AOTEAROA
NEW ZEALAND
AND CONFLICT
PREVENTION:
BUILDING A TRULY
INDEPENDENT
FOREIGN POLICY

A REPORT BY NEW ZEALAND ALTERNATIVE
Aotearoa New Zealand and Conflict Prevention: Building a Truly Independent Foreign Policy

A report by New Zealand Alternative

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New Zealand Alternative was established in May 2018 by a group of New Zealanders with a commitment to an independent, values-driven foreign policy for our South Pacific nation – a New Zealand alternative.

Through writing, hui and connections with others, we seek to reframe and shape public debate about the role New Zealand plays in the world. We propose and promote practical and imaginative ideas for Aotearoa’s role on the global stage grounded in progressive values and evidence. We seek to identify concrete opportunities where New Zealand can provide diplomatic leadership and support to others to advance international action on: peace and disarmament, decolonisation and indigenous rights, feminist foreign policy, alternative models of economics and trade, humanitarian action, and environmental protection.

New Zealand Alternative was registered as an incorporated society on 14 May 2018 by a steering group comprising Nina Hall, Max Harris, Thomas Nash, and Laura O’Connell Rapira.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

New Zealand’s leaders traditionally embrace the notion that they pursue an ‘independent foreign policy’, but this claim is rarely subject to public scrutiny. Indeed, conversations about Aotearoa New Zealand and the world tend to be dominated by a small group of people and focused on a narrow range of subject areas. Certain areas, such as trade policy, alliances and security, and intelligence doctrines, are shielded from mainstream critical debate.

New Zealand Alternative has been established to challenge this orthodoxy and to widen the group of people taking part in conversations about our country’s role in the world. The organisation will do research, policy and advocacy to help shape a truly independent, values-driven foreign policy for this South Pacific country.

This first publication for New Zealand Alternative establishes a rationale for New Zealand to consolidate and institutionalise its contributions to peace mediation and conflict prevention work. The report sets out a vision for how New Zealand and New Zealanders can play a role in supporting regional and global peace efforts through training, diplomacy, negotiation and mediation.

Its recommendations are detailed and ambitious. We recommend that the government establish an independent unit focusing on peace mediation and mediation support. The Unit would gather, develop and maintain New Zealand’s capacity to contribute to international peace mediation and conflict prevention efforts. We recommend naming the Unit a Conflict Prevention Unit to avoid an overly narrow interpretation of what peace mediation and mediation support require. (In the remainder of the report, the terms ‘Conflict Prevention Unit’ and ‘Peace Mediation Unit’ are used interchangeably.) Based on our research, we have set out some clear proposals for the institutional structure, mandate, staffing and budget of this independent peace mediation and conflict prevention entity, with a view to advancing discussion and consideration of it in concrete terms.
Our recommendations are in line with Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern’s commitment to international peace and conflict prevention work in her remarks to the Nelson Mandela Peace Summit at the United Nations in September 2018. They are also consistent with the comments Ardern made on her return from New York in October 2018 reiterating New Zealand’s “independent foreign policy”. After a year in office leading a government that aspires to be transformative, Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern should outline concrete foreign policy initiatives that give effect to the values of “peace, prosperity and fairness” espoused in her high-profile address to the United Nations General Assembly. Ardern’s presence at the United Nations captured the global attention; now it is time for her government’s foreign policy to do the same.

For his part, during a major speech in June 2018, Foreign Minister Winston Peters argued that “New Zealand’s independent foreign policy is regaining its self-respect,” but that “…orthodox analyses on their own won’t advance [foreign policy debate]”. He encouraged people to “challenge the orthodoxy of small state foreign policy analysis”, saying this “is not a time for intellectual timidity.”

This report directly takes up that invitation to challenge orthodox analysis with fresh ideas. At a time when the international system and its institutions for peace and security are under increasing pressure, New Zealand Alternative encourages Prime Minister Ardern and Foreign Minister Winston Peters to take up the recommendations in this report on international peace mediation and conflict prevention. Doing so would demonstrate a commitment to multilateralism, intellectual temerity and truly independent foreign policy.

The report that follows is based on a series of over 30 expert interviews with practitioners from inside and outside government as well as academics, current and former politicians across the spectrum. Our interviews and research have also incorporated experiences from international partners.

An analysis of our own historical entry points to discussion of peace as a country draws on discussion of, for example, the Parihaka movement, experiences from the Waitangi Tribunal, our nuclear-free movement and the Bougainville peace talks that New Zealand hosted and facilitated in the 1990s. This context provides a rationale for why New Zealand should pursue an international role in supporting peace mediation work.

Expert perspectives provide a snapshot of what New Zealand and other countries, such as Norway, Switzerland, Germany, Finland, Ireland and South Africa, are already doing on peace mediation and conflict resolution. Importantly, a picture emerges here of an ambition towards peace mediation and conflict prevention that successive New Zealand governments have been keen to pursue, but have not quite managed to implement. We hope this report will rekindle that
bipartisan ambition for New Zealand to play a sustained, institutionalised role as a responsible and sophisticated contributor to international peace and security, beyond the provision of military force.

As conflict and armed violence become more complex, fragmented and enmeshed with transnational organised crime and terrorism, peace mediation is also becoming more complex. Peace mediation and conflict prevention must take into account local context and causes of conflict (including climate change) to avoid being a superficial response to deep-rooted problems. But the increasing frequency and intensity of armed violence also provide all the more reason for New Zealand to contribute to peace mediation and conflict prevention through a dedicated entity. And an assessment of the policy options in this area demonstrates that there is an opportunity for New Zealand to support new models of peace mediation, at a time when traditional approaches to peace mediation are coming under strain.

Drawing on an assessment of the policy framework, the report provides detailed recommendations for the New Zealand government, with the support of the wider community working on peace, security and international relations, to pursue an independent peace mediation and conflict prevention entity.

We recommend that:

- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade undertakes a feasibility and appropriateness study for the establishment of a Conflict Prevention Unit;

- A Conflict Prevention Unit be established independent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (subject to the feasibility and appropriateness study confirming the viability of a Unit); and

- The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, as well as others in political and public service leadership (where appropriate), speak more vocally – in formal and informal settings – about New Zealand playing a greater role in peace mediation and conflict prevention internationally; and

- A commitment to peace mediation and conflict prevention is made alongside an accompanying redoubling of efforts to decolonise Aotearoa New Zealand.
The Unit would pull together staff from agencies such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Defence and Police, as well as drawing on expertise from non-governmental organisations, iwi, unions, and the private sector. We envisage this Unit developing over time and refining its work to offer specialised contributions that reflect our own history and contemporary democracy in Aotearoa New Zealand. Our own imperfect experiences of mediation between Māori and the Crown, including through the Waitangi Tribunal; the struggle to revitalise indigenous language and culture; the contested management of natural resources; and the role of women in peace operations all emerged from the interviews as areas where New Zealand could offer experience – if not necessarily best practice – to other countries. We also consider how, alongside the development of our own capacity for international peace mediation and conflict prevention, New Zealand might participate in joint peace mediation and conflict prevention efforts with Pacific partners. New Zealand cannot itself claim to have achieved complete peace in the history of relations between Māori and the Crown, and for this reason it is essential that an ongoing process of decolonisation accompanies the establishment of a Conflict Mediation Unit. This process recognises that as New Zealand advocates for peace internationally there is an ongoing struggle for justice and indigenous rights at home.

Our claims to an independent foreign policy must be challenged here at home if they are to be credible on the international stage. Independent foreign policy requires taking risks and taking initiatives that push us out of our comfort zone. With careful consideration of our own contested history as a country, this report proposes one such foreign policy initiative. In the same way as our nuclear-free status has become emblematic of our international identity, we believe an independent Conflict Prevention Unit could, in time, become a flagship pillar of a truly independent New Zealand foreign policy.
In 1997 New Zealand hosted peace negotiations between armed groups in Bougainville and the Papua New Guinean government. The National government, and in particular Foreign Minister Don McKinnon, thought that New Zealand could offer meaningful assistance and a neutral space for the parties to work through these differences. In winter the parties to the Bougainvillean conflict met at Burnham Military Camp just outside Christchurch for two rounds of talks.

New Zealand’s role in these talks was in some ways minimal – the government offered the venue, but did not try to control the substance of the negotiations. The negotiations were highly successful and led to a truce and eventually a peaceful resolution to the conflict (at least in the short- to medium-term). Despite New Zealand’s role in facilitating peace for the Bougainville conflict, no subsequent government has invested the resources, political capital or time to assist with international peace mediation in this way again.

In this report we suggest that New Zealand can, and should, play a more proactive role in facilitating international peace. We call for a new, independent peace mediation and conflict prevention entity, which should be established with bipartisan support to ensure its longevity.

We make this suggestion in the spirit of renewed interest in independent foreign policy in 2017-2018.
There was, it is fair to say, limited discussion of foreign policy – or, more broadly, questions relating to Aotearoa New Zealand and the world – in the lead-up to New Zealand’s September 2017 election. But since the formation of the new government – comprising Labour, Greens, and New Zealand First – there have been indications, in words and in action, of the need for refreshed thinking about how New Zealand relates to the rest of the world.

Trips by Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern to APEC in November 2017, and Europe in April 2018, resulted in public statements about the importance of global action on climate change. In February 2018, the Prime Minister gave a speech in which she stated that she believed that a values-based approach to foreign policy could be “pursue[d] ... with more vigour.” In May 2018, the Government announced a suite of measures designed to support Pacific Island countries in responding to climate change. Perhaps most prominently, in June 2018 Foreign Affairs Minister Winston Peters gave a wide-ranging speech at the Otago Foreign Policy School on future directions for foreign policy. Peters said: “a fundamental question for our small state is to ask what does having an independent foreign policy mean in 2018?” He added: “It is not a time for intellectual timidity. It is a time for original thinking as we develop foreign policy prescriptions ...” He issued a challenge to the audience of individuals engaged with thinking about New Zealand and the world:

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**Creative syntheses and challenging old verities is needed more than ever so be bold and take risks in your work. If you do you will find in this government a receptive ear to your ideas.**

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In her address to the United Nations General Assembly in September 2018, Prime Minister Ardern also identified the notions of kaitiakitanga and kindness as central to New Zealand’s place in the world.

New Zealand Alternative shares the view that there is a need for bold thinking on the place of Aotearoa New Zealand in the world; indeed, it is founded with a commitment to contribute to such thinking. This report focuses on one area where New Zealand might be able to focus its international energies and pursue a genuinely independent foreign policy: in supporting efforts to achieve peace internationally.
WHY PEACE?

There are many areas of action where there could be renewed, bold foreign policy thinking. We think that focusing on how New Zealand might support efforts to secure peace internationally is a key area, for five interlocking reasons.

First, Te Tiriti o Waitangi expresses a commitment to peace that was meant to undergird New Zealand as a country. It refers to “te rongo ki a rātou me te Atanoho hoki”, translated by Merimeri Penfold and Anne Salmond as meaning in context that “lasting peace and ... tranquil living should” be secured for Māori. This is discussed further in Part II below. If Te Tiriti o Waitangi is to be a living document, the spirit of that commitment to peace on the part of the Crown or government should be honoured in the interactions that New Zealanders, in particular the government, have internationally. Of course, the Crown has not upheld its commitment to peace throughout New Zealand history, and has undermined peace repeatedly through military invasions of Māori land, land confiscations, and other actions that have created the conditions for violence and discord. But at different moments there have been attempts to achieve reconciliation domestically, such as through the establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975. These attempts have been imperfect. But they show that peace has remained an aspiration, and our view is that – underpinned by the words of Te Tiriti o Waitangi – peace should continue to be a meaningful aspiration in our actions internationally.

Second, relatedly, there is a strong theme of pacifism and domestic peace-seeking efforts in New Zealand history. There is a long history of Māori practices of peace mediation, as recounted by Elsdon Best. Women’s groups in New Zealand have repeatedly advocated for peace, including the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (which set up a ‘peace department’ in 1885) and the National Council of Women (which had a ‘department for peace and arbitration’). Its first President, Kate Sheppard, is widely recognised for her role in the movement to win the vote for some women in 1893. But it is less well-known that she was also a prominent anti-militarist, staunchly opposing imperialism. The 1880s and early 1900s saw vocal opposition to war. Te Whiti o Rongomai, the Māori resistance leader, spoke forcefully in favour of peace in the face of Crown incursions into land at Parihaka. Conscientious objection has featured prominently during times when New Zealand has gone to war. New Zealand Christians have been heavily involved with peace activism, as discussed in a recent book (with members of other religious groups being similarly active throughout New Zealand history). The early labour movement understood links between capitalism, imperialism, and war, and opposed all three. New Zealand was, of course, a founding member of the United
Nations; the preamble of the UN Charter speaks of the need to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” and to “live together in peace”. And the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s saw strident opposition to nuclear testing, often undergirded by an opposition to war. Certainly, New Zealand also has a history of militarism, reflected in the commemoration of ANZAC Day, amongst other things. Societies will always contain multiple conflicting traditions. What is worth noting, for our purposes, is that there is at least one of those traditions that involves valuing peace and opposing war. That tradition provides resources for ongoing international efforts to promote peace.

Third, a commitment to supporting the achievement of peace is consistent with – and an extension of – our historical, bipartisan approach to independent foreign policy. New Zealand has long been relatively less aligned than our partners, and has been willing to suspend flexible alliances in order to maintain foreign policy positions. One of the most prominent examples of this was the suspension of the ANZUS alliance following a dispute with the United States over New Zealand’s nuclear-free stance, which involved New Zealand’s opposition to the visit to New Zealand waters of a US naval vessel that might contain nuclear material, the USS Buchanan and a subsequent decision by the government to enact legislation enshrining our nuclear-free status as a country. Another example is New Zealand’s unwillingness to support the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (involving troops from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Poland), despite considerable pressure from the United States and the United Kingdom. It is not a great stretch from New Zealand’s commitment to being relatively less aligned to New Zealand playing a role in supporting peace in particular regions. This does not mean, as we discuss later in the report, that New Zealand cannot take sides or maintain strong stands in particular disputes. It is only to say that for New Zealand to support peace in particular places overseas continues a past feature of New Zealand foreign policy.

Fourth, the current historical conjuncture presents a moment where a heightened commitment to peace on the part of New Zealand would be both appropriate and necessary. As of late 2018, the United States under President Donald Trump has inflamed tensions internationally (for example, by abandoning the Iranian nuclear deal, and considering an invasion of Venezuela), while also withdrawing support from some UN and other international institutions and challenging their relevance. This increases the need for peace-brokering by other small states. At the same time, conflicts remain constant around the world, exacerbated by the impact of climate change and the competition for resources like freshwater. Against this backdrop, a role for New Zealand in looking out for peace is both useful and urgent.
Fifth, further work on supporting peace efforts internationally fit how New Zealand is seen by a number of countries around the world. New Zealand and New Zealanders are generally regarded in international diplomacy as fair-minded and reasonable in dealings with other countries (with some exceptions). New Zealand is not without some entanglements that might throw up challenges to this view: our colonial history and involvement in the Five Eyes intelligence network could detract from this reputation of fairness and independence. (How New Zealand’s colonial past and Five Eyes membership could impact on peace efforts is considered at greater length later in this report.) However, these points aside, there is an overlap between New Zealand’s non-threatening reputation internationally and what is sought in a peace broker or mediator, which makes a greater focus on peace efforts internationally a suitable strategy for New Zealand.

**SO WHAT IS TO BE DONE?**

With this general case for action set out, a more specific set of questions arises: how should New Zealand pursue a focus on securing peace internationally, under this government and future governments? Are there bold but pragmatic steps that can be taken to advance this area of action? What obstacles might be in the way of these steps? The remainder of this report addresses these questions.

The next Part of the report, Part II, sets out important considerations, when reflecting on these questions, based on interviews conducted with key experts in this field and an overview of what peace mediation and conflict prevention efforts are ongoing internationally at the moment. The experts consulted include peace activists who have worked domestically in Aotearoa New Zealand; academics with expertise in New Zealand foreign policy; individuals with experience in New Zealand diplomatic, military, and political roles internationally; and non-New Zealanders offering thoughts on what role New Zealand might play. Interviewees were selected based on expertise, diversity of background, and availability. Part III draws from these interviews, the account of the history, and a literature review (as well as other off-the-record or informal conversations) a longlist of policy options for securing peace internationally; it evaluates the pros and cons of the options on this longlist. A final section, Part IV offers some concluding recommendations.
Before turning to the history and interviews, it is worth clarifying some central concepts and important points of scope in this report. When discussing ‘peace’, we refer to the absence of armed conflict, though we elaborate on the meaning of peace further in Part II. We want to underscore that it is important that a nuanced, and not overly narrow, view is taken of what ‘the absence of armed conflict’ means. The absence of armed conflict involves not just the signing of a truce to end armed hostilities, but also substantially removing conditions that might result in future conflict – and an ongoing vigilance about the existence of those conditions.

We refer commonly to mediation throughout this report. We focus explicitly on mediation in international contexts – i.e. providing New Zealand mediation to other countries. Mediation is “a form of third-party assistance in which an invited outsider helps the belligerent parties with their conflict management efforts” as an “alternative to negotiation by the disputants themselves.”\textsuperscript{10} It can involve the transfer of information or the offer of promises of political and economic support. Peace mediation has become “a common and greatly championed method of international conflict resolution”, and has taken place in nearly 70 percent of all conflicts since 1945, according to International Conflict Mediation.\textsuperscript{11}

When looking at ‘New Zealand’s role’ in securing peace, we discuss possible roles for the New Zealand government and civil service; but ‘New Zealand foreign policy’ also concerns the role of actors such as iwi, academics, unions, judges, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and other community groups. Their role in securing peace should not be ignored when considering how peace is achieved internationally.
This Part of the report is split into two parts. First, we summarise expert perspectives on New Zealand’s possible role in advancing the cause of peace. Second, we explain what is occurring internationally in the areas of peace and peace mediation. These overviews provide an important foundation for discussing in more detail how New Zealand should change its foreign policy course – a task we take up in Part III.

EXPERT PERSPECTIVES

In addition to reviewing relevant literature, we sought out expert perspectives on peace, New Zealand’s role in the world, and strategies for securing peace. We hoped to use these perspectives to better understand international peace, the conditions for successful mediation, and to think through what New Zealand could do to strengthen its commitment to peace internationally. We identified ‘experts’ (by which we simply mean individuals or groups who have authority or legitimacy to speak on matters relevant to the topic, grounded in their experience in research or practice) through our past work, reading, and informal conversations. We sought to talk with a wide range of people including: activists and thinkers informed by tikanga Māori perspectives, diplomats, politicians, defence officials, peace activists, academics, and international mediators. We asked these experts why securing peace was important, and what role New Zealand could play. Our interviewees also recommended other people for further conversations. Of course, we do not purport to have interviewed all relevant experts, from within Aotearoa New Zealand or
elsewhere. Like everyone, we have blindspots and faced time constraints. But we consider that a range of different perspectives have been represented in the experts consulted (the full listing can be seen in the Appendix). These interviews helped us identify both a long-list of approaches to enhancing New Zealand’s role in mediation; and stress-test our ultimate recommendation to create an independent peace mediation body.

**WHAT DOES ‘PEACE’ MEAN IN AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND?**

One initial question is: how is peace best understood, particularly in light of Aotearoa New Zealand’s history, culture, and values? Academic and campaigner Tina Ngata offered an eloquent explanation of how concepts related to peace are understood in te ao Māori. The word ‘rongo’ in te reo Māori is often translated to mean ‘peace’. But Ngata noted that it “has many different meanings, and those meanings are connected.” Rongo is the Atua, or god, of peace. The inside of a wharenui on a marae is also the realm of Rongo, the outside being the realm of Tūmatauenga (often referred to as ‘the god of conflict’). Ngata pointed out that this helped to highlight the meanings of ‘rongo’. The word whakarongo is often defined as “to listen”, but it refers to the capacity to take in material from a whole range of our senses. It is “about ... our ability to be aware ... to take in information, and to make sense of that information.” In a state of ill-health, that capacity is impaired: “one of the chief aspects of being unwell”, Ngata explained, “is your inability to be completely aware of the world around you”. The concept of peace or rongo, therefore, is “closely linked to [the] idea of humility, the ability to go deeply inside ourselves, to learn, to exchange information, to make sense of the world around us.” It represents a state of affairs where we feel “safe enough to exchange with integrity”. The word ‘rongo’ hence shows how peace can be understood in a rich way: as a state of equilibrium where certain preconditions (of feeling safe to exchange) are met, a healthy sense of being is maintained, and we are able to interact authentically with others.

Tina Ngata pointed out that our understanding of rongo is deepened by also understanding the related concept of Tū or Tūmatauenga, sometimes translated as war or the Atua (god) of war. Ngata observed that the Western mindset quickly categorises concepts in terms of binaries or dichotomies, but Tū and Rongo are not best understood as opposites. Rather, they are two related concepts, and each has a spectrum of meanings. At one end of the spectrum of Tū is physical conflict, and at the other end is the ability to have ‘tūara’ (also the Māori word for back, or ally or defender): “to hold your space, to have your backbone”. This needs to be kept in balance along with respect for rongo: “if you have too much rongo,” explained Ngata, “you can be walked over”. Sometimes exchanges
in the realm of Tū need to be had to allow for the openness and frankness guaranteed by ‘rongo’, noted Ngata; and this is symbolised powerfully on the marae where exchanges outside of the wharenui are needed before people are able to move into the realm of Rongo, inside the house. The Tū space produces the safety and integrity that facilitates the “authentic sharing with each other” that is at the heart of ‘rongo’. In sum, then, in Ngata’s words “peace is inherently linked to the ability to share with authenticity, exchange information, to be safe around each other, and healing”, including “healing from historical trauma” (a point we return to below).

We make no apologies for describing Ngata’s explanation of ‘rongo’ at length. To ensure the concept is not lifted out of context, or appropriated for cheap ends, it is necessary to explain how rongo is connected to the world of Ātua (or gods), how it is related to Tū, and the preconditions of its realisation. (Indeed, an even fuller explanation is possible, and the above description is abbreviated.) This detailed understanding of ‘rongo’ provides a rich guide to how peace might be understood by campaigners, policy-makers, and politicians in New Zealand. We can understand peace as a relational concept: a concept that concerns how we are in relation to other beings, including in how we share and exchange information. We can understand peace as a concept that requires a state of safety. We can understand it not as a soft concept, but as a concept and state of affairs that requires healing, backbone, and justice. These seem to be important starting points for any discussion about actions that can be taken to honour a commitment to peace.

PEACE AND NEW ZEALAND HISTORY

A second relevant starting point for understanding peace in relation to Aotearoa New Zealand is Te Tiriti o Waitangi, New Zealand’s founding document – not least because Te Tiriti o Waitangi (the Māori version of the document, which should be regarded as the most authoritative version)\(^1\) refers to ‘rongo’. Indeed, the word appears in the first (long) sentence of Te Tiriti o Waitangi’s preamble:

\[\text{Ko Wikitoria te Kuini o Ingarani i tana mahara atawai ki nga Rangatira me nga Hapu o Nu Tirani i tana hiahia hoki ki tohungia ki a ratou o ratou rangitaratanga me to ratou wenua, a kia mau tonu hoki te Rongo ki a ratou me te Atanoho hoki kua wakaaro ia he mea tika kia tukua mai tetahi Rangatira ...}\]
Victoria, the Queen of England, in her concern to protect the chiefs and chiefs and subtribes of New Zealand and in her desire to preserve their chieftainship and their lands to them and to maintain peace and good order considers it just to appoint an administrator...

As noted in Part I, Merimeri Penfold and Anne Salmond translate the passage in Te Tiriti as referring to a guarantee of “lasting peace and ... tranquil living” for Māori.14 This has already been referred to in Part I as providing a rationale for the New Zealand government to focus on peace. As Tina Ngata stated in an interview, the commitment from Queen Victoria in Te Tiriti o Waitangi is to “take care of her own troublesome subjects ... so that we [Māori] could live in a space of rongo”. In a sense, then, the Treaty of Waitangi can be seen as an undertaking to safeguard the space of rongo, the realm of peace, in particular for Māori. (We take up again below the question of whether the Crown has legitimacy to seek to advance peace when it has consistently failed to honour its undertakings in Te Tiriti o Waitangi to safeguard the space of rongo, the realm of peace.)

We have already mentioned briefly that New Zealand has a history of committing to peace (albeit that the history is characterised by patchy protections of peace, in particular by the government). Jack McDonald, a young New Zealand political campaigner, writer and te reo Māori advocate who traces his whakapapa to Parihaka, explained in an interview the particular importance of peace in the Parihaka and Moriori tribal traditions. Both these traditions were also underscored by Tina Ngata. “Parihaka inspired the world,” noted McDonald, referring to the non-violent resistance (led by Te Whiti o Rongomai and Tohu Kakahi) of the village of Parihaka in the 1870s and 1880s in response to repeated government raids. It “inspired Gandhi,” said McDonald, “[who] references it after reading about it in the newspapers while he was working in London ... and of course Gandhi inspired Martin Luther King Jr.” McDonald went on: “Parihaka ... was about recognising the strategic value of peace and trying to progress things through dialogue rather than violence.” He also highlighted the different approach of the Moriori. The Moriori had “a more pacifist tradition,” recounted McDonald: “when they were invaded by a few Taranaki iwi they decided not to fight back, knowing it put their existence at risk.” McDonald added that there were “strong links to peace” later in New Zealand history as well, including through New Zealand’s role (via Prime Minister Peter Fraser’s leadership) “at the founding of the UN”.
THE GENERAL BENEFITS OF PEACE

Maire Leadbeater, writer and peace campaigner, echoed Tina Ngata’s points about the connections between peace and justice. She added that there is a “responsibility to international peace” because of the way New Zealand has benefited from “advantageous international circumstances and the generosity of the indigenous people whose land we live in.” Leadbeater explained that features of our history make it apt that we play a strong role in advocating for peace, including “an indigenous culture with strong traditions of peaceful conflict resolution”, “our small size”, and “our reputation for a degree of independent thinking in international affairs, even though this may not be as deserved as we think it is.” Rosemary Banks, an experienced New Zealand diplomat (who has been New Zealand’s Permanent Representative at the Permanent Mission to the United Nations, and was recently appointed New Zealand Ambassador to the United States of America) offered some further reasons why peace should be valued. “I see it as self-evident,” she said, “that peace is to be pursued as a necessary condition for well-being at both the individual level and for society as a whole, allowing self-fulfilment, exercise of individual freedoms and human rights, [and] allowing wider objectives such as care for the environment.” It is easy to see in this statement the connections to Tina Ngata’s explanation of peace, or rongo, as a concept that requires safety and allows for healthy relationships with others.

Edwina Hughes, coordinator of Peace Movement Aotearoa, made a similar point. “New Zealand is in a unique position to have an active role in peace building and peace mediation globally,” Hughes observed, “in part because for decades successive governments have said there is no direct military threat to the nation, which provides space to move from military-based responses to conflict to an authentic independent foreign policy.”

AN INSTITUTION FOR PEACE MEDIATION?

Terence O’Brien – another former New Zealand Permanent Representative to the United Nations and the founding Director of the New Zealand Centre for Strategic Studies – suggested that peace mediation could be an especially valuable focus area, because of New Zealand’s history and capacities. At least an aspiration to reconciliation is already at the heart of our democracy through Te Tiriti o Waitangi, said O’Brien, and it should be at the heart of our foreign policy as well. At the same time, the current US approach to diplomacy contrasts sharply with how it has previously dealt with allies and protagonists (for example, in North Korea, Iran, Russia, Europe, Canada, Mexico); and with
global institutions that it established (e.g. NATO, the United Nations, the World Trade Organisation). All this favours a focus on mediation internationally, to seek agreement rather than confrontation. For New Zealand to embrace peace mediation specifically “would be a step change in our foreign policy.” Up until this point, O’Brien observed, there has been some pressure from the NGO community for New Zealand to do more on peace mediation, but the government has not responded. O’Brien suggested that a specific unit be established, with explicit prioritisation from the government. This echoes the words of his book, Presence of Mind: New Zealand in the World, where O’Brien writes:15

Successive governments have not yet sought ... to fashion a deliberate New Zealand role as peace-broker, comparable, say, to Finland or Norway – countries of similar size and international aspiration. Yet New Zealand has displayed singular aptitude when it has chosen to pursue peace-brokering as in Bougainville with a fresh approach and novel methods.

Numerous other interviewees echoed support for some kind of peace mediation unit. Andrew Ladley, a New Zealand international mediator, lawyer, and academic, said: “An argument can be made for New Zealand to set up a dedicated body – such as a peace mediation unit – to focus on the objectives, gather expertise, coordinate research and to orient the work around practical contributions.” He emphasised that for a unit to be useful, New Zealand would need to build capacity, especially since increasingly complex conflicts require matching complex responses, including from mediation: “Conflict complexity has arguably overtaken what was previously understood to be the field of mediation; how does a mediator imagine, let alone actually construct, the fabled peace negotiations where there are multiple conflict parties, overlaps with organised crime, problematic international interventions and proxies, and massive humanitarian and economic crises?”

For Ladley, this complexity emphasises the need for coordination and capacity that could address the challenges of present and future threats, not those of the past. The complexity also requires a much wider definition of both peace and conflict, probably based around some version of ‘human security’. It would stretch disciplines, especially pulling in much more from the field of political economy, since this has been shown to be of crucial relevance in showing how choices were made towards or out of conflict. He pointed to diverse areas where New Zealand had historically pulled together relevant institutional capacity such as agricultural science, climate change, disarmament, women’s
issues, and Treaty issues. He noted that ‘NZ Inc.’’s expertise in disciplines related to mediation might collectively be considerable, but it is scattered. He did not suggest it was necessary to match the enormous peace research investment of Oslo’s Peace Research Institute and Stockholm’s International Peace Research Institute. But if New Zealand wished to engage, it would need some sort of institutional focus to coordinate and build relevant expertise. As he noted, “a goal of assisting to reduce or mitigate current conflict is ‘fluffy’ without realism, including about the increasing complexity of current issues and the limitations of mediation and related contributions.”

One application of that realistic approach is in the capacity to understand risk, both of conflict escalation and of intervention by mediation. Because mediation is relatively ‘soft’, the risks for all concerned are often much lower than the risks of escalating conflict. But in some situations, mediation processes expose conflict participants to great risks (including assassination), or are tactically used by actors to mask preparations for continued war. It is also necessary to understand the requirements of consent: who needs to agree to the intervention, let alone the outcome; what needs to be done to secure that consent? These essentials of detail require practical research and analysis.

Ladley thought that NZ would have particular advantages in some areas, such as in the South Pacific. He noted: “NZ’s Bougainville contribution suggests that in the right context, New Zealand can offer a unique combination of humility arising in part from dealing with our own reconciliation regarding the Treaty of Waitangi, the communicative power of tikanga Māori, and what is perceived to be kiwi approachability and likeability.” Ladley also observed that “inclusion is key” – meaning building processes that hear all key voices involved in the relevant issues. In particular, “inclusion of women in mediation processes needs practicality and imagination rather than box-ticking, from both men and women.”

In her remarks to the Nelson Mandela Peace Summit at the United Nations in New York in September 2018, Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern offered New Zealand’s “unwavering” commitment to strengthening international action in this area, with sentiments that overlap strongly with the thinking laid out by Ladley above.16

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**We must get better at identifying high risk situations and warning signs, before the conflict starts. We must not be silent in the face of intolerance, hate and discrimination. We must speak for those who do not have a voice. We must pursue equal rights for all.**
Rosemary Banks saw New Zealand’s success in playing a mediating role in Bougainville, an experience we discuss further below, as resulting from political commitment, diplomatic and military support and conflict weariness on the part of the combatants. If these conditions were met, she agreed that “there could be value in trying to institutionalise our capacity to respond and offer help like that in the future.” Dave Gawn, from a different, military perspective – he was formerly Chief of the Army and Head of Mission/Chief of Staff to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation – was similarly supportive in general terms. He said in an interview: “The idea of a body that is dedicated to New Zealand’s contribution to international peace and conflict work is sensible.” He suggested that body could “make sure New Zealand has a strategy on international peace and conflict work” and build “expertise from across the wider system to implement that strategy.” Gawn pointed to the value of events being hosted by such a body, and to the value of training programmes, such as academic courses, on peace. Former diplomat Neil Walter (also formerly Administrator of Tokelau) noted that New Zealand’s size could be a factor in favour of a strong peace mediation role. “There are some things that big countries can’t do,” Walters said, “that small countries can do.” Colin Keating, former Permanent Representative to the United Nations and founding Executive Director of the Security Council Report, made a similar point: “Remoteness is an asset, not a liability,” he stated. Roxanne Bazergan, Team Leader of the United Nations’ Mediation Support Unit, suggested that smaller countries like New Zealand bring some inherent strengths to mediation work: “The quiet, under the radar and sometimes risky work to open up communications channels between parties to conflict is easier to do when you are a small and non-threatening country.”

David Harland is a New Zealander actively involved in peace mediation efforts internationally, as Executive Director of the Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and a member of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Advisory Board on Mediation. Harland explained in an interview that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has previously considered a greater role for mediation, which he has advocated for in the past (in particular between 2012 and 2017). Harland indicated interest in the idea from politicians and diplomats. A low-risk and low-cost strategy, said Harland, would be for New Zealand to test an increased role in mediation by supporting Crown and iwi financially to share experiences with others overseas on a consultant basis. A minimal project could operate on approximately NZD $200,000 a year. Over the medium or long-term New Zealand could then make a more significant investment in MFAT training, build up a dedicated cadre of professional domestic specialists, establish a mediation support unit, and offer ‘good offices’ as a site of mediation.

A discussion with Steve Marshall, New Zealand’s current Ambassador in Myanmar and former senior representative for the International Labour Organisation in that country, underscored that New Zealand is already involved in some peace mediation efforts. He noted that New Zealand’s non-threatening
military status may allow conversations that are not possible for other countries. He added that New Zealanders have the ability to be diplomatic but also direct, open, and critical; in addition, New Zealanders are regarded as practical, which is a strength. Marshall explained that New Zealand is not playing any formal mediation role in Myanmar, but Marshall has been working for two years as chair of the Peace Support Group, a group of 18 bilateral governments and representatives of international institutions with an interest in the peace process in Myanmar. In this group, information is being shared and assistance offered for the peace process. New Zealand also has various informal relationships with smaller states internationally to advance the cause of peace. New Zealand and Norway, for example, have been cooperating on projects to prepare the ground and institutional capacity for the clearance of landmines in the future, as well as developing capacity for communities to address power and electricity challenges, in Myanmar. All in all, these insights reveal that MFAT’s existing peace mediation work – work conducted without fanfare – should not be underestimated.

It is also worth noting that New Zealand has a record of performing brokering and facilitating roles in international institutions (not necessarily exclusively related to peace). As Adrian Macey has written, New Zealand has been given a disproportionate number of facilitating, chairing, and brokering roles in climate change roles, partly because of diplomatic skills and the perception that New Zealand is not strongly aligned.19 There is a historical lineage for New Zealand’s international facilitation role, with Prime Minister Peter Fraser chairing one of the main diplomatic committees at the founding of the United Nations in 1945 – the committee that established the mechanism for decolonisation and the United Nations Trusteeship Council.

Sir Don McKinnon, former Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs Minister, and Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, was slightly more circumspect than others about New Zealand adopting a dedicated focus on peace mediation. He emphasised the work New Zealand would have to do to be a credible mediator. “If your intent is to have a wide-ranging role like the Norwegians or Swiss” – and we discuss further the activities of Norway and Switzerland below – “I don’t quite see New Zealand in that position yet,” McKinnon observed. “Can you have people specialising in this area? Yes, you can,” McKinnon stated. He proposed starting within the United Nations and suggested that this would be a “25 year ... two generation project.” He accepted, however, that New Zealand could have a “commitment to assist peace processes wherever we can suitably fit into the local landscape.”
In 2005, under the Clark government, New Zealand hosted a visit from the Norwegian Prime Minister, Kjell Magne Bondevik.

Documents prepared for this visit by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and released under the Official Information Act, indicate that the government was interested in pursuing a more structured engagement on peace mediation and conflict resolution, drawing on Norway’s experiences:

» “Norway has a strong reputation in the field of conflict resolution of which it can be justly proud.

» We have had some experience in this field [sic], particularly in the Pacific region (Bougainville, Solomon Islands, Fiji) and have individuals in New Zealand with some expertise in the area.

» Past engagement has, however, been largely ad hoc, and we are beginning to consider whether there is a role for a more structured engagement in this field in our foreign policy. We will be very keen to learn from Norway’s experiences.

» We would be interested to learn more about what role Norwegian political leaders have played in its conflict resolution initiatives.

» We understand that cross-party political support has been an important element underpinning Norway’s interventions. Is there broad political support in Norway for its role as a peace-builder, and how is this consent obtained?”

This excerpt suggests that New Zealand has previously explored the possibility of further institutionalising its work in relation to peace mediation and conflict resolution, but, as others have noted, such steps have not materialised.

An Official Information Act request from New Zealand Alternative also revealed significant initial work on a ‘conflict prevention strategy’ by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in the lead-up to, and during, New Zealand’s period on the United Nations Security Council (from 1 January 2015 until 31 December 2016). Particular attention was paid to conflict prevention when New Zealand assumed the presidency of the Council in September 2016.

A document produced on 28 February 2016, entitled ‘Conflict Prevention Strategy’, recommended “NZ sustaining and developing a modest capacity of its own, so as to work smarter with the UN and also to be better prepared for future regional demands.” It added: “We have all the building blocks. It is important not to let them slip away.” The same document observed: “It may be timely to learn from the mistakes that were made in 1995 after coming off the Council last time. The resources and capacity generated in 93/94 were dissipated. [...] Today it would be a brave (and probably foolish adviser) who would suggest that we are in such a benign security situation that we could afford to repeat the loss of capability that happened in 1995.”

This conflict prevention strategy document prioritised enhancing the conflict prevention capacity of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs. NZD $500,000 was provided to the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, earmarked for conflict prevention work, in July 2017.
On its website, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade describes its peace support operations in terms of regional peace support, current operations and future operations:

MFAT’s role is to work with the UN and other coalitions to assess peace support needs and develop policies and practices. We advise our government on how New Zealand could best contribute to peace support operations. We also work with the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) and Police who do much of the work on the ground.

Regional peace support refers to New Zealand’s engagement in forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, the East Asia Summit and the Pacific Islands Forum as well as direct engagements in Timor Leste, the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea. Much of these latter efforts were undertaken through civilian deployments, including major contributions from the New Zealand Police.

The current operations relate to NZDF and New Zealand Police deployments overseas. At the time of writing, this includes New Zealand Police personnel in: Papua New Guinea (Bougainville); Solomon Islands; Timor-Leste, and Tonga. It also includes NZDF personnel in the following places: Afghanistan, the Arabian Sea, Bahrain, the Cook Islands, Egypt, Fiji, Iraq, Israel/Lebanon/Syria (Golan Heights), Mali, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Republic of Korea, South Sudan, Timor-Leste.

Future operations are described as focused on being ready to support our Pacific neighbours with challenges they may face due to “social, economic, environmental and governance stresses that make them fragile in terms of potential conflicts”. There is also a focus on training of personnel in other countries.

This summary is a snapshot of the work being undertaken by the New Zealand government, through various agencies, in pursuit of peace and security around the world. At the same time, it does not seek comprehensively to describe the peace-related work being undertaken by New Zealand and New Zealanders in various parts of the world, much of which is sensitive, relationship-based and taking place under the radar. Indeed, there is much work in the peace mediation and support space being undertaken by New Zealanders working in humanitarian and other organisations or embedded within UN peace operations. The work of these individuals, such as David Shearer as head of the UN Mission in South Sudan, makes up a key part of New Zealand’s international identity in relation to peace and peace mediation. Also, this description from MFAT does not clearly distinguish between military and non-military activities being undertaken on behalf of New Zealand.
Sir Don McKinnon offered a detailed and helpful account of New Zealand’s role in securing the Bougainville Peace Agreement.

There had been an ongoing conflict on the island of Bougainville (part of an autonomous region in Papua New Guinea) between a secessionist movement and the Papua New Guinean government, between 1988 and 1998. Bougainville contained a large copper ore mine, which was one cause of the conflict, since local Bougainvilleans expressed fears about adverse environmental effects and the influx of workers. In 1997 there were movements towards a ceasefire, and New Zealand played a role in this process.

Sir Don McKinnon explained via Skype that the civil war had felt “absolutely bitter all round”. He first visited Bougainville in 1995 as part of a tour to the Pacific. “What we saw was just appalling,” McKinnon recounted. “This is our home region,” he said (noting pointedly that we should not talk about the Pacific region as “our backyard”, since that implies that New Zealand is in the “front-yard”). New Zealand’s natural inclination would have been to support Australia, but what McKinnon saw prompted a rethink. He attempted not to raise expectations, but he suggested to Prime Minister Jim Bolger that “we can do a little bit more” by “engaging with them”. He insisted on the value of “spend[ing] three or four days listening”. McKinnon sought to bring parties “to New Zealand without any preconditions whatsoever”, to “look at political structures that were there”, and to “talk about some kind of autonomy”. Various models were cited, including Hong Kong, Zanzibar, and elsewhere, but New Zealand did not take a stance.

A key part of what McKinnon did, on his account, was to take the parties out of the conflict zone and to encourage discussion – though “we were not putting direct pressure on them for a result”, said McKinnon. McKinnon was also emphatic that New Zealand should not claim too much credit for the peace agreement that eventuated: the “Burnham Declaration ... was very much [the parties’] own work”, and it took a “long process” of collaboration with multiple parties. As well, it involved some measure of good luck: “a lot of stars were aligned”, in McKinnon’s words. McKinnon emphasised the calm approach taken by New Zealand (which he contrasts with the Australian approach in the region), and observed that New Zealanders supporting the process “never tried to push the pace”. In particular, McKinnon “didn’t want to create an expectation in the New Zealand media that something dramatic was going to happen.” McKinnon pinpoints several features of preparation and summit design as key to the eventual agreement. First, Māori women soldiers were engaged: they “had a remarkable ability to develop empathy with women on Bougainville.”
Second, funding was committed by the government, though it did run dry eventually. Third, a core interdisciplinary team of people from Defence and MFAT undertook preparation and shepherded the process. As already noted, McKinnon was cautious but optimistic about New Zealand playing a similar role again in other conflicts. McKinnon’s account is corroborated by a reference to Bougainville in a prominent 2009 publication on peace mediation, which noted that: “when New Zealand mediated the Bougainville conflict in 1995 [sic], it brought both parties to a military camp in New Zealand and exercised full control over the procedural aspects of the interaction (but little or no control over other aspects).”

Other interviewees drew lessons from New Zealand’s experience in Bougainville, too. Maire Leadbeater underscored the importance of tikanga Māori in the process. She noted that it was diplomat (and later National Party MP) John Hayes’ initiative – perhaps on the advice of others – to ensure pōwhiri and hongi were part of the peace discussions. “This had a calming influence,” said Leadbeater. She also emphasised the importance of women’s involvement, especially “Bougainville women who had been working with their men to discourage violence.” Women were invited and included in the peace negotiations at Burnham military camp, and put pressure on male delegates to sign a peace agreement. As Helen Hakena, a Bougainvillean peace activist, explained: it was “women who were willing to talk, women who were willing to mobilise people, because the men did not trust each other.” Her view was echoed by Jerry Mateparae, who commanded the combined-force Peace Monitoring Group on Bougainville in 1998: “the women’s groups actually achieved things... which meant peace was actually delivered.”

Dr. Anna Powles, Senior Lecturer in Security Studies at Massey University, has conducted extensive research on the Bougainville negotiations, and provided further commentary on Bougainville. She noted that collaboration between MFAT and Defence was important for the success of the Burnham talks, with John Hayes (MFAT) and Roger Mortlock (of the New Zealand Defence Force) being the key architects of the dialogues.

New Zealand’s experience in Bougainville is important as it is the only time, to our knowledge, that the country has publicly hosted international peace negotiations. New Zealand’s strategy in the Bougainville conflict may not always be successful in other cases. International mediators often need to try a range of approaches, and even then may not succeed, as is discussed further below.
THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT FOR PEACE MEDIATION

The traditional stalwarts of mediation practice have evolved to meet this new environment and the changes in their practice and approach reflect these larger changes in the field itself. In particular, the emergence of the field of mediation support – as distinct from the practice of mediation itself – has reconfigured the international institutional landscape for peace support. Where mediation can be defined as the assistance of third parties to help opposing parties reach an agreement, mediation support centres around three types of activities: first, research and knowledge production about mediation; second, training and capacity-building aimed at enhancing the ability of mediators and conflict parties to reach agreements; and third, providing logistical, administrative, and technical support to mediators and their staff for the advancement of peace processes. The distinction between mediation and mediation support has emerged gradually since the early 2000s when the first mediation support structures were established among bilateral actors (most notably Switzerland) and from there spread to the United Nations and other regional and supra-national organisations, including the European Union (EU), the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the African Union (AU).

Amongst arbiters of mediation the United Nations has long been and remains the world’s pre-eminent authority with responsibility for peace-making based on Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. During the Cold War and after its end this responsibility was principally met in the exercise of ‘good offices’ by the UN Secretary-General, and resulted in a number of successful outcomes during the 1990s, including notably the peace process in El Salvador. In the early 2000s member states began to call for a more systematic approach to peace processes and mediation: the landmark report of the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, issued advice in 2004 to professionalize support for mediation to meet increasing demand. This recommendation was followed by Member States’ request in the 2005 World Summit Outcome for the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to strengthen mediation support – a call which formalized recognition for the UN’s role in mediation and resulted in 2006 in the creation of the UN Mediation Support Unit (MSU) within the Department for Political Affairs.

Beginning small with 1-2 staff, the MSU fought from the beginning to prove its value in an institutional landscape where peace support was considered the core task of regional DPA divisions. A focus on technical expertise as well as the usefulness of the Standby Team helped prove the relevance of the unit.
early on by making available specialist thematic expertise that regional desks did not otherwise have. Since its inception, the MSU has grown to a staff of more than 20 people.

The MSU is responsible for mediation support across the UN system despite finding its institutional home within DPA. It has three functions: technical and operational support to peace processes; strengthening mediation capacity; and developing and disseminating mediation knowledge. Its expertise is divided between core staff at the UN’s New York headquarters and members of the Standby Team of Senior Mediation Advisors – a rotating annual roster of 7-8 subject area specialists available for immediate deployment to the field as required. The MSU also maintains a roster of several hundred qualified thematic experts as well as broad and deep partnerships with external institutions, such as specialist think-tanks and NGOs.

At the same time as the professionalization of mediation support was being institutionalised within the UN, a normative policy framework was under development to guide UN mediation practice. This process began with the UNSG’s first dedicated report on mediation issued in 2009, offering a vision for UN mediation and support activities as well as the MSU. This was followed in 2011 by the first UN General Assembly resolution to address mediation explicitly and request to the UNSG to draft guidance on the topic, which was presented and unanimously adopted in 2012, giving the UN a detailed definition of mediation for the first time.

Mediation support units in other multilateral settings have emerged in a similar way and faced similar challenges to the UN’s MSU. The mandate for mediation within the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, for example, dates back to its founding document, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, but a dedicated unit for mediation support was only established in 2011 (and with the direct support of the UN MSU). Inspired to “copy/paste” a workable plan from the UN, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Mediation Support Team has a similar mandate but is adapted to the unique elements of the OSCE setting such as consensus decision-making. Beginning modestly with a single staff member as a dedicated focal point in 2012, the staff grew to three with the support of a small but active coalition of supportive member-states (Switzerland, Finland and Turkey). By raising extra-budgetary funds and building interest through a series of pilot activities, the unit was able to make itself a source of useful partnership (as opposed to competition) for existing elements of the OSCE structure. This pragmatic approach allowed the unit to prove its usefulness at low cost, becoming by 2014 a “hub” for the specialist knowledge and expertise it gradually built up.
The example of the UN MSU also inspired moves towards the institutionalization and professionalization of mediation within the European Union. The EU already had a long history of supporting mediation in peace processes either through member-states or its own delegations, Special Representatives and Envoys or CSDP missions. In 2009 the two-year campaign of members of the EU Parliament and a consortium of civil society organisations culminated in the EU Council’s adoption of the ‘Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities’, which for the first time distilled historical EU support for mediation into a set of principles and practices. The concept resulted in a pilot project launched in 2010 that established a single staff member within the Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Mediation Instruments Division (K2) of the European External Action Services’ specialist Security Policy Division (SECPOL) 2. The new unit focussed on operational support and internal capacity building for mediation, knowledge management, and partnerships and outreach to the UN and civil society.

The role of a few relatively small states has been instrumental in creating and promoting more coherent, professional and systematic support for mediators and peace processes. These are states traditionally associated with mediation efforts and a preference for relatively pacifist rather than militaristic solutions to conflict, such as Switzerland, Norway, Sweden and Finland (some of which are discussed further below). All of these countries have made peace and security a centre-piece of their foreign policies with varying degrees of neutrality and financial investment. Whilst their commitments have been configured differently they share a willingness to form close working partnerships for peace support with civil society actors such as NGOs and think-tanks. They direct their support internally to those working under a national mandate in a particular setting as well as externally to support other international actors in peace processes where they do not play a lead role. They also support multilateral mediation support structures and the peace processes they broker.

The experience of these traditional actors in mediation shows that an investment of time and strategic patience is essential to building up the credibility necessary to become a central actor in international peace efforts. Yet there are also a number of states who are relative newcomers to the field of peace mediation or who have played successful roles in spite of their relative lack of experience or systematic support structures. For example, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have sought to broker peace processes on a regional basis, while Singapore has carved out a reputation for negotiation in mediated trade negotiation. Canada in the meantime has refocused its foreign policy on increasing “Canada’s support for United Nations peace operations and its mediation, conflict-prevention, and post-conflict reconstruction efforts” 29 Making mediation part of its renewed commitment through its newly established Peace and Stabilization Operations Programme, Canada has committed several million CAD to support mediation and dialogue in contexts as diverse as Syria, Ukraine, Colombia and South Sudan. 30

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Further developments in the field of mediation have seen the growing involvement of civil society actors, and in particular specialist local and international non-governmental organisations. Civil society has always had a role to play in mediation but its increased participation has made the distinction between formal and informal peace processes, as well as tracks one, two and three, more malleable. This is partly due to the call for greater inclusion of civil society and especially women in peace process: access to otherwise closed negotiation processes has increased somewhat, creating greater space for civil society to support mediation. At the same time, the so-called global ‘War on Terror’ and the labelling of conflict parties as ‘terrorist actors’ has constrained the ability of states to reach out to all conflict parties via formal channels: this has increased the usefulness of using civil society actors as indirect brokers and go-betweens.

A small number of NGOs have become leading specialists of mediation: the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, based in Geneva, is among the pre-eminent private centres supporting mediation and hosts the annual Oslo Forum, which brings together the world’s most experienced mediators to discuss their art and practice. The London-based Conciliation Resources and the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) are also reputed specialists. Among these specialists, some have carved out roles as primary support-partners to national mediation structures: for example, swisspeace in Bern and the Centre for Security Studies in Zurich work closely with the Swiss FDFA on mediation; and in Germany, the Berlin Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (Centre for International Peace Operations: ZIF) and the Berghof Foundation have similar support roles.

Some international NGOs focused on mediation or aspects of support to peace processes have different specialisations: the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva Call, and the International Committee of the Red Cross, for example, all specialise in so-called humanitarian mediation, which means negotiating protection of civilians, safe access for humanitarian actors, and respect for international humanitarian law in conflict settings where political dialogue is all but impossible. Where political dialogue is possible, some such as the Asia Foundation, or South Africa’s African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) focus on geographical regions. Others have a broad thematic and geographical reach but are built around the reputation of a former statesman: for example, the Carter Centre through which former US President Jimmy Carter negotiated the 1999 Nairobi Agreement between Sudan and Uganda and which supports a range of mediation activities; the Kofi Annan Foundation, which has worked in Burkina Faso, Colombia, Iraq, Kenya, Myanmar, and Senegal, among other places; and Crisis Management Initiative, which was founded by former President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari and played a prominent role in bringing peace to Aceh in 2004. Civil society actors of this kind are especially useful in convening so-called Track 1.5 dialogues, which are...
not formally endorsed or recognised but bring together people close enough to official circles of power as to carry particular political influence.

Religious and faith-based organisations have also developed conflict mediation skills: prominent examples include Islamic Relief Services, Catholic Relief Services, and the Quakers. Among the most well-known examples of religious peace brokers is the Community of Sant’Egidio, which concluded its first successful peace accord in Mozambique in 1992 and in 2017 formalised its relationship with the UN’s Department of Political Affairs after more than three decades of cooperation in conflict prevention and peacemaking.32

Civil society actors have been successful in mediating peace processes because they can be more flexible, more responsive, and less intimidating than state-based or international mediators. They may also bring specialist thematic or regional expertise and be able to invest in a longer-term engagement than state or international actors can sustain. Involving an international NGO in a mediation role can also be helpful because it offers a way to internationalise a conflict (something non-state conflict parties often want) but without the risk of conferring legitimacy on non-state conflict parties (something state parties usually fear). Although civil society mediators will never wield the political or economic leverage that state or multilateral mediators bring, they also do not come with the same vested interests that typically motivate state-based actors.

OTHER COUNTRIES’ EXPERIENCES: NORWAY, SWITZERLAND, AND GERMANY

A number of other countries have focused on developing a comparative advantage in peace mediation.

Finland has developed comparative advantage in peace mediation, including by building on the success of individual mediators such as Martti Ahtisaari. In comments that would equally apply to New Zealand, Finland has framed its focus on peace mediation in the following terms:33

To stand out from the crowd a small nation needs to be creative. A high-profile and transparent foreign policy as well as close personal contacts in the international arena are invaluable.
South Africa has been a leading contributor to peace mediation and conflict prevention efforts on the African continent. Its own history has played an important part in shaping its engagement in this area. This is because South Africa was able to draw on its own experiences, including the setting up of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and the process of developing the constitution. These have often been used as entry points for initiatives and engagements on the continent. Similarly, Ireland, brings its own history of conflict and tension to the table in its work on peace mediation. At a recent United Nations meeting on peace mediation, Ireland emphasised the importance of women in mediation, recognising the role of the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition in the achievement of the Good Friday Agreement. New Zealand has made similar statements about the importance of women in peace mediation and conflict resolution. Constraints of brevity and time mean we cannot provide an extensive analysis of Finland, South Africa or Ireland’s approaches, but they are instructive given parallels with elements of New Zealand’s history, situation and suitability as a peace mediator. We focus below in a little more depth on two well-known peace mediators (Norway and Switzerland) and Germany, a country seeking to be more active in international mediation.

**SWITZERLAND**

Switzerland is a country with a long history of supporting international peace. We conducted an interview with Zenna Bou Chakra and Georg Stein of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs’ (FDFA) Mediation Desk in order to understand better Switzerland’s approach. Switzerland’s support to mediation is situated within its larger policy on peace, human rights and humanitarian aid. The Human Security Division, of which the Mediation Desk is part, benefits from a “four yearly framework credit”, based on a federal law. The Mediation Desk has grown since its inception in 2003/04, from a single full-time staff position to six full-time staff members in 2018. The Desk also draws regularly on the support
of the Mediation Support Project (MSP), a joint venture between the Swiss thinktank, swisspeace, and the Centre for Security Studies (CSS) at a leading Swiss university, the ETH Zurich.

Bou Chakra and Stein explained that Switzerland’s approach to mediation covers a range of activities: (1) dialogue support, which means enabling and structuring dialogue between conflicting parties to deepen mutual understanding; (2) facilitation, which is a kind of ‘mediation-light’ whereby Switzerland assists conflict parties to clarify issues and prepare for future peace processes; (3) negotiation support, which means providing expertise on the substance of negotiations; (4) mediation support, whereby Switzerland supports a team of mediators and provides thematic expertise to shape and guide the content of negotiations within a mediation framework; and finally, (5) mediation proper. Mediation proper is quite rare and means that Switzerland is responsible for leading, shaping and guiding the process itself. Switzerland has further developed a distinction between political and thematic expertise in mediation. Offering political expertise, on the one hand, involves strategic and political leadership of the negotiation process and the mediation team; thematic expertise, on the other hand, means Switzerland provides expertise on issues of content and design of the process to the chief mediators and parties to the mediation. Switzerland is active across all five layers of mediation activities and across all tracks.

**DEFINING TRACKS IN MEDIATION**

International peace mediation is sometimes described in terms of ‘tracks’ of dialogue. ‘Track one’ diplomacy involves formal State officials and sometimes military groups. ‘Track two’ involves more informal and unofficial interactions (often involving NGOs). There are also references in the literature to ‘track three’ diplomacy (involving commercial or business actors) as well as other tracks, all the way through to ‘track nine’ (which relates to media).

- **Track 1** – official negotiations between parties to the conflict, and including government representatives.
- **Track 2** – informal negotiations often involving NGOs, alongside government representatives.
- **Track 3** – informal negotiations involving business and civil society, and typically not government officials.
Swiss peace support and mediation activities are facilitated by Switzerland’s policy of deploying civilian experts to fragile situations under its policy on peace and human rights. The work of so-called Human Security Advisors facilitates a close reading of context and often allows them to identify opportunities where the support or assistance of Swiss mediation might be useful. These Advisors are not necessarily career diplomats; in total there are around 20 of these advisors working around the world at any given time. Their success relies on the fact that they are experienced civilian experts with deep relationships and strong knowledge of the local situation.

Switzerland has also invested in professionalising its mediation capacity and an important aspect of this investment has been the development of an academic programme to support mediation work. Since 2017, the CSS/ETH Zurich has offered a Master of Advanced Studies on Mediation in Peace Processes. This is funded by Switzerland, Sweden, Germany, and Finland, all of which send diplomats and/or experts, including from the global south. The course is also supported by international organisations, such as the United Nations (UN), European Union, (EU) and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The Master of Advanced Studies provides 1,800 hours of training and study through six modules over two years, and is therefore more extensive than the United Nations High Level Mediation course (which runs for just one week).

Aspects of Switzerland’s history and identity support its role in peace mediation: in particular, its policy of political neutrality; its long humanitarian tradition (associated with the International Committee of the Red Cross); and its domestic history of peaceful conflict management across linguistic and cultural divides. Regarding New Zealand, the Swiss experts noted that New Zealand mediation capacity would benefit from being guided by appropriate expertise and funding, and that Swiss experience indicated that any role in mediation requires both commitment and a certain tolerance of risk. They further asked whether New Zealand might be able to develop a regional comparative advantage. They recommended that New Zealand could contribute to multilateral mechanisms, such as the United Nations Mediation Support Unit, while pursuing its own priorities. While New Zealand has contributed funds to the UN’s mediation capacity, there are real opportunities for New Zealand to better support multilateral mediation structures: for example, New Zealand is not currently a member of the United Nations Group of Friends Mediation Network; and New Zealand did not speak at a recent open meeting of the United Nations Security Council on peace mediation.
For a previous project, one of the co-authors of this report interviewed several individuals in Norway about peace mediation. In those interviews, Norwegian officials emphasised that Norway’s effectiveness in peace mediation – which has not been without its failures – is a result, at least in part, of sustained political commitment and dedicated funding. Jan Egeland, now Secretary-General of the Norwegian Refugee Council, said: “if you’re not willing to invest some resources and some money [into building capacity in peace-building] it will rarely become effective.”41

We interviewed Dag Nylander, Director of the Section for Peace and Reconciliation in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to hear further elaboration on these points. Nylander observed that there has been strong political will in Norway for peace mediation since at least the early 1990s, partly because of the link between peace and reconciliation work and “humanitarian ideals” at the core of Norway’s identity. Political will has also been sustained through work that has been done through the Oslo Agreement (between Israel and the Palestinian territories), in Guatemala, and in El Salvador. Norway’s “not having a colonial history” and being a “relatively small country”, with a “relatively small footprint” internationally, has been important for Norway’s relative success in this field. Overall, as Nylander said, “it is difficult to suspect Norway for having ulterior motives” and this makes Norway an apt mediator and facilitator.

Nylander’s unit is comprised of 12-15 diplomats. Nylander made it clear that the section does not focus so much on negotiating ceasefires or constitutional issues, which might be regarded as other aspects of ‘peace and reconciliation’, broadly construed. In the past the section has been supportive of United Nations mediation work (through exchanges and funding), and it has developed a complementary relationship with the United Nations – it is engaged in processes where the UN is not engaged, but will not engage with some processes that the UN is in the best position to handle (as with Syria peace negotiations). The section has done particular work on ‘track two’ initiatives, discussed further below, preparing the ground for more formal state-level interactions. The section tends to be made up of quite senior diplomats, who have spent time at the Norwegian ministry and completed at least one or two postings overseas. It maintains a network of relationships with NGOs, in Norway and abroad.

Nylander was supportive in principle of the idea of New Zealand doing more to advance peace and reconciliation. He noted that peace mediation is a “crowded field” but that he would “welcome cooperation” if a unit of some kind were to be set up, and said there was always “room for professional diplomats” doing dedicated work. He recommended that the focus be on low-profile, behind-the-scenes work, by “permanently interested and focused” people, with
high-profile mediators brought on board only occasionally and selectively. On the question of whether New Zealand or other countries should only act when invited in, he said the best approach was always context-sensitive. A country “can do quite a lot before you get a formal invitation”, but any preparatory or anticipatory work involves “political risk” that needs to be managed carefully.

GERMANY

Germany is not well-known internationally for its role in peace mediation. However, in the past few years it has sought to develop a more proactive role. In 2017, the German Government released Guidelines on Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace, a 155-page publication on Germany’s strategy towards peace and conflict prevention. The publication goes beyond peace mediation, and offers a toolkit of measures and interventions to build peace. One suggestion it offers is that Germany might support the development of mediation capacity in other countries and regional organisations, such as the African Union. The report also expresses an intention for Germany to expand its mediation capabilities. “The Federal Government is firmly committed to further expanding its mediation capabilities,” the report notes, “and to intensifying its involvement in mediation processes, as well as the long-term development of the UN’s and other partners’ mediation processes, as well as the long-term development of the UN’s and other partners’ mediation capacities, and may even involve direct participation in mediation processes.” The report gives a useful definition of peace mediation, outlines how it can be delivered, and explains its benefits:

The term peace mediation describes the mediation process between conflict parties in formal and informal negotiation processes. Mediation serves to prevent and manage domestic and international conflicts and is therefore at the heart of preventive policy. Mediation can be the first step towards establishing contact between the conflict parties, and can help every step of the way, from support of ceasefire negotiations all the way to the implementation of an agreement and the associated political reform processes. Mediation efforts are generally found to have greatly improved chances of success if women are equally involved, and if their concerns and interests are equally reflected in the mediation efforts.
It is the Federal Government’s firm belief that mediation can help to bridge the often deep political and social rifts between conflict parties, and to develop a basis of mutual trust. It supports in particular the training of mediators (e.g. from regional organisations, ministries and civil society) and the local institutionalisation of mediation processes (e.g. in land rights issues). The Federal Government also supports the negotiating delegations of conflict parties, e.g. by providing “protected and confidential spaces” outside of the regular negotiation context, or by providing resources and institutional structures, but also by offering basic and further training programmes to strengthen the delegations’ negotiating skills. In these endeavours, the Federal Government works in close collaboration with partner states experienced in mediation and with international organisations such as the United Nations, OSCE [Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe] or AU [African Union], as well as with non-governmental organisations.

The report also mentions Germany’s plan to second judges to support peace operations, and Germany’s existing Civil Peace Service, a joint government-NGO mechanism for bottom-up peacebuilding support that has existed since 1999.

Overall, the report shows how a country (albeit one with greater economic and military clout than New Zealand) might set out to develop peace mediation capacity, building on existing initiatives. It reveals the value of training in mediation for diplomatic services; the fact that provision of “protected and confidential spaces” is a useful contribution to mediation; that a country’s judges might support mediation work; and that collaboration with NGOs (through a body such as the Civil Peace Service) can amplify the effect of mediation work.
THE NEED FOR NEW APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE MEDIATION

Mediated solutions to end armed conflict have been dramatically successful since the end of the Cold War. More armed conflicts were resolved through mediated solutions in the fifteen years between 1985 and year 2000 than in the past two hundred years combined. Moreover, 74.6 per cent of conflicts between 1985-2015 ended in mediated agreements, which over the same period have also proven to be the most durable and stable form of conflict termination. The majority of these agreements were externally brokered by third parties, most often under the auspices of the United Nations, or a regional organization.

However, the end of the Cold War has dramatically changed the nature of armed conflict, and challenged the effectiveness of conventional peace-mediation models. The typical configuration of a conflict in the twentieth century saw a state party challenged by a single, relatively coherent fighting force. Mediation involved brokering an international peace negotiation, which if successful, would lead to a comprehensive peace agreement detailing a relatively broad plan for political transition to be implemented under international auspices. These were the days when mediation became synonymous with a single prominent envoy using his (and it was often a man) reputation and gravitas to usher opposed parties through a peace process culminating in a comprehensive accord. In these circumstances (as noted above), mediation was the domain of the ‘good offices’ of the UN Secretary-General, a relevant regional organisation or a state with a vested foreign policy interest (stemming from colonial relationships for example) or one of the small set of countries that made mediation a centrepiece of its foreign policy: Switzerland, Finland, Sweden or Norway, for example.

Since the mid-2000s armed conflicts have become more fragmented, with a larger numbers of fighting forces, vying for different causes. Crises now last longer on average and limited agreements focused on temporary ceasefires or narrower political questions have become more common than ambitious comprehensive agreements. Addressing and preventing conflict has become more difficult due to new drivers of violence such as climate change, the influence of transnational organized crime, and high rates of inequality. The 2018 United Nations and World Bank Pathways for Peace report (of which one of the contributing authors was New Zealander Chris Mahony, interviewed below) has emphasised that people engage in violence because of perceived, or real, unequal access to resources, political power, land, justice and security, and services. It notes that: “Some of the greatest risks of violence...
today stem from the mobilization of perceptions of exclusion and injustice, rooted in inequalities across groups”. Addressing inequality, conflict and transnational crime are not simple tasks.

Armed conflict in the twenty-first century is not only more complex, but also more widespread. The 2018 OECD States of Fragility report observed an increase in recorded armed political violence with more countries at war in the year 2016 than at any time in the past 30 years. This increase in violence, together with visible failures of international intervention in Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, Yemen, CAR, South Sudan and DRC, has contributed to create a sense of pessimism and hopelessness about the prospects for international peace-making. The increase in and severity of violence across so many contexts also underlines the need to rethink international approaches to mediation.

The practice of international mediation has begun to change as a result. There is an expansion of dialogue and support roles ranging from high-level official governmental deliberations to unofficial dialogue and grassroots peace promotion. The demands of sustaining support for drawn-out and complex negotiations have created incentives for international actors to form coalitions among multilateral and regional organizations, interested states, and a professionalized cadre of private organisations. The vision of mediation as a “high art performed by the eminent” has largely given way to an increasingly professionalized space supported by internationally sponsored training programmes and dedicated support units ready to lend expertise, experience, and resources to peace processes.

Mediation is now undertaken more often by multi-stakeholder mediation teams and if there is a lead mediator, then the role tends to rotate over a longer process. Even where there is a most eminent stately figure at the helm of the negotiations at any given time, an international coalition is to be found behind the scenes offering technical, thematic and operational support. A range of state actors and regional and international organizations configured as “groups of friends” or “contact groups” typically form to guide the process in a desired direction and many seek to maximise their influence on such processes by maintaining bespoke mediation support structures.

Critically, the potential benefits (and relative costs) of international mediation are not up for question. It is still cheaper to invest in peace mediation and conflict prevention activities than having to deal with the outbreak of violence. As the Pathways for Peace report explains: “Even in the most pessimistic scenario where preventative action is rarely successful, the average net savings are close to US $5 billion per year. In the most optimistic scenario, the net savings are almost $70 billion per year.”
The international community is calling for new approaches to prevent, and mediate international conflict. In this context, New Zealand could pioneer new approaches to international conflict mediation, which acknowledge the complexity of armed violence today, the need to collaborate with many actors, and to address the underlying causes of conflict. New Zealand, for instance, could draw on its own experiences (both successes and failures) in natural resource management, political power sharing, and indigenous relations. New Zealand has much to bring to the international table, as we discuss in the following section.

**THE DESIGN AND POSITIONING OF A POSSIBLE PEACE MEDIATION AND CONFLICT PREVENTION UNIT**

Multiple views were expressed about how a peace mediation unit, or commission, should be designed and positioned. All interviewees emphasised the need for a well-resourced commitment to peace mediation. Colin Keating underscored the value of a bipartisan commitment to peace mediation. “In Norway it doesn’t matter whether it’s a Labour or Conservative government in power,” Keating explained. “Both sides understand what it can do for the reputation of the country.” The same ethos is needed in New Zealand. “We need to get that bipartisan sense if it were to work,” he said. “It can’t be seen to be driven by one side of politics.”

The value of support from the military was also underscored. Bethan Greener, Associate Professor of Politics at Massey University (and author of the book, *Army Fundamentals*), noted that there could be value in broadening the usual response of turning to the military in the event of an overseas conflict. Neil Walter noted that there is good interagency coordination, which augurs well for a role for Defence in peace mediation work. In addition to collaboration with the New Zealand Defence Force, there is a need for any peace mediation body to maintain connections to civil society. This was a point emphasised by those we interviewed who are based in Switzerland and Norway. Colin Keating also recommended that work go into building international partnerships. “New Zealand needs to have partners,” he said, “whether someone like Norway, or DPA [the United Nations Department of Political Affairs], or the Swiss…”

Careful thought must go into the personnel that might comprise a peace mediation unit. Several interviewees noted the need for strong Māori involvement, to draw on expertise in tikanga Māori, and to honour Te Tiriti o Waitangi. Kevin Clements, Foundation Chair of Peace and Conflict Studies, and former Director of the New Zealand National Centre for Peace and
Conflict Studies, highlighted that peace mediation requires an integrated approach across skills and policy areas. Multifaceted teams are needed, since “people good at convening may not be good at facilitation.” Andrew Ladley echoed the point, noting that mediation is an “inherently interdisciplinary field.” A peace mediation unit would need people with knowledge of history, international relations, and culture, as well as people with interpersonal skills, negotiation and mediation abilities, and experience working in different settings.

A further feature underlined by interviewees was the need for New Zealanders working in peace mediation to be humble and low-profile, especially in preparatory work. There is also a need for humility and realism, as Rosemary Banks pointed out, in determining what New Zealand can and cannot do. New Zealand would have insufficient knowledge and profile in certain conflict settings, or would not be as well-placed as other states or NGOs to do some conflict mediation. A hard-nosed appraisal of capabilities will be needed. In a similar vein, New Zealand as a country should not seek to push itself onto anyone. Effective peace mediation support is not about telling people how they should solve their problems, as interviewees explained. During the Bougainville conflict, New Zealand was specifically asked to help and this is a sound basis for any involvement in peace mediation support. However, if New Zealand wants to be asked for help, a unit will need to build up the capacity to provide assistance so that we are relevant to countries experiencing armed conflict. This requires a dedicated focus on peace mediation and conflict resolution and it means putting budgetary resources into a strategy for peace mediation support.

From her perspective working with Pacific states, Anna Powles explained the need for a partnership rather than paternalistic approach to peace mediation:

**Governments in the Pacific tend to be rightly wary of a bunch of white people coming in and seeking to solve their conflict problems. So this needs to be done as a partnership in a sophisticated way. We should make sure that any peace mediation proposals fit with the Pacific reset.**
Kevin Clements made a similar point, drawing links between our evolving aid and development policy and the emergence of a strategy on peace mediation support:

We should link conflict mediation to a different kind of aid and development policy. This should be a policy of accompaniment rather than neo-colonial dictation. We should do work in collaboration with people who want it - a needs-based approach rather than thinking about what we can give. It should be about listening to parties to the conflict.

A theme emerging from interviews was that New Zealand ought to be alert to emerging conflicts and existing flash points, but must avoid ‘rushing in’. Andrew Ladley observed that speed in engaging with a peace process had proved ill-advised for some in the past, not least because people sometimes presumed they had met the requirements for consent from key players to the intervention itself. It was noted, on the subject of humility, that high-profile people might sometimes be useful for particular mediating roles – but at other times were major impediments because of the importance of a low profile. Colin Keating, amongst others, was unsure that high-profile individuals needed to be a priority for the establishment of some kind of peace mediation unit.

A key question, on which different views were expressed, is where a peace mediation unit might be housed within the New Zealand political landscape. Some interviewees favoured centring such a unit within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, while others explicitly recommended that the unit sit outside the Ministry. Anna Powles observed that an important issue is how the unit would be funded; and it is true (though Dr. Powles did not say this) that if the unit were housed within the Ministry, its funding source would be clearer. On the other hand, Maire Leadbeater insisted that the unit “needs to be as independent as possible” to be able to make meaningful recommendations. Tina Ngata said: “I think it’s a very good idea to set the unit up, but I think that unit needs to be both mandated by and independent of government”; as with a government watchdog, Ngata explained, the unit would have to be “recognised” and “taken heed of” by government. In part, Ngata noted, this independence would be necessary because the government itself does not have a good record in matters of peace and conflict relating to Māori within New Zealand, a point that we discuss further below.
Alongside these points from interviews, it is worth considering some general insights from the literature on mediation when discussing a peace mediation unit’s functions and positioning. Mediation can be costly and time-consuming, and “the greater the intensity of conflict, the more likely it will require experienced, institutional mediators with larger resources and the ability to mobilise sustained and active efforts in order to change the course of the conflict.”

Experts have noted that mediation occurs along a spectrum from fairly passive (e.g. transferring information from one side to the other) to very active involvement (e.g. offering promises of political and economic support). Mediation scholars describe three types of mediation strategies: communication-facilitation (used in the Oslo agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation, which involves relatively passive channelling of information between parties without control over process or substance); procedural strategies (where a mediator determines the environment and process of mediation, as New Zealand did in Bougainville); and directive strategies (where the mediator steers the content and substance of bargaining, and may change the way issues are framed). There is also a distinction often drawn in the literature between mediation (the actual brokering of relationships at a time of breakdown) and mediation support (background work done to prepare, support, and follow-up on mediation). Experts have noted that the success of mediation strategies is context specific. Direct strategies may work in more intense conflicts, but not in low intensity conflicts. A peace mediation unit will need to develop expertise, and weigh up which of these strategies, and approaches is most important in each context. New Zealand would need to partner with other countries to develop knowledge of different approaches and implement these.

A final strategic consideration is whether a New Zealand peace mediation unit should have a regional focus: for example, whether the unit should be dedicated to mediation and brokering in the Pacific. In an interview, former New Zealand Member of Parliament Charles Chauvel thought that a regional or Commonwealth focus made most sense, although he felt that a regional approach would ideally be part of a much more robust and comprehensive approach to New Zealand’s overall support to small island developing states in the Pacific. This might involve a peace mediation orientation towards the Pacific, though more would be required and Chauvel did not touch on this point specifically. David Harland recommended a regional focus, partly because mediation is “an incredibly crowded international space”, and because New Zealand could “carry relative weight” in the Pacific to prevent violence. Kevin Clements suggested a broader Asia-Pacific focus. Colin Keating, however, noted that New Zealand’s experience in Bougainville was successful because both sides viewed New Zealand as “neutral” and “disinterested”. New Zealand has a strong knowledge of the Pacific, arguably
more than any other regional area, which is a good rationale for focusing efforts there. However, New Zealand also has various vested interests, including through aid and business. Keating explained: “While it was true that NZ was seen as a valuable independent mediator in the Bougainville case, that situation had a special context. It would be wrong to extrapolate from that and conclude that the same would automatically be true elsewhere in the Pacific. To the contrary, the deep NZ connections in the region as a whole could often be a barrier to NZ mediation role.

WOULD SETTING UP A PEACE MEDIATION AND CONFLICT PREVENTION UNIT BE HYPOCRITICAL OR HINDERED BY OTHER FEATURES OF NEW ZEALAND POLITICS TODAY?

Five further points arose, out of interviews and research, regarding how a peace mediation unit might be hypocritical – or hindered by other structural features of New Zealand politics. These need to be carefully considered.

First, and in our view most importantly, there is the major problem that New Zealand’s government has a record of disrupting peace domestically in its own interactions with Māori. The eighteenth and nineteenth century is full of examples – whether the Waikato War, the invasions at Parihaka, or land confiscations through the Native Land Court – of government-initiated conflict with Māori. But much of this conflict continued into the twentieth century, with the Tohunga Suppression Act 1907 (banning Māori cultural and medicinal practices) being just one example. And this sense that the government has failed to keep peace with Māori persists in the minds of many, as Tina Ngata explained. Ngata noted that the government might not accept that it has perpetrated acts of war, “but from a Māori perspective when everyone around you is dying before their time, and you are never guaranteed that you’ll have your baby pass two years of age, from our perspective it is” a state where it cannot be said that peace is present. Ngata underscored the hypocrisy of New Zealand advocating for, or brokering, peace internationally while this state persists domestically, comparing it to “a domestic abuser holding workshops on feminism.” She concluded: “If New Zealand is going to assume a role in relation to peace” internationally, “it needs to be a lot more real about the systemic and institutional violence it’s meting out towards Māori and its minority populations.” That is a minimum precondition, in our view, for a peace mediation unit to have integrity.
Secondly, Maire Leadbeater raised the possibility that New Zealand’s involvement in the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network – involving New Zealand, Australia, Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom – might imperil the independence needed for New Zealand to broker peace between nations. There is real force in this concern. To take a purely hypothetical example: if, say, Palestinian representatives saw New Zealand as closely tied to the US due to Five Eyes, they might be less likely to accede to New Zealand mediation of the Israel-Palestine conflict (should New Zealand be asked to be involved). Geopolitical consultant, Paul G. Buchanan, in an interview, agreed that membership of Five Eyes would be “a disadvantage in the sense that partners may doubt our integrity”, but he noted advantages too: New Zealand could be regarded as “a privileged broker in potential negotiations because we can ... pass messages from world powers ... [or] advise parties on how a particular approach is likely to be received.” Nevertheless Buchanan recommended that New Zealand should at least open the door to leaving Five Eyes to provide “some leverage” and to allow New Zealand to “take on a more independent role”. We discuss further how to take these points further in Part IV, but it might be that New Zealand would have to at the very least create some separation between Five Eyes work and peace mediation work – or begin a debate about ongoing involvement in Five Eyes.

Thirdly, relatedly, as Jack McDonald noted in an interview (a point echoed by others), trade relationships might pose a barrier to New Zealand’s taking on a prominent peace mediation role. It is true that even an agreement to mediate can itself be a contentious diplomatic decision. For example (again, only a hypothetical), a New Zealand decision to mediate between West Papua and Indonesia might put New Zealand offside with Indonesia. New Zealand should be willing to exercise care in making decisions about where and how it mediates. However, on occasion it may be that a principled stand will need to be taken in favour of mediation that has some effect on trading relationships, such as with Indonesia in this hypothetical example. That there may be an interrelationship between New Zealand’s national interests and its neutral positioning in mediation is a further reason for close relationships to be maintained between mediators and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, regardless of whether a unit is positioned inside MFAT.

Fourthly, as has already been alluded to, there is a danger that there is insufficient political will to develop a political mediation unit – or that political will flags over time. This was a point raised in an interview with Chris Mahony, a New Zealander working as a Political Economy and Justice Sector Advisor with the World Bank. Peace mediation does not bring a huge number of self-serving benefits, other than perhaps some potential positive reputational effects (though even these are not guaranteed in the event that mediations do not resolve conflicts and also given the quiet nature of much of this work). Mahony noted that: “a short electoral cycle of three years does not particularly enable
politicians to take policy approaches that emphasize the long-term, particularly in an area like foreign policy that drives little polling change.” Therefore there is a need for politicians to be genuinely motivated by a desire to contribute to peace efforts, and to commit funding for that cause. As many interviewees, including Don McKinnon, have said, building a successful peace mediation hub is also a long-term or at least a medium-term project; it therefore requires the political will of successive politicians. Several interviewees told us that the former Foreign Minister Murray McCully (2008-2017), considered an expanded approach to peace mediation, but did not pursue the idea. Media and civil society can help to encourage an ongoing commitment to peace mediation, but did not pursue the idea. Media and civil society can help to encourage an ongoing commitment to peace mediation, but ultimately this has to be a cause that politicians themselves own. Politicians themselves need to believe that New Zealand is, or can be, important enough to play a significant role. David Harland noted that politicians’ belief in the value of New Zealand can, counter-intuitively, be a major barrier: members of the New Zealand political elite, he said, have “trouble getting past their image of New Zealand as a small, relatively unimportant and powerless player.” This image will need to be changed for a peace mediation unit to be active. We make some further comments about this in Part IV.

Fifthly, there is a real question about whether New Zealand has the expertise for a peace mediation unit. Bethan Greener raised this point in conversation. New Zealand has some public commitments to biculturalism and gender equality that might prove useful for peace mediation, but – Greener asked – is New Zealand good at mediation? Would we be skilled facilitators of discussions? It is true that New Zealand is unlikely to become an instant leader of the mediation world. Countries that have become successful peace mediators, such as Switzerland and Norway, have built capacity – and this takes patience as well as sufficient resourcing. What is certainly true is that New Zealand has the cultural background and positioning that provide a foundation for expertise; and that Bougainville suggests New Zealand could play a positive mediating role. But expertise will have to be cultivated and maintained through training and practice. Furthermore, New Zealand would need to carve out distinctive approaches to international mediation – drawing on tikanga Māori and the role of women mediators as we discuss further below.

Critics might argue the money would be better spent on domestic problems. After all, New Zealand is facing some major social and environmental challenges including: child poverty, a housing crisis, the pollution of riverways, and growing income inequality. Given international mediation is a high-risk, high-cost activity, shouldn’t we just leave it to the rich and powerful countries? This argument however, ignores the fact that New Zealand is a relatively rich country internationally and should contribute to global challenges and fostering peace. As Colin Keating explained: “avoiding armed conflict is hugely important in terms of the impact of human life, on disruption of development. We are very good at preparing for the armed conflict, but we are very poor at
preparing for action to make use of military tools unnecessary.” Furthermore it is more cost efficient to contribute to conflict prevention and mediation, rather than peacekeeping operations. As Keating explained: what “we found during the United Nations Security Council election campaign [was that] universally from Africa to the Middle East, everyone said that the most important priority was not peacekeeping – which is mopping up after the conflict had already occurred - but how do you actually help countries to achieve peaceful outcomes rather than using violence?”

With all of these points made about the meaning of peace, the benefits of peace, the appropriateness of New Zealand doing peace mediation specifically, New Zealand’s experience in Bougainville, the experiences of other countries, the design of a peace mediation unit, and the possible obstacles to a unit, it is important to consider international developments in the field of peace mediation, before we turn to evaluating various policy options.
PART III: POLICY OPTIONS

PRINCIPLES FOR PEACE MEDIATION AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

Before sketching out these seven policy options, though, we offer some overarching reflections on what principles should underpin New Zealand’s policy response in the field of peace mediation and conflict prevention.

LONG-TERM INVESTMENT AND SUPPORT

The unit will take several years to build up expertise and credibility. A peace mediation strategy will not be launched one day, with the next day New Zealand pursuing peace around the world.

A long-term capacity development approach requires a strategic orientation towards peace mediation and peace mediation support as a New Zealand diplomatic priority. A key job for an independent peace mediation and conflict prevention unit would be to develop such a strategy, so it should include significant research and analysis capacity. In a world where conflicts are more and more complex and fragmented, such a capacity for strategic analysis is needed more than ever. The changing nature of conflict is changing the nature of peace mediation.
STRENGTHENING OUR COMMITMENT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

At the same time, while it would indeed be a significant and long-term endeavour, a renewed and enhanced capacity to support peace mediation would not be a radical departure from New Zealand’s current approach. It would be consistent with our longstanding commitment to peace and to conflict resolution.

The work of establishing a dedicated unit should be about building on our existing work in peace support. It should be understood as a mechanism to institutionalise skills and experience in peace support, maintaining and passing on New Zealand’s capacity in peace mediation across government agencies, NGOs, academics, individual mediators and so on.

So this is not a proposal for New Zealand to embark on a radical new direction; it is a proposal for New Zealand to make the most of comparative advantages.

MAKING SKILLS AVAILABLE

Another starting point for this work, as already noted in Part II, should be that New Zealand as a country is not seeking to push itself onto anyone. Effective peace mediation support is not about telling people how they should solve their problems. During the Bougainville conflict, New Zealand was specifically asked to help and this is a sound basis for any involvement in peace mediation support. However, if New Zealand wants to be asked for help, a unit needs to build up the capacity to provide assistance so that it is relevant to countries experiencing armed conflict. This requires a dedicated focus on peace mediation and conflict resolution and it means putting budgetary resources into a strategy for peace mediation support.
In developing this capacity, New Zealand should consider where it can best offer support and expertise. Some particular areas that have been proposed in this regard include:

- Promoting the role of women in peace mediation and conflict resolution, given our experience from peace support operations;
- Training and hosting people in New Zealand, as was done in Bougainville;
- The struggle to honour the rights of indigenous peoples and promote the rehabilitation of indigenous language and culture, based on ongoing (and far from complete) experience of decolonisation;
- The struggle to seek acknowledgment and peaceful settlement of grievances and land claims, including through the Waitangi Tribunal experience; and
- Building on the longstanding traditions of strategic non-violence promoted by the Parihaka community.

It’s important to understand where you get your legitimacy to engage in international work. For New Zealand, it is not from geography like Singapore; it is not from neutrality like Switzerland; and it is not from economic power like Japan or Norway. Maybe for New Zealand it comes from being an honest broker, with no hidden agenda. The concept of legitimacy is really important in peace mediation - trust is everything. New Zealand has trust and integrity and empathy and transparency in its favour.

— Former Chief of the New Zealand Army, Dave Gawn
COMMITMENT TO THE PACIFIC

Given the government’s “Pacific reset” policy and our general commitment to our own region, New Zealand should make sure it is able to support mediation work in the Pacific, where appropriate. This has implications for how we consider and develop our policy responses. For example, there is conflict prevention work going on right now in the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea that should inform any discussion of NZ peace mediation policy.

TAKING INITIATIVES

Whilst generally progressive-leaning, New Zealand has tended to be rather tentative in our contributions to international initiatives. New Zealand has been described as a “fast follower”, as former UN Ambassador Terence O’Brien notes below. New Zealand would need to be willing to take bolder actions if it is to pursue a peace mediation strategy. This could also be linked to a wider approach in support of decolonisation.

*Within the UN, NZ has generally been a fast follower rather than a taker of initiatives ourselves, we have tended to coat tail on the initiatives of others. To become a peace mediator, MFAT would need to be able to take initiatives itself on the front foot and would need strong back up from civil society in doing this.*

— Terence O’Brien
PEACE MEDIATION AS AN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTION

A New Zealand peace mediation strategy would be a central element of our contribution to international peace and security. New Zealand has very little hard power and military hardware might best be used in support of peace and conflict resolution. Security partners could appreciate New Zealand’s building up its capacity to support peace mediation efforts in the Pacific and elsewhere. A peace mediation strategy could offer New Zealand an additional pathway with which to navigate the geopolitical competition and tension between the United States and China.

We need to make sure we are not seen as shirking our responsibility for defence burden sharing. Peace mediation should be seen as part of our contribution to international peace and security - something that we are doing that others cannot do.

— Anna Powles

EIGHT POLICY PROPOSALS FOR PEACE MEDIATION

With these framing points in mind, we offer the following eight policy proposals evaluated, roughly, in order of most minimal to most demanding in terms of cost and effort.

1. A Feasibility/Appropriateness Study for Some Kind of Unit on Peace Mediation

Anna Powles suggested a feasibility/appropriateness study for New Zealand action on peace mediation. Such a study could examine: New Zealand’s existing reputation and strengths; possible costings for various proposals on peace mediation; and prospects for success. The study would be most obviously carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, given its existing expertise.

This is a sensible idea. It is likely that any action on peace mediation or peace and reconciliation would have to be preceded by a feasibility/appropriateness study. However, the study needs a clear proposal, or set of possible proposals, to assess. At the very least, a detailed proposal would have to be drawn up to give the study some focus. As well, this involves a very minimal commitment, which
might be attractive from the perspective of political capital but does less to contribute to the achievement of peace worldwide. We see this as an initial step towards creating a Peace Mediation Unit.

2. A Training Scheme Focused on Peace and Reconciliation for Individuals within MFAT

A slightly more ambitious proposal is for MFAT to establish a formal training scheme for diplomats so that they are able to develop specific mediation skills. This could be developed in conjunction with the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at Otago University, or developed in-house at MFAT (with guest lecturers and speakers brought in where appropriate). It could be a semester-long course or even a postgraduate qualification of the kind used in Switzerland, or a shorter master-class, similar to the China Capable programme run at MFAT at present. New Zealanders with mediation experience, such as David Harland and Andrew Ladley, might be leading teachers on the course.

This would prepare diplomats for facilitation or mediation work when on posting, and might be a first step to more developed mediation capacity. However, there is a danger that the training would be ineffective if not accompanied by a broader strategy. It would be quite likely that a person could receive extended training in mediation, only to move into another role subsequently. There is a tension in most Foreign Ministries: mediators tend to be specialists, whereas diplomats are more generalist in their training. As with Option 1, then, there is promise to this educational proposal but it is unlikely to be sufficient or satisfactory on its own.

3. Increased Investment in Multilateral Mediation Support

A third possibility is a concerted increase in investment in multilateral mediation support. The United Nations under Secretary-General Antonio Gutteres has made mediation a UN priority. The United Nations Mediation Support Unit (which has had individual New Zealanders on its stand-by team) remains active; New Zealand could contribute a significant sum to support its work, or recommend more mediators as members of their standby team. Alternatively, New Zealand could become part of the United Nations Group of Friends mediation network. This now has more than 50 members, but none are member states of the Pacific Islands Forum.

Advantages of ‘the investment option’ include the fact that such an investment would represent a humble acknowledgment that bodies already exist to do mediation; New Zealand would take some time to build a mediation reputation and it might be more effective for New Zealand to direct its energies towards existing international institutions. This increased investment could count
towards an expansion in New Zealand’s Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) more generally, helping New Zealand’s figure to inch up to 0.7% of GDP (the amount encouraged internationally). As well, now is a time of heightened, intense conflicts where UN mediation is perhaps more needed than ever.

On the other hand, it has been acknowledged that there are shortcomings with United Nations mediation. It was hinted by various international mediators that we interviewed that the United Nations is less effective in some settings. As well, simply increasing investment might be said to be a wasted opportunity for New Zealand to provide mediation support, drawing on reputation, history, and identity. This ‘international investment option’ has its merits, but its impacts could well be questionable, especially relative to other possible options. New Zealand could support the United Nations by developing its own approaches to mediation which complement the Mediation Support Unit.

4. Building a Network of Mediation-Savvy International New Zealand Diplomats

Another relatively moderate option, in terms of investment and complexity, is for New Zealand – possibly through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade – to build a loose network of diplomats internationally, either with an interest or some skills in mediation. This network could be brought together for an annual event, and might maintain contact electronically through a year. The idea might be that the network could exchange advice, with each member of the network in a position to be able act in some mediation capacity where a conflict or need arises.

This would be relatively easy to implement. There are some New Zealand diplomats with mediation experience, through MFAT or from other careers. There is a model to imitate: the Swiss model of Human Security Advisors stationed in different countries. Administrative costs would be minimal, though some level of planning and coordination would be valuable. New Zealand could, in a low-cost way, contribute to mediation, without raising expectations or taking excessive risks. But some of these advantages are also disadvantages. A mere loose network might not make enough of a difference to build necessary capacity, shift New Zealand’s reputation (in order for New Zealand to be thought of, and respected, when mediation opportunities arise), or shift the direction of diplomatic strategy. This idea does not seem robust or meaningful enough for it to be pursued at present, though it may be that in conjunction with other steps it could be appropriate in future.
5. **Establishing a Peace Mediation or Conflict Prevention Unit inside MFAT**

A more ambitious suggestion is the creation of a fully-fledged Peace Mediation Unit inside MFAT. This Unit would begin with a small number of personnel, but could also have seconded staff from elsewhere, including Defence and the United Nations. Functions of the unit could include: developing a strategy for peace mediation for New Zealand; developing educational materials on mediation for diplomats; maintaining relationships with NGOs, unions, peace and other civil society organizations and with the United Nations; monitoring conflict situations globally (including by liaising with embassies) to see whether New Zealand might be able to contribute to mediation efforts; developing a database of individuals (with lower or higher profiles) who can play mediation roles; ensuring New Zealand is available as a ‘site of good offices’ wherever mediation in New Zealand might be appropriate; and developing a distinctive New Zealand approach to mediation which would draw on tikanga Māori and the facilitation of women’s participation in peace negotiations.

Without any link to this specific proposal, Steve Marshall noted that a repository of information and contacts could be useful for New Zealand embassies and diplomats. Moreover, it is clear that a unit of this size could genuinely chart a course for New Zealand foreign policy, even if it would take time and resources to build expertise. The positioning of the unit within MFAT might ensure that its ideas are closely considered, and not viewed as the intruding thoughts of outsiders.

Disadvantages of the proposal – on top of the fact that it relies on funding and political will – include the fact that the unit would not have independence from MFAT. It would be seen as an organ of government, which may lead to perceptions of government hypocrisy along the lines of those suggested by Tina Ngata in Part II. As well, the unit might be hindered in its ability to propose ideas not directly in line with MFAT practice and policy, and there could be a greater likelihood that New Zealand mediators are associated with the Five Eyes.

There are some legitimate concerns here; we take forward aspects of this proposal in Part IV.

6. **Establishing a Peace Mediation or Conflict Prevention Unit outside MFAT**

The sixth option could involve a unit with the same functions as described above – strategising, developing educational programmes, relationship-building, monitoring, information-storing, and hosting negotiation – but with the unit housed outside of MFAT. The Peace Mediation Unit, on this proposal, would be an independent Crown entity, in contact with MFAT but not directly answerable to it.

The Unit could have the space, with this positioning, to be largely insulated from the Five Eyes network. It need not be seen as part of the central government apparatus, avoiding the sense that the central government is hypocritical in
promoting peace abroad while perpetuating colonial injustices at home. As well, the Unit could still co-opt experts from MFAT, Defence, and elsewhere. It might also be easier for the Unit to cement relationships with NGOs and civil society if it is at arm’s-length from ministries and departments.

It might be wondered whether the Unit would be as attractive for MFAT and Defence officials if they are ‘exiled’ from the central government apparatus. Additionally, the loss of a connection to a minister might weaken the Unit (though it might also free it from undue political pressure). Efforts would have to be made to ensure the Unit maintained the ear and respect of MFAT, despite the operational distance between the two agencies.

Overall, this proposal (drawing on the functions of a Peace Mediation or Conflict Prevention Unit explained in the context of the fifth option), possibly in conjunction with elements of the earlier policy options sketched, is the most attractive of those considered. We develop a more detailed account of an independent Peace Mediation or Conflict Prevention Unit, and what would be needed to set it up, in Part IV.

7. **Supporting and Creating a Regional Centre for Mediation in the Pacific**

Perhaps an even bolder idea, building on suggestions made by Dave Gawn and Neil Walter in interviews, is that New Zealand might fund and support a Pacific Centre for Mediation. This might be based in the Pacific, for example in Apia, and could offer a suite of mediation expertise and service for mediation in the Asia-Pacific. Functions could include a site for training, a space for ongoing discussion of regional dynamics, and the sharing of skills across the region.

This could involve a useful transfer and sharing of skills. Rather than New Zealand seeking reputational benefit on its own, a regional centre could upskill multiple countries. One positive side-effect might be more consolidated relationships across the Pacific. However, the Centre’s positioning would be much more complex, because it would have to reflect some kind of convergence of interest based on many different countries. Would Australia be included? What would be the approach to countries, where certain communities within the country might seek international mediation (for example, Fiji)? Moreover, and relatedly, the move to set up the Centre could be seen as further colonial intervention by New Zealand in Pacific affairs. It is not clear that such a Centre is desired by other Pacific countries. Who funds the Centre and how (and more funds would be needed for a regional than a national centre) would be sensitive questions.

There appear to be too many lingering doubts to take this idea forward at present, though it might be useful for ongoing conversation to be had about the suggestion between New Zealand and Pacific governments.
8. Setting up a Peace Commission along with a Minister for Peace

The most expansive proposal would be for the establishment of a Peace Commission. This Commission would sit outside of government, like the Climate Change Commission, and would have all the functions of a peace mediation unit. However, this Commission could also function as a research agency, analysing conditions that make war more likely and the ways in which conflict is best resolved, perhaps with an especial focus on the Pacific region. The research work of the Commission would focus on tikanga Māori and how ideas in tikanga Māori might enrich understanding of peace and reconciliation. To bolster the political credibility of peace and reconciliation issues, a government could also create a Minister for Peace position (generally taken up either by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade or the Minister of Defence). Ministerial responsibility for peace was proposed in 2017 by the opposition Labour Party in the United Kingdom.

This fully-fledged Commission could produce important analytical work, useful to other agencies of government. Ministerial responsibility could prompt accountability for the work of the Commission and the government as a whole, and might make it more likely that a commitment to peace and reconciliation is bipartisan. The breadth of the mandate of the Commission would address the fact that ‘mediation’ might be an overly narrow focus for a public service agency, particularly because mediation is tied up in reasons for conflict and other conflict prevention methods.

But there are downsides to this Commission. Setting up a Peace Commission might be too broad. Some focus, say on mediation, might help to limit workload and to improve accountability. There is also a risk that ministerial responsibility for peace is merely a soupy tag-on to other ministerial responsibilities (though steps could be taken to mitigate that risk). It might be best, given these shortcomings, for initial moves to be made to set up a Peace Mediation Unit – and for something like a Peace Commission, along with ministerial responsibility for peace, to be borne in mind as an aspiration to be worked towards in the future.
PART IV: RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that:

» The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade undertakes a feasibility and appropriateness study for the establishment of a Conflict Prevention Unit;

» A Conflict Prevention Unit be established independent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (subject to the feasibility and appropriateness study confirming the viability of a Unit); and

» The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, as well as others in political and public service leadership (where appropriate), speak more vocally – in formal and informal settings – about New Zealand playing a greater role in peace mediation and conflict prevention internationally; and

» A commitment to peace mediation and conflict prevention is made alongside an accompanying redoubling of efforts to decolonise Aotearoa New Zealand.

We explain these recommendations in brief below.

It would be responsible and valuable for MFAT staff to be tasked with considering the appropriateness and feasibility of a Conflict Prevention Unit. We suggest that the focus of the study be the proposal we sketch below, but any concrete proposal could be the subject of such a study. MFAT staff are well-equipped to undertake studies of this kind. Relevant considerations include: the international context of conflicts and peace mediation (including the state of mediation NGOs, mediation by governments, and mediation by the UN); the approximate cost of a Conflict Prevention Unit; the likely benefits of a Conflict Prevention Unit, over different time spans; and whether these benefits justify the costs. The study could also, drawing on MFAT’s expertise, discuss the likely responses to a Unit by: New Zealand’s neighbours and allies; other countries playing a mediating role; and international institutions (including the Commonwealth and the United Nations). Part of the work of the study might be informal consultations with some of these countries and institutions.
If the feasibility and appropriateness study provides a broadly positive conclusion, we recommend that a Conflict Prevention Unit be established. It is necessary to spell out in some detail how we envisage the Unit operating initially. (This also doubles as the model that might be the focus of a feasibility and appropriateness study.) However, the design will no doubt be refined over time. The Unit could be called a Peace Mediation Commission (with a ‘commission’ implying a slightly more expansive body), a Peace and Reconciliation Unit (which would give the Unit license to think broadly about peace and reconciliation matters), a Peace Mediation Unit, or a Conflict Prevention Unit. We recommend calling it a Conflict Prevention Unit to indicate the broad way we understand peace mediation.

We envisage the Unit having the following mandate:

» To develop a strategy for Aotearoa New Zealand in international peace mediation (a plan for New Zealand’s focus areas including the relative weight to be put on mediation as opposed to mediation support, a set of medium- and long-term goals for a Unit, and an outline of methods used to achieve these goals);

» To become a hub for expertise on mediation, and develop a course for New Zealand mediators (possibly in conjunction with the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at Otago University, with international mediation training institutions, iwi and hapū, the public sector, unions, NGOs and community and diaspora groups);

» To build and maintain relationships with other countries playing a role in peace mediation, international NGOs carrying out peace mediation, New Zealanders working overseas with appropriate skills, United Nations mediation officials, and other relevant bodies, communities, and individuals, and look to establish partnerships and secondments with expert peace mediators;

» To develop distinctively New Zealand approaches to peace mediation – drawing on tikanga Māori, and ensuring women have a role in peace negotiations;

» To coordinate a system of early warning monitoring of international hot-spots, flash-points, and conflict zones through regular briefings with humanitarian organizations in Geneva and New York to evaluate which conflicts are most in need of mediation; and to develop close contact with appropriate local actors to review regularly whether New Zealand might be able to facilitate, mediate, or provide a site for negotiation;
To develop plans so that New Zealand is made more regularly available as a site of ‘good offices’ or negotiation, as occurred as part of Bougainville peace mediation;

To retain a database of information on conflicts, mediators, and strategies to which relevant New Zealand public sector actors and diplomats might have access;

To help debrief New Zealanders who have been involved in conflict zones and / or specifically peace mediation or conflict resolution efforts, and to offer a capacity to record and retain information on these experiences to help inform further mediation support work; and,

To work actively with humanitarian and other non-governmental organisations to support their international peace mediation efforts.

We suggest that this Unit be mandated and funded by government, but be independent of government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The Unit would be a standalone entity. It would maintain close contact with the public sector (including NZAID), as the mandate above suggests. It could focus on track one (State-State), track two (involving NGOs and supporting actors), and track three (commercial) diplomacy relevant to mediation, though the Unit’s own strategy might spell out over time what kind of track is most appropriate. The Unit would acknowledge that mediation should no longer be simply an elite activity narrowly focused on ceasefires; it must involve the building of careful, inclusive, long-term solutions to conflict and armed violence. This requires good understanding of the local causes and contexts of conflict and armed violence (including inequality, ethnic tensions, political disagreements and climate change). The Unit should place a particular emphasis on two thematic areas:

1. The role of women in mediation.

2. The role of indigenous language, culture, business and control of resources, including the relevance of tikanga Māori for mediation; and

These focus points reflect unique aspects of New Zealand history and identity. A Unit policy might be adopted on whether mediation opportunities would be proactively sought out, or only responded to upon invitation.

As this report has illustrated, tikanga Māori provides a source of rich insight on the meaning and nature of peace. It is crucial that tikanga Māori concepts underpin the work of the Conflict Prevention Unit. One way of ensuring this happens is for the Unit to be staffed by individuals with knowledge and experience of tikanga Māori.
WOMEN IN PEACE MEDIATION

We have noted above the widely recognised importance of women’s contributions to the peace process in Bougainville, including women working as part of the New Zealand effort. This has become a central tenet of New Zealand’s approach to peace mediation support and was a strong point of advocacy for the New Zealand government during its Security Council tenure in 2015-2016.

In a statement to the United Nations Security Council Open Debate on Women Peace and Security in October 2016, New Zealand’s Deputy Permanent Representative, Carolyn Schwalger noted that: “...meaningful participation of women at all stages of the conflict spectrum is essential for achieving sustainable peace. We know that gender equality is critical to maintaining international peace and security. We know that women and girls have a significant role to play as leaders and decision-makers in the prevention and durable resolution of conflict.”

In another statement to the Security Council, Schwalger reported that: “an all-female New Zealand Defence Force team provided training on the ‘Operationalisation of Gender’ at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Ghana (in November 2015). This training incorporated conflict prevention techniques through the inclusion of women, increasing the employment of women in conflict prevention and resolution processes, and women’s experiences of leadership in conflict.”

A number of countries have undertaken substantial efforts to facilitate the work of women in peace mediation, including national and regional networks of women peace mediators. Most recently the Women Mediators across the Commonwealth (WMC) launched at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in April 2018. New Zealand, as a member of the Commonwealth, has the opportunity to encourage nominations from New Zealand women peace mediators to join this network. The importance of women’s role in peace mediation is underscored in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325.

Many interviewees noted that New Zealand’s efforts in this area represent an opportunity for a distinct comparative advantage in peace mediation work. At the same time, some interviewees also expressed a frustration that New Zealand’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security has not been allocated a dedicated budget that would facilitate its implementation. This should be rectified as part of the work to establish a dedicated peace mediation capacity.
New Zealand’s approach to peace mediation must be informed by tikanga and te ao Māori. As noted elsewhere in this report, an immediate consideration in this regard is the value and appropriate integration of tikanga Māori in peace mediation efforts. The Parihaka and Moriori communities, amongst others, offer a rich source of knowledge and expertise.

Beyond this there are a number of areas of New Zealand’s historical and contemporary political experience that a Conflict Prevention Unit can draw on in its interactions with other countries and actors, for example:

» The airing of historical grievances and settlement of past wrongs, including through restitution of land and financial compensation;

» The development of indigenous commercial entities that manage land and natural resources; and

» The Māori-led revitalisation of indigenous language.

As noted previously, the work of the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs through its Embassy in Myanmar is a recent example of the value New Zealand can bring to others in sharing our experiences of mediation between Māori and the Crown.

Roxanne Bazergan, United Nations Mediation Support Unit, observed: “When a country says: ‘We will show you our scars’, it builds trust with its partners.”
Our provisional proposal is for the Unit to be staffed initially with six individuals: two executive directors, at least one of whom should be Māori (with knowledge of tikanga and te reo Māori); the remaining staff should have a mix of diplomatic, defence, direct mediation, and conflict analysis expertise. The organisation should ensure that no more than 50% of its positions are held by people who identify as men, including in the more prominent leadership roles. There should be a board comprising senior individuals able to oversee the work of the Unit. We suggest that there is no need for a high-profile ex-politician to be permanently attached to the Unit. Ongoing low-profile, credibility-building work is needed and higher profile individuals (with whom the Unit should build and maintain relationships) can be called on more occasionally where necessary. Both the government and the Unit will need some patience in recognising that peace mediation expertise will be built up slowly over time, and through experimentation and failing fast.

We would envision the annual operating budget of the Unit to be:

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<tr>
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<th>Amount</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>Human Resources</td>
<td>$720,000</td>
<td>Two senior staff at approximately NZ $150,000, and four policy staff at NZ $90,000 each, with additional provision for recruitment, set up, employer contributions and professional development costs of $60,000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Space</td>
<td>$40,000</td>
<td>Small office approximately 100m² in downtown Wellington.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel</td>
<td>$150,000</td>
<td>Approximately 20 international meetings at NZ $5,000 each and domestic travel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Events and representation</td>
<td>$90,000</td>
<td>Approximately 5 events at NZ $10,000 each. Provision for seminars, training and approximately 5 events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational costs</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
<td>IT, digital services, professional consulting</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total (NZD)</td>
<td>$1.1 million</td>
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(NB: The cost of hosting overseas delegations would be borne by other agencies rather than being envisaged in this budget.)
We think this budget is a modest sum, given the benefits New Zealand could gain from
the investment and the fact that New Zealand contributed NZD $500,000 to the United
Nations Department of Political Affairs in 2017. Another reason for hosting the Unit
outside of MFAT is that the financing would not simply be spent on diplomats’ travel
costs, but on developing a new, broad range of mediation expertise in New Zealand.

Assuming this Unit is established, we recommend that the Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Trade takes a role in vocally articulating New Zealand’s desired comparative advantage
in peace mediation. This could be done through speeches, in bilateral meetings, and
at international events; mention could be made of how peace mediation fits with
New Zealand history and identity. Such statements would be usefully supported by
statements from other political leaders (including the Prime Minister) and key public
service leaders, who will have relationships with the Conflict Prevention Unit. These
statements should help to raise the domestic and international profile of New Zealand’s
Conflict Prevention Unit.

As has been noted earlier in this report, New Zealand is not in a complete state of peace
with respect to the Crown-Māori relationship or in other ways. There is no cause for
complacency about the New Zealand government’s record in this regard. Therefore the
Conflict Prevention Unit must be set up with a real recognition of the ongoing challenges
that the Crown faces in reckoning with historical injustices, righting past wrongs, and
restoring genuine peace in Aotearoa New Zealand (which requires social and economic
policy change as well as patient, fair, and just settlement of claims under Te Tiriti o
Waitangi). The establishment of a Conflict Prevention Unit must be accompanied by
an ongoing commitment at all government levels to decolonisation: understanding and
addressing the negative effects of colonisation, and recentring the views of Māori in
order to redistribute public power in the present. At the same time, the Unit’s operation
will require a recommitment to independence in foreign policy, which may require
continual review of how Five Eyes membership and government-driven trade links
affect New Zealand’s position. These ongoing commitments – to decolonisation and
independence in foreign policy – will at least allow the Unit to aspire to some level of
integrity and legitimacy in the eyes of all.

All in all: there is a strong case for the establishment of a Unit. It is our considered view
that a Unit needs to be established, to respond to international needs and advance New
Zealand’s independent foreign policy.

We view action on peace and reconciliation worldwide as an area where New Zealand
could draw on the best of its history and identity, in order to make a meaningful
contribution globally. But what we have outlined above is designed to open up debate,
not to end conversations. New Zealand’s role in the world needs to be openly discussed,
and by a broader range of voices. We hope that these recommendations will stimulate
more thought and conversations, and we look forward to hearing the views of others on
the ideas developed here.
A POSSIBLE TIMEFRAME FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONFLICT PREVENTION UNIT

November 2018
Provisional Budget bid submitted

February 2019
Terms of reference for feasibility study approved

April 2019
Feasibility study completed

May 2019
Budget line for Conflict Prevention Unit included in Budget 2019

July 2019
Terms of reference for Conflict Prevention Unit approved

August 2019
Recruitment opens for appointment of board and senior staff

January 2020
Conflict Prevention Unit opens with senior staff and board

April 2020
Remaining staff of Unit recruited

June 2020
Unit holds first national event on peace mediation
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The principal drafters of this report were Max Harris, Thomas Nash, Nina Hall, and Fairlie Chappuis. We are grateful to all those who were interviewed for this report, including those who shared their insights off-the-record, and those who read the report in draft, providing very helpful suggestions. Particular thanks go to Jonathan Cohen, Darren Brunk, Lewis Mills, and Philip Tremewan for detailed feedback on the draft report.
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

The following people were interviewed during the course of preparing this publication and, in three cases, during previous research for The New Zealand Project by Max Harris. The various policy positions and recommendations contained within the report are presented on behalf of New Zealand Alternative only and not on behalf of any of the participants in the research.

Mads Andenas
Law Professor
University of Oslo

Kevin Clements
Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies,
Otago University

Rouben Azizian
Centre for Defence and Security Studies,
Massey University

Jan Egeland
Norwegian Refugee Council

Rosemary Banks
New Zealand Ambassador to the
United States

Dave Gawn
Former Chief of the New Zealand Army

Roxanne Bazergan
Team Leader, United Nations
Mediation Support Unit

Bethan Greener
Associate Professor of Politics,
Massey University

Zenna Bou Chakra
Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs

David Harland
Executive Director of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue

Paul G. Buchanan
Director, 36th Parallel Assessments

Edwina Hughes
Coordinator,
Peace Movement Aotearoa

Charles Chauvel
Former New Zealand Member of Parliament

Colin Keating
Former New Zealand Permanent Representative to the United Nations

Helen Clark
Former Prime Minister of New Zealand,
former Administrator of UNDP

Andrew Ladley
Former United Nations mediator
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title/Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maire Leadbeater</td>
<td>Peace Activist and Author</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dag Nylander</td>
<td>Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chris Mahony</td>
<td>Political Economy Advisor, World Bank Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Steve Marshall</td>
<td>New Zealand Ambassador to Myanmar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Terence O’Brien</td>
<td>Former New Zealand Permanent Representative to the United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jack McDonald</td>
<td>Political Campaigner</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anna Powles</td>
<td>Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University</td>
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<tr>
<td>Don McKinnon</td>
<td>Former Foreign Minister of New Zealand</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philipp Rotmann</td>
<td>Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin</td>
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<td>Georg Stein</td>
<td>Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jonas Gahr Store</td>
<td>Former Foreign Minister, current Labour Party leader, Norway</td>
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<td>Joanna Nathan</td>
<td>United Nations and former International Crisis Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neil Walter</td>
<td>Former Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tina Ngata</td>
<td>Environmental and Indigenous Rights Advocate</td>
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5 This is also explained in Elsie Locke’s book: ibid.


7 Geoff Troughton and Philip Fountain (eds.), Pursuing Peace in Godzone: Christianity and the Peace Tradition in New Zealand (Victoria University Press, 2017).

8 This is discussed be Elsie Locke: above n iv.


12 This is because it was the Māori text that was signed by rangatira (chiefs); this text is to be preferred when the Treaty is interpreted, under international law.


14 See above n 3.


New Zealand, and New Zealanders, have been involved in many other peacekeeping operations from Timor-Leste to South Sudan. However, peacekeeping is a much broader set of activities than peace mediation, which is focused specifically on ending conflicts through dialogue and diplomacy.


Lanz, et al., above n xxiii, at p. 8.

Ibid., at p. 12.


31 The analysis below this footnote draws heavily on the excellent overview offered by Claudia Hofmann, *Reasoning with Rebels: International NGOs’ Approaches to Engaging Armed Groups*, (2012, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik).


34 Gustavo de Carvalho and Kgalalelo Nganje, ‘South Africa should redefine its approaches to conflict prevention to become more proactive and effective’, ISS Today, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 14 November 2016.

35 See, for example, the statement to the United Nations Security Council Open Debate on the role of women in prevention and resolution of conflicts in Africa, delivered by Carolyn Schwalger, Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 28 March 2016.


37 According to Göldner-Ebenthal and Dudouet, the term multi-track diplomacy was first developed by Diamond and McDonald (1993) “to depict the interconnected activities, individuals and institutions that cooperate to prevent or resolve conflicts peaceably, primarily through (direct or mediated) dialogue and negotiation. The concept is anchored in a systemic approach to conflict analysis by explicitly focusing on the relationships between different actors in a given system. It targets multiple levels of society and decision-making simultaneously, in an inter-connected (or at best coordinated) manner”. Diamond and McDonald’s vision of nine tracks was later redeveloped into three tracks based on Lederach’s 1997 peacebuilding pyramid and is now a widely used framing for mediation, diplomacy and peace processes. See Karin Göldner-Ebenthal and Véronique Dudouet, *From Power Mediation to Dialogue Support? Assessing the European Union’s Capabilities for Multi-Track Diplomacy* (2017, Berghof Foundation), at pp. 6-8, also available online at http://image.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Papers/MDTReport.pdf (last accessed 10 October 2018). See also Louise Diamond and John McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace*. Second Edition (1993, Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy); John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, (1997, United States Institute of Peace).

38 For a fuller explanation, see Julian Thomas Hottinger, ‘The Relationship Between Track One and Track Two Diplomacy’ (2005) 16 Accord 56–59 at p. 56.

39 For more information, see ‘MAS ETH Mediation in Peace Processes’, available online at https://www.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/brosch_A4_MAS_ETH_MPP_rz_03_1.pdf (last accessed 10 October 2018).

40 Previously, the Canadian think-tank and international peacekeeping training centre, the Pearson Centre, had sponsored a similar course but the Centre has now been dissolved. The Pearson Centre operated with the support of the Canadian government from 1994 until 2013.


43 Ibid, at p. 147.

44 Ibid, at p. 77.


47 The masculine pronoun is used because the vast majority of envoys named to negotiate high-level peace processes have been men.


50 On multi-track diplomacy model see note xxxvii above.

51 On the development of mediation support in a UN context, see further: Elodie Convergne, ‘Learning to Mediate?’, above n xxiv.


53 *Pathways for Peace*, above n vi, at p. xix.

54 Ibid, at p. 21.


56 Ibid.
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