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ABOUT PUBLIC DIPLOMACY MAGAZINE

Public Diplomacy Magazine is a publication of the Association of Public Diplomacy Scholars (APDS) at the University of Southern California, with support from the USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School, USC Dana and Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences School of International Relations, the Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism and USC Annenberg Press.

Its unique mission is to provide a common forum for the views of both scholars and practitioners from around the globe, in order to explore key concepts in the study and practice of public diplomacy. Public Diplomacy Magazine is published bi-annually, in print and on the web at www.publicdiplomacymagazine.org.

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The USC Association of Public Diplomacy Scholars (APDS) is the nation’s first student-run organization in the field of public diplomacy. As an organization, APDS seeks to promote the field of public diplomacy as a practice and study, provide a forum for dialogue and interaction among practitioners of public diplomacy and related fields in pursuit of professional development, and cultivate fellowship and camaraderie among members. For more information please visit www.pdscholars.org.
ABOUT THE COVER
REAGAN COOK

Referencing both current events and world history, this issue's cover explores the relationships between culture, conflict, and activism. It presents a diverse array of themes, including terrorism, celebrity diplomacy, environmentalism, protest movements, and human rights.
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Stay connected and informed about critical developments in public diplomacy around the world at the all-new USCPublicDiplomacy.org.
In recent decades, the emergence of the Internet and information & communication technologies (ICTs) has revolutionized the possibilities within the international political landscape. With expanded opportunities to cultivate networks over distances, Non-State Actors (NSAs) have emerged as significant players in the global system. While the traditional definition of public diplomacy refers to governmental practices of informing and influencing foreign publics through intercultural communication, NSAs have rapidly adopted public diplomacy processes in their increased diplomatic relations with state actors. The 12th issue of Public Diplomacy Magazine, “The Power of Non-State Actors,” enlists a wide range of expertise to illustrate the diversity of NSAs and the public diplomacy tools they employ.

The rise of NSAs advocating for change from the bottom-up is one of the central themes of this issue. In our Features section, Mary Finley-Brook focuses on civil society actors who are socializing the international community to their norms and values through action-oriented, people-to-people diplomacy. As ICT prices decrease, public diplomacy strategies will continue to be key in managing the network’s activities and relationships.

In addition to pressuring states to make changes, NSAs also collaborate with states. Richard Wike’s contribution, “Survey Research and International Affairs,” considers states’ reliance on research and survey organizations like Pew Research Center to provide public opinion information to policymakers. Our interview with the Master of Public Diplomacy delegation to São Paulo draws attention to Campus Brasil, an educational NSA in Brazil which collaborates with the state to bring cultural exchange students to the country. Partnering with states can add legitimacy to NSAs and increase access to funding.

Other actors discussed in this issue include celebrities, diasporas, refugees, violent NSAs, and corporations. We hope that the breadth of topics featured throughout this issue adds to the reader’s understanding of NSAs and their public diplomacy tools. For more on public diplomacy trends and access to current and past issues of the magazine, please visit www.publicdiplomacymagazine.com.

As always, we would like to express our sincere gratitude to the USC Center on Public Diplomacy, Annenberg Press, the USC Dornsife School of International Relations, and the USC Master of Public Diplomacy Program. Without their support and advice, this student-run publication would not be possible. Last, but certainly not least, we would like to thank all our contributors for adding dimension to the dialogue. Finally, this issue concludes my tenure as editor-in-chief. It is with great confidence that we pass the reins to the Master of Public Diplomacy Class of 2015.

Shannon Haugh
Editor-in-Chief
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HORACIO TRUJILLO & DAVID ELAM
Creating international policy to combat climate change is one of the biggest public diplomacy challenges of our time. With slow progress in “state-led” forums such as the annual Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), advocacy coalitions of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are pressing decision-makers and working to build global awareness. The power of NGOs is soft since state actors set emissions targets; nonetheless, climate justice organizations persistently broadcast several important messages, including: 1) industrialized nations along with private sector polluters have an obligation to remedy ecological debt; 2) low-income and marginalized populations are most vulnerable to climatic variations, even though they are generally not high greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters, and 3) current policy needs to protect the well-being of future generations. This article explores how civil society has been spurred into action by weak state commitments as well as how web-based, bottom-up, and network approaches to influence policymakers and implement climate change mitigation can broaden our understanding of public diplomacy.

CLIMATE JUSTICE ADVOCACY

CLIMATE JUSTICE

Climate justice links human rights and development… safeguarding the rights of the most vulnerable and sharing the burdens and benefits of climate change and its resolution equitably and fairly.¹

…Climate justice is the fair treatment of all people and freedom from discrimination with the creation of policies and projects that address climate change and the systems that create climate change and perpetuate discrimination.²

Although perspectives on climate justice range, non-state approaches generally seek to address root causes, rights, reparations and restorative actions, participation, and empowerment. Marginalized and vulnerable groups, such as Indigenous Peoples and low-income women, are not well-represented in climate policy decision-making.³ Climate change, and sometimes even the policies supposedly aiming to mitigate it, can deepen poverty and inequality, particularly if there are restrictions on local access to resources.⁴ Because of the broad, long-term implications of climatic variation and GHG offsets, scientists and policymakers should be cognizant of implications for international, intergenerational, and intersectional justice.⁵ Holistic climate justice encompasses the elimination of multiple social inequities while addressing non-human elements, such as watersheds and biodiversity, and considering future implications.

While non-state actors focus more on empowerment, advocacy, and representation of marginalized peoples, state actors approach climate justice as a utilitarian framework to define equity between countries at different stages of development in terms of responsibility for historical and contemporary GHG emissions. Is it is fair to limit emissions in countries with robust economic trade, but where a large portion of the population lives in poverty? The BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) set the agenda to assure differentiated mitigation responsibilities “taking into account national circumstances, capabilities, population, development needs, in the context of equitable access to sustainable development.”⁶ Meanwhile, the 39-member Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), a state bargaining coalition with less economic weight but an urgent message about the ramifications of sea-level rise, advocates for large, swift emission reductions.⁷

The issue of climate change demonstrates the extent to which countries are interconnected. If one small country cuts emissions, it is not likely to be enough to alter how citizens of that country experience climate change; nevertheless Costa Rica, Iceland, New Zealand, and Norway have made major reforms to release fewer GHGs. Substantial reforms in China and the U.S. (the two highest GHG emitters, contributing 45% of total international emissions in 2012) could contribute significantly to global mitigation, but getting either country to agree to binding targets has been a point of contention in international negotiations for more than a decade.⁸

Climate justice goes beyond GHG emission allocations among states, since not all citizens of any particular country experience climatic variation in the same way. “Double exposure” is a phrase used to highlight how economic and environmental vulnerabilities interact and magnify: those hit hard by climatic variation were often likely to have lived in a precarious situation prior to extreme weather events and generally have the fewest
economically means for recovery.\(^9\)

**HISTORY OF CLIMATE JUSTICE NETWORKS**

Climate justice networks involve collaboration among hundreds of diverse social and environmental organizations with the common goal of combating climate change in ways that reduce existing economic and political inequalities. A key concern of these civil society networks has been limited and slow state responses within the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC was created in 1992 and the first COP occurred in 1995. At COP 3 in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was established to create a binding structure to reduce emissions, largely through GHG offsets and technology transfer. In 2000, a Climate Justice Summit held parallel to COP 6 drew attention to the negative impacts of climate policy on local rights, livelihoods, and health.\(^10\) In 2002, social and environmental NGOs gathered in Bali and agreed on 27 Principles of Climate Justice; these were extended from the Environmental Justice Principles recognized since 1991.\(^11\)

By 2004, it was clear to climate justice activists that the diverse NGOs in the movement advocated different approaches. More radical groups called for “real” action on climate change, in contrast to “false” solutions like GHG emission trading, which they viewed as allowing the wealthy to “pay to pollute.”\(^12\) Focusing on “system change not climate change,” anti-capitalism organizers in a coalition called Climate Justice Now! (CJN!) critiqued market environmentalism and the privatization of nature and the global and local commons in carbon trading schemes.\(^13\) Tension continues within the climate justice movement, as mainstream environmental groups are relatively comfortable with market-based approaches, but advocate for programs, projects, and policies to be fairer and more participatory.

Slow government progress to address climate change has increasingly spurred non-state actors to collaborate with old and new partners to broadcast demands.\(^14\) On December 12, 2009, at the UNFCCC’s COP 15 in Copenhagen, an estimated 100,000 people from around the world participated in a demonstration and at least 950, mainly youth, were arrested.\(^15\) A 12-day alternative to COP 15, Klimaforum, a people’s climate summit, hosted presentations, exhibitions, concerts, and films.\(^16\) In 2010, at Bolivia’s Cochabamba Summit, participants drafted a “Peoples’ Agreement on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth.”\(^17\) This statement criticized state mitigation and adaptation efforts thus far and demanded commitment in future COPs.

A state-centered approach holds out hope that UNFCCC parties can advance change. In 2012, the Doha Amendments emerging from COP 18 led to an extension of Kyoto Protocol commitments to 2020, but this agreement has only been ratified by a few countries since, and thus has not entered into effect. By 2015, at COP 21, the UNFCCC proposes to finish a new universal climate change agreement. Success remains uncertain, leaving scholars like John Foran and Richard Widick to suggest that momentum for progress lies in the hands of non-state actors:

> Our best hope is that global civil society organizations, and the movements of youth, indigenous people, labor, and environmentalists, will continue to converge at these [COP] talks, supporting those countries whose positions best address the magnitude of the crisis, and challenging those which do not. Under these conditions, there is a cautious basis for optimism.\(^18\)

**CLIMATE COALITIONS**

Many organizations combat climate change outside the UNFCCC structure. Civil society advocates for climate justice practice action-oriented, people-to-people diplomacy involving cooperation and networking among hundreds of autonomous organizations.\(^19\) There is not one global climate justice movement, but rather many local and regional movements. Distinct foci such as gender, rights of Indigenous Peoples, forests, biodiversity, agriculture, energy, waste management, and green industry can mean a splintering of attention, but can also provide the basis for broad, populous coalitions working across the development spectrum. Climate justice objectives (Figure 1) are cross-sectoral, involving wide-ranging and comprehensive change with ramifications for transportation, energy, agriculture, and more.
FIGURE 1: CLIMATE JUSTICE OBJECTIVES

- Implement food and energy sovereignty
- Guarantee participatory, rights-based management of natural resources
- Enforce indigenous land rights and promote sovereignty
- Defend public ownership of energy, forests, seeds, land, and water
- Re-localize production and consumption
- End excessive consumption by the wealthy
- Protect workers’ rights and health
- Eliminate racism and gender injustice
- Create democratically-controlled, clean, renewable energy
- Leave fossil fuels in the ground
- Invest in accessible and sustainable public transportation
- Eliminate climate debt and finance climate change adaptation

Today’s climate coalitions are vibrant due to the emergence of new actors, such as youth activists and grassroots organizations from the Global South, who have not previously collaborated on multiple political scales—from the local to the global. These coalitions put forth solutions that simultaneously reduce emissions and have the potential to narrow economic inequality. For example, the Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives (GAIA), a network of more than 650 grassroots groups in 90 countries, argues that trash pickers who live from recycling and re-using waste do more to reduce GHG emissions than waste-to-energy incineration. Tying waste management to climate change mitigation, a central GAIA initiative called “zero waste for zero warming” is a campaign to support grassroots efforts for waste minimization.

To scale up local initiatives, GAIA has created regional campaigns aimed at shifting policy and public finance away from incinerators and landfills, which disproportionately impact low-income communities of color.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 2.0+

Public diplomacy 2.0+ involves both face-to-face and online web 2.0 networking. Initially, climate justice groups relied largely on face-to-face meetings and trainings, such as Climate Camps. While there is still personal interaction, like at rallies and international meetings such as COPs, digital strategies widen opportunities to network across distances. Organizers do not have to wait for meetings or factor in transportation costs, meaning that they can reach more people with lower financial costs and fewer GHG emissions.

Public diplomacy 2.0+ is exemplified by 350, a network whose name refers to the need to decrease atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations to 350 parts per million to safely maintain life on earth as we know it. The organization creatively and strategically broadcasts through 350.org, an interactive website: a ticker on the bottom of the screen informs visitors of who has just completed a particular action, such as signing a petition. A series of network maps are informative tools, and an effort to make visitors feel like part of a growing international movement. In addition, 350 goes beyond digital communication, emphasizing public gatherings and personal encounters:

We think the climate crisis is about power...We believe that the only way we'll see meaningful action on climate change is if we can counter the power of the fossil fuel industry with the power of people taking collective action. We use online tools to leverage that power, to help those people see themselves as one movement, and to facilitate strategic offline action.

Website visitors are urged to partake in collective action by hosting meet-ups, workshops and events, starting petitions, organizing campaigns, or initiating a local 350 chapter. This sprawling organization, founded in 2008 by Middlebury College professor Bill McKibben and a group of college friends, has rapidly grown to an international network with over 500,000 supporters, including many youth, and 1,000 partner organizations in 188 countries. Although the strongest support is in the U.S., 350 has regional offices in Brazil and India and is expanding its global presence.

POWER OF YOUTH

Figure 2 (see page 16) illustrates two climate campaigns that receive support from 350, which are both primarily youth-led, and began in the U.S. before spreading to other locations. The first focuses on fossil fuel divestment as a tactic for reducing GHG emissions. Since 2011, nine U.S. colleges and universities have committed to pursue divestment, while dozens of others are considering it. The second, Powershift, is a youth movement which claims that because policymakers are in deadlock, youth need to instigate change to address climate change: the website states “This is our moment.”

The Fossil Free Campaign’s diplomacy focuses predominantly on industrialized countries, with chapter offices in Australia, Canada, Europe, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. Organizers advocate for divestment on the part of universities, local governments,
religious organizations, and other institutions with stocks, bonds, pensions, trust funds, mutual funds, or other fossil fuel investments. Divestment strategies target the top 200 fossil fuel companies based on proven carbon reserves, since these firms have produced the most emissions and are poised to continue to irreversibly damage the environment. Organizers argue that institutions with a mission to serve the public good have a responsibility to divest from companies that make profit from causing harm. Fossil fuel companies are commonly part of university endowments, but divestment provides educational opportunities for campus communities to learn about alternative technologies and shift to greener investment options.

Energy Action Coalition, a youth organization which combats climate change, started in 2005. In 2007, the coalition organized the first U.S.-based Power Shift, an action-packed four-day conference for thousands of youth to converge in one location to exchange reasons and tactics for instigating change. With a message of “one movement, many fights,” the Power Shift 2013 conference linked social and environmental justice during motivational speeches from leaders of the Little Village Environmental Justice Organization, United We Dream, Dream Defenders, and the Indigenous Environmental Network. Eight thousand young people who attended Power Shift 2013 took what they learned back to their communities with the goal of advocating for environmental and social justice.

Single-country Power Shifts have spread to Australia, Belgium, Canada, India, New Zealand, Sweden, Ukraine, and the U.K. In 2013, 350 organized a Global Power Shift (GPS) in Turkey. Organizers brought together youth leaders from all over the world, particularly focusing on representation from Africa and the Middle East, to provide training on setting goals, sharing compelling stories to inspire others, and organizing networks. Using 350’s extensive web toolkit, technical assistance, media contacts, opportunities to apply for grants, and other support, these activists are now launching their own campaigns. This same GPS model was brought to Japan, the Philippines, and Kyrgyzstan and will reach additional locations over time.

FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
Climate justice movements, with youth as some of the loudest voices and boldest actors, seek a cleaner and more equitable future. During the closing plenary of UNFCCC’s COP 17, a student from Maine’s College of the Atlantic accused delegates of betraying her generation: “You’ve been negotiating all my life. In that time, you’ve failed to meet pledges, you’ve missed targets, and you’ve broken promises.” Frustration due to weak state action increases the likelihood of civil disobedience, as seen surrounding COPs and at rallies protesting expansion of fossil fuel infrastructure. For example, the Keystone Pipeline has become a flashpoint to incite protest in Canada and the U.S., because it is perceived to represent on-going commitment to fossil fuels and an unwillingness to recognize and address climate change.

Advocacy for climate justice translates beyond the policy arena. As civil society organizations broadcast what they oppose, they also need to show what they support, such as alternative energy sources built upon new social, political, ecological, and economic relationships. Part of the long-term solution is for the poor, women, Indigenous Peoples, migrants, and other historically marginalized populations to participate in the decision-making process. Civil society networks reinforce, promote, and broadcast grassroots and multi-scale efforts to build low-carbon and sustainable lifestyles. As climate justice movements expand, activists gain power from collaborating to hold leaders accountable, while also working collectively to make change from the bottom upward.

REFERENCES & NOTES
5. Intersectionality draws upon theory from feminist women of color and refers to interconnected inequalities of race, gender, class, age, nationality, and other characteristics that need to be understood in conjunction with one another; see also Cappello and Harcourt.
7. René Audet. “Climate Justice and Bargaining
17. “People’s Agreement.” World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth. March 5, 2014.
19. For example, Climate Action Network International, Global Call for Climate Action, and Global Gender and Climate Alliance.
23. Climate camps gather together activists for training and direct action. They tend to be low-cost, open to all, run by volunteers, and use non-hierarchical decision-making procedures.
29. Quoted in Foran and Widick, p. 37.

Mary Finley-Brook is an Associate Professor of Geography, International Studies, and Environmental Studies at the University of Richmond. She has published on climate and energy justice in journals such as Water Alternatives and the Annals of the Association of American Geographers.
# FIGURE 2
## YOUTH CLIMATE ACTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diplomacy Tactics</th>
<th>Higher Education Fossil Fuels Divestment Campaign</th>
<th>Powershift</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Exchange Diplomacy** | • Chapters on different campuses exchange information and tactics  
• Efforts in one location or institution encourage and inspire progress in others | • Youth converge to construct coalitions  
• Training forums provide materials and know-how to take back to local area  
• Use of terminology of meme to encourage cultural shift |
| **Advocacy** | • Generates organizing toolkit with sample resolutions, petitions, and support letters  
• Provides informational resources and mentorship program | • Organizes rallies with motivational speakers |
| **International Broadcasting** | • Creation of eight international chapters and growing  
• Use of on-line petitions with real-time tracking to show progress in every institution in the region | • Organization of Global Power Shifts (GPS)  
• Creation of Powershift TV with edited speeches so people not present at live events can hear messages  
• Use of sophisticated websites: simple text and powerful visual images and videos  
• Use of Flickr photostream for postings from around the world |
As a professor of sport diplomacy and former professional athlete, the idea of an art museum putting its hand in the fervently ritualized, mass cultural happening of sport grabs my attention. Upon learning of the Los Angeles County Museum of Art’s exhibition, “Fútbol: the Beautiful Game,” I was both quick to view the show and to incorporate the exhibition as a curricular component in my graduate seminar, Sport Diplomacy.

Recently, among the ongoing debates that my students have grappled with, one issue that has distinguished itself is money motives and profit incentives behind sport diplomacy projects. Do certain funding sources and/or types of actors presenting sport as a technique for social engagement taint the social goods and even possibly the game itself? Can there be positive, lasting community engagement and real social good through corporate-driven sport diplomacy? These debates present real struggles for authenticity.

Throughout a recent semester, one student who I will call “Xavi” distinguished himself as the class’ so-called “sport purist” by consistently being the most loyal to and vocal about sport traditions. For Xavi, the likes of Nike, Adidas, and Puma on the pitch and around the game at large was and could only be about one priority: profit-making. On the other side of the academic encampment was a student who I will call “Corey,” who was wholeheartedly committed to a corporate diplomacy project. Corey was serious about re-imaging and proposing new directions for community engagement for the National Basketball Association’s (NBA) global community outreach campaign, NBA Cares. The classroom dynamic that semester was on fire in a positive way, as students engaged in dynamic debate.

When Xavi was absent from class, the other students did not know what to do. They needed his perspective and his skepticism that had, at first, felt like jabs of criticism. To make their arguments or further open the discussion in new directions, students would point to Xavi’s empty chair, and offer a question or comment on behalf of him. In witnessing these changes in the classroom community, I realized my students needed Xavi’s nostalgic bent and desire to keep sport’s commercial elements in place. The classroom camps – the cultural traditionalists and the commercial, corporate-friendly – came to realize that we live, play, act, and operate fully in these co-mixed, contradictory spaces.

Often, we struggle to have a conversation about sport without ruining it. The same is true of art. Do our messaging devices (e.g. sport, art, diplomacy) and ends threaten to quash the freedom of our cultural relations and expressions? These cautions are, perhaps, all the more relevant when attempting to employ sport and art for a variety of social causes.

Among many formally beautiful, playful, and provocative pieces I observed in the exhibition “Fútbol: The Beautiful Game,” I discovered one painting that continues to fascinate me as an important and complex diplomacy subject. This piece (see Photo 1, page 19) is American portraitist Kehinde Wiley’s larger than life, 72” x 60” oil on canvas portrait of footballer (soccer player) Samuel Eto’o.

Wiley’s portrait of Eto’o makes for an academically rich case study, as this work involves a non-state actor’s diplomacy effort to use cultural media–sport and the arts–to engage publics and facilitate cooperation on a transnational basis. Beyond mere symbolic expression, this piece is enmeshed with funding streams, partnerships, and highly-articulated messaging strategies that raise questions regarding the nature of conflicting diplomacy and financial interests. I offer this analysis because of the important general diplomacy tensions and challenges it both raises and may help resolve.

CASE STUDY: PEACE WORK, ART, SPORT, AND PUMA
Kehinde Wiley’s portrait, Samuel Eto’o (2010), depicts
Eto'o with a masculine, majestic gaze, arms crossed, popping with veins that seem to pulsate through the painting’s fore- and backgrounds. This footballer’s vascularity continues behind and around his standing figure in a pattern of what appears to be flattened footballs or spherical globes whose panels seem comprised of green land and blue sea masses. These globes are framed by a pattern of clay-colored keys that both loop together and de-ring, a device by which Wiley pares down the painting to one layer.

A light blue jersey announces Eto'o’s number as “10.” Just above the number, centered between his pectoral muscles, appears the Puma logo: the leaping Puma cat. Above his heart, left of the Puma, is a circular insignia of two hands interlocking across an outline of the African continent.

For the avid football fan, these jersey emblems may be more easily read (and perhaps even dismissed) as “typical” components or advertisements on professional sportswear. Yet there is more at work here: the Puma brand represents more than a simple shirt sponsor.

This Cameroon player is one of Puma’s “top cats,” iconic and valuable beyond his nationality. Not only has Puma crowned Eto'o as a Puma Football Ambassador, but Puma also acted as the financial backer of Wiley’s painting. His portrait of Samuel Eto'o is one of four “Puma Unity Portraits” that Puma commissioned to portray African togetherness and the universalizing, common human aspects of the game.

SAMUEL ETO’O: CAMEROON AND TRANSTATIONAL FOOTBALLER
Who is Samuel Eto’o? A global powerhouse and offensive striker on the football pitch, Eto'o represents Cameroon in football’s national sport model game, the game of World Cup-linked and driven competitions. However, his sport talent also enriches football’s global commercial—not nationally organized—sport model, the game of corporate clubs. In this way, Eto'o’s sport prowess extends well beyond Cameroonian, or even African, borders.

Eto'o entered football’s transnational labor flows in 1997 as a minor, when he accepted an invitation to enroll in Real Madrid’s youth academy. Since then, his talent on the field has been allied with top teams in the world’s most prestigious football leagues–Spanish La Liga, Italia Serie A, and English Premier League.

It was during his time playing in Spain with Barcelona FC (2004-2009) that Eto’o came to acquire a Spanish passport. This dual citizenship offers a particular and valuable distinction for Eto'o and other elite transnational footballers like him. Dual citizenship acts as a subterfuge by which teams can wiggle around sport governance rules that require compliance with quota allowances for “foreign” players (now, since the infamous Bosman Ruling, called “homegrown talent”). On the one hand, Eto'o counts as a European citizen with his Spanish nationality working nicely in service to the commercial game. On the other hand, Eto'o continues to call upon his Cameroonian nationality while representing his country in nation-state qualified competitions, such as the Olympic Games, the Africa Cup of Nations, and the World Cup.

Eto'o's biographical details, as well as the access to power that he holds, make him fit for Puma's ambassadorial delegation. Eto'o is a global good: his celebrity has global currency. Though, draped in national colors of Cameroonian pride, Eto'o remains mobile, empowered, and privileged as a cosmopolitan. It is the combination of these characteristics that qualifies him to serve as an ambassador at both local and global levels.

CORPORATE DIPLOMACY: MOTIVES AND MOVES
How are we to understand Puma's relationship with the arts, football, and the African continent? As Wiley aestheticizes Puma's endeavor to celebrate its relationship with sport on the African continent, should we look askance? Is this art, or high art? Is this diplomacy?

Unmoved by the potential tainting of high art’s status by dipping his hand into commercial art enterprises, Wiley makes his subject, Eto'o, a masterpiece. This portrait is about an intentional engagement with the arts, pop culture, and diplomacy. Transparent in his full embrace of both the arts’ and sport’s corporate and money motives, Wiley creates a hyper-realistic portrait that exists in and in spite of the presence of conflicting interests.

Seeing art as a technology for social transformation, Puma’s art diplomacy endeavors to strengthen civil society beyond nation-state borders. Commissioned with the intention of producing a world
exhibition tour entitled “Legends of Unity,” Wiley’s art offers a tool to affect positive change by facilitating cross-cultural dialogue and in gathering publics into the shared cultural space of a gallery.

In Wiley, Puma identified a culturally savvy, radical, yet consumer-friendly artist. Wiley only dabbles in the bold, confident, and powerful. Whether painting portraits of celebrities the likes of Samuel Eto’o or painting everyday people encountered on the street, his subjects become seemingly immortalized in trans-historic portraiture. Wiley subverts art’s rules of who matters, and thereby (re)declares what cultural spaces and doings ought to be valorized, ought to be canonized in permanence, and ought to be ordained as “high art.”

In Wiley’s work with Puma’s Unity Project, a clear art diplomacy enterprise has emerged. Wiley’s work has become paired with a specific and direct engagement for affecting change. The very issues of race, status, diaspora, colonialism, and power that Wiley’s work frequently raises are concretized in actual, on-the-ground communication campaigns that aim to give real-life meaning to notions of togetherness and unity in Africa.

Having briefly considered some of the fundamental backgrounds of converging art and sport diplomacy deployments, I now return to examine the artwork, Wiley’s Samuel Eto’, as a way to better understand the piece’s conflicting political and economic interests.

Eto’o wears the Puma Unity Kit, a kit intended to be used in common as the third kit by twelve African national teams sponsored by Puma: Ghana, Cameroon, Côte D’Ivoire, Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Mozambique, Togo, Tunisia, Senegal, Morocco, and Namibia. Wiley has painted Eto’o from the waist up, incorporating changes in hue from the Puma Unity Kit’s sky blue into bronze-brown. Though not entirely visible in Wiley’s painting, the jersey that Eto’o wears is made to pair with a short tinted in proprietary “Puma Pantone,” a bronze-brown, earthen color created from the actual blending of soil samples from Ghana, South Africa, Ivory Coast, and Cameroon. This Puma project articulates a clear diplomatic agenda.

Though I am examining Wiley’s football portrait as a singular work—as I first saw it in LACMA’s “Fútbol: The Beautiful Game”—the portrait exists and should be read alongside Wiley’s individual Puma Portraits of John Mensah of Ghana and Emmanuel Eboué of the Ivory Coast, as well as Wiley’s portrait Unity, which depicts all three footballers, Eto’, Mensah, and Eboué, hand-in-hand and hand-in-arm, together. In each painting, the players share the same number, “10.” This numerical equivalence is not a cardstock issuance of a generic jersey, though it may be the result of an artistic or diplomatic contrivance.

Rather, these players are on-the-field equivalents, albeit opposing equivalents. This common denominator, number 10, represents each player’s status and team role. The number 10 indicates each player’s greatness, vision, and ability to read and thus lead the game. In football, the number 10 makes things happen. This numerology is about status: the number 10 has currency for players and fans. Yet, as Wiley’s work carries these idolized footballers far off the field, the footballers become repositioned and read in an entirely different space, a museum space. The number 10 registers differently in this changed context: it
becomes rendered more or less as uniformity, a standard sameness. We might read this as a transformative declaration: “We are all number 10!” These are the visual elements and messaging components communicating Puma’s corporate diplomacy campaign.

Football joins people together. But does football’s presence and potential tend toward solidarity or unity-building? Puma Films’ documentary, Puma: Of the Same Earth, describes the sport and art projects that Puma has set forth to better achieve the positive, universalizing aspects, the human aspects, of the game. The Puma Unity kit matters: according to footballer John Mensah, “It’s not easy for the different countries to wear the same colors.” If these celebrated players can wear the same jersey before their very separate fans, then perhaps change is possible. By embodying Puma’s graphic design, these star players help bring people around the world together.

In this way, Puma offers a visual thread by which to better unite nations of Africa, to foster post- or transnational identities and new possibilities of cooperation. Yet intertwined with this kit’s diplomatic mandate stands a solid marketing and brand extension campaign. The recruitment of the likes of Eto’o as a Puma Brand Ambassador, the commissioning of Wiley, and the production and showing of such formally beautiful art help reach and foster a brand community—to wit, Africa.

There are commercial interests in expanding brand recognition. Puma stands to gain in profits from selling replica jerseys, as well as its Kehinde Wiley-designed lifestyle sport apparel line—though these profits are shared with Puma’s partner, the United Nations Environmental Program, to support biodiversity in Africa.

In another light, Puma’s corporate diplomacy might be seen as an effort to compete as a global lifestyle sport brand. In the late 1990s, the globe was heavily branded by Puma’s rivals, Nike and Adidas. Only Africa remained as under-chartered territory. Less benignly narrated, in this version of corporate diplomacy vis-à-vis brand extension, Puma said, “Let’s own something”—and thus they went to Africa.

A real difficulty emerges in assessing Puma’s sport and artistic engagement. This specific sport and art corporate diplomacy case brings up a common challenge of evaluating diplomacy actions by a for-profit entity: is this opportunism?

Perhaps we might give this corporate diplomacy action negative marks for its temporary, short-lived nature. Even as the Puma Unity campaign’s messaging seems timely and well-calibrated, the Unity project may fail to continue over time. The Unity project, including the commissioned Wiley art and Unity kits, emerged in the run-up to the 2010 South African World Cup. After the World Cup, the presence of the campaign seemingly disappeared.

Puma’s strategy might be assessed more favorably in terms of its integrated marketing communication, which demonstrates substantial intentionality, commitment, and perhaps even reciprocal responsibilities with its brand community. Puma’s brand relationship with Africa has been deliberately linked with social causes. In response to xenophobia and a number of attacks against immigrants and refugees in South Africa, Puma refused to be a silent corporate actor, and instead jumped into the fray through its introduction of the Puma Peace Ball (2010). This transnational corporation has the rapport and means to communicate effectively and powerfully with massive populations.

DIPLOMACY LESSONS LEARNED

As I consider how to articulate the potential lessons learned, I recognize an uncanny and important similarity between this corporate diplomacy action and the topics that most perplexed my recent graduate students of diplomacy.

Notions of authenticity, prim versions of non-commodified sport or art, are by and large illusions. The stories of corporate diplomacy and marketing that converge in this case study hit at central cultural diplomacy tensions. Standing before Kehinde Wiley’s Samuel Eto’o in the museum, I was struck by how Wiley, despite the presence of seemingly conflicting interests, seems to offer a way forward.

REFERENCES & NOTES

1. In football, the national sport model is primarily focused on the World Cup, as this is the most sought-after and coveted prize in a footballer’s career. The Olympic Games are organized on the same nation-state basis for eligibility to participate, even though these games hold less prestige than the end-all, be-all World Cup.
2. Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association v. Jean-Marc Bosman, European Court of Justice, (Case C-415/93).
4. Though distinguished by a rather regal title, Puma Football Ambassador, this footballer-Puma relationship might simply be thought of as individual athletic sponsorship. To be sure, Puma demands a more active, reciprocal, attaché relationship from its
endorsed athletes than many other corporate athletic sponsors.

5. Puma’s Peace Ball, introduced with non-profit partner Peace One Day, sought to raise awareness and change attitudes through a simple device—a basic football ball branded with Peace One Day logos—and an on-the-ground and film community engagement envoy. Puma’s strategic presence and commitment to community building and peace extends globally. In 2010, Puma was awarded the Best Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative at the prestigious Peace and Sport Awards.

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Introduced just twelve years ago, the Responsibility to Protect—the principle that states and the international community have a responsibility to protect populations from crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, genocide and war crimes—has rapidly become one of the most referenced and debated topics in international relations. Since its introduction, the principle has been a central topic of concern regarding events around the world and especially in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and Central and Southeast Asia.

While the Responsibility to Protect was originally formalized under the auspices of actors primarily representing states, especially through the work of the International Commission on Sovereignty and Security (ICISS) and later through efforts of the United Nations (UN), the meteoric rise of the principle as a matter of attention of national governments could not have advanced as it has without the advocacy efforts of civil society actors. As such, a survey of these efforts to promote the Responsibility to Protect could be a valuable subject of study for students of public diplomacy, particularly a practical examination of the methods by which state and non-state actors alike have worked to raise awareness of the principle among governments, which would stand in contrast to the more theoretical studies of the diffusion of the principle that have been the focus of research to date.

However, instead of looking back at the history of public diplomacy efforts to advance the Responsibility to Protect, we want to take this opportunity to invite scholars of public diplomacy to think about the future of the Responsibility to Protect, and in particular the role that public diplomacy could play in the more timely, effective operationalization of the principle through the extension of the responsibility to national societies and even local communities themselves.

We suggest that scholars of public diplomacy can make a unique contribution to advancing the operationalization of the Responsibility to Protect on at least two fronts. First, the challenge of continuing to increase, among peoples and states, not only an awareness of the Responsibility to Protect, but also and especially a more careful understanding of the principle is clearly one that falls in the traditional scope of public diplomacy. As an example of this need, much of the controversy over the Responsibility to Protect hinges on a narrow understanding of the principle as only a responsibility of the international community to react to atrocities, rather than an understanding that of equal standing in the principle are “the responsibility to prevent” atrocities and “the responsibility to rebuild” societies that have experienced atrocities. The vast majority of international attention to the Responsibility to Protect also focuses primarily on the third of the three pillars (see Figure 1) of the principle—that requiring the international community to respond to atrocities—with less attention given to the first and second pillars of the principle—that each state has primary responsibility for protecting its own populace from atrocities, and that the international community is obligated to provide assistance to states to help them fulfill this primary responsibility of atrocities prevention.

While international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), in particular, continue to raise awareness and especially understanding of the Responsibility to Protect, the involvement of public diplomacy experts in this work—to ensure that the principle is more completely and carefully understood—could contribute greatly to these efforts.
The three component principles of The Responsibility to Protect as articulated in the Report of the International Commission on Sovereignty and Security are:

1. The Responsibility to Prevent
2. The Responsibility to React
3. The Responsibility to Rebuild

The three pillars of the Responsibility to Protect identified in the Outcome Document of the 2005 United Nations World Summit (A/RES/60/1, paragraphs 138-140) and formulated in the Secretary-General’s 2009 Report on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (A/63/677) are:

1. The State carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement;
2. The international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist States in fulfilling this responsibility;
3. The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect populations from these crimes. If a State is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect populations, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

Second, and potentially even more importantly, scholars of public diplomacy could contribute uniquely and critically to advancing the understanding that for the Responsibility to Protect to be effective, it must be operationalized not only at the international, and even more importantly, the national level, but also at sub-national levels by non-state actors as well. As Figure 1 shows, while the principle as formulated by the ICISS and the UN assigns responsibility for the protection of populations from atrocities primarily to states (Pillar 1) and secondarily to the international community (Pillar 3), it is increasingly being recognized that for the aspirations of the Responsibility to Protect to be realized—for atrocities to be effectively prevented, not just reacted to—this responsibility must be understood by and assumed by sub-national actors and especially non-state actors as well. This includes not just international NGOs, but especially non-state actors that can operationalize the Responsibility to Protect in their own societies, including sub-national governments, local non-governmental organizations, and even communities and individuals themselves. As public diplomacy has evolved from a focus on communications efforts primarily by states to influence foreign audiences as a complement to more traditional diplomacy, to a more comprehensive study of the transnational flow of information and ideas, the process of intercultural communications, and the interaction of private groups in one country with those of another—new insights from the field promise much in terms of lessons for how to advance this understanding of the critical role that non-state actors need to play in the operationalization of the Responsibility to Protect as a complement to national and international efforts.

### OPERATIONALIZING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE NEED FOR EXPANDED RESPONSIBILITY

As introduced above, civil society has played a leading role in efforts to diffuse the Responsibility to Protect and promote states’ recognition of the principle as an operational norm, individually and through multilateral organizations. Notably, however, in spite of this central role of NGOs in diffusing the principle, the focus of these efforts has continued to be states, both as the primary targets for NGOs’ public diplomacy and as the actors responsible for operationalizing the principle. While states, of course, should be primarily responsible for the security of their citizens as a condition of their sovereignty, as elaborated by the Responsibility to Protect, the international community ought to serve a subsidiary role in guaranteeing this security as a protection of universal human rights. Meaningful operationalization of the principle will require the participation of actors other than states, and public diplomacy can play a critical role in advancing this understanding of the need for expanded responsibility and even more so for mobilizing non-state actors’ assumption of this expanded responsibility.

Why is this so? First, we suggest that for the Responsibility to Protect to be truly operationalized, it needs to be internalized by the nations of the world into their domestic laws and policies. This objective is essential to the full realization of Pillar 1 of the principle—each state’s assumption of the responsibility to protect its own population. However, because of the highly contested character of the Responsibility to Protect, we suggest that the process by which the principle will be internalized in countries throughout the world will not necessarily follow a path from interaction to incorporation to internalization, such as outlined by Koh in his discussion of the enforcement of human rights law.
Instead, we suggest that because of the sensitivity of some states to the guidance of the principle, especially regarding the “responsibility to react” and Pillar 3 on the subsidiary responsibility of the international community, these states are likely to be more slow to incorporate into domestic law and policy the precepts of the responsibility to protect as a result of their interaction with other states. Instead, we suggest, there is more promise for states to incorporate precepts of the Responsibility to Protect into domestic law and policy as a result of their populations’ internalization of the principle due to the influence of transnational transmission of ideas and values.

Second, we suggest that for the principle to be meaningfully operationalized to effectively prevent threats to populations, such populations themselves have to be enabled to recognize, mitigate, and respond to security risks. In spite of this potential, and even arguably critical importance of non-state actors to the full operationalization of the Responsibility to Protect, there has been relatively little focus on interpreting guidance for non-state actors, including sub-national governments, to operationalize the principle. Again, we suggest that there is a critical need and opportunity for greater and more effective public diplomacy to advance this goal of non-state operationalization of the Responsibility to Protect, especially as non-state actors themselves are likely to be most effective at influencing non-state actors in other societies to take on a direct role in operationalizing the principle.

Notably, the importance of non-state actors to the operationalization of the Responsibility to Protect is beginning to be recognized. For example, speaking in May 2012 at the Conference on Regional Capacity to Protect, Prevent and Respond: United Nations-Asia Pacific Strategy and Coordination in Bangkok, Thailand, then-Special Advisor to the United Nations Secretary General on the Responsibility to Protect Edward Luck made this understanding clear:

> The UN’s role in a normative sense is unique because of its universality. But in an operational sense it always looks for partners in regional and sub-regional arrangements. We also should not forget the idea of the individual responsibility to protect. The Responsibility to Protect is not something only for governments and it is certainly not only something for international and regional bodies. Individuals have responsibility and individuals can make a difference… Civil society is enormously important, as are partnerships with national institutions, public–private partnerships, and legislative partnerships. (emphasis added)

In a separate discussion in 2011, Luck commented on the role of civil society in advancing the Responsibility to Protect in a manner that speaks to the increasing focus of public diplomacy on the transnational flow of information and ideas, the process of intercultural communications and the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another, “...[W]e very much expect that civil society—we’re seeing this around the world—will continue to be very, very interested in working with us. [T]hat there will be more trans-regional learning processes, comparing notes from different parts of the world about what works and doesn’t work and new ideas that might be adopted in different places.”

Non-state actors can play two critical roles in the advancement and extension of the Responsibility to Protect—first, to promote internalization of the principle within countries, and second, to develop sub-national capacity to prevent, react, and rebuild. In each of these roles, public diplomacy expertise is crucial to facilitating communication and interaction that emphasizes society’s role in implementing the Responsibility to Protect.

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In 2011, in response to being asked, “Where do you see the Responsibility to Protect in five year’s time?” Edward Luck specifically identified the aspiration of increasing internalization of the principle within countries, and second, to develop sub-national capacity to prevent, react, and rebuild. In each of these roles, public diplomacy expertise is crucial to facilitating communication and interaction that emphasizes society’s role in implementing the Responsibility to Protect itself.

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In his reply, Luck continued to specifically point out the critical role of civil society in helping to realize this aspiration.

Complementing Luck’s perspective, Noel M. Morada, in his chapter in Jared Genser and Irwin Cotler’s
**The Responsibility to Protect: The Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Time**, specifically calls out the requirement that any such internalization will depend on the emergence of domestic constituencies within states to champion the principle: “The internalization of RtoP... must be anchored in constituency-building, particularly at the domestic level. Without strong advocates or ‘champions’ of RtoP from within, states may just be content with just having signed international documents or agreements committing themselves to the norm.”11 In this sense, the role for domestic constituencies and other non-state actors is to prevent states from circumventing the Responsibility to Protect through lip service to the principle.

Continuing his discussion, Morada examines the need for internalization in a manner that alludes to the value that public diplomacy can lend to this effort—not only in building awareness of the Responsibility to Protect, but also in increasing understanding of the importance of the principle and of the principle itself: “… Building awareness about the importance of preventing genocide and mass atrocities is one key objective of domestic constituency-building. Currently, there is a very low level of public awareness about RtoP in all countries of Southeast Asia. For those who have heard of the principle, they have some misconceptions about its scope and perceive it to be mainly about military intervention.”12

And while Morada refers only to Southeast Asia, others, such as Bamberger et al, in *The Responsibility to Protect: Moving the Campaign Forward*, note that awareness of the principle, and particularly understanding of the principle, remains low among Western nations’ populations, policymakers, and international NGOs.13

Importantly, Morada reflects on the role of non-state actors in efforts to raise awareness and, again, particularly understanding of the principle among the public and policymakers to foster internalization. Of specific concern to Morada are two different types of civil society actors—non-governmental organizations and the media:

...Civil society groups...are also potential RtoP champions in the domestic sphere. Specifically, they could incorporate RtoP in their advocacy framework that could enable them to actively engage the state or government in enhancing the role of law, promote protection of civilians in conflict areas, prevent or contain extrajudicial killings, and pursue inter-faith or inter-civilization dialogue, among others. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that also campaign for ratification of international treaties... [could] lobby for passage of domestic laws that enhance the protection of human rights and punishment of crimes covered by RtoP. At the community level, NGOs involved in conflict prevention and peace-building could also play a critical role in developing early warning and response systems, in partnership with local government and law enforcement agencies, that can contribute to building state capacity in preventing genocide and mass atrocities.14

Notably, Morada moves from a discussion of civil society’s role in internalizing the Responsibility to Protect into domestic law and policy to a discussion of how these groups can be active agents in operationalizing the Responsibility to Protect within their societies.

In addition, when it comes to the media, while Morada identifies journalism as another key player in promoting awareness of and thus advancing the internalization of the Responsibility to Protect, he similarly moves on to identify how the media can play a critical role in operationalizing the principle with other non-state and sub-national actors:

The media has a direct role in increasing public awareness about human rights violations and crimes against humanity...To some extent, the media could potentially contribute to developing an early warning and response system as journalists can alert law enforcement, local or national government agencies, and civil society groups in conflict areas about violence taking place that could escalate into a crisis situation.15

However, he cautions, this role will be limited until more journalists are themselves aware of and better versed in the principle. This is a call to scholars of public diplomacy to consider more carefully both the role that journalism might play in operationalization and how the Responsibility to Protect might be better communicated to journalists.

Morada’s comments on civil society and media illustrate how the role of non-state actors in the advancement of the Responsibility to Protect can be thought of as advancing along two overlapping tracks: internalization and operationalization. With the ultimate goal of engaging all critical sectors of a society—national government, local government, civil society, media, and others—to operationalize a people-centered national security framework, we must explore the role that non-state actors can play in prevention, protection, and rebuilding. Public diplomacy scholars can play a critical
role in this undertaking.

EXAMPLES FROM CIVIL SOCIETY
Examples of non-state actors’ engagement in operationalizing the Responsibility to Protect are emerging—both as the agents of operationalization as well as transmitters of this expectation of non-state operationalization. Looking at these leading efforts by civil societies to operationalize the Responsibility to Protect provides an opportunity to illustrate the potential role for public diplomacy to diffuse the principle into the fabric of societies.

One recent example comes from Kenya, where civil society actors worked concertedly in 2012 and 2013 to engage the broad population of the country in the prevention of mass violence during the 2013 national elections, similar to that which surrounded the 2007 elections. Through a variety of efforts, from grassroots community mediation programs to nationwide efforts to use information and communication technology to monitor electoral irregularities and report efforts to accommodate them, civil society groups engaged members of Kenyan society to develop shared expectations and motivation to act to maintain social order to prevent violence.16

One example of an innovative public diplomacy effort is the use of PeaceTXT, an initiative that employed SMS to relay carefully crafted messages to communities to promote non-violence. Another intervention employed mobile and Internet technologies to collect and report incidents of violence, as well as counter misinformation and hate speech. These efforts point to a potential role not only for public diplomacy, but innovative technology-enabled public diplomacy for socializing the principle of the Responsibility to Protect can take, as well as the opportunity for scholars of public diplomacy to think about how to inform these efforts and innovate with them to increase their effectiveness.

The above examples suggest the viability of internalizing and operationalizing the Responsibility to Protect in local communities, as well as highlight the important role of public diplomacy in socializing conceptions of the principle.

CONCLUSION
Though most discussions on the Responsibility to Protect focus on international response, there is a growing awareness that communities should be empowered to contribute to their own protection.17 In his comments at the 2012 Conference on Regional Capacity to Protect, Prevent and Respond, Luck said of civil society groups: “They can be whistle-blowers; they can say no to incitement and incendiary rhetoric or targeting of certain groups within societies; they can influence political decisions by their governments; and, very importantly, those who might be victims often have options for self-
and informing the work of external protection actors. \(^{19,20}\) Importantly, Breakey et al emphasize community-led prevention and protection capacity, noting that some international efforts can actually undercut local protection efforts. \(^{21}\)

In short, non-state actors must play an increasingly important role to fully realize the potential of the Responsibility to Protect. This role will include engagement of national and local governments, civil society, media, and other actors to manifest a people-centered national security framework in every nation throughout the world. Insights from public diplomacy can be critical in helping these efforts to internalize and operationalize the Responsibility to Protect to be successful. \(^{22}\)

**REFERENCES & NOTES**

1. Drawing on the literature on international regimes, we refer to the Responsibility to Protect as a “principle” in that it is a concept at times appealed to by various actors to guide or justify state behavior. Borrowing from Krasner's definition of international regimes as “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations” as a guide, we find this definition more useful than referring to the Responsibility to Protect as a “norm” or “emerging norm,” as it is still to be established that the Responsibility to Protect itself influences nation-states to behave differently than they otherwise would, particularly with regularity, or that it has altered the expectations of routine state behavior beyond what can be attributed to the Responsibility to Protect as a principle. For more discussion on the classification of the Responsibility to Protect as a concept, principle or norm, see Jeremy Sarkin, “Why the Responsibility to Protect as a Doctrine or (Emerging) Norm to Prevent Genocide and Other Massive Human Rights Violations is on the Decline: The Role of Principles, Pragmatism and the Shifting Patterns of International Relations” in *Politorbis* 47, February 2009.


3. While public diplomacy is defined variously by different actors, we consider public diplomacy to be an activity engaged in not only by states but also by non-state actors, and not only for the purposes of influencing states but also influencing non-state actors. In this fashion, we eschew many other definitions and look to the description of public diplomacy presented in one of the earlier brochures of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy’s Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy (with emphasis added): “Public diplomacy…deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; *the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another*, the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications.” Web. February 2014.

4. Speaking in May 2012 at the Conference on Regional Capacity to Protect, Prevent and Respond: UN-Asia Pacific Strategy and Coordination in Bangkok, Thailand, then-Special Advisor to the United Nations Secretary General on the Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck noted that 90% of the journal articles on the Responsibility to Protect focused only on the use of coercive force.

5. For example, Crocker Snow Jr., Acting Director Edward R. Murrow Center in 2005, commented in
May of that year, “Public diplomacy that traditionally represents actions of governments to influence overseas publics within the foreign policy process has expanded today—by accident and design—beyond the realm of governments to include the media, multinational corporations, NGO’s and faith-based organizations as active participants in the field.” Snow’s and others’ comments on the definition and boundaries of public diplomacy are featured on the website of the PDAA, pdaa.publicdiplomacy.org, accessed in February 2014.

6. See Kathleen Renée Cronin-Furman, “60 Years of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Towards an Individual Responsibility to Protect,” American University International Law Review 25, no.1, 2009. 175-198, on both the Responsibility to Protect as an extension of universal human rights and on the demands for an “individual responsibility to protect.”


8. Edward Luck, Keynote Address at the Conference on Regional Capacity to Protect, Prevent and Respond: UN-Asia Pacific Strategy and Coordination in Bangkok, Thailand, in May 2012.


10. Ibid.


18. Luck, op. cit.


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PERSPECTIVES

DIASPORA DIPLOMACY: INFLUENCES FROM PHILIPPINE MIGRANTS

JOAQUIN JAY GONZALEZ III
This article is about the praxis of Philippine-style public diplomacy, or what I refer to as “diaspora diplomacy.” It discusses the growing public diplomacy trend in which diasporas are contributing more actively to the recasting of real-world cross-cultural exchanges and relations.

The global perception of the Philippines is heavily influenced by major television news networks. Watching coverage from Western Europe and North America for the last 20 years has been frustrating for the domestic and international Filipino communities. The BBC, CNN, and FOX seem to downplay much of the good news and often play up the bad news: violent volcano eruptions, massive flooding after typhoons, overloaded ferries sinking, political scandals, terrorist bombings, al-Qaeda cells, and insurgent kidnappings. The latter three eventually moved the U.S. State Department to issue strongly worded travel warnings to American citizens about the personal risk of doing business or tourism to the Philippines.

Counteracting this negative publicity is a daunting, often frustrating, task for Philippine government officials, especially those who work at diplomatic postings abroad. With the media and State Department warnings, who in their right mind would risk traveling to Manila or Cebu or Davao as an investor, not to mention as a tourist?

THE NEED FOR MORE AGGRESSIVE DIPLOMACY FOR DEVELOPING STATES

Why should diplomacy through diaspora be a concern for scholars and practitioners of international relations? The answer is simple: according to the World Bank, there are over 200 million migrants worldwide, and mainstream theories of international relations have not adequately explained their role and influence in global ties, particularly in terms of their soft power influences. Very few international relations textbooks take this phenomenon seriously.

Eight months after the June 2006 State Department travel warning against travel to the Philippines, San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom and a 140-member delegation went on a goodwill and business mission to Manila, San Francisco’s sister city. All were U.S. citizens; more than half were Filipino-Americans. Despite official and unofficial warnings, Newsom chose to heed the credible assessment of the Filipino-American chair of the San Francisco-Manila Sister City Commission. The chair reassured the mayor that travel to the Philippines was safe, a view echoed by the FilAm (Filipino-American) community in San Francisco.1

The mayor and his San Francisco-Manila Sister City delegation brought with them 180 wheelchairs for distribution to Manila’s physically challenged and a $10,000 check for the Philippine Philharmonic Orchestra. There was little coordination with the U.S. Embassy in Manila or the State Department in Washington, D.C. The San Francisco-Manila Sister City Commission communicated directly with the Philippine Departments of Tourism and Foreign Affairs, as well as the Manila Mayor’s Office.

Moving away from the norm, Mayor Gavin Newsom relied on what he viewed as more accurate and realistic advice from his city’s Filipino migrants to travel to Manila, discounting mainstream media exaggerations and State Department warnings. International relations theory and practice continue to point to the supposed pragmatism of hard power—large military presence, high Gross National Product (GNPs), and so forth—which developing diaspora states, such as the Philippines, do not have. What the Philippines offers, however, is on-the-ground, culturally sensitive knowledge from its millions of emigrants in diaspora.

What I am exposing, and consequently espousing, is not just public diplomacy but diaspora diplomacy, a more aggressive foreign policy path for developing states. This path could supersede the dominant and America-centered ideas that Harvard professor
Joseph S. Nye, Jr. promotes in his influential work, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.* Nye and many other western scholars already provide excellent policy guidance for President Barack Obama, Secretary of State John Kerry, and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on how America currently utilizes soft power and the continuing relevance of multilateralism—I am proposing an alternative to such America-centered work.

**THE PHILIPPINE DIASPORA AND ITS ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

Why is the Philippine diaspora important to the study of contemporary international relations and public diplomacy? As alluded to earlier, it is one of the fastest growing soft power movements in the world today. In the last century alone, the Philippine diaspora nation has grown to more than 10 million strong in 200 countries, while over a quarter of a million seafarers (one quarter of the world’s total) are plying the planet’s oceans and seas. Filipinos live, work, socialize, and worship in more than a thousand cities and ships. The aggregated diaspora population is twice the size of New Zealand’s and is equivalent to the total population of Switzerland.

Diaspora diplomacy’s economic influence is quite significant. In 2013, Filipino migrants remitted more than $26 billion, which is more than Nepal’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and more than the national income of 60 developing economies.

A CHANGED OUTLOOK

Prior to the mass dispersion of its nationals, the basic function of Philippine diplomacy was to promote the economic, political, cultural, and consular interests of the Republic. Foreign Service Officers (FSOs), Foreign Service Staff Officers (FSSOs), and Foreign Service Staff Employees (FSSEs) comprised a very elite corps that associated only with an elite Filipino expatriate community, the powerful local politicians, and the wealthy socialites in their country of posting. In conversations with me, a number of FSOs stated that eating with Filipina domestic helpers at a park in Singapore or Hong Kong was not the reason why they joined the diplomatic corps. Some felt they had earned this elite diplomatic stature by virtue of a highly selective examination and interview process.

When posted overseas, government diplomats received all the diplomatic courtesies, plenipotentiaries, and immunities accorded by the host country, and earned 10 times more than their civil service counterparts in the Philippines. They traveled on diplomatic passports which automatically got visas and paid no taxes to the host government, based on reciprocity agreements and treaties. They were detached from the bulk of the diaspora except through routine consular work—passport renewals, repatriation requests, and visits to the jailed.

But the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (or Republic Act 8042) changed the nature of their ritzy, glitzy lifestyle. The catalyst for this law was a tragic event: Flor Contemplacion, a Filipina domestic helper in Singapore, was hanged for the alleged double murder of a fellow Filipina care worker and the Singaporean child she was caring for. Doubts about Contemplacion’s culpability led to a serious diplomatic row between the Philippines and Singapore, two regional partners.

There were allegations from the Filipino public that the government, particularly the highly paid, highly trained foreign service officials, did not do enough to defend and protect Contemplacion because she was “just a maid.” Contemplacion symbolized the plight of the millions of Filipino diaspora diplomats that needed better
care, protection, and social safety nets. She was viewed by her fellow Filipinos as a martyr. In the wake of the controversy, the Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs resigned. The Philippine Congress responded with long overdue legislation benefitting the multitudes in diaspora.

From then on, a series of diaspora-friendly laws were enacted. In 1997, a Comprehensive Tax Reform Law was passed exempting the income earned by overseas Filipinos from Philippine taxation. Overseas Filipinos gained an elected representative in the Philippine Congress. Overseas absentee voting, retirement incentives, and dual citizenship laws were also legislated, formalizing a legal regime for a Filipino global nation. Consequently, the Philippines has become the largest labor, faith, and cultural exporter among the ten Association of Southeast Asian Nations member states.

Diaspora Diplomacy, Philippine-Style

Unlike other public diplomacy strategies, Philippine diaspora diplomacy is people-propelled rather than product- or propaganda-driven. It is the collective action of Filipinas and Filipinos emanating from various geographic locations. There are globally recognizable Filipino personalities, such as boxer Manny Pacquiao, but Filipinos are also visible just by their sheer numbers in international public and private spaces.

Diaspora diplomacy enables the Philippines and other diaspora states to influence another country’s culture, politics, and economics. Dual citizenship legislation which allows dual loyalties, in effect, institutionalized dual influencing. Public policies nurturing diaspora diplomacy allow the Philippines to be smart and aggressive without being hegemonic and arrogant. Realists write about the exercise of hard power such as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Diaspora diplomacy, on the other hand, is the launch of Weapons of Mass Dispersion and achieving a different form of MAD, More Acceptable Diplomacy.

The primary drivers of diaspora diplomacy are the basic needs of home and family, as opposed to economy and security. For Filipino migrants, the structure of home and family is often large and complex. A typical household may include, aside from the basic family unit of spouses and children, siblings, in-laws, uncles, aunts, grandparents, nieces, nephews, and grandchildren. It can also extend outwards to friends, strangers, churches, charities, hometown associations, and other organizations. Household income generation is based on this extended kinship structure; each family member of legal age is expected to contribute to household expenses, which may include education, medical expenses, and mortgage.

Beyond the home, extra disposable income often goes to help rehabilitate or construct schools, chapels, and roads in the Philippines. Most migrants meet their family obligations while at the same time contributing to the betterment of their homeland. Given these extended meanings of household and extended uses of income, it is not surprising to see Filipino migrants consider their churches as part of their families. Many feel that they are being sent out to the world as church members who need to spread the word of God, so they assume such roles as pastors, lay workers, bible readers, and choir singers, among others.

Governments of developing countries with limited budgets for bilateral relations are able to outsource their diplomatic functions to migrants who share their culture with the societies where they live and work. Although the Philippines has 87 diplomatic missions and opened seven more in 2009, these missions do not begin to cover and serve the more than 2,000 cities globally where Filipinos reside. Thus, Filipino migrants have adapted the traditionally governmental role of serving as ambassadors of Filipino culture and traditions. Through their many organizations, they assist in diplomacy by working independently or alongside efforts by the Philippine diplomatic corps. Since migrant workers use time outside of work and church to socialize and interact with the “locals” in their adopted countries, they contribute to the cultural sophistication and diversity of their locality through their religious events, musical groups, sports tournaments, and the like.

PHILIPPINE DIAPOsRA DIPLOMACy AND THE “FILIPINIZATION” OF GLOBAL CItES

The power of Philippine diaspora diplomacy comes from
its capacity to influence, charm, persuade, and assert, in order to solidify ties. It is not meant to dominate, but is instead creating two-way, open, consensual, and respectful relations.

In my two decades of living in the U.S., I have been studying and documenting how this evolving “Filipinization” process facilitates transnational integration, adaptive spirit, and inter-generational cohesion. If Americanization is the output of U.S. public diplomacy internationally, then varying degrees of Filipinization results from Philippine diaspora diplomacy in global cities. Our ethnic visibility through our local businesses, media, arts, pop culture, and other public spheres are some of the manifestations of success.

Filipinization is the process by which temporary and permanent Philippine migrants worship, get together, and earn money in their adopted country (kasamahan) and how they help each other, contribute to their new communities, and assist their families and hometowns in the Philippines (bayanihan).

Filipinization by kasamahan involves mostly inward-focused fellowship and togetherness. This includes formal and informal groups, such as a Filipino church choir, prayer or bible study group, bingo socials, mahjong sessions, and regional societies which may foster communal feelings of togetherness, companionship, fraternity, sisterhood, solidarity, pride, and competitiveness.

Filipinization by bayanihan includes predominantly outward-oriented linkages, associations, bridges, and connections. These involve transforming kasamahan to encompass volunteer activities, civic involvement, community partnerships, political advocacy, protest marches, clean-up drives, money remittance, disaster relief work, donating, and fundraising. Filipinization may be more pervasive in some countries than others depending on many factors, including number of migrants, their status and standing, and homeland or home base context.

Filipino migrant communities bring varying forms of bayanihan and kasamahan into their new host societies or homelands, and many eventually weave them into meaningful religious, economic, and political contributions or influences. I categorize Filipinization further into three types: (1) religious Filipinization, or the bayanihan and kasamahan influences emanating from churches or places of worship, as well as spiritual energy, passion, action, and advocacy; (2) occupational Filipinization, or the bayanihan and kasamahan influences associated with their work, labor, English proficiency, inter-personal communication skills, formal education, informal training as well as the sending care boxes or remitting money; and (3) associational Filipinization or the bayanihan and kasamahan influences that come from their participation in cultural shows, organizations, Philippine independence day commemorations, and informal gatherings.

What I have observed in my global sojourns is that migrants’ lives are consciously or subconsciously guided by a complex web of religious, occupational, and associational relationships based on utang na loob (debt of gratitude) to church (simbahan), hometown/province (bayan/probinsiya), and families (pamilya).

These are reflected in the many sayings that Filipino migrants have internalized and repeated to me during our conversations. Many Filipino migrants emphasized to me that faith and prayers helped in every step of the migration process, and they show their gratitude to God by going to and supporting their churches in their adopted countries and back home. Their religious behavior is guided by the saying “Nasa Dios ang awa, nasa tao ang gawa” (God sympathizes, but it is up to people to do the work).

Others told me that they work hard to be able to pay a debt of gratitude to the place where they come from and the country they now live or work in. Some added that their occupational drive is founded on the idea that “Ang hindi marunong lumingon sa pinanggalingan ay hindi makakarating sa paroroonan” (A person who forgets where he comes from will not get to where he wants to go).

Many of them said that they are very open to adapting to a new culture and language, but also like to share with non-Filipinos the love they have for their family traditions and native language: “Ang hindi marunong magmahal sa sariling wika ay higit pa ang amoy sa mahabong isda” (He who doesn’t know how to love his own language smells worse than a pungent fish).
CONCLUSION AND CALL TO ACTION

Over the past decades, the Filipino diaspora has increased the soft power of the Philippines. This influence is drawn from the thousands of temporary migrants that leave the country daily and the millions of permanent migrants and their descendants in close to 200 countries and more than 2000 cities globally. Filipino diaspora diplomats far outnumber Philippine foreign service officers in formal diplomatic missions. They Filipinize international cities, towns, provinces, and municipalities in three ways: religiously, occupationally, and associationally. Thus, policymakers, business, and civil societies in both host and home countries should continue to formulate ways and means to cultivate their rich contributions. Social safety nets that protect their welfare, health, and old-age security should be reinforced at both fronts.

REFERENCES & NOTES

1. Sister Cities, a common form of public diplomacy, are an agreement between government officials, business, and non-governmental actors between two cities, from two countries, to nurture cultural, sports, arts, and business dialogue and understanding.


INTERVIEWS

PASSOP: A NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION FOR REFUGEES’ RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA
AN INTERVIEW WITH LGBTI REFUGEE PROJECT COORDINATOR GUILLAIN KOKO

NON–STATE ACTORS IN BRAZILIAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
AN INTERVIEW WITH THE USC MASTER OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY DELEGATION TO BRAZIL

WHAT IS HOLLYWOOD’S DIPLOMATIC ROLE?
AN INTERVIEW WITH FILM PRODUCER MIKE MEDAVOY
With human rights enshrined in its Constitution, South Africa has stood as a beacon of hope for refugees across the African continent. Despite this vision, refugees (mostly from Somalia, Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic of Congo) still face discrimination in the process of seeking asylum. Every day, hours before sunrise, lines of refugees stand in front of the Department of Home Affairs—the country’s immigration office—to plead their cases for asylum status. The ground is often muddy from recent rains, scattered with trash, and occasionally human waste due to a lack of toilets. Many refugees’ claims are deemed “unfounded.” Other claims are never heard. Violence and chaos often characterize the Department of Home Affairs’ Refugee Reception Center.

People Against Suffering, Oppression, and Poverty (PASSOP) is a grassroots, non-profit organization based just outside of Cape Town, South Africa where it seeks to advocate, serve, and promote the rights of asylum seekers, refugees, and immigrants in South Africa. Shannon Haugh, the editor-in-chief of Public Diplomacy Magazine, sat down with Guillain Koko, PASSOP’s LGBTI Refugee Project Coordinator, to learn more about PASSOP’s public diplomacy strategy. Koko is a human rights lawyer from the Democratic Republic of Congo, where he once worked with the United Nations Mission to monitor human rights violations. In 2012, Koko joined PASSOP as a paralegal officer prior to becoming the LGBTI Project Coordinator.

**Shannon Haugh**: Tell me about PASSOP. How did it start and how has it progressed?

**Guillain Koko**: PASSOP started in 2007 in the context of the xenophobic attacks in South Africa against refugees. The attackers thought refugees were taking their jobs. People were killed. Soon after, Braam Hanekom, Anthony Muteti, and various volunteers went to Home Affairs to start helping refugees with complex legal documents and appeals. When Home Affairs adopted policies that hurt refugees or failed to provide them basic services, Braam, Anthony, and the volunteers began protests and demonstrations to advocate on behalf of the refugees. PASSOP applied to various philanthropic organizations for funding, like the Atlantic Philanthropic and Open Society Foundation. Later on, PASSOP grew up and started to develop programs to serve the vulnerabilities of our clients including the Disabled Children project, the LGBTI Refugee project, Anti-Xenophobic Project and the Gender Rights project. Today, we provide paralegal assistance to refugees, asylum seekers and other foreign nationals, organize workshops and integration events to promote collaboration and cooperation among people of different backgrounds. We want people to learn to live together and love each other according to the spirit of "UBUNTU." We showed them the importance and value of cooperating together. We want refugees and South Africans to learn to see others as brothers and sisters. Ubuntu, meaning “solidarity,” is the message we stand behind. PASSOP has really grown up from when it first started.

**SH**: Who are your main partners?

**GK**: We partner with international organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International Gay & Lesbian Human Rights Commission, the United Nations Refugee Center, and the Organization for Refugee, Asylum & Migration, among others. They have really helped us spread the word while adding legitimacy to our work. Our local partners are also important. Locally, we work with legal organizations like the University of Cape Town Law Clinic, the Legal Resources Centre, also the Scalabrini Center, the Cape Town Refugee Center, the Catholic Welfare Program, the African Center for Mi-
gration and Society at Wits University in Johannesburg, the South African Liaison Office, Sonke Gender Justice, Triangle Project, Free Gender, Gender Dynamic, and the Foundation for Human Rights.

SH: The Home Affairs Refugee Reception Center has been chaotic at times. As a volunteer there in the summer of 2013, I personally witnessed violence and chaos in the lines. There were no proper toilets. I saw police show up with large weapons to intimidate people. PASSOP has successfully mobilized its staff and volunteers to monitor the Center, pressure Home Affairs to bring order to the line, and provide services to the refugees. Refugees who have been supported by PASSOP while in line at the Center have reported they have: a) been treated well and; b) been given a longer extension than usual. How much of this can we attribute to PASSOP? What kind of tools does PASSOP use to implement change?

GK: PASSOP started to monitor the Refugee Reception Center every day. We produced reports based on the information we received from surveying people. How are people being treated in the queue? How are vulnerable people, like disabled and pregnant women, being treated? We call for the effective implementation of the South African Refugee Act and better service delivery for refugees. We met with the Department of Home Affairs and a good result came from that dialogue and engagement. This did not happen from one time. We went several times. If Department of Home Affairs is not cooperative, we protest in front of the Refugee Reception Center or outside of the South African Parliament in Cape Town. In the past, the Department of Home Affairs failed to come up with a better queuing system to meet with every person in the queue. As a result, PASSOP has absorbed many of their responsibilities. In addition to our job, we are doing some of the work that other organizations were doing. Our office is full and it has gotten to the point where even some of our neighbors are complaining to our landlord. Besides the funding issue, another issue comes from Home Affairs and their poor policies. Many refugees travel from across South Africa to receive services and they wait all day and don't get served. Some people can't afford the long trip and the accommodations to travel and stay in Cape Town. Other people are not aware of the policies and consequently, they get arrested. South Africa also still struggles with xenophobia. For example, there was a fear that when Mandela died, all the foreigners would be chased away. Of course it was a rumor, but it was taken very seriously.

SH: What is the relationship between PASSOP and the government?

GK: Home Affairs is supposed to be our partner because we need to work together to deliver better services to the refugees and asylum seeker community. When it comes being built to shelter people in the queue so they can stay dry. However, we still have some pending issues with the Department of Home Affairs and the Refugee Reception Office in Cape Town. The first of these issues is the failure to comply with the Court order to serve newcomers. The second deals with extending permits to all asylum seekers regardless of their offices of origin.

SH: What are the challenges PASSOP currently faces?

GK: Lack of funding. In the past 3 years, most of our funding comes from the Atlantic Philanthropic Office. They are now pulling out from South Africa. Other donors also are pulling out of South Africa and going to other African countries because they assume that South Africa no longer has problems. The Refugee Law Clinic at the University of Cape Town was also affected by the funding issue. Now, they lack the staff necessary to perform the work they were doing for refugees and asylum seekers. As a result, PASSOP has absorbed many of their responsibilities. In addition to our job, we are doing some of the work that other organizations were doing. Our office is full and it has gotten to the point where even some of our neighbors are complaining to our landlord. Besides the funding issue, another issue comes from Home Affairs and their poor policies. Many refugees travel from across South Africa to receive services and they wait all day and don't get served. Some people can't afford the long trip and the accommodations to travel and stay in Cape Town. Other people are not aware of the policies and consequently, they get arrested. South Africa also still struggles with xenophobia. For example, there was a fear that when Mandela died, all the foreigners would be chased away. Of course it was a rumor, but it was taken very seriously.
to corruption, we are very involved in the fight and very vocal. We are there to serve people. We need to remind Home Affairs of their obligation. Whenever we see that there is some discrepancy, we do something. In partnership with other with other organizations, we have taken Home Affairs to court to dispute their decision to stop providing services to new applicants and refusing to serve people who got their first permit from other offices and now live in Cape Town.

SH: What kind of relationship does PASSOP have with the media?

GK: Generally, the media comes to us to cover our advocacy work and activities in support to the refugee community. We report our problems, and the response (or lack of response) from the government. Several documentaries have also been made. They come to us to interview refugees and asylum seekers. Most of the time, they come to us to look for the stories to highlight the plight of refugees.

SH: What kind of digital presence does PASSOP have? What kind of digital tools does it use to advocate for refugees?

GK: Social media has played a huge role in helping us spread the news and connect with people. Just recently, two LGBT activists in Uganda contacted us via Facebook. We provided them with support and guided them out of harm’s way by helping them get refugee status here in South Africa. Many others contact us through these social media platforms. We also communicate with the public with frequent press statements and tweets.

SH: Can you speak a little about the PASSOP solidarity network?

GK: The solidarity network is a group of LGBT refugees in South Africa. An LGBT refugee faces double discrimination as a foreigner and as an LGBT. They are often isolated and this isolation can lead to suicide. Through the solidarity network, LGBT refugees are able to connect with each other and share ideas and give each other advice. Sometimes they throw events. It is a way for people to reach each other.

SH: There is a huge global network of people who have interned or volunteered at PASSOP. What do you think is the impact of this?

KG: They become PASSOP ambassadors and spread the news of PASSOP.
In February 2014, a group of seven USC Master of Public Diplomacy (MPD) students traveled to São Paulo, Brazil to conduct field research, with the intention of furthering the study and field of public diplomacy. Through carefully planned site visits, students engaged a wide range of public diplomacy actors from governmental, corporate, academic, and non-governmental organizations. Each of these meetings allowed the students to gain a better understanding of Brazilian public diplomacy and the transnational network of non-state actors. Back in Los Angeles, Public Diplomacy Magazine interviewed the group to gain insight on their key findings, specifically in the areas of international broadcasting, citizen, and digital diplomacy.

Public Diplomacy Magazine: Last year the MPD research trip was to China, and the year before it was to India. Why did you choose Brazil and, more specifically, why did you choose São Paulo? It would seem that your research would be more suited to the capital city, Brasília.

Emily Schatzle: It’s interesting you should say that, because that was the same question that was asked by almost everyone when we told them we were going to Brazil. They were certain that we would be able to research public diplomacy better in Brasília. What we actually found is that São Paulo is such a dynamic city and is full of diplomatic potential, with so many international actors, it ended up being a more valuable opportunity to go to São Paulo.

Helene Imperiale: I think overall, we chose Brazil because as one of the BRICS, it is a rising economic, political, and diplomatic power. We wanted to identify an emerging world power and analyze what they are doing through public diplomacy. Additionally, because of the two mega-events, the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics in Rio, we wanted to see how Brazil is going to present and represent itself to the international community.

PDM: Your group did some research on international broadcasting. Can you tell us about your findings? Did you see any differences between broadcasting in Brazil versus broadcasting in the United States?

ES: We visited Globo, the second largest media conglomerate in the world and the largest in Latin America. It covers print, broadcast, radio, and digital media, and is best known for its TV network, Rede Globo. We had the opportunity to meet with journalist William Waack, who hosts a popular evening news program. It was really interesting when we asked Waack about broadcasting and how he thinks Globo affects Brazil’s image. He said, “We don’t feel responsible for Brazil’s world image,” which was an interesting take. I feel like when you look at American journalists, many of them are keen on upholding America. It’s interesting to see a journalist that’s willing to just tell it like it is.

Tenille Metti: For one, broadcasting in the United States is focused on using innovative platforms to engage audiences; however, for Globo, they simply are not yet there. While they have a designated Communications Department, they do not focus on multimedia approaches to sharing information—rather, this department focuses on the reputation and image of Globo as a whole.

Gabriel Bernadett-Shapiro: One of the things that William Waack mentioned was that Globo is a monopoly. Because they have no competition, it changes the way they report. For example, Waack told us that a reporter he was close to was killed in the recent street riots. For...
Waack, it's Globo's responsibility to name the rioters and to call them what they are: disruptive.

ES: I think the biggest difference is that TV viewership is still so high in Brazil, higher than the percentage of people primarily getting their news online. In the U.S., that's shifting quickly. I think that definitely impacts how we disseminate information.

TM: In our meeting with University of São Paulo Communications Professor Luli Radfahrer, he spoke about how grand institutions, like Globo, could be even more dominating if they invested in technology. One of the most interesting things he told us was that Globo has the opportunity to become something as instantly massive as Netflix by incorporating visual-centric technologies into their broadcasting, but Globo is practically “too big to care,” in that they have such loyal viewership, there’s no need to diversify broadcasting strategies.

PDM: Tourists may form opinions about a place based on the interactions and experiences they have with locals. How did the locals treat you as foreign visitors? Did they try to convey anything about Brazil to you, either intentionally or unintentionally?

ES: Almost all of the people we talked to told us “I love São Paulo, I love Brazil,” and I don't think they were trying to conceal or hide anything. I think this is a nation of people who are extremely passionate about their country and happy to talk about it to anyone who will listen.

Colin Hale: Also, our local guide told us, “Anybody could walk down the street and be Brazilian.” Brazil has the largest Japanese community outside of Japan. It has one of the largest Korean communities outside of Korea. There are significant Italian and German communities—everybody’s there.

PDM: Campus Brasil, a Brazil-based people-to-people educational tourist company, helped you plan and schedule your meetings and trip accommodations. It seems like they made a big effort to welcome you and to help you experience Brazil. Can you tell us a bit more about your engagement with them?

HI: Campus Brasil is relatively new. It started a few years ago. Recently, there has been a significant rise in entrepreneurship in Brazil, and many young people are starting their own companies. These two young entrepreneurs at the University of São Paulo started a tourism company designed originally to welcome students studying in Brazil by helping them with small logistical issues, like finding a doctor or a place to live. Later, they realized it would be better to start bringing groups to Brazil to participate in international exchange. Now, Campus Brasil works in partnership with Embratur, the tourism institution within the Brazilian government, to try to bring more students to São Paulo, and specifically more American students. But they're not only working with American students, they're working with Europeans and Australians.

Caitlin Dobson: In general, we saw a big push from promoting business tourism to promoting actual tourism—highlighting São Paulo’s cultural appeal. They want you think of São Paulo and not just Rio de Janeiro. Campus Brasil really welcomed us, and showed us how to be locals in Brazil. So for people who are looking to truly experience the culture of a place, Campus Brasil does a great job.

PDM: Can you talk about the role of Brazil's digital diplomacy in communicating with foreign publics? Do you think there is a difference between governmental and non-state use of these platforms?

HI: Professor Radfahrer talked to us about digital engagement strategies, which are crucial for NSAs. One of the most interesting things we learned from him about digital diplomacy is that it’s all about visuals and visualization. Literacy rates are at 90% right now, but with a population of over 200 million people, that still leaves millions of people without the ability to read and write. So a platform like Twitter isn’t going to work. It’s all about visual communication and videos. He said that the best way to reach people is by television, which is exactly what we were talking about with Globo. The second thing we learned is that the best way to communicate is through free text messaging. Everyone has a mobile phone, but it’s not necessarily a smart phone. The last major takeaway was that successful engagement is often done through YouTube videos. How-to videos are big in Brazil. Professor Radfahrer gave us an insight into the Brazilian mind and Brazilian culture: the visualization that is most effective in Brazil is based on a tradition of oral history that was passed down through Asian and Afro-Brazilian cultures.

GS: The government is not using digital platforms to their full potential in Brazil, while NSAs are doing a better job incorporating and harnessing online engagement. It was incredible to talk to the NSAs like the magazine
Cemporcento Skate, which is trying to keep its head above water and earn a profit. But it is making full use of all digital platforms—it is tied in and engaged. When we went to the U.S. Consulate, on the other hand, they were not using their digital platforms and did not think that they should be. Their Twitter account only has about 800 followers and is mostly for journalists. No digital diplomacy initiatives are in place there, it was strictly traditional diplomacy.

PDM: What were the most important lessons you took away from your trip?

CH: Latin America, South America, and Brazil are ripe for good, thoughtful, and dynamic public diplomacy from the U.S. I think the Brazilian culture, people, and values are much more in line with the U.S. than in other parts of the world, so I'm hopeful about that. My second takeaway is that the city of São Paulo and the state of São Paulo—separate entities that work together—are starting to strategically communicate their brand. They are coming together to brand their city-state as a true global destination that should be mentioned alongside Paris, London, and Tokyo.

ES: As scholars of public diplomacy, we tend to look primarily at the state agenda in determining what a state’s or city’s goal is in developing its brand. When Mayor Garcetti says “Los Angeles,” for example, what does he want people to think? But I got a good view of how everyday people contribute to the city and nation branding. Are they happy? How do they feel about their city? How do they feel about their country? What do they think could be better? What would they like to change? And the biggest thing I saw was the potential for NSAs to filter that dialogue. To go between what the state wants and what the people are feeling and to create the best possible city brand for both groups.

HI: The U.S. doesn’t understand the potential value in engaging the Brazilian public. There is a lot of opportunity to connect these two publics and participate in exchange and digital diplomacy. The U.S. Consulate in São Paulo said that Brazilians want to meet Americans and understand the U.S. However, I don’t know if there is that same response in the U.S., which is part of the problem. If the U.S. strategically engages with the Brazilian public, it could be an important and beneficial relationship in the future.

GS: My biggest take-away was that visual communication is the most important form of communication in Brazil, and that it reflects the oral tradition—the country’s culture.

TM: For my focus in digital diplomacy, it was compelling to see that digital innovations are not a growing trend worldwide, even in emerging powers like Brazil. Some organizations we met with had yet to develop strategic approaches which could target audiences they sought to reach. In an age where public diplomacy tends to look very different than it used to, thanks to these technological platforms (for example, some ambassadors have the ability to tweet today), I can appreciate that face-to-face public diplomacy still triumphs in parts of the world, like it does in Brazil.

CD: There is so much room for growth in Brazil. In any research setting, gaining that cross-cultural understanding is invaluable. And I think that non-state actors are the perfect vehicle to facilitate this exchange, and I hope it continues on.

Neftalie Williams: My biggest take-away is that the best way for us to do great work as public diplomacy scholars is to create our own digital diplomacy programs...The U.S. Consulate is interested in making new connections. This creates opportunities for partnerships between the U.S. Consulate and NSAs who understand digital platforms. As the next generation of diplomats, we have the skills and expertise to be of service in this area.

Members of the USC Master of Public Diplomacy Delegation to Brazil: Gabriel Bernadett-Shapiro, Caitlin Dobson, Colin Hale, Helene Imperiale, Tenille Metti, Emily Schatzle, and Neftalie Williams.

See photos from the research trip to Sao Paulo on page 46.
Mike Medavoy is Chairman and CEO of Phoenix Pictures, a member of the USC Center on Public Diplomacy Advisory Board, and co-author with Nathan Gardels of *American Idol After Iraq: Competing for Hearts and Minds in the Global Media Age* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).

Born to Russian-Jewish emigrants in Shanghai, Medavoy’s family moved to Chile in 1947, and later to the U.S. His career began at Universal Studios in the 1960s. Since then, in various positions at several Hollywood studios, he has overseen the release of many major American films, including *One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest* (1975), *Rocky* (1976), *Annie Hall* (1977), *Platoon* (1986), *Philadelphia* (1993), *The Thin Red Line* (1998), and others.

Lauren Madow spoke with Medavoy about Hollywood’s complex position as a potential diplomatic actor, as well as Hollywood’s shifting role on the world stage since the publication of *American Idol After Iraq*, in which he wrote: “If culture is on the front line of world affairs in the times to come, then Hollywood, as much as Silicon Valley, the Pentagon, or the U.S. State Department, has a starring role.”

LM: In 2009, you said that “the magic is gone” from the U.S.’ image abroad, especially in the wake of the George W. Bush administration. Where do you think we stand in 2014, and what role has Hollywood played in restoring (or not) the magic?

MM: I think there is no doubt that going to Iraq and eventually Afghanistan caused many countries to question the nature of our leadership. In my opinion, Obama’s pulling out of Iraq and Afghanistan—while giving an impression of weakness to some—is probably facing the reality that the argument of putting boots on the ground is untenable. I don’t believe the American public wants it. It’s pure bravado. “We are big and we will attack” is not enough of a threat, and to make it credible we would have to do something, and a miscalculation could cause millions of people to die.

In the last few years, American movies have tended toward the cartoon-like comic book heroes favored by the Millennials, and quite frankly these work well around the world.

LM: You wrote that “the most attractive attribute in our arsenal of soft power” is the image of America as “the Promised Land.” When you select a project to work on, do you take the ideas of soft power and projecting a certain image abroad into account? Do you think that producers in general should be cognizant of this?

MM: I don’t select a project based on trying to change people’s minds; I make a movie based on whether the story will connect viscerally to an audience and attract a large enough audience to pay for its cost. For example, the film I’m involved with now, *The 33*, is the [true] story of 33 [Chilean miners] trapped 800 meters below the earth by a rock twice the size of the Empire State Building. It’s a story of courage; it’s the story of every man who works every day to improve his lot and that of his family.

The story of the Jews in Shanghai is another project I’m working on because it connects to my own story, having been born there. The story of my parents’ survival again touches on that which makes us human. I am also working on a project in Europe about genocide. All of those are universal themes and should attract large audiences if well done.

It would be a serious mistake to think that our problems are only cyclical. We now live in a knowledge economy, boosted by technology that goes everywhere, at every time. I believe as filmmakers we are engaged in a higher calling.

LM: So you choose a given project based on whether it’s a good story that interests you, not because you’re making calculations about public diplomacy.
MM: Yes. I connected to Philadelphia not because of any reason other than it being a great story. But you know, the fact that an American citizen who has lived in Chile is doing a film about a Chilean mine disaster, I don't think is lost on anybody.

LM: Would you say making The 33 is part of what you've called an “empathetic cinema,” meaning films that inform global citizens about one another?

MM: I think when you go to see a film, mostly you're going there to escape the daily rigors of life, whether you see it on television or at the movies or on your iPad, for that matter. I don't think you're going to it just to get informed. I think human beings have a common need. In the case for example of the miners, I looked at it from the following point of view: I say that all of the people I know, including my parents, went to work every single day wanting to make a better life for their families and to give their children a better opportunity than the one they had. This is certainly true in the case of my parents, and certainly true about the miners. They were working in order to give their families a better opportunity...You know, I recently had an interesting conversation with Martha Raddatz about her book, The Long Road Home, which touches on a battle that took place in Iraq. I wanted to take that story, and tell the story about how we got there and what happened after—not all of it is in the book. The power that a film can have, of being able to synthesize a whole experience and make it come above is immense—and that we in America can do it and have less interference doing it [than in other countries] is what is great about Hollywood.

LM: You predicted that Hollywood might not be displaced as the main global storyteller, but that it might “return to its origins as the production site of the hopes and dreams of a cosmopolitan immigrant culture.” You are an example of that yourself—do you see this prediction being born out?

MM: Yes, I still think that people view America as that beacon—we are still the land of opportunity. It's still a place where people want to come and do films that are exported around the world. I'm a perfect example of it—a Shanghai-born Jew. Now, more people in more and more countries want to see their own lives onscreen. That's been true for years, but I think more so now than ever. I think the Arab world wants to see films about themselves; the Germans want to see films about themselves, the Italians, same thing. It's a healthy thing.

LM: Which film industries or which schools of independent filmmakers around the world would you say have been especially successful at projecting their own countries through film, or at resisting what you've called “cultural occupation” by the U.S.?

MM: Well, film industries now are so diverse, there’s Belgian filmmakers, there’s French filmmakers, they’re all trying to get the rest of the world to see their work. But in the final analysis, I think you have to view film as an art form, but an art form that entertains. The byproduct of that is an examination of human beings being human, or inhuman for that matter. It’s a way to look at yourself.

LM: You’ve proposed that Hollywood might establish it’s own Council on Cultural Relations in order to harness soft power more effectively. Is that an idea that you’re pursuing?

MM: When Nathan and I wrote that prescription [in American Idol After Iraq], we thought, “Well, somebody needs to do something.” But the movie companies are run by large conglomerates that are basically bankers. They don’t want to be told what to do. The only thing that they’ll understand is that unless you do something that recognizes other cultures you won’t make money. So when 60-70% of the income on many of the movies comes from foreign markets—that tells you everything you need to know. They’re smart and they’re looking to make money. They could care less about the politics of it.

REFERENCES & NOTES
GLOBAL THINK TANKS

NORTH AMERICA
1,984

CENTRAL AMERICA
97

SOUTH AMERICA
565
BY REGION IN 2013

- **EUROPE**: 1,818
- **ASIA**: 1,201
- **MIDDLE EAST**: 365
- **SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**: 612
- **NORTH AFRICA**: 146
- **OCEANIA**: 38

Source: University of Pennsylvania Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, The 2013 Global Go To Think Tank Index (GGTTTI)
Photos (Top to Bottom): Rede Globo’s headquarters in São Paulo; USC MPD students meet with the editorial staff of Cemporcento Skate magazine; City of São Paulo’s Leonardo Barchini discusses the branding and legacy plans for the 2014 FIFA World Cup.

Photos by Neftalie Williams
CASE STUDIES

SURVEY RESEARCH AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
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CELEBRITY DIPLOMACY WITHOUT EFFECTS:
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KEVIN E. GRISHAM

DISPLACED RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN CHIAPAS:
COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES FOR AGENCY
LAURA RUBIO DIAZ–LEAL
“The advancement and diffusion of knowledge,” wrote James Madison, “is the only guardian of true liberty.” This belief that knowledge and information empower people and improve the quality of democracy is built into the DNA of many think tanks and research organizations. More information and analysis about major issues affecting society lead to a better-informed citizenry, more knowledgeable lawmakers, and ultimately, better policies and outcomes.

One way that research organizations provide information to citizens, policymakers, and others is through survey research. In many countries, surveys have become an almost institutionalized facet of domestic politics, and polling organizations are also becoming important actors in international politics, providing information about where global publics stand on key issues in world affairs.

When done well, surveys give the public a voice and ensure that the beliefs and opinions of ordinary citizens are heard in debates about important political, economic, and social topics. Harvard political scientist Sidney Verba has suggested that when survey respondents tell pollsters their views, they are engaging in a form of political participation.1 Moreover, polls provide an egalitarian form of participation by soliciting opinions from a representative sample of the population, not just select interest groups or those with enough resources to make their voices heard in other ways. Rigorous polls follow well-established social scientific methods to ensure that the characteristics of the survey’s sample mirror the characteristics of the full population.

In the United States and other wealthy democracies, public polls have become an integral component of politics. They are covered extensively by the media, and have become part of the national conversation, regularly highlighting whose political fortunes are up or down, and more importantly, revealing the public’s thinking on major issues of the day.

Even in non-democratic countries, survey research is increasingly common. In countries like China, where national leaders do not have to stand for election, leaders still utilize polls to check the public pulse now and then. As the Washington Post recently highlighted, Communist Party leaders in Beijing regularly commission polls to gauge what Chinese citizens are thinking on a variety of issues.2 “More than ever before,” the Washington Post’s Simon Denyer writes, “China’s rulers are actually listening to their people, reacting quickly to contain potential crises that could threaten one-party control.” And increasingly, there is publicly available polling in China that informs average Chinese people about what their fellow citizens are thinking.

In addition to its role in domestic politics, over the last decade, polling has also become a common feature of international affairs. Today, organizations like the Pew Research Center, the Gallup Organization, the Program on International Policy Attitudes, and the German Marshall Fund routinely conduct cross-national surveys exploring public opinion on key issues around the world. These efforts are complemented by academic projects such as the World Values Survey and the various “barometer” polls, such as the AmericasBarometer, Afrobarometer, Arab Barometer, and others.

These studies fill the information gap about international politics in the same way polls in the U.S. fill an information gap about American politics: by providing data on the opinions of average citizens. This kind of information is especially valuable in world affairs, where debates are often shaped by diplomats, business leaders, scholarly experts, journalists, and other elites. While all of these groups have a lot to add to discussions about key global issues, international conferences and elite conversations can be out of touch with the priorities and opinions of the general public. When elites jet into a capital city or financial center to talk with other elites about important global challenges, there is always a risk that important voices will be left out of the discussion.

Organizations like the Pew Research Center try to address this problem by conducting cross-national
surveys using rigorous social science methods. Our experience suggests there is a strong demand for this type of research among policymakers, the media, scholars, and the general public. These types of polls can tell us a great deal about the priorities of people from countries across the globe. For instance, a 2013 Pew Research survey asked respondents in 39 countries to rate a series of potential global threats. The results suggest people are more worried about big global challenges than they are about localized regional issues or threats from specific countries. The top two concerns were global climate change and international financial instability. Lower on the list were issues such as the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs and political instability in Pakistan.

Polls can also shed light on how the actions of major world powers are received. At the Pew Research Center, we have collected a great deal of data over the last decade on global perceptions of the U.S., tracking the rise of anti-Americanism during the George W. Bush presidency and the rebound in America's image—in many, though not all, countries—during the Obama era. This kind of research is more than just a popularity contest: it examines the various strengths and weaknesses of America's image and American ideals, in addition to the ways in which people see the various dimensions of U.S. power. It shows the extent to which there is a receptive public opinion environment for U.S. diplomacy, business, and culture.

Similar research can be conducted about other major players on the world stage. For example, polls show that publics around the world clearly see China's power on the rise. In the Pew Research Center's 2013 poll, majorities or pluralities in 23 of 39 countries said they believe China either will surpass, or already has surpassed, the U.S. as the world's leading superpower.

Today, survey research can make particularly important contributions in emerging nations. The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), the MINT countries (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey), and other rising nations are playing an increasingly significant role in world affairs, and they are undergoing enormous political, economic, and social transformations. How do people in these countries feel about their growing clout in international politics and the rapid changes affecting their lives?

The current attitudes of the Chinese public show how people in emerging nations are enjoying the economic progress they have made, while at the same time wrestling with the side effects of progress. In the Pew Research Center's 2013 poll, the Chinese overwhelmingly said their economy was in good shape, and they were optimistic about the future, but growing numbers are also concerned about issues such as air pollution, water pollution, and food safety. In China and many other nations, inequality is a major public concern. Most Chinese people welcome their country's economic growth, but they do not necessarily believe everyone in society is experiencing the benefits of that growth.

On these and other issues, survey research organizations provide information and analysis that inform and shape debates over global issues. In this way, they are significant non-state actors in international affairs. Polls are hardly the only way people can express their views, especially in an era when millions use Twitter, Facebook, Weibo, and many other social media platforms, in addition to more traditional methods of participation such as voting and protesting. However, surveys are still the most rigorous way to get a representative picture of public opinion. As polling becomes more and more common in emerging and developing nations across the globe, we will have a much better,
and truly global, understanding of how average citizens view top global challenges, as well as the major issues in their countries and their own lives.

REFERENCES & NOTES


RICHARD WIKE

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In this article, I briefly explore the relationship between celebrities and the diplomatic process. Much of the general public’s knowledge about the work of celebrities comes through the efforts of Bono or Angelina Jolie. Academically speaking, our understanding of “celebrity diplomacy” comes through works by a number of scholars, including Andrew Cooper and Mark Wheeler. As part of that effort, I will focus on the humanitarian work of American actor and entertainer Danny Kaye for the United Nations International Children’s Fund (UNICEF) from the 1950s until his death in 1987. Before there were “celebrity diplomats,” there were “Goodwill Ambassadors” who used their fame and status to broadcast the United Nations’ (UN) message of international cooperation. Kaye was the first Hollywood spokesperson for the UN and its affiliated agencies and served as its first “Ambassador-at-Large” starting in 1954. Much of the scholarship on celebrity diplomacy is interested in assessing the effects celebrities have on the diplomatic process. I am uneasy about this tendency to think along the lines of a “help or hurt” mentality. Measuring effectiveness is a difficult thing because it involves an important assumption about causality. Celebrities have to do something that can be tangible enough that we might be able to account for its direct impact. Of course, this is easier said than done. A recent symposium at the University of Southern California devoted to the topic concluded that, “in policy terms, it remains unclear whether the UN’s celebrity diplomats are effective in helping the UN achieve its objectives in promoting the world body’s goals in peace building, disarmament, human rights, environmental protection, and human development.” Cooper’s observation that “[a]s celebrities push for recognition and support by becoming plugged into transnational policy making, the political elite use celebrities to boost their own credibility” is probably the closest we can get to a definitive assessment of celebrity diplomacy. It is when we move to assess the relationship between actor and cause that things become more difficult to ascertain.

This “help or hurt” mentality is similarly deployed in media studies, another area where I work. Scholars in this field frequently default to a series of claims about causality when it comes to media—social media brings about revolution, television begets violent behavior, and so on. In his examination of the relationship between Hollywood and American politics, Steven Ross points to the “love-hate relationship” between celebrities and the public. “We love stars when they remain faithful to our fantasy images of them,” Ross writes, “but we condemn them when they reveal their flaws or disagree with our politics.” We are deeply suspicious about the motives of celebrities and the values they communicate—perhaps less so in an age characterized by promotional culture—but we are equally ambivalent about media technologies. Both carry with them a sense of awe at what they are able to do, but both celebrities and media technologies also carry a certain amount of baggage about the possible negative or untrammeled effects of their power. Turning to the case of Danny Kaye can highlight different questions about the role of celebrities in the diplomatic process, such as why celebrities turn to diplomatic issues, why specific celebrities team up with particular institutions, and what each has to gain.

The timing for this reflection is fortuitous. The Library of Congress recently celebrated the centennial year of Kaye’s birth with an exhibition of his work and the work of his talented wife, the composer and writer Sylvia Fine. A smaller version of that exhibit was on display at the Walt Disney Concert Hall in Los Angeles. The U.S. cable network TCM also had a 24-hour tribute to Kaye’s work, a new biography of Kaye was published, and the
re-make of one of Kaye’s signature films, *The Secret Life of Walter Mitty*, ran in theaters.

Starting his career in vaudeville, Kaye became one of the most popular entertainers worldwide for his theatrical work, comedic roles, musical talents, and acting work in such films as *Hans Christian Andersen* (1952) and *White Christmas* (1954). Many others followed, as did a career on television as the host of variety specials and *The Danny Kaye Show*. The story of how Kaye became involved with UNICEF is infamous: he met the Executive Director of UNICEF, Maurice Pate, in 1949 on a flight from London to New York that was re-routed to Ireland after it caught fire. Pate invited Kaye to lunch at UNICEF’s headquarters, as well as to some UNICEF field offices. Kaye agreed, and Paramount Pictures provided a camera crew to accompany him. Paramount produced a film based on these visits, *Assignment Children* (1954), and distributed it free of charge to movie theatres, classrooms, community centers, and other public venues all over the world. This launched Danny Kaye’s career as a celebrity humanitarian and supporter of a number of causes for UNICEF which are now part of the broader cultural imagination, from promoting the sale of UNICEF greeting cards to promoting the “Trick or Treat with UNICEF” Halloween campaign.

Why might Pate have been so interested in Kaye? In part, this was due to Kaye’s universal appeal, particularly his popularity among children and families. At the same time, the need for a celebrity spokesman at UNICEF arose due to changing dynamics of the agency. In the same year as Kaye and Pate’s chance meeting, UNICEF transformed from a temporary organization charged with attending to displaced children during World War II to an agency associated with development through a series of long-term projects. In 1959, the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of the Rights of the Child, and the agency turned away from reconstruction efforts towards development concerns. As J.P. Singh notes, educational responsibilities that had once been confined to other UN-related agencies, such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), were transferred to agencies like the World Bank and UNICEF by the 1960s. UNICEF needed Kaye to usher in this moment of institutional change by highlighting its efforts at improving children’s health.

The creation of Goodwill Ambassadors should draw our attention to how public diplomacy can be considered to represent a series of communication problems. The diplomatic challenge is one of messaging: What can we say to convince other constituencies to change their view of us? Many of the components in the public diplomacy toolkit—dialogue, dissemination, translation, interaction, and engagement—are ideas about messages, receivers, and media. For agencies like the United Nations, celebrities are used in part because other forms of communication—namely intra-state “dialogue,” other bureaucratic processes of multilateralism, or public communication efforts—were unable to deliver desirable results. Celebrities such as Kaye emerge as a different way to mediate multilateralism, another tool in the effort by the UN to get its message across to larger populations.

But what was in it for Kaye, aside from fulfilling a laudable humanitarian impulse? There are a number of factors to consider. For one, Kaye and Hollywood were stung badly by the anti-communist “red-baiting” activities of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) in the 1950s. Many Hollywood actors and directors protested their treatment at the hands of HUAC, and expressed frustration that the industry had come under such close scrutiny by the government. Kaye joined legendary actors including Lauren Bacall and Humphrey Bogart in denouncing HUAC’s actions. His work for UNICEF shortly thereafter was not only a reflection of his own philanthropic impulses, but also the reflection of a sentiment held within the industry that sought legitimacy. The post-1945 environment also saw the development of Hollywood actors as independent businessmen, as a result of anti-trust legislation that liberated them from the studio system. Many started production companies and became their own “brands.” Celebrity work for the UN is very much a continuation of this process, one that legitimates celebrities’ efforts and distinguishes them among their peers.

What is the relationship between diplomatic efforts and other new technological innovations? The story of post-war public diplomacy is very much the story of the triumph of jet travel that makes intercontinental
forms of diplomacy more efficient and diplomats more mobile. Telephones and telex machines (and diplomatic cables before them) increased the speed and expanded the scope of intra-state communication. Today the primary tools are technical platforms owned by private companies—like Twitter—that require less mobility and physical transportation. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why so many celebrities have been drawn into various causes so easily. Much of the history of the UN has been framed by the gap between the scope of its aspirations and the financial resources it has had at its disposal, and its reliance on the voluntary humanitarian efforts of non-state actors. The work of celebrities represents a highly efficient means for the dissemination of ideas for an organization that has historically lacked financial resources to meet its objectives.

It is my hope that this brief discussion of celebrity diplomacy, beginning with the work of Danny Kaye, provokes a more robust conversation about the relationship between the entertainment industry and multilateral institutions that are involved in diplomatic practices. What is needed is a better appreciation of the history of the industries that produce celebrities, the agencies that make use of them, and of the nature of celebrity careers that make humanitarian work a part of the job. The co-editors of a recent issue of the journal Celebrity Studies advocate the notion of “celebrity ecologies” in order to “emphasize the larger assemblages and systems within and around which celebrity is enmeshed.” This may result in a more expansive understanding of “celebrity diplomacy,” one which will be far more reflective of the work that these agents do—role-playing, status-seeking, attention-grabbing, audience-forming, and resource-using—even if that leaves questions of “effectiveness” up in the air.

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3. Cooper, 3.

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Fox 11 News in Los Angeles has called it a group of “hackers on steroids” and an “Internet hate machine.” In recent years, those associated with it have been referred to as “hacktivists,” or “Internet vigilantes.”

The labels continue to be assigned—but what exactly is “Anonymous?” Is it a group? Can it be assigned an encompassing descriptor? Perhaps the best description of Anonymous is that both in reality and in cyberspace, Anonymous is simply an idea.

Often symbolized by the Guy Fawkes mask popularized by the movie *V for Vendetta,* Anonymous has no formal leadership, no formal membership, and no formal purpose. To assign labels, purposes, or goals to Anonymous as a whole, is to completely misunderstand what Anonymous is, when Anonymous as an idea can include almost anyone. Considering this, and that Anonymous has no formal membership, it is appropriate to refer to those who identify as Anonymous as “Anon(s).”

Nevertheless, despite these important concepts, article after article, commentator after commentator, and government official after government official still refer to Anonymous as a tangible, organized entity—when in reality it is anything but.

How is it, then, that Anonymous is perceived to be so influential in the world? What type of power does it possess, and does that translate to actions of consequence on the international scene?

A BRIEF HISTORY OF ANONYMOUS

Key to understanding the influence of Anonymous is gaining an appreciation of its history.

In 2003, 15-year-old Christopher Poole, more commonly known by his Internet handle “moot,” founded the online image board 4chan.org. Reflecting his interest in Anime and modeled after Japan’s popular 2chan website, 4chan was simple in design and employed a basic posting system whereby unregistered users could easily post images or comments in threads under the name “anonymous.” Still using this simple system today, the website is divided into various topics, ranging from technology to Anime, and includes the notorious, anything-goes “random” section simply referred to by its directory label, “/b/.” It is within /b/ that many Anons tend to congregate.

Aside from common, but not universal, interests in video games, anime, and other types of “nerd” or “geek” culture, Anonymous can be described as uniting around a need for amusement, or “lulz.” Literally a twist on “lol” (which stands for “laugh out loud”), Anons often cite the purpose of their actions as being “for the lulz.” Thus, much of the content and imagery found on /b/ can aptly be described as shocking or disgusting to the average viewer—devoid of any political correctness, respectfulness, or filtering. There is no real purpose other than to entertain, amuse, troll, or shock.

A typical early Anonymous action “for the lulz” was “raiding,” an activity best described as the online equivalent of a disruptive flash mob. Often at the call of a single user, Anons would flood into chat rooms, forums, online video games, and other Internet media merely to overwhelm that outlet and shock its users.

One of Anonymous’ first raids occurred in 2006, when it invaded the online game “Habbo Hotel” in a protest against the perceived racism of the game’s moderators. With their in-game avatars uniformly presented as black men with large afros and wearing suits, Anonymous blocked off key areas within the game, sometimes forming the shape of a swastika.

Despite the inherent silliness of this type of action, it demonstrated to Anons the potential impact that a united effort such as a raid could have on a targeted outlet. In some cases, for any number of reasons, raids have been initiated against private individuals, during which their personal information is made public and they are severely harassed. This type of action has contributed to the “internet hate machine” label applied by media outlets like Fox 11 Los Angeles. Yet just as often as not, calls for raids and other types of attacks are ignored or outright rejected by the wider community. It is thus completely dependent on the actions of individual Anons to carry...
out raids or other types of attacks, either collectively or independently.

Though 4chan’s /b/ board saw the origin of Anonymous, it is incorrect to label /b/ as Anonymous’ home—it would be more accurate to refer to it as a primary community where Anonymous congregates virtually. This status is not exclusive to 4chan, as Anonymous is known to utilize a variety of “chan” websites, Internet-Relay-Chat (IRC) channels, and other means of interaction. But what often unites Anons outside of the typical meeting grounds is a common use of lingo, memes, and phraseology that tend to easily identify one Anon to another.

This identifiable culture has generated a monumental list of viral memes incomparable to any other online source. Many of the memes we see and share today would have never become popular without having cleared 4chan first. For instance, the “LOLCats” phenomenon of posting captioned cat pictures originated in 2005 as a means of celebrating “Caturday” on Saturdays.6 “Rickrolling,” the practice by which users were tricked into watching a video of Rick Astley’s “Never Gonna Give You Up,” also had its origins at 4chan.7

**ANONYMOUS ACTIONS**

Although it has exceptional meme-creating prowess, it’s difficult to determine just how much influence Anonymous has beyond conducting raids or generating Internet culture. Does its influence translate into national or international political power? Ultimately, this is a question of whether Anonymous wields any soft power.

Key to the idea of Anonymous is, of course, anonymity. While anonymity is a prized concept on the Internet, it is becoming increasingly difficult to preserve. This has affected not only Anons, but some of their individual targets as well. Anonymity tends to act as an enabler, providing Anons with a feeling of safety and thus granting a greater amount of creative license. That is, the feeling of safety enables Anons to create material or commit acts to which they would not normally feel comfortable attaching their own names.

As a whole, Anonymous has difficulty organizing to accomplish any particular goal because it is too loose and too ill-defined to take collective action. Instead, it relies on ad hoc coalitions of interested individuals to carry out work under the Anonymous banner. Demonstrating Anonymous’ inherent inability to mobilize as a whole, many Anons reject individual calls to action, claiming that Anonymous does not constitute anyone’s personal army. If anything, these calls to action are more often ignored or rejected than heeded. Despite this, the sheer number of Anons and their prolific posting on various sites creates an environment of low-probability, but high-impact, events. Considering this, there are numerous cases in which collective operations are undertaken for a specific purpose—and these particular actions are perhaps where Anonymous has garnered much of its notoriety as a “hacker group.” However, the percentage of people who possess the skills and knowledge necessary to actually break into secured systems amongst Anonymous is likely to be very low. Many of the famous “distributed denial of service” (DDoS) attacks used by Anonymous to take down websites are accomplished with very simple tools such as “Low Orbit Ion Cannon” (LOIC). DDoS tools like LOIC require little more than a URL and a single click to flood websites with millions of hits that exceed their bandwidth capabilities, rendering them inaccessible to a majority of users.

One of Anonymous’ first attempts at a worldwide campaign came in the form of Project Chanology, a protest effort against the Church of Scientology. In 2008, after the Church of Scientology demanded that YouTube remove a leaked promotional video in which Tom Cruise extolled the virtues of Scientology,9 Anonymous launched a campaign to eliminate the Church’s presence on the Internet. On January 21, Anonymous launched its own YouTube video outlining its complaints against Scientology,9 and soon after began DDoS attacks on Scientology websites. Not long after the launch of the first YouTube video by Anonymous, a second video surfaced, calling for real-world protests beginning February 10.10 Soon, Project Chanology grew from a small, Internet-based effort to full-scale public protests. Anons rolled out onto the streets, donning Guy Fawkes masks and blaring “Never Gonna Give You Up” in front of Scientology centers in cities around the world. Collective anger over the Church of Scientology’s actions prompted an estimated 7,000 people in over 90 cities to take to the streets.11

In the grand scheme of things, the turnout for Project Chanology was relatively small and the long-term impact was negligible, but for a relatively unknown entity like Anonymous, the event was significant. As there was no measurable impact against Scientology, the true achievement of Chanology was in demonstrating to Anons that other Anons were real and existed beyond posts on a website.12 It showed that online activism could transcend the virtual and exist in the real world, setting a precedent by which Anonymous became a more tangible entity. And unlike the much larger Occupy Movement several years later, Chanology was truly Anonymous-driven.

Fast-forward to 2011 and the Arab Spring in Tunisia, when Anonymous DDoS-ed Tunisian
government websites in response to Tunisia’s censorship of WikiLeaks cables in similar fashion to the Anonymous-led pro-WikiLeaks attacks on PayPal, Visa, and MasterCard. Yet, unlike the attacks on those financial institutions, when Anons hacked the Tunisian Prime Minister’s website, they replaced the front page with an “open letter” explaining their grievances against the Tunisian Government. Anons also actively provided Tunisian citizens with the tools and information necessary to increase their online security. In addition to “Operation Tunisia,” Anonymous also undertook efforts in Egypt, Algeria, and other countries, with varying degrees of success or failure.

POWER LEVEL: OVER 9000? Perhaps the best way to understand Anonymous’ influence is to acknowledge that as a formal body, it has no power, no purpose, and no leadership. That hardly makes it a major player on the international scene. But as an idea, and as a culture, Anonymous holds a great deal of soft power, uniting small groups of interested individuals who can make a Collective difference in whichever way their interests and skills sets allow. The idea of Anonymous as a defender of Internet freedom and bulwark against tyranny is also powerful, but at the same time, efforts taken by Anonymous to harass, silence, or violate the privacy of its targets have also worked against that narrative. The pro-WikiLeaks idea supported by some Anons that privacy should not apply to diplomatic correspondence is just one place where this dichotomy can be seen.

So how much power does Anonymous ultimately have? The real answer is: only as much power as is possessed by the sum of motivated individuals who identify as Anon and choose to carry out action in its name. Yet as anonymity continues to be eroded online, and the faces of those behind the Guy Fawkes masks become more visible, the number of individuals willing to carry out this action may be destined to decrease. As this happens, it may turn out that the removal of the mask and a new willingness to be identified and stand by one’s actions is what proves most powerful.

REFERENCES & NOTES
16. “Over 9000” is an Anime reference that became a meme commonly used by Anons. The original "over 9000" reference describes the power level of a specific character in the Anime series Dragon Ball Z. It has been repeatedly used to troll those with little understanding of the group, including Oprah Winfrey. For more information, see "It's Over 9000." Know Your Meme. Web. April 9, 2014.

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ASBESTOS: FROM MAGIC MINERAL TO KILLER DUST

For most activists, the commitment to influence public policy begins from personal pain. When the Larkin and Reinstein families’ loved ones were diagnosed with a preventable asbestos-caused cancer called mesothelioma, we had never heard of the disease and could not even pronounce it. The learning curve was steep, the surgical treatment was radical, and we learned that mesothelioma was aggressively deadly.

Within months of our family members’ diagnoses, it was abundantly clear to us that civil society must assume a stronger role politically, economically, and socially to eradicate this man-made public health crisis. We realized that high standards of responsibility, accountability, and transparency were essential to changing international public policy. In 2004, we founded the Asbestos Disease Awareness Organization (ADAO) and our interwoven initiatives were focused on education (to reduce and eliminate exposure), advocacy (to shape policy and protect civil rights), and community (to reduce isolation and build a grassroots organization).

Creating and sustaining a grassroots international organization requires both human and financial resources that for most non-state actors (NSAs) are challenging. Primarily powered by volunteers, our diverse core of supporters and a set of strategic alliances have allowed our organization to grow exponentially. Funded by individual donors and conference sponsors, there is no quid pro quo. In order to maintain our independence and credibility, ADAO does not make medical or legal referrals.

ASBESTOS: THE IRREFUTABLE FACTS

Asbestos is a known carcinogen. There is no safe level of exposure, and Americans remain at risk. It is a naturally found mineral that was commonly used by commercial manufacturers and builders until the 1980s. Because of its wide usage, asbestos can still be found in ceilings and insulation, light fixtures, electrical wiring, tile floors, shingles and roofing felt, siding and cladding, fireplaces, and brake pads. When asbestos fibers are inhaled or ingested, they can cause asbestosis, non-malignant pleural disease, and cancers such as mesothelioma (cancer of the lung lining), lung, gastrointestinal, laryngeal, and ovarian. The latency period from exposure to diagnosis can range from 10 to 50 years.

Globally, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that 107,000 people die each year from asbestos-caused diseases. In 1906, Dr. Montague Murray was the first expert to cite asbestos as a cause of death, yet mining and usage continued. Although there were advances in policy in the 1970s with the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, the Clean Air Act of 1970, and the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, usage of asbestos in buildings and manufacturing continued. U.S. Geological Survey data confirms that from 1900 to the present, we have used more than 31 million metric tons of asbestos. Use of asbestos in the U.S. has declined over the years, but without legislation banning asbestos, imports and exports continue today.

EDUCATION

Traditionally, trade unions have been the strongest advocates for occupational health and safety prevention and policy; however, non-profits have recently become more vocal. Our organization’s initial primary focus was to establish a website presence to articulate our mission and vision, and to share resources. Recognizing the power of new media, we began developing a robust communications strategy to have our message heard, felt, shared, and remembered.

Our public affairs strategy originated from our education initiative, which began through research in which we identified data gaps, stagnant policy, and
As technology advanced and price per device decreased, worldwide access to the Internet increased. For nimble and fiscally solvent organizations, we witnessed a shift in power, efficiency, and efficacy.

Above all, the greatest factor in the growth of our impact since ADAO was founded has been the digital revolution. In 2013, the Pew Research Center stated that “91% of U.S. adults own a cell phone; 56% of U.S. adults own a smartphone.” Recognizing the potential of mobile technology, ADAO developed a mobile app to expand our ability to connect and share. Infographics have enabled us to translate complicated data into a story that is easily understood and shared in the U.S. and abroad. With the use of social media platforms, ADAO has been able to strategically connect and share educational, advocacy, and community information around the world, in turn fostering an online community of asbestos-affected individuals.

COMMUNITY
New media has changed how our society reads, perceives, and distributes news. Armed with digital storytelling and social media advocacy, ADAO builds communities unbound by traditional borders and restrictions. Language barriers are nearly nonexistent thanks to many online platforms which have enabled ADAO to develop transnational relationships, such as Google Translate and built-in translation features in blogs. In addition, citizen journalism allows ADAO to make or use news to increase readership and reach lawmakers, media, and scientific communities. In 2006, Twitter became a vast network for the distribution of real-time news and information.

With social media analytics, we can be responsive to our strengths and weaknesses in order to maximize our policy efforts.

One of ADAO’s greatest successes has been creating a global community with international strategic alliances in nearly 20 countries with civil societies, unions, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and governments. Our ability to shape policy is strengthened by joining coalitions in order to prevent toxic chemical exposure and to fund cancer research.

During the past decade, ADAO has organized ten international conferences and videotaped presentations to be shared around the world. In 2014, more than 100 people from ten countries attended ADAO’s annual conference that was also live-streamed around the world. Education, coupled with advocacy, leads to change.

ADVOCACY
When ADAO was first founded in 2004, we immediately began requesting and scheduling Congressional and White House meetings. We expanded rapidly, advocating for national and international asbestos bans, workers safety initiatives, and educational programs. As an independent non-profit organization, we serve as a frequent Congressional witness and a resource for the media. As our community initiative has grown stronger, so has our ability to advocate.

For ten years, in response to ADAO’s request and efforts in drafting language, the U.S. Senate has passed Asbestos Awareness Week Resolutions for the week of April 1-7, which quickly expanded to become Global Asbestos Awareness Week. Concurrently with our conferences, these bipartisan Resolutions blend education, advocacy, and community. Building on education, we have strengthened our Senate Resolutions with language urging the U.S. Surgeon General to issue a public health warning, which has been done in 2009, 2013, and 2014. In 2014, Acting U.S. Surgeon General Boris Lushniak delivered our conference keynote address in Washington, D.C.

Undeniably, individual voices shape policy and influence action, most effectively at Congressional meetings, hearings, and staff briefings. Asbestos victims share their experiences through stories and photos, transforming anonymous statistics into the real lives and deaths of innocent people. In the case of a debilitating disease like mesothelioma, many victims around the world are homebound, not knowing anyone else who shares their experience. ADAO takes their voices, even when they are struggling to breathe, to places they can no longer go—that is, to influence international public opinion and lawmakers.

The founders of ADAO have never forgotten that our organization grew from our own desire for a supportive community that did not exist when our family members were diagnosed. Enabling victims, patients, and families to “turn anger into action” has strengthened our reach. We use the united voices of our specific public—people affected by asbestos—to shape international
public opinion. Leveraging social media advocacy efforts, ADAO has become a leader and presenter in conferences such as the Global Health and Innovations Conference, held at Yale University. This allows us to share our techniques, core beliefs, and guiding principles to encourage other public health education and advocacy organizations to influence public policy.

Both the Larkins’ and the Reinsteins’ loved ones lost their mesothelioma battles, but with the advancement of 21st century digital activism, we continue to see new and innovative educational, advocacy, and community opportunities to influence global public health policy.

REFERENCES & NOTES

Linda Reinstein founded the Asbestos Disease Awareness Organization (ADAO) in 2004 shortly after her husband was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2003. You can follow Linda Reinstein on Twitter @Linda_ADAO.
“It is not the strongest of the species that survive, nor the most intelligent, but the one most responsive to change.” - Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species*

Change and transformation are constants of the human experience. To survive, humanity is continuously adapting and changing through the millennia. State and non-state actors in their various organizational forms also adjust and transform. Violent non-state actors (including guerilla movements, insurgents, and terrorist organizations) continually change their organizational forms, and their strategies, to carry on their struggle against opponents. Non-violent non-state actors do the same, such as the adaptation of marketing materials by international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) to gain more supporters and sympathizers in the global community. For example, Amnesty International began producing short videos for their YouTube channel that had the feel and appearance of a commercial for mainstream television. The use of social media and the creation of new frames was an apparent attempt to appeal to a younger generation of supporters. An example of violent non-state actors using the same approach of readapting the framing and priming of their core message can be seen in the recent announcement of al-Qaeda’s release of a new online magazine, *Resurgence*. The core messages contained within *Resurgence* are similar to previous messages in *Inspire* (another al-Qaeda magazine), however, the message has been reframed and presented in a different manner to appeal to a wider and younger audience.

Violent non-state actors often find themselves in the same position as INGOs when attempting to gain greater human resources. A series of frames which outline the complexity of a violent non-state actor’s belief system in a simplified manner is necessary to coordinate a multitude of individuals who have different ideas and motivations for being part of the group. The development of a common frame of struggle allows the violent non-state actor to maintain control over its human resources. As the dynamics of the struggle change, it is necessary for the violent non-state actor to modify its belief system and associated frames. An example of the changing of frames can be seen in the Provisional Irish Republican Army’s (PIRA) shift from a stance of political abstention and absenteeism to a frame of struggling with, as the slogan goes, an “Armalite in one hand and a ballot in the other hand.” The PIRA’s most recent frame shifted even further to a sole focus on political struggle without any armed resistance. The necessity of changing frames has been noted by scholars of and participants in rebellious movements alike.

Without revising their original frames, violent non-state actors would have difficulty continuing to maintain human and physical resources drawn from their supporters. A struggle over the belief systems and related frames within the organization could lead to splintering and a series of new trajectories for the violent non-state actor. Without human resources, the struggle of the violent non-state actor withers, and the organization ceases to exist. The form and function of the organization changes as shifts in the belief systems and associated frames occur.

**INTERACTION AND TRANSFORMATION**

Violent non-state actors often find themselves far removed from their original struggle over time: in Northern Ireland, the PIRA and Sinn Féin (SF) went from fighting the British government and Unionists to disarming and becoming a legitimate political party. Evidence of this transformation from rebels to politicians was seen recently when Martin McGuinness, former PIRA commander and now Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland, attended a state dinner hosted by Queen Elizabeth of the UK at Windsor. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP), originally a populist movement, transformed into a criminal syndicate involved in the illicit drug
industry. The violent non-state actor had once issued laws in the Colombian territory they controlled outlawing the growth, production, and selling of cocaine. By March 2000, the Central Staff of FARC-EP issued a statement outlining a shift in their stance on the permissibility of being involved in the cocaine trade. Additionally, “Law 002: On Taxation” outlined the acceptability of other forms of criminal activity, including kidnapping for ransom, to gain resources for FARC-EP. The transformations of FARC-EP and the PIRA are due to the interaction of belief systems and associated frames of the organization, political accessibility to the government, and human and physical resources. Changes in one of these elements can potentially change another.

Adaptation, or lack thereof, influences the internal dynamics of an organization and how subgroups approach their struggle and the world around them. Splintering within violent non-state actor organizations abounds in part because of the internal struggles that occur over belief systems and associated frames. Such struggles often begin as organizations make connections with government actors and gain political access. Some individuals who want to stay true to the group’s original beliefs will develop their own pool of human resources. The more pragmatic members will draw their followers, supporters, and sympathizers into a separate group and pursue the opening offered by the connection with government actors. For example, when members of the Moro National Liberation Front were offered positions by the Philippine government, a splinter group formed: the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) developed from those individuals who wanted to stay true to the struggle of the Moro people. This also occurred in the dissident groups (the Continuity IRA and Real IRA) that grew out of the PIRA and SF as the Good Friday peace process progressed.

The multitude of recent transformations of violent non-state actors (including FARC-EP, Abu Sayyaf Group, the PIRA and SF, the African National Congress, Hezbollah, and Hamas) suggests a possible way to negate some degree of their violent activities. The engagement of political pragmatists within violent non-state actor organizations by government actors presents an opening. This opening may be enough to shift political pragmatists towards a path of non-violent struggle (i.e. through the ballot box versus at the end of a gun barrel). In taking this new path, the organization will either cease to exist, or it will adapt, as the organization’s beliefs and associated frames adapt to the new environment. As supporters and sympathizers react to internal changes and support new approaches to the struggle, the pragmatic leadership and rank-and-file members will continue their adaptation. This adaptation is necessary to maintain and increase the physical and human resource pool.

These transformations are not instantaneous and need time to unfold. The Obama administration’s recent engagement of the Taliban illustrates this point. There are a variety of subgroups within the Taliban, and to engage the more pragmatic members will assist the U.S. and its allies in pushing violent non-state actors towards struggling within the political system, rather than from the outside. Splinter groups that refuse this adaptation have formed and will continue to form. But, as noted by Adham Saouli concerning the transformation of Hezbollah in Lebanon, “political groups are often changed by the real world and by the conditions they face in trying to survive there.”

The pragmatists within the Taliban will persist over time due to their transformation, and the splinter groups will not persist. Given the choice between struggles where many lives are lost, or a non-violent political struggle where lives are not lost, supporters and sympathizers will more often choose the latter. Two example of this can be seen with the PIRA in Northern Ireland and the African National Congress and Umkhonto We Sizwe (Spear of the Nation or MK). In the author’s fieldwork in Northern Ireland in the late 2000s, several former PIRA members and current Sinn Féin members noted that as the death count increased in the 1980s, many saw that the armed struggle was futile in the long term. Similarly, in the final
days of apartheid in South Africa, a debate grew within the African National Congress and MK between various subgroups over continuing the struggle. In both cases, the pragmatists won the argument and helped to move the organization toward a new approach. In the case of the PIRA, the Real IRA and the Continuity IRA developed as the schism between the pragmatists (e.g. Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness) and the hardliners widened.

As Darwin noted, entities do not need to be strong to survive, they just need to adapt. Surviving the struggle is the goal of all non-state actors—whether they are violent or non-violent. Through embracing the reality of these possible adaptations and transformations, state actors may even partner with violent non-state actors and influence this change for the better. Survivability is key for all actors. Understanding and effecting transformation should be a means to that end.

REFERENCES & NOTES
2. One can see multiple examples of this use of social media by Amnesty International by going to the following: http://www.youtube.com/user/AmnestyInternational.
8. Details concerning interactions and their impacts on transformation of violent political movements are outlined in the Collective Political Violence Transformative (CPVT) model discussed in Chapter Three of Transforming Violent Political Movements (28-59).
10. Another, more violent non-state actor grew out of a different transformation of MILF. This splinter group became known as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Similar to FARC-EP’s transformation, the ASG transformed into a criminal syndicate following the death of its founding leader, Janjalani.
12. For more details of these two cases, see Grisham, pp. 121-154 and 155-186.

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Over the past seventy years, the rapid increase of non-Catholic Christian churches within Mexico’s indigenous communities has prompted a radical transformation of the religious and social landscapes in various parts of the country. The case of Chiapas is particularly relevant, having occurred in a highly volatile political environment where military intervention, economic deprivation, and disputes over land tenure and control have been paramount. Chiapas is one of the poorest and most diverse states in the nation; it is located in the southeast, bordering Guatemala. Since the 1980s, discrimination, exclusion, and violence have all been part of the Protestant minority’s experience and as a result, thousands have fled to other counties within the political boundaries of the state. Displaced religious minorities consequently developed various public diplomacy-oriented survival strategies that, in the context of conflict and constitutional changes taking place at the federal level in the 1990s, have led to their social and political empowerment.

The initial conversion process in Chiapas began under the leadership of traditional Protestant Churches from Guatemala, namely Baptist and Presbyterian; however, other denominations (e.g. Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal, as well as biblical non-evangelical denominations: Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh-Day Adventist, and Mormon) became widespread in the region by the 1980s. In most cases, conversion meant a departure from social, religious, and cultural codes, which regulated family and communal behavior. As part of this process, new social categories emerged within traditional Catholic majorities as they tried to cope with the challenges posed by breaking with the past and increasing diversity. For instance, categories such as “dissident,” which in other circumstances meant differences in political affiliation with no serious social drifts, acquired new religious overtones. Minities thus experienced various levels of victimization: from mild forms of criticism and marginalization from family circles and the community, to less access to economic resources and opportunities, to the more radical prohibition of enrollment of dissidents’ children in local schools, persecution, expulsion from the community, the appropriation of their land by local leaders, transferal to less productive land, and finally, forced displacement.

Although the region has historically been characterized by ethnic and religious diversity, the social and religious reproduction of Protestantism was perceived as a real threat to the hegemony of the local Catholic Church, and therefore to the region’s cultural identity. The larger the Christian community, the more violent forms of discrimination appeared against them. The intensity of religious intolerance unleashed a conflict in the indigenous central regions of the Altos, the Frontier, and the Lacandon jungle. Local authorities (i.e. the mayors of the main cities and municipalities) sanctioned and actively participated in the persecution of minorities. By 1993, a month before the Zapatista uprising broke out in Chiapas, more than 30,000 members of the Christian minorities had been displaced from these regions, particularly from San Juan Chamula. The majority settled in the city of San Cristóbal de Las Casas, altering the already precarious social and ethnic balance there.

Both in the regions of origin and places of refuge, such as San Cristóbal de Las Casas, resistance to exclusion and persecution triggered the development of a political activism within religious minorities without precedent in the history of the state. Two factors contributed to this phenomenon: the gradual establishment of the religious institutions of the Protestant Church with a recognized— albeit unwelcome—religious presence, and the emergence of a plethora of social organizations, which called for an activism centered around the struggle for legal
recognition in the local and federal legal systems, and respect for minorities’ rights (i.e. religious freedom). Thus, the political movement that stemmed from this linked itself with a national movement pursuing constitutional reforms to grant legal standing to all churches in Mexico. This activism had the immediate effect of strengthening the religious identity of the new converts and of the emerging Christian displaced communities, as well as increasing their preaching capabilities.

Other social, economic, and political consequences included the gradual acquisition of disputed land and the formation of religious minority colonies. An example of the latter is Tzanabó, which served as a base for the displaced persons’ religious and political activities. The growth in numbers and significance of the Christian minorities forced the Catholic majority to accommodate, to the advantage of the former. For instance, during elections, Christians have exchanged their vote for economic gain and favors of diverse nature. Furthermore, in times of political crisis, many members of such minorities relied on narratives of victimization, persecution, uprootedness, and loss of access to certain resources, all at the hands of the local government and Catholics. In this way, indigenous religious minorities learned to insert themselves not only in the local economy, but also in the complex social and political dynamics of the region.

One very recent area of competition between Catholic majorities and Protestant displaced minorities has been in mass media. Up until the year 2000, Protestant minorities in Chiapas were not authorized by local and federal authorities to inform and communicate with their audiences through their radio broadcasting agencies; thus they were deprived of access to mass media outlets. However, from 2000 onwards their struggle focused on their perceived right to a presence in radio and television, as well to form political parties and participate in existing ones (such as Partido Encuentro Social y el Partido Demócrata Campesino). With the arrival of Radio Tepeyac, competition for new converts and a struggle to retain old devotees has ensued.

In brief, the dissemination of Protestantism in Chiapas, and the insertion of its devotees into the economic, social, and political landscape of the region show an inherent tension between agency and victimization. Their growth in numbers and the development of “new” minority religious identities in the midst of political change have both empowered them and kept them on the margins of society in Chiapas.

REFERENCES & NOTES
1. The state of Chiapas ranks eighth in physical size (73,211km²) and seventh in population (approximately five million inhabitants) in Mexico. The population is very diverse linguistically (twelve dialects) and ethnically, with eight ethnic groups stemming from the Mayan ethnic group.


3. Kovic, Christine. “Para tener vida en abundancia: visiones de los derechos humanos en una comunidad


6. Tsotsil, Tseltal, Tojolabal, and Chole ethnic groups; as well as other even smaller groups such as Lacandon, Zoque, and Mame.

7. Rivera, Carolina, op cit. 89.


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BOOK REVIEW

MAX BOOT’S
INVISIBLE ARMIES: AN EPIC HISTORY OF GUERILLA WARFARE
FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE PRESENT
REVIEW BY MARIA PORTELA
Military historian and author Max Boot’s *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present* is a comprehensive historical account of major guerilla and terrorist insurgencies, stretching from the Jewish rebellion against the Roman Empire in 66 AD to today’s post-9/11 world. Boot’s extensive global history of uprisings through the ages is infused with memorable characters, including the likes of Giuseppe Garibaldi, Che Guevara, and Osama bin Laden. Their charisma and notoriety help make this complex historical study highly readable, but also reveal the dark side of public diplomacy when used for malevolent purposes.

Boot argues that since ancient times, disadvantaged groups and individuals have resorted to guerilla warfare. However, despite its ancient origins, Boot concludes that today’s guerilla warfare has changed dramatically due to factors he calls the “three P’s”: politics, propaganda, and public opinion. Boot attributes an increase in insurgent victories to the growing power of the three P’s.

Expanding on concepts of interconnectedness, Boot claims that guerilla operations are more likely to succeed when they have assistance from outside the network. These “invisible armies” are adept at publicity. For instance, Mao Zedong understood the importance of publicity and public opinion; he stressed the Red Army’s need to maintain the best possible relations with the general population. The public diplomacy-oriented strategies of good publicity and appealing to the population allowed his insurgent group to overthrow established authority. During the Long March, Mao Zedong ordered the Red Army to treat villagers along the way with respect, which greatly increased peasant support for the Communists and eventually allowed him to establish leadership of the country.

In addition to his insights and understanding of the history of guerilla warfare, Boot offers important lessons on counterinsurgency. In order to counter the threats invisible armies pose, it is essential to understand their history and evolution. Boot states, “Since World War II, insurgency and terrorism have become the dominant forms of conflict—a trend likely to continue into the foreseeable future.” Therefore, knowledge of the history of guerilla warfare that Boot offers is key in assessing the best counterinsurgency approach. Since 1945, insurgencies have become more successful, winning approximately 40 percent of their campaigns. However, the level of organization in conventional warfare still puts guerilla and terrorist groups at a disadvantage over conventional warfare. Boot maintains that the best approach to counterinsurgency, one that is more likely to warrant long-term success, is to focus on winning “the hearts and minds” of the people. Security and legitimacy are two key tenets of this approach. Openness to compromise and two-way communication are paramount in a successful campaign that strives to win hearts and minds.

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REFERENCES & NOTES
ENDNOTE

OUR WINTER 2015 ISSUE: THE LGBT MOVEMENT & PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

AN INTERVIEW WITH PATRICK J. LINEHAN
UNITED STATES CONSUL GENERAL, OSAKA–KOBE, JAPAN
The Winter 2015 issue of Public Diplomacy Magazine will explore Lesbian, Gay, Bi-Sexual, Transgender (LGBT) and gender issues in the field of public diplomacy. The LGBT movement is changing laws across America and influencing the agenda of international policymakers. Through the use of social media and digital platforms, education, and branding, public diplomacy has been central to the movement’s efforts to socialize, inform, and advocate.

To begin the conversation, Public Diplomacy Magazine editor-in-chief Shannon Haugh and incoming editor-in-chief Jocelyn Coffin interviewed the U.S. Consul General to Osaka-Kobe, Patrick J. Linehan. Throughout his life and career in the U.S. Foreign Service, Linehan has witnessed the LGBT movement increase in momentum, reach, and scale. Since joining the U.S. Foreign Service in 1984, Linehan has been posted in Finland, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Brazil, and Canada. Linehan lives in Osaka, Japan with his husband, Emerson Kanegusuke. Linehan will also be the 2014-2015 U.S. Public Diplomat-in-Residence at USC’s Center on Public Diplomacy.

Public Diplomacy Magazine: Can you speak about the LGBT movement and how it has progressed over the years?

Patrick J. Linehan: Start with my age. I am 61 years old, so I was born in 1953. The year I was born, the U.S. government fired 5,000 American citizens from government service because they were gay. That phenomenon was called the “Lavender Scare”... In the 1950s, when I was born, nobody was out. By the time I was graduating from high school in 1970, the time I started to come out myself, the time I was figuring myself out, there were no role models out there. There were no gay heroes. There was almost no public discussion and the [1969] Stonewall uprising really changed all of that. All of a sudden, it put it on the map. From Stonewall, we start to develop language: the use of the word gay, gay rights, the idea of a gay movement. The “LGBT” term comes later, but the whole concept of gay rights really stems from Stonewall...

Within one year from the Stonewall uprising, there were pride parades in many major American cities including Los Angeles, San Francisco, and New York, but we did not have our first openly gay elected public figures until Harvey Milk in 1977. And then of course he was murdered in 1978, so this demonstrated how dangerous being an openly gay public figure could be. The advice Harvey gave is still the best advice out there. He told gay people, “Be out! You’ve got to come out. You got to stand up. You have to own it. If you are gay you have to say so.” He wasn’t into outing other people, but he was into encouraging other people to be themselves. After Harvey, it took almost another ten years for things to jump to the national stage. In the mid-1980s, we get the first openly gay member of Congress, Barney Frank. He wasn’t out when he first ran, but he was out by his second term. He continued to serve with dignity and honor for almost 30 years in the U.S. Congress. The movement gradually picked up steam as we got people who could speak up for it...

The next major event that led to a movement was the advent of AIDS. It gave gay people visibility...
in a negative way, but it also led to organized action by gay people in their own interest and defense. The next benchmark was when Massachusetts became the first state to allow same-sex marriage in 2004...That led to a huge backlash—we had the Federal laws like Don't Ask, Don't Tell and the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). It took us years to get rid of DOMA and Don't Ask Don't Tell. In June 2013, less than a year ago, the Supreme Court’s decision on Edie Windsor vs. the U.S. to end DOMA was huge...We went from just lonely Massachusetts in 2004 to now about 17 states that either have same-sex marriage, marriage equality, or at least recognize other states’ marriage equality. This has all come about through a combination of political actors, court decisions, and popular movements. But really what it all comes down to is what Harvey was talking about many years ago. The most important factor is gay people themselves—owning their own identity, being proud and standing up, and fighting for rights. Visibility is crucial.

PDM: Would you say that the LGBT movement has a public diplomacy strategy?

PL: Absolutely. I think the best example of this is the Human Rights Campaign (HRC). Their very organized campaigns have been extremely effective. Of course, they could not mount the campaigns without real cases. It took the perfect case, like Edie Windsor who faced tax issues when her longtime partner and then wife Thea died. She was being taxed as if her partner, her wife, was a total stranger. It took having that ideal case to go through the court system to make that legal point. HRC helped her amplify that issue through their own network. HRC is doing things to community-build and raise awareness within the community, but at the same time, reaching out to dispel myths, and to tell truths, and to make the case. Because of groups like HRC, we have seen terminology and language use change from “gay marriage” to a more accurate or understandable term: “marriage equality.” Organized groups like HRC were able to educate the public about what the issues really were. They were also able to raise money. They were able to fight political candidates [who are] against equal rights, and support candidates who are for equal rights. There are many people using sophisticated tactics to promote our movement.

PDM: It sounds like keys to the strategy have been education, advocacy, and branding.

PL: Yes, all of those. But the starting point is internal. We have to own our identity and we have to be visible. And then it is all about community-building. One of the strengths of HRC is that they have so many members, and they have a network all across the country. They don’t have as many members as say, the National Rifle Association, or the American Association of Retired Persons, but they are a recognized group on a national level that have mounted successful campaigns at the local level, the state level, and at the national level. When HRC was standing on the steps of the Supreme Court after the successful decision, who did Edie Windsor get a phone call from but President Obama. They, as a group, have recognition at the highest levels. They have been one of the most successful groups, but they are not the only one. There are many others such as PFLAG, Federal GLOBE and GLIFAA.

PDM: Have you seen social media and digital platforms playing roles in the LGBT movement?

PL: Absolutely. Social media plays all sorts of roles. Long-term education is certainly one of them, but it is particularly effective at putting out brush fires...When these campaigns—like Chick-Fil-A for example—take off, how do you quickly raise awareness about the latest atrocity or bizarreness? A good example of one of these brush fires would be the situation in Arizona, where both houses of the Arizona Legislature passed a bill stating that they were promoting religious freedom, when in fact they were authorizing blatant discrimination.

How do you get the word out? You use social media. What do you want them to do? You want the audience to use social media to put pressure on the players. How do you get the word out? You use social media. What do you want them to do? You want the audience to use social media to put pressure on the players, including the Governor of Arizona, but also the corporate community to start spreading the word. We saw this very recently with the St. Patrick’s Day Parades in New York and Boston. The Boston Parade has been going on for 150 years and they receive a lot of corporate sponsorship from the likes of Guinness, Boston Brewing, and Heineken. And for decades the parades discriminated against gay people. They have said, “No gay organizations are allowed to march.” Then LGBT people responded,
saying that “We’re Irish”… Then they say, “You can be Irish, but you can’t be gay.” This came to a head when the corporate community recognized this as bad advertising. If the makers of Sam Adams, Heineken, and Guinness are promoting an event that is blatantly anti-marriage equality in an era when states have same-sex marriage, then that is really bad advertising for them and they pulled out. The Mayor of Boston, the Mayor of New York said they were not marching if LGBT people were being discriminated against. Mayors have marched for generations in these parades, but social media was used to raise awareness, mount a campaign, and get people to do the right thing.

PDM: The 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi highlighted LGBT issues and human rights on an international scale. What kind of impact does a country’s stance on LGBT issues have on that country’s image and international reputation?

PL: All the persuasion in the world was not enough to encourage Uganda not to institute really horrendous legislation against LGBT people—Nigeria and Russia too. When we get to the Olympics, there is a question of how persuadable some of these countries that discriminate in the most horrendous ways really are. At the moment, not very. It didn’t keep the Olympics from happening, but it did raise the discussion. I think enough countries spoke up that the word went out. We as a nation did the right thing. We didn’t pull the plug on participating in the Olympics, but the President made a point by appointing openly gay prominent sports people to be his personal envoys to the Olympics.

PDM: You have worked in Japan for several years as the U.S. Consul General. As you discussed in your TED talk, there is enormous pressure in Japan to conform to social norms. What is the LGBT movement like in Japan, and what has been your personal experience?

PL: In Japan too, the most important factor in forward progress is people standing up and self-identifying as LGBT. Visibility is crucial. The movement is not as far ahead here in Japan as it is in the U.S., but Japan recently had a number of firsts. Within the last three or four years, Japan had its first openly gay, publicly elected officials in different wards in Tokyo. There are three councilpersons from wards in Tokyo who are quite openly gay. One woman is transgender and her website says, “She used to be he.” She is very vocal about being different and about respecting people who are different. Just last year, we had the first openly gay elected member of the upper house of Japan’s national parliament—the Diet. Japan is still in the era of firsts. When I talk to Japanese groups, I say we had our Barney Franks and we had our Harvey Milks and Japan does too. But further down the road, it takes organization. It takes consciousness-raising, and that is happening in Japan… People are still less open than they would be in the U.S., but I have seen enormous change.

When I first came to Japan in 1988, I was told routinely by everyone that, “Oh, there are no gay people in Japan.” This was told to me by my neighbors, my co-workers, and the average man on the street. Ten years later, people were saying, “I hear there are gay people, but I have never met one.” So when my husband Emerson and I meet people who say that, we both stick our hands out and say “Now you have, congratulations.” We found that Japan is changing, and I think it will change more quickly going forward. One thing we don’t have to deal with in Japan that we have to deal with in the United States and many other countries, are the organized groups that exist solely to fight against gay people. There are no churches or political parties that stand up against gay groups and say, “We hate gay people, gay people are the devil.” These organized opposition groups to our very existence are not here.

On the other hand, this is a “same think” country. There are very set ideas of what a family is, what the roles are for men and women. Emerson and I have attempted, in our three years here as the Consul General and spouse, to consciousness-raise just by simply by being who we are. We have done a lot of media, and I always introduce Emerson as my husband, and he introduces me as his husband. The most frequently asked question we get is: “Which one is the wife?” We say there is no wife, it’s a gay marriage: husband, husband. It is consciousness-raising again. But we have never encountered hostility, snide remarks, or negativity.
PDM: What is the future of the LGBT movement? What kind of challenges do you see ahead?

PL: The challenge is always to keep momentum and encourage people to do the right thing. So much of our progress comes from demonstrating to people how much common sense it makes and how right it is to acknowledge the equality of people who are LGBT. We are talking about equality. These are human beings we are talking about. We are not talking about people from another planet; we are your fellow human beings. We just happen to be different in one way or another, in the same way that some people are tall and other people are short, and some people are black and some people are white. We come in all shapes and sizes and we come in different sexual orientations, but we are all human beings and we are all to be valued and accorded equal human rights. We have finally gotten to the point where the chief constitutional and legal scholars of our nation have arrived at this same conclusion: that the idea of equality before the law applies to LGBT people. On the world stage, we want to exemplify what it means to do the right thing. America has always been best when we live up to the values that we espouse. We have a great Constitution, a great Bill of Rights, and when we actually live up to the values embodied in those documents, that is when we are at our best. 

Photo on page 68 provided by Sankei Shimbun.
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