ADVANCING POLICE LEADERSHIP: Considerations, Lessons Learned, and Preferable Futures

Volume 6 of the Proceedings of the Futures Working Group

Edited by Joseph A. Schafer & Sandy Boyd

ADVANCING POLICE LEADERSHIP: CONSIDERATIONS,

LESSONS LEARNED, AND PREFERABLE FUTURES

Volume 6 of the Proceedings of the Futures Working Group

Edited by Joseph A. Schafer & Sandy Boyd

Acknowledgments

The Futures Working Group and the authors that contributed to this volume wish to thank the following individuals for their significant contributions to this project: FBI Behavioral Science Unit Interns Adrienne Barr, Arielle Nielsen, BSU Visiting Scholar Hayley Daglis Cleary, and other staff of the FBI Training and Development Division who provided significant assistance with the production of this volume. Their efforts included, but were not limited to, additional editing, organization, and formatting of this volume. Their generous efforts and sincere commitment to assisting with this project made it possible in its current form. Given this volume, in large measure represents a conference proceeding, any printing or editing errors that may remain are inadvertent and individual contributors should be contacted directly for clarification if needed.

Suggested Citation:

Advancing Police Leadership: Considerations, Lessons Learned, and Preferable Futures. Volume 6: Proceedings of the Futures Working Group. Quantico, Virginia. 2010.

Release Date: March 11, 2010

Biographical information pertaining to individual authors can be found at http://futuresworkinggroup.cos.ucf.edu.

The opinions and statements expressed throughout this volume are those of the individual authors and contributors and should not be considered an endorsement or a reflection of the official position of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Society of Police Futures International, or any other institution or organization for any policy,

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments……………………………………………………………………………………….........................pg. 3

Word from the Chairman……………………………………………………………………………………………….pg. 6

On Leaders & Leadership: The On-Going Dialogue within Policing
Joseph A. Schafer………pg. 7

Leadership in Crisis
Toby M. Finnie………...pg. 19

The "Universality" of Leadership & Management in Policing
Marshall Jones, Earl Moulton, & James K. Reynolds……………………………………………………………pg. 30

Police Leadership: Challenges of Definition and Measurement
John P. Jarvis, Thomas A. Petee, & Lin Huff-Corzine…………………………………………….…..............pg. 45

Leadership's Role in Shaping Organizational Culture: The Key to the Future
Marshall Jones…………………………………………………………………………….................................pg. 53

Generational Change within Law Enforcement
Jay Corzine, Tina Jaeckle, & Jeri Roberts………………………………………………………….................pg. 68

Essentials of a Futures-Oriented Public Safety Leadership Development Course
Gene Stephens…….…..pg. 76

Janus Leadership
Michael E. Buerger……………………………………………………………………………………………………..…pg. 91

Knowledge Retention and Management
Gerald Konkler……………………………………………………………………...............................pg. 101

Leadership Development Creates Chiefs of Police
Alan Youngs………....pg. 109

Tactical Science?
Sid Heal…….……........pg. 117

Leadership and Opposing Force Networks
Robert J. Bunker………………………………………………………………………………………………….…….....pg. 122

Leadership in the Net-centric Organization
John Jackson, Richard Myers, & Thomas Cowper……………………………………………………..………………….pg. 138

The "Buffy Factor": Vampires in Organizational Leadership
Michael Buerger, Greg Weaver, & Toby Finnie…………………………………………………………………pg. 150

Paths Forward: Developing and Expanding Effective Leadership in Policing
Joseph A. Schafer, John P. Jarvis, & Bernard H. Levin……...pg. 158

A WORD FROM THE CHAIRMAN

Since its inception, the Futures Working Group, an ongoing collaboration between the Society of Police Futurists International (PFI) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, has assembled numerous bodies of work relating to the future and policing. Many of these can be found at http://futuresworkinggroup.cos.ucf.edu. The entries in the present volume were initiated at a FWG meeting held in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in the fall of 2007. I wish to thank Jeri Roberts and all of the attendees for making this meeting and endeavor fruitful in the short time we had to discuss and outline these contributions.

In doing so, a group of police managers and futurists as well as academics and military personnel gathered to consider the challenges and opportunities of continually fostering leadership in law enforcement. Their goal: to draw upon past experiences, recent research and publications, and lessons learned to examine various dimensions and associated dynamics of leadership in policing. The resulting issues and answers to fostering future leadership efforts by law enforcement are what is contained herein.

At that time, we could not imagine a timelier topic in light of the potential necessities that would become realities in the economic difficulties that the world has experienced since this meeting. To be sure, much has been written about that subject; however, little has concerned itself with the future of leadership in law enforcement organizations. As discussions of this topic progressed, it became clear that many possible futures exist with regard to this very important area. This volume is an attempt to consider some of them and, further, to articulate strategies to bring about what futurists refer to as "preferred futures."

As you read the entries contained herein, remember that the goal of futurists is to make others think. As such, some entries are quite detailed exploring various aspects of the complexities of leadership in policing. In contrast, other entries are brief observations of what we believe contributes to the discussion of the future of leadership in policing. All of these entries serve to introduce new, challenging, and at times disconcerting ideas. You may agree with some authors and disagree with others. You may even feel somewhat unnerved by what has been written. Often considerations of the future breed these emotive responses. As expressed in prior FWG volumes, "ultimately, it is our fervent desire to devise ways to motivate individuals to create their own preferred future…--perhaps central to the idea of leadership-…-for yourself, for your agency, and for the communities you serve."

That goal continues. We hope this volume and the efforts that went into it are helpful toward that end.

John P. Jarvis, Ph.D.
Senior Scientist-Chief Criminologist
Behavioral Science Unit, FBI Academy
Chairman, Futures Working Group
Quantico, Virginia
May 2009

ON LEADERS AND LEADERSHIP: THE ON-GOING DIALOGUE WITHIN POLICING

Joseph A. Schafer

Introduction

Effective leadership is a concept both strikingly simple and stunningly complex. Bookshelves are filled with texts defining leadership and detailing the behavior of leaders, yet we struggle to identify a universal definition of either concept (Bass, 1990) and, more importantly, we continue to see too many police agencies struggling to find suitable candidates for promotion (Haberfeld, 2006) and struggling under the weight of ineffective leadership (O' Hara, 2005; Reese, 2005). In a recent project the author surveyed one thousand police supervisors seeking their definition of "effective leadership" and their beliefs about the traits and habits of effective leaders. The responses suggest the presence of some commonalities, but also disagreement and contradiction in what constitutes leadership and what ensures leadership efficacy. While we can reach general agreement on what leadership means, detailing how to lead is far more nuanced and generates divergent points of view.

This volume will not resolve the ambiguity and uncertainty regarding leadership and leaders. If some contributors achieve their objectives, readers may find their thinking challenged by new perspectives and complexities they had not previously considered. The objective of this volume is to discuss the dynamic and complex nature of leadership within the context of policing; this task is undertaken with the secondary objective of discussing leadership while focusing on the future of policing. As such, the intention of the editors and contributors is to not dwell excessively on the past and present, though consideration of both is necessary. Rather, the intention is to consider the leadership challenges policing will confront in the future and the ways in which police leaders and agencies might best prepare for and confront those challenges.

This volume does not offer a universal definition of leadership or leaders, though some contributors have proffered definitions of these terms for the purposes of individual chapters. The editors would, however, submit that leadership and leaders are interrelated, but distinct

concepts. For the purpose of this volume leadership is accepted as the practice of influencing and mobilizing people and resources to secure a desired outcome. Leaders are those who seek to engage in that practice, though their efforts might sometimes fail. Defining the act of leadership in general is a relatively simple task; defining the "ideal" way to lead in a given situation is far more complex. Though members of a given police agency might share a common definition of leadership, they may each hold subtly (or radically) different views on how to lead and how they wish to be led.

Leadership is not about formal authority; it is the process of motivating, inspiring, convincing, persuading, and in some other way compelling others to follow. There is a line of thinking that suggests, "every officer is a leader" (Anderson, Gisborne, & Holliday, 2006) in myriad forms and contexts. Advocates of this perspective contend even rookie patrol officers exercise a form of leadership in the handling of matters as routine as a traffic accident or the organization of a community outreach event. Accepting such a broad vision of leadership further complicates our understanding of what it means to be a leader. Though the fundamental concepts of leadership may be quite similar for the chief of a large agency and their newest rookie officer (i.e., moving people and/or the organization from point A to point B), the ways in which these processes are accomplished fundamentally differ. Viewed in this way, the mechanisms an individual uses to achieve leadership success might be quite different across contexts, work groups, and career levels.

At times readers may wonder how the content of this volume falls under the umbrella of a future issue; some contributions seem to be grounded more in the present than in the future. At its core, leadership is a fundamentally futures-oriented enterprise. One cannot guide a group, organization, or process from point A to point B without some understanding of "where" point B is located and why it is preferable to the current state found in point A. In other words, the act of leadership is a process of considering how things can be made better...it is the identification and pursuits of a preferable future. Although the notion of "the future" in such leadership processes might have a shorter time horizon than other aspects of futures thinking, the former is still important and necessary.

The "Crisis" In Police Leadership

In one of the best recent considerations of contemporary police leadership, Maki Haberfeld comments on an experience all too common for American police agencies, writing that: "Many law enforcement agencies face real problems in identifying good leaders when a position becomes available" (2006, p. 1). The editors of this volume are not aware of definitive empirical evidence suggesting a lack of adequate leadership exists in far too many police agencies. The members of the Futures Working Group (FWG); however, have experienced this problem first hand and repeatedly heard it expressed by police officers and supervisors in myriad contexts from the FBI National Academy, to International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), to Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), to state association meetings, to various training programs FWG members have facilitated and attended as participants. We suspect most readers have witnessed leadership deficiencies firsthand, both in terms of a failure to lead by those in positions of authority and an inability to find suitable candidates for promotion.

Toby Finnie leads off this volume with a chapter that presents three crises within police leadership…events and circumstances that might have been averted if the involved agencies had been able to overcome exigent conditions and manage constraints in a more effective manner. At the core of all three stories are agencies in transition due to the rapid departure of large segments of the force and/or the rapid growth of the organizations. In each case, circumstances evolved so that large numbers of new employees entered the agency without adequate training, mentoring, and leadership. To what extent is this cautionary tale salient for agencies today? Since the mid-1990s departments across the country have lamented the existence of a recruitment and retention crisis in policing. In the future will this situation manifest itself in additional agencies that struggle not only with the loss of institutional knowledge, but also the loss of sufficient personnel possessing the temperament and knowledge to exhibit leadership and professionalism commensurate with their position? The crisis might involve more than simply the hiring and training of a large numbers of new officers; it might also manifest itself in large numbers of new supervisors who have not been provided adequate training and mentoring to understand the importance of their new position.

Whether a full "crisis" will emerge surrounding police leadership has yet to be seen, but it is clear that retirements coupled with the hiring challenges most agencies are experiencing creates this potential for several reasons. First, the rapid turnover experienced in many agencies means that officers are often being promoted at unusually early points in their careers, at least relative to past practice. Personnel who would normally not be competitive for supervisory positions (though they may meet the requisite years of service) are being promoted because agencies have little choice. Because the officers who have less experience, they have less context and exposure to different leadership challenges and the good, bad, and ugly ways of meeting those challenges. Second, as Haberfeld (2006) reminds her readers, policing (among other career fields) tends to confuse management and leadership. The little training new supervisors are given is all-too-often focused on the mechanical aspects of being a shift sergeant (for example), such as staffing issues, handling paperwork, and understanding policies and procedures. How many agencies provide new supervisors with education regarding leadership theories and styles to help them understand the various ways in which their actions can alternatively inspire or disillusion reporting employees?

Third, officers are promoted based on their skills in their prior position, rather than their aptitude to excel in the position their agency seeks to fill. Officers are promoted because they have shown proficiency as a patrol officer and they have typically passed a test assessing their management knowledge of policies and procedures. Assessing leadership aptitude is a much more complicated enterprise, so it is often downplayed or ignored in the assessment and promotion process. Measuring a candidate's mastery of written dictums regarding officer conduct and agency protocol, in contrast, is a far more objective undertaking. Consequently, agencies lean toward the latter process, coupled with a vague assessment (often completely subjective) of the leadership acumen of those in the pool of promotional candidates. In extreme cases, agencies are forced to select the candidate believed to pose the most manageable threat to themselves, their subordinates, and the agency; the appointment goes to the lesser of various "evils."

Finally, the potential crisis within police leadership exists because too many agencies wait too long to begin developing the leadership potential of employees. Though some pre-

service training academies place primacy on the importance of officers showing leadership while performing their duties, how many agencies continue to develop officers as leaders once new recruits advance to field training? Do agencies continue that theme by having field-training officers stress that message and build upon recruits' potential as leaders? Do agencies continue to groom officers to be leaders, or are "followership" and conformity suddenly the desired traits? Do agencies continue to train, educate, and mentor post-probation patrol officers to enhance their skills and provide them opportunities to gain more experience, skill, and confidence as a leader? Though stressing the importance of leadership in training academies is laudable, does that process accomplish anything if the development does not continue once the recruit is on the streets?

This volume seeks to offer some ideas for how agencies can manage the gap between their leadership needs and the leadership behaviors actually demonstrated by personnel. The chapters contain information that can help avert the emergence of a leadership crisis. The contributors would not claim to have "THE" solution to enhancing police leadership in the future; readers would do well to be skeptical of any product claiming to offer such answers. Rather, the contributors seek to offer ideas and insights to generate further thought, deliberation, and experimentation among police personnel. Some of these ideas are grounded in current practice, while others extend the horizon of our thinking into the police agency of the future. Readers are reminded that futures thinking is not about making bold predictions of future states…it is about defining a preferred state of affairs and bringing that situation to life.

The Context of Leadership within Policing

As articulated earlier, the editors and contributors do not adhere to a strict dictionary definition of what leadership entails. For the purposes of this volume, leadership is loosely recognized to be the act of moving people, organizations, and/or processes to preferred states of being. Stated another way, leadership in policing is the act of bringing about change to enhance the equity, efficiency, and/or efficacy of police operations. In the context of policing, leadership can also mean exercising command authority in times of crisis. This distinguishes police, public safety, and the military from many other occupational fields, where there is

almost always time to seek input, generate consensus, and communicate rationales. Effective police leaders might need the capacity to do all of those things, while recognizing when it is time to issue split-second orders. Likewise, effective police followers must have an ability to be aware of times when their role is to provide unquestioning compliance with a peer or supervisor. Leadership in such environments becomes more complex, because the doctrines and dogmas espoused by many leadership visionaries may be ill suited for the low frequency, high impact events that define these disciplines.

Distinctions are sometimes made between "wartime" leaders and "peacetime" leaders, suggesting that different skill sets might be needed to achieve success under these differing circumstances. As noted in Gene Stephen's chapter, Churchill is sometimes viewed as a strong wartime prime minister, but not a leader who had a strong skill set for times of peace. Military commanders are sometimes viewed in the same fashion—as leaders who excelled during times of conflict but not in the times between conflicts. Likewise, some police leaders excel under the routine circumstances of leading organizations in the face of the onslaught of tedious day-to-day demands. Other police leaders excel within the crucible of the crisis situation where split-second, life-and-death decisions and judgments must be made. Some leaders can stand with feet firmly planted in these two very different environments, while many others are less fortunate.

Though leadership may be a broad concept, the specific traits and habits of effective leaders might be more bound to a given context or situation. The idea of "situational leadership" has wide popularity within policing. It implies that a given leader might need different skill sets to achieve efficacy based upon the circumstances at hand. These circumstances will vary across problems, time of day, period in history, geography, and the culture and personality of those the leader seeks to influence, among other variables. In other words, a leader with a "winning" record in one agency might fail spectacularly in another jurisdiction; this has been observed repeatedly when externally hired police chiefs "crash and burn" when they confront a new agencies with unique norms, standards, expectations, and traditions (Reese, 2005, pp. 43-63). Parallel experiences can certainly be found in the corporate world, as well. The techniques used to lead a neighborhood association in an anti-gang

initiative might be fundamentally different than those used to lead an organizational change initiative. Furthermore, those whom leaders seek to influence vary in the tactics and tools to which they best respond. Followers vary in how they want to be led, though they may not consciously recognize that which they seek from a leader; they vary in what coerces, motivates, compels and inspires them to do better and work harder.

The fragmented nature of American policing, with some 18,000 different agencies, further contributes to the situational nature of effective policing. There is considerable variation across these agencies in terms of jurisdiction, mandate, responsibilities, expectations of constituents, and organizational norms, traditions, and culture. The result is the "followers" in these variations seek to be led in divergent manners. Though the broad notion of leadership and its associated goals might be quite universal across these different settings, the actual process of leading might be quite different.

Leadership versus Management

There is a tendency in policing to confuse the concepts of "leadership" and "management"; this situation is further complicated when these terms and concepts are used interchangeably with the concepts of "administration" and "supervision" (see Jones' chapter for a more detailed discussion of this point). Leadership's function is strategic, while management's is tactical. Both are needed to ensure an organization operates in an effective, efficient, and equitable fashion, and both are needed, in some balance, for an individual to be effective in a position of authority. Though an effective supervisor might be stronger as a leader than as a manager, a basic level of proficiency on the latter dimension is a requisite to achieve desired outcomes. A supervisor can only be effective while displaying minimal leadership skills if their current duty places them in a role where little leadership is expected.

In considering the relationship between leadership and management, FWG member Tom Cowper offered an insightful perspective, paraphrased here. Viewed from a warfare metaphor, both strategy (leadership) and tactic (management) are of considerable importance; both are required to win a battle, but strategy is what wins wars. Leaders, no matter the agency, profession, sector, culture, or job, operate globally, providing strategic direction and

long-term vision (though the “long term” in some contexts might only be a matter if days), inspiration, and motivation. The leader helps the team focus the appropriate tactics in a way that wins the war. Without leaders providing that direction and motivation, all the tactics (management) in the world will not ensure success.   It can also be argued that without effective tactics (management) victory will likewise remain elusive.   This may be true, though strategists can sometimes still achieve desired outcomes with mediocre tactics; concerns may arise, however, of the losses associated with such a style of operation. Great leaders can achieve victory with less-than-ideal management, but great managers will rarely create a success while exhibiting poor leadership. Truly great leaders will, of course, recognize the need for balance in both of these dimensions. Individuals who excel through vision and motivation will generally find themselves limited if they lack basic credibility for their management skills and their ability to handle day-to-day tactics associated with their occupation.

Thus, it is the belief of the editors and most contributors to this volume that both leadership and management skills are needed to effectively lead, though not every supervisor needs to excel in both domains. Highly routine and formulaic tasks (the budget, the property room, the evidence process, the quarter master, etc.) might be better suited for those who excel in management. Persons who are detail-oriented and task-centered may be less effective if they rely on those traits in rapidly changing circumstances (leading a tactical operation). Strong managers may also struggle to develop the vision and support needed to bring about sweeping organizational transformation.

The distinction between leadership and management becomes problematic when we expect personnel to excel in one of these areas despite few efforts by the organization to develop those skills. In some points of view, developing management skills might be easier, as such processes are more task-oriented, routine, and formulaic. An employee with a reasonable attention to detail and a good work ethic should be able to excel as a manager. Leadership, in contrast, is a more amorphous concept involving a broader skill set. It may be more difficult to develop leadership acumen and most agencies make little/no effort to do so or wait until well into an officer’s career to pursue such development. Confusing leadership and management also becomes problematic when agencies assessing and promoting based on a candidate’s

aptitude in one domain, while the position at hand requires skill in the other domain. Though a strong leader with reasonable management skills may perform adequately in a management-focused supervisory capacity, a strong manager with reasonable leadership skills may struggle when assigned to a position requiring greater vision, communication, engagement, and collaboration with constituent groups.

The Content of this Volume

This volume is organized as a series of independent, but interrelated essays on contemporary and future aspects of leadership within policing. In the fall of 2007, the FWG convened a series of meetings in Pittsburgh, PA. Members of the group engaged in online discussions leading up to this meeting. Large and small group discussions in Pittsburgh helped members to further solidify their ideas on these issues. Consideration was given to leadership, including: definition and scope; nature; traits and habits; challenges; development; enhancement; and future dimensions. The essays in this volume distill these discussions. Though each was developed independently (hence, attentive readers will notice some redundancy and contradiction), our intention is to guide readers through a coherent consideration of the present and future state of police leadership.

The volume begins with Toby Finnie's presentation of three case studies in which insufficient leadership created and compounded crises in three urban police departments. Her cautionary tale may not represent the challenge facing every agency, but it is an all-too-common and recurrent theme in policing literature (see Haberfeld, 2006; O'Hara, 2005; Reese, 2005). Marshall Jones, Earl Moulton and James Reynolds follow with a consideration of the relationship between leadership and management in policing. Their essay also addresses the extent to which these domains have common elements across American police agencies.

Thomas Petee, John Jarvis, and Lin Huff-Corzine review the challenges of defining and measuring leadership within policing. Such measurement is of key importance to identify those who show leadership potential, to develop leadership skills within existing personnel of all ranks, and perhaps to evaluate the performance of current police leaders. The challenge, of course, is different definitions and measurement protocols may be needed to accomplish each

of those three very different tasks. This is followed by Marshall Jones' consideration of how organization culture and leadership play off one another. The relationship between culture and leadership can create either harmony or tension, depending on the context and how leaders address their interplay.

Generational change in policing has sparked considerable discussion and debate in the past decade. Jay Corzine, Tina Jaeckle and Jeri Roberts provide an overview of this situation and how it relates with aspects of police leadership. Their essay provides important insights for agencies experiencing personnel transition, particularly those struggling to retain young officers. Gene Stephens provides an insightful discussion of a futures-oriented leadership development program created in South Carolina. His essay provides a strong case for the merits of leadership development, the need for integrating futures-thinking into such developmental efforts, and the perils and pitfalls best avoided by those working to establish leadership development programs.

Michael Buerger's essay on Janus leadership illustrates how leadership is an inherently futures-oriented enterprise. Buerger illustrates the rationale for his position on this matter while also articulating how this situation creates a challenging situation for police leaders. Effectively straddling the worlds of the past/present and the future, while a requisite element of leadership (particularly in policing) is perhaps easier said than done. Truly effective leaders often find themselves moving to new positions, sometimes in new organizations. Coupling this reality with the current out-flow of experienced police personnel is creating a knowledge drain in many agencies. Gerald Konkler provides a solution to this potential loss by articulating how institutional knowledge can be retained and managed to avert large-scale problems. Though this matter may seem present- and management-focused, a prime example of true leadership would include recognizing and preventing the loss of key institutional knowledge.

Alan Youngs presents an account of the Lakewood (CO) Police Department, which has produced an amazing number of police executives in its relatively short history. Youngs reviews how the operations and culture of that department have contributed to the success of its employees. Sid Heal's essay on tactical science reminds us that while leadership is concerned with long-term, visionary efforts, strong leaders must often make sound tactical judgments, as

well. The program he describes is designed to help leaders understand the ebb and flow of tactical operations. Armed with such knowledge, it is hoped police leaders will be more effective in both strategic and tactical domains.

Though consideration of Opposing Force Networks emerges from military literature and doctrine, Robert Bunker articulates the lessons this matter holds for policing efforts. Bunker contends that effectively targeting a criminal enterprise requires an understanding of how a group of offenders is structured and organized to carry out their operations. Furthermore, it is helpful to recognize what motivates a group. Armed with this knowledge, police personnel can more effectively study, intervene, and neutralize the threat posed by a group. John Jackson, Richard Myers and Thomas Cowper provide a discussion of what leadership might look like in a net-centric police organization. It has been suggested that organizations are beginning to shift toward net-centric structures, which offer greater efficiency, flexibility, and adaptability. Though the military is experimenting with these types of structures in their operations, examples to date have largely been witnessed in the corporate world. These authors make a compelling case for how net-centric structures could significantly enhance policing (overcoming deeply entrenched limitations in current operational paradigms) and what leadership would entail under those conditions.

Michael Buerger, Greg Weaver, and Toby Finnie comment on the need for greater research insight into the leadership process in police organizations. The questions they propose are in need of resolution to support both scholarly pursuits and to help police organizations make more informed policy, training, and promotional decisions. Finally, the author, Bernard Levin, and John Jarvis offer an essay examining the possible and preferable paths forward toward more effective leadership in policing. This contribution also details the ways in which further debate, research, exploration, and experimentation can enhance the development and expansion of effective leadership practices.

Final Thoughts

Members of the Futures Working Group recognize some will disagree with our assertions. The intent of FWG is never to provide “THE” solution to, or future of, a given issue.

Rather, FWG seeks to encourage police personnel to consider possible, probable, and preferable futures in policing. In the context of this particular volume, the intent is to generate consideration, debate, and discussion of how police leadership can be refined to ensure more efficient, effective, and equitable police operations. It is our hope that readers will find the ideas intriguing, even if they may disagree or dispute some of the conclusions.

References

Anderson, T.D., Gisborne, K. & Holliday, P. (2006). *Every officer is a leader* (2nd ed.). Victoria, BC: Trafford Publishing.

Bass, B.M. (1990). *Bass & Stogdill's handbook of leadership: Theory, research, & managerial applications* (3rd ed.). New York: The Free Press.

Haberfeld, M.R. (2006). *Police leadership.* Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.

O'Hara, P. (2005). *Why law enforcement organizations fail.* Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.

Reese, R. (2005). *Leadership in the LAPD: Walking the tightrope.* Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.

LEADERSHIP IN CRISIS

Toby M. Finnie

Labor force projections indicate that growth in numbers of older workers will soon exceed the growth of young workers who are just entering the workforce. The outcome is that by 2016, one in four workers will be age 55 or older. Police and detective supervisors are among the top ten occupations that will be most affected by "Baby Boomer" retirements and on average, 54 percent of workers aged 45 and older will leave the workforce in the next 10 years (U.S. Economist Office of Employment Projections, 2000). Veteran (ages 62+) and Baby Boomer (ages 42–61 years) law enforcement leaders increasingly express concerns about the influx of Generation X (ages 28–41) and Generation Y (ages 21–27) recruits into policing careers during the time when a mass departure of experienced supervisors is anticipated.

To fill the void left by retiring Baby Boomers, police departments will be required to promote less experienced officers whose positions will in turn need to be filled by inexperienced recruits. In addition, early retirement programs may further exacerbate the exodus of seasoned police personnel. Police departments could end up with severe staffing shortages due to projected retirements and attrition. This should come as no surprise; similar occurrences have happened before; often with disastrous outcomes.

Hiring Rush

Washington D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), 1989-1990

Based on an estimate that 2,351 officers (61%) of MPD's 3,880 officers were nearing retirement and expressing alarm at the increase in violent crimes, Congress mandated Washington MPD to hire 1,800 officers. Quotas and hiring deadlines were put in place with very rigid and short-term demands that they be met (Horton, 2000, P. 12-13). Within twenty months, roughly 1,500 applicants were recruited, rushed thorough academy training and turned out on patrol. More than half of the lieutenants and captains and nearly 80% of the inspectors had retired (Flaherty, 1994). The considerable increase in probationary officers

coupled with a scarcity of veteran officers meant that there were not enough field training officers to go around. Consequently, 1,500 inexperienced police officers began to patrol the streets. A few were fearful, most were poorly trained, and all worked under minimal supervision and guidance.

An investigation conducted by the *Washington Post* found that the 1,500 graduates comprised a third of MPD's workforce and accounted for more than half of 201 D.C. police officers arrested for charges ranging from forgery to rape and murder (Harriston & Flaherty, 1994, p. A1). In addition, in May of 1992 the FBI conducted an undercover investigation code-named "Operation Broken Faith" and involved the arrest and conviction of 12 MPD officers—11 of whom were part of the hiring rush—on charges ranging from bribery, extortion, conspiracy to distribute cocaine, conspiracy to distribute marijuana, and carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking offense (Horton, 2000, P. 14).

<u>Pittsburgh Police Bureau (PPB), 1994-1995</u>

The city of Pittsburgh offered early retirement incentives that brought about the rapid departure of 410 senior police officers. An additional 136 officers retired on disability or regular pensions. Pittsburgh was compelled to replace nearly half its police force with new recruits. The outcome was that fifty percent of Pittsburgh's 1,171 officers had less than five years experience. One zone commander commented that 90% of the officers in her sector had less than three years experience. Field training suffered for lack of seasoned supervisory staff. For a time, field training was suspended; there simply were not enough veteran officers to train the recruits. Mistakes were made; inexperienced officers' errors in judgment and performance went uncorrected, sometimes escalating into criminal offenses:

> Moreover, while most of the veteran officers were fired for long-standing, noncriminal problems such as alcoholism, most of the younger officers were terminated after being arrested on criminal charges that included insurance fraud, drug selling, prostitution, sexual assault and even homicide (Fuoco, 1999).

In 1996 the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and other organizations filed suit on behalf of sixty-six plaintiffs, alleging civil rights violations against the city and 100 PPB officers. The ACLU invited the US Department of Justice to conduct an investigation under the Violent

Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which provided authority to use civil litigation to root out "patterns and practices" of police misconduct. The Justice Department agreed to investigate. Findings included use of excessive force, false arrests, improper searches and seizures, failure to discipline officers adequately, and failure to supervise officers. In April 1997, Pittsburgh was the first city in the nation to sign a consent decree subjecting PPB management and operations to federal oversight.

Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), 1999

The US Department of Justice launched an investigation in response to citizens' complaints regarding officers involved in theft, drug dealing, perjury, improper shootings, evidence tampering, false arrests, witness intimidation, and beatings of suspects by LAPD's Rampart Division officers. The officers had been assigned to an elite anti-gang unit called "Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums" or "CRASH." LAPD formed a Board of Inquiry (BOI) to analyze management failures and propose remedies. Among the findings was that the application of "hiring standards was compromised … *during periods of accelerated hiring* in the late 1980s and early 1990s" (emphasis added) (Los Angeles Police Department, 2000, p. 14).

In September 2000, the city of Los Angeles agreed to enter into a consent decree allowing the U.S. Department of Justice to oversee and monitor reforms within the LAPD for a period of five years. The decree addressed: use of force investigation procedures, search and arrest procedures, gang unit operations and administration, the initiation of complaints, the conduct and adjudication of investigations, discipline and non-disciplinary action, motor vehicle and pedestrian stops, and the implementation of a non-discrimination policy. Due to negative and ongoing publicity about the Rampart Division corruption scandal, LAPD's rate of attrition soon doubled its hiring rate, leaving open positions for 884 officers. Veteran officers increasingly transferred out of LAPD to take positions with other agencies and there was a sharp reduction in the number of new applicants. LAPD was forced to cancel a July 2001 training academy for lack of recruits (Butterfield, 2001).

The BOI found that the average experience of the officers who remained on the job was about five years.

> We also have a fairly young Department and many people promote so rapidly through the supervisory and mid-management ranks that they never have the opportunity to acquire the institutional knowledge, which is so critical in those positions (LAPD, 2000, p. 351).

The BOI determined that quality of supervision was poor and that inexperienced officers were provided little or inadequate guidance.

> Instead of having the very best officers and supervisors, the CRASH unit and other specialized entities were now staffed by a pool of officers and supervisors with limited tenure and experience. The specialized units often had new, untested sergeants and either very young officers or officers who may not have been selected into the units had a larger selection pool existed. In some cases, probationary officers were assigned to CRASH in order to fulfill their personnel needs. These inexperienced young officers were simply unable to distinguish effective police work from patterns indicative of potential misconduct (LAPD, 2000, p. 57).

Police departments should prepare for the anticipated exodus of Baby Boomer supervisors and seasoned line officers and anticipate high recruiting needs. Leadership training must become an integral part of police curriculum, beginning at the academy and continuing on the job as officers promote through the ranks.

Lowered Standards

Whether mandated or politically motivated, downward modifications of intellectual, physical, and character standards of police officer candidates to satisfy hiring quotas may ultimately lead to collapse of public trust and support, especially if such practice generates incompetent police officers. An analysis of hiring practices and outcomes of the above-cited police departments is illustrative.

<u>Washington D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), 1989-1990</u>

In its rush to hire 1500 officers, MPD's traditional applicant vetting processes were abbreviated:

> Critical background checks on applicants were cut short, and investigators scrimped on visits to neighborhoods and interviews with former employers. Physical examinations were hurried, and some people who failed to meet minimum requirements were hired

> anyway. The psychological services unit, which had rejected one in five applicants in other years, rejected just one in 20 (Harriston & Flaherty, 1994, p. A1).

An MPD academy training director reported that numerous recruits tested low in reading comprehension and needed remedial classes. District Mayor Marion Barry reportedly refused to allow the classes out of concern it would reflect negatively on the city's public schools that many of the recruits had attended (Harriston & Flaherty, 1994, p. A1).

Pittsburgh Police Bureau (PPB), 1994-1995

In the case of Pittsburgh Police Bureau, there were no discernable signs that hiring standards had been lowered in order to quickly replenish the depleted ranks with 550 new officers. However, there were indications that some corners were cut. A court order in effect from 1975 to 1991 directed PPB to hire one white woman, one black woman and one black man for every white man it hired (Leinwand, 2004). A reverse discrimination lawsuit caused the court to set aside the injunction. When the push was on to quickly recruit replacement officers, the new hires were predominantly white males.

Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), 1991 & 1999

A decade before the Rampart corruption scandal in Los Angeles, a widely televised incident depicted a fleeing felon, Rodney King, being beaten by LAPD officers. Public outcries of police brutality regarding the telecast compelled an inquiry conducted by the Christopher Commission review board. In 1991, the Commission recommended, and LAPD agreed, to increase racial diversity by imposing hiring quotas for minority and female officers. To meet those requirements, however, LAPD found it necessary to lower standards for physical capability, intellectual capacity, and personal character. Former Los Angeles Police Department Chief Daryl Gates described the challenges of compliance with the guidelines:

> As a result, if you don't have all of those quotas, you can't hire all the people you need. So you've got to make all of those quotas. And when that happens, you get somebody who is on the borderline, you'd say "Yes, he's black, or he's Hispanic, or it's a female, but we want to bring in these additional people when we have the opportunity. So we'll err on the side of, we'll take them and hope it works out." And we made some mistakes. … Some folks became cops, LAPD officers, who shouldn't have (Boyer, n.d.).

The outcome was that mediocre applicants, including some with street gang affiliations or other criminal ties, became LAPD officers. Several were prosecuted as a result of their criminal activities while assigned to the Rampart Division CRASH unit.

The March 2000, the LAPD *Board of Inquiry into the Rampart Area Corruption Incident Public Report* indicated that reduced standards presaged the Rampart scandal:

> It is important to note that the July 9, 1991, Report of the Independent (Christopher) Commission …all but predicted that a weak application of hiring standards was allowing risky candidates to become Los Angeles Police Officers (LAPD, 2000, p. 9).

The Board of Inquiry also noted that shortcuts were taken in applicant vetting processes:

> However, a 1997 internal audit disclosed that a “short form” background check format was being used in lieu of the more detailed background investigation narratives. We were never able to pinpoint its origin, but it appears that the short form originated during the 1994 or 1995 accelerated hiring periods in order to meet the increased demand for large Academy classes. As a result, the investigative paperwork may not have contained the same emphasis or detail needed to properly evaluate a marginal candidate (LAPD, 2000, p.14).

And finally, the Board interviewed 204 LAPD employees (probationary officers through sergeant and non-sworn employees of various classifications) who “overwhelmingly pointed to the department's lowered hiring standards as a major factor in the breakdown of integrity and ethical standards” (LAPD, 2000, p. 317). While efforts to achieve diverse and racially balanced police departments are to be encouraged, the process of hiring acceptable candidates should not be rushed or compromised. Hiring should be based on merit, not quotas. “As one analyst explains, the problem is not ‘…diversity per se, or the qualifications of any particular group, but the standard-lowering procedures by which diversity is often achieved’” (O’Malley, 1997).

Inadequate Training & Supervision

In addition to sharing rushed hiring under lowered standards, MPD, PPB, and LAPD had other shortcomings in common:

- Insufficient or nonexistent training of mid level managers and front line supervisors
- Inconsistent and inadequate supervision of young officers.

Washington D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), 1989-1990

MPD's training academy was geared to handle 300 trainees per year. With the hiring push, the academy began operating double shifts—with no increase in instructor staffing—graduating 1,500 recruits in two years. Trainees received as little as 322 hours at the academy, two-thirds less training hours than neighboring academies in Prince George and Fairfax Counties. Some course work was dropped entirely; other courses such as media relations and dealing with intoxicated individuals was assigned for home study only. Defensive and high-speed pursuit driving was cut back to just a few hours (Harriston, 1994, p. A1). Notably, MPD police-involved traffic accidents rose from 500 in 1988–89 to 597 in 1990 and 632 in 1991 (Trautman, n.d.).

Another outcome of poor training and supervision observed by prosecutors was that the officers were ill-prepared to testify at trial.

> Bad officers make bad witnesses, and whether officers are bad because they broke the law or bad because they are poorly trained, they are a handicap that prosecutors don't need (Flaherty, 1994, p. A1).

Juror's perception and confidence in police are eroded when officers' reports are incomprehensible due to poor spelling, grammatical errors, factual discrepancies, or inaccurate statements. Report writing was barely addressed during academy training and supervisors made little effort to guide officers. Further reflecting inadequate academy and on-the-job training, one prosecutor lamented that the officers were not astute observers and had little understanding of the law.

A lack of training was not just a problem at the academy; supervisors also were not receiving the training they needed. One commander commented that he had not had any updated legal training on, for example, search and seizure, in nearly a decade. Still, the lieutenant was tasked to provide guidance to subordinates on search and seizure. Already overworked prosecutors found themselves forced to provide advice to officers on report writing, proper courtroom attire (no sunglasses or shorts), and giving testimony, simply because the officers had not received that training in the academy. It was impossible to calculate how many criminal cases were dismissed or overturned, either because the officers themselves had been implicated in criminal activities or because the officers appeared incompetent and

provided weak testimony. Replacement and training costs skyrocketed. MPD spent $3 million to train new officers to replace those who had been dismissed from the department due to criminal involvement (Flaherty, 1994, p. A1).

Pittsburgh Police Bureau (PPB), 1994-1995

The city of Pittsburgh never admitted to wrongdoing, so most of what is known about failure to train supervisors and new recruits is anecdotal. One PPB Assistant Chief's comment, however, is revealing: "Rookies were training rookies"(Shepardson, 2003, p. 11A). Terms of the consent decree called for more training, especially for young officers. PPB was required to develop a million-dollar computerized "early warning system" to track officer's performance and flag for closer review for possible violation such things as citizen complaints, use of force, and traffic stops. Officers with three "flags" were sent for counseling or retraining. Changes were to be made in handling of citizen complaints. It is notable that the Early Warning System, developed under the command of PPB Chief Robert McNeilly provides for systemic analysis of line officer conduct, and was touted as the key change most beneficial to PPB for the long term (Shepardson, 2003, p. 11A). History may be doomed to repeat itself in Pennsylvania. According to the *Pittsburgh Post Gazette,* it does not appear as if some political leaders do learn from past mistakes:

> State Rep. Edward Wojnarski, D-Cambria, has introduced a bill to allow municipal police officers in 53 third-class cities to retire with full pension benefits after 20 years on the force, regardless of their age (Barnes, 2007).

Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) 1999

The LAPD Board of Inquiry found that inconsistent or poor supervision was a factor leading to the Rampart corruption scandal. It emphasized that there was a critical need for timely training. Calling for correction, the LAPD Board of Inquiry admitted, "Newly promoted sergeants frequently do not attend sergeant's school until months, and in some cases years, after their promotion." The Board also recognized the inexperience of mid-level managers, pointing out that there was insufficient training on job procedures, most of which was on-the-job training and "predicated on the knowledge of the one doing the training" (LAPD, 2000, p. 351).

> Instead of having the very best officers and supervisors, the CRASH unit and other specialized entities were now staffed by a pool of officers and supervisors with limited tenure and experience. The specialized units often had new, untested sergeants and either very young officers or officers who may not have been selected into the units had a larger selection pool existed. In some cases, probationary officers were assigned to CRASH in order to fulfill their personnel needs. These inexperienced young officers were simply unable to distinguish effective police work from patterns indicative of potential misconduct. (LAPD 2000, P. 57)

To remedy the training deficits, the LAPD Board of Inquiry recommended:

> A one to three day introductory course should be developed for new sergeants, detectives II and non-sworn supervisors. It should be given the first working day(s) of each deployment period, regardless of the number of personnel to be trained, and no one should be permitted to work as a supervisor until he or she attends the course (LAPD, 2000, P. 351).

It was suggested that the training focus on roles and responsibilities of police supervisors and be designed to “increase courage on the part of supervisors to make the tough decisions necessary to avoid ethical breakdowns in the future.”

Preparing for the Exodus

What lessons can be learned from the case examples described above? Leadership failures occurred at every level. Civic leaders failed to appreciate the short-term economic benefits of implementing early retirement programs weighted against the long-term consequences of replacing hundreds of experienced, senior officers with poorly vetted, inadequately trained and largely unsupervised recruits. In a prescient memo to the mayor of Washington DC, then MPD Chief Maurice T. Turner, Jr. wrote, “without addressing these issues of personnel shortages and insufficient recruitment, crime will undoubtedly rise and the department's image will be tarnished and its influence diminished” (Harriston, 1994). His forewarning went unheeded. Police leaders failed to candidly advise politicians as to potential consequences of retiring large numbers of experienced veteran officers, or failed to strategically plan for veterans’ mass departures. Activist leaders’ insistence that police departments implement affirmative action hiring policies regardless of availability of qualified minority and female applicants placed impracticable compliance burdens upon beleaguered

police departments.

In addition, police leaders permitted corruption of hiring standards, background investigations and psychological examinations. There was systemic failure of middle managers and front line supervisors to train and guide new officers in ethical conduct. The Board of Inquiry's analysis summed up LAPD's leadership failure as a loss of integrity that infected the department at all levels:

> It is very clear that many of these officers allowed their personal integrity to erode and their activities certainly had a contagion effect on some of those around them. We, as an agency, must learn from what they did and establish systems to prevent and detect similar patterns and activities should they occur in the future. This scandal has devastated our relationship with the public we serve and threatened the integrity of our entire criminal justice system. Distrust, cynicism, fear of the police, and an erosion of community law and order are the inevitable result of a law enforcement agency whose ethics and integrity have become suspect. Clearly, public safety in this City has been harmed and it will take strong resolve by Department personnel, along with equally strong support from our City's leaders, to correct the problems that allowed this breakdown (LAPD, 2000, P. 331).

In the coming decade, police are doomed to repeat the mistakes of the past unless steps are taken to plan for the exodus of Baby Boomers, to prepare the next generation of supervisors and field training officers to lead with integrity and to instruct young officers to be accountable and responsible.

References

Barnes, T. (2007, February 16). Capitol notes: Police retirement, congested Philadelphia, campaign debt. *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette Harrisburg Bureau.* Accessed online http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/07047/762509-293.stm September 6, 2008.

Boyer, P.J. & Kirk, M. (n.d.). LAPD blues: The story of Los Angeles' gangsta cops and the corruption scandal that has shaken the once great LAPD. *PBS Frontline.* Accessed online http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/lapd/race/protectserve.html August 20, 2008.

Butterfield, F. (2001, July 30). City police work losing its appeal and its veterans. *The New York Times.* Accessed online http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F0CE7DD113DF933A05754C0A9679C8B63 September 4, 2008.

Flaherty, M.P. (1994, August 29). After rookie got role model, he lost his job." *The Washington Post*, A13.

Flaherty, M.P. & Harrison, K. (1994, August 30). Police credibility on trial in D.C. courts. *The Washington Post*, A1.

Fuoco, M.A. (1999, June 27). Growing pains plaguing police, city rinds inexperience of numerous new hires led to problems in '90s. *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette.* Accessed online http://www.post-gazette.com/regionstate/19990627cophire2.asp August 29, 2008.

Harriston, K.A. & Flaherty, M.P. (1994, August 29). Cutting corners at police academy: Training was reduced, standards eased in rush to expand D.C. force. *The Washington Post*, A1.

Harriston, K. & Flaherty, M.P. (1994, August 28). District police are still paying for forced hiring binge. *The Washington Post*, A1.

Horton, R. (2000). *Independent judiciary and public corruption law enforcement in the United States*. Accessed online http:www.tdri.or.th/reports/unpublished/os_paper/horton.pdf

Leinwand, D. (2004, April 25). Lawsuits of '70s shape current police leadership. *USA Today.* Accessed online http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-04-25-female-police_x.htm August 29, 2008.

Los Angeles Police Department (2000). *Board of inquiry into the Rampart Area corruption incident public report*." Accessed online http://www.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/boi_pub.pdf August 24, 2008.

O'Malley, T. J. (1997, April). Managing for ethics: A mandate for administrators. *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*. Accessed online http://www.fbi.gov/publications/leb/1997/apr975.htm August 03, 2008. Quoting McGowan ,W. (1994, June 20). The corrupt influence of police diversity hiring. *The Wall Street Journal*, A123.

Shepardson, D. (2003, June 29). Feds shape up Pittsburgh Department: After five years of oversight, residents say cops are more humane. *The Detroit News*, 11A. Accessed online http://www.oracleinternational.com/articles/Article2.pdf September 07, 2008.

Trautman, N. (n.d.). *Stopping political interference within law enforcement*. Accessed online http://www.ethicsinstitute.com/pdf/Stopping%20Political%20Interference.pdf September 05, 2008.

U.S. Economist Office of Employment Projections (2000). Gauging the labor force effects of retiring baby-boomers. *Monthly Labor Review Online,* 123(7). Accessed online http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2000/07/art2abs.htm August 13

THE "UNIVERSALITY" OF LEADERSHIP & MANAGEMENT IN POLICING

Marshall Jones, Earl Moulton, & James K. Reynolds

What is the difference between leadership and management? The answer may depend on whom you ask. Philosophical debates about leadership and management theories can become as passionate as discussing politics. The answers may be prescribed "doctrine" specific or simply the model cognitively constructed from life experience of the beholder. The academic exploration of "leadership" and/or "management" is often an exercise that creates more ambiguity than clarity. Consensus on what defines leadership seems as elusive as the path to world peace. From schoolyards to battlefronts, leadership emerges in a variety of ways determined by the group dynamic, the individual, and the situational/environmental context.

Bookstores are full of leadership volumes. The Internet offers concepts ranging from peer reviewed academic research to leadership blogs with an infomercial tossed in from leadership consultants or "gurus" with the programs guaranteed to transform your organization. Most endeavors to research leadership and management leave the inquirer frustrated over the lack of consistency in the messages. The ability of leaders and managers to efficiently and effectively regulate daily tasks is predicated on the line-level members for the daily productivity. The exploration of followership and subordinate behaviors is often overlooked in literature regarding leadership and/or management.

This chapter is written to explore traits, behaviors, and other dynamic influences impacting "leadership" and "management" that could be considered universal in policing. Exploring these areas in the context of policing helps make the discussion more focused, but much of the discussion holds value across many organizational domains. It is also important to look beyond the various "types" or "styles" of leadership and instead look at the organizational needs for leadership and management and the roles they fill. This chapter is intended to foster a foundation for reflection, thought, and debate on leadership and management in policing. The goal is to facilitate contemplation, dialog, training, and future research in the areas

outlined. Individuals dedicated to academic exploration are encouraged to consider these comments and past research and literature on leadership and management.

We will explore, compare, and contrast some concepts and traits of not only leaders and managers, but also the dynamics of subordinates and "followership." Leaders and managers share in the task to "supervise" others. The degree of influence subordinates have in shaping the interpersonal dynamics and work behaviors is critical to the effectiveness and efficiency of the organizational mission. This point is often missing in many debates on leadership and management, but plays a key role in shaping the "style" of supervision required.

A seasoned patrol sergeant, for example, may enjoy confidence in his/her squad and has time to develop officers. His/her leadership style focusing on development has been earned from the squad by attaining and achieving a solid balance of community policing with proactive law enforcement. The squad gets the job done with ease. Not all officers see the entire big picture, but they trust the sergeant and he/she keeps them informed and out of trouble with the brass. Transfer that same seasoned sergeant to a new squad and the leadership style most likely will change to a more control-centered style. When rapport and trust are developed this style may evolve and become more development-centered, but the dynamics of the members plays a critical and evolving role in the supervision of the squad.

Another clear distinction in this discussion about leadership and management is that between the individual (micro) and the organizational (macro) aspects of leader and manager behavior. Distinguishing the big picture of the entire organization from the daily life of a squad or team tasked to handle the day-to-day mission is important for proper frame of reference.

The presented perspective offered here on leadership and management is based on three fundamental assumptions. First, leadership and management are very different, yet necessary, functions of organizational effectiveness, efficiency, and the ability to adapt to change. Second, the context of the discussion is police organization and culture. Third, that leadership and management must be examined both from the individual (micro) level and the agency-wide (macro) level.

Individual Perceptions on Leadership

There are countless books, theories, and leadership "programs" that profess particular doctrines, propositions, and concepts of leadership designed to make someone a better leader. Some of these various leadership paradigms may prove a good "fit" for an entire organization by providing a common theme, vision, or enhanced cohesion. Finding common operational scaffolding for leadership and management across the endless and ever-changing situations and environments is elusive. This search for a leadership "holy grail" should be expectedly difficult, since every person brings a unique and different perspective based on his/her life's experiences. The complexities of the involved individuals, combined with the dynamics of situations and problems presented, sets up an unreasonable expectation that leadership dynamics can be predicted at all. Perhaps we should strive for recognition that each individual, organizational, and situational interaction is unique, rather than prescribe a specific leadership or management doctrine or style.

We all build our cognitive understanding of the world via life experience. We each bring our own "perspective bias" into any discussion on a given situation. We each also possess different sense making (common sense) abilities. The groups' collective sense making ability is also determined by the experiences of the group. Knowing there are often a variety of options to solving a given situation is important for an agency to be effective. Demonstrating the wisdom to allow the group to explore various options, in appropriate situations, and to experience the quest for the optimal solution is critical to a member's experience and an agency's ability to adapt to change.

The "Leadership" Perception: Micro versus Macro

The study and exploration of leadership can become even more elusive when trying to articulate an operational definition of "what" it is. It is important to differentiate the leadership and/or management traits and behaviors of each individual member versus a "position" of leadership within an organization or group. There is a common myth that an individual is either a leader or a manager. Leadership is, however, far from a static trait. It is very dependent on the group interaction and situation as well as countless other dynamic factors. What is

important is to recognize that there are positions within an organization that rely heavily on "leadership" trait-based tasks and behaviors and some positions demand a higher frequency of management skill-based tasks.

When looking at leadership from a macro perspective the term "leadership" is often used synonymously with supervision or management. When we step back from the individual's perceptions and expectation associated with the "hype" commonly asserted by the "leadership of the day" it becomes clearer that organizations depend on leadership and management within to be efficient and effective. Reality necessitates a balance of leaders and managers in an organization to efficiently operate. Unfortunately, many police chiefs and sheriffs (as well as CEOs in the corporate sector) prefer to use the term "leaders" universally when talking about supervisors in their agency. This has created a perception that one must become a "leader" to succeed and has focused attention away from management skills. This leadership expectation, spoken or not, is reinforced when "leadership" is the preferred, and often the only means, to upward advancement.

Those with exemplary management skills are often overlooked at promotion time, especially when promotional processes ignores the knowledge, skills, and abilities of a job analysis for law enforcement supervisor in favor of a process based on the leadership "book of the month." An approach that includes a written exam based on agency-specific written directives and scenario-based problems offer a fair playing field to members who may have a stronger leadership or management style, which are equally valuable to the organization. Attention to detail and daily diligence in areas such as budgeting, staffing, and other management-heavy duties must be accomplished and if not staffed properly, can prove devastating to an organization without good managers.

Components, Interactions, and Definitions

Supervisor

A supervisor is the person that the agency recognizes as accountable for overseeing subordinates within the agency's command structure. Nearly everyone in the agency has a supervisor that reviews and evaluates performance, handles personnel administrative issues,

and enforces rules and regulations. Supervisors may demonstrate either leadership or management behaviors, or both, as determined by the situation, their position, and their individual traits.

Subordinate/ Follower

The first and often overlooked component to examining leadership and management are the individuals that get the job done. In a simplified view, supervisors assign subordinates to complete tasks. This viewpoint may hold true for completing reports and timecards, but the dynamic of followership and subordination is a complex area of research in its own respect. The term "followership" implies something different than subordination. Followership involves identifying with the leader and the vision and behaving in a proactive manner to contribute to the collective effort to arrive at the designated outcomes. Robert Kelley (1996) argues that followership requires focus on critical thinking and participation as behavioral dimensions. He distinguishes four "followership" types: "sheep", "yes people", "alienated followers", and "active followers." Figure 1 builds on Kelly's 1996 proposition on followership behavior by separating the subordinate behaviors from followership. This model agrees with Kelly's basic propositions but argues that all behavior other than "followership" is subordinate behavior.

"Sheep" lack strong participation and critical thinking behaviors. They do what they are tasked with little fanfare or self-initiation. Provided their duties fall within their comfort level, they accomplish required tasks adequately. The sheep usually reserve their opinions on issues. Many new members to the organization may fall into the "sheep" category due to a lack of knowledge, skills, and/or abilities but develop as their competence and confidence increase.

"Yes people" demonstrate more participation than sheep but share low critical thinking. These members may "talk the talk" but may fail to follow through completely. When asked for opinions or suggestions, yes people tend to go with the decision or perspective of the supervisor or the person in charge of the situation. Yes people want to be included but do not have the desire or ability to offer an opinion on the issue.

"Alienated followers" are actually critical observers that do think critically, but are passive (sometime passive/aggressive) and demonstrate low participation. This critical

observer can actually be harmful or damaging to the unit or mission. Some members in this category might have perceptions that the agency or leader has not been fair to them. Some situations can be attributed to the member's inability to "see the forest for the trees" or his/her lack of a macro perspective to complete a more holistic vision required for upward mobility. Often cynical, these members seem to lurk, waiting to point out the failings of others and/or undermining supervisors.

Followership is demonstrated with high critical thinking and participation behaviors. They "get it" and share a desire for that organization to thrive and achieve the mission with quality outcomes. These members demonstrate the situational awareness to make suggestions or share critical observations at appropriate times. Some of these followers are actually "informal leaders" on the squad or team and exercise great influence with co-workers. Followers become natural candidates for promotion.



Figure 1

Research on followership is a relative new area of inquiry. There appears to be consensus that followership and leadership are related but more empirical research would be useful, as it would provide additional insights for targeted training and development initiatives. Supervisors can use this information to offer developmental feedback to subordinates and followers as well as self-reflect on their own behaviors in their agency.

Leadership

Simply put, leadership's basic power is "influence." There is no requirement that a leader be in the organizational hierarchy for the influence of leadership. Many debates on leadership describe it as "you know it when you see it" but it seems to elude a universal definitive and all-inclusive list of observable behaviors or traits. There are many propositions and models that offer great insight, but none seem to account for all environments and situations. It is also important to recognize that "leadership" and "influence" can be exercised for either good or bad outcomes. Not only can members contribute to the organization's success, good followers may develop into informal leaders on the squad. Left unattended the "critical observers" can also become informal leaders when their critical attitudes are allowed to influence others and can seriously undermine the unit's cohesion and abilities.

Management

Management encompasses the knowledge, skills, and abilities to allocate resources and/or tasks. Unlike leadership, which does not necessarily have a defined hierarchy, management's control is often based on organizational authority. Management is also much easier to define and quantify than leadership in terms of a traditional job task analysis. Management tasks tend to be more precise and detail oriented but we can often forget that there are critical interpersonal aspects and supervisory ability. A chief or commander may attain buy-in from followers by influencing the big picture mission and goals for the organization, but supervisors who manage technical aspects of organizations must also handle the daily issues that occur daily in their respective areas. When we look objectively at

leadership and management, we can see that the distinctions can be artifacts of the organizational position and task focus within an agency.

We can compare and contrast leadership and management by looking at their respective perspectives and knowledge orientations (see Figure 2), as well the commonalities in supervision tasks. Major distinctions of leadership include a global domain (macro) perspective on the function and direction of the entire organization and an ability to recognize organizational-wide or environmental-wide "patterns" in problem solving, strategic planning, and growth. Managers may share the big picture, but have specific duties that require a local-focus with situational awareness of immediate subordinates and specific organizational functions, such as fleet services, budgets, or supply. These types of organizational necessities may also have large staffs of personnel that must be supervised on a daily basis.

Perspective & Knowledge Perspective

Leadership

- Global Domain Orientation
- Identifies Patterns
- Power Based on Influence
- Hierarchy Not Necessary
- Mission Orientation
- Developmental Focus
- More than 1 person

Common Skills

- Interpersonal Communication
- Social Skills
- Situational Awareness
- Organizational Knowledge
- Supervisory Skills

Management

- Local Domain Orientation
- Identifies Details
- Power Based on Position
- Usually Hierarchical
- Process Orientation
- Efficiency Focus
- 1 or more people

Figure 2

It is important to discuss the effect that leadership and management share. Supervision is often a duty assigned to each. Again, leadership and management are not mutually exclusive concepts. A chief or sheriff may possess amazing management abilities but must delegate the work to attend to dynamic issues of the day where strong leadership is a plus. A staff services sergeant may be a great leader but not great at managing projects and therefore delegates the

management duties to a member of the unit. As long as the sergeant praises the contribution, keeps accountability, and ensures the unit accomplishes the mission, members are empowered. While neither leadership nor management necessarily demands expertise over all areas of a unit they are assigned, organizational knowledge, interpersonal communications, and self-awareness are critical for successful outcomes in both.

Leadership-Management Interdependence

From a micro/individual perspective, leadership can exist and flourish without the need for management. A Little Leaguer can lead his or her teammates without concern for management. A leader can emerge from a catastrophe and guide a group of strangers to accomplish amazing feats of heroism. Even in these examples, there is still a management function inherent in terms of a team manager or ultimate emergency response mechanisms, but the instance of leadership emerged. From a macro/organizational perspective, leadership and management are necessary components. Line-level functions, especially in dynamic environments such as patrol, are often more successful with more leadership orientation, while greater management emphasis will help strategic planning and administrative/logistical necessities. It is important to remember that individuals, regardless of formal position within the organization, possess both leadership traits and management skills, and knowledge that, depending on the environment or circumstances, can provide the organization with rich resources when the culture embraces and recognizes each individual's potential to contribute.

Figure 3 provides visual examples of leadership and management oriented tasks and behaviors. It is not designed to be an exhaustive representation of every possible function necessary to an organization or a group, but rather to serve as a visual exercise to aid in conceptualizing the continuum. It can be viewed from the micro level perspective of a patrol supervisor, or any line-level supervisor, or from an organizational wide macro viewpoint. The interdependence of both leadership and management for the individual as well as the organization is exemplified. It becomes clear to see how a supervisor's position within the agency can dictate the frequency of leadership and management oriented duties. It also helps explain the instances when, for example, you take excellent road patrol sergeants and reassign

them to administrative duties where they too often become a not-so-great administrator. It also may help to explain how an average patrol sergeant may excel when given management assignments and ultimately become a very successful staff-level administrator.

All of the presented activities are organizationally necessary and allow for areas for development and training. Individuals with greater skills in either leadership or management would better serve their respective organizations when they are in positions that tap into natural abilities. It is imperative to recognize the need for an organization's command staff to have both members with strengths in both leadership and management. Having members prepared for command staff takes years of planning, training, and development.

Figure 3

Another classic example for developing leadership and management is the military. Commands are built on having a commanding officer (CO) and an executive officer (XO) where the CO has definitive leadership duties and the XO duties tend to be more management focus. It is also a natural military progression designed to develop COs. Not all XOs, however, become COs. Some individuals cannot transition from management-focused duties to delegating tasks to others without micromanaging. Some people are simply not comfortable being ultimately accountable for an organization's success or failure. The XO position does enable superiors to look for command potential by systematical observation. The best XOs earn promotion and

command, while the less capable are reassigned according to their strengths or forced to retire. The retirement alternative available to military commanders ("up or out" policies that keep regularly open promotional opportunities and ensure a constant process of development and mentoring for the next level) is usually not available to their police contemporaries.

The transition from a management orientation, where the tasks are well-defined, to a leadership orientation, where the demands become more fluid and dynamic, can be difficult. The human elements of leadership, life experiences, multiple intelligences, situational awareness, and a host of other observable and "art of leadership" behaviors are as uniquely distinct as a fingerprint. We each see the world and events through the "glasses" of our experience and all are colored differently.

Using Problems and Conflict to Model and Develop Followership and Leadership

Both routine police functions and unusual critical incidents (where training has shaped a set behavioral response) are both easier to execute and review. Stress and conflict go with the job in policing. It is a natural artifact of dealing with the public and solving critical problems. It may be surprising to those not in law enforcement, that cops acknowledge a primary major stressor is rooted in internal conflict from within the agency. Police culture has expectations on how the job is practiced, clear guidance, and expected accountability. Situations where the written policy clashes with long-standing practices can create conflict, especially if someone is selected for punishment for violating a written rule long ignored and never addressed. Promotional processes, lateral transfers, and overtime allotments can also create conflicts derived from competition or perceptions of fairness.

The global nature of police work poses conflict challenges on a routine or even daily basis. Issues such as excessive use of force complaints, racial profiling claims, and officer involved shootings can create media frenzies and internal conflicts. Many of these issues are centered on "perception bias" for many actors, but the manner in which these issues are addressed is critical. The professional investigation protocol and detached manner of the manager tasked with professional standards responsibilities is best tempered by the leader with a relationship focus on officers who can offer some emotional support and morale building.

Conflict, however, does not need to be a source of negative outcomes. It can be an opportunity for followership and leadership development and a chance to build on the experiences of the members. Command decisions often need to be made quickly due to the nature of the situation or sensitivity of the complaint. These can be viewed as opportunities to model behaviors. Issues such as policy and practice conflicts, problem assessment, and debriefings can be opportunities for valuable lessons when subordinates and followers are empowered to present solutions.

Robert Tannenbaum and Warren H. Schmidt (1958) proposed a continuum of "leadership" behavior to describe behavioral patterns available to a manager based on the amount of control exercised. Using Tannenbaum and Schmidt Continuum as a framework (Figure 4) but modifying it to examine the authority and empowerment from the viewpoint of control-centered versus development-centered behaviors, we can see how developing leadership (and followership) behaviors can be determined by the task at hand and the level of authority a supervisor is willing to concede or share.



Figure 4

Adapted from the Tannenbaum and Schmidt Continuum (1973)

Leadership, management, and followership behaviors must be demonstrated and learned via some degree of experience. Many factors can influence the necessity for control-centered or development-centered behaviors by supervisors. A critical incident command in police work has a high control-center doctrine due to the nature and urgency of the situation. More routine occurrences are less in need of a structured response and can present good learning opportunities. As leaders and members build trust and rapport, opportunities for development can become more obvious in daily tasks, and opportunities are welcomed. Agencies and leaders that recognize the issue can turn daily challenges into learning and developmental lessons that return dividends for the members and the agency.

Universal Police "Model" of Leadership

Perhaps the most elusive area of leadership debate is a consensus "model" of leadership. Maybe a true definition of "leadership" is more similar to defining "success" or what works for "us" rather than the definitive "model" that could change quickly as a new dynamic emerges or membership changes. With all people possessing unique perspectives of their world and the complexity of a situational or organizational environment or problem, is it simply that leadership is in the eye of the beholder? It is safe to say that common behavior or "universals" associated with good leaders include being genuine with who they are, recognizing their individual limitations, developing followers around them, and placing the group's well being or mission above themselves.

Efforts to define "universal" leadership may reaching the conclusion that the dynamics of any given situation and individual are too dynamic to predict. The awareness that the multitude of potential situations demand various leadership and management requirements can be powerful. Recognizing the collective experiences of the leaders and the followers around them can lead to synergy. When one tries to figure a calculation for an equation of leadership that includes the problem or situation against the various potential solutions and compound it with the volume of collective experiences and expectations of the group dynamic, the proposition alone is mind-boggling.

Future of Leadership and Management Paradigms

Few can argue that technological advances in society have created challenges for law enforcement, which struggles to keep pace. Agencies must adapt to a constantly changing world. The need for police agencies to invest in technical training and specializations, or to hire more technically skilled entry-level officers and/or support personnel is evident and critical in areas such as cybercrime. These technical specializations create new leadership and management dilemmas.

Perhaps the greatest challenge for the future of leadership and management in policing is to revisit the paradigms surrounding leadership, management, and followership in police culture. Leadership traits and management skills are critical to organizational adaptation in a constantly changing world. Followership not only develops a clear understanding of leadership and management expectations, but also communicates the value members have to the agency. Both leadership and followership behaviors and traits need to be identified and developed early. Leadership and management development should explore the nuances derived from both the individual and organizational perspectives. Situational awareness and leadership emergence at an individual officer level is a goal of any police agency. Recognizing the daily leadership behaviors exhibited by line-level officers and others are quite different from examining the leadership and management dynamics of organizational positions.

Agencies must also recognize and value the contributions of those in management positions who excel in those skills as well as leadership. Using the term "leadership" in an organization's culture to cover both skill/trait sets leads agencies to unconsciously hinder development of management skills as well as create unrealistic expectations when a member with very strong management skills seeks advancement onto a "leadership" position.

The future includes an evolution of policing into a truer professional model. The technology requirements will continue to transform the nature of police work and eventually mandate that entry level officers and staff possess education beyond a high school diploma. Generational differences will also require different conceptions of followership, leadership, and management to effectively recruit and retain modern youth in the service of policing. Progressive agencies can maintain their proud traditions, prepare for the future by recognizing

and respecting the differences of leadership and management, and encourage the development of followership, as well. Each of these disciplines must be developed at the individual and organizational level. Valuing both leadership and management while encouraging and rewarding followership will transform agency culture and prepare for the challenges of the future.

References

Kelley, R.E. (1996). In praise of followers. In R.L. Taylor & W.E. Rosenbach (Eds.), *Military leadership: In pursuit of excellence* (pp. 136-137). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Tannenbaum, R., & Schmidt, W.H. (1958). How to choose a leadership pattern. *Harvard Business Review,* 36, 95-101.

POLICE LEADERSHIP: CHALLENGES OF DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT

John P. Jarvis, Thomas A. Petee, & Lin Huff-Corzine

Despite the existence of thousands of leadership programs, books, and strategies addressing leadership, as well as the incredible importance placed on the ability to lead, leadership remains one of those concepts that is relatively easy to recognize retrospectively, but much more difficult to identify, describe, and articulate prospectively. Perhaps the diverse types of leaders, leadership, applications of leading inhibit our understanding of meaning. If success is to be accomplished, leadership is necessary in every kind and at multiple levels of organizations. The questions remain, then: How does one define leadership? How does one define a leader? Many have tried to define leadership through examples of those we consider "great" leaders. Others do the opposite and use examples of bad leadership as guidelines for what not to do.

As is clear from the above discussion, leadership is in many ways an elusive concept. In the current article, leadership is broadly defined as *the ability to influence and work with others to achieve desired outcomes,* a definition closely aligned with that of Evans (2000, p.16), who states that "leadership is basically the capacity of someone to bring about change." Both of these definitions focus on qualities we measure in individuals, i.e., traits. Others assert that leadership is something that relates to the organization under examination, e.g., organizational performance? If the focus is on only the former, what happens when organizational characteristics attenuate those individual traits? If the attempt is to capture the concept of leadership in this way, the question is, "Can an individual's leadership be compromised or augmented by features of the organization that s/he is attempting to lead?" What must be remembered is that an organization is simply a collection of individuals, some with more leadership potential; some with less. It is for this reason that the focus of this paper is on identifying and measuring individual leadership characteristics.

There is some tendency in the literature to equate leadership with management. Graham and Hays (1993), for example, maintain that the activities associated with leadership

tend to be managerial functions such as directing and coordinating tasks that must be completed. Conger and Kanungo (1994, 1998), on the other hand, advocate a distinction between the two concepts. From their standpoint, leadership involves broader, long-term direction, whereas management entails more limited supervisory tasks. Popular business guru Stephen Covey (1991) concurs, adding that leadership tends to be more visionary, while management involves establishing structure to get results. Kotterman (2006, p.14) differentiates the roles of management and leadership: "Managers . . . plan and budget while leaders establish direction." In essence, a manager is mainly responsible for overseeing subordinates to complete a task or accomplish a goal while offering the means and structure to do so. On the other hand, a leader is responsible for providing a vision and seeking new solutions for the organization. Guidance and creativity are major elements separating leadership from management. In this paper, leadership will include both the ability to oversee daily tasks to achieve desired outcomes, as well as to create a vision and a strategic plan to accomplish long term goals that will guide the way to change in the larger organization.

Of course, any conversation on leadership becomes complex once the different types of leadership that have been identified are examined. A quick search of the term "leadership" reveals a number of adjectives used to describe types of leadership – charismatic, strategic, tactical, bureaucratic, laissez-faire, emotional, task-oriented, transactional, and transformational – to list just a few. If leadership is to be measured in any comprehensive fashion, the different types of leadership must be taken into account in order to fully gauge the underlying construct. As an example, effective leadership varies depending on the context of the department or organization in which it is measured.

The requirements for a good leader in a business may also be much different than those needed for a good leader in a police department. Thus, it is imperative to take the goals of the institution and dynamics of the workplace into account when determining effective methods of leadership. A police environment differs greatly from the traditional business atmosphere, and the mission of each is unique. Therefore, the making of a great leader in policing may be exclusive to the field of law enforcement.

Within law enforcement organizations, the discussion is fortunately a bit more focused because strategic and tactical leadership are the most relevant of the various types of leadership identified in the literature on policing. Tactical leadership involves problem solving by examining the issue at hand, determining the most expeditious method for resolving the situation, and organizing and utilizing the resources necessary to address the problem. Strategic leadership, by contrast, involves a longer-term leadership view in which the direction takes into account the overall system and the contingencies involved (McKinney, 2008; Roberg & Kuykendall, 1990). Because leadership may exist at various levels within any given police organization, we suggest that tactical leadership is more likely to be exercised by mid-level management and even by line officers, while strategic leadership is more prominent among those in higher level management positions.

Measuring Leadership

As the preceding discussion suggests, the concept of leadership is difficult to define, thus measurement is also challenging. Ultimately police leadership, comprised of all of the complexities suggested above, is also complicated to measure. While the remainder of this essay will not produce a measure, which addresses all of the issues, some of the important considerations for measuring police leadership in the future are explored.

Level of Measurement

For the most part, the research on leadership employs measures of attributes possessed by individuals, such as vision, motivational capacity, innovative qualities, effectiveness, self-awareness, self-management, visibility, integrity, and communications skills (e.g., Evans, 2005; Goleman, 2000). Although researchers have created a number of methods, including surveys and interviews with subordinates, to gather data to measure leadership, such measures thus far fail to capture the meaning of a *universal* leader. Reasons for researcher's inability to universally measure leadership include reliance on feedback from subordinates, who may not completely understand the meaning of leadership, the tasks their supervisor has been assigned, or the lack of a universal meaning of leadership. Subordinates may judge their supervisor in

terms of their own interpretations, and in turn, negatively influence the validity and the possibility of generalization of such a study. So again, one has to be aware and understand the definition of leadership in order to measure it and judge others according to those measurements (Kotterman, 2006).

One popular philosophy of leadership measurement is the 360° Leader (e.g., Clark and Clark, 1996; Maxwell, 2005), which measures leadership up, down, and across levels of employment. The idea is that an organization is run more efficiently if there is leadership at every level. What must be done to properly understand the leadership of a particular individual is to embed the survey or interview questioning within the situational structure and triangulate the methodology. An ideal measure of leadership should connect individual qualities with organizational outcomes. All contingencies should be approached to express their opinions about the leadership being evaluated and the situational-influences should be explored. A police chief's evaluation, for example, should of course include information obtained from police officers who directly report to the chief, as well as those who work in the field. Data should also be obtained from staff, city commissioners, local citizens, the mayor, police chiefs with whom the chief being evaluated works on a regular basis, the sheriff, and any special groups with whom the chief interacts.

Surveys and interviews should be used in tandem to collect data. The chief should also have developed leadership goals, which are shared with these contingencies, for example, at the beginning of a five-year term and are then evaluated at the end of the five years by all of the groups noted above. Finally, the chief should be given the opportunity to provide a report outlining how the leadership goals that had been initiated five years earlier were accomplished, changed, or not accomplished. Once data is obtained from all sources, the findings need to be placed into a report by a neutral party, who is familiar with the specific police department. This step is important to provide a context for the results. If the police chief was hired with the understanding that an unpopular task must be accomplished for example, and it was accomplished to the dismay of one or more groups reporting to the chief, this must be spelled out in the report before the results can be fully understood.

As a second part of the situational context, consideration must be given to the organizational structure in which the leader is employed. In some cases, individual traits suggest that a police chief should be a good leader, but the police organization functions poorly. This type of situation requires further examination. As noted by Wendel, Schmidt, and Loch (1992), predictive leadership tests may reveal that an individual understands the concepts of leadership, but they cannot predict how well the person can implement leadership skills. Although some may immediately blame the individual leader for poor implementation, certainly the organizational structure may also inhibit some excellent leaders from being able to carry through on their goals. Thus, the neutral reviewer must be in a position to explain how the organizational structure may have negatively impacted the potential leader's ability to lead. This paper encourages using multi-level analyses to take into account both individual and organizational level characteristics when leadership is being measured.

Dimensionality

What should be clear from the discussion thus far is that leadership is a multi-dimensional concept. As a consequence, the mechanics of developing police leadership measures must involve the use of scaling techniques to reflect the multiple dimensions of leadership in the policing profession. This may yield multiple indicators of leadership for different purposes or, through employment of other data reduction techniques such as factor analysis to derive a single indicator or metric for widespread use to gauge leadership in law enforcement. In any case, the idea is to develop measures that take into account the complexity of police leadership. An alternative strategy, but likely much less useful, would be to conduct separate efforts with the goal of reaching conclusions about each individual aspect of leadership. What is clear from the most recent studies of leadership is that simple measures of leadership are no longer sufficient. Clearly the multidimensionality of police leadership demands that any future measurement or assessment of an agency's leadership be more sensitive to the varied behaviors both individually and organizationally that may comprise leadership as described above.

Validity and Reliability

Issues of validity and reliability in measurement derivation must be considered. With respect to reliability, the specific question to be addressed is whether any measure(s) of leadership result in the same outcome across repeated measures. That is, will someone who scores high on leadership at one testing also score high on another testing? The more consistent the results across repeated measures, the more reliable the measure. This is a critical issue in measurement, in general, because it has implications about the assumptions of measurement error for statistical analyses. As it pertains to leadership within law enforcement, a measure that will consistently gauge the leadership capabilities of both the law enforcement agency and the law enforcement officer or management is required. Police leadership aside, if a measurement is wildly inconsistent, it will undermine and invalidate evaluation efforts that employ such measures. For example, if the measures of leadership by a police chief indicate high quality leadership the first time it is employed at a mid-year evaluation, and assuming no known or identifiable adverse event(s) occur, and then indicates the same individual to be a poor quality leader at the year-end evaluation, the reliability of the indicator is likely questionable, and the resulting evaluation becomes suspect. In contrast, validity concerns whether the measure(s) derived actually gauge leadership. This is the issue that has driven all of the previous discussion and is essential for any successful measurement.

Concluding Remarks

Lacking precise definitions and measures of leadership, police agencies nonetheless still have recognized the need to cultivate leadership in younger members of their forces to secure the advancement of the organization's future direction. In policing, it has been important for senior officers to serve as examples for, and mentor to, the young officers. Mentors are extremely important for the purpose of providing new officers with an example of good and effective leadership, encouraging them to discover the traits of a good leader early on in their career (Conger & Benjamin, 1999). Mentors can also be of use for offering a knowledgeable opinion about the leadership potential of the new officers with whom they work closely.

Police could experience leadership gains by actively attempting to hire applicants with developmental and leadership experiences the potential officer has had in the past. For example, taking earlier leadership experiences and prior work experience into greater account can help law enforcement agencies understand how the applicant's background may contribute to his or her "language skills, basic confidence, achievement drive, interpersonal skills," and other traditional traits of leaders that add to a worker's success (Conger & Benjamin, 1999, p. 10). Additionally, Conger and Benjamin (1999) maintain that the importance of leadership education has been underemphasized; believing leadership programs can help provide young employees with a clear understanding of the organization's vision. Lastly, insights into the responsibilities of leaders to further the mission of the police department are critically important.

One of the biggest challenges to finding leaders to lead is an individual and personal obstacle. Each individual must recognize the leadership potential in him or herself in order to believe one is capable of effective leadership. Lee and King (2001, p. 138) define "bell ringers" as "insights that you accept as major truths about yourself—the kinds of truths or facts that can serve as lights for guidance into the future." It is important for law enforcement agencies as well as law enforcement officers and civilian police employees to identify their motivation for leadership before assuming a leadership role or position. There are many possible motivations for leadership in law enforcement, such as the desire to help people, organize a messy work situation, get credit for results, increase one's income, or validate one's abilities. Whatever the case, self-awareness is essential to take into account before a leader can be most successful. Research and other related work being conducted by Joseph Schafer, the 2008 Futures Working Group Futurist in Residence, explores many of these definitional and measurement issues (see Schafer, 2008, 2009). This work is promising and likely will provide significant insights and direction into these definitional and measurement challenges associated with police leadership in the near future.

References

Clark, K.E. & Clark, M. (1996). *Choosing to lead*. Greensboro, NC: Center for Creative Leadership.

Conger, J.A. & Kanungo, R.N. (1994). Charismatic leadership in organizations: Perceived behavioral attributes and their measurement. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 15, 439-452.

Conger, J.A. & Kanungo, R.N. (1998). *Charismatic leadership in organizations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Conger, J. A., & Benjamin, B. (1999) *Building leaders: How successful companies develop the next generation.* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Covey, S.R. (1991). *Principle-centered Leadership*. New York: Fireside, Simon & Schuster.

Evans, M.H. (2005). It's time to start measuring leadership." *Excellence in Financial Management*. www.exinfm.com.

Goleman, D. (2000). Leadership that gets results. *Harvard Business Review*. Boston: Harvard Business Publishing.

Graham, C.B. & Hays, S.W. (1993). *Managing the public organization* (2nd Edition). Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc.

Kotterman, J. (2006). Leadership versus management: What's the difference? *Journal for Quality & Participation, 29,* 13-17.

Lee, R. J., & King, S.N. (2001). *Developing the leader in you*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Maxwell, J. C. (2005). *The 360° leader: Developing your influence from anywhere in the organization*. Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, Inc.

McKinney, H.M. (2008). *The meaning, value, and experience of strategic leadership for law enforcement executives in today's world*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Falls Church, VA: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.

Roberg, R. R. & Kuykendall, J. (1990). *Police organization and management: Behavior, theory and processes.* Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing.

Schafer, J.A. (2009). Enhancing effective leadership in policing. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management, 32, 238-260.

Schafer, J.A. (2008). Experiences and perspectives of law enforcement leaders. *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 77*(7), 13-19.

Wendel, F. C., Schmidt, A.H. & Loch, J. (1992). *Measurements of personality and leadership: Some relationships.* Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska.

LEADERSHIP'S ROLE IN SHAPING ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE:

THE KEY TO THE FUTURE

Marshall Jones

The secret weapon of cops has long been their creativity in problem solving. From the era when Robert Peel laid the foundation for the first modern police department in London, cops have drawn from the resources at hand, common sense, and experience to accomplish their mission. As human society becomes more technologically complex, cops are recognizing the need to marry that creativity with innovation to keep pace.

The culture of every law enforcement agency establishes the framework, norms, and "personality" for itself and its members. The agency culture establishes the environment that either facilitates and empowers members or constrains them by the structure of its rules, regulations, and customs. Leaders are the stewards of an agency's culture and are the catalyst to organizational change and development. Some argue that an agency's culture is the sum of its member's experiences and agency history. Often its members cannot recall the origin and purpose of accepted behaviors, just that "we've always done it that way." Culture most commonly happens by circumstance and without planning, although planning and intentional attention can pay huge dividends.

The power of an agency's culture on its members cannot be understated. Good or bad, culture establishes an identity for the agency. Landmark police corruption cases (see Finnie earlier in this volume) and international awards are equally rooted in agency culture. In a time where budgets are tight, training time and funds are limited, and agencies struggle to keep pace with technology and global changes, learning to understand and deploy organizational culture to influence, facilitate growth, and aid change can pay dividends for agencies. It is essential to understand the dynamics of agency culture and its potential as a tool for change-minded police leaders.

Leadership: The Bottom Line

Basic assumptions about leadership need to be established before exploring how leadership can shape culture. The interplay of leadership, management, followership, and other organizational actors in accomplishing goals and objectives has been introduced elsewhere in this volume. As background, Nelson and Quick (2002) do an excellent job synthesizing a relative consensus of leadership studies over the past 60 years in five general principles.

First, leaders and organizations should appreciate the diversity gained from the unique attributes and perceptions of each leader. We each bring our worldview based largely on our collective life experience; that can be an asset when the organization has a culture that values the critical, and often overlooked, diversity of thought and experience. In an age where "diversity" is most often perceived as race or gender, diversity of thought and experience is a critical "fuel" for an agency to develop and utilize.

Second, there is no "single best style" of leadership; there may be organizational preferences or situational optimisms in terms of style. Nelson and Quick (2002) stress that leaders should be chosen who challenge the organizational culture, when necessary, without destroying it. Many police cultures are challenged by officers and other members challenging the status quo.

Third, successful leaders demonstrate a consideration for the well being of followers and welcome participation. Nelson and Quick (2002) are careful to point out that a leader cannot ignore the mission, but well attended followers are more effective. In research that asked officers about core behaviors of their "model" sergeant, many respondents discussed that the ideal sergeants were "genuine" (Jones, McChrystal, Kung & Griffith, 2002). Even the human faults of the "model" sergeants, such as being brash, were overlooked as it was natural and who they were. This suggests that leaders who invest and demonstrate a genuine concern for their officers can build idiosyncratic credits that facilitate a positive leader-member, a strong dynamic in job satisfaction and retention.

Fourth, specific situations may call for various leaders, with differential talents and behaviors, to assume the leadership role. This is exemplified in the National Incident

Management System (NIMS) that outlines a global framework allowing multiple local, state, and federal agencies to effectively and efficiently respond to natural disasters and emergencies. This response calls for the best leader for the specific incident at hand regardless of rank. This concept may rattle the paramilitary senses of structure and formal hierarchy, but within proper guidelines and to accomplish specific goals, it makes operational sense. This also reinforces that all formal leaders often find themselves in followership situations, and that leadership can emerge from those who do not possess formal rank or authority.

Fifth, good leaders are likely to be good followers despite the distinctions in role. Nelson and Quick (2002) contend that a closer examination of the attributes and behaviors of leaders and followers may not be as distinct as often thought. There is a lot to be said for the leader who recognizes the need to follow and support a bigger cause. This followership behavior can also strengthen the "message" conveyed to his/her subordinates in the value and necessity of followership behaviors and strongly demonstrates desired behavior. Even these five generalized leadership principles demonstrate that an agency's organizational culture is critical in the emergence of these behaviors. Healthy organizations utilize individuals with leadership and followership abilities as change agents for evolution and growth.

Active and Constant Attention to Organizational Culture

Law enforcement is possibly the best example of a vast disconnect between academics and practitioners in workplace research. The volume of critical incidents, often used in studies of law enforcement, is by far the highest for the daily first responders in our society. Researchers attempting to do more applied inquiry in law enforcement face the classic, if not universal, closed nature of police agency cultures. Cops are sensitive to the "arm-chair quarterbacking" of the media when their time is a luxury not shared in the immediacy of the crisis call. Getting an agency and its members to openly trust longitudinal review and critique for researchers is a real challenge.

Law enforcement is often blind to the utility in organizational research from other professions and disciplines. Culture is a great example of an area that law enforcement practitioners and researchers alike could build on existing research and literature. Even with the

environmental differences of various domains, cultural dynamics are basic to all organizations regardless their mission. Efforts to shape and intentionally tap into the power of organizational culture are akin to looking at people who want to lose weight. Diets, and organizational change, often fail because of a focus on immediate success and a tendency toward quick reversion to old behaviors. Lasting change requires a long-term approach and gradual, but permanent, changes in behavior. It takes discipline and attention to the details.

Schein (2004) discusses five ways that leaders reinforce organizational culture:

1. What leaders pay attention to.
2. How leaders react to crisis.
3. How leaders behave.
4. How leaders allocate rewards.
5. How leaders hire and fire individuals.

These will be discussed and examined with respect to the impact and potential dividends for law enforcement agencies. Scenarios will be used to make one case in point for each concept. While these scenarios may have played out in reality for many agencies, the names and contexts of the situations are purely fictitious and any association with a real person or organization is coincidence.

What Leaders Pay Attention To

The issues, ideas, problems, and opportunities to which leaders pay attention are extremely important in shaping expectations and outcomes. This often occurs without announcement or documentation and can vary from supervisor to supervisor. The implications for existing supervisors, and for developing future leaders, are tremendous but often happen without design or thought. Agencies that encourage and sanction appropriate risk taking and use the honest mistakes made by members as learning opportunities can create an atmosphere of innovation and openness to change. On the other hand, agencies that focus on rigid procedures, reports, and strict accountability for mistakes can lose focus on quality policing and lose out on valuable development opportunities.

Case in Point: Officer Smith

A 27 year-old male probationary police officer, Officer Smith works the midnight shift in an agency of 140 officers. He performs very well under stress and displays common sense and life experience. In this age, where most candidates are barely out of their teens, Officer Smith is a commodity in terms of new officers. His biggest deficit in field training was report writing. He demonstrated consistently that he could perform the job, but his reports were weak at best. Other trainees failing to meet standards in perception and judgment were subsequently terminated, so Officer Smith's report writing was not such a critical issue.

Officer Smith's patrol supervisor, Sergeant Jones, is young and energetic and likes to be in the field with the officers. Smith's squad works the most active part of the city and it has been doing an exemplary job balancing community policing with proactive policing, especially concerning drug arrests. Smith routinely shows up on calls and serves as back-up when calls are holding. Witnessing the good and consistent performance of Officer Smith, Sergeant Jones usually glances at his reports, as with most shift members, and endorses them along to records. Every evening prior to roll call the watch commander would return Officer Smith's reports to Sergeant Jones and ask Sergeant Jones why this continues to occur. Sergeant Jones most often tells Officer Smith how to correct the report so Smith can make the changes and get out of the station as quickly as possible. The squad enjoys hitting the streets and Officer Smith has fit right in to that group philosophy. The problem is Sergeant Jones is not paying attention to the detail of the reports. It is not long until Officer Smith's cases are not being prosecuted by the state attorney's office and someone in command staff notices the stat line. Change happens fast with downward momentum.

Both Sergeant Jones and Officer Smith are surprised to learn at roll call that Officer Smith is immediately being transferred to the other squad on the shift, a "quiet" and less active zone. Officer Smith's new supervisor, Sergeant Little, is a 25-year veteran of the department and a stickler for documentation. Weeks pass and Officer Smith finds his routine of traffic accidents, domestic disputes, and burglaries an unpleasant task. He focuses on his reports but he is discouraged. A ritual has begun where every morning about an hour before shift ends, Sergeant Little calls Officer Smith to his office to review the red marks on the reports. The

latest day included a memo from the patrol commander that Officer Smith's probation was being extended based on a deficiency in report writing. The scenario could end with Officer Smith resigning and going to another agency; ultimately failing to meet probation; finding a mentor followed by a resolution; or, approaching a host of other outcomes. This scenario has played out time and again in many agencies.

Sergeant Jones paid attention to the performance on the street while Sergeant Little focused on report writing. The watch commander facilitated kickback reports and reacted to the commander's reaction to the statistics. But could more have been done? Should more have been done? Was Officer Smith's writing deficiency identified prior to being hired? Was remedial training ever available or offered?

Anyone that has been in policing realizes that if an incident is not documented properly "it did not happen." Qualitative information from police executives since 2000 share a common theme that new officers "are better educated but less literate." This issue can easily create a situation where the actual effectiveness of "policing" can be diminished with the lack of efficiency and/or proficiency of documenting the events. Once the focus is on the paperwork and not necessarily the task then the message can be very disheartening to the current generation of young law enforcement officers.

Supervisors who invest in officers to assist weak performers in better articulation of events can not only help them with report writing but also in critical thinking skills, such as the behavior of an individual that may create a reasonable suspicion. The failure to properly articulate and document activity seems simple enough, but it can evolve into case law, policy review, or ultimately one of those command edicts that other members refer to as the "Officer X rule" when it is easier to toss a blanket over everyone than to work on the behavior or deficiency of an individual. Unfortunately, it is often the path of least resistance to transfer a problem employee, or in Officer Smith's case, an employee with a writing problem, rather than facilitate the necessary steps with the officer and supervisor responsible. Perhaps the field training system should have conducted remedial training, but Sergeant Jones should have attended to Officer Smith's deficits to further facilitate the squad's proactive and effective performance. A host of potential solutions could have been employed.

Obviously sending someone to training is the easy way out, but report-writing courses are infrequent and may not be logistically possible. But inter-squad mentoring, peer review, or one-on-one work with Sergeant Jones are among the squad level options. An agency culture where the patrol commander and/or watch commander uses this as a lesson for Sergeant Jones would have been preferred. The diagnosis and possible solutions are limited only by innovation and creativity, but the scenario unfortunately reflects reality too often. In this case the failure of leadership was multi-level.

How Leaders React in Crisis

Officers and supervisors alike pay close attention to how leaders react to crisis. From the Chief or Sheriff down, others watch and may very well shape their acceptable "norm" on the behavior modeled. The age-old "what if" scenario discussions can be very helpful to those in positions of leadership to prepare models of responses to incidents. The power of storytelling is also widely recognized as valuable in both cultural development and training and can serve as common reference points for future behaviors. Training, particularly scenario training cannot be overlooked but the time and cost can be prohibitive.

<u>Case in Point: Sergeant White</u>

The Sunshine City PD in south Florida is a 70-officer department formed a year ago and is comprised of experienced officer from all over the country. Sergeant White had been a supervisor with a sheriff's department in Kentucky prior to taking the job in Florida. He has about two years experience as a supervisor and eight years in law enforcement. Hurricane Johnna has been traced as a level 4 storm headed toward south Florida with an expected landfall about 50 miles north of Sunshine City. Two days prior to landfall the department suggests officers get their families evacuated. The agency made arrangements with a north Georgia police department to shelter police families if they did not have closer options. The department learned from Hurricane Andrew that cops that did not need to worry about their families were far more effective and focused, so the agency worked hard to tend to the families.

The hurricane plan for Sunshine City was for half of the department to head north a few hundred miles and for half of the officers to shelter either at the station or at one of the local schools during the storm. Eight hours prior to the storm making landfall, Sergeant White and his squad of five relatively new officers were assigned to shelter at the high school. Once the storm passed, they were to report to the station for assignments. The first few hours passed quietly. Around midnight Hurricane Johnna kicked up unexpectedly high storm surge. The last report from the station was that Johnna would make landfall right atop Sunshine City as a strong level 4 hurricane. Power, cell phones, and radio communications were lost. Nearly all of the city population evacuated except critical personnel and some stubborn or homebound residents. Sergeant White's high school housed the assigned police personnel, a handful of school staff and members of other critical government services, and about 40 residents who sought shelter just before the storm hit. All the people, including his officers, were getting anxious.
Officer Green asked, "Sarge, so is this why we sent half the department to Jacksonville?" Sergeant White responded, "Well Green, relax, we have learned that having fresh and rested relief is important. Heck, a clean car loaded with food and drinks will be nice too. Don't worry, this place has three floors and a solid roof." At about that time the storm surge began banging the front doors of the high school building. The residents were panicked and looked to the police for answers and action. All eyes fell to Sergeant White. The moment of truth had arrived. Sergeant White had played this worst case scenario out in his head for days. He had a plan. "Ok, folks, calm down, grab your stuff and follow me."

He led them up the stairs to the second floor faculty lounge that had been reserved for the school staff assigned to the shelter. The lounge was in the center of the building with no windows and several couches. Once there, White assigned an officer and a school representative to every 8 to 10 residents and formed groups. Each group had an assignment from food to sanitation. Sergeant White and the assistant principal went back downstairs and placed a note on the door that they were sheltered in the second floor lounge and they unlocked the door. The storm surge was about 5 feet and rising.

The night was busy. The group attended to everything from over-flowing toilets to missing roofs. Communications were established with the department via a landline, but this

link was eventually lost. The next morning's daylight revealed that the damage of the storm surge was more devastating than the wind. The waterline was 8 feet up the 1st floor wall. The cars from the parking lot were partially submerged in the canal between the school and the soccer field. Although uncomfortable, the people led to safety by Sergeant White were unharmed.

Agencies around the country prepare for such disasters and events. Lessons learned from Hurricane Andrew, Hurricane Katrina, and the multitude of other natural and induced disasters demonstrates how preparedness is key. Flexibility is critical and the unpredictable nature of the phenomenon reminds us all how insignificant we are. Sergeant White also exemplified how critical leadership, and followership, is at every rank and how anyone in the agency may be in a very important and demanding position. How can agencies prepare their members for such critical tasks? A culture where officers are afforded the opportunity to perform various tasks and given leadership opportunities can be critical. A culture that recognizes officers need to be free from the worry of the immediate needs of their families during crisis is critical to dealing with the issue at hand, in this scenario a strong hurricane. The scenario could have played out in a multitude of ways, but each member of Sergeant White's squad will remember how he handled that situation for the rest of their lives and helped establish the new department's identity and history.

How Leaders Behave

How leaders behave is also closely watched. This is obvious during roll call and other times when "people are watching" but it is more global. Members are always "watching" even if their eyes are not present. How do the leaders deal with sick time and overtime? Does the patrol sergeant or commander often show up on scene or are they always at the station or "somewhere else" and nonresponsive. Can they tell dispatch the location of an officer when they cannot be raised on the radio. Basically, are they paying attention?

Case in Point: Captain Coleman

Captain Coleman was the operations commander of a small Midwest police department. The officers and staff of the agency looked up to and respected Captain Coleman, even if he was perceived to go to extremes at times. He had one extreme and a resulting annual pilgrimage each year around town. He went to every restaurant and convenience store to personally ask shop owners not to provide free drinks or reduced priced meals to officers. Some would verbally agree. Some chain stores and restaurant managers would explain that it is national company store policy for uniformed public servants. Others would tell him that it was their business and not a topic for his concern.

On more than one occasion, the debate between Captain Coleman and Big Al from Al's Diner was overheard and subsequently became breakfast table legend among cops for years. The pilgrimage was always followed up with the annual "thou shall not" address that accompanied the annual training on ethics, critical incident management, harassment, and communicable diseases as mandated by the state. The issue always came down to the line between gratuity and graft. The debate continued, as it does in most every law enforcement agency everywhere. A fair number of the officers would subsequently frequent establishments that were not renowned for their "ability to count" and avoid the situation of an obvious gratuity situation. Many officers would take their own mug into the local convenience store and go to the counter to pay, or at least attempt to pay, for the coffee to keep with the Captain's order.

Many supervisors pointed out over the years that the policy was not aligned with actual practice; the agency needed to either rewrite the policy to be less restrictive (reflecting actual behavior of officers) or enforce the existing policy so that everyone would begin to comply. Captain Coleman's influence on gratuities, although limited to only part of the agency, came to an abrupt stop when it was revealed that he went to the annual police chief conference and accepted free golf and meals from venders at the event. Word spread like wildfire and behavior changed in the agency in the blink of an eye. Every day of the year, at the end of every cop's meal, cops simply "pay the bill." The bill is often ironically about half the menu price and a very generous tip is customarily left to the servers who day after day take care of the

culinary needs of cops everywhere. Captain Coleman's agency, despite his attempts to gain internal and external compliance, is not exceptional. Rather than having an influential member serving as the role model for ethical behavior, the story shifted to the hypocritical standards "they" send that all started with a free round of golf.

How Leaders Allocate Rewards

How leaders allocate rewards may appear at first glance as minimal given that the majority of law enforcement agencies cannot give financial rewards. But the cultural significance of traditional rewards is too often lost. Properly utilized and rewarded with proper standards and care, ribbons and recognition are powerful cultural currency.

Case in Point: Lieutenant Farmer

As the Commander of the Investigations Division of a mid-sized agency, Lieutenant Farmer supervises three sergeants, each with six detectives or agents. He also has a civilian support staff supervisor with nine staff members that handle evidence, crime scenes, and crime analysis. Lieutenant Farmer wants to be promoted to Captain and he is on top of everything. After last year's annual awards ceremony, he noticed that the annual awards went to patrol officers and most of the distinguish command level commendations were also from patrol. He was admittedly embarrassed that the lobby greeter won the civilian of the year award. At the next Investigations staff meeting he issued a directive that every month each supervisor would nominate someone from their squad for a department award. The supervisor's looked at one another in astonishment and one veteran sergeant finally said, "Lieutenant, you cannot do rewards by quota."

The lieutenant quickly pointed out that a member of their unit had not won a major award or commendation in years, yet he knew there was quality police work being done by the unit's personnel. The same veteran sergeant pointed out that over half of the investigations unit had over ten years experience in the unit and many had grown complacent. The agency just would not rotate people out. The new and energetic investigators are stuck on property

crimes. He also pointed out that they enjoyed a relatively quiet community with low violent crimes that are usually solved quickly. His arguments fell on deaf ears.

Three months passed and the Lieutenant had not seen any award nominations come across his desk. They were making a statement, he thought. The next week two of the sergeants were reassigned to patrol and two junior sergeants were assigned to investigations. Soon, nominations were flowing in as requested. Unfortunately, all it takes is one supervisor to over-submit members for awards on shaky or embellished criteria to negate even the highest of honors in an agency. Using rewards (particularly ribbons) to reinforce officers to do what they are suppose to can be not only damaging to the reward system, but can minimize the basic expectations of behavior. Meritorious service should be based on an event worth sharing the story rather than for an officer who finally has made it to roll call on time for the past quarter. Law enforcement often misses the basic lessons of behavior. People behave depending on how they are rewarded. Perhaps the most common reward for cops is their sense of doing a good job by way of recognition and praise from their supervisors.

How Leaders Hire (Promote) and Fire

How leaders hire and fire individuals may be better stated as “select” and “transfer” in the context of policing. Promotions and special unit selections are largely overlooked in terms of organizational impact and the messages being sent. Agencies where “someone has to retire or die” for a promotion or special unit assignment (such as detectives) is commonplace in many agencies in the US. The competition is fierce in many agencies. The process and sense of fairness can be neutralized without proper processes that are clearly stated well in advance of the promotion or assignment.

Case in Point: The Leadership Book of the Month

Chief Pauley is the newly hired police chief at a small agency of 50 officers. He retired as a Captain from the state police and always wanted to be a chief. It has been five years since a sergeant’s slot has been available. Nearly every officer in the agency is eligible to compete for the promotion and many have obtained degrees. The agency is fortunate that there are several

qualified applicants. The Chief has asked one of his commanders to write the test and to look for leaders. He recently read a leadership book focused on putting people where their strengths are and wanted that as part of the test. He also wanted questions from their policy manual and union contract. The sources were announced to the agency.

A few weeks later the test was scored. Some officers scored where they were expected while some excellent officers did poorly and some mediocre performing officers did very well. In an agency of 50 officers, everyone knows each other and their work behaviors. The Chief consulted his commanders and they choose one from the top five candidates as called for in the labor contract. The top two scoring candidates were senior officers and considered by most as malcontents; a third officer was barely eligible to take the exam. The remaining two candidates were good officers and very capable; one of these were selected for the promotion. Within a few days the two malcontent officers filed a grievance wanting to know why they were passed over. Most of the agency questioned the test itself when the best officers did not pass it and the malcontents were the top two. The grievance was dismissed as the contract clearly gave the Chief the ability to select from the top five.

A week later a grievance was filed on behalf of several members claiming the test was not valid to the job. The challenge pointed to the source materials needing to be anchored to a valid job analysis of a police supervisor and that the text, dubbed “book of the month” was certainly not relevant. They also took issue with the number of policy questions that were asked and when challenged, revealed conflicting policy or practice. Months passed before the matter was settled. To avoid future problems, the city had to hire a consultant, at appreciable expense, to write a validated exam based on the job tasks of a police supervisor and derived from the written directives necessary to the job.

Chief Pauley learned a valuable lesson in managing perceptions of fairness and the importance of culture in promotional processes, regardless of who gets selected. His previous agency had annual promotional opportunities and the agency’s psychometric staff conducted standardized testing for the entire agency. His current agency did not have the resources and technical proficiency to prepare a defensible process, thus the outcomes insured a controversy. Critical organizational events, such as promotional processes, can generate significant internal

turmoil. Proper processes are built on the job task analysis and job description of patrol supervisors, and are based on the written directive systems of an agency. Testing processes based on the "leadership book of the month" are neither valid nor reliable. Scenario-based assessment (written and exercise-based) offers great opportunities for candidates to demonstrate their abilities. Using supervisors from outside agencies for assessment panels with reliable processes will demonstrate a fair and consistent process.

Conclusion and the Future

Each of the scenarios presented here demonstrate a snapshot of events some agencies encounter and each has cultural ramifications well beyond the life of the event. It can be challenging to anticipate the multiple potential pitfalls when making decisions. It can be helpful, however, to examine events in terms of how frequent they occur and how important and/or critical they are to the people in the community and the agency. When the frequency is low, the event is not a routine occurrence, and the importance is high (hurricane or promotion as an example), then take time to think out multiple scenarios; consider how seemingly simple decisions may send a message and impact the agency culture.

It is also important that supervisors make concerted efforts to "walk the walk" when "talking the talk" of ethics and acceptable behavior. Everyone in the agency is "watching" whether their eyes are present or not and even if they are unaware they are watching. The messages conveyed are powerful. Reward the behaviors that are wanted. Does the agency recognize initiative and creativity or stifle it with paperwork. Do all the supervisors have a common frame of reference that the agency universally recognizes and desires to insure all members are being evaluated equally and have very clear expectations? Establishing performance standards can be challenging but it is very necessary. Yes, most supervisors recognize good police work when they see it, but can they articulate the behaviors that comprise goods police work? If not, how can they mentor new officers or supervisors in what good police work is?

Developing an organizational culture to facilitate leader and follower emergence and development is critical to maintaining agency effectiveness. Smircich (1983) discusses

organizational culture and contends it serves four important functions by providing a sense of identity to members, facilitating a sense-making framework for organizational behaviors, reinforcing organizational values, and serving as a mechanism for shaping behavior. Law enforcement has a historical lag in keeping pace with technology. In the past, these lags were not as critical and were overcome by solid police work. As the degree and frequency of technological change takes place, law enforcement must live and adapt to changing environments faster. An agency culture that facilitates change and embraces new ideas and technology is not just a good idea, but also a necessity to keep pace with technology, to recruit qualified candidates, and to manage fiscal constraints.

References

Jones, M.A., McChrystal, E., Kung, M. & Griffith, R.L. (2002). Florida law enforcement recruiting and retention series: Leadership and organizational support: Keys to retention. *The Florida Police Chief,* 28(9).

Nelson, D.L., & Quick, J.C. (2002). *Understanding organizational behavior: A multimedia approach*. Mason, OH: South-Western.

Schein, E. (2004). *Organizational culture and leadership* (3rd ed.). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Smircich, L. (1983). Concepts of culture and organizational analysis. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 28, 339-358.

GENERATIONAL CHANGE WITHIN LAW ENFORCEMENT

Jay Corzine, Tina Jaeckle, & Jeri Roberts

Generations

In both popular discourse and research, the term "generation" or "cohort," refers to a group of people who were born during the same span of years (White, Foner, & Waring, 1988). Thus, the well-known Baby Boom Generation refers to individuals born approximately between the end of World War II and the early 1960s. The Baby Boomers illustrate the common lack of consensus about when one generation ends and the next one begins. Its beginning is identified as 1943 or 1945 by different authors, while its end is placed at somewhere between 1960 and 1965. Although there is not complete consistency, the span of a generation is usually identified as 20 to 25 years, the average time period that it takes persons born in the same year to mature and start having children of their own.

Although there are substantial commonalities between successive generations, the focus of writers and media pundits is more often on their differences, both presumed and real. Since Ryder (1965), it has been understood that generations will necessarily differ, in part because their members grow up at different times and share different experiences. For example, the Vietnam War is often presented as the most influential experience shared by the Baby Boom Generation, while members of Generation X who followed the Boomers have no direct memory of the conflict or the protests at home.

Because of increases in longevity, members of several generations co-exist at any single point in time. In the contemporary United States, most surviving members of the Silent Generation, born between 1925 and 1945, have either retired from the work force or will do so in the next few years. The Baby Boomers hold many of the most powerful economic and political positions in the U.S., e.g., Bill Clinton and George W. Bush were their first two Presidents. Successful members of Generation X born between the early 1960s and approximately 1980 are more likely to hold middle-level positions in business and government. The younger members of the following generation, referred to by several terms including Generation Y, Millennials, Echo Boomers, the Backpack Generation, and the YouTube

Generation, born between 1980 and 1994, are now entering the job market in record numbers. And, finally, the term Generation Z is increasingly used to refer to persons who are currently in the formative period between birth and junior high school.

The present paper will focus on Generation Y, or Millennials, and the two terms will be used interchangeably hereafter. The importance of this generation is obvious for meeting staffing needs in law enforcement agencies. They currently provide the bulk of new recruits for police organizations and will increasingly be the source for replacement of current police leaders during the next two decades (see also Finnie's chapter in this volume). Therefore, understanding the defining characteristics of Generation Y and how its members are likely to fit into law enforcement organizations is a central challenge facing policing.

Generational Change and Conflict

Within an organization, generational change will naturally occur as current members are gradually replaced by individuals who are from younger generations. For most of history, generational change was slow, because the generational gap (i.e. differences in early life experiences) was small. This gap began to grow with the increased rate of social change that accompanied the Industrial Revolution in the late 19th century, however. Generation Y has been shaped by several events, including the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the Iraqi War, but the defining social marker (or common experience) for its members may prove to be the rapid changes in information technology that have occurred during the last two decades. This process was recently underscored by the release of three U.S. businessmen who had been held captive by Columbian rebels in isolated jungle locations. Although their period of captivity had lasted five years, a brief period in generational terms, in post-release interviews the former hostages expressed surprise at the technological changes that had occurred since their capture.

Whether generational change within an organization is more consensual or more confliction will depend on the differences in norms and values between the current employees that are often embodied in rules and regulations and those of the new recruits. These differences will partially depend on the number of generations separating the groups. And, although the media focuses on generational differences and downplays generational continuity,

generational shifts involve movement in central tendencies among a cohort's members. To say that Generation Y places less importance on work, a common assertion made by social commentators, does not mean that **all** of its members share the same orientation toward their occupational careers. Within each generation, there is variation on any criterion, whether it is altruism, respect for authority, or attitudes toward peers.

Similar to variation among members of a given generation, there are also differences between the norms and values that are embodied within an occupation or organization. Some employers will more easily assimilate members of a new generation than others based on the magnitude of the gap between organizational norms and values, and those held by recruits who are filling entry-level positions. Simply stated, transitions between generations will proceed smoothly in some organizations, while they will spark significant conflict in others.

The Millennials and Law Enforcement

In terms of organization, the modal police agency maintains a clearly-defined hierarchical structure with well-defined roles or ranks that are similar to the military's. There is a command structure with clear lines of authority and an emphasis on following established procedures. Police officers are typically characterized as socially conservative and somewhat suspicious of the motives of outsiders with a corresponding strong sense of camaraderie that can become the basis for an "us versus them" perspective. Again, it is important to remember that this description is a presumed central tendency (i.e. the characteristics of the average police department) and there is significant variation between law enforcement agencies and between individual police officers within agencies.

Although there has been substantial commentary and speculation about the work-related values and habits of Generation Y, there has been limited empirical research (Asaro Gonzalez, 2006; Oliver, 2006). Consistent with the initial descriptions of most generations, much of the social portrait of Generation Y is negative. Members are described as being overly ambitious, seeking instant gratification, showing little loyalty to employers, changing jobs frequently, and having unrealistic expectations of employers. On the other hand, Generation Y is also described as flexible, team-oriented, and technologically sophisticated, characteristics

that may fit well within a netcentric organizational structure (see the chapter in this volume by Jackson, Myers & Cowper). Oliver (1996) provides some evidence that Generation Y's attitudes toward work are shaped by early jobs held during college, as employment has increasingly become a normal part of the undergraduate career. Of course, most college students hold entry-level service positions, receive low wages, and change jobs frequently. Loyalty to a specific employer is increasingly uncommon in this generation and this may become a central variable in the level of conflict experienced within police organizations.

Available research supports some of the hypotheses concerning work-related differences between Millennials and members of prior generations. Although Asaro Gonzalez (2006) did not find a decline in the work ethic among Millennials, they were more likely to place a greater emphasis on balancing work and family obligations. There is also some support for the contentions that work is not as important in the lives of Millennials and that they hold high expectations about the appropriate rewards associated with work (Oliver, 2006). According to Universum (2008), a company which surveys more than 250,000 graduating students every year about their ideal work environments, individuals in this generation are looking for more leadership opportunities, a clear path for advancement, good prospects for high future earnings and rapid promotion, challenging work, professional training and development, a variety of assignments, flexible working conditions, and a high level of responsibility. One student pointed out in the survey that this generation "wants the same things from employers as all of the previous generations; we're just the first to ask for it." Given what we now know about Millennials, it is clear that the possibilities for increased generational conflict in the workplace are abundant if consensus between law enforcement leadership and these new employees is not reached.

Implications for the Future of Policing

At present, Millennials have yet to make their full impact on the law enforcement workplace, but it is estimated they will be the majority of new police officers and deputies hired in the coming decade. By the year 2020, most police officers will be members of the Millennial generation (Henchey, 2008). With this significant change, it is expected that numerous

opportunities and challenges will exist for police leadership. Remembering that members of Generation Y are not homogeneous, there is reason to be optimistic about those who lean toward a career in law enforcement. Researchers at the University of North Carolina–Charlotte who examined the values orientation of criminal justice students concluded that "the differences between those criminal justice students who are specifically interested in law enforcement and other criminal justice majors as well as nonmajors seem to support higher ethical standards among law enforcement students" **(**Bjerregaard & Lord, 2004). This study further suggested positive outcomes for Millennials in the policing arena in that, "Criminal justice students interested in law enforcement received the highest mean scores on the trustworthiness scale, the lowest mean scores on the likelihood to engage in unethical acts, and the highest mean scores on the rating of the seriousness of police unethical behavior. It is the researchers' personal experience that most criminal justice majors who state they are interested in law enforcement specifically appear to have made that career decision early in their education and understand the values and standards necessary to work in law enforcement."

While the time is right to recruit Millennials into the law enforcement arena, as noted previously, many of these individuals will only effectively embrace a public safety workplace with an emphasis on mentoring relationships and opportunities for the future. These mentoring relationships will not only be important to the development of law enforcement leaders from the Millenials but will also become a critical element in any generational succession plan (Henchey, 2008). Martin and Tulgan (2001) further emphasized this characteristic of the millennial generation: "They will always need the wisdom of older, seasoned mentors. And they crave the guidance of knowledgeable, confident managers and coworkers. But they also want to be appreciated. . . . They want their ideas to be heard by expert listeners who don't outright discount [generation] Yer's simply because they're young."

Three significant threats law enforcement leaders will encounter in recruiting and retaining Millennials are the presence of blind adherence to tradition in policing agencies, linear thinking, and cynicism. In some agencies, outdated policies and procedures will likely need to be revised in order to incorporate the need for Millennials to have a sense of honor as well as

flexibility. Henchy (2008) explains that more entrepreneurial and adaptable careers will need to be provided by law enforcement, or the profession will be unable to effectively attract and retain the best of the millennial generation for leadership positions in the future.

Linearism, or linear thinking, is also consistently present in policing agencies. This is the viewpoint that time proceeds in a purposeful and inexorable manner, always forward into the future and is a never-repeating process of events and occurrences (Henchey, 2008). Howe and Strauss (2000) observed, "Yet the biggest obstacle now blocking a better adult appreciation of Millennials is one that today's adult generations did not face in their own youth. It is the obstacle that derives from straight-line thinking, from a near-universal adult consensus that, since the last two generations have defined a negative youth trend, the next American generation must necessarily follow that path." Because of this type of resistance, law enforcement leaders and trainers, due to their adherence to past belief systems and procedures may miss golden opportunities to successfully define a future plan that meets the career needs and demands of Millennials.

For many in the millennial generation, the view of the future is positive and hopeful. There is a real threat posed by the cynicism that is often found in law enforcement as a whole, as well as the human beings whose influence serve to guide Millennials today. Pessimism and a constant wave of negative criticism about members of this generation will raise mistrust and stifle their natural predisposition towards optimism, which is, so far, a defining characteristic of this generation. Ultimately, the lasting effect could be to cripple their generational can-do mentality and harm their progression to leadership positions in all areas of policing (Henchey, 2008).

One of the central challenges facing future police leaders is the ability to incorporate flexibility and motivation into a system, which has typically balked at such change. Motivation is clearly a key ingredient as well as the ability to motivate through instilling positive morale and excitement for specific assignments. Generation Y police officers need to feel that their views are seriously considered and that they as individuals actually mean something to the organization. Although difficult at times, police leaders must be transparent and able to clearly explain ideas and the thinking behind them from an organizational perspective. The future of

policing will also hinge on the change from an absolute management approach, which can create an atmosphere of mistrust and discontent and is not conducive to effective leadership. The Generation Y police officer will seek to be informed and thus gone will be the days of blind obedience. Furthermore, this approach will serve to build an understanding that police work in the new millennium is truly a team approach.

Final Note

The most likely scenario is that Millennials will be integrated into most police organizations with minimal problems, as were the generations that preceded them. Those police departments and sheriffs' offices that are willing to make creative changes in work structures and consciously incorporate at least some of the goals of Millennials into altered career paths will experience the fewest problems. Meeting the Millennials part way will be the most productive approach to follow.

References

Armour, S. (2005, November 6). Generation Y: They've arrived at work with a new attitude. *USA Today*. Accessed online http://www.usatoday.com/money/workplace/2005-11-06-gen-y_x.htm.

Asaro Gonzalez, C.J. (2006). *A causal comparative study of work ethic as a function of generational cohorts.* Dissertation Abstracts International: The Humanities and Social Sciences.

Bjerregaard, B., & Lord, V.B. (2004). An examination of the ethical and value orientation of criminal justice students. *Police Quarterly, 7*, 262-284.

Dittman, M. (2005). Generational differences at work. *Monitor on Psychology, 3*, 54.

Henchey, J.P. (2008). Ready or not, here they come: The millennial generation enters the workforce**.** *The Police Chief*. Accessed online http://theiacp.org.

Houlihan, A.(2007). The new melting pot: How to effectively lead different generations in the workplace. Accessed online http://www.goldenkeyleadership.com/Articles/the_new_melting_pot_pf.htm May 15, 2008.

Howe, N., & Strauss, W. (2000). *Millennials rising*. New York: Vintage.

Martin, C.A., & Tulgan, B. (2001). *Managing Generation Y*. Amherst, MA: HRD Press.

Mundy, Liza (2008, June 8). The amazing adventures of supergrad. *The Washington Post*. Accessed online http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/03/AR2008060302837_pf.html

Oliver, D. (2006). An expectation of continued success: The work attitudes of Generation X. *Labour & Industry, 17,* 61-84.

Riley, M. W., Foner, A., & Waring, J. (1988). Sociology of age. In N. Smelser (ed.), *Handbook of Sociology* (pp. 243-290). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Ryder, N. B. (1965). The cohort as a concept in the study of social change. *American Sociological Review, 30,* 843-861.

Universum (2008). Overall campus recruitment snapshot and diversity implications: Managing four generations at work. *Diversity Forum: State of Diversity Recruitment and Retention* [PowerPoint slides]. Accessed online http://www.universumusa.com.

ESSENTIALS OF A FUTURES-ORIENTED

PUBLIC SAFETY LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT COURSE[1]

Gene Stephens

Many consider the ideal leader to be the person with the right qualities for the situation at hand. In 1944 Winston Churchill's bulldog tenacity and ability to stay the course made him an ideal prime minister for wartime Great Britain; a couple of years later he was no longer considered the right leader for a nation tired of war and sacrifice and ready to kick up its heels and enjoy its victory. The key to grooming and choosing the right leader is to anticipate the times ahead and seek candidates who have or can acquire the assets necessary to cope with them. The only way to do that is to teach leadership candidates how to study the future and develop proactive policies to make the most of what is ahead. Such a strategy is particularly important in the field of public safety, where the very future of civil society is at stake.

In 2005, after 20 years of recommending that the South Carolina Criminal Justice Academy needed a leadership development program, this author received a call from Spears Westbrook to discuss starting just such a program. A former graduate assistant knew Spears was searching for a person to develop the program and knew of my interest. It only took a few minutes at the meeting to see this was an almost perfect situation—a chance to start a program and try out all the ideas accumulated from more than three decades of teaching the Future of Policing/Public Safety for more than 200 groups/academies across North America and a previous decade as a media crime and investigative reporter. Ending 20 months of "retirement" after 30 years of university teaching, it was back to work with a passion.

Lessons learned from the experience of starting a futures-oriented public safety leadership development program could be helpful to others wanting to accept the challenge. This chapter is written to detail some of the challenges encountered in South Carolina and how the author and others have worked to craft a successful futures-oriented leadership development curriculum.

Start with a Plan: Mission, Goals, and Objectives

Develop a strategic plan beginning with a mission statement, goals and objectives, and progressing through learning goals and objectives for each section. For example:

- Mission: To develop proactive future-oriented public safety leaders.
- Initial goal: Design and initiate a development program to serve 20 leadership candidates in the first year.
- Learning objectives: (1) Learn futures research methods via an eight-hour block of instruction; (2) Develop strategic planning skills via a six-hour block of instruction plus a three-hour simulation exercise; and (3) Demonstrate leadership skills via planning and administering a full-day emergency preparedness exercise.

In South Carolina we adopted a mission to produce futures-oriented, proactive leaders for the public safety field and an overall goal "to identify, implement, and internalize the leadership style and qualities needed to be a leader in the field of public safety." (For learning objectives, see "The SC Experiment.")

Determine the Clientele

When do you believe leadership begins—the first day on the job, above the rank of sergeant, captain? The answer to this question will determine whether you need a series of development programs—beginning with basic training and progressing through the ranks—or a single program delivered at a specific point in the candidate's career. If you choose an executive program, do you invite chiefs, sheriffs and department administrators (today's top officials) or lieutenants and captains (soon-to-be top officials)? Do you offer the program to police only or corrections only or do you open it to the full public safety spectrum? In South Carolina, even though we worked for the "Criminal Justice Academy," we determined from the outset to seek to develop leaders for the total public safety spectrum in the same classroom. Our belief was that cross-fertilization and joint communication among police, corrections, emergency services, and other public safety domains was necessary to "proactively" identify and prevent emerging problems and to truly protect the citizens served. We also decided to conduct classes at three levels—supervisory, mid- and executive. Being in charge of the

executive level, I decided we needed some top executives, but emphasis was on tomorrow's leaders—the rising stars in agencies across the state.

Seek a "Dedicated Stream" of Funding

Trying to fund a quality leadership development program with existing funds can be difficult and even if possible for one year may leave the program in limbo the next year or when budget shortages occur. To provide a quality program on a continuing basis requires a "dedicated stream" of funding. One of the most frequently used "streams" is court costs assessed with fines. A legislatively mandated percentage of those court costs or a special court assessment for the program provides a steady (although somewhat fluctuating) source of funding. Among other possibilities is a portion of the fines themselves or a public safety tax or special assessment. Obtaining this stream requires legislation at state or local levels and will depend on political skills and development of effective partners in the effort. In South Carolina, we failed to acquire this funding and the result was that after two years money destined for the executive leadership program was partially diverted, and the executive class was delayed indefinitely. With dedicated funding, this postponement could have been prevented, and diversion of funds would have been much more difficult.

Seek Creative Input before Program Development

Developing leaders is considerably different from other personnel development programs in public safety agencies; it cannot be accomplished via a traditional academy training program. Indeed, leadership development is NOT training. That was the first and possibly most important input we acquired from asking questions of other leadership development programs across the nation. Looking at other programs' content indicated leadership is more art than science, and thus mentors and role models are essential to the development process. Classroom material must emphasize advice and examples from proven leaders as well as skills training needed by tomorrow's leaders. After extensive consultation, choose carefully the persons you bring to the development program, and design activities that give the candidates opportunities to both learn and demonstrate their leadership skills.

To a large extent this step requires "futures research," especially use of literature searches, Delphi techniques, and bellwether methods. An Internet search for "creative police leadership," "proactive law enforcement," "futures-oriented public safety," etc. will result in thousands of possible individuals/organizations to contact. Soon a group of cutting edge individuals can be identified to serve as a Delphi panel to answer questions about preferred directions to develop a proactive, futures-oriented leadership development program; additionally, a group of cutting edge agencies will be identified and they can provide a bellwether of what is already underway to deliver this type of leadership development.

In our case, we relied heavily on groups including Police Futurists International (PFI), cutting-edge police across the world; PFI-FBI Futures Working Group (FWG), researching future public safety dilemmas with an eye to suggesting best practices; as well as efforts of major command colleges in the field (FBI National Academy, California Command College, Florida Criminal Justice Executive Institute, Law Enforcement Management Institute of Texas, etc.). From these sources we learned what was currently cutting edge and what was being forecast for the future in the field.

Structure and Outline a Full Program

Once the major portion of the input is acquired (input is circular, thus it never ends), it is time to outline the full leadership development program. A beginning point might be a checklist developed during the creative input phase. Put activities in a logical order (e.g., overview, definition of leadership presented by "leaders," basic characteristics of leaders, basic skills necessary to effective leadership, discussion of emerging leadership challenges in public safety, futures research and strategic planning skills development, partnership/coordination development skills, research skills development, basic communication/presentation skills development, ethical considerations by leaders, crisis management simulations, research project and presentation, etc.). Determine the structure of the program, based on the circumstances of your jurisdiction. While it might be possible to operate a compact three- to six-week program without interruption, leadership development seems best served by a series of shorter meetings (e.g., three- to five-day modules), followed by a period of synthesis of new

ideas/skills into daily activities with several other modules to follow. Each module might have an overall theme with activities designed to meet the specific learning goals of that particular module. The final module might be designated the candidate's opportunity to demonstrate their leadership skills via planning and executing the total program for the module.

To accomplish this goal in South Carolina, we started with a needs assessment specific to public safety in the state. Small in area with a population just less than 4.5 million, with the capital city, Columbia, almost in the center of the state, any public safety officer could reach the Academy within three hours from anywhere; most were within a two-hour drive. In addition, most agencies were small, with a few exceptions—those being state and local agencies in the Columbia area (30 minutes or less away)—and most had severely limited budgets and manpower deficits. We simply could not ask agencies to give up their best candidates—those either in top leadership positions or aspiring to them—for one, two, or three weeks at a time.

We decided to structure the classes so students could spend Monday in their agency, drive to the Academy to begin class at noon on Tuesday, then all day Wednesday and end at noon on Thursday. This would leave time for attendees to return home for attention to agency business on Friday. We believed we could provide a substantial program by offering five modules based on this schedule, with modules approximately six weeks apart, for a total of 80 hours (increased to 120 in the second year of the program). A syllabus was developed with students being required to write a Reflection Paper (a summary of what was learned and how it can be used) after each module and take part on panels, in class exercises, and prepare and present research to the class to obtain "leadership points" necessary to pass the class. Each presentation was to be accompanied by a PowerPoint program plus a list of references/resources found on the Internet and/or copies of resource papers. These student items were included in a workbook prepared for each module, which also contained PowerPoint and reference material provided by all instructors/guest panelists/guest speakers. Grades were assigned—A to C and U (Unsatisfactory), with students missing more than two days (or partial days) being dropped from the class. Assigning homework and grades was a first for the Academy, which before had previously used only a pass/fail system. (See The SC Experiment for more details.)

Choose Creative Instructional Staff/Consultants

Realizing that leadership development cannot be scripted into a class that can be taught by any instructor given a lesson plan, seek out a creative lead instructor supplemented by a series of creative speakers, panelists, presenters—each chosen to provide specific input to the process. For example, you might want to begin the first module with a panel chosen to serve as role models of effective leaders. During the creative input stage, you should have identified individuals and organizations that provide quality leadership to the public safety field. These are the people you now want to seek out as guest panelists, speakers, presenters, etc. As noted, in our program we identified Police Futurists International, the National Academy of the FBI, the California Command College, the Bill Blackwood Law Enforcement Management Institute of Texas, and several other programs as providing cutting edge leadership development, and identified individuals who could serve as the excellent role models and content specialists we needed. Hearing from proven leaders about what they have learned and how they lead is critical to proper leadership development.

Ensure Creative Evaluation of the Program

The evaluation process begins at the same time as the program development process, as only by designing the two together can we be certain the necessary interconnections are made and critical data is collected and analyzed. Mission, goals, and objectives establish the criteria for evaluation. If the mission is to create effective futures-oriented, proactive leaders, then the criteria for evaluation must be designed to provide and analyze data that measures that outcome. Since the best criteria would involve measurement of pre- and post-performance, creativity is essential to choosing appropriate behaviors/activities to evaluate the impact of the leadership development program on job performance. To date, the failure to develop such criteria, collect relevant data and measure it empirically has been a serious impediment to establishing reliable models for leadership development.

An example of creative evaluation can be seen in a National Institute of Justice-funded neighborhood crime prevention program to reduce apathy and increase knowledge of crime prevention methods by the citizenry. To measure the impact, before the program started,

1,000 citizens in the jurisdiction were chosen randomly and mailed a crime prevention questionnaire. The mail return within the two weeks allotted was 10% and the score on the 100-point test averaged 50. The program was designed to decrease apathy by at least 50% while increasing knowledge of crime prevention methods by at least 50%. After the program (home and business security surveys and TV-pamphlet information distribution) was completed, the same questionnaire was mailed to another 1,000 citizens randomly selected. Two weeks later, 17% had been returned and the average score was 75. Thus apathy, measured by return of the questionnaire, was reduced by more than 50% (170 returned versus 100) and knowledge of crime prevention, measured by scores on the questionnaire, was increased 50% (average score of 75 versus 50).

Constant Reevaluation

One critical trait of proactive leaders is the ability to foster and lead their agency/community through constant change. To accomplish this, the development program must be fluid, with the flexibility to change the lesson plan even in the midst of a planned activity. If change is to be embraced and assimilated by the leadership candidates, the development program also must welcome it when circumstances require it to enhance the effectiveness of the program. Thus, evaluation must be a constant process, with findings leading to reevaluation of the program from mission and goals to methods and outcomes. Changes in the program may require rethinking evaluation methods and measures, also part of the ongoing planning procedure—another reason the curriculum cannot be scripted and handed to an instructor to teach. Futures-oriented, proactive leadership development changes constantly and requires creative development skills on the parts of the administrators, instructors, and participants to be most effective. (See the SC Experiment for more examples.)

The South Carolina Experiment

The following chronicle of the first two years of the experimental public safety leadership development program at the South Carolina Criminal Justice Academy provides an

example of how one small group structured and carried out its program, dedicated to providing futures-oriented, proactive leaders for the public safety field.

Class One: 2006

Substantively, we decided to have a theme for each module, with a set of objectives that supported our overall mission to produce futures-oriented, proactive leaders for the public safety field and an overall goal "to identify, implement, and internalize the leadership style and qualities needed to be a leader in the field of public safety." Module One was titled "Overview: The Leadership Challenge" and had three learning objectives: to identify the leadership style and qualities needed in a 21st century public safety leader; to apply leadership skills in identifying trends that will challenge 21st century public safety; and to apply leadership skills in identifying strategies to maximize benefits while minimizing threats from trends. The concept was to introduce the students immediately to the difficulty of defining leadership, followed quickly by introducing them to a panel of top leaders in the public safety field who discussing their perspectives on leadership. On the second day, students were presented with an overview of futures thinking and research methodologies and then conducted their own assessment of future trends for South Carolina Public Safety. On the final day of Module One, the author of the textbook used for the course spoke via teleconference on the major themes in the book. As author of a chapter on "future" leadership in the text, I followed by discussing 10 principles of leadership deemed necessary to succeed in 21st century public safety agencies.

The homework assignment was the first Reflection Paper, in which each student in 3 to 5 pages was to (1) tell what he/she learned in the module, (2) describe how he/she would use what was learned at work and at home, and (3) state a problem/situation at work that he/she would attempt to solve using what had been learned as a base. Above all, the executives (ranging from lieutenants to chiefs of police, state highway patrol superintendents, detention center directors, probation district supervisors and public safety officers—i.e., cross-trained for police, fire, and emergency services) liked having top executives interact with them on questions about leadership and the ethics of leaders. They also learned from the Millennium

exercise that leaders must look to future trends and develop strategies—do research and strategic planning.

Module Two focused on futures research—The Visioning Concept Applied to Public Safety—with learning objectives: to inculcate the need for visioning/planning in decision making, to apply visioning and futures research methods to problem solving; and to develop creative skills in managing change and problem solving. This was a working session to learn the methods/skills of futures research and how they could be applied to public safety. The philosophy of futurism and the findings of futurists about the alternative future worlds evolving were discussed, along with the future of crime and methods of coping with crime—from high tech (e.g., cybercrime and biotech offenses) to the perennial youth-at-risk problem. Methods taught included literature review, future facts, bellwether, Delphi, brainstorming, trend extrapolation, opinion polling, and scenario development, as well as examination of the change process and the creative process applied to public safety leadership. This time the students began to express their enthusiasm for "being futurists" as prerequisite to being competent leaders. Their Reflection Paper projects began to take a futures focus—a developing problem/dilemma that could be headed off by a proactive approach.

Things really began to gel with Module Three—Coordination and Partnerships: Keys to 21st Century Leadership. Having taught for more than 20 years in the Law Enforcement Management Institute of Texas (LEMIT), I had become a believer in the teachings of LEMIT Module II that a prerequisite for futures-oriented leadership was development of partnerships and cooperative agreements between public safety leaders and city managers, county administrators, state and local agencies, and anyone who could facilitate the public safety mission. A highly seasoned public safety educator accepted the role of coordinating Module Three. We asked students in advance to bring with them a list of both formal and informal cooperative agreements their agencies had with other entities. This became the bases for a number of discussions of the need for and value of such arrangements, including a panel of top public safety administrators and their political superiors (e.g., city manager, state agency head). We ended the three days with a presentation and discussion of the necessity for understanding the complementary relationship of the news media and public safety leaders (with an

internationally-known former news reporter turned public safety agency information director as the moderator, and newspaper, radio, and television reporters a panel). The Reflection Papers began to include phrases such as “this is terrific” and “why haven’t we been exposed to this before?” Projects blossomed and by the end of the program several had instituted new policies, created new partnerships, and/or established new cooperative agreements to facilitate meeting their agencies’ mission statements.

Module Four—The Growing Impact of Technology on Leadership—gave us an opportunity to discuss the rapid pace of change and how it is already affecting/effecting leadership in the public safety field. One of the country’s leading experts on the matter (a high-ranking member of a state police force) took the class through a discussion of emerging technologies, with applications to public safety at every turn. Then he talked about how this technology could be used to create new crimes and new methods of crime control, followed by a discussion of the ethical issues raised by the technology and how the technology could threaten civil liberties (which he firmly admonished had to be protected as a matter of constitutional necessity). An open discussion of how to develop a technology-use policy for an agency came after a half-day exposition by vendors of developing technology in the public safety field.

It had become clear as the class progressed that the leadership students needed and wanted to take an ever increasing role in the procedures. Thus Module Five—Future Issues Challenging Public Safety Leadership—gave class members a chance to demonstrate their new leadership skills by researching, presenting, and leading a discussion on a challenging issue. Topics such as “Melding Boomers/Xers/Millennials in the Public Safety Workplace” and “Embedding Ethics in the Public Safety Agency” were complemented by student panels on topics such as “What We Have Learned That We Can Take Home to Improve Our Agency” and “What We Have Learned That We Can Incorporate into Our Leadership Style.” In between, topics such as the future of homeland security at the local level and how to recruit and train high-level personnel were interspersed with a session on how to develop the courage to “do the right thing.”

On the last day, a full-fledged graduation (with class shirts, class picture, luncheon, speaker, honor graduate award, etc.) was held and students created an alumni association to continue their leadership education and networking. Only one student—a police chief who had an officer killed during a module—dropped out of the course. All 21 others passed with grades of A or B and one C. During the class we were able to arrange three hours of college credit for the course (with an additional test and term paper) which three students earned. All graduates received Academy continuing education credits.

Reflection, Evaluation and Revision

In the final Reflection Paper, students were encouraged to evaluate the total program—what worked, what didn't, what should be kept, what should be discontinued or changed, what should be added—and to list recommendations for change. Now the hard work began as we started our own evaluation—guided by student comments and our observations during the nine months of the program. The student evaluations were invaluable here, pointing out some changes that needed to be made but which we had not recognized, but more often citing needed changes that confirmed our observations.

Major changes included:

(1) Adding instruction in communication skills to facilitate more professional presentations and panel/exercise participation. An eight-hour block was added to help participants understand how to research and present material; this included researching via by the Internet, developing and following an outline, effectively presenting to an audience, and preparing PowerPoint to enhance a presentation.

(2) Requiring each student to be a mentor or mentee. As good leaders need to inspire and teach, the executive student would choose a fellow officer or partner in the public safety field to either mentor or be mentored by, keeping a journal to record notes on each meeting and reporting to the class on the total experience.

(3) Adding a two-hour block on strategic planning and a two-hour strategic planning exercise based on budget and demographic data each student collected on his/her jurisdiction.

(4) Adding a session on trusteeship theory and the servant leader concept tied in with systems theory applied to public safety service and delivery; this included both classroom instruction, as well as practical consideration only implementing the theory at the agency and community levels.

(5) Enhancing the Youth-at-Risk exercise by having SC Dept. of Juvenile Justice leaders discuss the approach they took to the problem and having juvenile inmates and parolees talk with the class and answer any and all questions posed to them by executive students. This became even more intense as the juveniles served dinner to the executive students in an institutional dining room and joined them in an exercise to develop a plan to alleviate the Youth-at-Risk dilemma.

(6) Including student panels/presentations in Modules Two through Four and having students plan and execute Module Five as a demonstration of the leadership skills they developed during the program.

Class Two: 2007

Many smaller changes were integrated into the 2007 class, which was extended to 120 hours—still five modules of three days each, but beginning at 10 a.m. on Tuesdays, including a 6-8 p.m. session on Wednesday evenings, and ending at 4 p.m. on Thursdays (adding 8 hours per module for a total of 40 more hours). Also added was a pre-class Orientation at which the course and all its requirements were fully explained to all students. Decorum requirements included being prepared and on time for all classes and class activities ("a leader sets an example and is always prepared"). It also required appropriate dress (defined as dress shirt/blouse and slacks/skirt) for class and for making presentations or serving on panels, plus no talking while others were presenting, no cell phones ringing (could put on vibrate), and no checking email or surfing the internet while class was in session, except when working on an in-class research assignment. The orientation served its purpose—to be sure each student fully understood the commitment he/she was making and the conduct of the class. It was also emphasized that networking with each other and others in the field was expected and would be the most important lasting outcome of the experience.

PFI members proved invaluable for the Leadership Challenge Panel to kick off Module One. A police chief presented the participatory leadership teams he pioneered in his agency and, in keeping with the increased student participation, an open discussion was held on class views on leadership. A panel—Leading a Community-based Agency—was followed by a presentation by leaders—including a graduate of the 2006 first class of Executive Leadership—of the largest sheriff's department in the state on COMPSTAT from a Leadership Perspective. One outcome of this latter event was a surprised reaction by many students to the intensity and perceived "harshness" of the in-your-face COMPSTAT leadership style. Two officers in the class from a smaller agency with a COMPSTAT program mentioned that they had a very different approach; two modules later they provided a presentation on their "kinder, gentler" COMPSTAT, leading to a class discussion of how to tailor this proactive crime control model to the needs of the specific agency/community.

Module Two again focused on visioning and futures research along with creative thinking and the change process, all applied to public safety. The expanded youth-at-risk exercise proved to be possibly the most eye-opening experience of the class for most executive students, as they went home determined to implement changes in their agencies/communities to better identify and help these children in their jurisdictions. Module Three again focused on servant leadership and partnerships and coordinated effort, with added sessions presenting and discussing the work of the PFI/FBI Futures Working Group, and a student presentation on how problem-based learning could be used in both recruit training and executive development in the public safety field.

Module Four focused on technology and leadership, including ethical concerns in leading a public safety agency in the emerging high-tech era. A student roundtable considered the use of technology in South Carolina agencies—what already exists, what's on the horizon, and what leadership policies/issues must be considered. A class member volunteered to take responsibility for directing Module Five, soliciting and scheduling student-developed panels, presentations, and a debate (whether a college degree should be a prerequisite for employment in the public safety field). Other discussions included servant leadership in public safety in South Carolina, leading three generations in the SC public safety workplace, the most

important leadership traits to take home and practice, leading a direct supervision detention center, and the efficacy of military leadership development for public safety agencies. I finished up with a "Blue Sky Thinking" presentation/discussion to encourage creativity and thinking in terms of alternative futures—being flexible enough to lead under any circumstances. All 20 students also reported on their mentoring experiences and in a class discussion that followed agreed that mentoring can play a valuable role in creating a futures-oriented, proactive public safety agency.

The final Reflection Paper was an evaluation students worked on throughout the final module and submitted (most via email) at mid-day on the last class day, less than an hour before graduation. It is this information that will be invaluable in modifying the program to meet the needs of the students as future classes are held.

Conclusion

Integrity was always cited as the number one trait required by a leader, as no one wants to follow a person who is not trustworthy, who is not dependable, and who will not stand up and accept responsibility when under pressure. The second most cited trait of leaders was vision. No one wants to follow a leader who has no idea where he/she should be leading. There really is no true leadership without vision; thus visioning must be included as a key element in any leadership development program, and this is where the approach of the futurists is vital. Even though most agree that leadership requires attitudes/skills appropriate for the times, futures-oriented, proactive leaders are better prepared to accept and perform the leadership role under most circumstances by adopting the philosophy/methods used by futurists in their daily lives. There was unanimous agreement in the evaluations that thinking as a futurist provided competence and confidence to cope with whatever might lie ahead.

Thinking as a futurist, using futures methods of research, applying insight and foresight to considering the path forward, providing a vision for the agency/community, instilling confidence and optimism in colleagues—all of these are necessary traits for a futures-oriented, proactive leader. Whereas some hold leaders are born, not bred, we set out to provide the best development program we could envision, determined to instill the qualities we deemed

necessary to provide the type of leaders needed to lead the public safety arena in the 21st century. There was general agreement that when any officer (police, fire, emergency services) arrives on the scene of an incident, that officer is expected to take a leadership role in handling the situation. Thus leadership potential should be assessed as part of the employment process and basic leadership development should begin with basic training and continued throughout continuing professional development in the field. Every officer is indeed a ***potential*** leader.

Endnote

1. In 2005, Dr. Gene Stephens was hired by the South Carolina Criminal Justice Academy to create and be lead instructor in its first Executive Leadership Development Program. The following is based on his two years of experience in starting from a blank sheet of paper and developing a program with one overarching purpose: to develop futures-oriented, proactive leaders for the public safety field.

JANUS LEADERSHIP

Michael E. Buerger

Janus, the Roman god who looked back at the old year and forward to the new, provides an apt metaphor for leadership. The leader is a boundary-spanning position, with one foot in the organization (a shrine to its own past) and another in the external environment (from which blow the winds of change). The leader is both a two-way conduit, translating two very different worlds to each other, and a buffer to mitigate the unrealistic demands and expectations of each. The leader has two responsibilities: preserve the organization and prepare the organization for change. On one hand, leadership is a position oriented to the past, inasmuch as the culture of organizations is based upon traditions forged by the triumphs and catastrophes of earlier generations. Tradition bestows upon the organization an identity quite independent of the leader. In the worst-case scenario, it provides a bulwark against even positive changes.

Leadership is futures-oriented in that leaders must anticipate the impact of visible trends in the environment. The arrival of the future will not eliminate the unsavory inheritances of the past: it will exacerbate them. No matter what their vision of or for the future, a leader must be aware of the constraints imposed by the past before he or she can move an organization forward; hence the Janus metaphor. On the other hand, leaders confront the inevitability of change, as well as constant legitimate and illegitimate demands for change. Although change comes primarily from the external environment, it can have multiple forms. It can be ***imposed***, either by adverse budget conditions, new legislation, or a court decision. It can be ***induced***, by federal funding for innovation, or by imitating successful innovation elsewhere. It also can be ***anticipatory***, coming from within as members of the organization recognize developing needs in their own area. Change can produce a refinement of existing practice – better management – or it can foster wholesale alteration of those practices in order to respond to new challenges. While it might be tempting to equate “stability” and “change” with “management” and “leadership,” such a division constitutes a false dichotomy: the two

roles are symbiotic and constantly in play. Whether a leader has inherited a relatively stable, functional organization, or has been brought in to forge change amidst crisis, efforts toward both stability and change demand the leader's attention.

Despite the stereotype of The Leader as a prime mover of an organization, a main internal responsibility of leadership is the development of other leaders. Immediately beyond that, the incumbency of leadership is to coordinate the narrower products generated by subordinate leaders. Integral to leadership is the task of providing feedback to inform and educate those who produce the work; to help subordinates understand how their efforts fit into and benefit the larger organizational framework. Almost every newly appointed formal leader faces a series of hurdles to establishing their legitimate claim to the chair. If they have been promoted from within, the foibles of their earlier days will be well known. If they come from outside, they are largely a blank slate, but the standing members of the organization will be searching for background information – often, but not exclusively, "dirt" – in order to be able to gauge the likely impact of their appointment.

Before any substantive work can begin, leaders must identify the real strengths and weaknesses of their new command. Some will be known or revealed during the hiring process, but there is a new dimension that appears when one is thrust into leadership positions. Abstract possibilities now become realities and unsuspected resistance appears out of nowhere. Long-stymied agendas – both worthy and illegitimate – rise from graveyards inside and outside the organization.

Futures-Oriented Leadership

The biggest obstacle to the future is the comfortable past. In police culture, an ethos of "if it ain't broke, don't fix it" has almost talismanic properties against innovations that do not directly benefit the officers' individual circumstances. Regardless of the conditions in the local environment, one of the biggest challenges facing any leader is the job of broadening their subordinates' field of vision to recognize as equally valid the needs of the organization and the surrounding community.

Preparing an organization for change has several distinct phases: validating the need for the change almost always precedes validation of the change itself. Once the parameters are identified, there remains the task of overcoming innovation fatigue. That leads directly to the need to look beyond the just-completed task and anticipate environmental changes that result. The final task is identifying the necessary resources for the endeavor, a task little different from dealing with the day's alligators.

Validating the Threat/Validating the Need

If we all lived by the "if it ain't broke, don't fix it" bromide, we would wait until our cars ground to a halt before changing the oil. "Broke" and "ain't broke" is another false dichotomy. One of the jobs of leadership is establishing the terms of discussion for the change process and moving beyond the "ain't broke" paradigm is paramount. Modification is a form of enhancement, tuning the engine, enhancing performance, or any of a host of alternate metaphors that serve better than "broke" and "ain't broke."

Before we can change the terms of discussion, however, it is important to recognize that "if it ain't broke" is a demand for validation of the need for change. Change is disruptive and disturbing to comfortable routines. For many individuals, change will be undertaken voluntarily only if it is a controlled process that averts more serious dislocations. As a general rule, the greater the buy-in from the employees, the greater their commitment to the enterprise. In this regard, the leader must function as a teacher, authenticating trends in the environment that demand the change, and establishing the predicted impacts for the agency. This rule is predicated upon ***anticipatory*** change that is futures oriented; the process for dealing with wild-card ***imposed*** changes with immediate consequences -- such as adverse court decisions or budget cuts -- presents a more forceful rationale that short-circuits this part of the process.

The leader must also be ready to neutralize the nay-sayers, those who will take every opportunity to assert the opposite view. Preempting the opposition is one means; if the right circumstances exist, squashing the "yeah, but" arguments in a public forum can be effective. Ignoring the "yeah, but" may serve to maintain an on-task focus early in the process, but that approach can be self-defeating in the long run. Refusal to engage in the debate will be

interpreted as evidence of the "truth" of the objections. The true audience is not the loudmouths, who may be informal leaders or perhaps only legends in their own minds. A larger group of the uncertain and the uncommitted waits for someone to justify one or the other path to them in terms that they can understand: they are the target audience. Leaders must understand that would-be leaders of the opposition have a natural advantage, speaking in the familiar tones of traditional police culture.

Authenticating external trends can be done in a PowerPoint presentation or a memo, but dictated rationale is rarely as strong as discovered rationale. To the degree that it is possible, ranking and line-level officers should be invited to investigate and authenticate manifestations of trends ion their own areas. It will not always be possible: large-scale trends are not always immediately visible. But pump-priming tabletop exercises, fact-gathering to establish baseline data, and assignments to bring the issue before community groups for their input can all make a future trend more real. The information sources that are used by the leadership teams to identify the trends should be made available in an on-line library or other accessible form. Even if most of the agency's horses choose not to drink, the water should still be available to them: its mere presence can be a powerful validation tool, a trump card in the internal "put up or shut up" struggle for justification.

Establishing the predicted impacts is an activity linked to the trends, but not necessarily self-evident. The process is similar, though there will be an absence of literature. A variety of participatory tools can be made available, though: benchmarking and periodic reporting of impact – positive or negative – keeps the officers' minds engaged in the process and provides an informal canary-in-the-mineshaft function that precedes the fourth stage, anticipation of course changes from the original trajectory.

Validating the Change

Establishing the forces driving change does not necessarily mean that the proposed solution is the correct one. The process of discovery may be a Pandora's Box that produces a number of unrealistic alternative "solutions" that are "common sense" only within a particular perspective. Nevertheless, those alternatives that resonate more closely with the cultural

status quo will have more support with the rank and file.   Deflating alternative solutions is an important part of the change process. Dismissing them out of hand will generate hostility; they need to be acknowledged, deconstructed, and compared to the preferred solution. The tipping point may be any one factor or a combination of factors, including legal constraints and available resources. Short-term effects may be compared to predicted long-term outcomes and the impact on other operations added to the analysis.

Another of police culture's sacred cows is an entrenched desire to not "reinvent the wheel." Traditionally this has resulted in a viral adoption of Flavor of the Week programs that have been publicized as having been successful somewhere else. Nothing validates a police innovation quite so much as another police department having it already. However, this "off the shelf" approach is a second major contributor to the failure rate: adopting the shell without examining the roots of the problem. If the program is a mere façade with no specific fit to the new situation, it is unlikely to produce results. It becomes the institutional equivalent of a Pet Rock, the latest fad, soon forgotten in a back closet.

Like the original exercise, the consideration of alternatives is a teaching exercise. It is unlikely to convince every individual that the administration's choice is superior to their preferred solution, but that is not a necessary outcome. More important is the fact that all of the efforts are taken seriously. Whether the logic of the selected solution is evident or not, accepted or not, cultural norms still support leadership decisions as long as they are not seen as arbitrary or malicious.

Overcoming Innovation Fatigue

Academics are fond of wryly noting that the most common finding of social research is there is a need for more research. It is only a small step beyond that to observe that the most common outcome of innovation and new programs is no change at all, or only temporary change. Innovative police programs are wiped out when the leader who promoted them leaves the agency or informal leaders are promoted or transferred. Special units that have dealt effectively with special problems still cannot survive budget cuts that return the agency's operational emphasis to the least effective common denominator, answering calls for service.

Police officers with any substantial time in grade have been through numerous short-lived change scenarios, few of which made a lasting impact. During their careers, scores of fads and ill-conceived innovations have been inflicted upon them, without any resulting change in what they actually do or how they are rewarded (or punished). Some have witnessed a parade of temporary leaders, immortalized as "bungee bosses" in the Dilbert comic strip, who arrive with a flourish, only to depart quickly. History has taught the old-timers that most change is merely temporary and that by withholding commitment they can outlast the advocating leaders. The old-timers preach this view to the newcomers and organizational culture grows inured to the possibilities of substantive change.

Leaders cannot afford to ignore this phenomenon, as it is the primary inertia that any change process must overcome to be successful. Most failures have been top-down, shoved-down-the-throat changes by decree, providing the agency employees with little stake in the process. While not every change can be wholly participatory – indeed, some agencies may not be capable of even rudimentary participatory projects – the more the officers and supervisors have a voice and a role in creating change, the greater their commitment, the more incisive their critiques.

Since participation runs a huge risk of going sour, one of the responsibilities of leadership will be to lay the firmest groundwork and outline the clearest course possible in the early stages of any change process. This may require use of a small leadership group responsible for mapping out as much of the big picture as can be foreseen, then creating a roadmap for roll-out, and working with each successive group in small, easily-digested stages. It need not be a drawn-out process, but the core group cannot expect immediate comprehension and buy-in by any other element of the organization. A commitment must be made to responding to the many potential variations on the theme of "why we should not do this."

Anticipating Evolution

If no plan of battle survives the first contact with the enemy forces, no futures-oriented change is deployed into the same future that it was predicated upon. A persistent feature of

failed innovation is the lack of a “Plan B” or “Level 2” contingency. Most innovations are promulgated as a monolithic entity, set upon an assumption of instantaneous success. When the inevitable stumbling blocks are encountered, most fail to adapt to the new conditions. It is essential that change not be viewed as undimensional, but fluid. Because future-oriented changes anticipate the influence of many currents, not just one, the process of engaging agency personnel can embrace one or both anticipatory strategies designed to build as many contingencies as possible into the planning process.

Multiple probabilities. In order to combat group-think, agency personnel should be invited to consider as many second-stage developments as possible, a precursor to developing “what if?” contingency plans to support the change once it is launched. As an example, we might posit that a new gang enforcement strategy is to be launched in response to growing signs of gang activity. It is a familiar scenario and on the surface it might appear to be just a backward-looking enforcement action, one more link in a long chain of similar actions that produced feeble results. To improve the effort, part of the charge would be to anticipate the reactions of the gangs and to prepare contingency plans, adapting the program to meet those countermeasures. Another might be to anticipate the possible downstream effects if the top leadership of the gang were to be incapacitated: dissolution, succession, succession battles, encroachment by a newer gang, reconstitution, or redirection, among others.

At first, this portion of the exercise is certain to be an exercise in reviewing history: what happened the last time we did this, what was the result of other cities’ similar enforcement actions, and the like. Properly guided, however, the exercise should also include questions of what is different about our current situation-- will these results be inevitable here? While it is a thinly-disguised exercise in critical analysis, it can be done in terms familiar to line officers and supervisors, with an emphasis on practical, street-level conditions and measures. A premium should be placed upon empirically valid conditions, not raw opinion based on unverifiable assertions or individual instances. The process should demand empirical markers that provide tangible evidence of actions, trends, and outcomes.

Pre-mortems. The other face of change planning is to anticipate disaster rather than success. Some parts of the business world are experimenting with the concept of *pre-mortems*,

a negative form of advance thinking. Once the main dimensions of a plan are fleshed out, participants in a planning process are charged to anticipate all the ways in which the plan could blow up in their face. The purpose of the exercise is to identify flaws and potential obstacles before they happen; the second part of the assignment is to develop contingency plans to prevent those disasters or mitigate their effects if they occur for reasons beyond the agency's control. Police departments have no shortage of those who can pick apart a plan and see its flaws. The real skill to the pre-mortem exercise is to force their thinking beyond the "this will go wrong" stage to consider "how can we proactively stop it from going wrong?" That requires skill on the part of the leaders of the process, as well as rewards – acknowledgment, recognition, and "atta-boys" for real contributions, positive and negative.

As with the positive "multiple futures" approach, premiums should be paid for those observations that can identify useable measurements on the street, factors that would identify failure as well as success. It might even be worthwhile to challenge participants to identify -- and justify -- "cut points," conditions or circumstances that warrant the termination of the program. Both failure to accomplish the goals and the creation of unanticipated negative impacts could be cause for going back to the drawing board.

Once again, the point of the endeavor is not to have a plan, but to develop multiple paths branching from the central plan, to be invoked at need. Ancillary benefits should include greater buy-in at all levels as a result of participation, but that should never be considered a given. Another possible benefit is the identification of junior members of the organization who have some flair or capacity for broader thinking and critical analysis. These are future leaders, persons who can be tapped for other projects, and steered toward opportunities for further personal and professional development.

A Janus leader must avoid the trap of dismissing the negative comments. Looking back at history requires a willingness to learn from failure. The nay-sayers within an organization may lack the communications skills to make their points in dressed-up formal language, but even their crude dismissals may contain important truths. Though *why* earlier initiatives failed is more valuable than the mere fact of failure, the face the leader turns to the past must

understand the impact that those failures had on the organization. More importantly, the leader must value that impact.

Resource Development

Looking backward or forward, we see a lack of available resources. The constriction of available funds at local, state, and federal level continues to place police departments in the position of doing more with less. That in and of itself is a trend driving change, but it is also a trend that continues to engender resentment. We tend to think of resources primarily in terms of money: more money buys more cops, more overtime, more technology…. all the things we have traditionally valued, and squandered. The forward face of leadership must think in terms of community resources, private partnerships, innovative thinking at all levels, and institutional development as resources. Some can be more readily cultivated than others, but all of them – and more – are needed. Future changes are often spoken of in an amorphous vacuum, but a number of factors at work in the environment are impinging upon the police function. The distinction between the police and the military is narrowing. Crime itself is being redefined by the emerging area of cybercrime, while terrorist and natural events demand attention to the impacts of mass casualty and dislocation events.

There are other trends at work. The rise of the alternative policing industry, no longer just rent-a-cops but still less than The Man, is one such boundary-spanning topic. Changes in the nature of funding for the police may have an analog in the debates and court decisions that affect public funding of education. The shift from an investigative stance to an intelligence-gathering approach at the federal level has secondary impacts upon state and local police agencies, as do the associated lawsuits and court decisions defining privacy and the ability of government to reach into corporate databases. The demographic trends of the recent decade and the resulting changes in the faces of politics have implications for police actions. So, too, do decisions made in foreign courts, as globalization reshapes the nature of the nation-state and bends the concept of jurisdiction to the new economic circumstances. Technology and nanotechnology may change the nature of crime dramatically within a few years: it is possible at this point to anticipate a cashless society, with economic exchanges based purely upon

biometrics. Such a system may never develop, but it is one potential extension of the biometric security systems being developed for banking and for immigration control.

While these changes may not reach Smallville next week, or even next month, they are beginning to impinge upon Gotham and Metropolis. The Janus-faced leader, mindful of the past while peering into the possible futures, has a duty to deny her or his subordinates the fatal luxury of dwelling on the past. Demanding an ongoing awareness of the arrival of the future is a responsibility of leadership.

KNOWLEDGE RETENTION AND MANAGEMENT

Gerald Konkler

Jim Collins, author of *Good to Great* characterized companies that made a "leap to greatness" as those that after a transition point had cumulative returns at least three times the stock market for the next 15 years. His point was that you cannot be lucky for 15 years so there must be something that the company (and presumably its leaders) did to achieve this performance (Wexler, Wycoff, Fischer, 2007). There is a move to apply the concept of "good to great" in the public sector. While there are a variety of questions as to how to apply this concept to policing (not the least of which is how one measures "greatness" in policing or other entities where profit is not the purpose?), one question that immediately arises is how can this be done considering the relatively short tenure of most police agency heads? The average tenure of a major city police chief is under 4 years. Generally the rule is the larger the city, the shorter the chief's tenure (Wexler, Wycoff, Fischer, 2007). How do you make a police department, sheriff's office, or other law enforcement agency into a "great" agency, particularly given the short tenure of the chief and other leaders in the agency?

While a complete answer to that question is beyond the scope of this paper and will require that the police industry examine itself in detail over the next few years, it seems clear that the great agencies do not just plan for the next budget cycle and continue to do business as usual. Leaders who hope to lead their agencies to greatness must plan for the future and continually examine their business practices. It is suggested that an attribute of a "great" leader (of <u>whatever</u> rank) is the tendency to look beyond his or her career, to look to the future, to recognize and give effect to the fact that the agency (particularly a police agency) does not have a life span, that it continues on past the career of any one person. Looking beyond the "here and now" requires succession planning, not just for the Chief Executive Officer but for all those positions that require specialized knowledge (and, what position in a modern police agency does not require that?). Knowledge management and knowledge retention must be part of the secession plan of modern police leaders.

For a variety of reasons businesses and police agencies will be facing even more critical hiring and turnover issues in the near and longer term future. The impact of the looming retirements of baby boomers will impact policing just as it will impact other industries. Those who are replacing the boomers are, according to the Department of Labor, more mobile than ever before. "The average American worker today changes jobs nine times before age 34 to pursue greater economic opportunities. And that's not just because of technological change or the competitiveness of the worldwide economy. Young workers in America today are much more interested in trying out a variety of experiences, before settling on one career path" (Chao, 2005). World events also impact the makeup of local police agencies. Practitioners in policing are well aware of the impact Operation Iraqi Freedom has had on manpower with call up's of National Guard and Reserve forces. The direct connection between working cops and the military is well known. Many agencies are struggling with vacancies created by the war with officers being gone for periods of over a year and even called up multiple times.

Leadership requires knowledge—leaders have to ensure that institutional knowledge is passed on to provide consistency of leadership and continuity of operations. Leadership is made more difficult by a vacuum of knowledge…of where the widgets are, where and who the community leaders are, what font is used for policy, etc. Time taken by a leader to get up to speed – or for a subordinate up to get up to speed - is gone forever. In their 2008 Workforce/Workplace Forecast, the Herman Group notes a lack of succession preparation by organizations. Investment in leadership training has been lacking and there will be a dearth of personnel to move into leadership positions (Herman, 2007).

One of the appealing things about working in a police agency (particularly a medium or larger sized agency) is the ability to transfer and do many different things-- patrol, investigations, planning, and undercover work, among others-- but the ability to transfer (and in unionized agencies, sometimes the <u>right</u> to do so) is a liability to managing an agency. Couple this with the rules some agencies have about not leaving personnel in particular assignments too long (such as undercover, drug, or intelligence assignments), means that there is a regular loss of experience and knowledge. Every time an officer or employee leaves the agency, temporarily or permanently, that person takes knowledge with them. We keep track of

the number of police cars we have, how many riot helmets are stored where, and how many computers the agency owns. We do that because these are seen as having value and therefore they need to be tracked. The intellectual assets of the agency are also important. Why do we not have an inventory of knowledge so that we know where the knowledge is in the agency, who has the knowledge and, at least equally as important, how we transfer that knowledge? It is critical for leaders to know where the knowledge assets are and to ensure that methods to transfer knowledge are in place.

Leaders who are trying to take their agency to the status of a great agency must address retaining knowledge. A knowledge retention policy addresses these problems by providing a formal means of retaining corporate knowledge and transferring it to the newly assigned person. Knowledge Management is not just for lower level skill positions. Jim Collins suggests that in order to get the flywheel of greatness turning and to keep it turning, CEOs should mentor future leaders. According to Collins, Level 5 leaders (the highest level in his measurement system) set their successors up for greater success by identifying and preparing the next generation of leaders. Level 5 leaders do this by giving managers the authority to make important decisions, by creating leadership academies, and by sending them to external management and leadership training (Wexler, Wycoff, Fischer, 2007). It is suggested that this preparation is enhanced by permitting future leaders to identify the knowledge centers in the agency and creating ways to ensure knowledge is retained.

How Does an Agency Create a Knowledge Managment Policy?

To ensure that necessary knowledge is retained and to assist with easier transitions for new personnel, the agency has to make a conscious decision that retaining knowledge is important and a priority. Knowledge management is an emerging discipline concerned with the creation, discovery, and retention of organizational knowledge (Tryon and Hawamdeh, n.d.). It is "the name given to the set of systematic and disciplined actions that an organization can take to obtain the greatest value from the knowledge available to it" (Marwick, 2001). "A *Knowledge Retention Policy* or KRP is a formal document that declares the knowledge vital to an organization. A KRP does **not** define an organization's intellectual assets; it simply identifies

them and then provides a roadmap on how to find them and how to transfer this knowledge from one generation of employees to the next. One way to think about a Knowledge Retention Policy is as a succession plan for organizational knowledge" (Tryon and Hawamdeh, n.d, p. 2). At a minimum then the agency has to identify: where are the knowledge areas; what are the knowledge topics; and, what are the transfer mechanisms? Then, the agency has to document that process and make it part of the culture. As with many dimensions of police leadership, the challenge is successfully implementing these concepts.

Identify Where the Knowledge Areas Are in the Particular Agency

In a modern police agency some of knowledge areas are apparent. For example, most agencies have an investigative function, perhaps a records function, and most certainly a patrol function. According to Tryon and Hawandeh (n.d.), an examination of the organization chart and interviews with senior staff members will reveal the substructures that perform critical work that should be considered knowledge areas. In addition to staff interviews, the agency should consider discussions with the rank and file to identify these critical areas. There is usually a wealth of information about how things REALLY work residing with those who are ACTUALLY doing the work. In addition, in most agencies a particular individual may very well wear more than one hat. For example, a patrol shift commander might be the one with the most information on how the agency implements the Incident Command System; a detective sergeant may be the person in the agency with the most interest and knowledge in mental health issues; a field officer may be the person in the agency with the most knowledge of crime scene analysis, etc. Identifying these persons is important because the agency must do more than simply identify the Knowledge Area. The subject matter expert for that area must be identified (sometimes, but not always the person currently in charge to the function). That person will assist in determining the Knowledge Topics and ultimately the preferred transfer mechanisms.

Knowledge Areas will vary by the size of the agency. Larger agencies may have different squads for different crimes in their investigative function whereas smaller agencies will of necessity be less specialized. The former might have different Knowledge Areas for homicide,

robbery, burglary, and larceny, whereas smaller agencies may have investigators who are responsible for follow up investigation for all crimes. This would impact the Knowledge Area but the Knowledge Topics would likely be similar. Whatever the size of the agency, it is suggested that breaking the Knowledge Areas down as far as possible would be advantageous in defining the Knowledge Topics.

What the Knowledge Topics Are for Each Knowledge Area

Simply put, Knowledge Topics are the heart of the KRP. They are "distinct groupings of explicit and tacit knowledge that provide the basis for an organization's work. Knowledge Topics are the elusive intellectual assets we are seeking" (Tryon and Hawandeh, n.d., p. 3). Knowledge Topics in a typical police agency might include internal investigations, staff investigations, or accreditation. Depending on how the agency is organized, one or more of these might be under the Knowledge Area of the Headquarters Division. Similarly, the Knowledge Area of the Property Room or function might be broken down into Knowledge Topics of how evidence and property is stored, how it is purged, research into how and when it can and should be released, etc. The criminal records Knowledge Area for most agencies will include a Knowledge Topic of Uniform Crime Reporting (UCC) or National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS).

What Are the Transfer Mechanisms for Each Knowledge Topic

A transfer mechanism is how the knowledge in an area is transferred from the person leaving to the person coming to the position. The agency must identify what the current transfer mechanisms are for each of the identified Knowledge Areas. In most agencies there are already in place at least some valid/valuable/effective transfer mechanisms. For example, agencies might routinely transfer personnel early so that the new employee will be able to work with the outgoing person. This can be a form of apprenticeship or mentoring. Obviously, there will be times when that option is not available, e.g., when a person suddenly quits, dies, or becomes incapacitated, so there should be other options as well.

Some common examples of knowledge transfer include:

a) Documents, such as policy & procedure manuals that apply to the entire agency, what some agencies call "unit manuals" or Standard Operating procedures/SOPs, laws, regulations, etc.
b) Mentoring by serving as a trusted counselor or teacher, especially in an occupational setting.
c) Apprenticeship; by working for another in order to learn a trade.
d) Training, such as formalized training or on-the-job training.
e) Membership in professional organizations that provide the opportunity for conferences, list serves, or other educational experiences.
f) Cross training that ensures someone else knows how to do the job before the vacancy arises.

Another way to look at knowledge transfer is to ask, "If the person in the position suddenly quit, how will knowledge be transferred to the new person?"

As noted above, many agencies probably use at least some of these transfer mechanisms. The problem is, at least in some agencies, the methods are not formalized and they are done on an ad hoc basis. By formalizing the process-- by writing it down-- it becomes institutionalized and leaders know, for example, that when their crime analyst puts in his/her papers to retire, if possible the replacement needs to be transferred early to be apprenticed to the outgoing person. The knowledge transfer plan might also stipulate the incoming person needs to be scheduled to attend any formalized training that the agency has recognized to be necessary to perform the task associated with the new position.

In addition, by creating a Knowledge Retention Policy, the agency is forced to recognize characteristics about the knowledge and about the transfer mechanisms relative to particular tasks. These characteristics include how well (or how poorly) the knowledge is defined, whether there are current, sufficient, transfer mechanisms in place, and indeed the relative importance of the task/position/job to the mission of the agency. Are we flying by the seat of our pants or have we identified what the knowledge is and how it should be transferred? As part of this process the subject matter expert needs to characterize the knowledge topics as currently being Well Defined, Undocumented, or having Limited Definition. This analysis is critical. If those tasks critical to public safety are discovered to have limited knowledge

definition and/or poorly defined transfer mechanisms, the agency must seek better definition and develop adequate transfer mechanisms before the need arises.

Chief executive officers of police agencies must be careful to not only apply the concepts of knowledge management within the rank and file of their agency, but also to apply them to their position. Most chiefs of police realize that their position can be tenuous and that their tenure is likely to be short. If an agency is to continue its move from good to great, the chief should set the agency up to succeed by making plans for his or her departure through the development of a knowledge retention policy and identification of the future leaders of the agency. Far too many police agencies have suffered from the failure of the CEO to develop personnel to take his/her place.

While Knowledge Areas, Topics, and Transfer Mechanisms will differ from agency to agency, it is likely that there will be similarities. These similarities make it tempting to simply adopt another agency's policy. Agencies, however, need to customize their Knowledge Retention Policy to their own structure, environment, and circumstances, if for no other reason than doing so forces an examination of their practices and organization.

Conclusion

Considering the short tenure of heads of police agencies and the increasing movement of subordinates in and out of the organization, retaining and managing institutional knowledge should be of utmost important to police leaders. This is particularly so if the leader is trying to move the agency from a good agency to a great agency. By creating a Knowledge Retention Policy, an agency will ensure that knowledge assets of both the CEO and other leaders in the agency do not walk out the door when the person leaves. We would not let physical assets walk out the door. We should not allow knowledge assets to leave, either.

References

Chao, E. (2005, September 21). *Speech at Annual National Safety Congress and Expo*. Accessed online http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/speeches/20050921_safety.htm.

Herman Trend Alert. (2008). *Workforce/workplace forecast.* Accessed online http://www.hermangroup.com/alert/archive_12-12-2007.html

Marwick, A. (2001). Knowledge management technology. *IBM Systems Journal, 40* (4), 814-830. Accessed online www.research.ibm.com/journal/sj/404/marwick.html.

Tryon, C. & Hawamdeh, S. (n.d.). *Bridging the knowledge gap, part II*. Accessed online http://www.tryonassoc.com/pdffiles/Paper%20-%20KRP%20Part%20Two.pdf

Wexler, C., Wycoff, M., & Fischer, C., (2007). *Good to great policing: Application of business management principles in the public sector*. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

Leadership Development Creates Chiefs of Police

Alan Youngs

"Leaders don't create followers, they create more leaders." Tom Peters, management consultant

In the world of college football, the University of Southern California is known as "Tailback U." That nickname was created to reflect the steady stream of top rated tailbacks that have populated the ranks of the USC football squads over the years. If the names Mike Garrett, Ricky Bell, Charles White, Marcus Allen, Reggie Bush and LenDale White sound familiar, keep in mind that they all came from "Tailback U." If there is an equivalent to "Tailback U" in the world of law enforcement, the honor would surely go to the Lakewood (CO) Police Department. Call it Chief of Police U. if you will. Though modest in size and budget, LPD has been the breeding ground of 63 chiefs of police since it's founding in 1970.
Is there something in the water in Lakewood that spawns chiefs of police? Is the thin air of the nearby Rocky Mountains somehow responsible for creating excellence in the ranks of the local police department? Not exactly.

To understand the culture that produces so many chiefs of police from within its ranks, one must go back to the beginning of the department. The Lakewood Police Department was founded in 1970, shortly after the City of Lakewood – a fast-growing suburb of Denver – was incorporated. This was right on the heels of the tumultuous '60s that had been marked by an unpopular war that continued into the 70s, civil unrest, and race riots in places like Detroit and Watts (Los Angeles). The Democratic Convention of 1968, held in Chicago, was deeply scarred by riots that to some degree may have been exacerbated by police misconduct that some pundits referred to as "police riots." In short, police departments at the time suffered from unpopularity and a waning sense of self confidence.

In the late 1960s a presidential commission conducted a study on how to make law enforcement more professional. Lakewood's city fathers, along with newly appointed Director of Public Safety (aka chief of police) Ron Lynch embarked on a bold and daring (some called it

“radical”) experiment to create the police department of the future. At the core of the experiment was the requirement that all Lakewood Police Agents must have a four-year college degree. Through the years the “Lakewood experiment” adapted to its successes and failures, in some cases reverting back to the model of a more traditional police department. For instance, they did away with the controversial blue blazer and necktie “uniform” that had made the agents indistinguishable from the civilian population, and reverted back to the traditional police uniform. What did not change, and what lies at the heart of the U. of Chiefs of Police, was the requirement for a four-year college degree. Coupled with an unflagging desire to create and promote excellence, LPD flourished.

Current LPD Chief Kevin Paletta recently reflected on why an astonishing 63 members of its ranks have been hired elsewhere as chiefs. “Chiefs were sought from Lakewood’s ranks because of their educational requirements, their reputation for professionalism, their innovation, and their adherence to the highest standards of integrity and character,” Paletta noted. “Other departments wanted a chief who promoted and modeled Lakewood’s culture of excellence. The demand for Lakewood-style leadership grew out of the successes of those early chiefs. “Word spread quickly about the culture at Lakewood. Lakewood began attracting the best police officers from all over the country. If you wanted to work for one of the best police departments in the 1970s and 1980s, you wanted to work for the Lakewood Police Department. Success breeds success and a culture of excellence was created and sustained,” Paletta said. Today, one in every 10 Lakewood officers goes on to become a chief. Understandably, it is not difficult for Lakewood to recruit the cream of the crop.

James O’Dell, who was hired by Lakewood in 1970 and went on to become the chief in Kettering, OH, believes that one key element above all others set Lakewood apart from the rest. “Courage,” he said. “They were not afraid to try new things.” Chief O’Dell linked courage with “a healthy emphasis on education. …The agency made sure employees mastered interpersonal relations, communications, and customer service skills. …Lakewood became the melting pot of lateral entry recruits from across the country. These new hires brought so many different perspectives to the table. …Lakewood was not afraid of failure.”

Sidney Klein, also hired in 1970 by Lakewood, became the chief of police in Clearwater, FL. "It began for me in early 1970 when I completed several years as a deputy sheriff with the Dade County (FL) Public Safety Department, and was recruited to come to Lakewood to help start a new department, the likes of which the police world had never experienced," he said. "By request, I arrived with long hair and a beard, was sworn in by the mayor and chief in a motel room, given a wad of money, a code name, and told to go out and buy narcotics. It was truly the Wild West, like shooting fish in a barrel. There were only a few of us from all areas of the country. We had no building, cars, uniforms, and radios – nothing! It was then that I really learned the true meaning of teamwork," Chief Klein said.

David Dial, hired by Lakewood in 1973, later became the chief of police in Naperville, IL. Reflecting on his Lakewood experience, Chief Dial recently observed, "During the 1970s and 80s, it was truly a special place to work. Higher education and leadership training were encouraged in the department. It was there that I went back to school and received my first master's degree from the University of Colorado," he noted. "Just as important as the education and training was the opportunity to work in virtually all divisions in the police department," he said. "…The national recruitment that was being done at that time gave me an opportunity to work with a very diverse group of people and to learn from their diversity of ideas. In summary: Ethics and integrity; education and training; diverse assignments; and exposure to diverse people and ideas," Chief Dial concluded.

While the four-year degree requirement is an article of faith in LPD, it is not a shared value throughout the country. Can a candidate for chief of police not be qualified without a college diploma? Why are years of distinguished service and leadership not sufficient to run a good police department? The answer is yes, a candidate can be highly qualified without a degree, but that candidate will be even more qualified with a degree. It is not so important what subject or discipline the degree reflects; what is important is the intellectual and cultural rounding out that occurs when an officer expands his or her horizons in a rigorous academic environment.

Changing demographics and a changing culture often demand that the police officer of the new millennium approach situations with an eye for nuance, flexibility, innovation and

creativity. Leadership development, then, must be viewed as more important than ever in creating excellence in police departments. Leadership development has been extensively studied and written about in the private sector and the military. In law enforcement the picture is not as complete. To address the issue, in 2006 the U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Assistance funded the Law Enforcement Leadership Initiative (LELI), tasking the project with "identifying the critical core competencies needed in a contemporary law enforcement leader, regardless of rank." In other words, what are the critical, core factors needed to produce superior leadership skills within the law enforcement community?

According to a draft document from the LELI, "The compilation of these competencies will reflect core values such as integrity and commitment to the principles embodied in the Constitution, as well as skills such as effective communication, understanding of social context, and problem solving in multi-cultural settings." The draft further states, "The objective of LELI is to develop these competencies in conjunction with key law enforcement organizations, then deliver them to local, state, federal, private, and academic institutions that provide law enforcement education and training."

The LELI project includes and extensive review of existing literature on the subject of leadership development within law enforcement, and an in-depth case study centering on corruption in the Los Angeles Police Department. Specifically, the case study sought to identify issues of failed leadership that might have contributed to corruption, as well as issues of ethics and integrity failure. Additionally it was intended to identify management practices that would help in identifying potential misconduct or corruption at an early state. The study also sought to determine the impact the corruption had on the community where it occurred and to highlight lessons learned within LAPD as a result of the investigation. In order to identify core competencies for leadership, the LELI also interviewed key individuals within law enforcement and city management. In the early phases of the process, interviews were conducted in person. It was eventually determined, however, that survey responses were "more insightful than originally anticipated."

The people interviewed for the project were: Carlos Alvarez, mayor, Miami-Dade FL; Greg Anderson, sheriff, Hopewell, VA; Kevin Beary, sheriff, Orange County, FL; Steven

Borchardt, sheriff, Rochester, MN; Pat Bradley, peace officer standard and training, MD; Sam Cochran, sheriff, Mobile, AL; Michael Crews, criminal justice standards and training, FL; Pat Fitzsimmons, former chief of police, Seattle, WA; David Goad, sheriff, Allegany, MD; Sheldon Greenberg, Johns Hopkins University, MD; Victor Hill, sheriff, Clayton, GA; Ted Kamatchas, sheriff, Marshall County, IA; Gil Kerlikowske, chief of police, Seattle, WA; Phil Mask, sheriff, Saline, AR; James Montgomery, chief of police, Bellview, WA; Chuck Ramsey, former chief of police, Metropolitan Police, Washington, DC; Tim Rogers, sheriff, Coshocton, OH; Howard Rasmussen, Center for Public Management, FL; Ron Spike, sheriff, Yates, NY; Leonard Territo, Ph.D., University of South Florida; Randy Thorp, sheriff, Licking, OH; Jim Tracey, sheriff, Utah County, UT; and Jerry Williams, University of Colorado, Denver.

The interviews consisted of six open-ended questions intended to allow for an expression of views on a variety of issues. The questions are included below with a sampling of the responses provided by the study participants:

1. What core competencies are needed to promote ethical and effective law enforcement leadership?

- Modeling behaviors (based on values).
- Mentoring/coaching
- Accountability
- Performance measurement
- Ethics
- Integrity, including the ability to influence organizational culture, selection process, training, and supervision.
- They must be taught how to become an advocate for public policy including making effective policy arguments and presentations.

2. How can we promote the development of those competencies?

- Strategic planning requires exposure to other agencies to find best practices.
- Encourage people to look outside their own agency and work with other organizations.
- Organizations need to live their values.
- Not compromising integrity of core values.
- Submerge an aspiring leader in psychology and human development courses to they can understand other people.
- Teach good and bad leadership styles.

3. What partners are critical to promoting effective law enforcement leadership?

- Leadership is contingent upon partnerships.
- Political sectors must understand an organization's goals and help them achieve those goals.
- Trust requires transparent outreach to all segments of the community with honest dialogue.
- Recognize that, like it or not, the media can "make or break you."
- The academic community is a critical partner.
- Private sector leadership, especially those with demonstrated success.

4. What assets or resources do you think are important to promoting core competencies?

- Patience!
- Meaningful relationships are an extremely important asset including open and honest expression and acceptance.
- Diversity is required in the classroom, on the leadership team and in training positions.
- Meaningful inclusive process for developing values, e.g., how we treat each other and how we treat our customers.

5. What obstacles exist that must be overcome to promote ethical and effective law enforcement leadership?

- We need to find a better model to teach ethics so that leaders do not inadvertently act unethically.
- Inability to hold supervisors accountable for the actions of their subordinates.
- Overcome the notion that the best way is also the easiest or safest way. People can be driven to mediocre decision making if they believe that will prevent them from being harmed by their decisions.
- Trust/relationship building is inseparable requiring honest and open dialogue.
- Culture of the organization.

6. Do you see any new core competencies emerging over the next 10 to 15 years that may alter the current list of core competencies?

- No – the competencies of a good leader are historical and core values remain the same.
- We need to be more global in our thinking.
- We must be conscious of and responsive to the needs of emerging generations.
- Emerging technologies will affect…our service delivery and the way in which we manage information.

7. Other comments

- If we don't take the initiative, less qualified people will continue to fill leadership positions.
- Whatever model is developed must not only assure education in the competencies, but require their application.
- Agencies are frequently "over led" and "under managed." There must be a balance.

While the survey respondents reflected a range of ideas and opinions, it is clear that qualities such as ethics, integrity, and high standards are keys in developing strong, competent leaders. The question remains then, how to move these lofty notions from the realm of the theoretical into the real world. Using the Lakewood Police Department as a model, the first step might be determining whether law enforcement is to be viewed as a trade or a profession. From its inception, Lakewood was determined to have one of the most professional police departments in the country. The bar was set high in terms of education and ethics. Having fostered 63 chiefs of police (or sheriffs) in 38 years, the conclusion must be drawn that Lakewood is succeeding.

In the Lakewood model, an unwavering commitment to the goal and the processes that lead to it, are essential. There can be no tolerance for corruption, for instance. The LELI pointed out in its case study that little transgressions can easily morph into large scale corruption. "It is easy and often popular to ignore simple infractions," the study noted. "Yet it is those simple infractions that can lead to much more serious violations." Lakewood also takes pride in its policy that officers serve in a variety of departments, thus creating officers with an appreciation for the "big picture," that is greater than the needs of any single department. In Lakewood, anyone above the rank of commander is transferred every two years to a different division or section.

Lakewood intentionally set the bar high when the department was founded, and the bar is as high today as it was in 1970. The department continues to innovate but does not lower its standards when an innovation fails. Persistence, high ethical standards, education, and an unyielding demand for excellence are essential elements in creating a culture that consistently produces police officers who are able to carry out their duties professionally and to grow and mature in their profession in order to lead others. In producing so many police executives and officers of high quality, LPD has proven that individuals will rise to the level of expectation

presented them. Bringing a police department up to a level of excellence requires leaders who, as Stephen Covey says, work on the system not just management who work in the system. Commitment to higher standards at time of employment, training inside and outside the organization and expectations of integrity and high ethical values are elements of a model that has worked for the Lakewood Police Department.

TACTICAL SCIENCE?

Sid Heal

Ask just about anyone about law enforcement tactical fiascoes and they will be quick to cite the raid on the Branch Davidian Compound in Waco, Texas, or perhaps the "Ruby Ridge Standoff" with Randy Weaver and his family in Idaho. They may even describe the terrible fires in Philadelphia after local police attempted to serve arrest warrants on members of the MOVE group.[1] Some may describe an event in which their local police were involved, almost certainly a scenario alleging inappropriate force. Regardless of what is described, the scenarios almost always involve allegations of an overreaction of some type. In contrast, consider the following scenarios.

After attempting to serve arrest warrants on a group of radical farmers who, among other things, were accused of frauds and refusing to pay taxes, agents from the federal government surrounded their farm headquarters near Jordan, Montana, and pleaded with them to surrender. Fearing a repeat of the tragic events at Ruby Ridge, the operation continued for months and the media labeled the conspicuously timid efforts as "Weaver fever." When the suspects finally surrendered after 81 days, local citizens danced in the streets. The operation remains the longest police "siege" in U.S. history.

A year later, local police attempted to serve commitment papers on a 51 year-old widow and former nurse living in a house near Roby, Illinois, when relatives claimed she was mentally unstable. For nearly six weeks she single-handedly held off police. The so called "Roby Ridge Siege" cost the local authorities nearly a million dollars[2] and gained international attention as protestors picketed the site, and neighbors paid her bills and attempted to sneak food to her.

Unlike their comparative equivalents, these incidents are clearly cases of under-reaction, but are they any less tactical fiascos? The ridicule and scorn used to describe them clearly indicates some of the sentiments of the community and serves to undermine the

legitimate authority of their government to enforce the laws. The greater question, however, is what *is* appropriate?

In point of fact, there is no perfect solution to these situations and therein lays the root of the issue. Because there is no one right answer many conclude that there is also no wrong answer. The sad, but true, state of affairs is that most law enforcement tacticians are lacking even the most rudimentary understanding of any supporting science for making sound tactical decisions. As a matter of fact, many law enforcement tacticians would be the functional equivalent of witch doctors in the medical field. Medical terms such as lavage, dermabrasion, or hemodialysis are no more unfamiliar to them than tactical terms like tempo, fog, or friction. They would be hard put to quote a single source, theory or doctrine to justify their decisions. They simply apply what worked last time without any idea of why the preferred course of action in one situation may be a recipe for disaster in another. It is especially disheartening to have the noblest intentions disparaged by a plaintiff's "expert" who possesses all of the credentials and none of the knowledge to make effective and reliable tactical decisions. The fact that juries find them credible at all attests to law enforcement's superficial understanding and employment of fundamental doctrinal concepts that have withstood the test of time and trial.

As the war on terrorism is underway, law enforcement is shouldering the lion's share of the burden for guarding our communities from attack, it would seem prudent that commanders of tactical operations be fully immersed in the science from which to draw upon for appropriate tactical responses. Referring again to our medical analogy, a patient complaining of stomach pain expects a bona fide medical doctor to be able to tell the difference between indigestion and stomach cancer. Caught early enough and appropriately treated even potentially terminal illnesses are often curable. Likewise, members of the community have a right to expect law enforcement professionals to be capable of making a similar diagnosis in their discipline, especially an ability to recognize when a tactical operation or emergency response is moving in unanticipated directions and satisfactory outcomes become dubious. Accountants study math, doctors and nurses study medicine, and weather forecasters study meteorology, so why do tacticians not study tactical science? While the problem is pervasive throughout the ranks, it is

most acute at the command level. While a strong emphasis is placed on physical ability and prowess with weapons, good tactics have saved more lives than good marksmanship! Why then is this shortcoming so pervasive?

Predominately, the problem seems to stem from a general lack of awareness that there actually is a system of knowledge covering general truths for reconciling tactical ends with supporting scientific principles. In all but the rare exception, officers desiring to advance in rank, especially to a command level, must demonstrate some basic knowledge of managing, budgeting, staffing, organizing, and planning, but may not have the faintest inkling of logistics, intelligence, operations, or command and control. Is it any wonder that these people make great managers and poor commanders? It is a bitter irony, that because of their rank, they are also the most likely to be called upon to handle the largest and most complex tactical operations. It is a gut-wrenching experience listening to a person who has gained respect and acclaim as an administrator, but who has minimal experience, and little knowledge or understanding in the tactical arena, criticizing an operation for which they have only a minimal amount of comprehension.

So what exactly is tactical science? In the simplest terms, it is the systematized body of knowledge covering the principles and doctrines associated with tactical operations or emergency responses and reconciling scientific knowledge with practical ends. Unlike the "hard" sciences, like physics and mathematics, tactical science more closely resembles the "soft" sciences, like sociology and psychology, because scientific truths cannot be determined to an absolute certainly but instead are limited to a range of likely probabilities. Nevertheless, doctrinal concepts such as objective, mass, maneuver, fog, friction, initiative, and tempo go a long way towards elucidating the factors and influences involved in crafting reliable plans and making sound decisions in responding to emergency situations.

Likewise, it is an "applied science" in that the major contribution is not merely identifying the principles and precepts in play, but rather in applying the knowledge to forecast and influence behaviors and outcomes to enhance a more satisfactory outcome. In this manner, law enforcement tacticians more closely resemble engineers than scientists. The

problem, however, is that unlike the military services which teach these subjects as part of an officer's education, no such requirement exists for law enforcement leadership.

Recognizing this problem, the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department began a 40-hour course in tactical science in 2004. Students are predominately from law enforcement, with as much as 20% of a class of command rank. The course has attracted students from as far away as Hawaii, Washington, and Illinois, as well as other countries, most recently three Belgian counter-terrorist experts. The course assumes no prior knowledge of, or experience with, tactical science, military, or even law enforcement. Instead, competitive games like chess, checkers, soccer, football, basketball, baseball, and the like, are used to demonstrate how understanding and applying fundamental doctrinal concepts affect favorable resolutions. Among other things, students learn of the importance of envisioning an end state, the five inherent factors in any crisis, how to conduct an operational analysis and terrain analysis, maneuvering in time, fighting in five dimensions, as well as the differences and implications of analysis and synthesis, symmetric and asymmetric strategies, plans that are loosely or closely coupled, and many other tactical concepts. Of particular note is developing a capability of students for early recognition of operations that are moving away from the norm to prompt more scrutiny and provide for corrective measures. Described as a "miniature war college" for law enforcement, none of these subjects are routinely taught in any law enforcement agency in the United States and the courses have grown steadily in size and frequency.

As the years have passed, students are reporting one successful operation after another. Yet, despite the success of the program, it is far too small and infrequent to have a national impact. The military profession has long ago recognized the value of the study of tactical science and have established institutions from West Point and Annapolis to the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, England, not to mention the various service war colleges, to instill the importance and provide a forum for understanding and applying tactical principles that have been proven through the ages. In contrast, no equivalent exists anywhere for law enforcement.

As law enforcement ramps up for the war on terrorism it is more critical than ever to build upon a solid foundation of science. Command personnel need to be thoroughly familiar with tactical concepts, principles, axioms and doctrine. Promotional examinations need to

include material on tactical science. Professional associations, like the National Tactical Officers Association, need to be as important on a resume as the International Association of Chiefs of Police. Agencies need to recognize that the knowledge and skills for handling tactical operations are just as real and just as necessary as those for preparing budgets, managing personnel or organizing programs. They also need to invest as much in education for commanders as in training for the troops. It is time to recognize that the "art of war" is the application of the science. To do less is too horrible to consider in a profession that chastens its failures with death.

Endnotes

1. The "MOVE Group" was a loosely-knit group of people advocating a "back-to-nature" lifestyle and an aversion to technology. During a failed operation to serve arrest warrants on members of the group a violent gun battle erupted as well as a fire which killed eleven people and destroyed more than 60 homes. The City of Philadelphia was ordered to pay more than $25 million in settlements.
2. Even the most conservative estimates start at $500,000, but Illinois State Police Director, Terry Gainer, placed the figure between $750,000 and $1,000,000!

LEADERSHIP AND OPFOR NETWORKS

Robert J. Bunker

Leadership—the activity of leading others.

OPFOR—opposing or opposition force.

Networks—structures and processes that link personnel and/or organizations together.

This essay will address the topic of leadership and OPFOR networks. This subject area has suffered from quite a bit of neglect yet has great homeland security potentials.[1] For law enforcement purposes, this represents an important topic because gaining an understanding of one's opponents and their organizational and leadership approaches is the first step in achieving mastery and dominance over them. The primary reason for the neglect of this topic it is that it requires interdisciplinary knowledge concerning three distinct areas of study— leadership, OPFORs, and networks— and their subsequent analytical fusion. It is the intent of this essay to draw upon each of these areas of study and suggest strategies and methods that may be used to better understand their interrelationships and possibly open new lines of research. At the same time, when applicable, the focus will be upon how these may pertain to the Al Qaeda network.

The purpose of leadership in conflict and war is to get others to follow orders and directives, perform more effectively under fire, enhance personnel morale and, ultimately, promote in others the ability to achieve feats beyond their normal capacity. All of these capabilities are important to the functioning and 'combat effectiveness'[2] of non-state OPFOR networks engaging the law enforcement agencies and military forces of the United States.

A better understanding of the dynamics of leadership processes in OPFOR networks is important not only to our ability to disrupt, neutralize, and dismantle them but to facilitate the creation and development of our own allied operational networks. Line officers and police supervisors outside of specialized units may find this topic somewhat esoteric but the post 9-11 reality in which we now exist calls for all public safety officers and responders to begin to think

and plan for the very really possibility of future strikes against our homeland. With awareness of OPFOR patterns and functions comes our ability to develop new tactical and operational response capabilities and the organizational and technology based requirements to support them. Lessons learned concerning OPFOR leadership styles also provide us with an opportunity to better appreciate our own perspectives on police leadership and further our understanding of competing leadership models.

Types of OPFOR Leadership

Many different definitions and views on leadership exist. The bottom line, however, is how the art and science of leading others impacts real world operations. Since OPFOR networks exist for one singular purpose—to engage in conflict and war—we should view their leadership processes from this perspective. Unfortunately, a "one-size-fits-all" form of analysis does not exist concerning these leadership processes. Here, we examine several which offer useful insights for homeland security purposes.

One analytical method applicable to conflict and war is Clausewitz's differentiation between the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of activity. Leadership types based on this analytical method, with the inclusion of OPFOR examples, would be as follows:

Tactical Leaders. Based on individual tactics and procedures found at the fire team and squad levels. OPFOR-analogous positions are general terrorist cells and specialized units such as suicide bomber groups, direct assault groups, and beheading crews. These are low-level operatives akin to non-commissioned officers (NCOs) or police sergeants with more specialized training. The three Al Qaeda members who served as pilots in the 9/11 attacks would fall into this category.

Operational Leaders. Based on the coordination of many tactical units into an ongoing operation in large battlespace (operational space) areas. This can include military theater operations taking place across a country or countries. Regional leaders of Al Qaeda cells in the various regions of the world—such as Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi in Iraq and Mohamed Atta, the Al Qaeda member who coordinated the four 9-11 strike groups — are examples of operational leaders. Interestingly, Atta also served as the 4th tactical

leader for the 9-11 attacks. Such blurring between operational leaders and tactical leaders is not uncommon—this was also the case for Al-Zarqawi who directly engaged in beheadings. The reason for this overlap is that many radical Islamic leaders consider themselves warriors rather than soldiers, thus no distinction is made between the managers of violence (officers) and those that participate in it (enlisted troops) unlike in the US military.

Strategic Leaders. This is the level of political officials, senior level military officers, and police chiefs. These leaders set strategic and grand strategic goals and policies. For Al Qaeda, Usuma bin Laden and his second in command Ayman al-Zawahiri would be examples of strategic leaders.

Shamil Basayev, the infamous and now deceased Chechen leader, is an outlier in that he participated in all three levels of leadership activity. This would be tantamount to Usama Bin Laden picking up an AK-47 and both coordinating and engaging in school takeovers and aircraft hijackings.

Another analytical method utilized is based on generational patterns of the leadership. Such patterns can be derived from both the leaders themselves and the life cycle of an organization. Leader-based patterns can be viewed stemming from work conducted on the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA).[3] PIRA patterns are:

Early Founding Leaders. First generation leaders were from the working class and veteran terrorists. They were street smart rather than educated and tended to be in their 30s and 40s. As a result, they commanded great respect but were not charismatic individuals. Examples are MacStiofain, McKee, O'Bradaigh, and O'Conail who emerged from 1969-1975.

Follow-on and Continuity Leaders. Second generation leaders drew from both the working and middle class. They joined PIRA, when formed, and were more capable because of the benefits of universal education. These individuals were in their early 20s and cults of personality formed around them. Examples are Adams, McGinnis, and Sands, who emerged from 1978 to the present.

Embryonic Leaders. Projected third generation leaders are now emerging but not yet identified. While still drawing from the lower and middle classes, these individuals are well educated up to and including holding graduate degrees. They are primarily attracted to Shin Féin over PIRA. This group is in its 20s and 30s and can be viewed as 'political constituency' organizers as Northern Irish Catholics shift from a political violence (i.e. terrorism) to political accommodation strategy.

Al Qaeda leadership patterns are also now appearing. Major firebreaks in Al Qaeda organizational development can be noted from the early Mujahideen days in Afghanistan to the formation of Al Qaeda and the full scale operating of its training camps in Afghanistan and then again due to the post 9-11 loss of those training camps and the new reliance upon the internet for training and radicalization and the absorption of affiliated groups. These shifts all required different forms of leadership development and effectiveness. It is noteworthy that 88% percent of the Al Qaeda central staff leaders had finished college and 20% had doctorates.[4] Its leaders were far more educated, hence more capable of engaging in complex planning, from a much earlier point in its OPFOR evolution than a group such as PIRA/Shin Féin that is only now beginning to seek this level of education in its leadership. Still, with Al Qaeda's globalization and increasing incorporation of outside cells to the network (such as the Maghreb Arabs) the average educational level of organization leadership is decreasing.[5] It will be interesting to see what impact this will have on overall organization development and effectiveness.

Further crossovers and overlaps with patterns of leadership and OPFOR development can be derived from research conducted by this author on Weapons Systems Lifecycles. This research has been used to characterize the lifecycles of the European knight and the modern battle tank. A four-stage process is articulated from the emergence of a system through its dominance on the battlefield to its eventual obsolescence and discontinuation of use. Lifecycles research also has applicability to terrorists and other types of OPFORs such as insurgents, non-state combatants, criminal soldiers, and the like. The stages, with OPFOR examples applying to the above groups, are as follows:

Entrepreneurial. The OPFOR is in its early stages of development and is literally in the process of 'working out' all of its processes and structures. The organization can rapidly

change its course of behavior if required and tends to act in unexpected ways because of its lack of organizational sophistication. This amateur component creates deadly potential because many combatants are not inhibited by the ‘professional blinders’ of more institutionalized OPFORs. This has been seen with the wave of terrorists that emerged in the late 1960s and 1970s. This wave became professionalized to the extent that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) firebreak developed. None of those OPFORs chose to cross that firebreak. The new wave that emerged from the late 1980s through the present has less inhibition about crossing the WMD firebreak, as witnessed by the Aum Shinrikyo Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995. Hamas is representative of a still entrepreneurial OPFOR and is currently in the process of solidifying its power base in Gaza. Hamas cannot be bargained with or bought off and refuses to accept Israel’s right to exist. In fact, it actively seeks Israel’s destruction as one of its religious duties. Hamas leaders promote the purity of its mission and accept probable martyrdom as a result of being targeted by the Israeli’s for assassination, thus placing the organization’s needs above their own.

Instititutionalized. The OPFOR has matured to the point that it has its tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) standardized along with its organizational structure, doctrine, training, logistics, and other functioning elements. Both Al Qaeda and Hezbollah have pretty much reached this stage of their organizational existence with Hezbollah having a far tighter span of control over its members. Al Qaeda, on the other hand, contains many nodal hubs not fully under its central command. These OPFORs are in sync with much of their affiliated population’s needs—these being radicalized Sunni and Shia groups, respectively—with effective leaders that truly believe in their organizational missions.

Ritualized. The OPFOR is no longer a smoothly functioning entity. Specific procedures are undertaken because it has always been that way and a high level of organizational dogma has developed where actions are taken and no longer questioned. Independent thinking of the younger members of the organization is not tolerated and, when taken to extremes, the group has become so corrupted that it does not care about the

operational mission but rather the personal gain of those in offices of authority. An example of the ritualized stage can be found with the Fatah terrorist group in the West Bank and Gaza. It has become so corrupt over the decades of its existence that it has lost control in Gaza to Hamas and is currently attempting to reform its institutions in the West Bank. Leaders tend to be rigid, self-aggrandizing, and care little about their constituent populations.

Satirized. The OPFOR has become so dysfunctional as no longer to be a viable combatant force. Actual operations, when attempted, take on almost a comical nature. Either the mission is no longer valid or the OPFOR structure and function has become fully obsolete. In either case, the OPFOR should no longer exist. Typically, in the case of terrorist groups, the members are killed off or imprisoned long before entering this final stage. The arrests, starting in 1999, of Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) members provide a tragic story of individuals who have been on the run from the law for decades. The very concept of a group such as the SLA still being active or attempting to field an effective combatant force is so out of sync with current realities to the point of being ludicrous.

The first and the second lifecycle stages are the most important, for this is when an OPFOR has real combat capability. Entrepreneurial and institutionalized leadership roles are very different from one another as learned in the business realm. Typically, a new corporation is founded by an entrepreneur-type leader. Once it grows beyond a certain point, however, a different leader type is required to take the now mature company forward. Parallels exist in the terrorist world as seen earlier with generations identified for the PIRA.

Exceptions also seem to exist. Of interest in this regard is the strange tale of the Palestinian terrorist leader Yasser Arafat. As the original founder of Fatah in the late 1950s, he is recognized as an entrepreneurial leader with a fanatical cult of personality developing around him. His uncanny ability to hang on to both his life and power over the course of decades allowed him to enter each of the four phases of his organization’s lifecycle as its leader. At his high point, he sported a pistol while addressing the General Assembly of the United Nations and, later, was even awarded a Nobel Peace Prize. As time went on, the overall perception of

Arafat as initially a dangerous terrorist and then as peacemaker changed to that of an impotent old man whose actions were eventually viewed as both pathetic and comical in nature.

OPFOR Networks

OPFORs as entities committed to the mission of promoting their political, social, and religious goals and end states by means of violence (i.e. conflict, terrorism, and war) organize themselves in various ways. The following organizational types of OPFOR networks that exist have been identified below:[6]

- *Hub (star or wheel)*. Fully centralized information flow. OPFOR Examples: Terrorist Cell. Strength: Total centralized command and control of forces. Weakness: Subject to decapitation strike.
- *Central and Subordinate Hubs (hierarchy)*. Partially centralized information flow. OPFOR Example: Pre 9-11 Al Qaeda model and Hezbollah. Strength: Centralized command and control of forces. Weakness: Subject to decapitation strike, potential slow reaction cycles with periphery of network.
- *Chain (line).* Segmented information flow. Can represent one top down informational path within a hierarchy but in this instance is used as a smuggler chain where direct top down or center to periphery leadership authority does not exist. OPFOR Example: Drug Smugglers. Strength: OPSEC (operational security). Weakness: Information flow vulnerable to breakage and slow reaction cycles.
- *Mesh (distributed/netlike).* Partially decentralized information flow. OPFOR Example: Post 9-11 Al Qaeda model. Strength: Peripheral groups and clusters take on command and control responsibilities and decapitation strike less catastrophic. Weakness: Peripheral activities may be in variance to centralized command and control operational plans and strategies.
- *All-channel (fully connected/full-matrix).* Fully decentralized information flow at all levels. OPFOR Example: Anarchists. Strength: Common operating picture,

quick reaction cycles, swarming, and not subject to decapitation strikes. Weakness: OPSEC (operational security).

- *No-channel (nodes but no traceable connections).* No tactical or operational informational flow between nodes. OPFOR Example: Phineas Priests. Strength: OPSEC (operational security). Weakness: No command and control of forces.

A more esoteric and self-contained view on leadership and networks can be taken if 'leaderless resistance' thinking is incorporated.[7] This body of OPFOR work seeks to challenge US governmental authority by proposing an insurgent movement based on individual nodes unconnected to one another. The network shares the same common vision and end state desired but has no linkages between the individual nodes. This makes the OPFOR network impervious to infiltration and compromise. The result would be each node functioning as a combatant leader within its own self-contained OODA loop. The Phineas Priests, a white supremacist terrorist organization, promote a prime example of this form of leadership:

> …the Priesthood operates in extreme secrecy and believes in 'leaderless resistance,' tactics that ensure members escape detection and the organization is protected from infiltration...the Phineas Priests is not a membership organization in the traditional sense: there are no meetings, rallies or newsletters. Rather, extremists become 'members' when they commit 'Phineas acts,' any violent activity against 'non-whites.'[8]

It is of particular note that the Phineas Priests exist within an OPFOR network of no-channel nodes. That is to say, none of the nodes are physically connected to one another. This is significant in and of itself, and does not appear to exist in past OPFOR network-focused literature.

Figure 1. OPFOR Networks



Source: Courtesy of the Counter-OPFOR Corporation ©

Al Qaeda is an interesting case because the pre- and post 9-11 organizational models based on central and subordinate hubs (hierarchy*)* and mesh (distributed/netlike) information flows currently exist simultaneously, giving this OPFOR a unique duality. The old centralized structure is attempting to reassert itself from safe havens in the tribal lands of Western Pakistan. At the same time, spontaneous generation of Jihadi cell clusters in Europe and other parts of the globe along with purposeful command and control decentralization to the periphery help to extend its netlike nature. Al Qaeda name-branding has also become apparent, with affiliated groups in Iraq and Lebanon declaring their loyalty to the organization and taking on its name. In many ways, Al Qaeda has become a network of networks with the old guard having authority over one region of the network and affinity groups and outsiders comprising other parts of it. To this mix should be added more than a few non-channel nodes representing lone wolf affinity adherents who engage in independent acts of violence much like

Phineas Priests. The end result is some sort of hybrid semi-mesh and hubs organizational structure with some satellite no-channel nodes:

- *Semi-mesh and hubs (hierarchy blended with distributed clusters) with some No-channel nodes.* Partially centralized and decentralized information flow. Strength: Centralized command and control of forces for part of the network and peripheral groups; clusters take on command and control responsibilities. "Decapitation" strikes less catastrophic for other parts of the network. Random no-channel activities represent some wild card potentials. Weakness: Part of the network subject to decapitation strike and potential slow reaction cycles with periphery of network and part of the network peripheral and satellite no-channel activities may be in variance to centralized command and control operational plans and strategies.

Figure 2. Al Qaeda Network



Semi-mesh and Hubs with No-channel Nodes

Source: Courtesy of the Counter-OPFOR Corporation ©

Such an organizational structure would readily help to explain great leadership tensions like those that existed between Usama Bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri in their dealings with self-proclaimed Al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi. Al-Zarqawi engaged in a terror campaign against Shia targets in Iraq that helped to turn Islamic public opinion against him and push Iraq further towards fragmentation and civil war during the American occupation. It never became clear if Al-Zarqawi was acting as Bin Laden's rogue lieutenant or his direct rival. Although he had rebuffed some of Bin Laden's earlier attempts at recruiting him, he still conducted operations on his behalf as a contractor when it served his purposes. Ultimately, Al-Zarqawi boosted the Al Qaeda brand name by gaining it great levels of media attention by means of his exploits and atrocities. At the global political level, however, he clearly had a negative impact on Al Qaeda strategies by focusing on Shia instead of American targets, thereby additionally straining Sunni and Shia relations.

Furthermore, this organizational structure with its no-channel nodal elements would help to explain the generation of wildcard acts of violence such as the DC sniper attacks, Los Angeles International Airport El Al terminal shooting, and other Al Qaeda affinity based incidents which straddles the lines between crime, delusional behavior, and quasi-terrorism.[9] Practical application of the theoretical insights gained from such new perceptions would include a revisiting of the legal definition of conspiracy (such as that due to OPFOR no-channel nodal element coordination following the tenets of leaderless resistance) and a need to create countermeasures to hostile meme emergence (for example the directive in the white supremacist work The Hunter to kill interracial couples).

Research Implications

As discussed in this essay, a dynamic relationship exists between leaders and OPFOR organizational structures. Important factors concerning this relationship from the leadership side are the role and function of the leader. Key elements of this relationship from the organizational side are OPFOR network type and where the OPFOR is in its evolutionary process. Questions abound concerning whether OPFOR leaders naturally chose those roles and functions or if they had those positions thrust upon them by circumstance, coercion, or chance.

While organizational structures shape the role and functions of leaders (e.g. no dominant leader will emerge in a no-channel network), leaders affect the shaping of organizations through control over initial organizational structure development and decisions regarding its future evolution.

Leader intelligence and education may have a great deal of impact on OPFOR capabilities, but pure meritocracy-based organizations do not exist and those leaders that achieve positions of power draw upon other advantages including financial resources, family connections, patron and client relationships, natural charisma, and class privilege. It is well noted that, given his background, Usama Bin Laden had many things going for him but, from the perspective of sheer intellect, he functions on a much lower tier than many of his chief officers and aides.

A typology of four different leadership forms exists in a loose relationship to OPFOR organizational structures. The first type of leadership exists from a “tightly coupled” perspective, that is, leadership derived from detailed instruction and control.[10] These are direct managers of violence who give specific orders to others and watch over them to ensure that those directives are precisely carried out. These *Direct Control Leaders* are primarily found in hub nodes that follow hierarchical and industrial processes based on tasks. The second and third types of leadership exist due to variations pertaining to a “loosely coupled” perspective wherein leadership is derived from individuals who share trust and knowledge.[11]

The second type of leadership seeks to transmits the commander’s intent to their followers, who then seek to fulfill the mission. These *Network Influence Leaders* may be found in hub nodes but may also be found in mesh and, to a lesser extent, still immature all-channel networks. Tolerance exists for the tasks undertaken to achieve this goal with some self-organizing behavior evident. Those directed take on the role of independent contractors more than that of employees.

The third type of leadership is based on an even more extreme and evolved form of decentralized control. These leaders exist in mesh and all-channel networks that have developed a network or collective vision. The commander’s intent is no longer required from a leadership perspective. The nodal members each influence, and are influenced by, the network

vision of the mission or end state. These *Collective Vision Leaders* may shift leadership roles to engage in specialized activities and, if sufficiently evolved, have the capability to engage in swarming behavior. To these entities, symbols of rank and authority are no longer required and are generally ignored.

The fourth type of leadership is based on the *Isolated Leader,* who functions as a true force-of-one. These leaders exist only in no-channel networks that are decentralized as to operate on the edge of chaos. Examples would be Phineas Priests and Al Qaeda affinity members engaging in lone wolf behavior derived from the principles of 'leaderless resistance'. The desired higher end state or mission of the network is, however, derived in two completely different ways. In the case of the Phineas Priests, a simple prime directive exists—to engage in any violent activity against non-whites. In the case of Al Qaeda no-channel affinity node members, the end state is transmitted by *Network Influence Leaders* such as Usuma Bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri.

These four leadership types are mutually exclusive, except for the *Direct Control Leaders* and the *Network Influence Leaders,* as the same individual can exhibit both forms of leadership. A primarily example in this regard is Usama Bin Laden as the head of Al Qaeda. He has direct command and control by means of the older centralized structure of the organization while at the same time influencing the broader network containing peripheral mesh clusters and satellite no-channel nodes.

This typology of four different leadership forms should not be viewed as the final word concerning leadership in OPFOR networks. Rather, its value is that of a starting point from which to understand destructive and disruptive targeting schemes, group penetration and intelligence gathering processes, network cooption and subversion, OPFOR evolution or de-evolution, and, ultimately, to gain a better understanding of how our own mesh and all-channel network structures are evolving. In order to understand these processes, real world OPFOR data needs to be continually obtained and updated, network relationships visually characterized, and the leadership forms applied.

Lessons learned from this endeavor will have direct bearing on future law enforcement doctrinal, organizational, and technological requirements. While general law enforcement

functions and structures would probably not at first benefit or be impacted, more specialized units focused on counter-terrorism, counter-drug, and counter-gang missions would be directly influenced. Such units will find themselves, at times, directly pitted against organized OPFORs rather than groups of disorganized individuals engaging in criminal activities. The insights generated from OPFOR leadership analysis can also be applied to our own police leadership typologies developed in this volume on police leadership and in other related works. This would allow for a better critique of opposing and allied leadership models and possibly provide us with a much more comprehensive understanding of both "good guy" and "bad guy" leadership dynamics. The benefits provided would thus have broad law enforcement utility.

Endnotes

1. The best-known work on the topic is probably Marc Sageman's Understanding Terror Networks (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) (see also Bunker & Begert, 2005; Krebs 2002).
2. Combat effectiveness can be measured in both destructive and disruptive ways. Central and subordinate hubs structures (hierarchies) engage in industrial style destructive targeting while mesh, all-channel, and no-channel structures engage in informational-based disruptive targeting strategies.
3. See Garfield (2005).
4. Sageman (2004), p. 75.
5. *Ibid.,* pp. 75-76.
6. This figure is a blending of *Fig 1. Centralized, Decentralized, and Distributed Networks* in Baran (1964) and *Figure 1.1 Three Basic Types of Networks* in Arquilla and Ronfeld (2001), with additional modifications and additions by the author.
7. See Beam (1992).
8. Group Profile: Phineas Priests. MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=3244. Accessed November 19, 2007.
9. Debate exists concerning the use of leaderless resistance strategies by individuals influenced by Al Qaeda ideology but with no organizational ties to the semi-mesh and hubs network. For a recent perspective see "The 'Lone Wolf' Theory and John Allen Muhammad." MEMRI Website. Special Dispatch Series No. 1772. November 21, 2007. http://memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=SD177207. Accessed November 21, 2007. Derived from "The Islamist website www.ek-ls.org, hosted by NOC4Hosts Inc., Tampa, FL, USA, published, on November 19, 2007, a proposal by regular forum participant 'Jihadi Salafi' on Al-Qaeda's possible use of a 'lone wolf' operative in the U.S. and/or the West." p. 1.
10. See Atkinson and Moffat (2005).
11. *Ibid.*

References

Alberts, D.S. & Hayes, R.E. (2005). *Power to the edge: Command…control…in the Information Age.* Washington, DC: Command and Control Research Program.

Arquilla, J. & Ronfeldt, D. (Eds.). (1997). *In Athena's camp: Preparing for conflict in the Information Age.* Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Arquilla, J. & Ronfeldt, D. (Eds.). (2001). *Networks and netwars: The future of terror, crime, and militancy*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Atkinson, S.A. & Moffat, J. (2005). *The agile organization: From informal networks to complex effects and agility*. Washington, DC: Command and Control Research Program.

Baran, P. (1964). *On distributed communications: I. Introduction to distributed communications cetworks*. Memorandum RM-4320-PR. United States Air Force Project RAND. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Beam, L. (1992, February). Leaderless resistance. *The Seditionist*, 12. Accessed online http://www.louisbeam.com/leaderless.htm.

Bunker, R. J. (2002, May 22-23). *Networked OPFORs: Strategic and operational considerations*. Presentation to Project O'Bannon, Event 4: Terrorist Networks: An Analysis. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Warfighting Lab.

Bunker, R.J. & Begert, M. (2005). Operational combat analysis of the Al Qaeda network. In R.J. Bunker (Ed.), *Networks, terrorism and global insurgency* (pp. 146-169). London: Routledge.

Don, B.W. et al. (2007). *Network technologies for networked terrorists*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Garfield, A. (2005). PIRA lessons learned: A model of terrorist leadership succession. In R.J. Bunker (Ed.), *Networks, terrorism and global insurgency* (pp. 104-114). London: Routledge.

Krebs, V.E (2002). Mapping networks of terrorist cells. *Connections, 24*(3), 43-52.

MacDonald, A. (1989). *The hunter*. Hillsboro, WV: National Vanguard Books.

Murphy, P. (2004). *The wolves of Islam: Russia and the faces of Chechen terrorism*. Washington, DC: Brassey's Inc.

Sageman, M. (2004). *Understanding terror networks*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Sullivan, J.P. (2003). Networked force structure and C^4I. In R.J. Bunker (Ed.), *Non-state threats and future wars* (pp. 144-155). London: Frank Cass, 2003.

Sullivan, J.P. & Bunker, R.J. (2005). Multilateral counter-insurgency networks. In R.J. Bunker (Ed.), *Networks, terrorism and global insurgency* (pp. 183-198). London: Routledge.

von Clausewitz, C. (1976). *On war*. M. Howard & P. Paret, eds. and trans. New York: The Free Press.

LEADERSHIP IN THE NET-CENTRIC ORGANIZATION

John Jackson, Richard Myers, & Thomas Cowper

In times of change, learners inherit the Earth, while the learned find themselves beautifully equipped to deal with a world that no longer exists.

Eric Hoffer

The only safe ship in a storm is leadership.

Faye Wattleton

Previously, the Futures Working Group has advanced the concept of Net-Centric Policing (NCP) (see the *Further Readings* list at the end of this chapter). Here, we return to the concept and attempt to reconcile its implications with conceptions of leadership. We see this task as vitally important. The long-term process of accelerating change has reached a pace that is pushing our organizations to adapt. The contemporary world has reached the end of hierarchies, an organizational form that achieved its maturity in the Industrial Age. Well into the transition to the Information Age, the world needs a new organizational paradigm that provides adaptability and flexibility. Hierarchies cannot keep up with an increasingly changing world much longer and a new, more robust model for coordination and administration is sorely needed. These are not new observations. Indeed, the call for flatter organizations emerged with Community Oriented Policing and has become the Holy Grail of modern policing. We see net-centric organization as the successor to hierarchies and the mechanism for achieving the longed-for flattening of our agencies.

We will proceed along a simple course. First, a short history of leadership is in order; along the way, we will examine the difference between management and leadership. Next, we will offer a short overview of net-centric organization. As a finale', we will describe the operation of leadership in the net-centric enterprise.

A Short History of Leadership

There is no singular definition of leadership that suffices in all its occasions. Indeed, leadership is an exceedingly difficult concept to define precisely. A host of famous thinkers have taken their shots, each subtly different from the others. Hordes of authors and consultants publish their own unique takes on leadership each year. This is perhaps to be expected; leadership is a dynamic concept rooted in context. Long ago, the context of leadership was simpler . . . and so was the concept. Leadership was from the front – the mightiest of the group. In some contexts, this model still suffices. Yet, in most contexts, leadership requires much more.

Throughout history, leadership has always been important. But, the set of skills and behaviors that constituted leadership have changed substantially over time. Barton Kunstler's analysis (2006) is particularly instructive. Early leaders – kings – possessed the same skills as their followers; they were just better at them – the mightiest of the mighty. They were the first in battle, leading the charge against the enemy. As feudal systems developed, kings became leaders among leaders, negotiating and balancing groups of powerful nobles in a network of liege-lord oath contracts. Bureaucratization followed suit. The emergence of multiple sources of power – merchant classes, labor, and bureaucrats – that rivaled the landed nobility added subsequent complexity. Out of this developmental stew, empires, nation-states, and parliaments emerged. During the Industrial Age, the modern corporation emerged and leadership entered the Managerial Phase, focused on shaping operations and processes to optimize outputs. With the Information Age, leadership has again transformed to the Orchestral Phase. Acting much as the conductor (or section chairs) in an orchestra, leaders are smart, visionary, and flexible. The Orchestral Phase is marked by emphases on peer-relationships, expertise, and short-term alliances centered on specific tasks. Kunstler's Orchestral Phase is congruent with our concept of net-centric leadership.

While Kunstler reveals how leadership has evolved as the context changed, John Clippinger offers a different perspective. Clippinger treats leadership as a trait of societies and as a biologically evolved capacity. Leadership can be learned, but some people – natural leaders – possess the requisite traits as part of their basic personality. Calling upon the

examples of the Greek Golden Age, Cicero, the Renaissance, and the founding period of the United States, Clippinger demonstrates how certain timeless characteristics are found in abundance during the great periods of growth. During these times, societies "succeeded by replacing or modifying authoritarian, rigid, hierarchical, hereditary, and theocratic networks" (Clippinger, 2007, p. 129). While exemplary physical characteristics contribute to one's leadership capacity, the most important leadership traits are character traits. Clippinger cites Lord Alfred Tennyson's *Ode on the Death of the Duke of Wellington*, noting sacrifice; decisiveness, courage, initiative, truth-telling and modesty defined the ideal leadership traits to Tennyson. These "are all virtues that make a social network trustworthy, effective and robust ... it is transparent and authentic" (Clippinger, 2007, p. 134).

Lest one think leadership traits are static, Clippinger notes leadership context has evolved. Thousands of years of warfare have bred social emotions into our brains. As Clippinger notes, "[r]isk taking and peer accountability have been proven to be evolutionarily stable strategies for building and sustaining reciprocal social relationships that ensure mutual security under maximum duress" (Clippinger, 2007, p. 134). These are primal manifestations of leadership activated during stress. What happens when society transitions from primal to group (networked) leadership? The answer is simple: leadership differentiates into specialized roles with distributed control. Leadership "requires specialization and flexibility as groups grow, shrink, or simply alter over time" (Clippinger, 2007, p. 135).

Many thinkers have pointed out the distinctions between leadership and management.[1] A search on Google of the phrase "manager vs leader" produces 70,800,000 results. It is well established that leadership and management invoke completely different, and often contradictory, skill-sets. Coupling that recognition with Kunstler's evolutionary framework places management in perspective. Leadership has always been prominent; however, management emerged as a field of study during the later 19th Century, documented most famously in Frederick Winslow Taylor's *Scientific Management* (1911).

When viewed chronologically, management is clearly an innovation of the Industrial Age. The Industrial Revolution enabled the emergence of large conglomerate firms, global empires and mass armies. In such an environment, managers became necessary in order to

administer the large organizations; in essence, managers were intermediaries between the small group of leaders and the large masses of followers. Hierarchies expanded to accommodate the ranks of managers; these structures served a vital purpose: regulating the flow of information – what to do, when, with whom –that was costly to obtain. Through the course of the Industrial Age, management was emphasized and leadership was marginalized.

As John Kotter has pointed out, the problem of the past couple of decades has been over-managed and under-led organizations (Kotter, 1996). As the world has transitioned from the Industrial Age to the Information Age, complexity has increased, demands on organizations have exploded, and information has moved from scarcity to abundance. While most of the private sector has responded with a transition – in Kunstler's framework – from the Managerial Phase to the Orchestral Phase, government (including policing) has remained anchored in the Industrial Age Managerial Phase. Net-Centric Policing represents a highly adaptable model with a focus on leadership.

Net-Centric Organization, Revisited

Net-centric organization represents a change in perspective, reframing the world through the lens of networks. The Futures Working Group's previous literature on Net-Centric Policing considers the police agency as a network in itself. Equally valid, a complete view of NCP treats the agency as part of other networks: policing, government, regional, national, societal, etc. Likewise, NCP recognizes that the members who make up police agencies are members of numerous networks – social, familial, religious, hobbyist, recreational, etc – of which the agency is but one. Further, NCP recognizes that crime occurs in the context of social networks: victims, witnesses, other criminal associates. Terrorists operate in networks and use the network approach to identify targets in order to maximize disruption.

NCP is a child of the Information Age; its speed and agility arises from a robustly interlinked network that enables the rapid exchange of information and an evolution of the organization's collective knowledge toward a state of shared awareness. The technologies of the Information Age – computer networks, email, text messages, social networking, wikis, blogs, RSS publishing, geotagging, and video blogging ("vlogging") – form the links that connect

the members of the organization. The technological network – the infrastructure – and the information and knowledge management – the "infostructure" – enable the capacity for information sharing. The leader endeavoring to transform an enterprise to net-centric would well follow a simple maxim: connect as many people in as many ways as possible.

To understand the dynamics of the net-centric organization (NCO), a metaphor is necessary – in this case, the planet Earth. The Earth has a core, a mantle, a crust and an atmosphere. Human beings live on the crust, where the solid surface of the Earth meets the atmosphere. Together, the Earth and the life living upon it form a system. In a planetary model of the net-centric organization, parts analogous to the Earth can be found. The NCO has a core: its purpose for existence, its mission. Around this core is the mantle of the organization: infrastructure and infostructure. The infrastructure – all the hardware that makes the organization function: the buildings, computer systems, phones, vehicles, equipment, etc – is the deeper and more fundamental layer. The infostructure – the data, information and collective knowledge – rests upon the foundation of the infrastructure. The atmosphere of the NCO is the culture, the values, norms and standards that guide the organization. It is upon the crust where the infostructure and the culture collide that the vast majority of the NCO's people live; it is the operational edge where the organization interacts with the outside world. Figure 1 outlines the planetary model of the NCO.

Figure 1
PLANET MODEL OF THE NET-CENTRIC ORGANIZATION



With a solid infrastructure and infostructure in place, management functions – control – are substantially incorporated into the network's technology. Business intelligence software helps bring performance information to commanders. Institutionalized rules and procedures give way to protocols, best practices, professional standards and culture. Analysts use their professional competence to transform data into valuable information and knowledge. Through search engines, the producers and consumers of information are brought together, without either requiring prior knowledge of the other. Line elements coordinate and cooperate spontaneously, agilely coming together to resolve shared problems and challenges, forming enduring *communities of practice*. The title of David Alberts and Richard Hayes book, *Power to the Edge,* neatly sums up the transformation embodied in net-centric. In the language of networks, the edge is the connection; the net-centric transition is a movement of power from individuals to the network.

Leadership in the Net-Centric Organization

Leadership is important in every organization. In a profession in which its members are charged with the protection of society and given great power – the capacity to lawfully take the life or freedom of a person – leadership is paramount. Failures of leadership in the police profession are the substance of crisis, scandal, and disgrace. In the hierarchical model, leadership and discipline are embodied in rank. The distances between chiefs and line officers permit the concealment of behaviors. Warning signals are lost in a forest of routine communication, filtered through layers of management. In the NCO, values and culture are used to align leaders in a common direction, permitting the network to detect deviations from accepted norms and make corrections before the behaviors condense into habit. It is our belief that NCP permits peer-discipline to operate. The challenge for police executives is to clearly define the operational mission and behavioral boundaries, to organize agencies around the proper set of values, and to shape the culture so that peer-discipline functions in a manner appropriate to a democracy.

In the net-centric organization, leadership is dispersed throughout the network. It takes many forms based on a person's position in the organization. Taken to the extreme, net-centric organization allows for completely flat organizations. NCP does not, however, require agencies to be completely flat. Nevertheless, NCP seeks to create an environment supportive of the development and exercise of leadership throughout all levels of the network, at all levels of its organizations. In effect, NCP seeks to create leadership networks. Such networks are "peer-to-peer" and operate with specialized roles, each with intrinsic social protocols that result in robustness and effectiveness in combination.

What does dispersed leadership look like? Scholar and author John Clippinger has studied the operation of leadership in networked organizations and identified eight key roles (Clippinger, 2007). The **Alpha Leader** embodies the standards and qualities that characterize the organization. They are the role models. Alphas often perform the most difficult tasks. They may be ceremonial, symbolic, charismatic, or elite. The **Exemplary Leader** is the natural leader. The rarest form, these leaders are able to "create a shared theory of mind for the group, a shared code of conduct and belief that gives the group its own identity, character, and purpose" (Clippinger, 2007, p. 137). The **Visionary** performs a critical but often unpopular function. On the positive side, the visionary imagines possible futures and creates new forms of interaction. They have broad peripheral vision, watch trends others ignore, and identify patterns most people do not see. The visionary challenges the status quo, which can be destabilizing when continuity and execution are critical. Visionaries live outside the mainstream and push boundaries. Visionary leaders can be transformational in the chief executive role. The **Gatekeeper** decides who is in or out. He or she upholds the membership rules that determine who is included, retained, promoted and excluded. The real assets of a network are its people and its culture and the gatekeeper "sustains the identity and character of the entire enterprise" (Clippinger, 2007, p. 139). The **Truth-Teller** keeps the organization honest. He or she identifies free riders, cheaters, half-truths and spin. The truth-teller trades on credibility. Speaking the truth may bring retribution; truth-tellers must be shielded from reprisal or they lose their effectiveness. Dysfunctional networks will seek to silence the truth-tellers, marginalizing them with potentially troublesome effects: marginalized truth-tellers may

operate informally or extraneous to the network – think blogs. The **Fixer** gets things done that others cannot. They are pragmatic and task-oriented. These are the "scroungers" – the Radar O'Reilly's – of the world. The **Connector** participates in numerous social networks, serving as a bridge between dispersed groups. Connectors are critical in identifying and utilizing new resources. Connectors enable the benefits of diversity and contravene the silos than inevitably form in highly institutionalized networks. The **Enforcer** ensures organization members adhere to cultural norms and professional standards. In small networks, the roles of enforcer, gatekeeper and, sometimes, truth-teller will be combined in single person. In large networks, enforcers are often distributed. Enforcers can wield authoritative and coercive power, but first and most often will use moral, social or peer pressure. Like the truth-teller, the enforcer must be independent to be effective.

So, where do these roles fit in police agencies? Alpha leaders can appear anywhere, although they will be clearest at the officer level. They are the best officers and the legends in the department. Exemplary leaders can be found at all levels. They will be the attractors around which others naturally gather. Ideally, exemplary leaders will rise to prominence in the network; if isolated from the power, they have the capacity to lead their followers on paths diverging from the agency. The Visionaries are the innovators, and at times, disruptors. They may be part of the command, and on occasion, even be the Chief. Visionaries will often be found in staff assignments. Because of their disruptive capacity, it is important to identify visionaries among the ranks and channel their vital energy to appropriate projects. In most agencies, the Gatekeeper will be the top executive – the Chief, the Sheriff, the Director, and so on. Gatekeepers may also be found in support roles, in recruiting, training and internal affairs. Truth-tellers may be found at any level. They should be channeled into veracity functions – internal affairs, accounting, inspections, and auditing. They must be granted independence with one caveat: truth-tellers rely on credibility and must live, more than others, in a fishbowl. Reproach hampers their effectiveness and may permanently impede an individual's ability to function as a truth-teller. Fixers are go-to people, often found on staffs of organization managers. Connectors appear at all levels. They are particularly suited to working with people; they will develop extensive contacts. Connectors are valuable in unstructured work settings

and are ideal for assignments with substantial community engagement. In many ways, the connector is the quintessential community-oriented policing officer. The enforcer is a natural role for police officers; since that is part of the role they serve for society. Therefore, we expect enforcers to be abundant in police agencies at all levels. In a net-centric organization with a strong "theory of mind," peer networks will reinforce cultural norms and maintain compliance.

Another way of looking at leadership is along a local-global dimension. Local leadership occurs incidentally as operational circumstances arise. Local leadership is the province of line officers and supervisors. Leadership aimed at the organization as a whole can be considered global. Commanders operate globally, exerting leadership to shape the whole, principally in the culture and in the infrastructure. Local leadership is instantaneous and tactical; global leadership is protracted and strategic. The vastly greater proportion of leadership exercised in an organization should be local. Figure 2 synthesizes the local/global framework with Clippinger's roles.

Figure 2



Thus far, we have treated leadership from the perspective of the agency. As previously noted, NCP must also consider the agency as part of the greater network of society and the agency's members as part of other social networks. Yet, the principles of leadership work

across scales. In nearly every case, however, the agency or the members hold no special supervisory authority. In these networks, the police (agency or member) are at the operational edge. They are normally peers, or in the case of government networks, subject to other authorities. The police must work principally in the local leadership roles fostering collaboration or organizing peers through the attractiveness of their ideas as a ground-up visionary. While the police serve as enforcers at the incident level, cops should expand their proficiency in navigating networks at the scale of the whole (the city, the county, the state, the nation, etc). The ideal of the Beat Cop – the cop who knows his or her beat and knows the people who reside and do business there – is an age-old manifestation of the Connector role. The capacity of the police to address crime increasing rests upon its ability to work in networks – to tap resource networks, to build healthy community networks, and to disrupt criminal networks.

Conclusion

Few people today debate the existence of accelerating change. Its presence has become palpable, a constant pressure upon our current hierarchical structures. In the face of cheap, abundant information, the filtering mechanisms of the hierarchies have lost their value and serve principally to obscure, obstruct and delay. In the contemporary age, the performance failures that plague us can be reduced to informational problems: someone with the power to do something did not know what was happening, what needed to happen, who was doing it, where it was being done, or why it was being done. Yet, the typical response to performance failures is one of management: create another rule or another position to "manage" the parts. And so, the hierarchy grows incrementally, doing what it is supposed to do: filter information. The hierarchy feeds back to increase the likelihood of future failings.

The policing profession emerged in the Industrial Age; naturally, it evolved in conjunction with the hierarchical, managerial institutions that were substantial innovations of that age. Since its emergence in the 1950s, the Information Age has only peripherally made impacts on the policing profession. We have adopted some of its tools but the Information Age has only marginally impacted the fundamental shape of the contemporary police organization.

While private sector organizations began integrating fundamental structural changes in the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, only now, in the Information Age's maturity, does it seem that government agencies may follow suit. Now within sight of a new age, it is imperative that police leadership adopt organizational forms with the agility to keep pace with rapidly changing environments.

Further, police officers must learn to work with communities and peer agencies to address crime problems. Building and reinforcing peer networks through trust and reciprocity are core competencies of the Information Age officer. Networks are a natural part of human nature; they form spontaneously among groups of people. The only requirement for the formation of a network is a group of people willing to collaborate in an effort to do the right thing. In fact, networks form within hierarchies. For at least 30 years, police management books have acknowledged the existence of informal communication networks in our organizations. Very often, the real, day-to-day work of the agency gets done through these networks. Net-Centric Policing nurtures, leverages and expands these networks to enable broad collaboration and rapid response to problems emerging in the environment. Moving from Industrial Age hierarchies to Information Age networks will require leadership. Leadership, more than ever, is the future of policing.

Endnote

1. For an outstanding comparison of roles, see Warren Bennis' "Roles of Leadership" in *Visionary Leadership* by Burt Nanus, 1992.

Further Reading

For further reading on net-centric organizations, see the writings of the Futures Working Group and the Department of Defense's Command and Control Research Project (www.dodccrp.org).

Alberts, D.S. & Hayes, R.E. (2003). *Power to the edge*. Washington, DC: Command and Control Research Program.

Atkinson, S.R. & Moffat, J. (2005). *The agile organization*. Washington, DC: Command and Control Research Program.

Cowper, T. J. (2005). Network centric policing: Alternative or augmentation to the Neighborhood-Driven Policing (NDP) model?" In C.J. Jensen & B.H. Levin (Eds.),

Neighborhood Driven Policing: Volume 1 of the proceedings of the Futures Working Group. Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Myers, R. & Cowper, T. (2007). Net-centric crisis response. In J.A. Schafer & B.H. Levin (Eds.), *Policing and mass casualty events*: *Volume 3 of the proceedings of the Futures Working Group.* Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Myers, R.W. (2007). From pyramids to network: Police structure and leadership in 2020. In J.A. Schafer (Ed.), *Policing 2020: The future of crime, community and policing.* Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Olligschlager, A. (2007). Beyond hierarchies: Toward a universal crisis network. In J.A. Schafer & B.H. Levin (Eds.), *Policing and mass casualty events*: *Volume 3 of the proceedings of the Futures Working Group.* Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation.

References

Clippinger, J. H. (2007). Toward a literacy of natural leadership. In J. H. Clippinger, *A crowd of one: The future of individual identity* (pp. 125-144). New York: PublicAffairs.

Kotter, J. (1996). *Leading change.* Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

Kunstler, B. (2006). Leadership in the era of singularity. In Timothy C. Mack (Ed.), *Creating global strategies for humanity's future* (p. 388). Bethesda: World Future Society.

THE "BUFFY FACTOR": VAMPIRES IN ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP

Micheal Buerger, Greg Weaver & Toby Finnie

One of the purposes of research in criminal justice is to develop knowledge that can improve conditions or operations. It is with this thought in mind that we explore how the study of leadership should reveal information that can be transformed into education, training, or other preparation for persons already in or for persons who aspire to assume positions of leadership.

As complex as the subject of leadership can be, police leadership presents special challenges. Instead of generic inquiries into leadership styles[1], traits, or personal memoirs that focus only on the person occupying the leadership position, a more robust template is needed. Mastrofski (2007:24) echoes this point in commenting on the present state of research on police leadership. In addressing this issue, however, it will become clear that even more questions arise than will precise answers to them. Perhaps Dobby, Anscombe, and Tuffin (2004:2) state it best: "Whilst police leadership has fallen under regular criticism, owing to perceived failings in police performance, it has never been clear precisely how police leadership needed to change."

We do not presume that this chapter is definitive: our purpose is to open a more extensive conversation on what is needed. Though experience can be a powerful teacher, trial-and-error has risks to the agency, and to the polity by which it is sponsored. Not everyone placed in leadership positions has the ability or the instinct to succeed that is demonstrated by those revered as exemplars. Whether comparable skills can be built, and how we might better move beyond the current curricula based upon general principles, are central problems for research.

Instead, we present several propositions to inform new research on leadership. It must incorporate both organizational and individual attributes, and must distinguish between situational and long-term leadership performance. It must incorporate political and economic

contexts, including the interactions of organizational leaders with other leaders in network configurations. We also propose that leadership should not be limited to the top of the organization and that development of leaders throughout the organization is a key reflection of successful top leadership. To that end, examination of those leadership models that provide subordinates the autonomy to actively participate in this process is of utmost importance.

Organizational Attributes

We propose that research on leadership must incorporate organizational attributes as well as those of the individual. While the actions of a leader are important, the opposing or conforming responses of the organization are equally important to understanding effectiveness of leaders.

The history of an organization, and of the polity it serves, provides a critical framework for evaluating the accomplishments of an agency's leaders. The least mutable qualities center on the agency's personnel: conditions and personalities of the previous twenty to thirty years shaped the hiring, retention, and orientation of the personnel a leader inherits. A large body of research and practical experience points out the obvious, namely that the bureaucratic nature of law enforcement agencies impedes change – even when all (or most) would agree that it is necessary. At the same time however, attempts by supervisors and administrators to implement large-scale changes can be met with resistance from officers (Engel & Worden, 2003). This statement is not intended to attribute blame, but to point out those perceptions of what constitutes effective policy (and leadership) can differ among the public, politicians, and front line personnel (Bryman, Stephens, & a´ Campo, 1996). Attempting to do so oversimplifies a very complicated state of affairs. For example: How does one balance the different and sometimes competing philosophies of the Community-Oriented Policing versus Problem-oriented Policing versus Compstat versus Hot Spots paradigms (Mastrofski, 2007)?

Arguably, the most important dimension for success or failure lies in the realm of capitalizing upon – or reshaping – the organizational culture itself. Organizations are shaped as well by the political leadership of their jurisdiction. Individual competence and collective competence (which includes an ability to work with each other) may vary widely. Ideological

orientation, the shifting priorities of the electorate, and the inroads of corruption (where they exist) all influence the makeup of the elected bodies that determine budgets and appoint officials. These realities make "selling and implementing a vision of the future of policing... especially difficult" (Bryman et al., 1996:364). However, Kim and Mauborgne (2003) note that a major component of the changes implemented by William Bratton in New York City lay in his successful efforts to influence the culture of the NYPD itself, particularly in terms of making officers and supervisors alike believe they were part of the solution.

Local and regional economies also influence tax bases, which in turn influence hiring and retention. Low-paying inner city departments often serve as starting points for young officers who quickly leave for better-paying positions in the suburbs. Even well-regarded suburban and small-town agencies may be "puppy mills," training entry-level officers for careers elsewhere. The sudden collapse of a local industry has serious implications for staffing (both for maintaining salaries and hiring replacement personnel), as well as for equipment purchases and capital budgets. A sudden influx to an area of new industry, new residential development, or a radically different demographic community may strain an agency's existing resources for some time before budget and training resources can bestow additional advantages (or even restore equilibrium).

Context

We propose that context shares equal importance with personal attributes and decisions. Different demands are placed on leaders by conditions of change, and by conditions of stability.

In biography, leadership is most easily portrayed in its vivid "white knight" rescue mode. General George S. Patton's reinvigoration of the battered army in North Africa after Kasserine Pass, Lee Iacocca's resuscitation of the Chrysler Corporation in the early 1980s, and Commissioner William Bratton's "Turnaround" of the New York City Police Department stand out as exemplars. In fiction, dynamic, inspirational personalities or immovable bulwarks against reactionary forces (Robert Redford's *Brubaker*, the fictionalized story of Warden Tom Murton; Lee Marvin's Major John Reisman in *The Dirty Dozen*, Clint Eastwood's Sgt. Gunny Roads in

Heartbreak Ridge) dominate our view and shape our expectations for real-life transformational leadership. The sharp contrast between "before" and "after" – which is truncated at some finite point, usually shortly after the apparent resolution of the crisis – defines the leader's success.

Most instances of leadership succession do not take place under such dramatic conditions, but that does not understate its importance. Mastrofski (2007) notes that the person who is hired for the position of chief is expected to have a marked impact on the department. Within this general expectation, however, there remains a distinct difference between the challenge of restoring a malfunctioning organization and that of maintaining and improving the performance of a good one.

Any leader brought in with a mandate to shake up a moribund agency, or to restructure a dysfunctional one, usually is supported by a political commitment stronger than that, which attends 'stay the course' successions. A reforming chief of police – if brought in with this purpose in mind – typically has at his or her disposal a battery of resources beyond what would be granted under conditions of normal succession. Political sovereigns who recognize the need for change are willing to take more risks, or more stringent actions, than would be considered prudent under conditions of greater stability. However, Kim and Mauborgne (2003) suggest that typically, external opposition is usually greater.

The binary division of "Change" and "Stability" is relatively easy to identify. The research challenge lies in developing a useful scale of measurement for the type and degree of forces demanding change, and conditions that are conducive to stability. In the latter category, there remain distinctions between "caretaker" administrations and those that are installed with expectations of improvement, but reifying those conditions in scientifically valid terms has yet to be done for policing.

Crisis and Continuity

We propose that both situational leadership (usually highlighted by conditions of change or crisis) and continuity of leadership are vital. The qualities and tactics that respond to crisis may differ from those needed to maintain an organization and build upon existing strengths.

Crises do not automatically precede or even coincide with changes in leadership, but arise periodically across the spectrum of leadership tenures. Stable, functional leadership deals with periodic crises that do not demand a change at the top: crime waves, episodes of misconduct by subordinates, or budgetary shortfalls. No standard metrics exist to chart the response of the leadership to such episodes, nor indeed of the extended consequences of the responses.

It is also possible for slow, unremarked conditions to contribute to either organizational decline or overall improvements in agency operations. The organizational culture is a fairly reliable canary in the mineshaft for such declines, although separating normal grumbling from insightful "early warning" dissent is extremely difficult. A useful set of longitudinal measures of police organizational health has yet to be constructed, and is a primary need for research into organizational behavior and leadership. Personal bias (borne of thwarted aspirations or unrealistic ideological expectations) must be separated from shared (and thus at least superficially validated) observations.

Distributed Leadership

We propose that leadership is not limited to the top of the organization. Community policing and problem solving demands leadership skills at the line level – the "chief of police of the beat" concept found elsewhere in the literature – but it is more honored in the breach than the observance.

Leaders who develop a new cadre of leaders among their subordinates are substantively different from those who surround themselves with followers. Police culture teems with tales of cronyism, RIP (Retired in Place) figureheads, and "the blind leading the bland." Even prescient leaders may find their latitude of action restricted by union contracts that dictate the conditions of promotion processes (honoring seniority at the expense of ability may seem antiquated, but remains entrenched in far too many agencies).

Delegation of responsibility is critical to skills development in up-and-coming subordinates, but is largely unmeasured. Within organizations, the tools for evaluating

managerial and leadership abilities in the limited roles of shift supervisor and unit commander are lacking as well, defaulting the responsibility to intuition and formulaic processes.

Complicating the task of measuring or assessing this dimension is the multi-layered responsibility: the role of chief of the organization is attenuated, diluted through the individual abilities of his or her deputies, and the section and unit heads for which each is responsible. Identifying and measuring the relative success of delegation and development through multiple layers of an organization is a technical problem still to be resolved.

Networks: Leadership among Equals

The evolution of policing will demand leaders who can work with other leaders in larger networks and partnerships. Operating as a leader of subordinates is a different framework from operating within a team of leaders from different organizational contexts. We propose further that these same concepts apply at all levels of the twenty-first century police department.

Effective creation of networks hinges upon their ability to adapt to new circumstances. While not discussed specifically in this essay, Pillai and Williams (2003) suggest that an alleged (but thus far unconfirmed) advantage of transformational leadership lies in the numerous networks through which it operates within an organization.[2] One measure of police leadership might be the degree to which it encourages subordinates' participation in networks and adapts the agency's structure and operations to accommodate them. The very nature of networks requires a multi-textured approach.

The nature of leadership changes when leaders are placed on a team with other leaders. The assumptions of command must be renegotiated among peers; those accustomed to making decisions for their units or agencies are faced with carrying out decisions made by others. Though the anecdotal evidence suggests that these adaptations are made routinely, little is known about the mechanisms for success, and less about the incidence where strong egos clash to the detriment of the endeavor. Even in more limited, role-defined multi-agency environments like task forces, adapting to new and different status references is not always an easy path. Good faith, professionalism, and dedication are reasonably credited with success;

whether additional training and orientation could improve the composition and operations of task forces is largely unexplored.

Further research on the demands of social networks upon police leaders will be needed as the nature of the demand for networks expands. Community policing has provided a first step for police, a basis upon which to build, but in its formative stages it has been police-driven and largely police controlled. The dynamics of networks when the police are brought in to them on the initiative of other elements or sovereigns is still to be explored. On the other hand, the post-9/11 era has, particularly for the United States, resulted in a concerted effort to increase communication and cooperation between agencies and departments that have traditionally, experienced difficulties in working or "playing well" together. The Joint Terrorism Task Force concept is but one example (Mastrofski, 2007). Other important post-9/11 development is the reorganization of various agencies and departments under the auspices of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), consisting of no less than sixteen entities representing the military, the intelligence community, law enforcement, and other "first responders." Similarly, the advent of fusion centers is another attempt to facilitate cooperation among various organizations. One starting point is to identify those multi-level, multi-jurisdictional efforts currently in existence and to determine the mechanisms through which cooperation and coordination can be facilitated.

Leadership demands and skills in public service settings are fundamentally different from those of the private sector. Multiple constituencies, external sovereigns, a different legal framework and history, and multiple – often conflicting – goals present a landscape for special research into the demands, successful strategies, shortfalls, and qualities of police leadership. A new effort is needed to develop multiple scales and interpretive values for that effort.

Endnotes

1. While not a focus of the present effort, research by Pillai and Williams (2003) examining transformational leadership in a fire-rescue department suggests it is particularly well-suited for this arena, as well as for law enforcement. For a brief yet excellent review of the principles of transformational leadership as it relates to law enforcement, see Negus (2002).
2. An equally important research question lies in determining if or how transformational leadership may affect multi-agency, collaborative efforts.

References

Bryman, A., Stephens, M., & a´ Campo, C. (1996). The importance of context: Qualitative research and the study of leadership. *Leadership Quarterly, 7*(3), 353-370.

Engel, R.S., & Worden, R.E. (2003). Police officers' attitudes, behavior, and supervisory influences: An analysis of problem solving. *Criminology, 41*(1),131-166.

Negus, T. (2002). Leadership in the year 2010 – Implications for policing. *Platypus, 74* (March). Online at http://www.afp.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/3900/leadership.pdf accessed September 6, 2008.

Dobby, J., Anscombe, J., & Tuffin, R. (2004). *Police leadership: Expectations and impact*. Home Office Online Report 20/04. Online at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs04/rdsolr2004.pdf accessed September 6, 2008.

Mastrofski, S.D. (2007). Police organization and management issues for the next decade. Presented at the *National Institute of Justice (NIJ) Policing Research Workshop*: *Planning for the Future*. Washington, D.C., November 28-9-2006. NIJ 218584.

Pillai, R., & Williams, E.A. (2003). Transformational leadership, self-efficacy, group cohesiveness, commitment, and performance. *Journal of Organizational Change Management, 17*(2), 144-159.

Paths Forward: Developing and Expanding Effective Leadership in Policing

Joseph A. Schafer, John P. Jarvis, Bernard H. Levin

Some contend that current knowledge regarding the generation of leaders and leadership in policing is hampered significantly by an inability of current evidence to specifically identify the traits and attributes of the leaders that we seek. According to this notion, policing relies upon experiential evidence of “what works”; that evidence may sometimes be idiosyncratic to the circumstances and environments in which the police operate. Notions such as these are well-reflected in this recent comment by Chief Rick Myers (Colorado Springs Police Department):

> Having been a “formal” leader now for over 20 years, I confess that I probably am as confused as anyone about what the hell it means; I can tell you for sure that my “practice” of it has changed over the years, but not exclusively because someone wrote up something about it or I went to a seminar. Scars have a lot to do with it!

That is, experience has a significant impact on defining what leadership may encompass and also helps us define what leadership is not. From a futures perspective, questions arise such as: How do we select entry-level applicants who are or have the potential to become leaders? How do we create and maintain environments in which true police leaders can emerge and excel? How do we create promotion systems that allow for leaders to shine (so we do not simply promote those who have avoided professional self-destruction)? How do we create a policing profession that allows talented and proven leaders to advance based on what they have done, rather than promoting those who have “played the game” of organizational brown nosing? How do we avoid the “Peter Principle”?

Perhaps the key police leadership questions should be: How do we balance assessment of past leadership with the promise for future leadership? While we rely upon assessments of the former to identify "lessons learned", what we really seek is future leadership not just remodeling old leadership efforts. In the end, what do we do with all these notions of leadership? If police leadership is strictly situational, what can police departments do to develop, identify, promote, and expand effective leadership? What can our employees do to enhance their efficacy as leaders? Unresolved questions abound, yet there is minimal dialog within police professional publications and associations regarding these thorny matters.

While some suggest that the existing scholarly research literature has limited practical information for police, we contend that this body of writings can still inform the effort to a significant extent. Such efforts must, however, be grounded in experimentation and statistically-based research with experience. This volume represents one such effort along these lines. While experience as a leader is critical to understanding the process and its development, it is not enough (as evidenced by the persistent challenges that are present in identifying and developing great leaders or even good leaders). Scholarly inquiry plays a role and is important, but if leadership is situational (at least in part), it is not just about understanding theories and concepts, but also knowing when and how to apply that knowledge (i.e., if leadership is in part intuitive and experiential…it can also then be augmented, but not replaced, by research evidence).

The lack of definitive strategies for insuring the continual development of leadership -- or even operational definitions for leadership – also suggests a different possibility. Perhaps we are asking the wrong questions and assume we know the individual traits and attributes that

engender leadership when, in fact, we simply do not. This may well be the case with leadership dynamics in the realm of law enforcement. There have been many attempts to address key questions associated with police leadership (definitions, measurement, outcomes, and development), yet few clear answers having emerged. For example, there is still an acute shortage of objective evidence that any specific strategy generates improved leadership.

The challenges in identifying these answers may be supportive of the above notion. That is, the specific delineation of the traits, attributes, programmatic efforts, and organizational processes of what leadership is within the realm of policing may be elusive. Another more extreme but simplistic version of this contention relegates leadership to a concept akin to pornography: We are not sure what it is but we know it when we see it. **We contend in this essay that such notions are likely not only wrong but also insufficient for future considerations of police leadership.** Drawing upon evidence provided in this volume, we argue that such notions are not adequate for the past, the present, or the future of the policing profession. This concluding essay will briefly explain why and what paths forward may be available to policing to engender the development and maintenance of leaders and leadership within the profession.

Numerous others (both in the current volume and elsewhere) have pointed out the many changes that have and are occurring not only in policing but also in our communities, our nation, and globally. For the moment, consider just one: traditional organizational hierarchies have become, or are becoming, obsolete. That net-centric organizations have emerged is hardly news. The primary purpose of this section is to connect developments such as these with notions of the future of leadership. The essays contained in this volume highlight specific

actions can be taken by both individuals and organizations to foster the development of not only future leaders but also overall future leadership within policing and police organizations.

While each contribution in this volume holds some nuggets of wisdom that illuminates paths to future leadership in law enforcement, some examples should be noted here. Take, for example, the essay offered by Gerald Konkler which suggests that one path for the future of police leadership may lie in the commitment to succession planning rather than secession planning. That is, devoting resources to plan for change rather than simply serving a policing agency or community until such time that this responsibility falls upon someone else's shoulders. In Konklers' viewpoint this includes planning for knowledge transfer, stacking knowledge, and avoiding over-reliance on hardware and software to provide for the actual transfer of knowledge and wisdom pertaining to agency practices and policies. In another similar vein, consider Al Youngs' essay discussing the notion of a leadership university and the idea of identifying other departments (such as the Lakewood (CO) Police Department) where leadership development has become a hallmark and legacy of agency operations. These operations have included embracing education, training, and integrity as well as encouraging diversity of opinion, diversity of assignments, and diversity of ideas in providing police services to a community. Such efforts are likely to identify some best practices for developing both leaders and leadership.

Now consider the contributions by Sid Heal and Robert Bunker. Each of these essays encourages the merging of scientific knowledge with practical ends. This includes researching "what works" and examining what leadership may be required in different contexts to respond to different problems or groups. Bunker's contribution specifically holds promise for addressing

the leadership challenges related to confronting the myriad problems associated with gangs, guns, and drugs that may threaten public safety in a community.

John Jackson, Rick Myers, and Tom Cowper offer an essay that details the advantages a net-centric approach to organizational leadership may provide. They contend that a net-centric organizational transformation will foster the movement of power from the organizational level to the individual level thereby spreading leadership throughout the policing organization. A transformation to a net-centric organizational scheme puts a premium on cooperation, collaboration, and rapid response to problems inside and outside the organization. Jackson and his colleagues contend that leadership will breed in this environment; indeed, leaders and leadership must flourish if a net-centric organization is going to function and survive. Though empirical evidence to date is limited, preliminary experimentation with net-centric approaches shows great promise. The greatest obstacle is not in developing and articulating the idea; it is in finding the will and courage to experiment with the application of this structural model in policing.

On a similar note, Michael Buerger, Greg Weaver, and Toby Finnie endorse the importance of organizational considerations, while also noting new directions for leadership research to inform the future of policing. They point to both dynamic and static dimensions of leadership and the need for succession planning in ever-changing environments (again, see also Konkler in this volume). Buerger, Weaver, and Finnie lend additional support to the idea of the net-centric concept of distributed leadership that they argue fosters networking and partnering.

Taking these arguments as a whole, perhaps no single measure, strategy, or course of action will reliably produce or improve efforts to deliver the complete promise of leadership in policing. In fact, to reduce these arguments down to specific types or styles of leadership and management of people and problems may be unnecessarily complicating the potential paths for leadership to develop and prosper. This may be akin to examining the strengths and weakness of community policing versus intelligence-led policing versus problem oriented policing rather than simply examining what leads to effective and efficient policing strategies. Perhaps one path forward is simply to focus on productivity and quality rather than the dynamic and elusive concepts related to leadership. In fact, one could effectively argue that cultivating leadership is really a process of empowering or influencing people to be able to be most productive in their lives, their careers, their organizations, and their communities. From a police productivity standpoint, the outputs from this process may take the form of more effective community-based crime reduction strategies, lower fear of crime within the community, or a greater issuance of tickets for driving violations; the result would be the same—increased police productivity. Under these conditions, the path forward to future police leadership would be through maximizing productivity by wielding influence to persuade people to realize their potentials both individually and organizationally.

Regardless of which leadership path is chosen, several recent developments have emerged that show promise for the future of police leadership. These include, but are not limited to, the following:

1. There has been a plethora of leadership development initiatives occurring throughout law enforcement (including this both this volume and on-going efforts of the Leadership Development Institute at the FBI).

2. The Public Safety Leadership Development Consortium (now a part of Police Futures International) has emerged to network those working in police leadership development and to begin advocacy for increased research into elements of the leadership development process.
3. And, lastly, the more people – good people, competent people – wrestle with the meaning, measurement, and means of leadership, the more likely some light will be generated to illuminate paths forward.

So, what is the path forward? How do we create preferred futures in conceptualization and implementation of leadership as discussed in this volume? While no easy answers emerge, some directions include identifying and promoting practices and research pertaining to not only influencing people and policies but the leadership that results from such efforts. Further efforts to determine how the development of influence works in net-centric environments, as well as intermediate formats such as public-private partnerships and neighborhood-driven policing, may also serve as a compass forward. These directions -- and many others found in earlier chapters -- must be given serious consideration. We simply cannot continue as we have been. The world is changing. While some agencies will change by attrition, the more proactive and effective agencies will change intentionally how they do business, how they are structured, how they empower employees, and how they operate internally.

There is not one right answer. There is not one right mold for leadership for the future. There is, however, an inexhaustible list of unproductive paths to these ends. Let us not continue to do what we have always been doing. Let us move forward in a principled way knowing that there are numerous complexities to this task such as leveraging competencies both at the top and bottom of an organization, confronting the challenges of similarities and differences across nations and organizational types, and identifying evidence-based approaches for determining best practices. Perhaps most importantly, evaluating outcomes and continually

assessing our organizations for opportunities to lead only identifies the present and future challenges that lie ahead. We hope this volume has, at least in part, provided some paths forward to meeting these challenges.