given issue, the authors test drive assorted free-speech theories to see how they work in the context of a given form of expression. The problem: this back-and-forth form of analysis is indeterminate, as revealed in their examination of data collection and dissemination, which discusses at least three different and sometimes incompatible theories but finds no resolution short of micro case-by-case analysis. Another challenge: have the authors identified all of the applicable theories or only the traditional lineup of hierarchical theories? If not, those problems associated with my second contention might well loom large.

It is true: our First Amendment jurisprudence needs astute thinkers like Professors Tushnet, Chen, and Blocher to get us to reconsider where we have been, where we may be tending, and why. And what of Professor Weinrib? Yes, there is welcome room for her (and the likes of Steve Shiffrin and his What’s Wrong with the First Amendment) in our grand debate parlor. For what kind of robust First Amendment would we have if not for doctrinal agitators who rail against our “overprotective” free speech jurisprudence?

In the end, one lesson to be gleaned from both of these fine books is that a vibrant First Amendment culture requires a demanding degree of open-mindedness. Take heed!

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Classical realists condemn leaders for going to war over such ephemeral goals as honor, glory, or status instead of following the guidance of the national interest defined in terms of power. In contrast, Jonathan Renshon argues that the use of military force to achieve higher status can be rational.

He theorizes that disparity between the status that elites believe is just and appropriate for their state and how others treat their state creates status dissatisfaction, an aversive state that motivates some sort of forceful action to remedy this situation (pp. 54–55). Renshon emphasizes that leaders are not concerned about their global standing but rather their position within a defined status community (pp. 42–43). Unlike previous quantitative research on status inconsistency, which suggested that states initiate military disputes out of frustration with their inability to overcome status barriers, Renshon asserts that leaders use force instrumentally and strategically to alter their state’s image. Although this may not be their explicit intent, the use of military force can provide dramatic, visible, and unambiguous
evidence concerning a state’s military capabilities and resolve. If so, then the international community must worry about prospects for China’s peaceful rise (pp. 57–58).

Renshon tests his theoretical predictions using large-N studies, network analysis, survey and laboratory experiments, and historical case studies. In the large-N analysis, he finds that states experiencing a status deficit are more likely to initiate military disputes (pp. 163–165). Experiments test for status deficits and escalating commitments. Network analysis identifies the status communities with which states are concerned (pp. 141–145). Renshon explains his methodological choices, making the book useful for graduate students and others who would like to do research in this area.

Renshon illustrates the logic of his theory with a case study of Wilhelmine Germany’s provocation of repeated crises and a naval race with Great Britain to compel Britain, Russia, and France to recognize Germany as an equal power. Contrary to historians’ judgment that Germany’s coercive policies caused its encirclement by hostile states, Renshon argues that the use of threats to achieve worthless colonial territories and the building of battleships forced its great-power rivals to give Germany greater status than they would have done otherwise. To provide variation in the type of state and historical era, he includes shorter studies of Britain’s use of force during the 1956 Suez Crisis, Egypt’s 1962–1967 intervention in Yemen, and Russia’s decision to support Serbia’s refusal to comply with the Austrian ultimatum in July 1914, even at the risk of global war. Britain was trying to maintain its great-power status in the face of decline, whereas Egypt acted to assert its status in response to the humiliation of Syria’s recent withdrawal from the United Arab Republic. In backing Serbia, Russia was trying to preserve its standing as a great power, which would be endangered by betrayal of its client state Serbia under pressure from German-Austrian threats.

In practice, it may be difficult to distinguish between status seeking that is motivated by rational, instrumental goals and emotional reactions to humiliation or disrespect. The book’s focus on fighting for status leaves little room for discussion of more constructive routes to higher status such as norm entrepreneurship or economic development. Renshon presents a clear, logical, and coherent theory for the role of status in generating military conflicts, supported by a variety of evidence. The book is methodologically innovative and rigorous, providing a template for additional research in this area.

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