INTRODUCTION

“As you know, I have for years been concerned about the fact that the Mont Pèlerin Society has become a large social gathering rather than the kind of intense intellectual community it once was,” Milton Friedman wrote in 1987 to his friend and comrade-in-arms, Arthur Seldon, founder of the Institute for Economic Affairs, a British pro-market think tank. By the second half of the 1980s, the neoliberal trans-Atlantic alliance between Reagan and Thatcher was on a firm footing. The views and proposals of the Mont Pèlerin Society, once marginal and ridiculed in a world dominated by Keynesianism, were now in alignment with the prevailing spirit of the age (Burgin, 2012, pp. 206–207). This moment of unexpected success seemed to afford Friedman, one of the Society’s founding members and leading luminaries, the opportunity to muse on past trials: “In 1972, I was in favor of having a big twenty-fifth anniversary celebration and closing the Society down,” Friedman wrote, “in the view that it would be better for a new society to emerge which would have fresh vigor and would be staffed by a new group of people.”

Serving as the Society’s president between 1970 and 1972, Friedman had come to the belief that the Mont Pèlerin Society had been sapped of its original vigor and resolve. It had turned, according to Friedman (1987), into little more than a traveling circus, a gathering of “tourists” and “fellow travelers” in efforts to promulgate the neoliberal creed. It had ceased to function as the sparring grounds for world-class thinkers. With typical folksy candor, Friedman continued, “Unfortunately, I was unable persuade my fellow directors of that view, but in retrospect I still believe it was a darn good idea.” Seldon replied that he remembered Friedman’s position well and recalled being “shocked at the notion that the effort to muster market economists of the world might end prematurely.” With hindsight, however, Seldon (1987) had to agree that Friedman was probably right and that he could “now see your argument.” Not for the first time Friedman had propounded a viewpoint once derided by his peers and only later to be embraced by others.

Many scholars believe the Society has played a noteworthy role to play in the formation of neoliberal ideas and implementation of neoliberal policies. Mirowski and Plehwe, who assembled an international team of esteemed scholars to assess the Society’s impact, turned the significance and centrality of the Society into an axiom for their research colloquium: theirs was a study of “what we believe has been the central thought collective that has conscientiously developed the neoliberal identity for more than sixty years now” (Plehwe, 2009, p. 4). Elsewhere, Mirowski (2014, p. 29) has claimed that the Society was “at one time in its history the premier site of the construction of neoliberalism,” rebranding it as one of the preeminent sites in what he terms the “Neoliberal Thought Collective,” a network of...
organizations agitating for the dissolution of the Fordist–Keynesian social compact in the postwar era. Similarly, Harcourt (2011, p. 31) claims the Society played an “important role” in the evolution of neoliberal thought. In a sweeping account of the history of neoliberal ideas, Turner (2008, p. 2) congratulates the Society for providing the “embryonic form” of a political movement that “created a huge intellectual network of foundations, institutes, research centres, ideologues and scholars who relentlessly publish and package new ideas,” which in turn contributed to nothing less than the redirection of the very “course of Western civilisation.” According to this account, the Society was a powerful organizational instrument that proved “integral to the ideological genesis of neo-liberalism” (Turner, 2008, p. 48). Likewise, Burgin (2012, pp. 9–10) contends that the Society’s members played a “decisive role in the construction of the contemporary market-centered world.” And in his celebrated account of neoliberalism, David Harvey (2007) attributes significant powers to the Society, particularly through the monetarist writings of Milton Friedman and other economists trained or employed by the University of Chicago, said to have produced a set of policies that were granted a mark of respectability when Friedman was awarded the Nobel Prize in economics in 1976. Harvey observes that “in the US in particular, a powerful group of wealthy individuals and corporate leaders” were eager to “organize opposition to what they saw as an emerging consensus for pursuing a mixed economy.” Their chosen vehicle, Harvey (2007, pp. 21–22) writes, was, in addition to think tanks like the Heritage Foundation, none other than the Mont Pèlerin Society.

This article details a continuous series of discussions among leading elements of the Society, ongoing from its earliest beginnings in 1947, on the degree of elitism that it would pursue and the extent to which intellectual rigor would underpin its activities. From the very start, leading members of the Society worried about the diminution of the Society’s lofty aims, whose qualities seemed to be physically manifested at the site of its founding meeting, held at an exclusive resort in the Swiss Prealps overlooking Lake Geneva, elevated far above the workaday lives of the populace below. More specifically, this article scrutinizes the views of Milton Friedman, a leading Chicago School economist and founding member of the Society, who repeatedly voiced concerns about the intrusion of second-rate academics, journalists, and other hangers-on in what had originally been conceived of as an exclusive and exclusionary club of esteemed (largely male) scholars.

Throughout the Society’s early history there was a constant concern to limit membership. Alongside this restrictive tendency, however, there also existed a strong desire to propagate neoliberal ideas far and wide, and to ensure that the proposals of the Society would be realized in the realm of practical politics; a desire that seemed to necessitate the inclusion of a wide range of scholars, thinkers, businesspersons, and politicians, if not as formal members, then as guests at the regular annual meetings held around the world.

The central research question guiding this article is how and why the Society vacillated between popular appeal and elitist closure. This dialectic of organizational inclusion and exclusion simultaneously mirrored the tense and tenuous relationship that existed between democratic politics, public participation, and neoliberalism (Biebricher, 2015). The Society’s organizational model could be described as a form of elitist vanguardism: if experts were permitted to lead the way in the struggle to develop ideas, politicians and the public would surely follow close behind.

2 | TOURISTS AND FELLOW TRAVELERS

“The central values of civilization are in danger,” proclaimed the founding members of the Society in a statement after their first meeting in April 1947. The meeting was held at a luxurious Swiss resort, the Hotel du Parc, sitting astride a mountain range overlooking Lake Geneva. The members considered the cause of freedom to be in retreat across the whole of Europe, a retreat hastened by the “growth of theories which question the desirability of the rule of law” and “fostered by a decline of belief in private property and the competitive market” (“Mont Pèlerin Conference,” 1947). To counteract what was “essentially” an “ideological movement” that seemed to reject the principles of the Rechtststaat and free markets alike, what was needed was an equally forceful ideological countermovement capable of promoting neoliberal ideals. According to the “founding fathers”—a magniloquent nickname enthusiastically appropriated by the Society’s founding members—this movement’s aims were to be at once modest and sweeping. On the one hand, the goal was simply to engage in “further study” of relevant issues; the group did “not aspire to conduct propaganda. It seeks to
establish no meticulous and hampering orthodoxy” (“Mont Pèlerin Conference,” 1947). Instead, its aims were said to be purely intellectual: “Its object is solely, by facilitating the exchange of views among minds inspired by certain ideals and broad conceptions held in common, to contribute to the preservation and improvement of free society.”

In keeping with this apparent modesty, Hayek (1946) tentatively suggested in December 1946 that the name of the organization that would promote this end would be known as the Acton–Tocqueville Society. The name, however, was quickly rejected by the founding members: inscribing the names of Lord Acton and Alexis de Tocqueville seemed too dogmatic and laden with stilted orthodoxies.

Veiled by these apparently modest intellectual aims, emphasizing scholarly pursuits—“to study and promote the study of political, economic, historical, moral, and philosophical aspects of civil society,” to sponsor “meetings and discussion,” to publish “reports, announcements and other documents” (“The Mont Pelerin Society”, 1947)—the Society in reality envisaged nothing less than overturning the statist consensus that had formed in the ruins of postwar Europe. What could be more ambitious than to maintain that the “central values of civilization” (“Statement of aims,” ca. 1947) were in danger and that the Society would take on the role of an intellectual vanguard in the struggle to defend society against the encroachment of noxious ideas? What was needed in this struggle were autonomous, powerful thinkers who would not shy away from skirmishes on the battlefield of ideological struggle. At the founding meeting of famous or soon-to-be famous figures like Friedrich Hayek, Karl Popper, Ludwig von Mises, Michael Polanyi, Wilhelm Röpke, and Milton Friedman, the Society proposed to tackle an astonishing variety of topics: discussion sessions on significant political, social, cultural, and economic issues of the day were planned, from talks on “modern historiography” to the “future of Germany,” discussions of “Liberalism and Christianity,” wage levels, trade unions, taxation, poverty, and income distribution, and presentations on issues ranging from agricultural policy to “the present political crisis” and the “problems and chances of European federation” (“1st Meeting, Mont Pèlerin,” 1947). These scholars were not content to remain ensconced in ivory towers, even if they paid lip service to the attractions of the quiet, contemplative life of the thinker. Instead, they wanted to transform the world. It was a world that was, as yet, not ready to receive their ideas.

Their strategy for ushering in this new order remained decidedly bookish. Hayek, traveling to the US in early 1948, met a number of members to discuss the future activities of the Society. “There was fairly general agreement that the most useful thing we could do at the present moment was to resume our discussions of the conditions of a free society through circular letters,” Hayek (1948a) reported in a presidential circular. Hayek proposed setting up a sort of discussion forum for the predigital age. “Any member who wishes to raise a problem for discussion,” Hayek (1948a) wrote, could write a “short statement in the form of a circular letter” and address it to the “Professor Director,” who would distribute this letter in modified form to the rest of the members. Any comments on this original letter would be “handled in a similar manner,” Hayek (1948a) informed his readers. This transnational debating club was still content to restrict its activities to the airy vistas of pure theory, distributing information to a closed club of few and far-flung members. The Society, an erudite gathering of dons and deans, happily confined itself to matters of the mind. It was, in Denord's (2002, p. 15) phrase, the “discourse of an elite, destined for an elite.”

At this time, the Society was also concerned with the problem of delimitation. What were to be the Society's proper bounds? Organizational issues were structured by a perceived binary opposition between elitism and populism, between intellectual rigor and popular agitation. If this Society was, on the one hand, to constitute the elite vanguard of the market revolution, consisting of a select group of penetrating thinkers, it would at the same time necessarily have to consist of real human beings made of flesh and blood, who were embedded in wider social relations and institutional structures, with all the frailties of the embodied mind. Spreading the market creed would necessitate entering into relations of mutual exchange with broader segments of the academic, political, and business fields, moving the organization beyond its core membership of the Society’s original founders.

These tensions produced worried exchanges and deliberations. In a memorandum from a meeting of the Society’s directors in September 1948, Jacques Rueff, a French pro-market economist, argued that the Society should be “very careful in accepting new members,” fearing that “by becoming too many . . . we will lose our strength”; Hayek “understands this argument well,” the author of the meeting’s minutes observes (“Memorandum from a séance du Comité des Directeurs,” 1948). While a political party might welcome the multitudes into their ranks, this gathering of
self-professed bright minds took a different stance. By October 1948 the Society had nearly doubled its membership, growing from 65 to 115 members in little more than a year, but Hayek (1948b) expressed regret that a “considerable number” of those who had been asked to join “have not replied” and an “even larger number of those who have accepted have not yet paid their subscriptions.”

By 1949, however, Hayek contended that in order to achieve its aims, the Society would have to grow beyond its closed circle of founding fathers. Admittedly, it would have to do so in a tempered fashion, balancing the imperatives of expansion with the lofty elitism of its eponymous meeting grounds in the Swiss Prealps. In a presidential circular, Hayek (1949) gently chided the Society’s members for the unsystematic way in which new members had been accepted, noting that “it seems necessary to adopt a slightly more formal procedure” for admissions. The Society would have to “elect further members and to agree on more definite principles of selection.” Proposals for new members were to include information on their position, age, key publications, and a brief statement “from personal knowledge of why the person is suggested as a suitable member of the Society.” The barriers to entry were slowly being raised. The requirement of personal acquaintanceship meant the Society would grow primarily through a network of proximate affinities.

Some 10 years later, in September 1959, a meeting of the Society’s leading members was held at Christ Church College, Oxford, where the membership problem was again broached. John Jewkes, an Oxford professor and liberal economist, argued that “the Society is getting too big and that new members should be examined more carefully” (“Minutes of the Proceedings of the Meeting of the Council,” 1959). According to the minutes, Jewkes “thinks that we should make up our minds what sort of society the Mont Pèlerin Society shall become. Do we want to be a limited elite?” On the one hand, Jewkes favored a broader membership because the “great value of the Mont Pelerin Society consists of the spreading of its ideas.” What better way to spread its ideas than to ensure a broad-based membership? As if to confirm this impulse, Jewkes nominated Ralph Harris, a British economist and head of the Institute of Economic Affairs since 1957. This nomination was immediately met with opposition by Albert Hunold, one of the Society’s founding members, who “owing to some bad experience at the 10th Anniversary Meeting in 1957 when Mr. Harris had been invited for the first time as a guest,” thought Harris should not be admitted as a member because he “did not behave like a gentleman” (“Minutes of the Proceedings of the Meeting of the Council,” 1959). (Harris was later admitted to the Society, serving as secretary from 1967 and president from 1982 to 1984.) On the other hand, Hayek seemed in favor of maintaining the restricted nature of the original Society. Hayek drew attention to the “fact that the Society is growing more and more and that this growth has to be considered very carefully because unlimited growth may change the character of the Society entirely” (“Minutes of the Proceedings of the General Meeting,” 1959.) Hayek wished to “retain the character of the Society as a group of scholars” and did not favor close relations with “political organisations” like the Liberal International. Similarly, the French economist Daniel Villey also opposed “further growth” on grounds that he believed the Society had “reached...its optimal size.” Villey “wishes the meetings to take place in such a way that there is a possibility of discussion between different members as friends. This is not possible in too large gatherings” (“Minutes of the Proceedings of the General Meeting,” 1959). Once again the Society was haunted by the problem of demarcation.

In the following year, Hayek believed it was “inevitable that the character and functions of the Society should in the future be somewhat different from what they were in the early years.” Still, he was

**persuaded that its importance and potential beneficial influence are in no way diminished. It has grown into a much bigger group than it was during its first decade and this is bound to affect the character of its meetings and may even make changes in its organisation necessary. (Hayek, 1960, p. 7)**

Aside from its nostalgic tinge, Hayek’s observation also contained a measure of fatalism: expansion seemed inevitable, whether the original membership liked it or not, and a shift in the Society’s inner workings was unavoidable. The naysayers would simply have to accept that the market creed was now growing in popularity. The longing to establish a gentleman’s club of select scholars, a venue still capable of producing “exciting intellectual experiences,” in Friedman’s (1970) phrase, would have to remain unmet within this broader Society.
But these tensions did not fade away. Friedman would not give in so easily. He was intent on rescuing the Society against itself by shutting it down and starting afresh. By 1970 Friedman had taken over the presidential chair of the Society from Günter Schmölders, a West German liberal economist who had been chosen as president of the Society between 1968 and 1970 in Friedman’s place, at Hayek’s insistence (Read, 1970). Friedman used the opportunity to initiate a campaign against the Society itself. “Our basic problems arise out of our success,” Friedman wrote in a circular to the Society’s members. The 1970 meeting in Munich had included 330 members and guests, a nearly tenfold increase over the original 36 individuals who had attended the Society’s founding meeting in 1947 (Burgin, 2012, p. 207). There was simply too much deadweight. Friedman convinced other leading figures in the Society to forego the annual meeting in 1971. In its place, a small group of select members would gather in Montreux, Switzerland—a site that was symbolically significant owing to its geographical proximity to the Society’s birthplace—in September 1971. This meeting would stake out the future course of the Society. A “special Board of Directors meeting” would be called to “consider the long run future of the Society” and to “concentrate on preparations for a 25th anniversary meeting in September 1972” (Kemp, 1971). These apparently strategic and celebratory concerns, however, served only to conceal Friedman’s real intention: to dissolve the Society and start afresh.

In organizing this special session, Friedman’s main priority was to ensure that only a limited core of former high-ranking members would be in attendance. Little could be accomplished in the presence of intrusive newcomers or peripheral hangers-on. Writing conspiratorially in April 1971, Friedman (1971a) decreed to Ralph Harris, Secretary of the Society, that the “total number invited will be 38.” Friedman quickly took to the role of careful organizer of a surreptitious coup d’état: of the 38 attendees to be invited, “I suspect that Shenoy, Philbrook, Director, Knight, Denison, Iversen, Trevoux, Pfister, Ilaü, and Bohm are very unlikely to attend.” This still left 28 attendees, “which with wives and family might well exceed 50,” though, Friedman noted, ever the judicious mathematician with an eye to risks and probabilities, “also might not.” This was evidently a greater number than he originally had in mind, but it was right at the limit of what Friedman considered tolerable. In closing, Friedman wrote:

> 38 is much larger than I had hoped, but that I am sure is a very outside figure. 28 is I believe a more reasonable upper limit. That is still a little high but not I believe much too high.

Almost as an afterthought, Friedman (1971a) asked Harris: “Do you share this optimistic view?”

Funds for the meeting were quickly secured. One of the advantages of working to promote the neoliberal creed was that wealthy benefactors always seemed ready to assist the Society. An appeal was made to the Earhart Foundation, founded by the American oilman Harry Boyd Earhart, a generous supporter of pro-market scholars and writers. The Foundation promised 4,500 dollars “for travel by former officers and directors” to a “special directors meeting in Switzerland in September 1971” (Ware, 1971). But even this relatively sizeable sum was a disappointment to Friedman: “I tried to get a larger grant,” Friedman (1971a) wrote to Harris, but the Earhart directors, he admitted, had “decided otherwise.” The coup was not off to a good start. Still, Friedman seemed buoyant. He wanted the meeting to last 3 days, noting that “there is certainly no need for more than four” (Friedman, 1971a). He seemed to hope that the problem of the Society’s continued existence could be dealt with quickly, leaving time for discussions of real issues in economics. His hope was that “if we make rapid progress on organizational matters we can afford the luxury of some sessions on substantive discussions” (Friedman, 1971a). To Friedman, theoretical discussions were the prize, the real reason for the Society’s existence, and they were therefore to be relished whenever possible. Dismantling the Society was no more than a necessary evil to achieving this end.

The conspirators continued apace. In an invitation to a select group of “present and former members of the Board of Directors, past Presidents and a very few other senior members who for special reasons the President believes would make a valuable contribution to our discussions,” Harris (1971) outlined the venue for a “private conference” to “discuss the future development of the Society.” This was an innocuous rebranding of what was to be a euthenasic gathering, a drawing up of burial plans for what was considered a moribund organization. As if to draw attention to the circularity
of life itself, Harris (1971) noted that the meeting would take place “at the Palace Hotel Montreux which is close to our birth place at Mont Pelerin.”

Writing from his summer house in Ely, Vermont, Friedman meticulously planned the Montreux meeting. Working groups were to be established: one would examine membership matters, “including number, method of selection, criteria for selection, and dues”; another would discuss meetings, “including kind, frequency, and method of conducting”; the final two groups would discuss the 1972 annual meeting and decide whether to publish a Society journal (Friedman, 1971c). A dossier containing extracts of membership opinion on the future of the Society was assembled. Members had aired their grievances and suggestions for reform in preparation for the meeting. Alberto del Corra, a Society member in Colombia, suggested limiting membership to those holding a university degree and that admission to the Society be made subject to unanimous election (“Extracts from letters on future of MPS [Mont Pèlerin Society],” n.d.). Henry Hazlitt, an American libertarian journalist, agreed that “some limit must be adopted” because the Society was “growing bigger all the time and none of us seems to know how to stop it.” Another member suggested that discussions at the annual meetings were “discursive rather than penetrating” and that they had become little more than a “mere formality.” Donald Kemmerer, an American economist, suggested limiting the number of guests to 50 persons per meeting and “also limit the number of times a person might attend as a guest to twice in say ten years.” George Koether, a supporter of Ludwig von Mises, believed “meetings were too unwieldy,” that the “burgeoning membership” was problematic, and that the intellectual standards of the Society were declining: “no businessman should be accepted simply because he is rich or enthusiastic for ‘free enterprise’” and “no professor should be accepted simply because he is a professor,” Koether wrote. Many scholars were “dealers in secondhand ideas” and some businessmen had little more claim to inclusion than their pocketbook, Koether continued, and those who were to become members should have proven “by their work or writing or speaking that they have been working at the problems of the Free Society, not just sitting in the cheering section.”

Simon Rottenberg, an American economist, agreed that “meetings are of suboptimal size” and criticized the Society’s annual meetings for having become “conventions for the reaffirmation of faith rather than institutions for the definition of that faith” (“Extracts from letters on future of MPS”). Clearly, this was a curated selection of membership opinion, tailored to present voices largely according with Friedman’s diagnosis. Such was the power of the presidency. A “classified summary” of the testimonies was distributed to the Montreux attendees (“Classified Summary of Suggestions Made in Letters from Members,” n.d.).

When the Montreux meeting opened on Sunday evening in early September 1971 26 members were in attendance (“Provisional List of Participants,” ca. 1971). This initial session—laconically entitled “The Problem”—set the stage for the remaining 4 days and was followed by a dinner of the assembled members (and their wives)—to be held “in private room” (“MPS Board Conference,” ca. 1971). Leonard Read had prepared a statement to be signed by attending members at the close of the 5-day meeting. Read’s statement largely accorded with Friedman’s diagnosis, but it substituted Friedman’s revolutionism with a reformist solution. Read laid out the rationale for a significant restriction of the Society’s scale and scope. He recalled the founding meeting of the Society in 1947, reminiscing that the Society was originally to be named “after some noted liberal” from “bygone days,” which was quickly decided against: why should this new Society “contract any of his imperfections?” (Read, ca. 1971). Instead, the “notion of” naming the society after the [Swiss] mountain top prevailed; this carried with it no ideological or doctrinaire commitments—thus, the Mont Pelerin Society. The 1947 was a gathering of “individuals” engaged in “frank discussion” who “met in a small room,” Read noted. The implication was clear: this was so different from those masses that now met in large halls and engaged only in constrained discussions that contributed little to intellectual refinement. It was a clever literary foil, emphasizing the failings of the present Society by way of contrast with what it was once said to have been.

The purpose of the Society, Read wrote, was not to produce a powerful collective but rather a disjointed set of ameliorated individuals: “No propaganda!” (Read, ca. 1971). The maxim of the organization might as well be “to each his own—an improved thinker, acting in his own way, and in his own orbit,” Read observed. The Society was not so much a collectivity that acted collectively as a sanctuary for atomistic individuals. It was established to provide the moral support and fellow feeling inherent in a body composed of like-minded peers; however, it would also allow them to pursue private lines of inquiry. These functions were particularly important in the immediate postwar decades, in
those years when statism had reached its zenith and the market creed seemed an improbable fantasy (Burgin, 2012, pp. 1–11). But this era was now over. There was less need to shelter these fragile thinkers from the storm; the floodwaters had receded and the storm had abated.

“Nothing fails like success,” Read quoted approvingly, ironically observing that the Society had “succeeded beyond anyone’s expectations,” that is, “if a mushrooming and unwieldy membership is any criterion” (Read, ca. 1971). This was a bittersweet sort of success, the kind of victory that was undermined by its own excess, not fully Pyrrhic, but certainly attenuated by its own trajectory. Read’s diagnosis was fourfold. First, the annual meetings were no longer an “intimate exchange of ideas” but instead resembled a cheap “convention.” Second, to accommodate the grossly enlarged membership, annual meetings would now have to be held in large cities instead of in an appropriately bucolic “retreat place, conducive to personal discussions,” such as the Hotel du Parc in 1947. Third, the quality of papers given at the annual meeting had deteriorated, with some contributions resembling mere “studies in comparative ideological systems” instead of “explorations into how best to insure an essentially free society.” Finally, and in sum, the Society had “veered seriously from its original intent.” Read’s proposed solution was less radical than Friedman’s. “The very best that can be done is to execute a one-eighty and head perhaps awkwardly and for certain slowly toward the original intent,” Read speculated. With this, most the Society’s leadership had cleverly outfoxed the lone revolutionist Friedman. They diagnosed the same disease, but their prognosis was more upbeat and their proposed cure less drastic.

As a result, the coup failed and Friedman’s proposal was roundly rejected. Instead, the assembled members agreed to introduce a more circumscribed organizational form. The Society’s membership section, consisting of Hayek, Harris, and five other leading members (but excluding Friedman), presented a report detailing measures to raise the barriers to entry: new members were to be limited to a fixed number per year; for the next five years, the maximum number of new entrants was to be 25 persons per year; annual dues were to be doubled, from 10 dollars to 20 dollars; the number of guests at meetings was to be curtailed by allowing members to invite only two non-members—although “wives of members were considered as special guests to which this recommendation is inapplicable” (“Report of the Membership Section,” 1971). This was hardly the clean break Friedman had hoped for.

Still, he came close to convincing Hayek that the Society should be discontinued. “Although I am not sure that the Society can look forward to another twenty-five years,” Hayek (1973) wrote, “I do hope it will continue, it will continue to prosper, and that we will have at least a good many more meetings of this kind.” Only a year earlier, Hayek admitted, he had been “not at all certain that the Society still had a definite function in the future.” At the last hour, however, Hayek found himself unswayed by Friedman’s proposal: “I did vote in the end for its continuance,” Hayek (1973) wrote, “but not with an altogether clear conscience.” His unclear conscience may have had something to do with the feeling that he was wasting his and everyone else’s time: “I do not dare to say that things would have moved very differently if the Mont Pèlerin Society had never existed” (Hayek 1973). Friedman very nearly turned Hayek against his own creation.

Friedman seemed always ready to put a brave face on even the most dismal of defeats. Writing later in his memoirs, Friedman offered an upbeat précis of the proceedings:

The special meeting was extremely pleasant, recreating to some extent the feeling of the first. However, I was completely unsuccessful in converting the other attendees to my view. Most institutions, once established, become perennial, and the Mont Pelerin Society proved no exception. As an alternative, we enacted some measures designed to limit membership and guests. (Friedman & Friedman, 1998, p. 334)

The measures to limit membership, Friedman later observed in his memoirs, had

not been very effective. At the twenty-fifth-anniversary meeting in Montreux, attendance numbered 150 members and 60 guests, who with their families totaled more than 320 participants; at the forty-fifth meeting, held in Vancouver in 1992, attendance numbered 415 persons from 33 countries—206 members and 209 guests. (Friedman & Friedman, 1998, p. 334)

Looking back on this event later, Friedman (1992) mused:
The 1971 Montreux meeting was called because I was concerned about the future of the Society and indeed I wanted to push for my own proposal, which was to have a great celebratory twenty-fifth anniversary meeting in 1972 and terminate the Society officially.

Ruefully, Friedman admitted, “As you know, I could not get the others to agree with that.”

Any rancor this attempted insurgency might have yielded was quickly glossed over by the Society. Friedman had established himself as the Society’s perhaps most important economist, and the Society seemed eager to appease their star scholar. At the following year’s annual meeting, also held at Montreux, Friedman was presented with a sycophantic message and belated birthday present:

The undersigned warmly wish to be associated with a declaration of their great admiration for the President of the Mont Pelerin Society and their profound gratitude for his unrivalled contribution to the cause of a free society rebuilt on the twin pillars of capitalism and the rule of law,

the fawning statement declared (“Suggestions for Wording of Presentations,” (n.d.). The eight signatories, including Hayek, Read, and Kemp, congratulated Friedman on his “undiminished vigour in his sixtieth year” and wished Friedman and his wife “continued happiness and ever increasing success in the years to come.” Finally, Friedman was presented with a comically absurd gift: a Swiss cowbell, inscribed with his name. It was a strangely appropriate gift, presented by a groveling flock to the Society’s bellwether. They sought reassurance that Friedman would remain faithful to the herd.

4 | POLICING SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES

The Society originally aimed to be far removed from the world of brash politics or stultifying ideology building. The Society “did not intend to create an orthodoxy, to form or align itself with any political party or parties, or to conduct propaganda,” notes one document, described as a “Summary of Aims,” circulated to members in 1974. The Society would not sully itself with politics nor with the establishment of dead doxa. Rather, the circular noted, the Society’s “sole object” was to “facilitate an exchange of ideas between like-minded scholars in the hope of strengthening the principles and practice of a free society” and to “study the workings, virtues, and defects of market-oriented economic systems” (“Summary of History and Aims,” 1974). It is possible, perhaps even probable, that the Society ultimately had effects beyond these circumscribed goals, but it is telling that the Society considered itself, even at such a late stage as the mid-1970s, as a sort of freewheeling debate club for gentlemen-scholars. Even the Society’s own official historian could not keep himself from expressing his doubts about its place in history: “It is not obvious that the Society, as a society, has been important enough to warrant an institutional history, even though many of its members have been influential as members,” wrote R. M. Hartwell, before launching into an institutional history of the Society (Hartwell, n.d.).

But the issue of whether the Society was important or not may not be the most apt question. Even Friedman, who continued to oppose the Society’s existence for decades following his unsuccessful 1971 coup, conceded that despite his “misgivings about the way the society has developed,” there was “no doubt that it has contributed substantially to the change that has occurred in the climate of opinion” (Friedman & Friedman, 1998, p. 334). It does not at all seem obvious how one is to square such positive pronouncements with over three decades of complaints about the Society’s exceedingly broad-based membership. Perhaps such statements amounted to putting on a brave face or not wanting to hurt the feelings of others. Whatever the truth of the Society’s influence, it seems equally worthwhile to examine the significance of the existence of very real differences of opinion at the core of one of the neoliberal establishment’s central thought-producing organizations. Strategies were contested, fractions erupted, and personal differences smoldered: it was not clear that the Society’s ideas would be met with success in the world of practical affairs from the vantage-point of those participating in its workaday operations, affairs, intrigues, and squabbles.5

To take one example: Gary Becker, a prominent Chicago School economist, was apparently offended when the Society chose Antonio Martino, not him, to serve as president in 1988. “Gary was very much hurt by this,” Friedman confided to a colleague, and as a result Becker was most likely “not going to participate in Mont Pelerin any further”
(Friedman, 1990b). (Becker later served as president of the MPS from 1990 to 1992.) Such were the prickly politics called forth in the sustenance of a network of imperious scholars. A more serious threat was the so-called Hunold Affair, an episode that threatened to undermine the very existence of the Society in the second decade of its life (Hartwell, 1995). It was, in Friedman’s (1996) view, “in many ways the most dramatic episode in the history of the Society: it was make or break.” One leading member, Karl Brandt, wrote an open letter to the members of the Society, declaring that “the Mont Pelerin Society is dead” and recommending that its leadership should “prevent the further use of the Society's name” and “liquidate” the Society altogether (Brandt, 1962).

The ideas of economists and political philosophers shape the world, as Keynes (1936/2013, p. 383) observed, but their ability to make themselves felt as weighty is subject to the fleeting nature of contingent events and personages. Mirowski (2009, p. 425) highlights the tension between elitism and popular appeal in the neoliberal project, emphasizing that neoliberals made much of the distinction between an organic cosmos, said to arise spontaneously out of the actions of all, and an ordered taxis, which was to be carefully constructed by technocrats. Neoliberalism, on Mirowski’s account, is on the one hand a plea for spontaneous self-organization, a “radical leveling philosophy” that denigrated “expertise and elite pretensions to hard-won knowledge;” on the other hand, in the realm of practical life, neoliberals were unabashed elitists who promoted a designed order. This contradiction is fundamental to the neoliberal thought collective. In Durkheimian terms, what was crucial to Friedman, as well as other leading members of the Society, was to engage in a constant effort to regulate the Society’s symbolic boundaries (see Lamont, 1992): the ideological purity and intellectual rigor of the Society would have to be maintained against the vulgar horse trading of workaday politics and the lowly, circus-like atmosphere that is pervasive wherever second-rate scholars, journalists, policy analysts, and professional scribblers congregated. Friedman’s lament arose from his failure to keep intellectual hacks from the Society’s door. It was this vigilance that provided the Society with its religious character: Durkheim (1912/2001, p. 36) famously observed that it is the “division of the world into two comprehensive domains, one sacred, the other profane” that is the “hallmark of religious thought.”

One illustrative example of the ever-vigilant gaze sweeping along the Society’s symbolic boundaries was an informal list of Society members who had failed to exploit their positions in government to implement policies that accorded with the Society’s wider Weltanschauung. “We were impressed by the fact that those Mont Pelerin members who had an important role in government had, so far as we could see, invariably departed from the principles of the Mont Pelerin Society in their official actions,” Friedman (1981) observed. Numerous prominent politicians had failed the Society:

Sir Keith Joseph in Britain, who as Education Minister turned down the proposed experiment in vouchers and in other ways has departed from the Mont Pelerin principles; Enoch Powell at an earlier date in Britain when as Health Minister he expanded the National Health Service; Lionel Robbins, one of the founding members, through the impact of the Robbins Report on British education; in the United States, Arthur Burns in his capacity as Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Paul McCracken and Herbert Stein who participated in the administration of price and wage controls during the Nixon period; Jacques Rueff in France who as chairman of a commission on one of the Southeast Asian countries . . . came up with a report that contained many anti-market recommendations and may well have done the same . . . in his role within France. (Friedman 1981)

This was essentially a blacklist, albeit one that was only rarely or casually enforced. Any members who deviated from the Society’s philosophy were to be excluded. Friedman suggested that a member “be automatically readmitted on termination of his government post,” while Harris and others “suggested that he should have to go through a further vetting process.” Admittedly, in keeping with the faintly amateurish, gentlemanly spirit of the Society, this device seems to have remained largely informal. Friedman ultimately believed “suggestions of this kind” were “not feasible.” Still, the fact that the Society even contemplated such measures is telling. First, it suggests dismay at the imperfect translation from the realm of ideas to the world of politics—what Friedman (1981) described as “the extent to which the Mont Pelerin Society has been far more consistent in respect of the views it has preached than in respect of the actions of those members of it who have an opportunity to influence results.” Second, it emphasizes the perceived importance to the core leadership of conserving ideological purity and piety against the intrusions of impure politics.
Orthodoxies would have to be defended against pragmatism. While the Society’s founding fathers may not have been ready to exclude nonconformists, the mere fact that leading members were toying with this idea demonstrated the growing salience of the symbolic couplet of orthodoxy and heresy—constitutive features of any religious community. The Society resembled a fraternity of right-thinking believers who were religiously convinced that their views were right.

Beyond such policing activities, members of the Society frequently employed the lexicon of religiosity. In the early 1950s Milton Friedman (1951) wrote of the need for “a new faith” to supplant classical liberalism and state “collectivism.” In an article reviewing a meeting in Switzerland, a day trip was described in near-divine terms: “The sun shone on our pilgrimage to Mont Pèlerin, where our founder, Friedrich Hayek, was moved profoundly . . . and [the sun] continued to shine as we made our way to Gruyere [sic] for a delightful outing” (Friedman, 1972, p. 1). Nature itself seemed favorably inclined towards neoliberalism. Elsewhere, Friedman referred to Hayek using similarly elevated terms: “It is my privilege and my honor to bring to your notice our founder, Friedrich Hayek, but for whom none of you would be here” (Hayek, 1973). Strictly speaking, Hayek was of course the originator of the Society, but this reference to an original cause, a *primum movens*, seemed suggestive of divinity. The death of Ludwig von Mises in 1973 was commemorated in an obituary in the Society’s newsletter that described Mises’ role as “our guide and eternal inspiration” (von Mises, 1973). One potential addition to the Society’s ranks, a Japanese economist, was approvingly described as a “person who is heart and soul with us” (Friedman, 1964)—terms suggestive of faith and belief. Fritz Machlup was favorably inclined towards another member because he was a “fanatic in the best sense” of the term, a person who was “entirely devoted” to the cause of neoliberalism (Machlup, 1964). The Society often resorted to a quasi-divine, faith-based vocabulary in constructing a coherent community of like-minded believers.

Throughout the late 1980s, in correspondence with Society members and supporters around the world, Friedman, by now in his mid-seventies, repeatedly returned to his old hobbyhorse: the Society should have been dissolved in the early 1970s, a new and more explicitly elitist organization should have been established in its place, and the failure to have done so meant that the Society was little more than a fraud and a failure; an organization that included influential and capable members, to be sure, but one also held down by so much deadweight. The organization contained intellectually capable members, but it was not itself a site for the development of important ideas. Friedman, now entering the late stage of his life and with most of his real work and accomplishments behind of him, returned to a position that by now had become something of an idée fixe. In a letter to Antonio Martino, an Italian conservative politician and Society president, Friedman (1990a) wrote that he believed Martino’s “idea of engaging in a serious reflection of what the Mont Pelerin Society should try to achieve and how it can do so is a splendid idea.” But, he added, “I am not sure there is any way other than terminating the Society and starting a new much smaller one to do so. That is a depressing conclusion.”

Similarly, in correspondence with one of the Society’s leading supporters in Japan, Nobutane Kiuchi, Friedman (1989) wrote that the most vexing aspect of the Society was that the proportion of thinkers and doers to what I am inclined to call ‘fellow travelers’ has gotten too small and the size of our Society has gotten too large. A large fraction of the people who come to our Society meetings are there in considerable part as tourists.

The restrictive mechanisms introduced following the 1971 meeting in Montreux, designed to assuage Friedman’s concerns, had largely failed. The Society had become an organization meeting in attractive places with interesting speakers whose major function is to enable people to visit a different environment, to become acquainted with a few of the leading figures in the freedom movement, and to enable old friends to visit with one another during a period of time. (Friedman 1989)

While another political movement might have welcomed growing popularity as a sign of the correctness of its approach, Friedman saw it instead as evidence of the Society’s deterioration. Writing after the 1971 special session of the Society, Friedman (1971b) observed:
Because we were so few, the spirit came closer to that of our first meeting than any other that I have attended. If only there were some way to duplicate with several hundred people the atmosphere of intimacy and of common goodwill that is possible with 30.

The Society should have been for the select few alone, but it was not to be. Friedman derided the Society's wordliness and disdained what it had become, even as he continued to fantasize about what it might yet become. Emblematic of the increasingly popular tone of the Society's gatherings was William F. Buckley Jr.'s opening address to the 1975 annual meeting: Buckley warned that he would not be able to contribute in any way to the scholarly discussions of the attendees. "I intend carefully to steer a course outside the territorial waters of the professional scholars," Buckley said, asserting wryly, "I am simply incapable of contributing weight to the scales on which your millimeasurements are calibrated" (Buckley, 2000, p. 224). His ironic self-deprecation and Friedman's plea for intellectualism could not have been more at odds.

As with so many revolutionaries, the promised land lay elsewhere, far from home. Friedman believed that "there is room and need now for two societies, very different in character" (Friedman 1989). One of them would be "like the present Society, a way to keep alive and provide a home for the ideas that have been so successful in the countries from which most of our members come—the US, Britain, Japan, Europe." But the First World was politically and intellectually settled: the cause of market liberalism had already been victorious there. What was needed now was for the Third World to be brought into the fray. The "original purpose of the Society" was "still vital" in places like "China, Poland, Russia, Guatemala, El Salvador, Argentina, Brazil, Peru, India, etc." Casting the struggle in proto-revolutionary, even Messianic terms, Friedman believed history called for

\[ \text{a Hayek to arise from one of those places who could call together these isolated and embattled defenders of freedom, leavened with a few of the freedom activists and thinkers of the West, and perhaps financed largely by Western foundations and individuals, but consisting mostly of the embattled fighters for freedom in those countries.} \]

This heroic struggle, imbued with the power of prophecy, would have to sidestep the pitfalls that threatened the original Society. It was in the developing world that a properly elitist organizational model could most fully be realized. "That society needs to be kept small, like the original Mont Pelerin Society," Friedman (1989) wrote.

By September 2004, Friedman, now in his nineties, again offered a familiar observation:

\[ \text{One problem with the Society is that it has been getting too large so that its meetings no longer have the quality which at one point they did have of a true intellectual discussion among a band of like believers.} \]

Friedman (2004) wrote to an American economist. He was nothing if not consistent in his message: the Society was too large and it was not to be taken seriously.

5 | CONCLUSION

The organizational ethos of the Society was constantly torn between a logic of exclusion and a logic of inclusion. On the one hand, the Society was characterized by a hyper-individualistic vanguardism. It preferred to conduct its business out of public sight. "As is the custom," a memo on the Society's annual meeting in Munich in 1970 noted, "the Meeting was unpublicized, thus enabling all participants to discuss their positions and ideas freely without having to consider what effect they might have in the public press" (Langenberg, 1970). Held under the so-called Chatham House Rule (see Chatham House 2017), the originators of viewpoints expressed during the meeting could not be divulged publicly. More broadly, upholding the undesirability of interactions with the broader public was considered legitimate: the "broad ideological movement" for a market society would have to be preceded by the striving of intellectuals, for "without such a base, no activist movement is likely to be effective"; isolation was a necessary means to widened social influence that would flow from the meeting of "minds" that agreed on certain foundational principles (Langenberg, 1970).
Occasionally this logic found its expression in almost comically extreme terms, as when Albert Hunold (1959) claimed that it would be "dangerous, if not impossible" for the Society to publish a journal expressing collective views on economic theory and policy because "we believe it is essential not to fall into the tendency of our opponents by sponsoring a dogma, but to preserve individual freedom of thought"—a statement made all the more absurd for being expressed in the Society's own (short-lived) journal, the *Mont Pèlerin Quarterly*. Other leading voices, including Hayek and Friedman, believed at various times that the Society should lead the way in forging a durable body of neoliberal theory and practice. As has been shown above, this disposition towards vanguardism entailed a constant labor of redefining, tightening, and policing symbolic boundaries, an effort that at times met with success, at other times with vociferous resistance. It meant maintaining the symbolic purity of an organization where the stakes for admission and membership hinged primarily on the capacity for original thought and inspired intellectual effort. There was much bad-mouthing of weak thinkers and those seen to trade in second-hand ideas.

On the other hand, the Society was committed to a quasi-evangelical proselytism of the market creed. This meant reaching out to the broader public and engaging with the masses. For all of Friedman's railing against the vulgarity of mass conventions, none of the Society's members was more successful in pleasing crowds, appearing on talk shows, or producing hit television series. It seems impossible to even imagine Hayek, a somber Old World intellectual, appearing on the Phil Donahue Show. "Our faith requires that we be sceptical of the efficacy, at least in the short run, of organized effort to promulgate it," Friedman (1947) wrote to Hayek on the occasion of the first meeting of the Society. "But it also requires a belief in the long-run efficacy of the kind of discussion this conference is intended to promote." This was a circumscribed sort of missionary zeal, but it was nevertheless colored by a strongly religious tint. Caught between these outer poles, the structuring dialectic of inclusivity-exclusivity constituted the Society as an anti-collective collectivity. This was a band of individualists so individualistic that they sometimes found it difficult to discover "precisely what held them together," as Plehwe (2009, p. 22) notes.

Far from being the adept progenitors of the neoliberal creed that some critics have imagined, the Society was frequently bumbling and ineffectual, given to internal strife, personality clashes, and fracture. Its far-flung scholars were overworked and occupied with other affairs, and the Society usually seemed to land far down on their list of priorities. The Society's resources were stretched thin and remained unpredictable, forcing the leadership to be endlessly chasing grants. This has not prevented critics of neoliberalism from elevating the Society to a leading role in ushering in a foundational transformation of Western political economy in the second half of the 20th century. At times, this discourse approaches what Bourdieu terms the "fantasy of the conspiracy," consisting of the "idea that an evil will is responsible for everything that happens in the social world," and that, on Bourdieu's account "haunts critical social thought" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 102). There are two reasons why this approach to the Society has been taken. First, it may be tempting to ascribe powerful agentic capacities to identifiable entities because it seems to offer a relatively straightforward path to mapping out the vectors and byways of social domination—and thereby offering an opportunity to counteract domination. Second, it was the very dialectic of inclusion and exclusion that generated the Society's peculiar dynamic: its members were at once covert missionaries, aloof popularizers, individualist collectivists, and secret proselytizers. This unresolved tension has surrounded the Society with an aura of dignified mysticism, converting it into a suitably phantasmal object for opponents of neoliberalism.

What are we to make of Friedman's repeated observations that the Society was irrelevant, impuissant, distracted by popularity, and filled with a "disturbingly large fraction of members" who acted as "voyeurs and not real participants" (Friedman, 1990a)? One might interpret them as the products of a romantic mind given to bouts of nostalgic deliberation: to maintain that everything was better in decades past is the privilege of society's seniors and sentimentalists. Perhaps Friedman's disappointment with the Society, revolving around the idea that it was no longer a site of interesting intellectual development, was a reflection of the state of his own mind and career, that he himself had ceased to be the originator of powerful ideas, novel frameworks, and persuasive theories. By the mid-1970s Friedman's major academic accomplishments were behind him.

More probably, Friedman was at once an elitist intellectual and a populist proselytizer, embodying in a single individual the two-tiered conception of social engineering that determined the Society's course of action. On the one hand, there was an inner circle of neoliberal high priests, one that remained tightly circumscribed and protected...
against intrusion from what Hayek called “second-hand dealers in ideas” (cited in Steiner, 2007, p. 74). On the other hand, the Society produced a neoliberal vulgate intended for popular consumption. This structure amounts to what Mirowski has termed the Mont Pèlerin Society’s “double truth” doctrine, with “one truth for the masses/participants and another for those at the top” (Mirowski, 2009, p. 426). Within this arrangement, the peculiarities of Friedman’s own intellectual temperament produced a heady brew of elitist populism: this leading economist of the 20th century was by turns brash, charming, antagonistic, and eloquent, equally at home over White House dinners with President Reagan and on the millions of television sets of ordinary Americans where he expounded on the virtues of anti-statism.

At the core of the Society, there was a continuous concern with maintaining vigilance against the impurity of popularity. One would not have had to wait for the neoliberals to take power to learn of their tangled sentiments towards elites and the public. Mirroring their blueprint for the political organization of the social order—a world where the few, the best and the brightest would lead—the methods deployed by the neoliberals in organizing their own anti-collective collectivity contained within the Society a future world writ small: a sleek and streamlined club of sharp minds who would counteract the sort of sloppy thinking that produced debased statist solutions and half-hearted compromises with the holy doxa of marketization. A total commitment to market rule required the sort of personal and intellectual cleansing that was a precondition for the pursuit of market society. In the Mont Pèlerin Society, this state of purity was never achieved, but it suggested the shape of things to come.

NOTES

1 This article draws primarily on a close reading of archival materials culled from the Mont Pèlerin Society collections and Milton Friedman papers, housed at the Hoover Institution Archives. It also makes use of a wide range of secondary analyses produced by historians and social scientists in recent years. While this empirical basis offers a partial view of the events broached here—most if not all archives have been sanitized for posterity—it nevertheless sheds light on central points of dis-sension and key modes of thought in the Society over several decades. This narrow approach is justified in so far as it helps elucidate an organizational ethos and institutional form of life as it appeared to key agents. Certainly, additional analytic angles and arguments might be excavated using other archival sources.

2 The problem of “the wives” as an undesirable Other surfaces repeatedly in the letters and memos of leading members of the Society. The male-dominated membership of the Society decidedly lent its early meetings the character of a patriarchal gentleman’s club to which women could contribute only as service providers or detract from by serving as unwanted distractions. For instance, Hayek (1947), outlining a series of plans for the inaugural Society meeting, observed, “One of the problems is that some of the participants might want to bring their wives . . . I know that Robbins contemplates taking Mrs. Robbins, although with the intention of leaving her somewhere else in Switzerland while the conference lasts.” The category of “the wives” as an intrusive force of unruly femininity was viewed as a distraction from the serious pursuits of scholarly menfolk. A second example: in the 16 pages of photographs included in Hartwell’s (1995) official history of the Society, only three women are portrayed: two appear in the company of a group of prominent Society members, one of them being labeled simply as “Unknown” in the caption; the second is Rose Friedman, described as “Mrs. Friedman.” Tellingly, then, one of the three women is represented as a vacuous point of anonymity, while the third is defined solely in relation to a male figure of authority.

3 For an elucidation of the role played by organizations such as the William Volker Fund and Earhart Foundation in financing intellectual activities conducive to neoliberalism, see Jones (2014, pp.169–172). Similarly, Phillips-Fein (2009) offers a rich account of how business elites financed Society activities, concentrating on the efforts of Jasper Crane, a former DuPont Chemical Company executive who was instrumental in securing funds for the first American meeting of the Society at Princeton in 1958. As Phillips-Fein (2009) notes, US business elites viewed neoliberal ideology with interest and were quite often willing to part with a portion of their personal wealth to ensure its furtherance.

4 The claim that the Society’s name carried “no ideological or doctrinaire commitments” must be subjected to further scrutiny. To the contrary, the Society’s name contained several symbolic connotations. First, its physically elevated, eponymous origins signaled a sort of lofty, contemplative air, a location removed from the masses, aligning perfectly with the elitist and technocratic vision of the expert’s place in industrialized democracies. Second, its indissoluble association with a locale in Switzerland, a neutral and non-aligned nation, seemed to suggest a removal from the fray of tangled power blocs and international alliances, an apparent neutrality and non-partisanship that masked the fact that the Society membership was composed largely of European and American scholars. Finally, pèlerin is French for “pilgrim,” underscoring the religious overtones of the neoliberals’ original pilgrimage to the Society’s alpine birthplace. Names are never incidental and are always burdened with symbolic attachments that could certainly be labeled ideological in the broad sense of that term.
For a more detailed assessment of internal conflicts within the Society see the first eight chapters of Mirowski and Plehwe (2009). In this volume, Phillips-Fein (2009) examines the effects of the Society's reliance on external, wealthy benefactors on organizational structure and ideological position-takings, while van Horn and Mirowski assess the interior history of the Department of Economics at the University of Chicago in the postwar era—the so-called Chicago School of Economics—and its relationship with the Society.

Occasionally, members did call for the outright exclusion of other members, as when Wilhelm Röpke requested the removal of Michael Polanyi from the Society's ranks. For a further elucidation of political conflicts in the Society, see Walpen (2004).

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