Evaluation of ACES with Proposal

Roger Marks


Fairbanks Chapter
Alaska Industry Support Alliance
March 2, 2011


Overview

- I. How ACES Operates / Problems it Creates
- II. International Competitiveness
- III. Current Evidence of Problems from ACES
- IV. Proposal to Fix ACES

Tax Rate under ACES

- Base rate of 25% of net value (after deducting all costs)
- Progressivity element when net value per barrel exceeds \$30/bbl:
 - (Net value per barrel value \$30) X .004
- If oil market price is \$90/bbl:
 - Net value per barrel is \$61/bbl
 - Progressivity = (\$61 \$30) X .004 = 12.4%
 - Total tax rate = 25% + 12.4% = 37.4%
 - APPLIES TO ENTIRE NET VALUE





2010 U.S. Tax Rate for Single Taxpayer


100/

| • FIISL \$0,575 | 10% |
|-----------------------------------|-----|
| • Next \$25,625 | 15% |
| Next \$48,400 | 25% |
| Next \$89,450 | 28% |


• Eirct ¢0 27E


• Next \$201,800 33%


Anything over \$373,650
 35%

















International Competitiveness







After-Tax Income that Would Have Been Earned in Alaska in 2008 With Rates from Other Tax & Royalty Regimes (\$billions)

| Gulf of Mex | kico | \$10.3 |
|-------------|------|--------|
| | | |

U.K. \$9.0

Alberta \$8.2

Thailand \$8.2

Australia \$6.9

Brazil \$6.6

Alaska \$5.0

Norway \$4.1

ConocoPhillips Financial Performance: Alaska vs. Rest of World (\$millions) 2008 (\$100/bbl) vs. 2009 (\$60/bbl)


| | <u>Alaska</u> | Rest of World |
|--|----------------|----------------|
| Additional pre-tax income 2009 over 2008 | \$3,673 | \$14,707 |
| Additional taxes 2009 over 2008* | <u>\$2,898</u> | <u>\$7,163</u> |
| Additional after-tax income 2009 over 2008 | \$775 | \$7,544 |
| Percentage of additional pre-tax income retained after-tax | 21% | 51% |


^{*} Alaska: 80% severance tax / 20% income tax; Rest of World: 10% severance tax / 90% income tax


OIL SEVERANCE TAX RATES BY STATE


| <u>State</u> | Rate (% of gross) | : <u>State</u> | Rate (% of gross) |
|--------------|-------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|
| | | : | |
| lowa | NONE | : Illinois | 5.00% |
| New York | NONE | : Colorado | 5.00% |
| Pennsylvania | NONE | : West Virginia | 5.00% |
| Ohio | 10 cents/bbl | : Utah | 5.00% |
| California | 0.10% | : Mississippi | 6.00% |
| Indiana | 1.00% | : Wyoming | 6.00% |
| Nebraska | 3.00% | : Michigan | 6.60% |
| New Mexico | 3.75% | : Oklahoma | 7.00% |
| Alabama | 4.00% | : Florida | 8.00% |
| Kansas | 4.30% | : North Dakota | 11.50% |
| Kentucky | 4.50% | : Louisiana | 12.50% |
| South Dakota | 4.50% | : Montana | 12.50% |
| Texas | 4.60% | : ALASKA @ \$90 market | (25 % of gross equivalent) |
| Arkansas | 5.00% | | |


The State is Making Lots of Money Now: What is the Problem?












Resource Potential

- 2007 Department of Energy report: 10 billion barrels of additional economically recoverable oil on the North Slope <u>in current core producing</u> <u>area</u>.*
- DNR's current production forecast is for 5 billion barrels between now and 2050.

^{*} Department of Energy, National Energy Technology Laboratory, "Alaska North Slope Oil & Gas: A Promising Future or an Area of Decline?," August 2007, pp. 2 - 152-153.



Context of Spending

- Core fields down*
- Non-core fields up* (Nikaitchuq and Pt. Thomson)
 - A small share of potential reserves
- No other new fields on the horizon
- Gold-plating

^{*} Department of Revenue "Oil and Gas Production Tax Status Report to the Legislature," January 18, 2011, p. 8.

Fixing ACES

Aspects of Fair Share: Maximum Benefit to the People

- Long-term benefit: linked to maximizing longterm production
- Production maximized by continual investment
- Alaska competes with other jurisdictions for investment
- What is "fair" is what you can get in a competitive environment

Proposal for Fix: Bracketed Tax Structure


- The problem is not progressivity but the progressivity structure
- Changing the progressivity structure
 - HB 110
 - Bracketed progressivity structure
- Values within structure


Proposed Bracket Structure: HB 110 (Existing Units)* Based on Net Value p/bbl**


| • | \$0/bbl - \$30.00/bbl | 25.0% |
|---|--|-------|
| • | Next \$12.50/bbl (\$30.00 - \$42.50/bbl) | 27.5% |
| • | Next \$12.50/bbl (\$42.50 - \$55.00/bbl) | 32.5% |
| • | Next \$12.50/bbl (\$55.00 - \$67.50/bbl) | 37.5% |
| • | Next \$12.50/bbl (\$67.50 - \$80.00/bbl) | 42.5% |
| • | Next \$12.50/bbl (\$80.00 - \$92.50/bbl) | 47.5% |
| • | Anything over \$92.50/bbl | 50.0% |


^{*} For other fields outside existing units the tax rates are 10 percentage points less


^{**} These net values are approximately \$30 less than market values (the ANS West Coast price).











Revenue Losses from Proposal?

- Very plausible that production was lost as a result of ACES
- Very plausible that there will be greater production if taxes are decreased
- Production forecast makes no explicit assumptions about availability of capital due to relative tax rates
 - Very plausible that status quo production forecast is too high
- Cannot compare revenues between taxes using the same number of barrels