## OPUS2

Phones 4u Limited (In Administration) v EE Limited and others

Day 1

October 13, 2021

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(11.00 am)
(Proceedings delayed)
(11.13 am)
MR JUSTICE ROTH: I must start with a warning, because as
I understand it, although there are many in court, these
proceedings are being conveyed by a video platform for
those who are observing remotely, and an authorised
transcript of the proceedings is being made. You can
watch it through the screen, but it is strictly
prohibited for anyone watching to make any recording,
whether audio or video, of the proceedings.
We will also take a ten-minute break, although we
started late, at about some time after 12 o'clock, when
convenient, for the benefit of the transcribers, and
I do have to rise promptly at 4 o'clock today for
another commitment, but I think with two days, we should
not be in difficulties on the timetable.
The other thing I have to say is that, for reasons
that are not clear, I did not receive the link -- the
Opus link to the electronic bundles until 9.35 this
morning, which meant that although you gave me a helpful
reading list, I wasn't able to access most of the
documents. My clerk did print out the skeleton
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arguments of $C$ file, so I've read those, and obviously
they're helpful and informative, and I was able to
access some documents by searching around in the $C$ file,
but not the bundles in an organised way. So I've not
done the extended reading I would normally do, which is
unfortunate.
I think, Mr MacLean, there are four broad issues, as
I understand it, on the agenda for today, or there were.
There is first your amendment application. There is,
covered in the materials, your application for a limited
amount of further disclosure from Deutsche Telekom.
Can you just tell me, in the light of the letter
that I saw from Deutsche Telekom's solicitors, is that
still live?
MR MACLEAN: It is still live, but not as live as it was
before further disclosure was provided and before
further information was provided by Deutsche.
Essentially, in relation to Mr Kniese, who we wanted to
add as a custodian, Deutsche has provided the disclosure
which we were seeking in relation to that, although we
still would like them to produce a disclosure statement.
As far as Mr Höttges is concerned, where your
Lordship will see that we wanted to extend the time
period, and your Lordship will recall that your Lordship
specifically ordered that Mr Höttges' documents be

## Housekeeping <br> Housekeeping

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## Wednesday, 13 October 2021 <br> Wednesday, 13 October 2021

searched up until the time when he left the board as a member of the EE board, and we would like to extend
that, in the light of what we've seen in the disclosure.

> Now, what we've received from Deutsche --

MR JUSTICE ROTH: Well, I don't want you to develop it --
MR MACLEAN: Okay, sorry.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- I just want to know whether it's still
a live issue.
MR MACLEAN: There is still a live issue in relation --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: But it is more limited?
MR MACLEAN: It's more limited and it's related to
Mr Höttges.
As far as the pleadings are concerned, your Lordship will have seen that there was an issue between my
clients and Vodafone, in relation to a particular aspect of that. Now, there's been correspondence between the parties and I'm happy to tell your Lordship, as a result of that correspondence, we've agreed to provide further clarification of what it is that we are saying, in relation to that particular plea, and Vodafone has consented to that.

Now, Ms John for EE pointed out this morning to me that, of course, it affects her, but she indicated to me that she is prepared -- that EE is prepared to consent to those proposed amendments, but she will want to say

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something about this at the very end, in relation to the timetabling.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes.
MR MACLEAN: So the only live issue in relation to the amendments relates to the objections which are raised by Mr O'Donoghue on behalf of Deutsche, and we've cleared the rest out of the way. So that's the scope of that debate.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes. And then there's the expert evidence?
MR MACLEAN: Then there's the expert evidence.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: And then there's the trial timetable.
MR MACLEAN: Then there's the trial timetable, which
logically follows, once your Lordship has decided
whether to permit us to call expert evidence at all.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Would it not be sensible to deal with the expert evidence --
MR MACLEAN: Certainly, my Lord.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- first?
MR MACLEAN: Yes.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Because we can then deal with the trial directions.
MR MACLEAN: Yes.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: And if there is anything to be said about
the Vodafone amendment, that can be done clearly very

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    shortly, from what you've just told me, and at that point everybody, other than Deutsche Telekom, can be released.
MR MACLEAN: Respectfully - - I respectfully agree, my Lord that's a convenient way to proceed.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: I assume people -- they can stay, but equally they can watch it remotely.
MR MACLEAN: Indeed. And your Lordship will recollect that a similar procedure was applied at earlier CMCs where Mr O'Donoghue had his own furrow to plough.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes. I mean, it's a substantive argument on the amendment and will involve going through, no doubt, the pleadings quite carefully.
MR MACLEAN: Yes.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: So that we -- on that basis, if we start with the expert evidence, which is the major issue.
Yes, Mr O'Donoghue?
MR O'DONOGHUE: My Lord, forgive me for popping up. I've been informed that those attending by way of Teams cannot hear your Lordship and I don't know if there's a way for that to be investigated.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: I was late coming in because I was told that they could not see me. That's probably rather less of a disadvantage. But if they can't hear me, that is a problem.
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MR O'DONOGHUE: A fundamental problem.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: I don't know who is responsible for
    dealing with this. (Pause).
            Well, I don't think it 's right to go on, although
        I don't know if they can hear you, Mr MacLean.
MR MACLEAN: No one has indicated to me yet that they cannot
    hear me, but -- I'm told I can be heard in the ether.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: You can, but I cannot.
MR MACLEAN: I can.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes, but I don't think that's
        satisfactory. I think, even if I try and keep my
        interruptions very limited, it 's not viable.
            Very well. I will go away again and tell me when
        it 's restored.
(11.21 am)
                    (A short break)
(11.30 am)
MR JUSTICE ROTH: I'm told that if I speak into this
        microphone, and not that one, it should work. I will
        keep looking that way.
MR MACLEAN: I may not hear your Lordship, if your Lordship
        is looking at the microphone, but if I can't hear,
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to you. Can it be confirmed that I can now be heard?
I don't know what --
MR McQUATER: My Lord, we are getting quite a lot of feedback from this direction, I don't know --
NEW SPEAKER: Yes, I can hear you.
MR McQUATER: It may be that others have their microphones on, that shouldn't.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: If everyone else remotely could turn off
their -- they shouldn't have a live microphone - - if
they have a microphone, please turn it off.
And if I was not heard previously, I should,
therefore, just quickly repeat the warning that I gave to those who are attending remotely, that any unauthorised recording, video or audio, is strictly prohibited and would be a contempt of court. We are getting a lot of feedback and noise, and I don't know if anyone can look into that.
MR MACLEAN: It may be, my Lord, that the people who are behind the curtain, as it were, are not muted. That's possible.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Well, they are not participating remotely in the hearing and speaking, so they should be muted.
I'm told someone - - well, shall we struggle on?

> Submissions by MR MACLEAN

MR MACLEAN: Right. As your Lordship knows, this is the

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third CMC in a matter in which my clients, the administrators of Phones 4 u , are claiming damages for alleged collusion on the part of three groups of mobile network operators, on the basis that they colluded to drive Phones 4 u into administration.

And as your Lordship may know, since we were last before your Lordship, we've had a trip earlier in the year to the Court of Appeal, where the second to seventh defendants challenged your Lordship's order in relation to the provision of -- or to facilitate my clients having access to mobile phones and devices of a limited number of senior executives.

Happily, from our perspective, your Lordship's order was upheld by the Court of Appeal, and in so doing, they noted that a number of the submissions made by the defendants had an air of unreality about them.

Now, in our submission, the same air of unreality pervades a lot of what is being said repetitively across the skeleton arguments for these defendants.

As your Lordship has indicated, your Lordship wishes to hear about expert evidence first, and that's what I'm going to address your Lordship on. We say that this is a surprising case for the defendants to object lock, stock and barrel to the calling of any expert evidence at all, and I say that for four reasons.

First, in our submission, there can be no dispute -no sensible dispute, that when one looks at the pleadings in this case, those pleadings raise questions of expert evaluation. There are disputes, for example, my Lord, between the parties as to the market conditions at relevant points in time, from 2012 to 2014, and in 2006 to 2009. There is a question as to whether the market conditions in 2006 to 2009 were materially different to the conditions in 2012 to 2014.

There are also disputes between the parties, my Lord, as to the significance of various subjective characteristics of Phones 4 u and the MNOs. And the upshot of those disputes is, in our submission, a broader pleaded dispute; namely, we say that the MNOs are in a situation in the market conditions in which they find themselves, where an independent, as opposed to a concerted refusal to supply Phones 4 u , would be irrational.

Now, the defendants dispute this, and I' II come on to show your Lordship on the pleadings that dispute in some more detail.

Second, we say that the defendants' stance is all the more surprising, given that at least on the pleadings, they acknowledged in their defences, some of them, that expert evidence at least might be
appropriate. And we've referred to that in our skeleton argument at paragraph 84, and I needn't turn that up at this stage.

Next, we say there is actually no challenge to our proposed expert, Mr Thomas' expertise and ability to give evidence going to the relevant pleaded issues. The Telefónica defendants say, for example, that an expert cannot give evidence as to what he would have done in the MNOs' place. But that is not what the pleadings call for, and that is not what the proposed expert evidence amounts to.

Mr Thomas, we submit, is well placed to address the rationality of any unilateral cessation of supply and to draw out and analyse important material from the documentary record of the defendants' decision-making. And, in our submission, he can be trusted to provide appropriately focused evidence.

Finally, my Lord, in litigation of this scale, complexity and value, in our submission, there is an air of unreality to the submission that expert evidence would assist the court or even expert evidence that is required for the equality of arms between the parties should nevertheless be excluded because of concerns about cost and inconvenience. In our submission, that would be an extraordinary outcome.

## MR MACLEAN: No, my Lord.

MR JUSTICE ROTH: No, I'm sorry.
MR MACLEAN: No, my Lord.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: It's if it's not necessary, then you ask: is it helpful?
MR MACLEAN: Yes, indeed. I'm agreeing with your Lordship. Your Lordship has to ask first: is it necessary to the pleaded issues? If it's not strictly necessary to the pleaded issues, is it helpful? And if it's helpful, then your Lordship has to conduct a balancing exercise in relation to all the various features. And I'm going to show your Lordship the decision of Mr Justice Warren in the British Airways v Spencer case, which all parties, at least most parties in this case, have referred to, although we say, when your Lordship comes

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to look at it, it's apparent that the defendants have actually misunderstood what it's that Mr Justice Warren was saying in that case.

So that's the first stage, the stage that your Lordship must consider. Look at the pleadings, is the evidence necessary? If it's not necessary, is it helpful? So that is the first stage.

Only if we get past that stage do we then -- because if your Lordship says, "Well, I don't find it necessary to the pleaded case and I don't find it would be helpful, and on a balancing exercise I exclude it", then we don't need to consider what the terms of the proposed questions are.

But I propose to address your Lordship on the pleaded case, why we say it's necessary or helpful in relation to the pleaded case, before I address your Lordship on the questions which have been proposed and are appended to the draft order.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: It's a bit of a chicken and egg, because one's got to ask: what question is necessary and what question is helpful?
MR MACLEAN: Your Lordship is correct. One can't entirely divorce the second stage from the first stage, I accept that. But in the light of the objections which are made, and -- the primary objection which is made to this
evidence is that it does not go, as the defendants say, to the ultimate issue. That's their primary objection.

Now, that objection is bad in law.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Well, I understand that, and I'll no doubt hear from the defendants. I see the point, that it's a question of: does it go to a pleaded issue or one might say a pleaded issue that's significant?
MR MACLEAN: Well - -
MR JUSTICE ROTH: So as to justify the expense, and so on.
There is also concern, and that goes to the scope of any such evidence, about timing because I am slightly puzzled, and no doubt you will help me on that, as to why this application was made, I think in mid-August -MR MACLEAN: It was made in mid-August.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- when the disclosure was heavily concluded in February with, no doubt, more care, but sufficiently for you to make an application some time after Easter, and that was resisted considerably -MR MACLEAN: Well --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- but I can see real problems, depending perhaps partly on what scope of the areas that the expert is covering.
MR MACLEAN: Yes. Perhaps I can address your Lordship.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: So at some point --
MR MACLEAN: At some point in relation to the --
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MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- I don't know what has gone on, because it seems to me, I have to say, rather unsatisfactory.
It was floated, as you know, and it was pointed out at the original CMC, so it was always there --
MR MACLEAN: It was always there.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- and I thought it would have picked up rather earlier than in the middle of the summer.
MR MACLEAN: Well, if there is a criticism that the board hasn't been launched back into -- on to the pitch earlier, then I will address that. But ultimately, ultimately, at the end of the day, I will be submitting to your Lordship, even if your Lordship considers that we have been slow, and I'm going to submit that we've not, that is not something which ought to deter the court from ordering expert evidence which is necessary and which will be able to be accommodated within the current trial timetable, which envisages the trial starting, I think, on 11 May 2022. So I'll come back to that.

Now, obviously your Lordship -- it's common ground that the court should only permit expert evidence that is reasonably required to resolve the proceedings, and that's the test in Part 35, Rule 1. Obviously itself is not a test of strict necessary, and, as we know, the requirement of reasonableness is a fact-sensitive one

## MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- as I've indicated.

## MR MACLEAN: Okay.

MR JUSTICE ROTH: If there are important issues on the pleadings, they will have to be resolved as part of the process of deciding the ultimate question --
MR MACLEAN: Yes.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: - - then it seems to me that the relevant
question on this application is: well, is expert
evidence necessary or helpful --

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MR MACLEAN: Yes.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- for those important issues?
MR MACLEAN: But what we've been facing in the skeleton
    arguments that your Lordship has seen from the
    defendants is an approach which focuses almost
    exclusively on this question at the first stage. They
    say: well, it 's not going to help on the ultimate issue.
    And a similar point is made by Vodafone, it's made --
    a similar point is made by Deutsche, "The fundamental
    issue", says Deutsche, "before the court, is whether or
    not there was collusion".
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Well, as I say, I'm not impressed by the
        short point, but I think that's not all they are
        saying --
MR MACLEAN: That's not all they are saying.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- they're saying the sub-issues, if you
    like, or the issues, not -- and the ultimate questions
    also, are either not necessary or helpful for them and
    (overspeaking) --
MR MACLEAN: Well, yes, and I am going to --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: So that's what I think we need to focus
    on.
MR MACLEAN: Yeah. I'm going to show your Lordship what
        Mr Justice Warren said about that in the British Airways
        case, and I'm going to invite your Lordship to conclude
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    that on the basis of his approach, which we commend to
    the court, which we say is right in law, that you --
    unless -- unless the court can say at a stage like this
    that expert evidence cannot assist, logically cannot
    assist, then the court should allow expert evidence
    which is necessary to the resolution of a pleaded issue.
    So, in our submission, the defendants come nowhere near
    that, satisfying such a test on this case, they simply
    can't.
            And what essentially they invite the court to do is
    to pre-judge how important the evidence that we propose
    is going to be to the resolutions of the issue before
    the court, that's essentially what they are seeking to
    do, by excluding this evidence which goes, we say, to
    pleaded issues. Now, that, in our submission, in a case
    of this nature, in a case of this size and importance,
    would be an extraordinary thing for the court to do.
            Can I take your Lordship to Mr Justice Warren's
        decision, which one finds in bundle {H/17/1}, which is
        volume 3 of 6 in the hard copy.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes. I've actually -- I don't have the
    hard copy bundles.
MR MACLEAN: Right.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Except for the original pleadings.
MR MACLEAN: Yes.
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MR JUSTICE ROTH: And that's --
MR MACLEAN: We'll do it on the screen, my Lord.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- what I've been reading. But I have got
Mr Justice Warren's judgment in hard copy.
MR MACLEAN: In hard copy?
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes.
MR MACLEAN: Ah. Does your Lordship have a hard copy of the
Pensions Law Reports version?
MR JUSTICE ROTH: No, I've got it in -- but it's
paragraphed.
MR MACLEAN: Yes, that's fine. I'm told the paragraphs are
the same.
Now, by way of background, my Lord, the case
involved a claim by British Airways against --
challenging the decision made by British Airways pension
fund trustees to award increased pensions to BA
pensioners. And the nub of the complaint by British
Airways was that the trustees' decision was unlawful as,
amongst other things, the trustees had pre-determined
the issue of whether to award increased pensions, and it
appears that the amount at stake was very large --
potentially very large, hundreds of millions of pounds.
Now, the Deputy Master had refused BA's application
to adduce expert actuarial evidence, and when one reads
the report, one sees that the principal ground on which
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refusal -- the Deputy Master refused to grant permission
was that the evidence did not go to the ultimate issue.
Mr Justice Warren dealt with BA's appeal, BA arguing
that the Deputy Master had applied the wrong approach,
and he should have investigated whether the expert
evidence was either necessary or helpful in relation to
the pleaded issues.
Now, the ultimate issues in the case, which one can
see from reading paragraphs 2 through 8 , I can summarise
as this.
The first question was whether the pension trustees
had power to amend the rules of the pension scheme to
give themselves a power to grant pension increases.
And, secondly, assuming that such power had been validly
created, was it validly exercised by the trustees when
they decided to increase the pensions on a discretionary
basis?
Now, one of the key arguments run by BA in this case
was that the trustees had not genuinely acted on
professional actuarial advice when deciding to make the
pension increases. They had pre-determined the increase
should be made and then took and relied on such advice
as supported the decision that they had already taken in
substance.
Now, you can see from paragraph 16 of the learned
MR MACLEAN: No, my Lord. Mr Pardoe was the actuary on
whose advice the trustees had purported to act.
(Pause).

[^0]judge's judgment, if one can get that, that's H17, page $5\{\mathrm{H} / 17 / 5\}$. Your Lordship has paragraph 16 in hard copy.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes.
MR MACLEAN: "BA's case is that Mr Pardoe's [he was the advising actuary] advice changed and became progressively less and less prudent and more and more unorthodox. The AMT methodology which was eventually arrived at purported to reconcile what, on BA's case, are irreconcilable elements with the result that Mr Pardoe did not, in the end, advise against the grant of discretionary increases when his original advice had been against it. Mr Tennet says that the way in which this advice changed will assist BA's case on predetermination; and to understand the way in which this advice changed and the reasons for it can only be elucidated in the light of expert evidence going to the sort of advice which an actuary in Mr Pardoe's position could properly have given."

Paragraphs 23 and 24, my Lord, echo a point which is made by the defendants.
whose advice the trustees had purported to act.
(Pause).
issues in the case, and I'm not going to go through this in detail, because it's very involved.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Mm-hm.
MR MACLEAN: And I don't -- my submissions don't depend on
establishing there is an exact parallel between the
issues which arose in that case with the issues which
arise in this case, because they are very different.
But there is one parallel that's worth noting in this case. All of the defendants deny that a unilateral decision to cease supplies to Phones 4 u would have been irrational and, to a greater or lesser extent, they pour scorn on that idea.

Now, we obviously disagree with that, but let's assume for the purposes of argument that there was a reasonable basis for what the defendants say.

At paragraph 50, my Lord, if one can look at that, which is on $\{\mathrm{H} / 17 / 10\}$, Mr Justice Warren refers to a particular paragraph in the particulars of claim and defence:
"PoC 275 admits PoC 240, although it is denied that the Trustees' decision to grant discretionary increases was inconsistent with the SFO."

That's is the subsidiary funding objective.
"PoC 276, whilst emphasising that the SFO was always a subsidiary objective, admits part of PoC 241. As to

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the remainder ... it is admitted that getting to self-sufficiency was and is an important objective, but it is denied ... that (i) it was the sole or overriding objective for the Trustees acting rationally for prudently or (ii) it precluded the exercise of discretion under Rule 15 ... If BA contends that getting to self-sufficiency should have been an overriding objective of the Trustees (a proposition which is just about pleaded) then it would be of assistance to have expert evidence to that effect (and precisely what is meant) although I am bound to say that it is a pretty startling proposition that it would be perverse or irrational not to have had that as the sole or overriding objective. Again, if it really is BA's case that benefit increases costing $£ 12$ million were inconsistent with that objective, then actuarial evidence would assist in establishing that, again startling, proposition. I am, of course, conscious that startling propositions are sometimes correct."

Now, as your Lordship sees from the approach taken by the learned judge, whether at a preliminary stage, a pleading stage, he could take the view that the proposition was startling or not wasn't an answer to the desire by British Airways to call expert evidence which was necessary to decide the case which was pleaded.

In this case, we submit, the independent rationality
of the MNOs' decisions are squarely in issue; whatever the defendants say. So are a number of other sub-issues for which the defendants in their skeleton arguments seek to disparage the relevance of.

But even if, in our submission, the defendants were on solid ground for pouring scorn on the likely importance of those issues at trial, which we say they are not, they are still pleaded issues which call for determination and which call for expert evidence in order to assist that.

And if I could ask your Lordship then to turn on to paragraph 61 of Mr Justice Warren's judgment. That's at $H 17$, page $13\{H / 17 / 13\}$.

You will see that Mr Tennet, who was representing British Airways:
" ... submits that expert evidence need only be helpful in resolving an issue justly."

And then he refers to the decision of Mr Justice Evans-Lombe in Barings v Coopers and Lybrand. And the learned judge, Mr Justice Warren, remarked:
"What the judge actually said is that evidence can be excluded if the court comes to the conclusion that it would not be helpful in resolving an issue which needs to be decided where it is one of law or one on which the

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court can come to a fully informed decision without hearing such evidence but, whichever way one looks at it, evidence is admissible, if it might be helpful. But that is not, in my view, to say that it must be admitted even if helpful because it may be disproportionate in the light of the overriding objective to admit it. I accept, of course, that evidence can be helpful even if it's not determinative of any issue ..."

Paragraph $63\{\mathrm{H} / 17 / 14\}$, my Lord, is a key paragraph and it draws a distinction between evidence that is necessary and evidence that is helpful. You see the learned judge says:
"This, it seems to me, is saying something very different from the proposition that, because expert evidence may prove of assistance, it should be admitted. A judgment needs to be made in every case and, in making that judgment, it's relevant to consider whether, on the one hand, the evidence is necessary (in the sense that a decision cannot be made without it) or whether it's of very marginal relevance with the court being well able to decide the issue without it, in which case a balance has to be struck and the proportionality of its admission assessed. In striking that balance, the court should, in my judgment, be prepared to take into account disparate factors including the value of the claim, the
effect of a judgment either way on the parties, who is to pay for the commissioning of the evidence on each side and the delay, if any, which the production of such evidence would entail ( particularly delay which might result in the vacating of a trial date)."

Then paragraph 64:
"Let me get one point out of the way. CPR 35.1
refers to 'the proceedings' ..."
Forgive me, my Lord.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Would it be helpful for me, because
I haven't looked at it before, rather than you just
having to read it all out, have it read. Obviously 68 is important and --
MR MACLEAN: 64 is too, my Lord.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: So can I read 64 to 68 , or do you want me to go ...?
MR MACLEAN: I'm going to -- yes. Read 64 to 68 , my Lord, if you kindly would, then I will have some more
paragraphs to refer your Lordship to.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes. (Pause).
Yes.
MR MACLEAN: I'm grateful, my Lord.
Now, your Lordship will appreciate, for obvious reasons, I rely particularly on what the learned judge said in paragraph 66 in relation to issues which cannot

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## affect the outcome

Now, in this case, in our submission, any attempt by the defendants to suggest that the pleaded issues to which we suggest the expert evidence we seek goes, cannot affect the outcome of the case, is hopeless. Absolutely hopeless. Nor, indeed, have any of these defendants, since these matters were ventilated in the pleadings, sought to come to court to say: judge, please exclude these issues, pursuant to the case management powers, from consideration. So that is an extremely important feature of the learned judge's judgment.

And the court will, of course, if it permits expert evidence to be given, retain control of the process throughout. So one might envisage a circumstance where, if your Lordship is minded to give permission to the claimants to adduce expert evidence, as we seek, that the court still has the power at the trial stage to say: well, in the light of what I have seen in the trial witness statement, it's all in light of the evidence, which I have heard in the trial, I'm not minded to allow this expert evidence to be given. That is all within the case management powers of the court.

But, in our submission, it would be extraordinary and wrong, as a matter of law, to exclude or preclude evidence which my clients seek to adduce in relation to

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    issues which are pleaded, which are necessary to their
    case, in circumstances where none of these defendants
    have attempted to persuade the court that these issues
    cannot affect the outcome of the trial.
    And respectfully, my Lord, your Lordship doesn't
    have a crystal ball. Although your Lordship has
    enormous experience in these types of cases, your
    Lordship cannot know, at the end of the day, what
    evidence is going to be given by these defendants. They
    may turn up and give no evidence at all, if your
    Lordship decides that we shouldn't have permission to
    adduce expert evidence which, in our submission, is
    going to establish the prima facie rationality of
    a decision to terminate Phones 4u unilaterally, unless
    they knew that the other MNOs were going to do likewise.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Don't we have to look, and that's what
    Mr Justice Warren is potentially saying, at identifying
    the particular issues --
MR MACLEAN: Yes.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- which you say expert evidence is either
    necessary or helpful --
MR MACLEAN: Of course, my Lord.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- and then assess whether, actually,
    expert evidence goes materially to that issue, and
    that's the exercise we have to carry out?
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MR MACLEAN: That's the exercise your Lordship has to carry
out, but it's not an exercise, in my submission, that
the defendants really have carried out in the way in
which we have. What they've sought to do, for example,
in relation to -- your Lordship will recollect, there is
an issue as to whether the experience or actions of
Three, one of the non-defendant MNOs, whether that its
decision to cease selling through Phones $4 u$ is
a comparator. That is a point which is raised by the
defendants, some or all of them, and they say: well,
look, the fact that Three decided not to sell through
Phones 4 u shows you that your argument that MNOs
couldn't leave unilaterally is wrong, and they all rely
on that. So that's an argument they raise.
And we say: no, no, no, that's wrong for a host of
reasons which depend on Three's position in the market,
for example.
And your Lordship may see, in Orange's skeleton
argument, that it's said that it 's most unlikely that
the court will have to determine whether Three is
a close comparator for the other MNOs. But that's
a surprising submission, given that it's a point which
is raised by the defendants, not Phones 4 u , and put
forward as a potential defence to our claim.
Now, if they're saying: okay, we'll simply drop that
argument, that may take the position of Three off the table. But until they do so, it 's a pleaded issue which is going to have to be explored through expert evidence.

So the "most unlikely to affect" is well below the standard that we say Mr Justice Warren identified in paragraph 66. They can't say, and they don't seek to say, that that issue cannot affect the outcome of the case, and indeed some of them maintain it as part of their defence.

Now, it may be that, if I could invite your Lordship to -- could I invite your Lordship to look at paragraphs 76 to 77 as well?
MR JUSTICE ROTH: British Airways?
MR MACLEAN: The British Airways, my Lord, yes. For those who are following electronically, $\{\mathrm{H} / 17 / 16\}$. (Pause).

Now, thank you, my Lord. I'm not clear whether your Lordship wants to take a break. I'm very happy to press on, but your Lordship did indicate that there might be scope for a break at this time, but it's a matter for your Lordship, obviously.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: I think, because we started late, it's not so much for my benefit. We'll press on until 1 o'clock, but - -
MR MACLEAN: I'm grateful, my Lord.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: We will have a break in the afternoon,

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but - -
MR MACLEAN: Of course, of course, my Lord.
Now, as far as 76 and 77 are concerned, the reason -- your Lordship will obviously appreciate why I referred to these paragraphs, because the defendants all make a virtue of the fact that they are going to call witnesses who can speak to the modelling, for example, which was done in order to justify the decisions which were taken. Your Lordship may recollect that EE says that their decision, which was taken on 21 May 2014, was based on an iteration of the models. And the models, when one looks at them, are not easy, without the benefit of expert evidence, actually to understand or to see what assumptions were underlying.

Now, they say: oh, well, you can simply -- we will call these people. And we say to that: well, how we know you will? But even if you do -- they effectively -- what they're going to do is to give evidence of fact and quasi expert evidence, based on their supposed skill and experience. And there's inevitably going to be a blurring of the distinction between what they actually know and what they seek to justify, based on their experience and knowledge.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: You see, the modelling is rather
a different thing. If you look at the detail of the

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    modelling, Mr Pardoe is an actuary --
MR MACLEAN: Yes.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- and, therefore, with a specialist
    skill --
MR MACLEAN: Yes.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- with a professional skill. There is
        a question whether his methodology as an actuary was
    a prudent one --
MR MACLEAN: Yes.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- and, therefore, BA wanted to have
    expert actuarial evidence to test that.
MR MACLEAN: Yes.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Mr Thomas is an economist --
MR MACLEAN: He is.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- and what -- he will be looking into
    this business modelling and business planning, that's
    not particularly what he's concerned with. And if he is
    to give evidence about that, that's a very detailed
    examination of going quite granularly into the modelling
    and the way it's done. Where I really am concerned
    that's coming much too late, we've known about that
    modelling since the defences.
MR MACLEAN: Well --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: If he wants to understand the question of
    just interpreting the law and understanding them, first
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    of all, you write to ask, and if you don't get a proper
    answer, you can serve a request for further information,
    so you can understand them.
    But whether that is something (a) within Mr Thomas'
    expertise and (b) appropriate at this point, I don't
    know if you are saying anyway that the modelling is
    imprudent.
MR MACLEAN: No, we're not saying the modelling is
    imprudent, no.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: What --
MR MACLEAN: We're wanting to identify what assumptions
    underlie the modelling. As your Lordship knows, it's
    our case that unless these MNOs assumed that Phones 4u
    would go out of business, unless that was an assumption
    they had, then the decision to unilaterally terminate
    Phones 4u was irrational, because it was likely, in the
    circumstances of the market, to be loss-making and it
    was certainly likely to be loss -making in the light of
    the previous experience which they had.
    Now, it will need -- I simply can't hold up
    a spreadsheet and say to the court: look at the
    spreadsheet. And say to the witness: why is your
    assumption here that EE will retain all of the customers
    and clients that it had through Phones 4u, in the
    circumstances of terminating Phones 4u?
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MR MACLEAN: Yes.
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Our pleaded case, which I'll come to in due course,
is that unless EE knew what the other MNOs were likely to do, it would be irrational because they could not expect to retain anything like $100 \%$ of the sales which they had achieved through Phones 4 u . We put at -- they would need to expect to retain approximately $65 \%$ of the sales which they had made, and our economist will say that that is -- unless you assume Phones 4 u was going out of business, it's simply not an assumption which makes sense.

Now, we need expert evidence to say that.
There are a number of aspects to this.
First of all, it 's our pleaded case, and we need positive evidence to support our case --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Well, can we just -- I think it would help me to just look at -- rather than picking bits here and there, as you are doing, and as indeed, I must say, of course, the defendants have done in the other way, just to look at and identify on the pleaded case what are the points where you say that the evidence is necessary or, if not necessary, helpful.
MR MACLEAN: Helpful. Yes, certainly. Well, let's turn to the pleadings. I wasn't --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: I know you were coming to that.
MR MACLEAN: No, I definitely was coming to that.
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MR JUSTICE ROTH: That seems to me the critical point. It was clear, subject to what the defendants may say, it's not about the ultimate question whether the judgment goes this way or that way, it's about the issues that may be necessary to decide -- I say "may be", picking up your point that one cannot be sure at this stage, cannot be sure at this stage --
MR MACLEAN: Absolutely.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- and that it's an issue focusing on the issues, as Mr Justice Warren says. But let's just look at that.
MR MACLEAN: Right. Let's do that.
So we have set out in our skeleton argument, and we needn't look at it, a detailed list of the various pleaded issues which we say expert evidence is necessary to be helpful. I'm not going to go through all of them.

But let's start at the particulars of claim at paragraphs 124 to 129 , which is at $\{B / 3 / 68\}$. If we could have $\{B / 3 / 68\}$ up on the screen, please.

Now, your Lordship sees, under the heading "Economic analysis", we say:
"For the reasons explained in paragraphs 38 to 39 above, it was only by an unlawful collusive agreement ... that each of the MNO Defendants could rationally and/or without intolerable commercial risk

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    cease to supply P4U. No MNO Defendant acting rationally
    and/or in its own commercial interests would choose
    unilaterally to cease dealing with P4U in circumstances
    where P4U was likely to have one or more continuing
    commercial relationships ... because to do so would
    cause such MNO Defendant to lose significant market
    share of connections to other MNO defendants."
    Now, pausing there. It's in dispute between the
    parties as to what the nature of the market was, in this
    sense. Was this a saturated market? Was it -- was the
    nature of the competition within these MNOs
    oligopolistic or not.
        So there is a dispute between the parties as to the
        precise nature and circumstances of the market at the
        time. I just mention that at this stage while we are
        going through it.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: I think that is exactly the kind of point
    that I'm trying to identify .
MR MACLEAN: Right.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: So that's not to do with the individual
    decisions --
MR MACLEAN: No
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- it's the nature and circumstances of
    the market --
MR MACLEAN: Correct.
    3 7
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- and was it saturated, such that the
    points you make in -- and highly constrained(?), the
    point you make in subparagraph (a) is correct.
MR MACLEAN: Correct, yes. Exactly.
            So paragraph }124\mathrm{ isn't divorced from the factual
        pleas which precede it, which builds on a series of
        averments as to the market conditions, the nature of the
        competition between these MNOs and the basic economics
        of ceasing to supply a major retail intermediary, and
        Phones 4u in particular.
            I mean, can we look at the subparagraphs under this
        paragraph, which your Lordship has been looking at, and
        if I could have it up on the screen, please, and the
        following page.
            I think that must be {B/3/69}. Yes. So (b):
            "Each MNO Defendant, in considering its commercial
        relationship ... would compare the net present value of
        its customers in the ... scenarios that either (1) it
        did or (2) it did not continue its commercial
        relationship ... in this respect:
            "(i) Where a customer purchased a connection through
        P4U, each MNO Defendant would share with P4U the revenue
        and costs associated with that Connection."
            And we identify the relevant cashflows.
            "The NPV of a customer who joined an MNO Defendant

\section*{MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- just pausing there. That's a question}
of fact --
MR MACLEAN: It is.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: - - which may not be in dispute; if you
have to share the revenue with an intermediary --
MR MACLEAN: No, that is --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- that is its value.
MR MACLEAN: At that level, that is not in dispute,
absolutely. But it is a building block for understanding why it is that these MNOs might be motivated to get rid of Phones 4u. So that is a positive incentive to get rid of Phones 4 u , because they're not as valuable or profitable to the MNO.

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MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes.

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MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes.
MR MACLEAN: Sorry, my Lord. I'm going to try and find --
MR MACLEAN: Sorry, my Lord. I'm going to try and find --
    I find it easier to have the pleading in hard copy,
    I find it easier to have the pleading in hard copy,
    rather than on the screen, because I can't scroll
    rather than on the screen, because I can't scroll
    down --
    down --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: No.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: No.
MR MACLEAN: -- in my mind.
MR MACLEAN: -- in my mind.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: I'm with you on that. (Pause).
MR JUSTICE ROTH: I'm with you on that. (Pause).
MR MACLEAN: Right. Looking at subparagraph (c) and perhaps
MR MACLEAN: Right. Looking at subparagraph (c) and perhaps
    (d) {B/3/70}. As far as (d) is concerned, that is in
    (d) {B/3/70}. As far as (d) is concerned, that is in
    dispute, I believe, what the approximate NPV was.
    dispute, I believe, what the approximate NPV was.
    What is certainly in dispute in paragraph (e) is
    What is certainly in dispute in paragraph (e) is
that:
that:
    " ... only if, after termination of their commercial
    " ... only if, after termination of their commercial
    relationships with P4U, EE and/or Vodafone UK could
    relationships with P4U, EE and/or Vodafone UK could
    expect to retain through alternative sales channels
    expect to retain through alternative sales channels
    approximately 65% or more of the customers who had
    approximately 65% or more of the customers who had
    joined their networks via P4U, would it have been
    joined their networks via P4U, would it have been
    prospectively beneficial in NPV terms for EE and/or
    prospectively beneficial in NPV terms for EE and/or
    Vodafone UK to terminate their commercial relationship
    Vodafone UK to terminate their commercial relationship
    with Fiona P4U."
    with Fiona P4U."
    Now, that is denied and disputed by the defendants.
    Now, that is denied and disputed by the defendants.
    They say that's just not right.
    They say that's just not right.
    Also, they dispute is subparagraph (f):
    Also, they dispute is subparagraph (f):
    "It was extremely unlikely that, acting
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    "It was extremely unlikely that, acting
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independently, each of EE and/or Vodafone UK could have expected to retain anything like \(65 \%\) of customers who had joined their networks via P4U in the event that they terminated their commercial relationships ...."

In particular, one sees that EE and Vodafone had a share of the market for connections, which was significantly below \(65 \%\).

EE's average share was \(32--I\) 'm looking at the amended version \(--32 \%\) and Vodafone's average share was \(20 \%\). Those figures have been changed in the amended pleading, my Lord.

EE and Vodafone each had a share of high street stores selling connections significantly below \(65 \%\), and EE's shares of high street store selling connections in the UK was around \(21 \%\), and Vodafone's share was around 11.

And the key point in this regard, in this analysis, is that they would broadly only be able to expect and retain the percentage which reflected their proportion of customers when Phones 4 u was in existence. If Phones 4 u was not in existence, then the game would change. But if Phones 4 u was in existence and continued to sell connections for another MNO, none of these operators could expect to hoover up a significant share, unless Phones 4 u was no longer in existence, and that is

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what this analysis seeks to establish.
Now, that is essentially summarised in subparagraph (g) that there was no rational basis on which the MNOs could expect to achieve the necessary retention rate to make this not loss-making by terminating, unless they assumed that Phones 4 u would go out of business. That in turn --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: You see, it's not apparent from the questions in your application, but what you are seeking to do, if that is what you are seeking to do, is to call expert evidence to address and testify to what is pleaded, and pleaded under the heading of "Economic analysis", and pleaded by implicit reference to expert economic evidence, given the last line of the main paragraph before we get to subparagraph (f), and that's what you are seeking to do.
MR MACLEAN: Yes, it is what we are seeking to do.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: So you've put in this, by way of evidence from someone who's looked at the NPV and carried out this calculation and says, "Well, that's what I say the position is", and then the defendants can cross-examine him and say, "No, that's wrong, because you haven't taken account of this or that".
MR MACLEAN: Yes.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: And that may, therefore, include the state

\section*{43}
got from Phones 4 u , that itself is in debate and in issue between the parties. And how is the analysis affected, how is it sensitive to that, is a matter which is in dispute.

And we say, in subparagraph (c) on \(126\{B / 3 / 72\}\) :
"There was no reasonable basis on which the MNO Defendants could expect to retain such a high proportion of customers ... [again] unless they were proceeding on the assumption that Phones 4 u would cease trading following the cessation of supply."

But to take your Lordship's point: what are these questions that you have drafted intended to do? Well, the questions are intended to allow expert evidence to address the issues which we say are both necessary and helpful, which we identify in the pleading at paragraph 124 onwards, because what question 1 boils down to is this: what was the state of the market at the relevant time? What were the incentives, on an objective basis, which would attach to an MNO in deciding whether to stay with or --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: That is a much more general question. MR MACLEAN: Well --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: I mean, if you are saying that you want
expert evidence to address the pleaded case at
paragraphs 124 to -- we will have to look at that.
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MR MACLEAN: It goes to 129, my Lord.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Wherever it's.
MR MACLEAN: 129.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: I will have to look at 128.
MR MACLEAN: Yeah.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: That seems to me -- and perhaps there's
an additional point about the change since 2006/2009,
because of that experience, which is dealt with
elsewhere --
MR MACLEAN: Yes.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- but those are particular issues, that
does seem to me a much more focused and rather different
proposition, if I may say so, from the sort of
broad-ranging expert evidence in the application.
MR MACLEAN: Yes. Now, if we have failed to formulate the
questions in relation to evidence which is necessary to
resolve what are the issues on the pleadings, then we
are at fault, and I will put up my hand on that basis.
But we are not intending, by virtue of those
questions, to permit of an abstract -- as my learned
friends say, an abstract expert report, no. If the
expert is going to give evidence about the issues which
we say arise in those paragraphs, first of all, he has
to set out what the state of the market was, and that's
what question 1 is designed to achieve.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: That seems to me -- and perhaps there's
an additional point about the change since 2006/2009,
because of that experience, which is dealt with
elsewhere --
MR MACLEAN: Yes.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: - - but those are particular issues, that does seem to me a much more focused and rather different proposition, if I may say so, from the sort of broad-ranging expert evidence in the application.
MR MACLEAN: Yes. Now, if we have failed to formulate the questions in relation to evidence which is necessary to resolve what are the issues on the pleadings, then we are at fault, and I will put up my hand on that basis. questions, to permit of an abstract -- as my learned friends say, an abstract expert report, no. If the expert is going to give evidence about the issues which to set out what the state of the market was, and that's what question 1 is designed to achieve.

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MR JUSTICE ROTH: Well, I don't myself see why you can't
address the -- be instructed to address the assertions
and calculations and evaluation in these paragraphs of
the pleading.
MR MACLEAN: Yes. Well, that's certainly --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: That is what he is asked to do, and it
obviously depends - I I may not say(?). But that does
narrow it considerably and it focuses it much more
precisely. And --
MR MACLEAN: If your Lordship --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- one suspects that these paragraphs
indeed may have been drafted with some expert
assistance.
MR MACLEAN: If your Lordship is saying to me -- and
obviously your Lordship has not heard from my learned
friends -- go away and try again and make something more
focused in relation to the pleadings, then we will do
that. We have not been seeking, and I can assure your
Lordship, to produce questions which are designed to
range far and wide beyond the pleaded issues. That is
certainly not what we are intending to do. On the
contrary, we are trying to encapsulate, in perhaps
a more general form, the issues which we say arise on
the pleadings, in relation to this aspect of the case.
Now, one of the things that we are wanting to adduce

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evidence for the court is that when one looks at the models that the defendants rely upon by way of response, and my learned friends for Vodafone are particularly vociferous in making this point, they say that unless you suggest that the model and the documents which we relied on are shams and you haven't said that -- and we don't say that -- then your case can't succeed.

But that's misconceived. They seek to put us into a false binary. We will say that, given the state of this market, and given the circumstances in which Phones \(4 u\) found itself, being one of the two main indirect retailers, and how the MNOs facing competition from one another found themselves, we're going to say that the assumptions which must have been built into these models can only have been on the basis that Phones 4 u was going to go out of business.

Now, how would you assume that Phones 4 u was going to go out of business? If you left unilaterally, you would find yourself having the experience that you had in 2006 to 2009. It caused loss and it caused loss by reason of the structure of the market, which is why we plead, my Lord, that they are once bitten, twice shy, effectively .

And what seems to have happened is that they could get over their fear of loss by projecting substantial

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profits, by virtue, we say, of the consultation which took place between the parties. Otherwise, the assumptions which underlie the model, which need to be interrogated and analysed, don't make any sense.

Now, as I say, we don't need to say these models were shams or anything like that. We need to interrogate and analyse what underlies them. Was your assumption -- what was your assumption as to the retention rate, for example? The retention rate is: how many customers will you retain, as a result of getting rid of Phones \(4 u\) ? Will you, as we suggest in our pleading, never reach the retention rate of \(65 \%\) or will you project that you are going to reach a retention rate of \(100 \%\) ? A retention rate of \(100 \%\) can only mean that Phones 4 u is going to go out of business.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Well, those are questions you can put. MR MACLEAN: Yes.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: You don't need an expert to call. What you need the expert for is to say that with Phones \(4 u\) in the market the reasonable retention rate is \(65 \%\).

\section*{MR MACLEAN: Yes.}

MR JUSTICE ROTH: That's the calculation --
MR MACLEAN: And what these --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- or whatever it has been amended to.
MR MACLEAN: And looking at these models which are put
MR MACLEAN: Now, an important feature that your Lordship --
    when it comes to another aspect of the questions your
    Lordship put to me: why is this also so late? As
    a matter of fact, and if you read Mr Greeno's eighth
    witness statement, and I'm not going to turn it up now,
    if you read Mr Greeno's eighth witness statement, it's
    not correct to say that we've had the models or we've
    known about the models all along. True it is that in
    the pleadings, EE said: oh, we relied on models. And
    your Lordship will recollect that EE resisted providing
    the models and we got an order from your Lordship that
    they did, but it turns out that the documentation, which
    they -- this was way back when, before disclosure -- but
    it turns out that when we look at the disclosure, the
    models weren't all it, in this sense --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: The models weren't all?

MR MACLEAN: Weren't all it. Weren't the final answer. We've had to -- we've had, in the course of the last couple of months, been seeking to obtain from the defendants precisely what it is they say amounted to the models on which these decisions were based, and the disclosure has been ongoing. I think the disclosure was given in September by one of the MNOs. So it's not fair to say -- for the defendants to say -- nor with great respect to your Lordship is it fair to say: oh, you've taken a long time to do all this. Because we are facing models which are, to a great degree, opaque, which require an expert to look at and analyse, and the process of disclosure in relation to those has been an ongoing one.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Well, I say, to clarify, that's not unusual. To understand somebody else's modelling or data you have to ask questions. There may be correspondence and if you don't get proper answers, you can apply for an order by way of further information.

\section*{MR MACLEAN: Yes, of course.}

MR JUSTICE ROTH: And it may be that you will want your expert to look at them and then explain them to you. But that doesn't mean EE has to give evidence.

If he gives his evidence about what is a reasonable retention rate, if that becomes, as it seems, it's
that the retention rate which is assumed in the models
is far, far superior to that. That's something which I can't identify
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes. So I can see that that is something that -- the pleaded point you make here and build a lot on, of course, that's very important --
MR MACLEAN: Yes.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: - - the estimated retention rate.
MR MACLEAN: Now, an important feature that your Lordship --
your a matter of fact, and if you read Mr Greeno's eighth witness statement, and I'm not going to turn it up now, if you read Mr Greeno's eighth witness statement, it's known the pleadings, EE said: oh, we relied on models. And your they did, but it turns out that the documentation, which they -- this was way back when, before disclosure -- but it turns out that when we look at the disclosure, the

MR JUSTICE ROTH: The models weren't all?
MR JUSTICE ROTH: And what it said about --
MR MACLEAN: Let me - - yes. Let's look at - - is it
    paragraph 109?
MR JUSTICE ROTH: I think EE came a bit later, didn't it?
MR MACLEAN: Yes. I mean, if one looks at the EE defence,
    at paragraph 62c, which is at \(\{A / 3 / 21\}\), so it's
    paragraph 62c.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes. The market conditions were not the
    same as they had been in --
MR MACLEAN: Exactly:
"For example, the use of online retail had
    significantly expanded."
        Then Vodafone, perhaps if one looks at that,
    \(\{A / 6 / 17\}\).
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Just a moment. (Pause).
            Yes. And then you want to go to --
MR MACLEAN: To Vodafone, which is \(\{\mathrm{A} / 6 / 17\}\).
    Paragraph 31.4, if we can get that up in the Vodafone
    defence, please \(\{A / 6 / 17\}\). (Pause).
            Ah, now I've got it.
            So there your Lordship sees a fairly lengthy and
a very important point --
MR MACLEAN: It's, my Lord, and - - so --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: - - EE can consider, on the part of that, the way they have come up with the retention rate. But again, I think that's somewhat removed from the more wide-ranging questions that have been put forward.

You've taken me to these paragraphs. There is also somewhere -- you say there's what you call the "once bitten, twice shy" point, namely the experience in 2006 to 2009. Now, that's pleaded somewhere. Where is that?
MR MACLEAN: I think it's in 37, B, my Lord. Your Lordship can appreciate that I'm having slight trouble manipulating the various bundles, for which I apologise.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes. (Pause).
MR MACLEAN: If one starts, my Lord, at paragraph 37. 37, which is in \(\{B / 3 / 21\}\) for those following electronically. Your Lordship sees, we allege that the defendants were aware of the commercial risks inherent to any unilateral decision:
"In the market conditions described above, a MNO ... that ceased supplying ... would anticipate that many of its customers would thereafter be lost to the other MNOs it still sold Connections through Phones 4 u .
"Furthermore, there was fairly recent experience of the negative effects of the unilateral decisions not to

\section*{51}
trade with the other major retailers."
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Right. So we then want to look at the defence to that statement.
MR MACLEAN: Yes, certainly.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: And what it said about --
MR MACLEAN: Let me - - yes. Let's look at -- is it
paragraph 109?
MR JUSTICE ROTH: I think EE came a bit later, didn't it?
MR MACLEAN: Yes. I mean, if one looks at the EE defence,
at paragraph 62c, which is at \(\{A / 3 / 21\}\), so it's
paragraph 62c.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes. The market conditions were not the
same as they had been in --
MR MACLEAN: Exactly:

Then Vodafone, perhaps if one looks at that,
\(\{\mathrm{A} / 6 / 17\}\).
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Just a moment. (Pause).
Yes. And then you want to go to --
MR MACLEAN: To Vodafone, which is \(\{\mathrm{A} / 6 / 17\}\).
Paragraph 31.4, if we can get that up in the Vodafone
defence, please \(\{A / 6 / 17\}\). (Pause).
So there your Lordship sees a fairly lengthy and
detailed riposte to the notion that earlier experience was relevant. And it says that the analysis -- or an analysis is wholly deficient. (Pause).
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes. So there's a specific issue as to whether the change in the circumstances of the market, and there clearly was change, that's obvious, between 2006 to 2009, and I suppose 2013 to 2014, set out by the defendants such that the experience of what happened in 2006 to 2009, that you refer to at paragraph 37, was not relevant.
MR MACLEAN: Yes, or was material.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Or not --
MR MACLEAN: Not material.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Not material, yes.
MR MACLEAN: Absolutely.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: So that's ...
MR MACLEAN: Those are a range of issues which, in my respectful submission, we say expert evidence is necessary to resolve.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes.
MR MACLEAN: And even if it were not necessary, as a matter of fairness from the perspective of my client, they ought to have the benefit of putting a report which establishes a factual -- establishes a case, which supports the pleaded case, through expert evidence.

But I mean, suppose, my Lord, that I'm
cross-examining one of O2's witnesses -- take O 2 , for example -- to the effect that the contemporaneous documents -- and O 2 may be a bad example because O 2 has destroyed a lot of documents -- but suppose I'm
cross-examining O2 and the witness says, "Well, the
failed experiment had no real relevance to this",
because the circumstances had changed dramatically between 2006 and 2009, so it was no longer relevant. We want to explore, my Lord, whether the changes were significant and material to the decision to cease supplies. What am I supposed to do when the witness says, "Ah, well, we didn't have any regard to it or we didn't think it was relevant for the following reasons"? How am I to challenge the reasons which are given, unless I have some basis in an expert report?

So as I came to the end of the trial and we've done very well with the witnesses and your Lordship didn't think that the witness had done very well, nevertheless one can anticipate the submission that can be made by my learned friends: well, that's all fine and dandy, but where is the evidential foundation for what Mr MacLean says in this pleaded case? And the evidential
foundation will be in the expert --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: No, I understand that, that specific point
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes.
MR MACLEAN: Deutsche's defence, paragraph 32(a), which is at bundle \(\{A / 4 / 16\}\).
"It is denied that, in the absence of any unlawful conduct by the Defendants, the risk of termination of dealings with P4U was 'very small'."
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Just a moment.
MR MACLEAN: Sorry, my Lord. This is Deutsche's defence, paragraph 32(a). So this is a response to the pleading in relation to what we've been looking at:
"It is denied that, in the absence of any unlawful conduct by the Defendants, the risk of termination of dealings with P4U was 'very small'. There are obvious circumstances where such terminations may well make sense as a unilateral matter ... For example:
"In the UK, Three has long since terminated dealings with indirect distribution."

So that's said to demonstrate that our case as to irrationality is not right.

And then if we look at our reply, my Lord, to Deutsche's defence, which is in our reply in bundle \(\{A / 9 / 4\}\) at paragraph 12 .

\section*{MR JUSTICE ROTH: \{A/9/4\}?}

MR MACLEAN: If we could have that up on the screen, so -MR JUSTICE ROTH: Paragraph 12.
MR MACLEAN: We say, this is our reply:
"It is admitted that Three exited indirect retail ... including by ceasing to supply ... Three was in a materially different position from EE, such that its conduct does not shed light on the incentives that applied to EE (or the other defendant MNOs) in the relevant period."

And we go to identify a number of features of EE. For example, they had a much smaller market share. At the time of its decision to cease supplies, its share was \(9 \%\). It made only a small proportion of its sales through indirect retailers, compared to an average at the time of \(44 \%\) for the other defendants. It didn't have sufficient infrastructural capacity, etc, etc.

So how are we supposed to, in my submission, deal with this satisfactorily and fairly at trial, unless we have expert evidence which supports this? (Pause).

Now, my Lord, there are other issues which we've identified, pleaded issues which we've identified in our skeleton argument at paragraph 81, which we say call for expert evidence as a matter of necessity. And even if we're wrong about that, they would be helpful, in order
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for these issues to be dealt with at trial . For example, in our skeleton argument, paragraph 81(g).
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes, the downward to pressure on price.
MR MACLEAN: Yes. Now, that is not agreed between the parties, but it's relevant as an incentive, which we were seeking to identify, at contributing to the MNOs' desire to effect what is euphemistically referred to in the documents as "market repair". And so the economic incentive to market repair is in issue between the parties and, in my submission, requires or at least allows for the admission or the adducing of expert evidence.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes.
MR MACLEAN: And if your Lordship goes back in paragraph 81, you will see, to an extent, that I've already dealt with those subparagraphs in addressing your Lordship. 2006 to 2009 is the failed experiment.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Just a moment. Let me -- that is said to be about paragraphs 3 (d) and 27 and 28.
MR MACLEAN: Oh, sorry, your Lordship is looking for the pleading reference?
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes. (Pause).
So it's really 27(a) and 27(b)?
MR MACLEAN: Yes.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Effect of intermediaries on price
competition. Yes
MR MACLEAN: If your Lordship reads through all of these points, under subparagraph 81, I do submit that these are issues which arise in the pleadings which do require expert evidence. Take, for example, subparagraph (e), where we say that an important incentive to stay with Phones 4u --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Well, I think we've covered that, haven't we? That's the saturated --
MR MACLEAN: Yes.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: And that's in the paragraphs we've been looking at, isn't it? It's in 124 and ... (Pause).
MR MACLEAN: Well, the attractiveness -- the out-performance of Phones 4 u in attracting other customers in fact appears at paragraph 36 , which is anterior to the paragraphs that your Lordship was looking at, at 37, 38 and 39. It's another fact ...
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Paragraph ... (Pause).
MR MACLEAN: Yes. And then the attractiveness of Phones \(4 u\) to the younger customers is one of the factors which is referred to back in paragraph 128(a), when your Lordship gets to those paragraphs, 124 through 129.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes. It's 12 -- that's what I had in mind, 128(a) and it goes with 36.
MR MACLEAN: Yes.

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\section*{MR JUSTICE ROTH: So it goes to the calculations(?).} MR MACLEAN: It does. (Pause).

And, finally, before I anticipate your Lordship may wish to rise, perhaps your Lordship would look at paragraph 81(h), where one of the allegations that is made is that Phones 4 u wasn't a viable business, or wouldn't be a viable business, if one of the MNOs left.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: 81(h) in the?
MR MACLEAN: In the skeleton, my Lord.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: In the skeleton.
MR MACLEAN: Now, these are issues which obviously are raised by the defendants, which remain in issue, but it 's relevant to the question of: in the market circumstances, what are the incentives, operating on these MNOs to retain or get rid of Phones 4u? And they say: well, if, in those circumstances, one MNO left, you wouldn't have a viable business. And your Lordship sees --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: That's a rather different question that looks at your client and whether it could operate with only one MNO.
MR MACLEAN: Well --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: So that's a quite different issue, isn't it? Just focusing on you.
MR MACLEAN: Yes. I mean, this --
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MR JUSTICE ROTH: That's not neatly covered by your
MR MACLEAN: Well, it is.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Is it?
MR MACLEAN: It is covered in the incentives.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Well, is it? Yes, but the question --
unless, do you accept that it wouldn't have a viable
business, if it's supplied by only one?
MR MACLEAN: Certainly not.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: No. So, I mean, that's a matter that
would have to be explored, looking at your commercial
operation.
MR MACLEAN: Not just our commercial operation. It raises
a broader question as to what -- consumers in the
market, who buy these phones, what is the importance to
them of being able to choose between different MNOs in
an indirect retailer.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes, but all I'm saying is that the
pleading here is, they concede that it would no longer
be a credible operator in those circumstances. And
whether that's a rational view is a separate question.
Could you operate --
MR MACLEAN: Sorry, my Lord?
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- with only one MNO?
MR MACLEAN: They certainly assert that, and they may assert

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that they believe that. But we don't accept they're right about that. But they are seeking to put that forward as an explanation, as a defence to the claim that no rational MNO would leave, unless they knew what the other MNOs were going to do, they seek to put that forward as part of their defence.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes, but looking at your questions, that is not covered at all.
MR MACLEAN: Well - -
MR JUSTICE ROTH: It is an entirely different area of enquiry, whether Phones 4 u could viably operate if it was supplied by only one MNO.
MR MACLEAN: Well, it is not \(--I\) accept, it's not set out there in black and white, but we say it falls within the umbrella term "the incentives".
MR JUSTICE ROTH: No, I don't think -- forgive me. I don't think it does. You can say that if you were no longer in the market, then to what extent would that benefit the MNOs? That's quite a different question from whether, on your actual operations, it would have that effect. What you put in your question is: assuming that you would exit the market, then how would that work as -- what significance would that have?
MR MACLEAN: Well, if your Lordship looks at question 2(b), the existence or non-existence of another MNO sending
supplies to Phones 4 u , and let's assume that EE decides
to leave and it doesn't know that Vodafone is going to leave, then Phones \(4 u\) will retain the benefit of
a supply from Vodafone, unless EE knows or anticipates that Vodafone will leave.

The question then is: is the offering of Phones \(4 u\) such that another MNO, it will say inevitably and rationally: ah well, Phones 4 u , as a stand-alone business, cannot succeed or cannot survive on the basis of simply having one MNO.

So in other words, if EE says: we'll leave independently, the defendants are saying that the market position -- so it's looking at the market position of Phones 4 u , the market position -- wouldn't be credible. Well, that's a matter which we are entitled to explore, in my submission, through expert evidence.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: But the matter being what, precisely? Whether Phones 4 u would be credible?
MR MACLEAN: Yes. So it's a market perception; the perception in the market. It's not our internal finances that we're looking at here.

One of the considerations would be: well, what role would MVNOs, these are the virtual mobile operators, have to the perception in the market, as to the viability or credibility of Phones \(4 u\) ? It doesn't

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depend on examining Phones 4u's internal finances.
That's not the point.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: I don't quite see where --
MR MACLEAN: It is a perception question.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: The market perception is a question of economic expertise.
MR MACLEAN: Well, first of all, you have got to examine what the state of the market was and what the perception of the market would be, in the event that these MNOs perceived that there was only one supplier. How is its position in the market affected, in the event that it only has one supplier?

It is, to an extent, connected to the issue of network agnosticism which I've already been running the houses on.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: I'm not persuaded on that, but I think it 's time we'd better take a break perhaps, and you can say something more about that briefly after the short adjournment and I will come back at 2.05 .
MR MACLEAN: Right.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: And then how much more do you have on this point? Because obviously we started at 11 and we have a lot of defendants.
MR MACLEAN: Maximum half an hour.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes. I've got your basic point on the
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credibly believe their model, save on the assumption
that Phone \(4 \mathrm{u}--\)
MR MACLEAN: Yes.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- that's okay, Phones 4 u will exit the market --
MR MACLEAN: Yes, that's right.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- so that is why you've got to support
what you say here --
MR MACLEAN: Yes.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- in your own pleading.
MR MACLEAN: Exactly.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Well, I hope that gives you all some indication of the way my mind is working at the moment. Right. 2.05.
(1.11 pm)
(The short adjournment)
(2.05 pm)
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes, Mr MacLean.
MR MACLEAN: My Lord, in the light of your Lordship's indications before the adjournment, there are two points that I wish to make as relatively briefly as I can. And the first relates to the form of the questions. And I preface this, this is an assumption that your Lordship is persuaded that some expert evidence is necessary or would be helpful in relation to the issue. And your
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principles. I've said that I am concerned about the nature of the questions that are put out.

And I'm looking at a more focused question of expert evidence, looking at these particular issues on the pleadings; and I'm not sure, at the moment -particularly having regard to timing, which does concern me - - that it should be something that we should be scrutinising, in an expert report, the modelling that's actually done by the defendants. The expert can help you understand that modelling and there may be some questions you want to put by way of cross-examination, but I think the expert evidence that, it 's going through my mind, if that assists you and assists the defendants, may be helpful or potentially necessary, is to support and make good, as you would wish, the assertions that you put in the pleading about the market and about the necessary number of retentions and likely level of retentions, and so on.
MR MACLEAN: My Lord, yes.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: And that's effectively your own modelling that you've done, to some extent.
MR MACLEAN: To some extent. But I mean, ultimately, the defendants say what matters is their modelling.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Well, no. I know they say that. But you say that if this is the right model, then they can

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MR JUSTICE ROTH: Can I ask, will this affect the documents as well, or is it just the transcript? Well, maybe we should -- while you are attempting to sort that out, maybe we should press on. We've got a transcriber, so it 's just those ...
MR MACLEAN: As your Lordship pleases. I'm happy to press on.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: I think perhaps we should.
MR MACLEAN: Absolutely.
So the point I'm making is that, insofar as your Lordship considers that the questions are too broad, they can be narrowed.

## MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes.

MR MACLEAN: And that process of narrowing the questions ought not to take too long, and we, subject to obviously your Lordship concluding that expert evidence should be given, and subject to any steer that your Lordship may give to the parties, we would obviously proceed to get such reformulation before the other side by, say, Friday. And then your Lordship would obviously consider within what period of time any objection should be taken to the reformulation, and that would obviously be a short period of time.

Now, if your Lordship were persuaded that the reformulation is appropriate, in order to encapsulate

MR JUSTICE ROTH: If I am persuaded, and I haven't obviously --
MR MACLEAN: No, I understand that, of course.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- heard the defendants, so I haven't decided, but if what I have in mind is to deliver a short judgment setting out the specific --
MR MACLEAN: I see. Okay. Fine.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- issues on which it can and cannot be admitted --
MR MACLEAN: Then that solves --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- it won't actually put necessarily all (?) the questions, but you can then very rapidly --
MR MACLEAN: (Overspeaking) Yes, that solves the issue of us having to produce something by Friday. So that's the first point I wanted to make to your Lordship.

The second point is this, and it relates to the question of the modelling relied on by the other side to show --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes.
MR MACLEAN: -- which your Lordship, as I understand from what your Lordship said to me, is not attracted to the idea that we should have expert evidence which analyses
the modelling. But let me make a number of brief
further submissions in relation to that.
First of all, we say it puts the claimants at a position of considerable difficulty and unfairness potentially at trial, if we do not have an evidential foundation to explain to the court what the assumptions are underlying the model on which the claimants rely and, my Lord, underlying the models on which they do not rely.

And the reason that that is important, my Lord, I wonder if I could show your Lordship a passage from our proposed amended pleading, which your Lordship hasn't yet given permission for, but which, as I say, the only substantial objection being taken to that pleading is by Mr O'Donoghue, and that is at bundle $\{B / 3 / 46\}$. I don't know if your Lordship has the proposed amended --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: I've now got it here.
MR MACLEAN: You've got it, fantastic. $\{B / 3 / 46\}$, subparagraph 68L:
"The knowledge and/or expectation was the context for a sharp change in EE's thinking regarding [Phones 4u]. On 10 April ... EE's analysis showed that discontinuing EE's relationship with P4U would cost EE $£ 58$ million in EBITDA (per annum). By 16 May 2014, EE
had produced a new analysis, which showed that discontinuing EE's relationship with P4U would have a positive effect on EE's EBITDA, in the amount of $£ 202$ million over the period from 2015-2019. One component of this new analysis was that 'indirect retail consolidation' would ' facilitate handset cost efficiencies '. It is to be inferred that this new analysis, which culminated in a recommendation that EE should discontinue its relationship with P4U, was informed and/or influenced by the communications with Vodafone UK and/or Vodafone Group pleaded above."

Now, as I say, EE doesn't rely on the anterior analysis in April. But we say it is very surprising, in the absence of something inappropriate occurring, the analysis would switch from discontinuing a relationship from Phones 4 u , costing $£ 58$ million per annum, switching within a matter of weeks to producing a positive EBITDA of over $£ 202$ million.

Now, we want to be able to produce evidence to the court which analyses and explains the assumptions which lie behind that, and that is not something that we can do without the benefit of expert evidence.

And we are not envisaging an exercise which goes beyond that. We want to be able to tell the court: these are the assumptions which lie behind this.

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Now, the significance of those assumptions may be a matter for further debate; but we at least want to have before the court the evidence that these were the changes in the assumptions; and that is a concrete example of the sort of thing that we say we need expert evidence in order to achieve. Now --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Can I just try and understand this? You will obviously be asking about that in
cross-examination.
MR MACLEAN: Yes.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Maybe by a request for further information of what is meant by "indirect retail consolidation",
etc. So you can explore what EE says on the
assumptions, from how the change came about.
MR MACLEAN: Yes.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Now, what is the expert opinion involved in doing that?
MR MACLEAN: Well, the expert will identify -- your Lordship, I anticipate, is suggesting that we would ask questions of the defendants; and they would cooperate, in answering those questions, as to the basis of the assumptions underlying the models. That is what I assume lies behind your Lordship's suggestion.

Now, that is one way in which this could be achieved.

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MR JUSTICE ROTH: Well, they could be ordered to answer the
        questions.
MR MACLEAN: Yes, they could be ordered to answer the
        questions if they failed to cooperate. The history
        suggests that it may take time in order to get this to
        fruition, not least because of the blanket approach
        which has been taken in relation to the expert evidence,
        and not least because the modelling has only been coming
        out in dribs and drabs.
MS JOHN: My Lord, I have to interrupt here. We have never
        been asked any questions about our modelling and, as
        Mr MacLean said, they have had our models since
        March 2020. So I have to just interrupt to make that
        clarification .
MR JUSTICE ROTH: I assume they have had this for a while,
        because it is in the pleading that was prepared in
        August.
MS JOHN: Exactly.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: So insofar as you don't understand it, but
    you want to look at the assumptions behind it, you want
    to say that that assumption cannot support this switch
    when properly analysed, when properly calculated. As
    a matter of scrutiny, it may be that that is something
    that you need expert assistance on, which is a rather
    narrow point, and I can see that possibility. questions if they failed to cooperate. The history suggests that it may take time in order to get this to fruition, not least because of the blanket approach which has been taken in relation to the expert evidence, out in dribs and drabs.
MS JOHN: My Lord, I have to interrupt here. We have never been asked any questions about our modelling and, as Mr MacLean said, they have had our models since March 2020. So I have to just interrupt to make that clarification.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: I assume they have had this for a while, because it is in the pleading that was prepared in August.
MS JOHN: Exactly.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: So insofar as you don't understand it, but you want to look at the assumptions behind it, you want to say that that assumption cannot support this switch when properly analysed, when properly calculated. As a matter of scrutiny, it may be that that is something at you need expert assistance on, which is a rather narrow point, and I can see that possibility .
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MR MACLEAN: One of the points I'm making, my Lord, with
    reference to paragraph 68L, is the fact that it must be
    the case that there had been a change in the assumptions
    underlying the projections between April and May, and we
    also wish to understand why those changes happened,
    whether those changes were referable to market
    conditions or whether they were referable to something
    more sinister.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes, but the first thing you do is you ask
    EE.
MR MACLEAN: Yes. Suppose, my Lord --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: They don't get somebody outside
    hypothesising. And the only question then is, for you,
    whether the new assumptions actually can support, on the
    figures, a change of that magnitude.
MR MACLEAN: Yes.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: And that is a matter of analysis, and it
    may be, as I understand it, Mr Thomas is an accountant,
    as well as an economist.
MR MACLEAN: Yes, he is.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: That that would involve looking at the way
    the figures work and that specific point. I'm not sure
    you have reached that stage yet, because you haven't
    asked the question. But just to take the two models and
    then say to an expert to try and work out what the
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assumptions must have been, surely the first step is to ask what EE says the assumptions were.
MR MACLEAN: Right. Let's assume, my Lord, that that is the course which we adopt, and let's assume that they either don't answer them or they don't answer them satisfactorily, then we would need a mechanism to compel them to answer those questions or, alternatively, produce evidence to make clear to the court what we say the factual position or the underlying position was.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: I mean, it's something you could have done, as Ms John points out, a while ago. As we are now close to witness statements, as I think this is not objected to by EE, this amendment --
MR MACLEAN: No, it's not.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- presumably EE will then address it in
their witness statements, because it's a fairly obvious point, so one would expect that, in short order, you will get an explanation. If it's not addressed in the witness statement, no doubt that would attract comment. So maybe at this stage, that's no longer necessary to serve the request for further information. All I'm saying is that you could have done that a while ago.
MR MACLEAN: Well, that's certainly not the case in relation -- the criticism can't be made in relation to a number of the iterations of the model and the

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documents which have been disclosed within the last
number of weeks. You can't ask -- sensibly ask questions about what the underlying assumptions were if you haven't been given the documents.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: But this one, you have.
MR MACLEAN: I mean, I am concerned that we will find ourselves in some supposed procedural bind, where it's said: oh, well, this is a pleading against me EE but Vodafone may take a different view and they may refuse to answer questions in relation to their modelling, were we to pose in the correspondence. And they would say: well, it is not an interrogatory, it's not a request for further information, it's not on the pleadings, what do we do about that? What rule do we apply under? Do the court's management powers extend to compelling them to answer questions of that nature?

To avoid and obviate the necessity of these procedural wranglings, and this case is not free of procedural wranglings, we submit that the appropriate way is to give permission for Mr Thomas to produce a report stating what he says the underlying assumptions are in these various models, and we do submit that that is necessary and it is a matter which he should be entitled to opine on.

My Lord, I have made the points on that score and
they don't rely?
MR MACLEAN: Well, here the relevance is to show that they
have changed dramatically in a period of weeks. It was
loss-making, 58 million per annum, and suddenly,
a matter of weeks later, it was $£ 202$ million --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes, well, I understand in this case, but
that's about the model on which they do rely, in the
light of the previous model. Well, I think we have
explored that.
MR MACLEAN: The last point I want to make about this is
that the terms of identifying the underlying assumptions
will not require a significant amount of expenditure, in
terms of work or analysis. Nor will it, from the
perspective of the defendants, who themselves don't need
the same amount of assistance that we do, because they
unless your Lordship wants me to repeat it, that is what I propose to say about that. (Pause).
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Why do you say that the Part 18 request cannot seek information of what are the assumptions about the development of the market underlying this model?
MR MACLEAN: Why do I say that Part 18 isn't -- are we talking about EE at the moment?
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes.
MR MACLEAN: Part 18 would allow -- well, that's our pleading, so we're not asking --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: As I understand it, they've all relied on their modelling in their pleading.
MR MACLEAN: Yes, they are relying on them.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: It is quite broad --
MR MACLEAN: It is.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- for further information. It replaced the interrogatories.
MR MACLEAN: It is a broad power. What about -- forgive me, my Lord. What about, I ask rhetorically, the models on which they do not rely? Now, your Lordship may say, well, they are going to have to respond to that. I don't know. Maybe they will, maybe they won't. All I'm concerned to ensure is that we don't find ourselves not able to advance a positive case because we haven't

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had the benefit of Mr Thomas' report stating it in black
and white so we can all see what it is underlies, in his opinion, these models.

Now, if all the defendants are going to tell your Lordship, "We will answer any questions that the defendants raise as to the assumptions which underlie the models on which we rely and the models on which we don't rely, and we'll submit an order to that effect", then fine, but I don't imagine they will. they don't rely?
MR MACLEAN: Well, here the relevance is to show that they have changed dramatically in a period of weeks. It was a matter of
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes, well, I understand in this case, but that's about the model on which they do rely, in the light of the previous model. Well, I think we have MR MACLEAN: The last point I want to make about this is that the terms of identifying the underlying assumptions will not require a significant amount of expenditure, in terms of work or analysis. Nor will it, from the the same amount of assistance that we do, because they
must know what evidence underlies their analysis, so we are the ones who are in the dark, not them. (Pause).

My Lord, those are my submissions unless I can assist you further at this stage.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Thank you. There is, of course, a lot of duplication in the defendants' skeleton argument on this point and it affects you all, so I hope you've agreed between you that one advocate, as it were, take the lead for all if any supplementary points.
MR McQUATER: My Lord, happily we've agreed that the sequence certainly that I should go first, take the lead on this application, my Lord, and that other defendants will come in a sequence agreed. It is Tef, then EE, then Orange, then DT. But picking up points -- any additional points as points that are specific to them.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes, but only additional points, not - -
MR McQUATER: And they will be defendant-specific points as well, my Lord, and it may be that if I've missed something, one of my colleagues will very kindly bring that up as well.

> Submissions by MR McQUATER

MR McQUATER: Your Lordship's very helpful indication, as I think before lunch and the way the argument has gone, my Lord, has enabled us, I think, to streamline our submissions, if I can say so.

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Your Lordship already had, and rightly, expressed concerns about the questions and the way the questions were framed in this application. And there has been a distinct lack of clarity on the application and the scope of the exercise envisaged by those questions, and what it is intended that the experts should actually do in this case. And that lack of clarity has come from, first of all, the formulation of the questions themselves and the mismatch with the explanation we were given in Greeno 6 and Greeno 8, as to what Phones 4u considered the experts should be doing.

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\text { And then the skeleton }--
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MR JUSTICE ROTH: A mismatch between Greeno 6 and Greeno 8?
MR McQUATER: Yes. A mismatch between the formulation of the questions themselves, Mr Greeno's explanations of what he considered the experts should do, and then the skeleton itself from Phones 4 u last Thursday evening, which took the exercise in a different direction again, and took it off to certain specific identified issues in the pleadings.

And similarly, my Lord, the purported justification for expert evidence has moved around between Greeno 6, Greeno 8, which we got on Thursday evening, and the skeleton which we got, I think, on Friday, which was different even from Greeno 8 which you'd had on Thursday
evening. And so determining what the justification for this application is has been like trying to nail treacle to the wall.

There are, in addition, as your Lordship has already observed, serious issues with the timetable. Those are largely of Phones 4 u 's making, which I will come to, if necessary. But there are serious issues which makes one question whether an expert timetable is workable at all, but particularly if one is going to get involved in a granular detailed modelling evaluation, looking at the respective MNOs' models, critiquing them, producing rival models, having the MNO experts have a counter case on that.

And I observe, my Lord, that if expert evidence -there is to be any expert evidence in this case, given the limited time there is available for trial and the burden that is already on the parties, then there is absolutely no room for ships in the night scenario. And it is to be -- it would have to be very clear what the exercise was and there would have to be clarity, not only as to the scope of that exercise, but also the materials to be relied on.

And, my Lord, we have none of that. In fact, what we have is Phones 4 u and Mr MacLean effectively saying, "Can I reformulate my questions again by Friday?" So 81
there has been an utter lack of satisfactory thought and clarity about this application.

As to the $--I$ won't dwell on this, because I think your Lordship has the point and some of this may be water under the bridge, but as to the scope of the exercise that has been envisaged, just in summary, very short summary, my Lord.

First of all, in the questions themselves, those seemed to invite an abstract and rather generalised economic discussion which could -- which immediately to our mind gave rise to the risk of a wide-ranging and, by the look of it, costly exercise which was going to become a major distraction with little or no assistance to the court.

We then, in Greeno 6, at 31.2, had a rather different scope. It didn't seem to bear relation to the questions, where it was said that the expert was going to engage in detailed modelling and evaluation of the MNOs' analysis and their assumptions. So it didn't really remotely, to our mind, correspond with the formulation in the application.

And then when we get to the skeleton that was served on us, and paragraph 81 of that skeleton, which is at $\{G / 1 / 20\}$, it starts at the foot of the page and over through to page $\{G / 1 / 22\}$, on which there was some focus
this morning, one gets the case put -- the scope put somewhat differently again, because we then see focus on a number of specific and, Phones $4 u$ says, pleaded issues around the indirect market. And that's really the exercise that your Lordship has come to focus on in this application is to the extent to which there are specific pleaded issues as to which some form of expert evidence, not in the terms of questions 1 to 3 , but some form of expert evidence might be justified. And I will come to that.

But, my Lord, it's pretty unsatisfactory that Phones 4 u has served two witness statements in support of this application, one as late as Thursday evening, neither of which bears any resemblance to the paragraph 81 points that are now pursued. So what we are -- essentially is happening is that we are dealing with a new application, with a very different definition and scope. And, of course, had we had an application, a focused application, identifying specific pleaded issues on which objective market or economic evidence was sought, then one would have engaged in a rather different way, and we would have taken those issues identified in paragraph 81 and considered very carefully exactly the extent to which those were really in dispute, and so forth.

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But those matters, and I think your Lordship has the point, were never previously put as the target of this expert evidence.

Now, just to deal -- and before I come to what has now really become the crux of the matter, which is some of these specific pleaded issues, but before I come to that, I mean, there was some comment about our focus on collusion and the collusion issue in the debate this morning.

My Lord, the reason we got so distracted about the collusion issue, and quite a lot of ink was spilled on it, was because the factual issue of collusion was the core justification given in Greeno 1, at 31.1, to support the application for expert evidence. It was said that this evidence would support inferences of fact in relation to the collusion claims. He said in terms that it would help the court to decide who was more likely to be right or wrong on those issues of fact. And that was the central way in which the application was put. It was that it was not really surprising in those circumstances that we engaged with that and said well, actually, collusion is an issue of fact and we don't agree that evidence would be either necessary, on an issue of fact, not opinion, expert evidence would be necessary on an issue of fact, not opinion, and in any
event, if you were to be going down that route, which it seems they are not because that didn't feature in Mr MacLean's presentation this morning, but if you were
to be going down that route, at a minimum you would have
to focus on the actual decisions of the MNOs and apply a rationality standard, and you don't even do that in your questions.

So that was how that particular line evolved. It was really because that's how the application was put. And we -- and your Lordship has the point that insofar as it were to be based on -- put on a basis that this is all about inferences that can support the collusion case, in the end a question of fact, not necessarily. Would it assist the court? No, especially if you are not even focused on the actual reasons, and you're not even focused on a standard of rationality, and so on.

So that is really the --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: As I understood it, but I have the disadvantage that, for reasons I explained at the outset, I haven't read Mr Greeno's sixth witness statement, but the whole case of the claimants, the ultimate question is collusion. If they can actually show on the factual direct evidence that there were conversations and exchanges and emails, then -- which you will deny -- then this may not be necessary at all.

But insofar as they can't, they do rely and plead quite heavily on various inferences --
MR McQUATER: Yes.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- and I think what they are saying is
that the inferences are supported by fact, whether the
court should draw such an inference or not.
MR McQUATER: Exactly.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: You say it shouldn't draw such an inference. And they say, well, it's relevant to whether an inference can be drawn as to whether an MNO would rationally take this action without collusion.

So that's how it fits together, as I understand it.
MR McQUATER: Well, that was the argument, and --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: And I think that's why it's relevant, so it goes to whether it's appropriate or not to draw such inferences.
MR McQUATER: Well, it may be that if one were to get permission for some of the pleaded issues, the outcome of those pleaded issues might be said to help with inferences.

## MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes, quite.

MR McQUATER: But what it doesn't justify is the wide-ranging expert foray into all the matters that might have come within the compass of questions 1 to 3 , to then try and say, "Well, I can draw this inference
from -- based on this inference and" --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes, I see that and, as I indicated to Mr MacLean, I wasn't attracted by those questions, both because of the wide-ranging nature of the enquiry and even if at some point that might have been less of a concern, it is more of a concern because, as you rightly pointed out, we are now in a fairly tight -- by "we", I mean all of you, are under a fairly tight time frame.
MR McQUATER: Absolutely, and there is already a lot to do, never mind the burden of the expert evidence. And when we do come to discuss the timetable, which may be tomorrow now, but when we do come to discuss it, I think your Lordship will see exactly how there was really no flexibility in the time that we have remaining in the timetable. There really isn't. So if we are going to embark on any expert evidence exercise, it has to be very closely defined and it can't, in our submission, encompass large, granular, detailed modelling exercises, because that just isn't, in our submission, feasible in the time frame available, particularly -- Phones $4 u$ might think it's feasible. If their expert is working on models for many months, they might think it's feasible, but it is certainly not feasible as far as our side is concerned. We've got a standing start when we

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see their expert report as to what we are aiming at that's certainly not feasible.

To move, my Lord, to the paragraph 81 issues, if I can call them that, that is the specific pleaded issues that Phones 4 u has now lighted on as being effectively the basis of their remaining application.

I have made the point. This is a very different application to questions 1 to 3 and Greeno 6 and Greeno 8. And when your Lordship does have access to the documents and is able to look at those witness statements, your Lordship will see exactly what I mean, because there is not a hint in those witness statements that the application was going to be put on this narrow and rather different basis.

So the first point to make is that, of course, these pleaded issues could not possibly justify the wide-ranging report that seems to have been the intention in this case.

Now, I said it's not helpful that we were effectively led to believe the target for this application was something different, so that meant that there hasn't been, perhaps, the sharp focus that there could otherwise have been on the extent to which expert evidence might be necessary on these rather narrower issues, some of them market issues.

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So having received the skeleton on Friday, we did look to see the extent to which some of these issues identified in 81(a) to (h) are seriously in dispute.
I mean, I' ll deal -- I'll take the 2006 to 2009 question in (a) separately because that gives rise to -that's been the subject of a separate argument.
But insofar as the others are concerned, just to take a few of them.
81(c), the network agnostic point. That doesn't really seem to be in serious dispute. I mean, phones \(4 u\) 's business was essentially that they were able to offer a one-stop comparison shop between network deals, so it's hard to think that it 's going to be ferociously disputed as a general proposition.
So far as 81 --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Let me just -- this is in the skeleton?
MR McQUATER: 81. Yes, I'm in the skeleton at page 21, my Lord. And that is the network agnostic point.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes. What's said, and I haven't chased it through the footnote, is that the defendants, to varying degrees, deny or don't admit this point.
MR McQUATER: Yes, there are some non-admissions.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: So when you say it's not seriously in dispute, you mean if that's the position, Phones \(4 u\) has to prove it.
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MR McQUATER: Well, yes, although --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: And you say, well, that's something where expert evidence about the nature of competition and the nature of consumer preference in the market is relevant.
MR McQUATER: No, I see that argument, my Lord.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: If you now admit it, then one doesn't need it.
MR McQUATER: Well, it's not admitted. We don't admit this on the pleading --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Some people apparently -- we can chase through all the references but I don't want to take time with that and nor do you, so that's --
MR McQUATER: Well, that's --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: I mean, it can be clarified subsequently in correspondence, and I'm sure everyone would be happy, not least the claimants, if it's said, well, no, you don't need your expert to address that because that's accepted.
MR McQUATER: I take the point that admissions could be made and it's possible, in the light of the discussion that has been had, that a fresh -- there would be a fresh impetus to scrutinise some of these points very carefully to see what role they play in this case to see if dispute -- any dispute remaining can be narrowed. But even if there is a dispute on the pleadings,
a non-admission on the pleadings, that doesn't necessarily mean, and I will come to this, that evidence on each of them is necessary. And if it comes to a question of: well, would it assist and is it reasonably required? Then the question of its peripheral importance or the fact that there might not be a very serious dispute about it would become relevant.

Now - - and on necessary, my Lord, I do pause to suggest that necessity must be a pretty high threshold, because, as we saw in the British Airways v Spencer case, if you get over the necessity test, all proportionality is out of the window. So necessity really has to be quite a high test. And in this case, it won't have escaped your Lordship's attention that there inevitably will be, among the witnesses, many people with lots of market expertise in the indirect market, and indeed there were quite a number of senior people who were actually you running Phones $4 u$, because quite a lot of these points are about Phones $4 u^{\prime}$ own business. So you will have Mr Whiting, chief executive throughout the relevant period. If you haven't got Mr Whiting, I don't know what we are all doing here, because he's the author of the controversial January 2014 email.

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We know they've got Mr Kassler, he's in the confidentiality ring, who was the subsequent CEO. And we know that, in their case management information sheet, Phones 4 u have said they've got at least eight witnesses. And, of course, one will have market witnesses from all the other MNOs as well.

So it's not as though the court will be without evidence in these areas. It will have evidence and it will have the disclosure as well. So if one was addressing a necessity test, is expert evidence indispensable to a decision on these issues, the answer, in our submission, is, no, it's not, it's not necessary.

You then get on to whether we think it would be helpful and is it reasonably required, which will draw in some further matters, which I will come to.

But I was on the question of network agnostic. Just to give you -- I won't dwell on this, because your Lordship will probably come back with the same answer on most of these, which is to say: well, you haven't admitted it.

But insofar as $81(\mathrm{~d})$ is concerned, the market saturation, which was debated to some degree this morning, I mean, we have admitted that most consumers in the UK had a network-connected mobile phone, so that's not in dispute. There seems to be, when I trace through
the pleadings, a bit of a debate with Tef about what
"saturated" means, but that's what it comes to, so
I can't imagine it will be a point of huge controversy in this case.

And if we take the (g) -- the example in (g) over the page, page $22\{\mathrm{G} / 1 / 22\}$, which is that retail intermediaries put downward pressure on pricing, well, that's something we do admit, actually. Not an astounding proposition that if you have a competitor it may put downward pressure on your pricing.

So in some of these, you -- it looks as though, even on the pleadings as they stand today, there may not be a huge amount of dispute.

That is not true on all of them, but coming to the question of: well, is expert evidence necessary on these issues? I have touched on this a moment ago. But my Lord, the -- four of them relate directly to Phones 4u's own business. By that, I mean 81(c), the network agnostic point. In 81(e), the youth market price. 81(f), the fraud point, and the per customer profitability point, which may --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Can you -- because I don't have a transcript -- just give me those references again?

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MR McQUATER: Yes.
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MR JUSTICE ROTH: 81?
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MR McQUATER: I'm going by Phones 4u's skeleton --
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MR McQUATER: I'm going by Phones 4u's skeleton --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes.
MR McQUATER: - - and 81(c) was the first one, the market
MR McQUATER: - - and 81(c) was the first one, the market
agnostic point.
agnostic point.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes.
MR McQUATER: 81(e), the youth market point.
MR McQUATER: 81(e), the youth market point.
81(f), which is the customer fraud and per customer
81(f), which is the customer fraud and per customer
profitability point. That also brings in the Dixons
profitability point. That also brings in the Dixons
merger, which would be a question of how the Dixons
merger, which would be a question of how the Dixons
merger was likely to affect Phones 4u's business.
merger was likely to affect Phones 4u's business.
The last of the points that I was going to say --
The last of the points that I was going to say --
suggest to your Lordship were related directly to
suggest to your Lordship were related directly to
Phones 4u's own business. It is point (h), which is the
Phones 4u's own business. It is point (h), which is the
point about whether it could survive, with one MNO only.
point about whether it could survive, with one MNO only.
Now, effectively what has been said to you is that,
Now, effectively what has been said to you is that,
"Phones 4u would please like an expert to tell us all
"Phones 4u would please like an expert to tell us all
about our own market, and tell us all about our own
about our own market, and tell us all about our own
finances", and so forth, which doesn't seem to me to be
finances", and so forth, which doesn't seem to me to be
very --
very --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes. Well, I've said to Mr MacLean
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes. Well, I've said to Mr MacLean
I don't think they should on any view have an expert as
I don't think they should on any view have an expert as
to whether in the hypothetical of Phones 4u having only
to whether in the hypothetical of Phones 4u having only
one MNO it could maintain a commercial business, which
one MNO it could maintain a commercial business, which
is a factual enquiry looking at Phones 4u from the
is a factual enquiry looking at Phones 4u from the
access to funds, and so on, so the balance sheet, the

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        access to funds, and so on, so the balance sheet, the
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P\&L. I don't think that's appropriate or indeed necessarily relevant.

What may be relevant is market perception. That, I don't think, is something for an economic expert.
MR McQUATER: Yes.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: So on that one, I don't see that there should be expert evidence. I'm not being persuaded on that, you needn't address me. But that's (h),
I haven't - -
MR McQUATER: That's (h).
MR JUSTICE ROTH: That's not the other ones you are talking about.
MR McQUATER: Leaving aside for the moment, as I said, '06 to '09 for a moment. There's another three. One is 82(b), which is a dispute about Three -- the competitor Three and the fact that it disengaged with Phones 4 u , not asserted that was in any way anti-competitive. But just to identify them. (d) $--81(\mathrm{~d})$ is the saturated market point. And (g) is the intermediates and the pressure on prices. Those three remaining --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Well, let's just to test this, saturation of the market you may say there's not much issue about it, fine. But if there is an issue about it, to the extent that there is, to what extent is the market saturated? To what extent was competition for new

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customers or for switching customers at the time?
I mean, that is a classic question for an economic expert. Of course, your clients will have their view, and they put it, and the claimants or former employees of the claimant will give evidence of their view. But that's no different from a dispute about what's the relevant market where participants will give their view, it may be very relevant, but you still can benefit and indeed may need an economic expert who can look at it objectively .
MR McQUATER: Yes. My Lord, I see that, and I can't say that you couldn't in principle have useful economic evidence about that. And, indeed, if the application could be framed in a way to say, can we have some expert evidence from an economist on that specific point, we would probably have taken quite a different view to the application.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: I understand.
MR McQUATER: But I do come back -- on that individual one,
I do come back to the question of whether it actually is necessary on that fairly high threshold, given all the other evidence that your Lordship will have in the case. I'm not suggesting that you couldn't have a report that was helpful on the point, but necessary, I would
suggest, given the other evidence, not.

And then when you come to "reasonably required",
I mean, maybe another way to put it is whether, on something like that, Mr Thomas is going to be able to give your Lordship any more useful evidence than Phones 4u's witnesses themselves could give, and no doubt will give. And if you have that evidence in front of you, it may be that your Lordship would think: well, actually, it 's not necessary to have, in fact it 's not even reasonably required, given how much evidence I have. And if you do get to the question of "reasonably required", because your Lordship takes the view that it 's not strictly necessary, you've then got to ask yourself how important these issues are in the case and whether some of these issues are quite peripheral.

It doesn't apply if your Lordship takes the view that it's necessary, but if your Lordship takes the view that they might be of assistance, perhaps, of an expert, then one can look and see whether some of these issues are actually quite peripheral in the case. And proportionality considered and those matters, one could certainly -- one could decide these issues on such evidence of fact as we have.

An example of a more peripheral issue might be the dispute about Three, about this other company which

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ceased relations with Phones 4 u . I mean, that has the feel to us of something of a side dispute. It's something that could be the subject of some market evidence, to -- on the question of whether Three had the same characteristics, and so on, it could. But one gets a strong sense that that isn't actually going to play a very large role in this case.

And I think what our main fear is with these specific areas, my Lord, is that if your Lordship would be persuaded to go down this route, one needs to define very clearly what the issue is, such that it isn't inviting some wider exercise of modelling or economic analysis that becomes this sort of Trojan horse that the claimants use to get in the analysis that they obviously have in their back pocket and want Mr Thomas to give in the first place, a wide-ranging analysis bringing in all sorts of inferences from modelling and so forth, which it 's going to be impossible to deal with.

So one needs to be very clear about what one is focusing on. And if one decides that, actually, it is necessary to have a bit of evidence about Three, a bit of evidence about the saturated market, then that should be very clearly prescribed in any order that gives permission.

And what one can't do, in our submission, is simply
to pick out large passages of the pleading, the amended particulars of claim, like paragraph 124 and following and say, well, you can have permission in relation to those paragraphs, because that's just an open invitation to get involved in all sorts of economic analysis and theories that are put in those paragraphs.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Well, 124, and what's put there, is obviously based on, it 's agreeing at the market launch(?), what is the retention rate, what are the consequences of that retention rate, as opposed to a higher retention rate, that has been, since the outset, the claimant's case. So --
MR McQUATER: Yes, it has.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: So why is not a case that they can -- and it is a case based on the analysis of certain factors, regarding the MNO business, resting on a certain understanding of how the market operates -- why is that not something, then, that cannot be properly addressed and may need to be properly addressed by an expert, as opposed to a factual witness who doesn't work for an MNO, saying, "Well, that's my understanding of how I think an MNO would operate"?
MR McQUATER: My Lord, I'm not suggesting that one couldn't - - that expert evidence on that would be inadmissible, and I'm not suggesting that you couldn't

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craft a properly prescribed issue for expert evidence to go to, so far as that's concerned, because my immediate last point was simply let's not have a far-ranging permission that just refers to compendious references in the pleadings. But, yes, that is possible.

Interestingly, the 65\% NPV doesn't even feature in Phones 4u's skeleton on Friday as a justification for this application. It simply doesn't feature in Greeno 6 and Greeno 8, so it has only just raised its head as to a grounds and scope for expert evidence in this case. It's certainly evidence one could have, potentially, if properly prescribed.

Insofar as the pleading -- insofar as Vodafone is concerned, it is a bit incoherent, so far as this point is concerned, when I was following it through, because -- and this is on $\{B / 3 / 73\}$ of the draft amended APOC -- because so far as the pleading against us is concerned at (b) (iii) on that page, which is tab 3, page 73 , it's suggesting that we would have lost customers to O2. But at the time that we terminated, of course, Phones 4 u had already terminated and was gone.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: (b)?
MR McQUATER: (b)(iii) on page -- internal page 72 of the pleading, my Lord.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Is that the amended pleading?

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MR McQUATER: Yes, this is the amended pleading, my Lord. (Pause).
MR JUSTICE ROTH: 124(b)?
MR McQUATER: Sorry, 127, my Lord. So in the internal numbering, it is actually page 72 .
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes.
MR McQUATER: And it's (b)(iii). And I was observing the incoherence of the case against us that we -- so far as this is a pleading against us, that we --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: But this is not about expert evidence - -
MR McQUATER: Well, this is -- it's about the coherence of the case we are meeting. It's about that.
And as I've indicated, my Lord, I'm not saying that you couldn't, in principle, have expert evidence, and your Lordship might think it useful to have, I don't think it's necessary, given the witnesses we've got, but your Lordship might think it's useful to have. This hasn't featured so far. If it were properly prescribed in a suggested question, then we would obviously take a look at that constructively.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes.
MR McQUATER: The one -- one of the subparagraphs in 89 that I haven't addressed your Lordship on is (a), which is the 2006-2009 period, which has been the subject of a separate debate.
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[^1]have been proposed by question 3.
And so far as that is concerned, I accept -- your Lordship was shown our pleading, the Vodafone pleading at paragraph 31.4, which is back at A1, tab 6, page 17 $\{A 1 / 6 / 17\}$, where we do plead certain ways in which things have changed in the market, the SIM-only point, the expensive smartphones point, the growing e-commerce point. And I think Three was mentioned as well in that context. But I do -- even so far as this is concerned -- well, obviously if there were to be evidence in this area, which we are very sceptical about, it would have to be on market -- objective market conditions.

Now, we really do query whether Mr Thomas is an appropriate expert for that, as an economist, and whether he would add anything to what Mr Whiting and Mr Kassler, and so on, would have to say, because he is -- having looked at Mr Greeno's evidence about Mr Thomas' CV, he is an economist and an accountant, but we are really struggling to discern market expertise in the telecoms retail sector for Mr Thomas. And it may be worth just showing your Lordship a letter that was -because Mr Thomas did some work at Ofcom --

## MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes.

MR McQUATER: - - for a couple of years, from 2004 to 2006,

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and that was queried by Covingtons for the second defendant, as to what that was in the context of a possible conflict. The answer was quite revealing that came back. Which is in $--I$ believe it is in $F$, tab 45. It is a letter.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: $F / 45$ ?
MR McQUATER: $F / 45$. This should be a letter from Quinn Emanuel of 21 September this year $\{F / 45 / 1\}$. MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes, indeed.
MR McQUATER: The relevant passage is at 3 , so $\{F / 45 / 3\}$.
I'm just waiting for that one to come up $\{F / 45 / 3\}$.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: $\{F / 45 / 3\}$.
MR McQUATER: Perhaps shall I start reading it to your Lordship while we -- there we go, and it is paragraph 8.2, which perhaps to save me reading it out, your Lordship could just read that subparagraph 8.2. (Pause).
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes.
MR McQUATER: So the work that Mr Thomas seems to have done at Ofcom was really focused as being head of profession overseeing the work of the regulatory finance team, and seems to have had nothing to do with the telecoms retail sector, and they say this did not concern the retail activities of the MNOs. So as a result, we are struggling to see the utility of having Mr Thomas'

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opinion, as opposed to -- which your Lordship will have -- evidence from Mr Whiting, and so forth, and others who were directly involved in --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: I suppose if he did have an involvement in the telecoms retail, you would have objected on the grounds that he was conflicted, wouldn't you?
MR McQUATER: We didn't take the conflict point. I will leave Mr O'Donoghue to deal with that issue, but we didn't take a conflict point. But as it is, he isn't, he didn't deal with that, and so the point we can validly take is: well, what's his market expertise, then? And is his opinion worth -- or any advancement on, for example, Mr Whiting who was running Phones 4 u at the time?
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Well, he's independent.
MR McQUATER: Well, save -- but his independence, of itself, doesn't save him if he hasn't got the expertise, because his opinion --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: No, I accept that. But economists, as you know, in competition cases, they give evidence concerning a lot of different markets, they don't have industry expertise in all these markets that --
MR McQUATER: No, I understand that. I understand that the boundaries are pushed in that respect, my Lord, and I understand that they very often try to find public

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data on these things and crunch the data and give one great graphs, and so forth. But I do question the value of that over the value of people who are actually operating in the market on the relevant dates.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes.
MR McQUATER: So, yes, it's really an industry knowledge issue.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes.
MR McQUATER: And so necessary because of the other evidence? We say, no. Would it assist, in the sense that is it reasonably required for a sound decision? We say, no, for the reasons I have just mentioned.

And I should perhaps also just add this on the question of "reasonably required", evidence of -- expert evidence about 2006-2009, is that this issue has not loomed large on the pleadings, following disclosure. This goes to the question of how important or marginal an issue it is, my Lord, on a "reasonably required" test.

There's certainly the very substantial amendments put in the amended particulars of claim have introduced nothing from disclosure about this issue and the role it might have had in the decision-making process. So there's no particulars that have appeared as to any role this might have played in the actual decisions, which

I suggest in the context is quite telling that this is receding in importance. If it ever had any importance at all, that that is receding. It doesn't help if your Lordship thinks it 's necessary evidence but, of course, if it comes to a question of how useful or reasonably required, there is that.

And just before I get on to some broader "reasonably required" considerations, my Lord, your Lordship also had a debate with Mr MacLean about the modelling and an allegation against EE in the amended particulars of claim, which is at paragraph 86 L of the draft amended particulars. That was at $\{B / 3 / 46\}$.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes.
MR McQUATER: Yes -- sorry. It's 68L, is the reference I'm after. Sorry.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes, that's correct, 68 L .
MR McQUATER: Yes, 68L.
Now, Ms John rightly intervened about this question, in relation to EE. But in relation to Vodafone, can I just add this, that there is no equivalent pleading against Vodafone in respect of our modelling or our analysis. And, of course -- so there are no pleaded issues here against Vodafone, in respect of which permission could be given.

Phones 4 u have asked us one question about our
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modelling in correspondence, and this is covered in
Greeno 8, and we responded by explaining their query, much in the manner that your Lordship had envisaged in the discussion earlier, and that resulted in no further criticism for Vodafone.

So, much as you would expect, they had a query about our modelling, how it worked, what it represented. We explained and the matter, as it seems, was left there.

So there isn't any justification for a pleaded issue against Vodafone, so far as this is concerned. And I would suggest that if - - that ultimately, if there's a real point here, it has to be pleaded properly against the defendant and then permission asked for. But that should really have been done already, and if it happens in the future, I can well see your Lordship saying,
"Well, I'm sorry, that's just too late".
My Lord, I have a few points to make about "reasonably required" in the general, but I'm being invited to ask your Lordship if the transcribers might have a ten-minute break.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes, indeed. So we will return at 3.30. Just to remind you all that I have to rise at 4 o'clock, we may not complete this today. We will consider where we are at five to 4.00 .
(3.17 pm)

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(A short break)
(3.30 pm)
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes.
MR McQUATER: My Lord, I will be brief. I'm aware that
    others have to speak as well.
        Some more general points on "reasonably required".
        The first one, your Lordship I think has on board,
    which is the pre-trial timetable makes any substantial
    expert exercise really unworkable. Just two quick
    points on that.
        There's pressure at the front end, obviously,
    because it puts undue pressure on us to respond from
    a standing start, as l've mentioned before. And, as far
    as the pleadings are concerned, there's going to be some
    further time taken for that, so they're going to push
    the times further out already at the start, because, as
    your Lordship will have picked up, we only yesterday,
    after 4 o'clock, received a further version of the
    amended particulars of claim in relation to the
    allegation that Vodafone and EE unlawfully exchanged
    information indirectly via third parties.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Well, that's just the one paragraph, isn't
    it?
MR McQUATER: It's a short-ish addition --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes, you've had time to work on everything
else.
MR McQUATER: Yes, my Lord. That will hold up our amended defence, because there are quite a lot of enquiries have to be made about allegations which are seven and a half years old, with unidentified persons in Vodafone said to be involved, and that is not an easy enquiry, and it's not something that we will be able to respond to immediately. So it's going to mean that we will need a bit more time for our amended defence at the front end.
We can come to that on timetabling, my Lord, but I've just highlighted that to show you an example of the kind of pressures the timetable is already under. And, of course, when you look at Phones \(4 u\) 's proposed timetable, it gets very tight at the back end as well, because of the 7 April date for supplementaries, which is too close to trial.
When we come to timetable, I've got some suggestions -- if your Lordship is going to direct some expert evidence I've got some suggestions, but I won't take time up on that now.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Shall we do that at the end after we've heard everyone on expert evidence?
MR McQUATER: If your Lordship is happy to do it, yes.
And the second point on "reasonably required" I was
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MR McQUATER: - - and to do that you - - instructions to a joint expert are going to have to be agreed with -how many sets of solicitors? Five sets of solicitors, and clients take - - taking instructions from eight clients, so the -- that, one knows from experience, is
going to make is the pressure on the trial itself, because if your Lordship directs expert evidence, that's likely to mean effectively four experts. You're going to get $--M r$ Thomas can be multiplied and, given the groupings of the defendants around the MNOs, that means probably another three experts. It's not, in my submission, realistic to suggest that we could share experts, because each of the MNOs has its own story and its own case, and indeed there might be potential conflicts.

And also, to be frank, time is too tight to herd the eight defendant carts around one expert, it's just not really feasible to do that. So this can't be a shared expert situation, so we are going to have four experts. That's going to put pressure on the trial timetable, which -- and from the case management information sheets, the parties have said potentially up to 30 witnesses of fact in that period already. It's going to be tight. The --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: But could some aspects -- take the one you were raising, market saturation, I mean, is that not something -- or change in -- if that's to be covered a change in conditions in the market as between 2006 to 2009 and 2013-2014 that are relevant to a decision whether to use a retail intermediary, could that not be

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covered by a common expert, though not MNO-specific?
MR McQUATER: I take your Lordship's point that you might find discrete issues that might be capable of being dealt with, with commonality. I can think of other issues which wouldn't --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: They could have a common expert dealing with those and then some --
MR McQUATER: No, I absolutely --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: -- reports dealing with specific points.
MR McQUATER: Yes. I mean, obviously if one has a common expert at all, it takes time to agree instructions,
common -- well, one has, in this case, quite a number of defendants.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes, there's a bit of time -- I can see it takes a little extra time there, but it saves a lot of time at trial.
MR McQUATER: Well, it does. But one's principal concern here in process is how one is going to arrange the reports in the first instance --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes.

> going to take time. I mean, the shared experts is a very laudable target and laudable aim, one knows that, but when one gets down to the practice, it's very hard to get things to move forward. And, as I am reminded, one can have particular problems with competitors if they happen to have a different view on who might be the right experts and how the question ought to be put or what information the expert might be given.
> So I was making a point, my Lord, about the pressure on the trial itself.
> A related point is cost, of course, because Phones 4u have said 1.9 for their expert. That is going to be multiplied several times, realistically, if that is indeed the scale of evidence. That may go down, and in fact it might well go down if your Lordship is very careful about narrowing the issues that go to the experts and narrowing the scope of the expert exercise, because no doubt Phones 4 u --
> MR JUSTICE ROTH: Well, it's is a very big trial. There's a lot of money and a lot at stake. I think the cost -I'm very sympathetic to the point one shouldn't ever overlook cost, but I think in this case, the proportionality on the costs point is rather less fraught.
> MR McQUATER: Well, it is a substantial sum when one

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multiplies it by the number of defendants --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Oh, yes, it is clearly a very substantial sum and I'm not sure the total costs are an even more substantial sum.
MR McQUATER: I'm sure they are, my Lord. But costs are again a very important reason why one would be keen to be very specific and indeed we would say narrow the issues one prescribes -- in the exercise one prescribes here for the experts.

And, finally, my Lord, on equality of arms, which has been cited by Phones 4u. Your Lordship has the point that they have already Mr Thomas advising them or experts advising them on the case for some time already explaining -- able to explain the documents and modelling. They've been able to ask us questions about it. They've got their own witnesses of fact with market experience and extensive disclosure.

On equality of arms what we are most worried about is being dumped with some monster report that they have been working on for months and having to respond to it within eight weeks, or whatever the current suggestion is, which doesn't seem very equal to us. And really, as your Lordship has observed, there isn ' $t$ an excuse for having this exercise so late, which is putting pressure on us for our time to respond.

My Lord, I'm aware that others need to speak.
I wasn't going to address your Lordship further on this,
unless your Lordship wishes me to.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: No, thank you.
MR McQUATER: I'm very much obliged.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes?
Submissions by MS ABRAM
MS ABRAM: So five points from me, my Lord.
The first, a discrete point addressing -- just picking up something that Mr MacLean said during his opening submissions in respect of document preservation on the part of my clients.

Now, before your Lordship tells me that that's a matter for trial, may I just make two points as to inaccuracies in what Mr MacLean said?

First, there is no criticism of my client, O2, so Telefónica UK, in respect of document preservation. So in targeting that complaint against $\mathrm{O} 2, \mathrm{Mr}$ MacLean, I think, doubtless misspoke.

And, second, in respect of my other two clients,
Telefónica SA and the holding company below it, there is no basis for the allegation that any deliberate step was taken to destroy any document by either of those clients, and that will be the case that we put forward at trial, but it is important, of course, to my clients

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to put the record straight, as I understand it. Thank you.

So then to turn to my second point, which is on the substance and on the modelling analysis aspect and the substance.

We do have a number of serious concerns about Phones 4 u being able to put in expert evidence on what I will call the paragraph 124 to 7 issues. And to show you what those are, could I ask you to turn up that part of the pleading again, please, my Lord.

So I will look at the amended draft -- the draft amended version, which the relevant section starts at $\{B / 3 / 68\}$, and it is page 67 in the internal numbers of the pleading, if you've got a paper copy.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes.
MS ABRAM: So I want to make two submissions to you about this bit of the pleading, my Lord, and if I could just tee them up at once and then -- so I won't have to come back to it.

So for the purpose of a point I'm going to come back to, if you could look four lines down from the start of paragraph 124. You will see that it's pleaded:
"No MNO Defendant acting rationally and/or in its own commercial interests would choose unilaterally to cease dealing with P4U in circumstances where P4U was
likely to [keep dealing with other MNOs]."
And then over the page, at the top of page 68 in the internal numbering:
"In particular, without prejudice to the expert economic evidence that P4U will serve in due course, P4U avers as follows."

I want to come back to that passage in respect of the scope of expert evidence and the scope of what's now sought.

But the point in respect of O 2 , in respect of Telefónica specifically, just in a nutshell, my Lord, is that the bit of Phones 4 's case that it would be necessary for an MNO to retain about two-thirds of its Phones $4 u$ customers, in order to make leaving Phones $4 u$ rational, is not pleaded against my clients. So there is no basis, in these paragraphs of the pleading, for the posited positive modelling-based case by Phones 4 u , in respect of Telefónica leaving Phones $4 u$. So if this is the scope of the expert evidence application now made, it just doesn't stack up against one of the three MNOs at all, and I'll show you that.

So it starts with a kind of general description, but the point starts being teed up at point (b)(ii), page 68 $\{B / 3 / 69\}$ of the internal numbering:
"Nonetheless, the profits obtained by the MNO

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Defendants as a result of customers joining their networks via P4U were substantial."

And then some example figures that Phones $4 u$ have said to have generated in gross profit for EE and then Vodafone and not, my Lord will note, for O2.

The point continues over the page, my Lord, at point (d) $\{B / 3 / 70\}$ :
"The average NPV [so net present value] to EE and/or Vodafone UK of customers who joined either of their networks via [Phones 4u] was approximately $65 \%$ of the average NPV of customers who would join through direct means."

So, again, not pleaded against O2.
And then at subparagraph (e):
"It follows that ..."
In summary, EE or Vodafone would need to expect to retain at least $65 \%$ of their Phones 4 u customers, in order to make it sensible and rational for them to leave Phones 4u.

And there's the additional text -- the reason I'm showing you this, in the draft amended version, is because this is really the height of Phones 4 u 's case, and what you'll see is that they then go on to see in the red underlined text:
"However, any such analysis of expected customer
retention (for O 2 [as well as the others]) would always be subject to the need ..."

For the MNO to consider a number of different factors. But that's not the same as pleading a positive case against O 2 as to what level of customers we would need to retain, so it's not so much that the pleading is ragged against my clients, it's that it's totally absent in this respect.

And just to tie that up to the punchline. That comes at point (g) on page $70\{B / 3 / 71\}$ of the internal numbering:
"It follows that realistic expectations as to retained Phones 4 u customers were far below the $65 \%$ threshold and there was no rational basis on which EE or Vodafone could have expected to retain that number of customers."

Now, of course, it's to be inferred that while Phones 4 u were amending their pleading, including that passage, if they had a like case against O 2 , they would have advanced that case against O2. And in my submission, the fact that they don't do so, it 's not just $--I$ 'm not just raising a pleading point, I'm not trying to be difficult, but it actually stems from a fundamental difficulty with Phones 4 u's case that we have been seeking to explore with them in correspondence
for about 18 months.
So my Lord has seen, in my skeleton, that about 18 months ago we sent them a request for further information, asking: what are the counterfactual terms that you say that O2 essentially was weighing up against the idea of leaving Phones $4 u$ ? Because, of course, the question of how many customers you need to keep hold up, in order for it to be better to stay in Phones $4 u$, depends on whether Phones 4 u were going to pay us $£ 300$ a connection or we were going to lose $£ 50$ a connection, for example.

And Phones 4 u took eight months to answer, and then they said, "You don't need us to answer at all".

And, again, I'm not seeking to raise a pleading point, it's a point of real substance, because it means that if Phones $4 u$ were sent off to show us their positive case on the modelling, it appears that they don't have any positive case on what the threshold would be against which O 2 were judging the decision to leave Phones 4 u , and certainly we don't know what that positive case is.

And my Lord has seen in the authorities referred to in my skeleton, particularly London Executive Aviation, that there are significant warnings -- judicial warnings against the prospect of allowing expert evidence in
circumstances where the basis for the expert evidence
depends on factual permutations, the nature of which won't be determined until trial, because it just means in practice that the expert evidence is much, much less likely to be useful or even usable.

And in a sense, that is a theme that runs through what we say and what we've always said about Phones $4 u$ 's posited modelling approach, the idea that -- the idea that any MNO would judge whether or not to leave Phones 4 u against what they would call the net present value of each customer brought to the MNO by Phones $4 u$. We've said from the beginning, look, O2 just didn't look at it in that way. We didn't do an analysis by reference to the kind of technical accounting concept of net present value.

And that's important to this question, and it's also important to the trial, because, my Lord, at the trial, the trial judge, whether it's your Lordship or someone else, will be thinking: well, actually, why did these MNOs decide to leave Phones $4 u$ ? And looking at that by reference to a totally different analytical approach, particularly by reference to judged by threshold that we don't need to know what they are, just won't be of any assistance at all to the trial judge.

So what we would say is that the analysis of the
modelling -- and we do accept there needs to be analysis

## of the reasons for the MNOs leaving Phones 4 u , of course

 that's fine, and, of course, it's fine for Phones $4 u$ to want to understand our modelling and reasonable for them to want to ask its questions about it. But as my Lord commented in your interventions, it's difficult to see why expert analysis of our modelling analysis is likely to be helpful, in terms of an expert report process. Of course, it may inform questions being asked behind the scenes, but that's a totally different process.So we say, actually, either way you approach it, you don't need expert evidence, because if you look at Phones $4 u$ 's positive case, that's irrelevant and based on an unidentified threshold and no pleaded case. And based on our modelling analysis, you don't need expert evidence, because it's a question of understanding what we've done and why. (Pause).

That was my second point, my Lord.
My third point is that we are also seriously concerned about mission creep beyond the scope of the issues identified in paragraphs 124 to 127 , and I'm not going to repeat what Mr McQuater said about that, although we share and adopt those concerns. But the purpose of me showing you the opening words of paragraph 124 , at the beginning of my submissions, was
just to draw to your Lordship's attention that really what Phones 4 u are seeking to get out of their economic analysis section, vis-à-vis EE and Vodafone, is that it wouldn't have been commercially rational -- that's the punchline -- it wouldn't have been commercially rational for EE and Vodafone to leave Phones 4 u , according to their case.

And what we really don't want is for the broad rationality question to come creeping back in, through the backdoor, on the basis that the expert is thought entitled to set out some kind of modelling approach and then to tie that up to what he says would be rational.

And my Lord has my submissions on rationality, which I've set out extensively in my skeleton argument, but you've seen that I say that evidence that goes to credibility alone is not admissible. Evidence that an expert subjectively would have done something different is not admissible. And if what you're talking about really is a competition economist saying, "Well, if I'd been CEO of a major UK business, I would have had a different appetite for risk", that's highly unlikely, with the greatest respect to Mr Thomas, or any other competition economist, to be of any material assistance to the English court, because it's a question that was decided by businesses, based on their own internal risk

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appetites and their own decision-making processes.
So we strongly resist the prospect of mission creep and towards rationality.

And then on the paragraph 81 factors, I won't repeat what Mr McQuater said about the paragraph 81 practice, but we respectfully share Vodafone's concerns on those. I don't know, would it be useful for me to take your Lordship to one worked example of the way -- the sort of way that the paragraph 81 points come up in a pleading, so that you can see the kind of nature of the issues between the parties on them?
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Well, this is your point 4, is it?

## MS ABRAM: This is my point 3. Points 4 and 5 are happily

 short.MR JUSTICE ROTH: Well, give me your points 4 and 5, and we will come back to this point.
MS ABRAM: I'm grateful.
So point 4 is the 2006-2009 period, so that specific question. And I respectfully adopt what Mr McQuater had to say about that suggested question, and I just want to illuminate that with one further point.

Mr McQuater said that the court isn't going to be in a position to tell whether the market had changed from '06-'09 to '12-'14, including because there had been no disclosure. Now, Telefónica, for our part, in a sense
got no position on it. We believe that we did leave and come back in '06-'09. It's so long ago, we even struggle to confirm that. But certainly we're not relying on that as the reason to justify the rationality of the decision in '13 and '14.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: No. I think it's the case, isn't it, that the claimants rely on it, and several defendants have responded, not saying, "Oh, but the terms on offer were such that it wasn't attractive", but by saying there were certain conditions in the market then that meant that it was a very different situation. That's how the case was put, and so that's how it arises.
MS ABRAM: Yes, yes, my Lord. But in order to know whether it was a different situation, again you have really got to know what the offer is. It 's not just --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Well, that's not how the case has been pleaded. So if that's not the basis put forward for saying it's a different situation that's how the defendants have chosen to distinguish it. In which case, you look at the conditions in the market. If they had pleaded saying that there were particular terms that made it unattractive and then revised terms that made it more attractive, yes, then I would take your point. But that's not what has been advanced.
MS ABRAM: Yes. I suppose from the perspective of my
we've got very little skin in that game, because we've got no positive case on the reasons for the 2006-2009 decisions. We just say that we just thought it was the right thing to do to leave in '13 and '14.

But if we were going to want to look back to '06-'09, all parties on all sides and the court would need to know what the decisions that the MNOs were actually taking at that earlier time were. And in order to do so, they would have to have substantial disclosure, including, in particular, the terms that were on offer when the MNOs walked away from Phones $4 u$ and the terms that were offered in order to induce them back to Phones 4u. You can't just compare '06-'09 with ' 12 -' 14 in the abstract, in a kind of macro market sense, without actually knowing what the decisions were that were being --
MR JUSTICE ROTH: I thought the pleading about that is put precisely in that way.
MS ABRAM: I'm sorry, my Lord. I didn't hear you.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: I thought some of the pleading on '06-'09 from some of the defendants, maybe not your client, is put in general market way.
MS ABRAM: So far as Telefónica is concerned, and it may be that I'm in a particularly good position on this point, we just say that '06-'09, we've got no position -- we've

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    extract as well, just to show you the point.
    MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes. Well, I'll just make a note of it
and I' II read it before tomorrow.

## MS ABRAM: I'm grateful.

So the other extract that kind of pulls the point together is paragraph 30.2, and that is on page $\{\mathrm{A} / 7 / 10\}$.
MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes.
MS ABRAM: And my point on that is just that there may be pleaded issues on these paragraph 81 points, in the sense that they feature in the pleading, so in a sense the ink has been spilled on them, but it doesn't follow
that it would be appropriate at all for the parties to go away and spend hundreds and thousands or millions of pounds on expert evidence, on points that really, at the very best, are matters of background. That's all I wanted to say, my Lord.

MR JUSTICE ROTH: So it's peripheral. Right. I think if we start at 10.00 tomorrow, if that doesn't inconvenience everyone, that will give us a bit more time. So 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.
(4.00 pm)
(The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am on Thursday,

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Housekeeping
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[^0]:    MR MACLEAN: Now, I was going to say, paragraphs 23 to 24 of
    the judgment refer to the -- what Mr Justice Aikens said in the Springwell case, in relation to the adduction of expert evidence.

    And you will see in paragraph 24 that:
    "Mr Tennet ... did not, in his oral submissions, go so far as to suggest that BA should be entitled to adduce the expert actuarial evidence which it wishes to rely on simply to help the judge understand some of the actuarial matters ..."

    Now, that, of course, is right. We don't dispute that simply adducing evidence to assist in digesting material or explaining things that should be uncontentious or capable of agreement, it's not necessary. But in this case, we say it's important not to stretch that proposition to something rather more dramatic and wrong, and we suggest that it does not preclude the court ordering expert evidence where it's necessary and where the expert's evidence will involve scrutiny or analysis of the context for -- for the content of contemporaneous documents, as we envisage in this case.

    Now, your Lordship sees at paragraph 26, the learned judge starts a very detailed analysis of the pleaded

    ## MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes.

[^1]:    MR JUSTICE ROTH: Yes
    MR McQUATER: And your Lordship, I'm sure, will have picked up from the skeletons that there are limits to how much any evidence on 2006-2009 can go in this case, because by consent, disclosure from the MNOs relating to this period was not pursued. So there is no material before the court, and will be no material before the court, as to the actual facts relating to the MNOs' decisions to either start this experience they had between 2006 and 2009 or to exit that experience so as to the terms they were trading under, indeed as to terms which might have been on offer when they ceased this arrangement in 2009.

    So what one couldn't have, and obviously couldn't have in those circumstances, is any meaningful exercise in the form of question 3 that was originally put in the application of 2006-2009, because you couldn't have any evidence that was actually going to engage - - it would be such an abstract exercise, it would just become just an expensive sideshow and it didn't really assist anyone.

    Now, it's refocused itself in the course of discussion to a question of whether one could have evidence of objective market conditions and whether objective market conditions had changed, rather than having some more interactive exercises which seem to

