THE GLOBE

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THE GLOBE

*The Globe* aims to engage the George Washington University academic community in responsible global citizenship through the promotion of undergraduate international relations scholarship. The articles published in *The Globe* offer rich diversity in thought and conviction, allowing for active and vigorous debate on key policy issues in International Affairs.

We hope that the clarity, honesty, and accountability of our issues further our collective understanding of the discipline and encourage dynamic leadership on a community-wide level.

*The Globe* is a journal of the George Washington International Affairs Society.
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We are grateful for the work of our managing editor and director staff in supporting The Globe‘s operations this academic year.

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The Globe could not have been revived in 2023-24 without the dedication of our junior editors. Their enthusiasm for International Affairs is duly reflected in the quality of this issue.

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We are honored to have Professor Edi Jurkovic, PhD, as a supporter and mentor as we commit once more to showcasing quality undergraduate scholarship in International Affairs at the George Washington University.
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Letter from the Editor-In-Chief

Sophia Pavlenko

Sophia Pavlenko is a sophomore majoring in International Affairs with a concentration in Comparative Politics and a minor in GIS. She is a member of the IAS, participates actively on the GWMUN Team, and was part of the 2022-23 Civic House Program on Public Leadership. Professionally, Sophia has pursued several internships surrounding her interests, including a legal internship with Lutheran Social Services of the National Capitol Area and a geopolitical risk analysis internship with Wikistrat Inc., a global consultancy. She is originally from Ukraine but now calls Los Alamos, New Mexico home.
Dear Readers,

It is with great pleasure and enthusiasm that I welcome you to the latest edition of *The Globe*, a student-run undergraduate research publication in International Affairs at the George Washington University's Elliott School. As we embark on this journey together, I feel compelled to reflect on the path that has led us here and the significance of our revival in today's ever-changing global landscape.

This issue marks our first publication since 2019, after a five-year hiatus precipitated by the global upheaval wrought by the COVID-19 Pandemic. The journey of resurrecting our journal has been nothing short of a labor of love, filled with both challenges and triumphs. From the initial stages of recruitment and training our staff in peer review to working directly with our contributing writers to make their work the best it can possibly be, every step has been instrumental in ensuring our resurgence.

In the five years of our absence, the world has witnessed seismic shifts in the realm of international politics. The election of President Joe Biden in the United States, the return to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan in August 2021, the emergence of AUKUS in Indo-Pacific Affairs, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the War in Sudan, and Azerbaijan’s September 2023 offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh are just a few examples of the profound changes that we have witnessed. In the face of such transformation and turbulence in the international system, the need for rigorous scholarship and informed discourse has never been more pressing.
With the revival of *The Globe*, I am confident that we will continue to serve as a vital platform for undergraduate voices in the field of International Affairs for years to come. With our steadfast commitment to engaging our academic community in responsible global citizenship, we hope to foster critical thinking, elevate diverse perspectives, and empower the next generation of scholars and practitioners. Whether as academics, diplomats, analysts, or leaders in other capacities, I do not doubt that our staff and contributing writers will play a pivotal role in shaping the discourse and addressing the global challenges of tomorrow.

As you delve into the pages of this issue, I encourage you to engage deeply with the ideas and insights presented herein. Let us seize this opportunity to broaden our understanding, challenge established narratives, and contribute to the field as a whole.

Kind regards,

Sophia Pavlenko

Editor-In-Chief
The Mainstream Media Depiction of US Foreign Policy Toward Africa

Juliet Lancey

*Juliet Lancey is a senior majoring in International Affairs with a concentration in International Politics and a minor in Journalism & Mass Communications. She has interned for the Brookings Institution, the Wilson Center Africa Program, the Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network, and the National Endowment for Democracy. She hopes to attain a dual master’s degree in International Affairs and Journalism, and then contribute her experience to a career at the nexus of Development and Humanitarian Assistance.*
**Introduction**

On May 13th, 2000, the weekly edition of *the Economist* magazine was sent into circulation, reaching just short of 1 million readers globally. On its cover was plastered a map of Africa, the entire continent overlayed by an image of a young man straining under the weight of a shouldered weapon. Above it, a title that would come to serve as an example of the skewed and perversely false Western perception of Africa: “The Hopeless Continent.” By publishing this cover, the Economist, relegated a continent of almost 1.5 billion people within fifty-four multicultural and polyethnic nations to be represented by the one demoralizing word and an image of war and strife.

This depiction of Africa as a monolith of despair is not an isolated instance. Time and time again, the American media has driven a biased depiction of Africa based on a constant flow of crisis-centric coverage which presents the continent as one helpless entity reliant on repair from the outside world. The effects of this coverage are not merely confined to the written word; the consequences of the American media’s portrayal of certain topics have been found to have a significant influence on the public’s perception through the agenda-setting quality of news.

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1 This paper was originally submitted for IAFF 3190: International Conflict and Contentious Politics in Fall 2022.

2 Peter Lauria, “For the Economist, the Uncommercial Pays Off,” Reuters, February 16, 2012.


From childhood, Americans are bombarded with media that portrays Africa as a land of, as one author puts it, “wild animals and starving children” and this depiction pervades public consciousness regarding the continent. This paper seeks to explore the effect of American media coverage on America’s foreign policy toward Africa through the analysis of major news spikes about Africa and the correlation with American foreign policy focus pertaining to Africa during these times. Much research has been done on the American public’s skewed perceptions of Africa based on the continent’s portrayal in American mainstream media, but this paper seeks to add to this body of work by delving into the real-world consequences of this coverage through an analysis of U.S foreign policy, from the time of America’s first African-American president through the two following administrations. This research is based on a well-documented acknowledgment that mainstream media has an influence on public opinion and that public opinion has an influence on US foreign policy. The following research seeks to answer what is the connection between US foreign policy toward Africa and the mainstream media’s depiction of this policy to determine what effect this could have on public opinion toward the continent.

**Literature Review**

To fully understand the connection between American media coverage and America’s foreign policy toward Africa, one must understand the structure, norms, and function of the mainstream media in the United States and its norms and background on US foreign policy and public opinion toward Africa. This literature review frames the debates and backgrounds of these topics to provide background for the conceptualization of the cascading, potentially cyclical correlation

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between foreign policy, mainstream media, and public opinion upon which this research is founded. There are a large number of studies exploring the connecting influences of the media, policymakers, and the public. There is also a large sum of research on failed US-Africa foreign policy and Africa’s depiction in the media, but no study thus far has sought to connect all five aspects together through an analysis of American mainstream media depictions of U.S-Africa foreign policy, which is the subject of this paper, to explore the how the media, foreign policy and the public mutually reinforce flawed notions of Africa.

Throughout this literature review, all references to mainstream media will be about American mainstream media and all references to public opinion will be referring to American public opinion, unless otherwise specified. It is also necessary to note that this literature review acknowledges that the majority of core media studies pertaining to media theory are from the early to late 20th century, before the advent of social media and the movement of citizen journalism that followed it, but still considers them to be relevant to this research and its focus on American mainstream media and the way it affects citizen perceptions as whole. While this research will not delve deeply into the representations of Africa in alternative forms of journalism, such as citizen journalism and social media reporting, this omission is in no way a representation of the salience of these fields and is instead predicated on the researcher's goal which seeks to analyze mainstream media.

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12 Ibid, 150.
The American Media

Four of the top five most circulated English-language news sites worldwide are based in the United States, giving the American mainstream media incredible power in shaping American and global perceptions and narratives. For the majority of the American public who have never traveled to an African country, the media has tremendous power in shaping public opinion and views of Africa as most Americans interact with Africa solely through the written word and printed image.

Mainstream Media Norms

While the American media is widely accessible and influential in both the domestic and international community, it follows a uniquely American set of news norms, especially in foreign reporting. Typically, stories are chosen for publication if they have a strong impact on the lives of audience members; involve violence, conflict, disaster, or scandal; are familiar; are proximate; and are timely and novel. These norms have a multitude of consequences. Since news stories must be proximate, stories that are relevant to US audiences are more likely to be cut, reducing the chance a foreign policy story will appear in the first place and increasing the chances that these stories will require some semblance of a domestic peg. Additionally, the focus on timeliness and proximity results in a larger amount of stories emerging from countries where

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17 Graber, Mass Media and American Politics.
media outlets have reporters present who have access to the stories. 18 This issue is particularly relevant to this research, as the number of foreign correspondents in Africa has dropped significantly since 1998 due largely in part to the ease of knowledge accessibility through technology and declining freedom of the press on the continent. 19

The Consequences of These Norms

One of the most pressing consequences of American news norms is their effect on the content released and its generally negative characteristics. When foreign policy stories do appear, these criteria increase the chance that this coverage will be negative and focused on chaos and conflict rather than meetings and agreements. 20 Additionally, these norms have been found to result in foreign coverage that is ethnocentric, elite-driven, uncritical, and episodic, which can lead to depictions of foreign nations that may employ stereotypes and occur only when prominent figures decide to prioritize the nation or region. 21 They function as unofficial story selection criteria, form the foundation of each article that meets the public’s eye, and result in the publication of stories relating to foreign regions, Africa included, that are predominantly negative. 22 The media’s ability to send subliminal messages about how to view the topics it covers makes this negative depiction more harmful than simply disheartening. 23


21 Aday, “US Media, Foreign Policy, and War”; Graber, Mass Media and American Politics.

22 Ibid.

The Mainstream Media, US Foreign Policy, and Public Opinion

The mainstream media have been proven to affect public opinion, though the manner in which this occurs has been debated. Articles based on the norms outlined above reach their American audience and have the power to shape public opinion through a mechanism known as the “agenda-setting function of mass media.” Researchers Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, who conducted the inaugural study on the matter, coined the term to describe how “readers learn not only about a given issue but also how much importance to attach to that issue from the amount of information in a news story and its position.” These authors suggest only that the news impacts how people think about certain topics, but recent studies have shown that the media also tells people what to think about these topics.

This phenomenon is known as “second-level agenda setting” which suggests that the press not only tells people how to think about an issue but also what to think about an issue. In doing so, this notion expands the influence of the media beyond the importance attached to an issue to include the attributes attached to certain topics by their media depictions and considers the mental linkages formed between these media narratives and the topics themselves. In this way, the media does indeed shape how people think about certain topics, and studies using this theory

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27 Ibid, 364.

28 Ibid, 364.
of second-level agenda setting have discovered that the more negative coverage a nation received, the more likely respondents were to think negatively about the nation.  

This agenda-setting effect makes the ways news is portrayed and the norms that underlay it particularly salient because, as readers engage with foreign news stories, they are absorbing what is being discussed along with how it is being talked about, which can alter their opinion on the matter at hand.  

The finding that negative coverage of a nation engenders a negative public perception of the nation is particularly salient, as a majority of coverage surrounding the developing world, specifically Africa, is exceedingly negative, a phenomenon that will be elaborated later in this literature review. This power to shape the outlooks of individuals then cascades into the ability to shift and create public opinion.  

Various Connections Between Foreign Policy, the Media, and Public Opinion

The first connections to the model between foreign policy, the mainstream media, and public opinion follow the pattern of (a) media to (b) public opinion to (c) policy making. Since public opinion can serve as a driver for policy-making and can change in response to media coverage and attention to certain topics, the way media covers certain topics can therefore influence

\[\text{Ibid, 364.}\]


\[\text{Wanta, Golan and Lee, “Agenda setting and international news: Media influence on public perceptions of foreign nations,” 364.}\]
As the aforementioned study on Canadian news media outlines, “media coverage remains the major source of news and information about the developing world for Canadians and can exert a strong influence over policymaking.” While this study was focused exclusively on Canadian news media, this system is very similar to that of the United States and is relevant in connecting the nature of news media to public opinion and, in turn, its effect on foreign policy.

Another school of thought on this matter traces the connection from (a) media to (b) policymakers to (c) the public. One of the pilot studies on this matter suggested that American public opinion affected foreign policy through a two-step flow hypothesis which states that information flows from the media outlets to opinion makers and the public. According to this theory, there are a variety of “opinion makers” in society who are mostly decision-makers and elites, and the media serves as a conduit for their opinions to the general public.

Finally, the widely accepted “cascade network activation model” suggests that influence cascades downwards from (a) policymakers to (b) media to (c) public opinion. This model includes the White House as the primary catalyst of influence whose frames and agendas cascade

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35 James N. Rosenau, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*.

36 Ibid.

37 Entman, “Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House's Frame After 9/11.”
down to Congress which then flows to the media and finally to public opinion which is molded by the messages that are filtered through the other entities.  

Alternative models see the connection between media and public opinion as one of activation, stating that public opinion is normally dormant regarding foreign policy issues, but is activated when these issues receive mainstream media coverage. Others of a Realist School of Thought suggest that public opinion does not affect foreign policy. As referenced and compiled in a report by the Center for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN), these realists argue that the American public is uninformed regarding global affairs and the incoherent, unstructured nature of their opinions leads to a non-effect on policymaker’s decisions.

While this Realist School of Thought has its merits in considering the American public as ill-informed on international events, the studies outlined in this section have demonstrated that public opinion, the media, and foreign policy are deeply interconnected. This connection is cyclical, with a variety of scholars suggesting a variety of different origination points, their interconnectedness is the main subject of this literature review which seeks to present a backdrop for why media depiction of foreign policy toward a particular nation is important and the consequences of this depiction in the real world on foreign policy and public opinion, particularly in the case of Africa’s media depiction.

38 Entman, “Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House's Frame After 9/11.”


40 Sharifullah Dorani, “The Role of Public Opinion in Foreign Policy.”

American Foreign Policy Toward Africa

US foreign policy toward Africa has been largely unsuccessful, characterized by large and ineffective sums of aid money.\(^{42}\) The modern history of the US-Africa foreign policy can be grouped into three groups: the Cold War, the transitional period, and the post-1998 period.\(^{43}\)

The Cold War and Transitional Periods

The Cold War period from 1950 to 1990 was characterized by U.S relations with Africa strictly within the context of a great power competition with the Soviet Union, relegating Africa as a battlefield for influence and basing relations strictly on whether or not a nation maintained anti-communist ideologies.\(^{44}\) Following the end of the Cold War, the United States no longer prioritized Africa in strategy-making due to nations’ lack of nuclear weapons, low levels of economic activity, and a lack of trade connections.\(^{45}\) This period can be characterized by one sentence from a 1995 white paper published by the Pentagon: “Ultimately, we see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa.”\(^{46}\) The lack of importance attached to Africa flowed into the transitional period from 1990 to 1998 which consisted merely of a fluctuation between “utter neglect and half-hearted efforts to promote democracy and economic reform” along with an increase in humanitarian aid.\(^{47}\)


\(^{44}\) Ibid.


\(^{46}\) Ibid.

\(^{47}\) Kwasi Tieku, “A Brief History of US-Africa Relations.”
**Post-1998**

In the post-1998 period, the United States has found itself deeply enmeshed with England and France, whose arbitrary borders and colonial exploitation have hindered African development to this day.\(^{48}\) The first presidential visit to the “sub-Saharan” countries of Ghana, Uganda, Botswana, and Senegal occurred only in 1998 under the Clinton administration.\(^{49}\) US foreign policy toward Africa during this time was characterized by large-scale initiatives such as George W. Bush’s PEPFAR program against HIV/AIDS, Bill Clinton’s African Growth and Opportunity Act focused on increasing trade and economic relations, Barack Obama’s Power Africa initiative launched to increase access to power and Donald Trump’s Prosper Africa focused on trade and investment.\(^{50}\) While these programs were impactful, they reflect the overall trends of American foreign policy toward Africa as limited and episodic.\(^{51}\)

‘Dead Aid’

A striking and much-debated characteristic of U.S foreign policy toward Africa has been the immense inflows of aid totaling $1 trillion over the past 50 years containing between $6.5 and $7.5 billion arriving from the United States annually over the past decade.\(^{52}\) This aid was unaccompanied by substantial, long-term policies focused on economic growth and institution building, and proved only an ineffective band-aid solution.\(^{53}\) As noted by Zambian economist


\[^{49}\] “President Clinton: Recognizing the Problems and Promise of Africa,” Wilson Center.

\[^{50}\] Ibid.


\[^{52}\] Moyo. Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa.

\[^{53}\] Ibid.
Dambisa Moyo in her book *Dead Aid*, “the notion that aid can alleviate systemic poverty, and has done so, is a myth. Millions in Africa are poorer today because of aid; misery and poverty have not ended but increased. Aid has been, and continues to be, an unmitigated political, economic, and humanitarian disaster for most parts of the developing world.”

*The ‘Great Power Competition Lens’: Russia and China in Africa*

Over the past decade, China and Russia have increased their foreign investment, military involvement, and soft power influence in Africa, including but not limited to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Russia’s Wagner Group military involvement. As articulated in an article published in *Foreign Affairs* magazine: “Like it or not, a twenty-first-century ‘scramble for Africa’ is underway. Russia and China in particular are ramping up economic and military activity on the continent at the same time as the United States is scaling back.” This ‘great power’ narrative has pervaded discussions of US foreign policy in Africa and many scholars from Africa and abroad have expressed a concern that the Biden administration’s increased interest in the continent serves merely as a means to the end in the battle for global supremacy.

*The Mainstream Media’s Depiction of Africa*

With an understanding of the general correlation between the American mainstream media, its effect on public opinion, and public opinion’s effect on foreign policy coupled with a backdrop

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54 Ibid.


56 Ibid.

orientation on US-Africa foreign policy, an understanding of the mainstream media’s depiction of Africa will allow for further engagement in how these issues connect.

Negative, Conflict-Centric, and Damaging

According to Karen Rothmyer, a Kenya-based journalist and editor, “US journalism continues to portray a continent of unending horrors” despite decreasing poverty rates, increasing economic development, greater child mortality rates, and greater rates of education in many African countries.58 Researchers Josh Greenberg and Colette Brin make a similar observation based on an extensive literature review on the subject:

“While there continues to be horrific conflict and suffering in many parts of [Africa], the lack of context or breadth in international news coverage presents simplistic, one-sided stories that reproduce media coverage of the Ebola outbreak in Western Africa showed how persistent the “heart of darkness” narrative remains, despite the rapid economic advances across much of the continent. incomplete and inaccurate account of the continent—both the problems that continue to plague many countries and what the roots of those challenges are, not to mention the positive gains and development progress underway in many areas.”59


These claims by journalists and researchers are not just general claims. In fact, in a content analysis of New York Times articles published from 2003 to 2007, the most common type of news pertaining to Africa was crisis news. While more data is required as it pertains specifically to Africa, there is a large body of research that corroborates the notion that media coverage of the developing world is exceedingly negative, and this research is applicable to the continent of Africa which houses the largest global concentration of poor countries. The United States media have a proven tendency to convey negative and exploitative messages pertaining to the people and culture of developing nations, generating the idea that the developing world is in a perpetual state of crisis and conflict.

At the University of Pennsylvania’s Sixth Annual African Studies Consortium Workshop, Rod Chavis summarized the lack of positive news surrounding Africa: “Little is said about Africa's strategic importance to so-called industrialized nations; her indispensability and relevance to world development, global technology, and the wealth of nations, derived from involuntary African largesse, are not acclaimed in the media.” The consistently negative media coverage of Africa evokes a misguided image of the continent from a falsified public perception.

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61 “Mapped: The 25 Poorest Countries in the World,” Business Insider (Business Insider)
64 Ibid, 17.
American media’s negative portrayal of foreign nations is widespread, and the news media often portrays a twisted representation of foreign nations that is hyper-focused on negative news, which they attribute to a deeply-ingrained press bias toward conflict, and journalists reinforce the status quo in their reporting of the developing world which leads to a biased, twisted and ill-informed view of developing nations and their citizens.65

**Methodology**

The data for this study emerged from a qualitative analysis of three foreign policy documents and eight articles published in the month following the document’s release on either CNN, Fox News, the New York Times, or the Washington Post. The documents were collected using a Google Search which resulted in the PDF form of Biden and Obama’s documents and a website form of the Trump document through the White House archives. The articles were sourced from the websites of each news outlet using the search function, a data range filter, and the key terms “[President’s Last Name]” and “Africa.” Sourcing was done in this matter to simulate what a typical member of the American public would find if they were to look for information on Africa or the president’s policy toward Africa on any of these four sources. The three chosen administrations intentionally vary across the American political spectrum and it is this wide range of ideologies that is important in ensuring that any trends are not administration-specific and can be extrapolated more widely. The specific news sites were chosen as they are highly influential American news sources in the top ten leading news websites according to the most

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recent data with a massive collective viewership, totaling approximately 1,539,700,000 visits per month.\textsuperscript{66}

\textbf{Results}

Once collected, the articles directly pertaining to the foreign policy documents, referred to as the “relevant articles” and the foreign policy documents themselves were both coded to identify the main themes present in each paragraph using content analysis. The main findings from this content analysis were placed in a chart and the number of references noted in a column and cross-referenced for the Trump and Biden-eras.\textsuperscript{67}

When no articles were found pertaining to the foreign policy document following the Obama administration’s release, the research was expanded to include a thematic analysis of all articles that were returned when the specific keywords were searched on each website, referred to in this research as “non-relevant articles.” These articles were categorized and entered into a chart based on their overall theme to demonstrate what the media was reporting on in lieu of the foreign policy document.\textsuperscript{68} The goal of this content analysis of the documents and articles was to determine the overlaps and differences between the content of the foreign policy document and news articles pertaining to these documents in order to understand what narratives the populace is exposed to in the mainstream media as it relates to US foreign policy toward Africa.


\textsuperscript{67} See Appendix A and B.

\textsuperscript{68} See Appendix C.

The document used for the Trump era was the 3-page document entitled *President Donald J. Trump’s Africa Strategy Advances Prosperity, Security, and Stability*, a fact sheet published by The White House that served as the most relevant government-published document in reference to the Trump administration’s Africa policy; an original strategy document was not found.70 The news articles referring to this foreign policy document are as follows: “Bolton Says ‘Predatory’ China is Outpacing the U.S in Africa” published by the Washington Post, “Bolton Outlines a Strategy for Africa That’s Really About Countering China” published in the New York Times, “Bolton Slams China, Russia Over ‘Predatory Practices’ in Africa” published by CNN, and “Bolton threatens to pull aid for ‘unproductive’ UN missions in Africa, vows reform” published by Fox News.71


While the Obama administration’s foreign policy was not eligible for a comparison to the news due to a lack of articles published in the aftermath of the policy release, a content analysis was completed on the Obama administration’s 12-page *U.S Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa*, published on June 14th, 2012.\(^{72}\)

The data for this study emerged from a qualitative analysis of three foreign policy documents and eight articles published in the month following the document’s release on either *CNN, Fox News, the New York Times*, or *the Washington Post* and was condensed using a content analysis which began with reading each document, identifying various codes paragraph by paragraph for both the news articles and the foreign policy documents, and organizing them in a chart based on number of references and themes.\(^{73}\)


\(^{73}\) See Appendix A and B.
Table 1: Foreign Policy vs. Relevant News Article Topics During the Biden Administration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top 5 Most Prevalent References in the News Articles (Biden)</th>
<th>Top 5 Most Prevalent References in Foreign Policy Documents (Biden)</th>
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<td>Promoting/Strengthening U.S. Africa Partnership and Shared Interests (19)</td>
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<td>China’s Influence in Africa (17)</td>
<td>Strengthening/Reforming Democracy &amp; Democratic Norms/Institutions/Values (16)</td>
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<td>Africa’s Push Back Against U.S Influence/Assertions of Africa’s Independence (16)</td>
<td>Countering Foreign Influence from Russia &amp; China/Allusions to Great Power Competition (11)</td>
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<td>Strengthening Democracy &amp; Elections/Democratic Backsliding in Africa (11)</td>
<td>Combating Climate Change/Building Resilience to Climate Impacts/Supporting a Just Energy Transition (10)</td>
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<td>The War in Ukraine (8)</td>
<td>Promoting Trade &amp; Investment/Commercial Ties (8)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Promoting/Advancing U.S. Interests (8)</td>
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<td>Promoting/Fostering Economic Growth/Strength &amp; Expanding Opportunities (8)</td>
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<td>Affirming African Agency/Africa’s Role as a Global Player in Solving Global Problems (8)</td>
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Table 2: Foreign Policy vs. Relevant News Article Topics During the Trump Administration

<table>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critique of Donald Trump Actions/Policies in Africa (15)</td>
<td>Promoting/Advancing U.S. Interests (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration’s Skepticism/Desire to Restructure Foreign Aid/Taxpayer Dollars (13)</td>
<td>Strengthening/Reforming Democracy &amp; Democratic Norms/Institutions/Values (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia’s Influence in Africa (10)</td>
<td>Countering Threats to U.S. Interests, Safety and Security (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration’s Skepticism of Peacekeeping Operations/Reevaluating Missions in Africa (9)</td>
<td>Preventing/Countering/Responding to Conflict and Security Challenges in Africa (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promoting/Strengthening Africa’s Self-Reliance (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promoting Trade &amp; Investment/Commercial Ties (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promoting Good Governance (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promoting Regional Peace, Security and Stability (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Review/Realignment of U.S. Aid Efforts &amp; Spending of Taxpayer Dollars (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>All other references were made 1&gt; time</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 & 4: Non-Relevant Articles with Search Terms “Africa” and “Biden”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>08/08/2022 – 09/08/2022</th>
<th>NYT</th>
<th>WP</th>
<th>CNN</th>
<th>FOX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Articles Published</td>
<td>3,743</td>
<td>4,072</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles with Search Terms “Biden” and “Africa”</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles Pertaining Directly to the Foreign Policy Document</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Website does not make it possible to determine the number of articles published in the time frame.

Top 5 Most Prevalent Topics of News Articles with Search Terms “Africa” and “Biden” 08/08/2022 – 09/08/2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topics which Reference only North “Africa” or “South Africa”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran-US relations, Saudi spy, Actor suing prison, vaccine production, COVID deaths, Blinken’s trip, climate change, royal succession, wildlife poaching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Queen Elizabeth’s Death</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The War in Ukraine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hunger/grain shipments/famine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counterterrorism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Troops withdrawn, Al-Shabaab drone strikes, Al Qaeda in East Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Climate-Related Crises</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drought, energy crisis, climate change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>China’s Influence Globally</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belt and Road, Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kidnapping Release in Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nun released from Burkina Faso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disease in Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monkeypox</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mogadishu hotel attack, conflict in between DRC &amp; Rwanda,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections in Kenya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blunders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recall of African-produced vaccine, Ethiopian pilots falling asleep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Underwater cable running through Africa, Stolen art</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5 and 6: Non-Relevant Articles with Search Terms “Africa” and “Trump”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12/13/18 - 01/13/19</th>
<th>NYT</th>
<th>WP</th>
<th>CNN</th>
<th>FOX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Articles Published</td>
<td>3,950</td>
<td>4,472</td>
<td>N/A *</td>
<td>45,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles with Search Terms “Trump” and “Africa”</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles Pertaining Directly to the Foreign Policy Document</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Website does not make it possible to determine the number of articles published in the time frame.

Top 5 Most Prevalent Topics of News Articles with Search Terms “Africa” and “Trump” 12/13/18 - 01/13/19

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contained Exclusively in Phrase “African American”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive Reference to South Africa/North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption, apartheid reference, economic engagement, democratic backsliding, minerals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China’s Influence Globally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belt and Road, spreading influence, military presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In DRC, US airstrikes in Somalia, bombing in Somalia, Cameroon, Kenya hotel siege, coup in Gabon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entertainment/Soft News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trademarking Hakuna Matata, trees in Africa, West African leaders in Disneyland, Chigozie Obioma, Australian artist inspired by African safari, Pope prays for end to conflict in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trips to Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melania Trump, Rex Tillerson, Theresa May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned as a Search Result but did not contain references to Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Rights *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women seeking diverse more in ‘West Africa’, female genital mutilations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congolese Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence, destruction of machines, candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boat crash, illegal immigrants, migrant camps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Discussion

This research sought to provide a real-world application of the connection between the media, the public, and foreign policy to fill a gap in existing research and attempt to provide answers to pressing questions born from an acknowledgment of the overwhelmingly mediocre and insufficient U.S foreign policy toward Africa, the skewed and stereotyped American public opinion toward Africa and the negative, crisis-centric media depiction of Africa.\(^74\) Perhaps the media’s negative depiction of Africa engenders stereotypes in the public that influence policymakers to craft a foreign policy that is oriented around these stereotypes, or perhaps these generally ineffective foreign policies are barely reported in the media, and when they are, fuel a biased public opinion surrounding Africa’s importance to the United States. The deeply interconnected nature of media, public opinion, and foreign policy will leave these hypotheses without definitive conclusions, but the research presented in this paper can help shed light on the nature of media coverage of US-Africa policy and identify the narratives and emphasize the media are relaying to the public in this coverage.

Lack of Coverage

It is firstly important to note that, of the thousands of articles published in the months following the foreign policies release, only one article per source was directly relevant to the foreign policy.\(^75\) When reporting on foreign policy did occur, it barely referenced the foreign policy

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\(^{74}\) Refer to “Literature Review” for the multitude of citations on this conclusion.

document and was hyper-fixated on the content of the speeches announcing the documents instead of the documents themselves. A majority of the references went to Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and Former National Security Advisor John Bolton’s speeches announcing the foreign policy documents and the content of these speeches as opposed to the content of the foreign policy document itself.

**Lack of Alignment in Media Coverage and Foreign Policy Document**

One striking finding of this research is the difference between the portrayal of the strategy in the media and the actual content of the foreign policy document itself. An analysis of the Biden-era sources shows that there were 39 references in the news articles to Russia and China, 32% of the total topics mentioned. In contrast, countering foreign influence and topics related to both Russia and China combined were mentioned only 11 times in the foreign policy document, 6% of the total topics referenced, and half the number of times Russia’s influence alone was referenced in the news articles. Additionally, the most referenced topic in the Biden administration’s foreign policy document was Promoting and Strengthening the US-Africa Partnership and

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78 Ibid.

Shared Interests with 19 references, yet this topic was only mentioned five times in relevant articles, and two sources contained no mentions or references at all to this topic.\textsuperscript{80} In the Biden-era’s relevant news articles, four of the five most relevant news article topics reference external actors such as the United States, Russia, China, or Ukraine.\textsuperscript{81}

Similar to the Biden-era findings, the Trump-era contained striking incongruencies between the foreign policy content and the news articles, which were dominated by coverage of China and Russia.\textsuperscript{82} In the Trump-era news articles, 33 references were made to China’s influence in Africa, comprising approximately 28\% of all topics referenced in the news article, whereas only 2\% of all topics in the foreign policy document was China which was referenced once.\textsuperscript{83} The most prevalent topic in the Trump era foreign policy was Promoting/Fostering Economic Growth & Expanding Opportunities, yet this topic did not make the top five in the news articles, which were centered around Bolton, China, and Russia. Three of the four articles’ titles contained the words Russia or China and the other title, which reads “Bolton threatens to pull aid for ‘unproductive’ UN missions in Africa,” provides a highly general and negative overview of the article's content that is not anymore relevant to the topic of Africa than the China-Russia debate.\textsuperscript{84} The Trump news article has an overwhelming focus on news articles critiquing Donald Trump’s actions and policies in Africa instead of other more substantive policy goals, such as

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid.
promoting economic growth, fostering good governance, and trade and investment which were
mentioned in the foreign policy but did not make the news article top five.85

Non-Relevant Articles

These emerging great power-focused, conflict-centric narratives are reflected in the non-relevant
articles as well. Of the top five most prevalent topics in the non-relevant articles for the Biden
era, a topic that directly references ‘sub-Saharan’ Africa, the region around which the foreign
policy documents are based, only arises in the fourth place under Counterterrorism.86 The other
topics are overwhelmingly negative and are related either to violence, disease, and kidnapping or
blunders such as the recall of an African-produced vaccine or Ethiopian pilots asleep at the
wheel of their plane.87 Somehow, in a country of over a billion people with 54 nations, Ethiopian
pilots asleep at the wheel is the news that is chosen.88

The same trend is true for the media surrounding the Trump administration's foreign policy
release. Only four articles of more than 50,000 produced are relevant to the foreign policy itself,
and non-relevant article topics are focused either exclusively on “North” Africa or “South
Africa,” demarcations to which many African leaders and scholars do not themselves subscribe.89
Runners-up include entertainment news which is centered on violence – the Pope praying for an
end to conflict in Africa– and women’s rights stories also centered on violence – women in West

86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
Africa seeking divorce to escape abuse. Even the five stories pertaining to the Congolese elections were in reference to the burning and destruction of voting machines and election-related violence.

**Conclusion**

This research sought to examine the connection between mainstream media depictions of Africa and US foreign policy, in order to determine its potential effects on public opinion toward Africa and the potential recycling of these opinions back into foreign policy. As outlined in the literature review, the way the media talks about Africa matters. The narratives and attributes attached to various topics in the news have an effect on public opinion, which can then have a great influence on foreign policy. Foreign policy, as the main mechanism through which countries interact with the world, has a great global impact, especially coming from a global leader like the United States to which other nations around the world look for guidance and signals. If the United States of America maintains an ineffective foreign policy this harms Africa and American citizens as well.

The media depiction of US foreign policy toward Africa is far too focused on a power struggle with Russia and China, an issue that has sounded alarm bells in the minds of many scholars and policymakers both in Africa and abroad. With this in mind, journalists must seek to provide

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91 McCombs and Shaw, “The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media.”


94 Hicks, Atwell, and Collini, “Great-Power Competition Is Coming to Africa.”
more holistic depictions of Africa which account both for structural issues that are directly relevant to Africa, as well as the immense potential for business, economic growth, and entrepreneurship that is occurring on the continent.95

A change in the mainstream media’s African narrative could have a positive effect on policy making, a change that has already begun to occur, and a shift in the way Americans see the continent and its 54 countries. While the Great Power lens permeates Washington, and is often a powerful way to turn heads and garner support for foreign aid projects, this lens, when projected to the public, can resurrect the archaic Cold War notion of Africa as a sphere to be won. This lens can strip African nations of both individual identity and agency to those who only hear about the continent within this frame. Great Power stories are important but the disproportionate coverage of the continent within the context of a Russia-US or China-US struggle, when coupled with the already negative, conflict-driven coverage, glosses over the importance of locally-led peacebuilding, entrepreneurship, business development, and other stories that are coming from the continent.

References


96 See Appendix D, Part 2 for full list of citations.


Randolph, Brenda, and Elizabeth DeMulder. “‘I Didn't Know There Were Cities in Africa!’” Teaching Tolerance. Boston University, 2008.


Ryan, Missy. “In Africa, Blinken Seeks to Beguile, Not Browbeat, over Russia.” The


Appendix

Appendix A: Foreign Policy Document Coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coded Phrase</th>
<th>Biden</th>
<th>Trump</th>
<th>Obama</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promoting/Strengthening US Africa Partnership and Shared Interests</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening/Reforming Democracy &amp; Democratic Norms/Institutions/Values</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting/Fostering Economic Growth/Strength &amp; Expanding Opportunities</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting Trade &amp; Investment/Commercial Ties</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting/Advancing US Interests</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnering/Empowering Youth/Youth Leaders</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countering Foreign Influence (Russia/China)/Great Power Competition</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combating Climate Change/Building Resilience to Climate Impacts/Supporting a Just Energy Transition</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting Good Governance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting Regional Peace, Security and Stability</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countering Threats to US Interests, Safety and Security</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventing/Countering/Responding to Conflict and Security Challenges in Africa</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirming African Agency/Africa’s Role as a Global Player in Solving Global Problems</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting/Strengthening Africa’s Self-Reliance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expanding Educational Access</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Focus on Efforts to Alleviate Poverty</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combating Transnational Crime and Security Threats</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognizing Racial Justice Issues</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote Opportunity/ Sustainable Development</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addressing Africa’s Food Security/Drivers of Food Insecurity</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responding to Humanitarian Crises</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitating/Driving Digital Transformation &amp; Technology</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addressing Corruption/Political Challenges</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing Public Health Capacity - Healthcare/Health Infrastructure</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting/Working with Multilateral Actors/Institutions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowering Women/Marginalized Populations</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing Transparency</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elevating Engagement with Diaspora</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowering Africa Entrepreneurship/Innovation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building State/Institutional Resilience</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combatting Authoritarianism/Repression</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End COVID-19 Pandemic/Mitigate Consequences</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countering Terrorism/Violent Extremism</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encouraging/Supporting the Private Sector &amp; Private Organizations</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condemning Security Force Violations/Government</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review/Realign of US Aid Efforts &amp; Spending of Taxpayer Dollars</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removing/Reevaluating Support for Multilateral Institutions &amp; Multilateral Missions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting Structural Reforms/Reformists</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix B: Relevant News Article Coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic (Biden)</th>
<th>WP</th>
<th>NYT</th>
<th>CNN</th>
<th>Fox</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>References to Russia’s Influence in Africa</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References to China’s Influence in Africa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa Pushing Back Against U.S Influence/Assertions of Africa’s Independence</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening Democracy &amp; Elections/Democratic Backsliding in Africa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War in Ukraine</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>Health: Disease &amp; Pandemic Response</td>
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<td>Addressing Climate Change/Environmental Concerns/Farming</td>
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<td>Promoting Economic Interests</td>
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<td>Creating Economic Opportunity</td>
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<td>Discussion of Terrorism/Violence in Africa</td>
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<td>U.S Africa Foreign Policy Historically</td>
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<td>References to China’s Influence in Africa</td>
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<td>Critique of Donald Trump Actions/Policies (sh*thole reference, has not visited)</td>
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<td>Administration’s Dedication to Advancing US Interests in Africa</td>
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<td>Statistics on US Aid to Africa or Contribution to U.N. Peacekeeping</td>
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<td>Trump’s Approach to Counterterrorism in Africa (Terrorist Incident in Niger)</td>
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<td>Trump’s Foreign Policy (America First)</td>
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<td>References to Africa as Independent/Self-Reliant</td>
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<td>Trump’s Approach to National Security/Counterterrorism in Africa</td>
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<td>American Efforts in Africa (related to Economic Growth, Good Governance, Rule of Law, Healthcare)</td>
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<td>Background Information on Africa (population growth)</td>
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Appendix C: Non-Relevant News Article Coding

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<th>Topics – “Biden” and “Africa”</th>
<th>Articles</th>
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<tr>
<td>References North “Africa” and “South Africa”&lt;br&gt;Iran-US relations, Saudi spy, Actor suing prison, vaccine production, COVID deaths, Blinken’s trip, climate change, royal succession, wildlife poaching</td>
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<tr>
<td>Queen Elizabeth’s Death</td>
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<td>The War in Ukraine&lt;br&gt;Hunger/grain shipments/famine</td>
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<td>Counterterrorism&lt;br&gt;Troops withdrawn, Al-Shabaab drone strikes, Al Qaeda in East Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Climate-Related Crises&lt;br&gt;Drought, energy crisis, climate change</td>
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<tr>
<td>China’s Influence Globally&lt;br&gt;Belt and Road, Taiwan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kidnapping Release in Africa&lt;br&gt;Nun released from Burkina Faso</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disease in Africa&lt;br&gt;Monkeypox</td>
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<tr>
<td>Violence&lt;br&gt;Mogadishu hotel attack, conflict in between DRC &amp; Rwanda,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elections in Kenya</td>
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<td>Blunders&lt;br&gt;Recall of African-produced vaccine, Ethiopian pilots falling asleep</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other&lt;br&gt;Underwater cable running through Africa, Stolen art</td>
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<td>Defense of Democracy against Authoritarianism</td>
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<table>
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<th>Topics – “Trump” and “Africa”</th>
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<td>Corruption, apartheid reference, economic engagement, democratic backsliding, minerals</td>
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<td>China’s Influence Globally</td>
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<td>Belt and Road, spreading influence, military presence</td>
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<td>Violence in Africa</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>In DRC, US airstrikes in Somalia, bombing in Somalia, Cameroon, Kenya hotel siege, coup in Gabon</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Entertainment/Soft News</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>trademarking Hakuna Matata, trees in Africa, West African leaders in Disneyland, Chigozie Obioma, Australian artist inspired by African safari, Pope prays for end to conflict in Africa</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Trips to Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Melania Trump, Rex Tillerson, Theresa May</td>
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<tr>
<td>Returned as a Search Result but NO REFERENCES TO AFRICA</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women’s Rights *</td>
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<td>Women seeking diverse more in ‘West Africa’, female genital mutilations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congolese Elections</td>
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<tr>
<td>Violence, destruction of machines, candidates</td>
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<td>Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boat crash, illegal immigrants, migrant camps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>Senior Director for Africa resigns, poaching, return of art, scientific racism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Counterterrorism</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIS, Al Qaeda, girls kidnapped by Boko Haram</td>
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<td>America’s Interference in Other Nations</td>
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<td>Madagascar Election</td>
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<td>Runoff</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>Political prisoners, NGO acquittal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Involvement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arms market, military involvement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disease</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS, Rift Valley Virus</td>
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</table>

42
‘Bolton’s Speech at the Heritage Foundation was about China’

Poverty

Trump’s Comments about Africa and Haiti

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* This number is very high because three newsletter publications included references to the initial article on women seeking divorce in West Africa

† This speech was in reference to the foreign policy, but articles under this category do not mention the foreign policy itself and only refer to the speech.

Appendix D: Other Citations

1) FOX News Articles

a) Africa CDC looking to obtain monkeypox vaccines as virus spreads | Fox News
b) COVID vaccine production from South Africa's Aspen Pharmacare to end due to low demand | Fox News
c) Mali: 'Africa's Afghanistan' sees France withdraw troops and terror groups run amok | Fox News
d) 83-year-old nun released 5 months after kidnapping in Africa | Fox News
e) US buying Ukraine grain shipments for African regions on brink of starvation, UN says | Fox News
f) Blade Runner Oscar Pistorius sues South African prison in bid for early release | Fox News
g) US drone strike kills 13 al-Shabab fighters in Somalia | Fox News
h) African swine fever vaccine use halted in Vietnam after pig deaths | Fox News
i) Trump aide: Syria withdrawal waiting on 'conditions' | Fox News
j) CNN's Don Lemon suggests Trump is 'pinning black against brown' in Oval Office address | Fox News
k) North Carolina voter ID law faces court challenge -- immediately after GOP overrides Dem governor's veto | Fox News
l) Ocasio-Cortez bashes Politico article as 'birdcage lining' | Fox News
m) Florida governor suspends Broward County Sheriff Scott Israel | Fox News
n) Houston wins praise for handling of girl's drive-by shooting | Fox News
o) Judge Andrew Napolitano: The Supreme Court's most controversial decision since World War II | Fox News
p) Florida posthumously pardons 4 black men accused of sensational 1949 rape
q) Criminal justice reform bill clears first test vote in Senate | Fox News
r) Senate unanimously votes to make lynching a federal crime | Fox News
s) Mira Ricardel, the Bolton deputy ousted after spat with Melania Trump, up for top Pentagon job | Fox News
2) **CNN Articles**

a) Newly discovered ocean critter named after Bob Marley | CNN
b) Libyans turn out big, then celebrate historic election | CNN
c) Bill Clinton has most lucrative year on speech circuit | CNN Politics
d) Obama: Europe should stress financial integration | CNN
e) [https://www.cnn.com/2012/06/18/world/mexico-g-20-summit/index.html](https://www.cnn.com/2012/06/18/world/mexico-g-20-summit/index.html)
g) Clinton meets with Egypt's new president - CNN
i) U.N. chief warns African troops hunting for Kony short on food, equipment | CNN
j) ISIS is far from being defeated as a fighting force or ideology | CNN
k) Trump is pulling out of the wrong war at the wrong time (opinion) | CNN
l) The World Bank just got more pessimistic about global growth | CNN Business
m) NBC News veteran says media is failing at covering America's wars - CNN
n) William Arkin, NBC News veteran, warns of 'Trump circus' in 2,228-word farewell
o) A British military base on the South China Sea is not a far-fetched idea - CNN
3) Washington Post
   a) Trump silent on Russian efforts to influence African Americans, millennials and other left-leaning groups - The Washington Post
   b) Opinion | Beware when you hear Trump wave a flag for African Americans - The Washington Post
   c) 62 al-Shabab fighters in Somalia killed in two days of airstrikes, US military says - The Washington Post
   d) The remarkable — and secret — first presidential visit to troops fighting overseas
   e) Could China squeeze the US out of its only permanent military base in Africa?

4) New York Times
   a) Former Twitter Employee Convicted of Charges Related to Spying for Saudis
   b) Opinion | What the US Gets Wrong About Iran
   c) US Says Al Qaeda Has Not Regrouped in Afghanistan
   e) In China, Xi Risks Overconfidence That Could Stoke Taiwan Tensions
   f) Grief for the Queen Mixes With Criticism of the Monarchy
   g) Queen Elizabeth II: A Life in Photos
h) Queen Elizabeth II Dies at 96; Was Britain’s Longest-Reigning Monarch
i) How We Mourn Covid’s Victims
j) Your Wednesday Briefing
k) Lessons learned
l) Climate Bill, Albuquerque, Spiders: Your Monday Evening Briefing
m) Your Tuesday Evening Briefing
n) A Summer of Climate Disasters
o) Opinion | Live by the Trump, Die by the Trump
p) Thousands of Civilian Deaths and 6.6 Million Refugees: Calculating the Costs of War
q) Russia’s Economy Shrinks
r) Your Tuesday Briefing: Political Turmoil in Pakistan - The New York Times
s) Your Friday Briefing: Heat Shakes China’s Economy
t) Falling Oil Prices Defy Predictions. But What About the Next Chapter?
u) Opinion | Europe’s Energy Crisis May Get a Lot Worse
v) Kicking oil companies out of school
w) Ethiopian Airlines Pilots Miss Landing After Reportedly Falling Asleep
x) A Quiet Revolution: More Women Seek Divorces in Conservative West Africa
y) Coup Attempt in Gabon Is Thwarted, Government Says
z) In a Flash, US Military Policy Turns Inward and Echoes Across the Globe
aa) President Trump, Belt and Road, Huawei: Your Monday Briefing
bb) Competing Against Chinese Loans, US Companies Face Long Odds in Africa
cc) China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Plan in Pakistan Takes a Military Turn - The New York Times
dd) Trump Thinks He’s His Own Best Messenger. Where Does That Leave Bill Shine?
e) Trump, Brexit, Fatberg: Your Wednesday Briefing
f) Far-Right, Anti-immigrant Vox Party Gains a Toehold in Spain
gg) How Did Rifles With an American Stamp End Up in the Hands of African Poachers?
hh) Netflix’s Bow to Saudi Censors Comes at a Cost to Free Speech
ii) President Trump, Hungary, Gatwick: Your Monday Briefing
jj) DealBook Briefing: Corporate America Says It Often Apologizes for Trump
kk) Vladimir Putin, Tech Espionage, Markets: Your Friday Briefing
ll) Opinion | An Antidote to Idiocy in ‘Churchill’
nn) This Metal Is Worth More Than Gold, and It Scrubs Your Car’s Exhaust
oo) Opinion | The Dangers of Calling ‘Mission Accomplished” in Syria
qq) Hello, Does Poland Have Vampires? My Date Wants to Know My Blood Type.
rr) Opinion | Theresa May Is Determined — and Doomed
ss) Being There: Our Favorite Dispatches From Every Corner of the World - The New York Times
tt) Russia, US Congress, Brexit: Your Friday Briefing
When Is a Border Just a Border? Almost Never - The New York Times

Chigozie Obioma: By the Book - The New York Times

Pope Francis, in Christmas Speech, Emphasizes ‘Fraternity

El Museo del Barrio Drops Plan to Honor German Socialite

Opinion | The Family History DNA Can’t Reveal - The New York Times

18 Memorable People We Met Across the Country in 2018 - The New York Times

52 Places to Go: How Perth and Northern Rivers Made the List

In Saudi Arabia’s War in Yemen, No Refuge on Land or Sea

How Paparazzi Dogs and Rabbitgirl Conquered New York City Streets

Ibrahim al-Qosi Is Freed From Guantánamo and Sent Back to Sudan

In Rwanda, Health Care Coverage That Eludes the US

United States Ambassador to Kenya Quits Before Audit Release

Ambassador's Exit Shows Difficulties of Moving From Military to Diplomatic Circles

White House Relieved Over Egypt Announcement - The New York Times

As Islamists Gain Influence, Washington Reassesses Who Its Friends Are

Opinion | Libya’s Unintended Consequences - The New York Times

Opinion | Give Obama Elbow Room on Iran

Opinion | Show Me Your Papers - The New York Times

‘Barack Obama,’ by David Maraniss - The New York Times

Guns, Bullets, Human Rights on Agenda at Arms Treaty Talks

Military Expedition Into the Heart of Darkness

Books About the Pursuit of Al Qaeda - The New York Times

Opinion | Obama’s Fantastic Boring Idea - The New York Times
Is God Really Winning?: A Response to Religion, Demography, and Development in the 20th Century

Maya-David Teittinen

*Maya-David Teittinen is a junior majoring in International Affairs with a concentration in International Politics. In the Spring of 2024, they interned with the US Department of State in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. They endeavor to pursue a career in diplomacy and global advocacy for LGBTQ+ rights.*
Introduction

Secularization Theory postulates that as societies industrialize and modernize, the importance of religion in society will decline, causing the “systemic erosion of religious practices, values, and beliefs.”\(^1\) However, as the world has developed over the last century, many critics have challenged the idea that economic and political modernization causes secularization. In their 2009 article, “Why God is Winning,” Timothy S. Shah and Monica D. Toft argue that the role of religion in politics around the world rose over the 20th century, even though democratization and economic development also dramatically increased in the same period. Conservative religious movements utilized institutional strengths and modern technologies to achieve electoral victories, such as Evangelicals in the US, Hindu nationalists in India, and Muslims in Indonesia. Shah and Toft point out that growth in adherence to Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam, and Hinduism (the largest Christian denominations and non-Christian religions) outpaced global population growth, rising from 50% at the start of the 20th century to 64% at the start of the 21st century.

Ultimately, Shah and Toft contend that contrary to Secularization Theory, growth in religiosity has accompanied economic development rather than declined because of it. While many scholars have already addressed criticisms of Secularization Theory regarding modern religious revivals, I plan to address Shah and Toft’s claims from a demographic lens of analysis. I argue that not only has total religious identification declined over the 20th century, but growth in adherence to any particular religion was due to natural population growth, not mass religious conversion trends.

Literature Review

Much of the scholarly debate about the relationship between religion and economic development arose out of the ideas of Max Weber, who theorized in his 1905 book *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* that “greater religiosity,” particularly Protestant Christianity, “could spur investment and economic growth.” In modern scholarship, Secularization Theory directly refutes that thesis. Secularization Theory considers religion a “form of ideological power” that can become dominant in society but declines when processes of modernization – such as industrialization, bureaucratization, and democratization – institutionalize, replacing traditional values with secular-rational values. At its most extreme conclusion, Tschannen (1991) saw “a religionless society” as the final result of secularization, but to more descriptivist scholars, secularization can also reflect “the process of the separation of church and state.”

Some critics of Secularization Theory place stricter conditions on its applicability, claiming that its historical significance is overstated or that religious values and symbolism transform instead of decline. Other critics, like Shah and Toft, wholly refute it, citing increases in religiosity or arguing that the presence of religious revivals refutes the trend of secularization. However, secularization theorists agree that secularization is a tendency, not a prescriptive rule.

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5 Lechner, “The Case Against Secularization,” 1104.

6 Ibid.

secularization skeptics need to prove that long-term trends of “increases in the social power of religious organizations” correspond to processes of economic, social, political, and cultural modernization at large to disprove the theory as a whole.\(^8\)

Because of the divisiveness of the debate, much research has been done on the relationship between religiosity and economic growth. McCleary and Barro (2006) investigated how economic development and state influence affect religious participation and beliefs and how religious beliefs, conversely, affect economic and political variables.\(^9\) They found that as per capita GDP increased, all indicators of religiosity decreased, supporting the Secularization Theory that religiosity declines with greater economic development.\(^10\) The existence of a state religion also correlated to increased “attendance at formal religious services and with beliefs in Hell and an afterlife.”\(^11\) By contrast, Communist regimes’ suppressive religious policies had a “sharp negative effect on all of the religiosity indicators.”\(^12\) Furthermore, belief in Hell positively correlated to economic growth, but monthly attendance at religious services was significantly negatively correlated with economic growth.\(^13\) This suggests that while Weber was correct that religion influences individuals’ values and individual productivity, it does not have an “enhancing” effect on economic growth at large.\(^14\)

\(^8\) Lechner, 1111.

\(^9\) McCleary and Barro, “Religion and Economy,” 53.

\(^10\) Ibid, 62.

\(^11\) Ibid, 63.

\(^12\) Ibid, 63.

\(^13\) Ibid, 66.

\(^14\) Ibid, 68.
Norris and Inglehart go beyond testing observations about religiosity and economic development by positing a revised version of Secularization Theory. In their 2011 book *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*, they argue that secularization is “shaped by long-term changes in existential security,” or the sense of financial and personal security associated with the level of human development and socioeconomic equality in a country. In other words, a lack of economic and personal safety in a society has a psychological and sociological effect that increases the importance of religion in daily life. In their study, Norris and Inglehart measured religiosity according to the strength of the “values, beliefs, and practices of religion,” as well as the frequency of attending religious services and the frequency of praying or meditating.

Norris and Inglehart found that all human development and population demographic indicators were “powerfully and significantly related” to religious service attendance and prayer, with “human development and economic inequality alone” accounting for 46% of the variation in religious participation. While Norris and Inglehart found a strong inverse correlation between human development and religiosity in contemporary societies, they did not conduct a time-series analysis that would be able to establish a causal relationship between modernization and religiosity. My research attempts to begin to fill this gap. Although data on many human development or religious activity indicators before the 1960s is lacking, I investigated how religious affiliation changed from 1900 to 2000 to test whether a relationship existed between growth or decline in religious affiliation and measures of demography and human development.

15 Norris and Inglehart, 53.
16 Ibid, 27.
17 Ibid, 61, 65.
Methodology

My study specifically sought to investigate Shah and Toft’s claim that the increase in adherence to Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam, and Hinduism from 50% to 64% over the 20th century demonstrated an overall rise in religiosity rather than secularization. I hypothesized that growth in religious adherence to Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam, and Hinduism was due to natural population growth rather than mass religious or conversion movements. Religious affiliation was the dependent variable in terms of both absolute population and as a proportion of the population in 1900 and 2000. In addition to categorization by each religion or religious denomination, cumulative Christian population (summing up the populations of all the Christian denominations) and cumulative religious population (summing up the populations of all religions) were also measured as dependent variables.

The independent variables of my research were demographic change, measured by absolute and relative change in population from 1900 to 2000 and natural increase rates (NIR) in 2000, and economic development, measured by gross domestic product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) in 2000 and countries’ Human Development Index (HDI) scores in 2000. Because of the difficulty in finding measures of development before the 1960s and 1970s, only change in religious affiliation was analyzed across time from 1900 to 2000, while all measures of demography and development were analyzed in the year 2000. These limited the ability to determine a causal relationship between modernization and change in religiosity.

I gathered the data on total population and religious affiliation by country in 1900 and 2000 from the 2001 edition of the World Christian Encyclopedia, the source of Shah and Toft’s population
claims, to investigate how they drew the claims that they did and ultimately prove or disprove their conclusion that religiosity was increasing. UNdata’s data set on *Rate of natural increase (per 1,000 population)* provided the data for NIR by country in 2000, the World Bank’s *World Development Indicators* data set provided the GDP per capita PPP in current international dollars by country in 2000, and *Table 2. Human Development Index Trends, 1990-2021* by the United Nations Development Programme provided the data for HDI by country in 2000.

After gathering my data, I classified countries for development comparison purposes “according to their predominant religious culture,” as Norris and Inglehart did in their study.18 They justified this generalization by reasoning that each country’s mass media and unique politics instill the values of the predominant religion in its national culture, regardless of individuals’ religious identities. Therefore, the values of adherents of minority religions are closer to the values of the majority religion in that country than the values of their religion in other countries.19 I then found the change in population and religious affiliation from 1900 to 2000 and the least squares regression between cumulative religious population by country and its NIR, GDP per capita PPP, and HDI.

First, I investigated Shah and Toft’s claim that adherence to Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam, and Hinduism increased from 50% in 1900 to 64% in 2000. Using the same data from the *World Christian Encyclopedia*, I found that 47.70% of the world population identified as Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, or Hindu in 1900 but only 56.13% in 2000, demonstrating a somewhat smaller growth than Shah and Toft suggested. However, the proportion of the population

18 Ibid, 28.
19 Ibid, 17.
adhering to Catholicism or Hinduism increased very little from 1900 to 2000, by 1.14 and 0.87 percentage points, respectively, during which time the proportion of the population adhering to Protestantism decreased very little by 0.85 percentage points (see Table 1). By contrast, the proportion of the population adhering to Islam increased by 7.28 percentage points, clearly increasing at a far higher rate than average world population growth. Thus, growth in Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, and Hindu populations is extremely uneven, with Islam accounting for the majority of the population proportion change of the four religions and denominations altogether. Beyond Shah and Toft’s claim, though, they fail to point out that even though the Muslim population proportion increased from 1900 to 2000, the total cumulative religious population in the world decreased by approximately 15%, showing an overall relative decline in religious affiliation over the 20th century.

Table 1. World Population by Religion in 1900 and 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>% of Total Pop.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World (total)</td>
<td>1,619,625,741</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious (cumulative)</td>
<td>1,616,375,591</td>
<td>99.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian (total)</td>
<td>558,131,072</td>
<td>34.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian (Roman Catholic)</td>
<td>266,546,757</td>
<td>16.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian (Protestant)</td>
<td>103,023,615</td>
<td>6.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>199,940,924</td>
<td>12.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>203,003,440</td>
<td>12.53%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now that Shah and Toft’s overall claim about religious population change was disproven, I investigated whether a relationship exists between natural population increase – the population growth based on birth and death rates, excluding migration – and religious affiliation. Countries that were predominantly ethnoreligious or Muslim had the highest average NIRs, at 26.034 and 21.973 per 1,000 population. In contrast, predominantly Orthodox Christian and nonreligious countries had the lowest average NIRs, at 2.933 and 7.106 per 1,000 population, respectively (see Figure 1). While this data does not suggest a causal relationship between predominant religious affiliation and NIR, it does point out interesting patterns that may be explained by a third variable explored later in this study: economic and human development. Interestingly, though, the predominantly Orthodox countries with the lowest average NIR were former Soviet bloc states, and the only two predominantly nonreligious countries were China and North Korea. It is known that Communist states suppress religious activities and beliefs in societies, and the data demonstrates a significant correlation between Communism and suppressed natural increase rates. However, this correlation alone is not enough to establish whether Communism directly causes both low religiosity and low NIRs or whether low NIRs, perhaps caused by Communism, cause low religiosity.

When plotting the cumulative religious population proportion against NIR per country in 2000, I found a least squares regression line of \( \hat{Y} = -33.7467 + 51.5671X \), where \( X \) is the cumulative religious population proportion of a country, and \( \hat{Y} \) is its predicted NIR (see Figure 2). With a correlation coefficient of \( r = 0.4669 \), there exists a moderately strong positive relationship between NIR and cumulative religious population proportion. With an \( r^2 \) value of 0.218, the variation in NIR explains 21.8% of the variation in cumulative religious population proportion.

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20 McCleary and Barro, 62-63.
Figure 1: Average NIR of countries by predominant religion in 2000. NIR is measured per 1,000 population. Data from UNdata (2022) Rate of natural increase (per 1,000 population) [Data set].

Figure 2. NIR by Cumulative Religious Population Proportion per Country in 2000. NIR is measured per 1,000 population. Least squares regression line: 
\[ \hat{Y} = -33.7467 + 51.5671X. \]
\[ r = 0.4669, \quad r^2 = 0.218. \] Data from UNdata (2022) Rate of natural increase (per 1,000 population) [Data set].

Cumulative religious population proportion plotted against GDP per capita PPP per country in 2000 has a least squares regression equation of \( \hat{Y} = 18017.5651 - 6583.5165X \), where X is the
cumulative religious population proportion of a country, and \( \hat{Y} \) is its predicted GDP per capita PPP (see Figure 3). With a correlation coefficient of \( r = -0.03979 \), there exists a very weak negative relationship between GDP per capita and cumulative religious population proportion. With an \( r^2 \) value of 0.001583, variation in GDP per capita only accounts for approximately 0.2% of the variation in cumulative religious population proportion.

**Figure 3.** GDP per Capita at PPP by Cumulative Religious Population Proportion per Country in 2000. Least squares regression line: \( \hat{Y} = 18017.5651 - 6583.5165X \). \( r = -0.03979 \). \( r^2 = 0.001583 \). Data from The World Bank (n.d.). *World Development Indicators* [Data set].

**Figure 4.** HDI by Cumulative Religious Population Proportion per Country in 2000. Least squares regression line: \( \hat{Y} = 1.1919 - 0.5947X \). \( r = -0.3423 \). \( r^2 = 0.1172 \). Data from United Nations Development Programme. (2021-2022). *Table 2: Trends in the Human Development Index, 1990-2021* [Data set].
A least squares regression equation of $\hat{Y} = 1.1919 - 0.5947X$ exists between cumulative religious population proportion and HDI by country in 2000, where $X$ is the cumulative religious population proportion of a country and $\hat{Y}$ is its predicted HDI (see Figure 4). With a correlation coefficient of $r = -0.3423$, there exists a somewhat weak negative relationship between HDI and cumulative religious population proportion. With an $r^2$ value of 0.1172, variation in HDI can explain approximately 11.7% of the variation in cumulative religious population proportion.

**Theoretical Argument**

The data illustrates that the cumulative religious population proportion of a country is positively related to its natural increase rate and negatively related to its Human Development Index score, but there is no significant relationship between cumulative religious population proportion and GDP per capita. Thus, as a society’s natural population growth rate declines and its level of human development increases, we can expect its cumulative level of religious affiliation to decrease. This supports Norris and Inglehart’s theory that human development, and not purely economic development, is the “most crucial precondition” for existential security that lowers religiosity.\(^{21}\)

The relationship between development and level of cumulative religious affiliation is further made clear when we assess variation in demographic measures by countries of each predominant religion. We see that significant growth is not occurring in predominantly Catholic, Protestant, or Hindu countries; the highest natural increase rates are actually in Muslim- and

\(^{21}\) Norris and Inglehart, 53.
ethnoreligious-dominant countries, which tend to be in the least developed regions of the world. However, it is critical to note that it is not countries’ religious affiliation that causes their differences in population growth and level of development. Rather, centuries of colonization in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia by European powers left the predominantly Muslim and ethnoreligious nations in those regions to be overexploited and underdeveloped. Immanuel Wallerstein explains this dynamic in his World Systems Theory, which illustrates how the well-developed, capitalist “core” depends on “periphery” countries to produce raw materials to sustain core manufacturing at the expense of towns, unskilled labor, and withdrawing capital from the periphery to the core.22

Colonial and economic exploitation by the predominantly Christian European nations left a long-lasting legacy of underdevelopment and exploitation in the “Global South.” While the World Christian Encyclopedia data shows that many underdeveloped sub-Saharan African nations with high natural increase rates were also predominantly Christian, many of these same countries were also predominantly ethnoreligious in 1900, indicating the effects of both economic exploitation and religious conversion due to Western colonialism. Furthermore, population gains in Christianity due to natural increase in sub-Saharan Africa may have been offset by declining natural increase rates in the highly developed Christian North American and European countries, resulting in the total Christian population proportion from 1900 to 2000 stagnating at around one-third of the world population.

The relationship between such human development levels and population growth rates is explained by the demographic transition model, which theorizes a four-stage model of the “various conditions and factors that influence population growth,” specifically, birth and death rates (taken together, natural increase) and “changing socioeconomic conditions,” or development indicators. The model postulates that advancements in agriculture production, medicine, technology, and industrialization improve conditions of living so that death rates drop, birth rates decline more slowly as women move out of traditional child-rearing roles, and life expectancy increases, ultimately producing low or negative population growth in developed “post-industrial” societies (stage four) and high population growth in developing industrialized societies (stages two and three). This reflects the core ideas of Modernization Theory that as countries economically develop and modernize, they also undergo political, social, and cultural changes, including the decline in fertility rates and natural population growth caused by changing cultural perceptions of women’s role in society. Norris and Inglehart point out this critical relationship that the “shift from traditional religious values to secular-rational values brings a cultural shift from an emphasis on a traditional role for women… linked with a dramatic decline in fertility rates.”

While low HDIs and high socioeconomic inequality are conditions that lower a sense of existential security and predispose it toward higher religiosity, the greater level of traditional religious values in those societies also correlates to traditional child-rearing beliefs about the role

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of women, which cause higher total fertility rates and natural increase rates. Therefore, it is clear that variation in modernization levels, including economic development, secularization, cultural changes in the role of women, and demographic changes, plays a significant role, at least in part, in explaining the varying rates of growth or decline in Muslim, Christian, and other religiously affiliated populations around the world.

**Conclusion**

While Shah and Toft point to “upticks in religiosity” around the world, as manifested in religious revival movements and new roles of religion in modernized societies, such “upticks” are not enough to prove the end of a long-term trend of secularization that has persisted over a century.²⁶ Shah and Toft correctly cite Inglehart and Norris in that “the world as a whole now has more people with traditional religious views than ever before [who] constitute a growing proportion of the world’s population,” but they fail to recognize that uneven development has caused correspondingly uneven population growth in the world’s least developed countries, where traditional religious values are strongest. Overall, cumulative religious affiliation has declined by approximately 15% from 1900 to 2000, and a demographic analysis strongly suggests that growth in religion is associated with natural population growth, not mass religious conversion movements.

However, several limits exist on the conclusions that can be drawn from this research. The primary population data source, the *World Christian Encyclopedia*, may have a pro-Christian bias and does not break down population numbers for Islam and Hinduism into their sects the

way it does for Christianity. Additionally, Anglicanism was listed as a separate category from Protestantism in the *World Christian Encyclopedia*, so Anglicans were not counted in world Protestant populations. It is possible that including Anglican populations would have increased the total number of “Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, and Hindus” to match the 50% and 64% of world population statistics that Shah and Toft claimed. Additionally, the lack of data for many development statistics before the 1960s and 1970s meant that religious population data in 1900 and 2000 could only be compared to development measures such as HDI and GDP in 2000. Future research may attempt to find and explore whether a change in development across time from 1900 to 2000 correlates to changes in levels of total religious adherence. In the end, this research demonstrates that variation in modernization and development continues to explain variation in religiosity around the world, suggesting that “God” is not necessarily “winning,” and Secularization Theory is still a viable political lens for understanding the world.
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India and China’s Claims to Represent the Global South: Examining Positions on Human Rights and Cooperation with the West Since 2019

Sapna Suresh

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**Introduction**

Ever since Russia invaded Ukraine, the usage of the term “Global South,” by policymakers has increased. Consequently, the theme of representing the Global South was heavily featured in the foreign policies of the Indian and Chinese governments. For example, before the September 2023 G20 summit in India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said his country is “becoming the voice of the Global South.” At the 2023 UNGA summit, Vice President Han Zheng (on behalf of President Xi Jinping) said that China considers itself part of the Global South and supports those “nations’ development paths.” Hence, this paper will examine the differences and similarities between China and India's engagement with the Global South since 2019. First, it will give a brief explanation and history of the term “Global South.” Next, it will briefly describe India and China's policies toward the Third World during the Cold War. Lastly, it will analyze the similarities and differences between China's and India's approaches to the Global South since 2019.

When examining the approaches of India and China since 2019, China and India have largely similar policies of not criticizing countries in the Global South for their human rights. The refusal by China and India to criticize other countries over their human rights is influenced by their domestic political perceptions of state sovereignty. By contrast, since 2019, India and China have diverged on whether to work with the West to advance the interests of the Global South,

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illustrated by their interactions with the Group of 7 (G7) and BRICS. India has perceived the G7 as rightfully recognizing India’s growing influence on the world stage, while China has viewed the G7 as a source of containment for its rise. When examining BRICS (Brazil, Russia, China, India, South Africa) engagement, India views it as a forum to ensure equitable economic development for the Global South in cooperation with existing Western institutions. However, China seeks to make it an explicitly anti-Western organization.

**History of the Term “Global South”**

In 1952, French demographer Alfred Sauvy coined the concept of the Three-World System. The First World consisted of the West and its allies, such as Japan. The Second World was the Soviet Union and other communist countries. Lastly, the Third World was the non-aligned states, often newly independent from colonialism, such as India and Indonesia. The term “Global South” emerged when Carl Oglesby wrote in the Catholic journal *Commonweal*, saying, “the North's dominance over the Global South . . . [has] converged . . . to produce an intolerable social order.” However, the concept only gained traction after the 1980 Brandt Report, which showed the disparity between the wealthier countries in the North and the underdeveloped countries in the South.⁴

Following the end of the Cold War, the term “Third World” started to decline since it had a derogatory connotation, whereas the term “Global South” was used since it had a neutral

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Notably, according to SCOPUS (a database for academic journals similar to JSTOR), in 2000, the term “Global South” was mentioned about 10-15 times in academic papers, and 20 years later, the term was used about 1,600 times in academic papers. Today, the definition of “the Global South is a geographical, geopolitical, historical and developmental concept, all at the same time.” However, “the Global South has had no centralized structure, no central command, and no appointed spokesperson; it has had multiple custodians, all of them self-selected.” In the 21st century, the two prominent self-selected custodians of the Global South have been India and China.

India and China’s Engagement with the Third World During the Cold War

India and China’s engagement with the Global South started after World War II when most countries in Asia and Africa gained independence from European colonialism. During the Cold War, perceptions of India’s civilizational status and non-alignment guided its approach toward the Third World. In Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's speech to the Constituent Assembly of India on March 8, 1949, he said, “India, not because of any ambition of hers, but because of the force of circumstances, because of geography, because of history and because of so many other things, inevitably has to play a very important part in Asia.” He added, “If you

have to consider any question affecting the Middle East, India inevitably comes into the picture. If you have to consider any question concerning South-East Asia, you cannot do so without India.”9 In 1955, the concept of non-alignment was coined during the Bandung Conference in Indonesia, and the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) were Nehru, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Indonesian President Achmad Sukarno, and Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito.10 India utilized the NAM to promote “solidarity” among Third World countries. The most important factor was to avoid power-bloc alliances during the Cold War. However, with economic liberalization during the 1980s, the rhetoric of “Third World” and “Global South” became sidelined in Indian foreign policy.11

Similarly, China’s policy towards the Third World evolved during the Cold War. After the People’s Republic of China (PRC) took power in 1949, China saw itself as a “revolutionary” country challenging the Western-dominated international system. However, after the death of Stalin in 1953, Beijing was perceived to have a greater role in the world revolution throughout the Third World. Thus, at the 1955 Bandung Conference, the PRC adopted the five principles of peaceful coexistence. After establishing diplomatic relations with the US in 1979, Mao Zedong used the Three-World Systems Theory to claim that China was part of the Third World. When Deng Xiaoping took power, there was a greater emphasis on domestic economic development, and China significantly reduced its aid to the Third World. Notably, during the 1970s-80s, a significant element of China's Third World policy was to counter the Soviet threat. Consequently,

9 Ibid.


by normalizing relations with the Americans, the countries in the Third World were discouraged from using communism to achieve modernization. Later, from the 1980s to the 2000s, China's presence in the Third World was relatively marginal.12

Similar Views on Refusing to Criticize Countries Over Human Rights

One area in which India and China have been largely similar in their engagement with the Global South since 2019 is that they do not criticize countries over their human rights abuses, viewing it as an internal matter. In 2019, during the Venezuelan presidential crisis, India’s official statement was, “We are of the view that it is for the people of Venezuela to find a political solution to resolve their differences through constructive dialogue and discussion without resorting to violence,” implicitly rejecting outside interference.13 Likewise, Beijing issued a statement that opposed outside interference and supported efforts for stability.14 In 2021, Pratik Mathur, the counselor in India's permanent mission to the UNGA, said, “India has been reiterating since the beginning of the conflict that imposing external solutions cannot help in the resolution of the conflict” during a U.N. Security Council (UNSC) meeting on Syria.15

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Similarly, during Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s visit to China, Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated China's opposition to foreign interference and that the resolution to the Syrian Civil War should be “Syrian led, Syrian owned.” Later, in 2021, after the military coup in Myanmar, New Delhi issued the following statement: “India has always been steadfast in its support to the process of democratic transition in Myanmar. We believe that the rule of law and the democratic process must be upheld.” However, the statement did not describe the events as a “coup.” Even though these reactions did not explicitly mention external interference, they reflect a longstanding Indian position that the most successful democratic transitions are by local actors, not military intervention. The PRC issued a similar statement when the foreign ministry emphasized that it hoped the parties in Myanmar would reconcile.

India and China do not criticize countries in the Global South over human rights primarily because of the domestic political understanding of “state sovereignty.” For India, non-alignment is not limited to being neutral but includes non-interference. While the West believes in liberal internationalism, the Indian position is more inclined to Westphalian internationalism. The Westphalian concept of sovereignty emerged after the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which “permits


the state – represented by a king or queen, a dictator, or a democratically elected government – to claim control over the affairs within its territorial boundaries without the interference by other states.”21 Likewise, the Chinese understanding of sovereignty today is also shaped by a combination of Westphalian and traditional Chinese concepts.22 With the resurgence of nationalism in the PRC, the concept of *tianxia* has reemerged. It views the superiority of the Chinese model against “unethical Western governance” and “inferior values” like the rule of law and democracy. Additionally, the Chinese principle of “do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire” has been utilized in foreign policy as a justification for refraining from interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.23 Consequently, India and China's reactions to the situations in Venezuela, Syria, and Myanmar demonstrate how their domestic understandings of state sovereignty influence their approach toward the Global South on the issue of human rights.

**Divergent Views on Cooperation with the West: The G7 and BRICS**

While New Delhi and Beijing refrain from criticizing countries in the Global South over their human rights abuses, since 2019, a significant difference between India and China's claim to represent the Global South has been cooperation with the West, illustrated by their interactions with the G7 and BRICS. The G7 is an informal bloc of industrialized democracies – the US, the UK, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, and Canada – that meet annually to discuss international


security, global economic development, and other issues. In 1975, the US, France, the UK, West Germany, and Japan originally formed the G6 to allow non-communist powers to address economic concerns, and Canada joined a year later. From 1998 to 2014, Russia was a member of the group, making it the G8, but after it annexed Crimea in 2014, it was suspended. There are no official criteria for membership, but the implicit requirement is that all members must be democratic. However, one of the major criticisms of the G7 is that it does not represent the Global South, while the Group of Twenty (G20) has been suggested to be a much better representation of the current world since India, China, Brazil, and Indonesia are members. However, this paper uses the G7 rather than the G20 as a metric to compare India and China since the G7 embodies the current “rules-based approach to world order,” which excludes the Global South.

Since 2019, India's interaction with the G7 has illustrated its desire to work with the West. It sees the bloc’s outreach efforts as recognizing India’s growing importance on the world stage. By contrast, China’s reaction to the G7 illustrates that it perceives the current order as “at odds with its (China's) ambitions” and wants an international order friendlier to Beijing and other anti-American states. In 2019, when India was invited to the G7 summit in France, the Ministry of External Affairs issued a statement saying that Macron's invitation was a “recognition of India


as a major economic power.” However, in reaction to the summit, the PRC criticized the section in the joint communiqué about Hong Kong as interference in its internal affairs. Later, during the 2022 G7 summit held in Germany, Indian foreign secretary Vinay Mohan Kawatra said, “Our regular participation at the G7 summits points to increasing acceptance and recognition that India needs to be a part of any and every sustained effort to find solutions to solve global challenges.”

By contrast, the foreign ministry spokesperson for China, Zhao Lijian, said the “G7 has no intention of having dialogue and cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual respect, that the G7 remains entrenched in its Cold War mentality and ideological bias, and that the G7 prefers bloc politics that serves the group’s own interests.” After being invited to the 2023 G7 summit in Japan, Prime Minister Modi said he would use the meeting to voice the concerns of the Global South. However, the PRC criticized the summit's communique, which denounced China's human rights violations. In addition, the state-backed media outlet Global Times wrote, “the US


is pushing hard to weave an anti-China net in the Western world.” and the “G7 has descended into an anti-China workshop.” The differing reactions by both countries demonstrate that India sees inclusion in G7 meetings as a vehicle to advance the interests of the Global South, while China perceives it to be a hindrance to China's interests.

Another group India and China actively engage in regarding the Global South is BRICS. The term “BRIC” (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) was initially coined in a Goldman Sachs paper in the early 2000s, and it became an official institution on the sidelines of the G8 summit 2008 in St. Petersburg, Russia. The following year, in 2009, the very first BRIC summit took place, and in 2011, South Africa became a member, changing the organization name to “BRICS.” During the 2023 summit in South Africa, it was announced that Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Argentina, Egypt, and Ethiopia were invited to join the bloc starting in 2024. Since January 1, 2024, Iran, the UAE, Egypt, and Ethiopia have become official members; however, Saudi Arabia is still considering official membership. Additionally, after winning the Argentine election, President Javier Milei officially withdrew plans to join BRICS in a letter to the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, arguing that BRICS membership was inappropriate for Argentina.

In principle, the organization aims for emerging markets to have a greater voice in global governance. However, since 2019, India and China have had differing perceptions of the purpose of BRICS. In the 2019 BRICS summit, Modi urged greater intra-BRICS cooperation on counterterrorism and cooperation on the digital economy. By contrast, at the 2019 BRICS summit, Xi Jinping urged countries to practice multilateralism and oppose hegemonism and power politics. He also said that China would stay committed to an independent foreign policy.

In the 2022 BRICS summit, Indian officials prevented explicit criticism of the US in the joint statement and instead focused on countering climate change and cooperation on economic development. However, during the summit, Xi urged countries to reject the “Cold War mentality” and boost non-Western multilateral cooperation. Lastly, in the 2023 BRICS summit, while New Delhi welcomed the expansion of new members, it expressed concerns about the bloc becoming too anti-Western. Additionally, India continued to emphasize climate change.

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42 Liam Gibson, "At BRICS summit, China sets the stage to tout its governance model," Aljazeera, June 22, 2022, [https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/6/22/at-brics-summit-china-seeking-stage-for](https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/6/22/at-brics-summit-china-seeking-stage-for)

security, and engagement with the West to reform the international system after the expansion. However, during the summit, on behalf of Xi, Commerce Minister Wang Wentao insisted that hegemonism was not in China’s DNA.

The competing visions of India and China illustrate broader tensions within BRICS regarding the organization’s purpose. For example, Brazil has opposed the group’s explicit anti-Western orientation. At the 2023 South Africa BRICS summit, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva insisted that BRICS was not meant to be “a counterpoint to the G7, G20, or the United States” but a way to organize developing countries. His speech was mainly about securing financing for developing economies. Lula also believes that a less-dominated American world order would help expand democracy, not undermine it. By contrast, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi said that “Iran’s membership in the bloc is opposition to American unilateralism,” and has sought to use BRICS as a way to circumvent American sanctions and reduce its international isolation.

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Conclusion

Ever since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there has been a renewed interest in the “Global South” as a rising geopolitical actor. Accordingly, in this context, India and China are the two major powers that have claimed to be the leaders of the Global South. After examining India and China's engagement with the Global South since 2019, both countries have refrained from criticizing countries in the Global South over their human rights violations, influenced by their domestic political understandings to abide by the Westphalian concept of state sovereignty. However, India and China differ in their positions on cooperation with the West, illustrated by their interactions and perceptions of the G7 and BRICS. India views the recent G7 overtures as recognizing India’s growing influence, while China views the bloc as exclusive and containing China’s rise. Additionally, India perceives the BRICS as a forum to ensure equitable economic development for emerging markets in the Global South. In contrast, China has used the forum as a geopolitical bloc against Western hegemony. The similarities and differences in China and India’s engagement with the Global South indicate its group’s vast diversity.49 Each country in the Global South has different interests and definitions of a “representative world,” and most importantly, each has agency to navigate its own role in the evolving international system.

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The Origins of Postwar Japanese Pacifism

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Introduction

In an article in *Japan Review* from 2017 titled “History and Diplomacy: Perspective From Japan,” Nobukatsu Kanehara – Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary at the time under then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe from 2014 to 2019 – rightly says, “1945 became “year zero” and the year in which everything in Japan was reset.”\(^2\) Indeed, the transformation that Japan undertook after World War II created two polar opposite images of a nation: one seeking “imperialist expansion and… hegemony” during the war and “a pacifist and passive nation in global politics” after.\(^3\) As such, this paper aims to answer the research question: what accounts for Japan’s adoption of pacifism after World War II?

Historical Context

The aggressive foreign policy that characterized Japan before and during World War II undeniably had a physical impact on the Japanese people: “The overall Japanese death toll [was] close to 2.5 million.”\(^4\) Besides the high death toll, the war itself damaged the Japanese psyche, with the first postwar Prime Minister of Japan Shigeru Yoshida writing that the “miseries and destruction of the Pacific war [were] still actualities for a large majority of the Japanese people.”\(^5\)

The imperial expansionist Japan that was feared during the years of World War II came to an end on August 15, 1945, when the Emperor of Japan spoke on his first-ever radio broadcast

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\(^1\) A version of this article was submitted to the IBO for the May 2023 Exam Session, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the IB Diploma.


to say that “the general trends of the world have all turned against [Japan’s] interest.”6 Later, Japan would accept the Potsdam Declaration, a surrender deal drafted by the Allied Powers.7 The United States generals and soldiers began to arrive in September of the same year with two goals: “demilitarize and democratize.”8 With these in mind, the Allied Powers reformed Japan from the ground up, transforming everything from the basic political structure of the nation to the foundation of the economy.9 Considering the fact that this transformation fundamentally changed Japan as a nation, the US/Allied Occupation of Japan may be a cause for Japan’s preference for pacifism, the belief in the outright rejection of war as an appropriate medium to achieve peace.10

Postwar reformation by the US Occupation of Japan occurred at an interesting time in diplomatic history, which may be the root cause of the aforementioned tendencies. Hitoshi Ashida – Chair of the Imperial Constitution Revision Sub-Committee after World War II – felt that the international community after World War II was heading for “international cooperation through the rule of law” and recognized the democratic trend around the world.11 Consequently, Ashida believed that “international cooperative” and the “abolition of war” clause were essential in showing that Japan was a part of this trend which was vital to Japanese “freedom and independence”, likely because existing outside this trend would have

6 Gordon, 223.


8 Gordon, Modern History of Japan, 229.

9 Gordon, 229.


invited more tensions between Japan and the democratic countries. Simultaneously, the US became one of two superpowers on the global stage and was especially concerned about the spread of communism around the world, which was a real possibility in Asia considering the fact that it was within the USSR’s reach. As is later discussed, many historians even admit that tensions were especially high in Asia during the Cold War because of this reason.

Conventional wisdom dictates that Japanese postwar resistance to armament and relative pacifism came from a variety of factors, ranging from cultural circumstances to the US Occupation. Japanese historian Sakamoto Kazuya posits that Japan stayed on its pacifist path because Yoshida felt that the economic and social circumstances after World War II were not favorable. American historian John W. Dower does recognize these economic and social circumstances but favors the influence of the US Occupation on the postwar constitution as a more likely factor that put Japan down its pacifist path in the first place. Thus, it is important to consider the perspectives of both Japanese and American historians when assessing the root cause of Japanese pacifism.

**Methodology**

This paper aims to answer the research question by evaluating three factors that could have influenced postwar Japan’s pacifist resistance to rearmament: the US Occupation of Japan, the global shift in international circumstances, and World War II and its aftermath. By examining each factor, the paper will be able to evaluate all three’s relative influence in the

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12 Ueda, 37, 39.


15 Kazuya, 52–53.
context of shaping postwar Japanese pacifism, concluding that World War II and its aftermath were of utmost significance in the matter. Even the most superficial evaluation of the circumstances under which Japan shifted to pacifism would accentuate several factors that could shape Japan’s pacifist future, and the detailed historical context has shown that there are a myriad of aspects to consider when evaluating the cause of such a fundamental transformation. As such, this paper aims to clarify this and answer the research question with the examination of primary sources, like The Yoshida Memoirs from Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, secondary sources in the form of diplomatic history books, like Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II by historian John W. Dower, and articles like An Idea of Postwar Japan: Hitoshi Ashida and Japanese Liberalism by Makiko Ueda.

The use of both primary and secondary sources ensures that the wealth of first-hand accounts in primary sources is treated with the full context of external circumstances and future events. In addition, the use of both American and Japanese sources guarantees an objective approach in the paper’s investigation of the matter since both countries and their historians have important perspectives. Primary and secondary sources, both Japanese and American, have been synthesized together to create a whole picture of what led to a pacifistic transformation in Japan after World War II.

**The Significance of the US Occupation of Japan (1945-52)**

Postwar Japan cannot be understood properly without the inclusion of the US/Allied Occupation of Japan. Former diplomat Richard B. Finn, who worked in the US Occupation under the US Foreign Service and later the US State Department to oversee Japanese affairs, writes: “The Allied Occupation of Japan was perhaps the single most exhaustively planned
operation of massive and externally directed change in world history.”\textsuperscript{16} It is undeniable that this occupation had a concrete impact on Japan, with Prime Minister Yoshida even having admitted in his memoirs that “the zealous excesses” of postwar Japan “were a result of a spirit of enterprise for which Americans are justly famous.”\textsuperscript{17} However, the extent to which the US Occupation influenced postwar Japan’s staunch opposition to armament, a trait of its almost idiosyncratic pacifist foreign policy, must be investigated. In support of the claim that the US did influence the postwar opposition to armament, the role of General Douglas MacArthur and the postwar revised constitution of Japan remain two key points to consider.

On August 14, 1945, General MacArthur was appointed to the role of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP, referring to MacArthur and his administration) who would oversee the Allied Occupation of Japan.\textsuperscript{18} The goals to “demilitarize and democratize” were pushed forth by SCAP after it dissolved the Japanese military on November 30, 1945.\textsuperscript{19} To further work towards the goal of demilitarizing Japan in 1946, SCAP formed a committee of Japanese officials to revise the prewar constitution per the 1945 terms of surrender.\textsuperscript{20}

By February 1 of the same year, the committee’s revised constitution proposal was reported in the news and bore a noticeable resemblance to the prewar constitution.\textsuperscript{21} Dr. Joji Matsumoto, the head of the committee, believed that “since a great deal of alteration was


\textsuperscript{17} Yoshida, \textit{The Yoshida Memoirs}, 288.


\textsuperscript{20} Gordon, \textit{Modern History of Japan}, 230.

\textsuperscript{21} Yoshida, \textit{The Yoshida Memoirs}, 132.
bound to be demanded from all sides” it would be best for there to be only minor changes made at first. These minor changes included democratic accountability and powers for government officials and the safeguarding of Japanese rights and liberties. Since so few changes were made to the draft, Yoshida called it “a modified form of the Meiji Constitution,” referring to the constitution created during the Meiji Restoration (1869-89) that held up until the end of the war.

Presumably, because the committee’s draft was similar to its prewar antecedent, on February 3, General MacArthur outlined three ‘musts’ that the SCAP’s Government Section, a department within SCAP that dealt with reforming the Japanese government, needed to base a model draft constitution on. The first two concerned limiting the emperor’s power and dismantling the feudal system. The final one demanded the renunciation of war: “War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an instrumentality for settling its disputes and even for preserving its own security.” Then, SCAP Brigadier General Courtney Whitney held a meeting on February 4 with the Government Section to request the creation of the model draft constitution as an example for the committee. According to the summary of the meeting, even when Brigadier General Whitney introduced the model

22 Yoshida, 132.
23 Yoshida, 132.
24 Yoshida, 132.
26 GHQ, “Three Basic Points,” 2.
27 GHQ, “Three Basic Points,” 2.
constitution task to the Government Section, he reiterated the ‘abolition of war’ as the second “principle” on which the draft model should be predicated.29

Among other changes, this draft model went against one of Matsumoto’s principles of revision which was that there shall be no changes to the “principle of sovereignty residing in the Emperor.”30 Yoshida and the rest of the committee were given the model on February 13 and asked to create a draft that would have “the basic principles and form of the [SCAP] model version”, referring to the ‘must’s that had been outlined by MacArthur.31 Finding the SCAP model too controversial, the committee sent a member on February 21 to speak to MacArthur, who said that Japan needed to take “moral leadership” and adopt this principle because “the Soviet Union and Australia are worried that Japan will carry out a war of revenge” against the Allied Powers.32 At this point, it was more than clear to the committee that the Japanese constitution had to include the renunciation of war, regardless of whether its members agreed with the principle.

In short, SCAP reiterated the anti-armament principle on three separate occasions: February 3, when MacArthur outlined his three ‘musts’; February 4, when General Whitney introduced the model constitution task to the SCAP Government Section; and February 21, when MacArthur countered the committee’s opposition to the inclusion of the clause. SCAP and General MacArthur were successful in their attempts, with the modern-day Japanese Constitution still enshrining pacifism in Article 9, which outright rejects war as a sovereign


right of Japan. Thus, SCAP’s persistent push for this shows that the US Occupation of Japan influenced what later became Japan’s pacifist foreign policy.

However, the years after the constitution's promulgation provide a sound counterargument to this notion. Leading up to the Korean War, SCAP began to allow the government of Japan to technically ‘rearm’. The Korean War (1950-53) was one of the very first proxy wars between the US and USSR, which was why the US shifted troops from the Occupation of Japan to Korea to use all available forces. As such, on 8 July 1950, General MacArthur wrote to Prime Minister Yoshida because he had authorized the “government to take the necessary measures to establish a national police reserve of 75,000 men.” To Yoshida, this was not rearmament but rather a move to “fill the gap left by the [US] transfer” of troops to Korea. Nonetheless, the creation of the national police reserve generated much argument about the legality of this decision in light of Article 9 of the constitution which renounces the “use of force as means of settling international disputes.” On this matter, Yoshida says, “the idea of rearmament has always seemed to be one verging on idiocy,” and even though his government eventually had to comply with the orders, the cooperation between Japanese and US Forces was a compromise because he outright rejected concrete American suggestions of rearmament.


Even when the foreign imposition of the ban on armament was removed with SCAP’s suggestions and orders, Yoshida and his administration still resisted such action until compromises were made. Though the US Occupation had influenced the creation of Article 9, the postwar Yoshida administration’s conviction in the opposition to armament stemmed from other sources.

**The Significance of Shifting International Circumstances**

Another vital factor when evaluating Japanese history is the foundational changes that occurred on the global stage. At the time, there was a major “East-West clash” in Asia, stemming from Cold War binarism with two distinct US and USSR camps. Simultaneously, Ashida spoke of the global trend of democracy – an ideology he interpreted as having international cooperation embedded within it – and felt that Japan needed to be included in this trend, otherwise, its freedom and independence would be threatened. On three separate occasions in his book, Ashida speaks about this international situation affecting his policy of opposing rearmament. To begin with, Yoshida says that “the international situation as it remains today” was one reason why it was hard for him to believe that anyone would push for rearmament. Additionally, when discussing the Cold War bipolar world, he states “the only logical policy… to adopt in foreign affairs is co-operation” because he wanted Japan to be on the side of the US, backed by “a group of free countries.”

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41 Ueda, “An Idea of Postwar Japan.”
43 Yoshida, 111.
Lastly, Yoshida writes that rearmament will “only serve to aid Communist propaganda and infiltration” in that it would feed into the USSR’s perception that Japan was ramping up for war again, something he did not want for Japan as he strongly leaned toward the US in the Cold War. Across three different instances, Yoshida made it clear that the international situation was taken into consideration when deciding on foreign policy, which eventually became pacifist. Consequently, the role of shifting international circumstances was significant in shaping postwar Japanese pacifism.

However, the numerous other factors that Yoshida mentioned in his memoirs must also be considered. When he spoke of rearmament feeding into Communist propaganda, Yoshida also mentioned that it would “provoke national unrest” and, more importantly, “place too great a burden upon [Japan’s] people.” Evidently, Yoshida seemed to be more affected by domestic factors than international ones during policy formation. In addition, Makoto writes that the timings of the promulgation of the pacifist Japanese constitution and the shift in international political circumstances were essentially the same, meaning that the shift may have only had a minor role in conceptualizing postwar Japanese pacifism. The fact that more domestic factors were listed alongside international circumstances makes it clear that shifting international circumstances were, by far, not the most significant.

The Significance of World War II and its Aftermath

The most significant factor that shaped postwar Japanese pacifism is the fundamental transformation that occurred after the war. Two aspects of the situation that often came out in Prime Minister Yoshida’s memoirs were the economic and psychological aspects of World

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44 Yoshida, 112.

45 Yoshida, 112.

War II and postwar Japan. He says, “the burden of national expenditure that the people of Japan already have to bear” and the fact that the “miseries and destruction of the Pacific war are still actualities” for them made rearmament inconsiderable in postwar Japan. Yoshida was so against rearmament that he says it was an idea “verging on idiocy.” Throughout his memoirs, he echoed the psychological and economic effects of the war.

Postwar Japan had been left ravaged: close to 3 million of its soldiers and citizens had died, it had lost a third of its wealth and half of its potential income, both rural and nonrural living standards fell drastically, and every major city had been bombarded. Matters were made worse close to the end of the war. In the wake of Japan’s capitulation, haphazard financial policy to aid incoming Japanese servicemen created “fiscal and economic chaos and the beginning of the ravenous inflation that ultimately drained the economy.” Furthermore, as a result of wartime economic mobilization policies, the majority of the wealth of Japan was now in the hands of ten zaibatsu, wealthy corporations from wartime Japan, like Nissan and Mitsubishi, that grew off military and government contracts during heavy economic mobilization. Even at the time of the Emperor’s speech, approximately 9 million Japanese men and women were homeless, a testament to the accumulation of wealth for rich corporations and a lack thereof for the rest of the population. As such, it is understandable why Yoshida, throughout his memoirs, writes about how the economic circumstances of Japan after the war were not ready for rearmament of any kind.

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48 Yoshida, 191.

49 Dower, 45.

50 Dower, 531.

51 Dower, 529–30.

52 Dower, 47–48.
Indeed, as Yoshida put it, the “necessary wealth” to sustain the rearmament of the country was “lacking.”

Though the unemployed masses were absorbed by the informal sector, starvation was seen as a likely issue, so the immediate postwar government implemented price controls and printed more money, leading to “triple-digit inflation.” In addition, the small food rations meant the vast majority of survivors were purchasing food through black markets, which experienced even higher inflation. With a shortage of raw materials and the “sluggish domestic production of coal,” the economy had been brought down to its knees after the war. This is why Yoshida says that “Japan should naturally reinforce its defensive power as the nation's economy recovered,” but since it had not fully recovered, no steps should have been taken towards rearmament. This led to, as SCAP wanted, Japan expanding “vertically rather than horizontally,” referring to growing economically rather than expanding territorially. Gordon writes that, in the span of just two decades, the nation went “from poverty to prosperity,” partly because of American aid and “a more open world trading system.” Here, economic development was prioritized over rearmament which yielded a resistance to it, considering the economic circumstances of immediate postwar Japan.


55 Ohno, 146–47.

56 Ohno, 150.


58 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 42.

59 Gordon, Modern History of Japan, 289.
Another point echoed throughout Yoshida’s memoirs is the psychological effect of World War II leading to the Japanese people’s resistance to rearmament. Dower writes that “a shattered people sick of war and burdened by the knowledge that much of the world reviled them as inherently militaristic and untrustworthy” would be resistant to any rearmament in a country that was ravaged by the war itself.\(^6^0\) The people were sick of war as the gruesome images of their “miseries and destruction” were still fresh in their minds.\(^6^1\) The war had led to the death of close to 3 million Japanese soldiers across the Pacific and Southeast Asia and countless civilians from the bombardment of 66 major cities on the Japanese mainland.\(^6^2\) The current psychological background simply did not commensurate with that which was “necessary” for rearmament.\(^6^3\)

Exhaustion characterized the Japanese people in the first few years after the war, with alcohol and drug abuse and robbery sharply rising.\(^6^4\) Writers underscored the move from “the inhumanity of wartime loyalty” to “the humanity of peacetime decadence,” which was supposedly one explanation for the rise in drinking.\(^6^5\) As for how the people were seen as militaristic and untrustworthy, the Japanese World War II policy was to blame. Millions across the region bore the brunt of the expansionist will of imperial Japan, from the 1937 Rape of Nanking in China to the 1945 Vietnamese Famine, and over a quarter of all captured soldiers, mostly American and British, died in Japanese custody.\(^6^6\) Both the psychological

\(^{60}\) Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 398.


\(^{65}\) Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 229.

background of the Japanese people as well as their foreign perception were direct effects of Japanese wartime policy and were the main barriers to potential Japanese rearmament. The overwhelming academic and primary evidence that supports the significance of World War II and its aftermath brings this factor to the forefront of shaping postwar pacifism in the country.

Conclusion

It is evident that there were a myriad of factors that shaped postwar Japanese foreign policy: the US Occupation, shifting international circumstances, and World War II and its aftermath. The first factor was centered around SCAP’s influence on the creation of the postwar constitution that continues to enshrine Japan’s pacifism to this day. However, the fact that Prime Minister Yoshida still resisted American calls for rearmament amidst the Korean War shows that even when the US’s plan for Japan changed, he still firmly stood with pacifism, which meant that this conviction came from elsewhere. Focused on the shifting of international circumstances, the second factor seems plausible based on the ideology of Foreign Minister Hitoshi Ashida; however, more research must be done into the role that international circumstances played in Yoshida’s consideration of pacifism.  

In the face of rapidly changing diplomatic norms, the pacifist premise of Japanese foreign relations seemed ideal, but the factor lost its significance in light of Yoshida emphatically drawing on postwar circumstances to justify opposing rearmament.

This came to be the most compelling argument regarding the factor of World War II and its aftermath. The war had transformed Japanese cities into “extensive vistas of destruction.”

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67 Ueda, “An Idea of Postwar Japan.”


69 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 46.
the end, close to 3 million Japanese servicemen had died, and most major cities were razed.\textsuperscript{70} The country was in shambles and rearmament seemed like an economic burden for which Japan was not even close to prepared.\textsuperscript{71} Returning to the question of what accounted for Japan’s adoption of pacifism after World War II, one can argue that the immense amount of primary evidence and academic literature behind the claim about World War II and its impact shows that the factor not only shaped postwar Japanese foreign policy but played the most significant role in doing so, outshining international political circumstances and the US Occupation.

The ruptured postwar Japanese psyche evidently had a greater influence over postwar policy than it is given credit for. As Gordon rightly posits, World War II “left deep physical and emotional scars both inside and outside Japan.”\textsuperscript{72} However, what can truly be appreciated in all of this is that Prime Minister Yoshida’s stern opposition to rearmament did not stem from SCAP or global politics, but genuine care for his compatriots and their lives. This instance is one of many in history where if closer attention is paid to the finer nuances of circumstances, what had once been considered a closed case in textbooks becomes an entirely new story.

\textsuperscript{70} Dower, 45, 48.

\textsuperscript{71} Yoshida, \textit{The Yoshida Memoirs}, 146.

\textsuperscript{72} Gordon, \textit{Modern History of Japan}, 224.
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Sports and Education: How Sports Participation Cultivates Educational Success

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Introduction

Education is a core measurement for nations on the development front and is often used as a tool for measuring growth when looking at developing nations. Education levels can be assessed through literacy rates, school attendance, graduation rates, and school retention rates. The topic of sports within the context of international development is a relatively new concept. Sports play an integral role in the culture of a nation, unifying people from community levels to the international stage. For example, the Olympic Games headed by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) bring together nations through sports, ignoring the elements of politics. The 2018 Winter Games held in PyeongChang, South Korea eased relations between North and South Korea. Sports can be just as impactful at the local level. In this context, it provides children with a purpose and a goal aside from their families and schools. Put alongside the importance of education, these topics can work together to cohesively increase sports participation and educational success.

East Africa is a region with some of the lowest literacy rates in the world. This study will primarily concern members of the East African Community and the Horn of Africa. This includes Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Many of these levels of literacy rates link back to colonization. A majority of this region endured British colonization with involvement from Belgium, Italy, France, and Germany. This is also due to underlying causes. For example, gender inequality in education in Uganda is popularly due to teenage pregnancy and a need to support family success. Aside from financing and providing resources, which many non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) do, there are many means of increasing educational success as with sports. This paper explores the possibility of utilizing sports to increase school retention rates, literacy rates, and bridge the gender gap of school success between male and female students. Specifically, it answers the question of how participation in sports, through official team registration, impacts literacy rates and educational equality for youth ages 10 to 25 in East African nations.

The relationship between sports and education development is unique and lightly researched. Even in formal diplomacy, it is a new motive used by Western countries. Many of the problems within the sphere of international development stem from a lack of attention to alternative solutions or underlying problems. Increasing youth participation in sports can solve these underlying issues and serve as an alternate solution. It is a tool that can teach valuable lessons applicable to life and school. In this study, its primary influence is increasing educational success. The findings of this study can be applied to developing communities around the world. On a larger scale, low literacy rates and gender disparities within education can inhibit the welfare of families. This solution is then impactful for the welfare of communities, states, regions, and so on. In the long run, education is a tool for catalyzing economic growth. Aside from the solution of funding, promoting sports participation can increase educational success and therefore the growth of communities, nations, and regions.

This study will explore the benefits of youth participation in sports using academic and numerical sources. It proposes that participation in sports increases youth literacy rates as well as female literacy rates compared to male literacy rates. It also describes the specific requirements
to make sports accessible to youth, like funding, coaching, resources, and time. While addressing the ultimate challenges to access to sports, this research study will suggest policies that can be adopted at all levels of involvement.

**Background Significance**

International Affairs lacks research and development in the relationship between education and sports. Nations need to ensure long-term growth and stability for their futures, something that education plays a key role in. However, each nation and culture experiences different underlying issues to educational equality and literacy rates. Sports participation can be essential to increasing literacy rates, guaranteeing educational development and long-term growth of nations. Particularly within the East African region, literacy rates tend to be low compared to many other countries. Communities focus on schooling for primary and secondary school students, ignoring the impact of extracurricular activities that could aid retention rates at higher levels. Participation in sports is neglected as it is seen as a distraction from schooling. Many students cannot afford to participate in sports as they are required to help their families through working, housework, or taking care of other family members.

Previous research in this field focuses on general physical education in school, ignoring the impacts of official team registration in sports outside of school hours. It ignores the impact of this participation on literacy rates alongside gender equality. This adds a potential option to improve both literacy rates and gender equality in primary and secondary schools. It also ensures a higher rate of school retention at higher levels. Sports have the potential to be more than just a
game. They can bring people together in an apolitical manner. Sports can provide students with a focus and teach them valuable skills that are applicable to not only school but life further on. When closely tied with education, sports participation can empower school attendance. For example, sports scholarships in higher education levels entail requirements that ensure attendance and commitment to classes. This same principle utilized at lower levels can aid East African students. This paper can strengthen previous research through opening possibilities and limitations in education that can guarantee long-term growth of East African nations. This is especially applicable to the sport of soccer as it requires the least amount of resources and can be played anywhere.

This paper will primarily explore previous academic research to understand the role of sports in schools for youth ages 10 to 25, especially concerning literacy rates and gender equality. It will also explore statistics to better understand and compare numerical values of participation in sports and attendance in school. This paper will also explore first-hand perspectives from those working in educational development, sports diplomacy, and personal experiences from students in East Africa.

Economic theories and development support the significance of this study. For example, colonization is the core root of education struggles. As supported by the Settler Mortality Theory developed by Acemoglu-Robinson-Johnson, colonization directly impacted development levels of countries. It generally states that locations with high settler mortality rates led to
underdevelopment. This provides an explanation for the link of colonization to lower literacy rates and high educational inequality. Additionally, good institutions provide a direct link to good economic development. This infers that proper institutions focused on the greater development of sports and education are required. This means that for the effective use of sports for educational success, countries or the East African region must distinctly dignify an institution to progress this goal. Through the Theory of Convergence, where developing nations are thought to converge with the growth of developed nations, education plays an essential role. The New Human Development Index (NHDI), which measures the general welfare of countries, considers education as an indicator for one-third of its computation. This indicates that education can diversify a large variation between countries in terms of development, thus essential to invest in. Sports development provides a venue for that investment. Lastly, the economic empowerment of women plays a central role in general development theories. In the economic development realm, it is known that societies must empower and invest in women to make the biggest impact on development. This infers that it is essential to empower women in sports and education to prosper growth of East Africa from the individual to the regional levels.

**Literature Review**

The literature explored in this paper focuses on the impact of sports in schools throughout East Africa, focusing on a few specific country examples. Boit reflects on The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) data, stating that there is one

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sports federation member per 800 inhabitants in the East African region.\(^2\) Many of the popular sports, like soccer, were introduced through colonization by the British. The main issue with sports participation comes from funding, inadequate facilities, the lack of competitive exposure, and poor coaching. Time allocated for physical education or sports is often used instead for school or independent time. Institutions tend to ignore the relevance of sports in the success of educational development. Boit highlights that the talent is in these nations, as with any country, but the resources to bring this talent to the world stage are not available. Talents are discovered at early stages and harnessed for later development, making it essential to inspire sports participation at youth ages. Boit also explores the economic side of this issue, emphasizing the importance of funding and economic benefits.\(^3\)

Njororai takes an alternate approach to explore the role of gender and sports in Kenya. This article explores previous UNESCO resolutions to promote sports participation for youth. It explores the role of historical cultural values and how they influence female participation in sports. Njororai explains gender roles in Kenya from the time of childhood and how that plays into sports socialization. The article touches on the specific role of parents and how they can aid sports participation, especially for their daughters.\(^4\) Njororai also wrote an additional article about resource requirements. The article emphasizes the need for adequate equipment. Additionally, there is a need for coaching development to engage players and properly capitalize


Chappell and Seifu focus on specific cases within Ethiopia, arguing that the main problem is a lack of clear sports policy. As education is free at all levels in Ethiopia, proper facilities to promote sports participation are only available to approximately one-third of school-age children, particularly in urban areas. It is important to note that most of the population lives in rural areas. Ethiopia focuses on designating time during school to increase exposure to sports through physical education. In the case of primary school, this occurs during a 45-minute period each week. This is further developed in secondary school and higher education. However, this period is significantly lower than time focused on other non-formal education-dedicated blocs. This hints towards stricter sports policy within schools to be a possible solution. Chappell and Seifu emphasize that sports provide students with valuable skills applicable to education and life. They also explore the role of gender disparities, explaining how women have constraints placed on them in terms of commitment to family life, child care, and household activities. Since most women are economically dependent on men, they are restricted in their participation in leisure time pursuits. This yields a limited number of female sports participants and limited sports role models for girls. Sports organizations and policies are often dominated by men, hindering the progress of this issue.


6 Chappell, Robert, and Ejeta Seifu, “Sport, Culture and Politics in Ethiopia,” 35.

7 Chappell, Robert, and Ejeta Seifu, 42.

8 Chappell, Robert, and Ejeta Seifu, 43.
Muñoz-Bullón et al. focus on the relationship between sports and school through positive and negative aspects in higher education. For example, they explain that the positive effects of sports correlated with school increase the development of key skills that are consistent with education values. On the other hand, there are many negative aspects that pose a challenge in increasing literacy rates and gender equality within education.

**Methodology**

This research study will utilize multiple methods to collect data and propose solutions to the primary question. In this case, the independent variable is youth sports participation. The dependent variables are literacy rates, educational equality, and school enrollment. This paper will explore both qualitative and quantitative research methods. The qualitative methods will be derived from previous academic research found in articles. The quantitative methods will pull statistics from official data concerning sources like The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World Bank. This data will also be utilized to create original data. This research will be correlational and descriptive as it will look at the benefits of youth participation in sports for education while also looking at the correlation between the two. The population will focus on youth aged 10 to 25 in East African countries, concerning those in a school environment. These are also the prime ages for talent development in sports. Dropout rates tend to occur within this age range as well. Qualitative and quantitative sources of data will be selected based on location pertaining to East Africa and ages fitting within the 10-25 range.

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Interviews will be conducted with a representative from the Sports Diplomacy Division in the U.S. Department of State, and students who experienced education and the impact of sports while being raised in East Africa. The timeline of this research will cover about three months. Some obstacles may include finding proper academic articles on the specific topic and gaining diverse enough perspectives through interviews. Many of the academic articles available focus on the individual topics of educational enrollment, educational equality, and sports participation. However, they refrain from researching the correlations between all these topics. This paper will provide this correlational study, introducing solutions to increasing educational success through sports. These inhibitions will be balanced by gaining multiple sources of information through qualitative, quantitative, and interview methods.

Data

Literacy Rates and School Enrollment

This study explores a wide range of data to analyze changes and differences in education, attempting to see a correlation alongside sports participation. The literacy rates and school enrollment data are derived from the World Development Index, produced by the World Bank. Literacy rates are an important socio-economic indicator that provide an educational benchmark. School Enrollment focuses on attendance rates. When the two indicators are cross-referenced, they can provide valuable information on the differences in gender equality in education. The countries referenced in this study are Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. Each country other than Ethiopia is a part of the East African Community. Ethiopia was added as it plays a significant role in the region.
### Youth Literacy Rate, Population 15-24 years

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Both sexes (%) | .. | .. | .. | 89.39631
Female (%) | .. | .. | .. | 89.95064
Male (%) | .. | .. | .. | 88.8269

**Figure 1** Youth Literacy Rate by Population 15-24 years (World Bank, World Development Indicators)\(^\text{10}\)

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<th>Data</th>
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| Ethiopia              | 2015               | Both sexes (%)    | 85.62193 ..   |                     |
|                       |                    | Female (%)        | 82.43808 ..   |                     |
|                       | Primary            | Male (%)          | 88.74321 ..   |                     |
|                       |                    | Gender parity index (GPI) | 0.92895 .. |                     |
|                       |                    | Both sexes (%)    | 52.95187 -32.67006 |                   |
|                       | Lower Secondary    | Female (%)        | 50.80573 -31.63235 |                   |
|                       |                    | Male (%)          | 55.05134 -33.69187 |                   |
|                       | Secondary         | Gender parity index (GPI) | 0.92288 -0.00607 |                     |
|                       |                    | Both sexes (%)    | 25.98958 -26.96229 |                   |
|                       | Upper Secondary    | Female (%)        | 24.75972 -26.04601 |                   |
|                       |                    | Male (%)          | 27.19011 -27.86123 |                   |

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**Figure 2** Total Enrollment Rate by Most Recent Year (World Bank, World Development Index)

Figure 1 shows the Youth Literacy Rates for each country, focusing on ages 15 to 24. All countries are evaluated based on percentages of four series measures: Adjusted Gender Parity Index (GPIA), both sexes, females, and males. The data shown is from the available data from the most recent year for each country. Though this provides inconsistency in the difference in years, all data can be assumed to be in a similar state as it remains in a four-year range. GPIA is a measure produced by UNESCO that evaluates the ratio of female to male values of the relevant

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indicator. A GPIA below 0.97 indicates a disparity in favor of males. A GPIA between 0.97 and 1.03 indicates a parity between the genders. A GPIA greater than 1.03 indicates a disparity in favor of females.12 The data displays that female literacy rates tend to be lower than that of males in Burundi, D.R. Congo, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Tanzania. This case is reversed for Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda. Though these differences are split, they must be compared with school enrollment.

The school enrollment rates are provided by the most recent year available in Figure 2. The data is divided by primary, lower secondary, and upper secondary school levels. Each level is analyzed by four series: both sexes, females, males, and the Gender Parity Index (GPI). Also included is the difference of each series by level of education. This can explain changes in enrollment by gender at each level of schooling. A majority of the data demonstrates decreases in enrollment overall, though some experienced a slight increase between primary and lower secondary school. Most of these decreases are greater for females than males. For example, Rwanda experienced a slight increase of 4.2% in female students from primary to secondary school. However, from lower secondary school to upper secondary school, there was a drastic decrease of 47.36% for female students.

*Interviews*

Since official sports participation data in East Africa could not be found, particularly within the scope of timing for this research, interviews were conducted to allow for inference in

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replacement of the intended statistics. Two sets of interviews were conducted: one with a professional working in Sports Diplomacy and others with students who personally experienced education systems in East Africa. This was done in an effort to gain perspectives from both the side of working professionals in the field and individuals who have a firsthand understanding of sports and education, including those who have participated on teams.

The primary interview was conducted with a working professional in the Sports Diplomacy Division in the U.S. Department of State. He relayed much of the similar findings included throughout this paper. He stated that, generally, sports aid the brain and body in preparing for receptiveness in the classroom. Many of the skills, like dedication and focus, are transferable from sports to education. He stressed that sports should be a right, as seen with education and health care, but, unfortunately, this is far from realistic expectations. As supported by this research, it is clearly beneficial and applicable to education, yet there are numerous limitations to its success in implementation. Notably, he mentioned the importance of larger actors, like international organizations and governments. He stated “What has promoted growth of International Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations is the gaps in governmental provisions of services in developing countries. Governments should be filling these roles. When they are not, there comes an opportunity for other organizations.”

Nations can also learn from policies implemented by other countries. He mentioned that Norway implemented a sports model focused on increasing mass participation in sports. They do so by limiting the age of competition. Youth under a certain age cannot compete but focus on learning the sport. This

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effectively encourages them to participate in multiple sports rather than one and builds their physical literacy.\textsuperscript{14} The final question requested him to rank the importance of factors in promoting sports participation. He ranked them in order of priority, respectively: Absence of family obligations, coaches, funding, and resources.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure3.png}
\caption{Student Interviews (Positive vs Negative Responses)}
\end{figure}

Secondly, interviews were conducted with four students that experienced the education systems in East Africa. Two students were from Ethiopia, one was from Tanzania, and one was from Uganda. There were four questions asked with open responses. Three of the questions were organized by positive or negative responses and then displayed in Figure 3. The four questions were as follows:

\textsuperscript{14} Sports Diplomacy Professional, March 3, 2023.
1. What was your experience with sports in school/as an extracurricular in East Africa?

2. Did you notice it to be beneficial for your peers?

3. Do you think sports participation helps educational equality for girls, particularly in East Africa?

4. What changes do you think should be made to increase sports participation in East Africa?

Question 1 saw a result of 75% positive responses and 25% negative responses. Question 2 resulted in 75% positive responses and 25% negative responses as well. Question 3 saw 100% positive responses and 0% negative responses. Question 4 included five popular answers: funding, resources, promotion, transportation, and coaches. Overall, these interviews supported inferences based on previous research, respective of official sports participation statistics that are not knowingly collected by large organizations.

**Discussion**

*Literacy Rates, School Enrollment, and Interviews*

The variations in literacy rates and school enrollment have seen a change over the past few decades due to the role of development institutions in East Africa. For example, Uganda is home to numerous educational development organizations, many battling the underlying cause of teenage pregnancy. This has produced higher literacy rates and enrollment rates, at least at primary levels, for females. In 2018, Uganda had a female literacy rate of 89.95% contrary to the
male literacy rate of 89.40%. All these factors can be explained by the GPIA or GPI of 1.01 and 1.03, respectively. This indicates favorability for females in both categories. On the contrary, countries with less development focus, like Ethiopia, see a larger diversion between males and females. With a female literacy rate of roughly 72% and a male literacy rate of roughly 74%, the data can be further explained with enrollment. With the increase in levels of education, the GPI decreases from 0.93 to 0.91 overall. This demonstrates a large favorability towards male students. These changes in gender can be explained by a multitude of factors. Many times, children experience an increase in family responsibilities as they grow older, especially females. This eliminates their ability to attend school, impacting overall enrollment and literacy rates.

Since official youth sports participation statistics were not available, they were replaced by interviews from a professional and personal perspective. These interviews concluded that support from International Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations are required to increase participation rates. Additionally, governments have a responsibility to support these initiatives as well. The interviews concluded that there have been mixed experiences with sports for youth in East Africa. This can be an effect of many factors, including responsibilities to families or prior experiences in sports. However, a majority of responses reflected a positive perception of the impact of sports on youth in East Africa. Since there were a majority of positive responses

\[15\] Databank.
\[16\] Databank.
\[17\] Databank.
considering sports participation, and particularly female participation in sports, a confident conclusion can be drawn that sports participation benefits youth and increases equality within education.

**Qualitative Considerations from Current Practices**

Since there is limited data available on official sports participation, conclusions can be rendered from current efforts and alternative data available. The United Nations International Children’s Fund (UNICEF) is responsible for much of the world’s youth development efforts. In support of this research, they believe that sports participation improves educational attainment and develops skills including empowerment, leadership, and self-esteem. It states that “‘It’s long been understood that sport promotes children’s health and physical development, but now we have solid evidence to suggest that sport can have a powerful impact on their overall education and life skills development,’ said UNICEF Deputy Executive Director Charlotte Petri Gornitzka. ‘We must use this evidence to inspire investment in sports for children, especially the most vulnerable.’”

The UNICEF Sport for Development Report, released in 2019, includes in-depth research and data related to the benefits of sports participation for youth in developing nations. Strictly looking at the education portion, it computes for 35% of the focus area of this respective program.\(^\text{19}\) Initiatives through the Sports for Development (S4D) initiative increase student

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\(^{19}\) UNICEF.
engagement in education, including those most at risk of leaving school.\textsuperscript{20} The report outlines that S4D programs can create a positive learning environment, recruit quality educators, and engage local experts (including participants, families, communities, and schools).\textsuperscript{21} Reports also saw indirect positive outcomes that influenced better academic performance, such as better concentration and more alertness in class alongside better health. These lessons, as gathered from successes in developing nations, can be generalized to be a beneficial result of increasing sports participation for youth in East Africa. For reference, there are specific numbers for programs by country as relevant to this study: Burundi - 1, the Democratic Republic of Congo - 0, Ethiopia - 2, Kenya - 5, Rwanda - 2, South Sudan - 1, Tanzania - 0, and Uganda - 2. As seen through this U.N.-mandated project, research and development is necessary to advance solutions to increasing sports participation in developing countries.

\textsuperscript{20} UNICEF, 10.
\textsuperscript{21} UNICEF, 15.
In addition to positive outcomes, as also seen with topics in social inclusion, child protection, and empowerment, negative impacts can be utilized as a lesson for improvement. The report included data on challenges experienced by the S4D approach, as seen in Figure 4. It is important to acknowledge the challenges to implementing successful sports programs, namely fundraising, policy/practice, and technical staff/capacity. Whether it be NGOs, non-profit organizations, or government institutions leading these development programs, it is imperative that they consider foreseeable issues with funding, outline strict policies, and ensure the availability of adequate staffing. Additionally, this addresses many overlooked issues such as social norms, school-related issues, safety, and material resources/infrastructure. Many of these topics can be similarly addressed across the East African region. Due to historical experiences, such as

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22 UNICEF, 9.
colonization (excluding Ethiopia) and shared cultural practices, many social norms for female participation in sports are similar. These regionally specific issues must be addressed prior to program implementation. This can be done by coordinating with topical experts and local organizations, ensuring the consideration of regional/local values and norms.

There are also implementing partners of UNICEF, as mentioned in the 2019 report, that play an integral role in sports development for youth. For example, since 1987, Mathare Youth Sport Association (MYSA) has utilized sports for social improvement and community development in Kenya. They have engaged “over 30,000 children in work readiness and employability programs.”23 While this program focuses on employment opportunities, many other partner organizations focus on a variety of specified beneficial outcomes. “In 2006, Barcelona Football Club (FC Barcelona) and the Barça Foundation signed a pioneering partnership with UNICEF. Since then, over two million children in seven countries have been reached through UNICEF program support amounting to 19 million people.”24 The Barça Foundation focuses on social inclusion programs through child protection, equal opportunities, and education. As relevant to this study, the Barça Foundation has implemented social inclusion programs in the following countries: Burundi - yes, Democratic Republic of Congo - yes, Ethiopia - yes, Kenya - no, Rwanda - yes, South Sudan - no, Tanzania - yes, and Uganda - no.25 A majority of East African nations have benefited from this foundation, a prominent partner of UNICEF. Additionally, the Barça Foundation hosts the Olympafrica Program (since 2013) alongside the International

23 UNICEF, 16.


25 “Home: Barça Foundation.”
Olympic Committee. This program is specific to sports development in African countries, focusing on gender equality with a strong educational component. It is commonly run at community centers, including Rwanda and Burundi. Independent programs hold great power in implementing programs on the ground that increase youth participation in sports. It is clear that international organizations fund and support these programs, continuing their development. Additionally, regional organizations should take leadership in supporting these initiatives, especially those tailored to their respective regions. For example, the African Union Division of Sports, the African Youth Initiative, the East African University Sports Federation, and nation-specific Sports Ministries hold responsibility for supporting and leading the development of youth participation in sports.

Challenges

The data and information available for this study posed some challenges. For example, many of the academic articles on this topic focused on either education or sports. Many of the studies refrained from incorporating the correlation between sports and education. Furthermore, the data available posed many complications in the analysis of this study. Much of the data was not provided from the same year for each country. This can infer some deviation between the values of the data; however, these measures are not typically conducted each year. Since the data is grouped within a range of 2012 to 2019, it can safely be generalized for comparison. As research was being conducted, each data source produced different results in these measures.
World Bank data was utilized as it is the most viable and internationally supported source. It is produced in partnership with UNESCO data as well. The age range of this study also posed a challenge. Data is typically provided with standardized ranges. For example, youth literacy rates cover the age range of 15 to 24. However, school enrollment covers primary school ages to upper secondary school ages. These ranges overlap but are not strictly the same. This means that the data is not updated to its exact values today but provides a solid base for inference of gender differences in education. Additionally, official youth sports participation statistics were not available online. They were just available for Western countries, like the U.S. and the E.U. This made it difficult to make conclusions about the causations and correlations between sports participation and education. Another limiting factor of this research is the data derived from the student interviews. This data would be more legitimate if there were more students, ranging from all countries examined in this study.

**Suppositions and Implications**

This research paper explores a niche topic relatively new to international development. It suggests that participation in sports can aid youth success in education. This can later provide long-term benefits and growth for East African nations from the community to the national level. These findings can be applied to any developing nation. Aside from the common methods for promoting gender equality in education and literacy, sports can be utilized as a tool to increase school retention rates. This may be challenged by underlying or community-specific factors that impact school and sports participation. To be impactful, sports must be accessible to students through resources, time, and coaches. This research highlights the importance of niche forms of
development that can be correlated with education. Finally, it creates a domino effect to aid development within a country from the community level to the national level.

**Conclusion**

This research paper answers how participation in sports, through official community team registration, impacts literacy rates and educational equality for youth ages 10-25 in East African nations. Sports play the role of an easy and feasible way to increase school attendance, school retention rates, literacy rates, and gender equality in developing nations. This paper specifically explores the East African region as it experiences lower literacy compared to other countries. This has been a product of colonization and family prioritizations. East African cultures highly value family needs. Sports would be more attainable through resources, time, money, and coaching. They have the power to teach valuable lessons and promote educational success. The output of this research can feasibly be applied to other developing nations in an apolitical manner. It is evident that participation in sports aids youth in their educational endeavors. Additionally, it aids equality in the classroom for female students. This assumes there is community and parental support. It is essential that International Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations play a role in promoting sports participation alongside governments. Though this is a niche topic, it is integral to the future of development and can increase educational success at all levels in the long term.
References


“Ugh, Les Américains”: The Factors That Cause Parisian Animosity Toward Americans

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Introduction

After claiming and maintaining a position as one of the world’s great powers, American people, culture, politics, and goods travel to every part of the globe. However, “Americanism” is not desired by many of the countries who became its hosts – one of them being France. French people are often thought of as very hostile toward Americans. It’s puzzling that, notwithstanding their friendly diplomatic alliance, there seem to be many cultural misunderstandings that lead French public opinion of Americans to be negative. Thus, using an interpretivist epistemological approach, this paper will examine the factors that cause negative French sentiment toward Americans. This requires a strategy that respects the differences between people and the objects of natural sciences, allowing for a focus on social and historical meanings of the phenomenon being studied. \(^2\) For this approach, it is important to acknowledge that I am an American with a background in French language and history.

The data collection methods used in this paper are interviews and observations. Taking into account that interpretivism is based on the assumption that reality is subjective and ever changing, I believe that interviews and observations were the optimal ways to capture my subjects’ feelings while being conscious of my personality within the social space. I chose to conduct interviews because I had two people in mind who are well versed on the Parisian animosity toward Americans. As for my second collection method, I chose observations as I had scheduled a three-day trip to Paris in October of 2023. This narrowed my focus to a specific

\(^1\) This article was originally submitted for IAFF 2101: International Affairs Research Methods.

region and people of France, but also allowed me to attempt to detect what about me – as an American – would cause Parisians to act hostile.

Following my extensive research and data collection with the two methods described above, I will confirm that there is an undeniable amount of hostility toward Americans in Paris. I will also argue that the sharp differences in way of life, values, and political views – most notably surrounding food, clothing, demeanor, domestic policies, and capitalism – account for said hostility.

**Literature Review**

While reading the existing literature on this phenomenon, I found that scholars advance two explanations to account for the rise of French animosity toward Americans. The Political Differences School claims that the differences in the handling of politics in both countries cause widespread French disapproval. To adherents of this school, like Lacorne and Meunier, America’s image as an expansionist, domineering superpower is detrimental to French public opinion of Americans. On the other hand, the Cultural Differences School claims that extreme differences in way of life cause the French to look down upon Americans. To adherents of this school, like Baudry, Carroll, and Rozin, Remick, and Fischler, differences in everyday behaviors are the main reasons for negative French sentiment toward Americans. Both schools are essential to regard equally as I aim to prove my thesis.

Lacorne and Meunier have published significant work on the political differences between the US and France. Both acknowledge that France is known for its anti-Americanism, which they
argue is partly due to substantial French opposition to US foreign policy during the Bush administration—particularly the decision to invade Iraq in 2003. While America’s image suffered an European-wide decline between 2000 and 2008, the French maintained their reputation as the most virulently anti-American of all Europeans. Lacorne utilizes an open-ended poll to demonstrate this point: 78% of French opposed American intervention, more than a quarter of the French felt themselves “on the Iraqi side,” and 33% of the respondents “did not wish the United States to win.”³ He attributes the majority of French animosity to the Iraq War. Meunier also contends this clash over Iraq as a factor—also adding that Bush’s reelection caused increased French disapproval. However, she puts more emphasis on the French vision of the US as a “hyperpower,” always imposing its will, whatever the dispute, regardless of its inadequate domestic policies.⁴

Most of the argument made by Meunier lies on the understanding that America acts as an imperialist and expansionist superpower. She explains that the French see the US as “hypocritical”: while American politicians protect democratic values, US domestic policies allow abortion to be a highly divisive issue, guns and crime are rampant, and the death penalty is still allowed.⁵ She furthers this main point by displaying a 1996 poll in which “violence,” “power,” “inequalities,” and “racism” were the first words used by the French when asked to describe America.⁶ Lacorne makes similar points: he makes mention of the US’ domineering


⁵ Meunier, “Anti-Americanisms in France,” 129.

⁶ Meunier, “Anti-Americanisms in France,” 129.
behavior and indifference to poverty and mass killings in the world. The French see this as a display of American abuse of power and disrespect for international law.\(^7\) He uses a poll to ask “When you think of the United States, what words and images come to your mind?” . 56% of responses turned out to be negative: 21% mentioned violence in every form, such as physical violence, drugs, the death penalty, and uncontrolled gun sales.\(^8\) He also developed upon the continuance of the death penalty in America: to the French, Europeans are “civilized,” in contrast to their American cousins, the “barbarians”.\(^9\) It is clear from reading their literature that the US is not a political model to France, and the French are keen on maintaining their own political beliefs and traditions. However, neither scholar specified what area of France their polls were taken from, causing the population to be generalized regardless of the fact that sentiments toward Americans may differ based on location.

In the Cultural Differences School, scholars Rozin, Remick, and Fischler, Baudry, and Carroll lead the discussion. While all of them extensively discuss differences in cultural behaviors between French and Americans, Rozin, Remick, and Fischler focus exclusively on quality over quantity of food and their relationship with values and experiences. Using surveys, they collected data from people in major train stations in Philadelphia and Paris. They found that the French spend more time eating than Americans, but the former focus on \textit{quality} while the latter focus on \textit{quantity}.\(^10\) “The favoring of moderation is a guiding principle among the French, as opposed to

\(^7\) Lacorne, “Anti-Americanism and Americanophobia,” 6.

\(^8\) Lacorne, 2.

\(^9\) Lacorne, 11.

abundance among Americans.” Eating is more of a social experience in France than in America: the French place emphasis on the memory and experience of meals, and express a stronger concern in sharing food as part of the communal experience. French food is generally elegant, sophisticated, and graceful, while every foreign visitor who wrote about American eating habits expressed “shock and even disgust at the quantity of food consumed.” It was also found that the French value joys as opposed to comforts. Joys such as concerts, travels, quality time, and good meals, are more appreciated by the French.

While still mentioning differences in the importance of meals, scholars Baudry and Carroll place more emphasis on cultural norms, parenting styles, and interactions/conversations. They both acknowledge that Americans’ lack of preparation for interaction with foreigners is the source of the problem, but Baudry specifically says that this is due to their common ideology that the American system represents “the best mankind can hope for”; when different practices are encountered, they must be replaced as soon as possible with “superior” American practices.

Baudry and Carroll also similarly contend that French culture is implicit, while American culture is explicit. The French tend to be attracted by complexity while Americans by simplicity. Carroll also expands upon this by saying that the French appreciate keeping things private and

1 Rozin, Remick, and Fischler, “Broad Themes of Difference,” 2.
3 Rozin, Remick, and Fischler, 2.
4 Rozin, Remick, and Fischler, 3.
6 Baudry, French and Americans, 33.
regard what is too explicit as “naive,” as opposed to Americans, who “open their house to strangers on the street.”

Their last two main points lay with parenting and conversation styles. Baudry argues that American mothers encourage their children to run around the playground freely, whereas French mothers give their children a series of constraining commands. Carroll argues the same thing, saying that American childhood is a period of “great freedom and games” while French children “have a lot of homework to do and little time to play.” As for conversation styles, both scholars say that interruption is an essential part of conversation among French people. Respect for the process of alternating speakers and the depersonalization of speech in American conversations seem flat to the French; conversations are “less winding, less rhythmic, and above all, less challenging” as the conversation never “takes off” because it remains “formal” and “cold.”

The cultural differences discussed by these scholars are very varied and well-developed. However, Baudry was the only scholar who recognized the differences in attitudes and behaviors based on location, and Rozin, Remick, and Fischler were the only ones who specified their study on Paris and Philadelphia. Although Carroll made his arguments based on conversations with French and Americans, he did not mention which cities these experiences occurred in.

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18 Carroll, *Cultural Misunderstandings*, 50.


20 Carroll, *Cultural Misunderstandings*, 37.
It is clear that anti-Americanism does exist in France and can be thoroughly explained by both the Political Differences School and the Cultural Differences School combined. My research is in line with what has already been written on the topic, but there are three gaps I seek to bridge. Firstly, the schools of thought in the existing literature did not acknowledge each other’s existence, but I believe politics and culture should be intertwined; I will account for both. Secondly, the literature is not recent, therefore not accounting for the potential effects of the post-Covid tourism boom. I want to account for variations in French public opinion of Americans with this time difference. Lastly, the generalization of the French population in the literature disregards differences in sentiment toward Americans based on location. Because Paris is the French capital and the most visited by tourists, my study will focus only on Parisians to strongly answer my research question.

**Interviews**

My first interview was with Dr. Bradford Marshall, teaching professor of French language and director of the French Department at The George Washington University. We have been in touch since the spring of 2023 when I took his French 1001 class. I interviewed Dr. Marshall because he is very knowledgeable about France and French culture since he lived in Paris for around ten years between the 1980s-90s. The interview was held in his office on October 26, 2023, at 1:45 p.m. The interview lasted 53 minutes.\(^{21}\)

My second interview was with Justine Recor, a French-American third-year international affairs student at The George Washington University. She was my co-worker at the Institute for International Economic Policy during the previous academic year. I wanted to interview her

because although both of her parents are French and she holds French citizenship, she identifies as American—she was raised in Los Angeles and has lived in the US her whole life. She’s spending the 2023-24 academic year at Sciences Po Paris. Thus, her experience as an American in Paris during this time can be contrasted to that of Dr. Marshall in the 1980s-90s. The interview was on Google Meet on October 26, 2023, at 3:20 p.m., lasting 10 minutes.22

My third and last interview was with Dr. Noëlle Levy-Gires, Parisian teaching assistant professor of French at The George Washington University. This was a snowball interview recommended by Dr. Marshall. She is a professor of French 2006 at GW, which is an advanced-level class. I chose to get in touch with her because she is, in fact, Parisian; thus, she is relevant to my research question because she provided a view of Americans from a Parisian standpoint, which not only is essential for this paper, but can also be compared to Dr. Marshall and Justine Recor’s feelings as Americans in Paris. The interview was held in her office on November 2, 2023, at 1:45 p.m. The interview lasted 29 minutes.23

All of these interviews were semi-structured. I asked some fixed questions, such as “Is there a lot of anti-Americanism in Paris? If so, what type?”, “Have you ever seen Parisians being rude to Americans?” and “What are some of the stereotypes, if any, that you’ve noticed Parisians hold against Americans?” The conversations just flowed after these questions, exactly as I wanted: a more conversational environment as opposed to a structured interview without space for tangents. My identity as a GW student helped me access these interviewees and made them more comfortable to speak candidly with me about their personal experiences.


Observations

For my observations, I traveled to and observed Paris, France, for about three days in October of 2023. This trip was planned in March of 2023 for leisure, but its timing perfectly coincided with my research, allowing me to conduct field observations. I arrived in Paris on October 12 at 11:30 a.m. During my time there, I observed people and their interactions until I left on October 15 at 1 p.m. I was also able to travel to observe Versailles – a commune located one hour by metro from Paris – on October 14 from 11 a.m. to 4 p.m., which was beneficial as I saw how the treatment of Americans in Paris differs from elsewhere in France.

I stayed with Justine Recor during my trip. Her dorm is located in Cité Universitaire, which is in the fourteenth arrondissement; this is where all Sciences Po students live. The metro station directly in front of the dormitories is called Cité Universitaire and is highly used by students as the university is in the sixth arrondissement, about 20 minutes by metro. We used this metro station to get to and from the several arrondissements of Paris; the city is divided into 20 arrondissements (districts), of which I observed the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 14th, 16th, and the 18th. The images below represent where my observations were conducted. The first image shows the map of France, with the region of Île-de-France – where Paris and Versailles are located – colored in red. The second image displays the arrondissements of Paris, with the ones I observed colored in dark green.
As the French capital, Paris is a very popular tourist destination and the most visited city in France, so Parisians have constant interactions with and knowledge of Americans (as well as many other nationalities). In this data collection, I was both a participant and a non-participant; I was involved in several of the interactions that contributed to my observations, but I also just watched and listened from afar many times. In Paris, I was a *complete* outsider. On some occasions, such as at the airport and museums, I was able to code-switch and use my Spanish passport; in these interactions, my positionality was surely not that of an American tourist, but I was an outsider nonetheless.

My positionality is important to note here. I was with my friend Justine – who speaks the language fluently and is a French dual-citizen. Additionally, we are both white, young women, a potential factor of the way we were treated. Though we talked to other people in French, we only used English with each other, so our identities surely influenced my observations. Taking this into account, as well as my mannerisms and clothing, Parisians saw me as an American,
which was helpful for these observations because I was in a position to experience that Parisian hostility.

**Analysis**

The data I collected from the two methods described above provided me with answers that were not only compatible with the existing literature, but also confirm my hypothesis. The predominant reasons for Parisian hostility toward Americans are sharp differences in way of life, values, and political views—most notably surrounding food, clothing, demeanor, domestic policies, and capitalism. Contrasting ways French and Americans regard food, Dr. Marshall said:

> “Food is a huge part of life in France, bigger than it is here in the US. An American would say, ‘Look, I want this cooked. Well done.’ And restaurants in France would say ‘No, no, it'll ruin it. We are not going to cook it that way.’ They care more about the way food is eaten in France, but in the US anything goes, like drinking soda in the morning.”

Dr. Levy-Gires said the same: “We are very, very particular about what we eat in Paris. Not all regions of France, but in Paris people try to be very slim. So, healthy food is really important.” Both of their comments aligned with what I experienced in Paris, too. On one occasion, I ordered a pain au chocolat (in French) at a bakery at 6 p.m.; I didn’t know how to ask for it heated up, so Justine asked for me. The man who was working fully took a step back, turned his head, frowned his eyebrows, and in an overtly disapproving manner asked “Réchauffé?” (“Heated up?”). After Justine said “Oui” (“Yes”), he asked, again, in a rude tone, “Au micro-ondes?” (“In the microwave?”) and I said “Oui.” He continued standing there and asked “Etes-vous sûr?” (“Are you sure?”), which made me feel very judged and embarrassed. He re-heated my pain au chocolat and raised his eyebrows at his coworker and then both of them frowned at us. When I
went to pay, the coworker automatically spoke English. They did not respond when we said “Au revoir” (“Goodbye”). On another instance, Justine and I were having dinner at 9 p.m. and ordered two falafel plates to share. The waiter frowned and said “Non, non, non, un seul pour vous, le plat est grand” (“No, no, no, only one for you, the dish is large”). I later realized that my food orders, which were normal for me, were completely against their customs – Parisians care a lot about quantity, times of day, and ways in which their foods are eaten.

Something else I experienced directly was criticism regarding clothing. When I was in Paris, I wore a short dress and received extremely weird looks on the metro, both by men and women, making me feel extremely uncomfortable. I also got an unconsented picture taken of me in said dress when I was at the Louvre. Justine told me this was because Parisians dress rather conservatively, and seeing a woman wearing a dress like mine is not as usual as it is in the US.

Similarly, when asked about differences in clothing, Dr. Levy-Gires told me the following:

You Americans are very free in the way you dress. I have students here who come in shorts, very short shorts, and they couldn't do that in France. You don't go to someone with very, very short shorts. It's very rude. It’s not acceptable.

Demeanor is another social aspect that makes Parisians look down upon Americans; “English is a low-context culture and language and France is a high-context. In France, you don't have to say everything. There's much more ‘sous-entendu,’ it's understood,” according to Dr. Marshall. This, too, was mentioned by Dr. Levy-Gires as an important difference:
Parisians like the use of second level things, we like irony, we like sarcasm, we like implicit things, and we like a certain kind of modesty or discretion. We find Americans too loud, too demonstrative. French people are always negative, complaining, and I think entrenched in our brains is the idea that if you don't complain, you're stupid. American people are always, on the contrary, trying to do the best with what they have, trying to be happy. And this idea of being happy with whatever happens is not French. So we tend to despise that because we think Americans should fight more for certain things. And they're kind of brainwashed, thinking they're the greatest country on earth. Not fighting for important things like rights for their workers, for women's maternity leaves, those are the kind of things that we do have and we are proud to have them. Sometimes we call you ‘Les Bisounours’ to talk about how you are always so happy, but in a dumb, naive way.

Shifting to politics, US laws that bother Parisians are gun control, abortion, and the unamendable constitution. When telling me about her views on US domestic policies, Dr. Levy-Gires said that “each time I come back to Paris, the first thing I hear from my family is ‘Oh, thank goodness you didn't die during a shooting’ and ‘Oh, you're not obese.’” These statements imply that violence and obesity are negative stereotypes held by Parisians– both of which are in agreement with the existing literature. Furthermore, Dr. Levy-Gires said the following:

Violence. Yeah, because we hear about shootings every day in America, and that's true. That's the stereotype. Violence in the US is very, very strong in our minds. We don't have guns in France, we have laws that prevent us from having guns. And your relationship with your Constitution is very weird to us. We, of course, also have a Constitution, but we can change it. And we do it very often. We would add something or change some things. But here the constitution is just like the Bible, which is really weird to us. It's backwards because you treat it like a sacred book, which of course it is not. It's human. So it could be amended or changed, but it's not. Another important thing is abortion, yes, and all the education about sexuality, because we think you don't have a proper education in that regard. We look at numbers and we see that you have a lot of teen pregnancies that we don't have. And it's not rare in the US to mix religion and politics, like you see in abortion. In France, we have ‘La Laïcité,’ which says religion and politics must be absolutely two different. So that’s why a lot of people think Americans are backwards.

Lastly, capitalism: Parisians think the US is excessively capitalist. During his time living in Paris, Dr. Marshall was told “You and all Americans are so obsessed with money because the
first thing you wanted to know was how to get access to an ATM machine.” Dr. Levy-Gires said the same thing, including being “all about money and capitalism” as one of the American stereotypes held by Parisians. The main problem arising from this capitalism is the lack of universal healthcare and education, according to Dr. Levy-Gires:

The last two big things are healthcare and education. We in France are very proud of our social programs and we think America is very unfair, very violent to people who are weak or fragile. The opioid crisis in America is just mind-boggling for French people. We don't have that because doctors are not paid in relation to the prescription. And also all about money, ugh. You're only educated if you have money. In France, universities are free. So it's a big difference and we think it's so unfair.”

**Conclusion**

By reading and analyzing the existing literature on the topic as well as conducting my own interviews and observations, I found the factors that cause Parisian animosity toward Americans. Both cultural and political, they consist of sharp differences in way of life, values, and political views – notably surrounding food, clothing, demeanor, domestic policies, and capitalism. The anti-American feeling in France goes back to the fifties, when the subsidies from America to rebuild France after WWII were approved, like “Le Plan Marshall.” According to Dr. Levy-Gires, the French saw this “soft power” as a new way for the US to colonize other nations. However, Dr. Marshall said he did not experience any blatant anti-Americanism during his time in Paris in the 1980s-90s, though Justine gave me several examples of hostility during her time in Paris (only five months thus far) and I, too, had many negative interactions during only three days. With this, I can say that the anti-Americanism in Paris has definitely risen and become more noticeable over the years, considering a recent heavy influx of American tourists in Paris.
Though I was able to bridge the three gaps by intertwining politics and culture, evaluating the increase of this phenomenon over time, and focusing my research solely on Paris, I had time limitations that did not allow me to delve as deeply into this subject as I would have liked. I would like to see future researchers explore why Parisians are so cold; when I visited Versailles for a few hours, I was treated with respect and had heart-warming interactions with strangers. This intrigued me as I wonder if Paris is the only area of France that exhibits this overt anti-Americanism. I would advise another researcher to conduct interviews with non-Parisians and ask questions similar to mine. Despite my limitations, I am very happy with my findings and feel that I have contributed to the academic literature on this topic.
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