to go in such directions but there is considerable attraction in trying to avoid that. Second, animalism has the singular advantage of being the view that many scientifically knowledgeable people assume and work within. It should give philosophers some pause when they deny what many people take as more or less obvious. Third, although philosophers have concentrated on analyzing the conditions for us remaining in existence over time, we should also aim to achieve some understanding of our spatial extent at a time. Why are these limbs and organs part of me, but, say, my clothes are not? Most so-called theories of personal identity shed no light on this question. We have, though, a well-grounded and clear grasp of the extent at a time of animals. Animalism promises to explain (or illuminate) both our persistence conditions and our spatial extent. Fourth, animalism seems to make available to us explanations of many of our basic features. Thus, if we are animals we can explain why the world contains us in terms of ordinary evolutionary theory. And, we assume, we can explain why we have special concerns about our own futures, and why we are drawn to sex, and eating, and so on, in terms of our nature as animals. There is an explanatory simplicity built into the view.

These points do not force us to accept animalism, but they surely give some support to being reluctant to give up such a view without a real fight. Anyway, the chapters that follow need to be carefully weighed, if these attractions are real.

1.6. Contents

We now wish to highlight some of the issues raised by the contributors, and point to some questions that need asking in light of them. Our approach has to be very selective, and we cannot pick out everything that is of significance.

We have arranged the chapters into three broad groups: those that are principally concerned with criticizing animalism (Part I), those that are principally concerned with defending animalism (Part II), and those that are principally concerned with exploring animalism's practical applications (Part III). Of course, this is not the only way the chapters might have been arranged, and even by the classifications we adopted, individual chapters might have been grouped differently. (Chapter 11 by Campbell and McMahan, for example, is both critical of animalism and an exploration of animalism's implications.) In any case, the reader should follow her interests in determining the sequence in which she moves through the volume; the chapters certainly need not be read in the order in which we have arranged them. A second purpose of this section of our introduction, then, can be seen as guiding the reader's determination on how to proceed.

14 For a characteristic affirmation of animalism by a scientist, here is the opening of psychologist Thomas Suddendorf’s recent book (2013: 1): 'Biology puts beyond doubt that you are an organism. Like all living organisms, humans metabolize and reproduce. Your genome uses the same dictionary as a tulip and overlaps considerably with the genetic makeup of yeast, bananas, and mice. You are an animal.'
Part I

In Chapter 2, Derek Parfit provides an important contribution in presenting his current thinking on animalism, Lockeanism, and the fundamental nature of human persons. Parfit observes that the whole human animal thinks only derivatively, i.e. only in virtue of having a proper part that is directly engaged in thinking. The part of the animal that thinks nonderivatively is not the head, since the head thinks only in virtue of having a thinking brain as a part. Nor is the animal’s brain a nonderivative thinker, since it thinks only in virtue of including a thinking cerebrum. And while Parfit never tells us precisely what thing it is that thinks nonderivatively, ultimately there must be a smallest proper part of a human animal that does so: the cerebrum itself maybe, or perhaps some still smaller part. And whatever brain part it is that nonderivatively satisfies Locke’s definition of a person (‘a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places’), this thing, Parfit says, is what we are. He calls this the ‘embodied person view’ because this proper part of your animal is a person and this embodied person is you.

Parfit’s extended argument for this position consists in demonstrating its utility. For example, this view preserves our intuition about transplant cases: when the part of your brain that thinks nonderivatively is removed from one animal body and implanted into another animal body, you (i.e. the person you are) are thus relocated. The embodied person view can also answer various challenges that the animalist has put to the Lockean. For example, the too many thinkers objection makes the point that the Lockean distinction between persons and animals carries the absurd implication that every thought is had by two thinkers: the person and the animal. But the Lockean who affirms the embodied person view has the resources to avoid this problem: unlike the person who thinks nonderivatively, the animal thinks only by having a part that does. Furthermore, Parfit presents his view as ‘an obvious solution’ to the thinking parts objection to animalism. For each human animal, there is only one thing—one small part of the animal’s brain—that is nonderivatively a Lockean person. To the extent that proper parts of the animal are thinking parts, they are not thinkers in the most important sense. As a result, you can know that you are not an animal because you are whatever thing it is that thinks nonderivatively, and that thing—that person—is not an animal.

Parfit’s embodied person view is innovative and represents an important contribution both to the debate over personal identity generally and to the discussion of animalism specifically. Indeed, it is for this reason that we wanted to include this essay in the volume, despite its having appeared in print previously. Nevertheless, the embodied person view relies on some distinctions that will require further scrutiny. One such distinction is the derivative–nonderivative distinction itself. It is unclear, for instance, precisely what conditions a thing must satisfy in order to qualify as being directly involved in thinking. In the absence of this precissification, animalists may
suspect that any plausible candidate for being a nonderivative thinker will include as a proper part something that is not directly involved in thinking. The embodied person view also relies on a distinction between two usages of the first-person pronoun. In defending his view against an important objection, Parfit distinguishes the ‘Inner-I’ used to refer to the Lockeian person and the ‘Outer-I’ used to refer to the human animal. Parfit is certainly not the first Lockeian to draw this distinction; Baker (2000, 2007), Noonan (1998, 2001), Strawson (2009), and others have done so as well. But nor is it a distinction that has escaped controversy.15

In Chapter 3, Lynne Rudder Baker usefully and carefully presents her distinctive and well-known view of the relation between persons and animals, which is anti-animalist, and which holds that, in standard conditions, the animal constitutes, but is not identical with, the person. She sketches her distinctive elucidation of the constitution relation and its links with predication and truth conditions. She then employs these ideas to try to rebut the core pro-animalist arguments, and finally she adds two new reasons to favour her approach. Her response to the pro-animalist arguments raises the question why we should operate with the logic that she sketches. This is a question that has already received considerable attention, and the conduct of that debate will benefit from her clear and concise presentation. With her novel anti-animalist arguments one rests on the conviction that it is possible to preserve a person while totally replacing the constituting organic matter by inorganic matter, hence removing the animal while preserving the person, and one crucial question is why we should concede that is possible. This question has, at least, two sides. Can we be confident that a non-organic construct can sustain mentality? The other issue is whether we are entitled to be confident that if such an entity is possible it should count as being the person. The other argument rests on the conviction that persons will survive bodily death, a central religious conviction in the Christian tradition, but not something all of us are inclined to think. The argument also relies on the principle that if something is in fact to exist eternally it must be incorruptible. It might seem to those on the outside of the religious debate that God’s supposed omnipotence might unlock this problem. However, this interesting argument illustrates the way in which debate about animalism can be, and has been, broadened by its links to theological considerations.

In Chapter 4, Denis Robinson’s ambitious aim is to persuade us that what he calls psychological views of our fundamental nature fit well within what we might call a plausible metaphysics of the natural world. In particular, Robinson aims to counter the claim, promoted by Ayers and Olson, that it is a difficulty for non-animalist accounts if they employ the notion of constitution. He starts by engaging with the thought that animalism is more commonsensical than the psychological alternative. Robinson holds that the psychological view implies that entities of different types can coincide, but he suggests that this possibility is one that is not repugnant to common sense, since

it seems to be an implication of standardly recognized cases in which we start with something, A, and things happen to A resulting in the emergence of a new thing, B, without A ceasing to exist, so that A and another thing B end up coinciding. In such cases there is often a sense in which B emerges gradually, which fits the way in which, supposedly, the human animal develops into a person. The psychological theorist should take ‘person’ as a substance concept, and, it is argued, the popularity of responses to thought-experiments that favour the psychological account should be granted as evidence that we do indeed operate with such a concept.

Setting aside worries specifically about employing the notion of constitution in the theory of persons, Robinson investigates the general notion, or notions, of constitution. One notion is that of ‘minimal constitution’ (or ‘m-constitution’) which applies when two items are constituted at a time by the same material elements. This is contrasted with a more limited notion of constitution linked to the employment of the term by Baker. Robinson’s aim is to develop an account of m-constitution, which though not specifically tied to four-dimensionalism, can easily accommodate it. He develops his account by giving a series of suggested examples of m-constitution. For the purpose of this summary, the first example will have to suffice. Robinson has a normal car, from which the doors are removed. Cars without doors can be regarded as a new type of thing called a pre-car, suitable for beach driving. This pre-car has never had doors, but Robinson’s old car—which is still there without its doors—did have doors, so the pre-car and the old car are not identical but they are composed of the same matter. In the next section, however, Robinson expands his account to cover what are the important cases of substances in the debate about personal identity, namely substances which are dynamic, constantly evolving and changing their matter (e.g. human animals and perhaps persons). In setting up his account, he also prepares an answer to the query, posed by Olson, as to how there can be different substances with different modal properties composed of the same matter at the same place and time. It is remarked that the categories we employ in describing the world involve lots of ones which merely approximate to full substance concepts, but nonetheless there are good examples of substance concepts. In developing his account of substances of this sort, Robinson alludes to the way of speaking (endorsed by Wiggins, for example) which links substance concepts to principles of activity as insightful, but he tries to make it more precise by bringing in the fundamental notion of immanent causation, operating at different levels. The idea of coincident substances simply represents the idea that two substances constituting processes can happen to converge at a time so that the material base sustaining the appropriate processes are grounded in the same material base. This, it is claimed, does not generate any puzzles.

Robinson ends by acknowledging that there are many uncovered complexities here, some to do with the way that ‘person’ might be a psychological substance concept, but he suggests that, despite the strong link between human animals and persons of our kind, there can be room for individual human persons to leave behind their animal origins.
Robinson's highly metaphysical and original analysis can, perhaps, be examined at two levels. The first is whether the metaphysical nature of substance concepts and puzzles about them have been properly resolved. The second is whether he has located solid evidence that in discussions about our nature and persistence conditions we need to regard 'person' as a separate substance concept.

In Chapter 5, Mark Johnston provides an extremely rich and multifaceted evaluation of animalism, leading to the conclusion that it is false. This conclusion Johnston regards as the point at which we need to begin the interesting task of saying what we really are, but that is, sadly, a task that he does not attempt in this chapter. The shape of the overall negative argument is familiar from some of his earlier attempts to face up to the problem of personal identity, but the present chapter develops the argument in novel, wide-ranging, and powerful ways, which this summary is barely able to indicate.

Johnston’s discussion starts by fixing the target—animalism—as requiring not simply that we are animals, but that we cannot cease to be animals. As he puts it, this latter requirement can be expressed by saying that animalism requires that the kind ‘animal’ is a substance kind. Johnston begins with the important question: How can we determine whether animalism is true? One candidate method is what Johnston calls ‘the method of cases’, which is really the method of testing proposed accounts by whether they fit our intuitions about various imagined scenarios. This is taken to be the method of old-fashioned conceptual analysis. Standardly this method is taken to work against animalism, given the normal intuitive verdict on brain transplants (and other cases). In the section ‘Some New Worries About the Method of Cases’, Johnston opposes this method in the present case. One new argument is that whether dualism is true is an empirical question, so we cannot settle what our basic nature is by an a priori method of cases. A second and new argument is that the best model for the way we apply general concepts is that we rely on ‘generic’ connexions, which are not exceptionless principles, so our conceptual resources, on which the method of cases relies, does not contain data to determine verdicts about the type of cases that philosophers imagine. This section of argument raises the issue of whether either line of thought does discredit reliance on the method of cases. If Johnston is right then some dialectical benefit accrues to animalism since this method usually is taken to supply counterarguments to animalism. In Johnston’s view, though, this relief is merely temporary.

Johnston suggests a new method. At a general level it is to use ‘all relevant knowledge and argumentative ingenuity’. With that there could be no quarrel. But at a more specific level Johnston stresses that the kind of thing that we are must be a kind that our ordinary methods of tracing do actually trace. He proposes that his idea initially indicates that we are animals. A significant question is whether there is even this initial link.

The crucial question, though, is whether the type animal is a substance type. After discussing whether ‘homo sapiens’ is a substance type, and arguing that it is not, Johnston focuses on the central question about ‘animal’. Johnston makes two initial points. The first is that ordinary brain transplant arguments, pioneered by Shoemaker, do not settle this question, being examples of the discredited method of cases. The
second is that the well-known too-many-thinkers argument for animalism merely shows that we are animals and not that animal is a substance kind. It does not, therefore, support animalism.

This second critical conclusion is correct. The too-many-thinkers argument does not show that animal is a substance kind. However, it is well worth asking (1) whether it remains a significant argument since not everyone, unlike Johnston, does think we are animals; and (2) whether in the original context (and perhaps the abiding context) in which it was proposed the idea that animal is a substance type was more or less taken for granted, in which case it would take us all the way to animalism.

In the rest of the chapter Johnston argues that some fundamental principles about the creation and destruction of persons means that animal is not a substance notion. These principles force us to describe certain cases as ones in which a person who was an animal remains in existence but ceases to be an animal. One of the principles is called No Creation and it says: you do not cause a person to come into being by removing tissue, unless that tissue is suppressing the capacity for reflective mental life. Johnston claims that if this is correct then cases like brain transplants on standard assumptions about the role of the brain in the generation of consciousness and reflection will be examples which merit the above verdict. Johnston himself proposes the gruesome example of a guillotine that chops off heads but also crushes and eviscerates the rest of the body. It should be pointed out that Chapter 9, by Rory Madden, contains a response to this type of argument, and a crucial question is whether that reply seems strong.

In the rest of the chapter Johnston considers and rejects different responses to this problem proposed by van Inwagen and by Olson, and also the proposal that such severed heads can count as animals. This part of the discussion is interesting and forceful, and each significant claim deserves scrutiny. Johnston leaves us at this point, longing to know what he thinks we are, which, of course, he is entitled to in a volume focussed on animalism.

In Chapter 6, Shoemaker continues his defence and elucidation of a modified Lockean account of personal identity, further amplifying a tradition of thought to which he has already made many significant contributions. It is extremely valuable having his recent thinking on this in the volume.

Shoemaker wishes to say that persons are animals with psychological persistence conditions, but that in the space each of us occupies, there is also what he calls a ‘biological’ animal, which is an entity with biological persistence conditions. He regards this as meaning that ‘animal’ is ambiguous. Shoemaker follows Unger in holding that what we call animals (e.g. the cats and dogs we have as pets) are animals with psychological persistence conditions, but they themselves also coincide with biological animals. On Shoemaker’s reading of the animalist view, it says that persons are animals with biological persistence conditions. The aim of his chapter is to explain how his complex view can escape the so-called ‘too many minds’ objection to it, which is supposed to support animalism. In Shoemaker’s view, the objection arises because we accept physicalism, which seems to imply that physically identical things have the
same mental properties, and since the psychological animal and the biological animal have the same physical properties, they will have the same mental life. Shoemaker’s response, therefore, is to devise a metaphysics of properties that gives an interpretation of physicalism which blocks this derivation.

Shoemaker’s account is centred on the distinction between thick and thin properties. Thin properties (e.g. shape) can be shared by entities of different kinds, whereas thick properties (e.g. mental properties) can be shared only by entities of the same kind. Shoemaker takes properties to be individuated by causal profiles. He distinguishes between causal roles that are defined in terms of effects generated in the entity itself and those that are not defined that way. A possible illustration of this distinction, not given by Shoemaker, is that being radioactive is not defined particularly in terms of effects on the entity itself, whereas being angry is, perhaps, defined in terms of continuing processes within the thing possessing the property. A further aspect of this distinction put forward in Section 6.3 is that a thick property ‘partly determines the possessor’s persistence conditions’. Shoemaker claims that mental properties are thin in this sense. Then, in Section 6.4, the notion of realization is clarified so that just because an entity possesses the properties which fix that there is a mental property present does not mean that that thing has the mental property. With these clarifications in place, Shoemaker proposes that he has avoided ascribing mental properties to biological animals. Further, in Sections 6.5 through 6.7, he employs the machinery that he has set up to explain the embodiment of psychological subjects, and also to explain and defend talk of bodies and corpses.

The metaphysics that Shoemaker constructs around the concepts described above defies any brief summary and also any brief assessment. The challenge for a reader is to test the approach out as thoroughly as possible.

Part II

Olson devotes Chapter 7 to analysing a key objection to animalism and to assessing the prospects for a satisfactory animalist response to that objection. The objection he considers—the ‘remnant persons objection’, first developed by Mark Johnston (2007: 45)—is a twist on the more familiar transplant objection. In this case, instead of imagining your cerebrum being installed in the cerebrum-less skull of another human animal, Johnston invites us to consider your cerebrum mid-transplant: removed from your skull, but artificially sustained—in the fabled vat, say. This organ, we can assume, is not only capable of thought in general, but is psychologically just like you. Johnston calls it a ‘remnant person’. Animalism, of course, is committed to denying that this remnant person is you, since a cerebrum is not an animal. The official animalist line has it that you are the cerebrum-less organism left behind.

But even beyond this counter-intuitive commitment, animalists face the further challenge of explaining the origin of a remnant person: When does it come into existence? As Olson notes, the person does not exist before the operation, since this would mean that there must have been two persons prior to the procedure: ‘you, who
according to animalism became a brainless vegetable, and the remnant person, who became a naked brain. And yet the alternative answer—that the person came into existence when your cerebrum was removed from your skull—looks to be equally problematic. First of all, it seems absurd to think that a person could be created simply by cutting away sustaining human tissue. A further problem emerges once we imagine what the animalist must say about the fate of remnant people in transplant operations. When your cerebrum is installed in my body, I do not become you, the remnant person. According to animalism, I am the same organism that previously lacked a cerebrum; I was never a cerebrum in a vat. But this suggests that, by animalism’s lights, the result of the transplant is the destruction of the remnant person. Consequently, neither answer to the origin question appears to be open to the animalist. Claiming that the person existed prior to the cerebrum’s removal commits the animalist to affirming the existence of multiple persons for each human animal, while claiming that the person came into existence when the cerebrum was removed commits the animalist to the two absurdities just described.

Olson devotes the remainder of his chapter to exploring several possible strategies whereby an animalist can avoid these absurdities while still accounting for the ‘sort of thing the remnant person would be, where she could come from, what would happen to her at the end of the operation and why, and how she would relate to you and me’. He rules out the possibility that the remnant person could be you after considering three ways that an animalist might defend this claim—‘accidentalism’, ‘scattered animalism’, and Madden’s (2011) ‘remote-thought hypothesis’—and finding all of them unconvincing. And Olson’s objections to the proposal that the remnant person could be your cerebrum—what he calls ‘remnant cerebralism’—are equally withering. The last strategy that Olson explores appeals to van Inwagen’s (1990) answer to the special composition question in denying the existence of a remnant person. Olson calls this proposal—‘brain eliminativism’—‘drastic’, but offers no further criticism, and one has the sense that, of the various strategies open to the animalist, this is the one that Olson regards as the least unpromising, as it were.

Nevertheless, Olson concedes that he can see no really satisfying animalist solution to the remnant-person problem, but that this constitutes reason to reject animalism ‘only if our being animals is the source of the problem’. And in the final section of the chapter, Olson argues that this is not the case, i.e. that the remnant persons problem represents a challenge to animalism no more than it does to nearly all of animalism’s main rivals. The one exception, Olson recognizes, is the brain view, according to which we are our brains (or, perhaps, our cerebrums).

In Chapter 8, Stephan Blatti focuses on what might be called the standard objection to the standard argument. The standard argument for animalism—the ‘thinking animal argument’—was developed and refined over the years by Ayers, Carter, McDowell, Snowdon, and Olson. This argument registers the implausible multiplication of thinkers to which anyone who denies animalism’s identity thesis is thereby committed. According to one formulation of the standard argument, since animals think, and since
you think, if the identity thesis is false, then there must be two qualitatively identical mental lives running in parallel: yours and that of the animal located where you are. But since this is absurd, we should accept the identity thesis. The standard objection to this argument—one that animalism’s supporters and critics alike regard as posing a formidable challenge—points out that an analogous line of reasoning seems to recommend the opposite conclusion. Since thinking is plausibly attributed to many of an animal’s proper parts—e.g. its undetached head, its brain—what entitles the animalist to suppose that each of us is the whole thinking animal rather than any one of the animal’s many thinking parts? This sceptical question reflects the ‘thinking parts problem’.

Blatti’s aim is not to solve this problem, but to outline several strategies that animalists might pursue further in attempting to escape the thinking parts problem without renouncing the thinking animal argument. According to one of these strategies, the animalist answers the sceptical question directly by appealing to Tim Williamson’s (2000) recent attack on the ‘phenomenal conception of evidence’ and its role in sceptical scenarios like the one envisioned by the thinking parts problem. According to this conception, a subject’s phenomenal state just is her evidentiary state. But, Blatti suggests, if Williamson is correct that this conception is false because knowledge is factive, then the sort of evidence to which we would ordinarily appeal in ascribing thinking to the whole animal (e.g. the fact that the sensory, proprioceptive, and kinesthetic experiences that your proper, thinking parts have are detected in parts of the whole animal that are not parts of themselves) does in fact ground our claim to know—indeed, consists in our knowledge—that each of us is the whole thinking animal rather than any of its thinking parts.

The second main strategy that Blatti explores involves short-circuiting the thinking parts problem by challenging the attribution of thinking to proper parts in the first place. Here he distinguishes Wittgensteinian from non-Wittgensteinian resistance to such ascriptions. For the Wittgensteinian, to ascribe psychological activities to a proper part is to subsume under the concept human animal something that does not fall under that concept. Thinking cannot intelligibly be attributed proper parts like heads and brains, on this view, because the criteria for the ascription of thinking lie in the behaviour of a whole animal, and proper parts do not behave. The non-Wittgensteinian diagnosis that Blatti sketches reaches the same conclusion by a different route. Rather than pointing to conceptual confusion as the culprit, he urges us to reflect on the contexts in which attributions of thinking are ordinarily made: not in isolation, let alone in the course of philosophical argument, but embedded in practices of agential understanding and moral concern. In other words, it is in our attempts to describe, explain, praise, and blame one another’s actions that we credit ourselves with various cognitive and affective capacities. This, Blatti suggests, is the reason why animalism’s critic is mistaken in attributing thinking to a human animal’s parts: because the only behaviour eligible for agential understanding and moral concern is the behaviour of the whole animal.

The aim of Blatti’s paper is not to pursue any one of these strategies as far as they go, but to provide a roadmap for other animalists to do so. Nevertheless, it must be
admitted that, for all of the strategies Blatti sketches, the devil lurks in the details, and some of those details—such as Williamson’s conception of knowledge as evidence and Wittgenstein’s account of conceptual criteria—are highly contentious indeed.

In Chapter 9, Rory Madden’s very rich contribution starts from a recently devised problem for what he calls the naïve thesis, which is the idea that we are things which have a human shape, and that the things within that shape are our parts. This is summarized in the words that we are humanoids. As he points out, this thesis is not the same as animalism, since it is possible to hold that we are constituted by the animal where we are, even though we are not identical to that animal, but we would then share the animal’s shape. Clearly, though, animalists are committed to the naïve thesis. The problem in its initial formulation is epistemological. It relies on a number of assumptions and so takes some time to formulate properly, even in summary form.

It starts from the naturalistically inspired thesis that the parts of us that are responsible for generating consciousness and thought are just a small part of us. Most of us would say that these parts, which Madden calls our T-parts, are more or less the same as the brain. To this can be added the idea that just as our T-parts are what enable us to have a viewpoint, our T-parts are also parts of other entities, whose existence we seem to recognize. Thus my T-part is also part of my head, and of my upper body, etc. Now, it would seem that if I have a viewpoint in virtue of the processes in the T-parts that I contain, then anybody who contains those same T-parts thereby also acquires a viewpoint, indeed the same viewpoint. So this means that my head has a point of view, as does my upper body, as does anything that overlaps with my T-parts. If that is right, then our knowledge that we are humanoids is threatened. The reason is, roughly, that it is not implausible to say that it is a condition on a ground for a belief to count as knowledge-generating that it will not generate errors in most subjects who form beliefs on its basis. However, most of my overlappers will form the false belief that they are humanoid on the basis of the experiences which lead me to think I am humanoid. Given this epistemological principle, it would seem to follow that I do not know that I am humanoid. In which case it also seems to follow that I do not know that I am an animal. Madden remarks that he agrees with Olson in thinking that this is a far more troublesome problem for animalism than the familiar traditional anti-animalist arguments.

In Madden’s engagement with this argument a rich and very interesting range of responses are developed and explored. What stands out is that the argument relies on a fair number of diverse assumptions, allowing a wide range of potential replies. One response he mentions is what he calls ‘eliminativism’, the view that there are no such things as undetached parts of us. If there are no overlappers then the problem vanishes. Some philosophers affirm this negative ontological claim. Madden’s response is not to affirm categorically the existence of overlappers, but to suggest, surely plausibly, that it is hard to feel confident that there are no such things as my head or my hands or my fingers. Indeed, such a response is almost as paradoxical as the original sceptical conclusion. We are to save the idea that we know we are humanoid by being sceptical that there are such things as heads, knees, and toes.
Conceding then that there might be overlappers, there is the rough distinction, introduced by Olson and followed by Madden, between potential solutions that query the epistemological assumptions and those that reject the psychological assumptions relied on in the argument. The first epistemological response he sets out is to deny that the fact that my overlappers on the basis of the same grounds as I have will go wrong and so discredit the idea that I have knowledge about my shape and parts. The suggestion is that it is not at all obvious that I and my overlappers are basing our convictions on what should be thought of as the same grounds. Madden calls this move ‘evidential-externalism’. Madden’s view is that more needs to be said if this response is to look persuasive, but he does not rule some such addition out. Madden then develops what he calls a thought-theoretic response. The proposal to be explored starts from the idea that to entertain thoughts about oneself one needs to be acquainted with oneself, which involves having genuine channels of information about oneself. What Madden then explores is the thought that this requires mechanisms that have the natural function of supplying such information. If something like this is true then there is a reason to disallow that the so-called overlappers have acquaintance with themselves, since it would be very implausible to claim that there are mechanisms in our bodies with such a natural function. The third potential response that Madden articulates (in Section 9.3) proposes that the elucidation of what a mental subject is—that is to say, being a thing with a point of view and consciousness—involves the idea that the grounds of consciousness within it must have the proper natural function of interceding between the inputs and the outputs of the things itself. To this can be added the suggestion that the neural structures within humans have that function for the human, and not for the overlappers. The consequence would be that the overlappers are not in fact minded, even though they contain within themselves structures that ground consciousness. Madden carefully explores this proposal and suggests ways of developing it.

Finally, Madden engages with the remnant persons problem as proposed by Johnston and Parfit. He points out that this objection is not the same as the main one he is considering. His response to this consists in giving counterexamples to the basic assumption in the way that problem is set up, which is that shrinking an entity cannot create a new thing of the same sort as you started with. Madden’s example comes from biology.

This summary leaves out most of the fascinating details of Madden’s discussion. His chapter does raise many questions. One is whether the general idea of function plays the roles in our understanding of knowledge and of having a mind that his response to the main sceptical argument requires. Another important question is whether there might be other responses than the ones Madden explores. Overall, Madden’s discussion encourages animalists in their suspicion that the sceptical argument rests on too many assumptions to be genuinely convincing.

In Chapter 10, David B. Hershenov engages with a very important question about animalism, which can be expressed in these words: How does animalism stand within a four-dimensionalist approach to ontology? Most supporters of animalism work in a
non-four-dimensionalist framework, and perhaps, as one might put it, simply hope that the view’s status is not affected by the choice of a different basic metaphysics. Hershenov’s discussion aims to make a case for the truth of this claim or hope by critically examining the arguments of Hud Hudson, whom Hershenov describes, as having ‘thought longer and harder about this topic’ than anyone else he knows. Hershenov proceeds by picking out two lines of thought that Hudson proposes and trying to counter them. The first is, roughly, that according to the animalist the person has early stages which are mindless, but since according to the dominant type of four-dimensionalism there will be countless objects with early stages that are mindless, this will mean that there are ‘an infinite number of entities that are persons’, which is absurd. The second argument that Hudson proposes is that stages of animals contain elements that are not involved in thinking, whereas it is less arbitrary to restrict person stages to bits that are directly relevant to the production of thought. To the first argument Hershenov replies, roughly, that it is not at all arbitrary to have a view according to which persons have stages which are ‘unminded’, since these early stages have a crucial causal role in the final generation of the minded stages, when what we have is a developing animal. To the second argument Hershenov replies that it is far less easy than philosophers assume to restrict the generation of mindfulness to the brain. This is bold, and is clearly not a point the significance of which solely concerns the particular purposes of Hershenov’s chapter. In the final two sections, Hershenov argues with considerable forcefulness that our judgements (or intuitions) about our persistence—as revealed, for example, in our attitude of prudential concern—indicate that what we are best regarded as tracking are the human animals we are (according to animalism). This part of his argument links to and contrasts with Johansson’s treatment of prudence. It is clear that Hershenov has, in this chapter, contributed in a major way to two debates. The first debate is the one mentioned earlier about the status of animalism within a four-dimensionalist ontology. The second debate is, of course, the general assessment of the arguments which are critical of animalism and which can be presented within other more standard ontologies. Of particular importance here is his attempt to oppose some of the pressures to shrink the person to something more or less like the brain.

Part III

In Chapter 11, Tim Campbell and Jeff McMahan do two very important things. They construct what they see as counterexamples to the animalist identity based on the cases where either there are what might be called two-headed animals and cases where there are what might be called two animals sharing a single head. About these cases they claim that either they involve two subjects or selves and a single animal—in which case both subjects cannot be the animal, hence one is not an animal—or they involve one subject and two animals, and since there is no reason to identify the self with one of the animals rather than the other, it cannot be either animal. These cases are extremely interesting, and one issue is whether Campbell and McMahan adjudicate them correctly. But the second crucial issue is what it would show if they are right
about these cases. They simply assert that we—standard and typical humans—are the same sort of thing as the selves in these odd cases. But is that a legitimate assumption? The second thing they do is to develop a conception of ourselves according to which we either are brains or are constituted by brains (or parts of brains). A very basic question is whether this conception is supported by consideration of the examples, but also whether such an approach has any plausibility.

Mark D. Reid begins Chapter 12 by surveying what he calls counterexamples to animalism which ‘involve duplication’, and he concludes that the standard ones are ‘inconclusive’. Reid proposes a new potential counterexample, which he urges us to regard as ‘conclusive’. His extremely ingenious and novel case in effect combines brain splitting (with a severed corpus callosum) plus a process called ‘Intracarotid Amytal Procedure’, in which one cerebral hemisphere is in effect disabled by the selective injection of some substance leaving the other hemisphere capable of operating. Reid envisages that what happens is that on one day one hemisphere is disabled and then on the next day the other hemisphere is disabled, and so on. This is envisaged as happening from birth (or even earlier). Reid’s claim is that the best description of the result is that there are two distinct persons created in a single animal, whom we might call ‘Lefty’ and ‘Righty’. Each sleeps during the day the other is awake. In his paper Reid carefully develops and evaluates the issues that are involved in this case. Looked at in a general way there are two big questions the imagined case raises. The first concerns the overall logic. Suppose we agree with Reid’s description of what has happened, namely the creation of two persons in a single (human) animal. Is that a serious problem for animalism? This issue arises for the argument developed in Campbell and McMahan, and so we shall not spell it out again. The second issue is whether Reid’s description of what this case involves is correct. We need to remind ourselves that, if we think about the case in terms of what is happening to the single human animal, then we have to count it as involving a single functioning entity, the animal, which is being damaged by a complex surgical procedure. Having to think that way about the animal, it seems fair to say, must have some weight in deciding how we are to describe it in terms of ‘persons’ and ‘subjects’. However, this new case merits careful scrutiny.

In Chapter 13, Paul Snowdon attempts to broaden the exploration of animalism. The chapter tries to work out what implications animalism has about the conditions for different mental states to belong to a single subject. When we are talking about experiences this might be called the unity of consciousness. Focussing on the example of split-brain cases, it is argued that animalism is committed to a singularist verdict; that is, the verdict that the post-operative states are states of a single subject, despite the functional disunity among them. It is then argued that no contradiction can be generated in psychological theories for such single subjects, nor are there principles of interpretation (of a kind proposed by Davidson) that such a psychological theory must flout. Nor are there, contrary to what Tim Bayne proposes, any principles about inferences a single subject must make in relation to first-person beliefs, which create difficulties for this account. When the debate focuses on experiences it is argued that no
reason exists not to count the various experiences that the post-operative patients enjoy as experiences of a single subject. Nagel, it is claimed, fails to unearth any principle that rules this out. In conclusion, it is proposed that the question as to what degree of unity the mental states of a single subject must possess is an empirical one, and there are no reliable a priori principles that we can discern.

Various questions can be raised about this argument. Does the chapter really explain how to avoid problems for singularism in relation to split-brain cases? Does it seriously disarm the Nagelian intuition that the experiences of a single subject must have some strong degree of functional unity? Are there perhaps other more difficult cases for the singularism to which animalism is committed?

Jens Johansson starts Chapter 14 by helpfully clarifying the animalist thesis. Having done that, the paper aims to analyse and evaluate some problems for animalism that arise out of our attitudes to prudential concern and moral responsibility. One can say, therefore, that Johansson's chapter belongs in the general category of considering issues about animalism that relate to value theory. In particular, Johansson engages with replies, suggested by Olson (1997), to some possible arguments of this sort that are critical of animalism. These issues arise from both the nature of what is called 'prudential concern' and from assumptions that we make about moral responsibility, though here we shall restrict the summary to the case of prudential concern. That is meant to be the special sort of concern that someone feels about something that is taken by them to be going to happen to them. The problem for animalism arises from two assumptions. The first assumption, which might appear truistic given the previous characterization, is that if, say, X is reasonably prudentially concerned about the future occurrence of E then E must be happening to X, i.e. X is the person to whom E will be happening. This links (reasonable) prudence to personal identity. The second, more controversial assumption, is that if looking ahead X knows that the person undergoing E will be linked psychologically to X in the way that a cerebrum transplant from X into some other object will bring about then it will be reasonable for X to be prudentially concerned about the occurrence of E. If that is granted then it implies that transplanting the cerebrum of X preserves and takes with it the person X, a proposition that is normally thought of as inconsistent with animalism. Olson's clever response to this line of thought is to deny the first and apparently truistic claim that proper prudential concern requires identity with the person undergoing E. Olson points out that Parfit and Shoemaker have already made a convincing case against this. Johansson agrees, but adds that Olson has not shown that there are no related principles about prudence that can be used to generate an anti-animalist conclusion. Johansson's clever and novel move to break this logjam is to suggest that we focus on the entity that is agreed to be the animal present in the scenarios. Two things now seem true. First, we know (or we can assume) that the animal does not go with the cerebrum and whatever psychological connexions it generates. But if it is plausible to say that the person is reasonably prudentially concerned about the future occurrence of E it seems equally plausible to say that the animal is also reasonably prudentially...
concerned. If both things are granted then it turns out that the range of reasonable prudence does not conflict with animalism. In this move Johansson is attempting to make progress, as he himself points out, in a way that animalists have done in other areas in the debate, which is to ask participants to think about what we should say about the animal which is agreed to be present. This provides, or appears to provide, a significant anchor to speculation about what should be said. The important question that now arises if there still is to be debate about these issues is whether Johansson’s judgements about the animal are correct. But another important issue is whether someone trying to deny animalism and sustain the person/animal contrast can do that plausibly once we remember that both fall in the domain of practical reason. Has Johansson here provided us with a strengthening of the so-called ‘two-lives’ argument?

Like Johansson, David Shoemaker is also concerned with animalism’s normative import. In Chapter 15, he addresses animalism’s apparent inability to account for the practical concerns of human persons. Shoemaker formulates this objection as an argument against the plausibility of animalism, as follows: ‘(1) animalism lacks the proper fit with the set of our practical concerns; (2) if a theory of personal identity lacks the proper fit with the set of our practical concerns, it suffers a loss in plausibility; thus, (3) animalism suffers a loss in plausibility (in particular to psychological criteria of identity)’. In response to this objection— which he labels ‘Challenge’— Shoemaker considers three possible replies, each of which is extrapolated from recent work by David DeGrazia (2005), Marya Schechtman (2010), and Olson (1997).

According to Shoemaker, both DeGrazia and Schechtman would reply to Challenge by denying (1). In DeGrazia’s case, (1) is rejected on the grounds that, as far as is known about the actual world, the persistence of human animals is at least a necessary condition for the possession of those psychological characteristics which, in turn, ground such practical concerns as moral responsibility, prudential concern, and the like. By DeGrazia’s lights, this fact is enough to block the inference to (3)—i.e. to prevent animalism from suffering any loss in plausibility. Schechtman too would contend that animalism is perfectly capable of accounting for the practical concerns of human persons. But on her view, the route to (1)’s rejection is more ambitious, involving appeal to an expansive notion of personhood—what she calls a ‘person-life’—which ‘incorporate[s] the metaphysical insights of animalism in a way that allows that theory to produce the desired practical implications’. Ultimately, however, Shoemaker finds that neither DeGrazia’s nor Schechtman’s denials of (1) result in what an adequate response to Challenge really demands, which is an explanation of the justificatory role played by identity qua necessary condition for our practical concerns, where that explanation is both robust and informative (in senses that Shoemaker describes).

More promising, Shoemaker argues, is Olson’s reply to Challenge, which involves denying not (1), but (2). According to Olson, the intuition many of us report concerning familiar brain-transplant scenarios—i.e. that persons go where their psychological-continuity-preserving organs go—may not track any particular theory of
personal identity, but only our practical concerns. And in that case, animalism may be true regardless of its failure to explain adequately our practical concerns.

But as Shoemaker points out, even if Olson is correct that the transplant intuition may reflect only our practical concerns and thus can be divorced from any particular account of personal identity, it does not follow that the plausibility of a theory of personal identity is not impacted by the degree to which it jibes with our practical concerns. As a result, Olson’s attack on (2) is not sufficiently strong. On Shoemaker’s view, what is required in order to undermine (2)—and, thereby, to block the inference to (3)—is a defence of the claim that ‘none of the relations or elements in which numerical identity consists matter, so that the correct theory of personal identity will contain nothing of relevance to our practical concerns’. This is precisely the claim that Shoemaker proceeds to defend in the concluding section of the chapter—what he calls the ‘Identity Really Really Doesn’t Matter View’.

We are very grateful to the contributors for the chapters they have produced. Their work, we feel, is testimony to the richness of the debate about animalism that already exists, but we also believe and hope that it will act as a stimulus to enrich the debate beyond its present bounds.16

References


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