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PD Magazine is a publication of the Association of Public Diplomacy Scholars (APDS) at the University of Southern California, with support from the USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School, USC Dana and David Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences School of International Relations, the Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism and USC Annenberg Press.

Its unique mission is to provide a common forum for the views of both scholars and practitioners from around the globe, in order to explore key concepts in the study and practice of public diplomacy. PD Magazine is published bi-annually, in print and on the web at www.publicdiplomacymagazine.org.

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summer 2013 PD Magazine 3
This issue's cover playfully illustrates the transition from the "trans-Atlantic century" to the "Pacific century." We find the trans-Atlantic century represented by ancient European cartography symbols such as the 1630 "Nova Totius Terrarum Orbis" from Dutch cartographer Hendrik Hondius or the portrait of Italian explorer Amerigo Vespucci dressed in a green robe. In the original Hondius’ map, the oval decorative frames contained portraits of Great European scientists. Those portraits are replaced by workers and professionals to depict the workforce driving the Asian nations' growth and to represent how the intensity of commercial ties veered from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Ancient maps were the result of great voyages of exploration. The discoveries made by seamen allowed tradesmen to extend their reach to peoples from around the world. Merchants weaved trade routes which consequently gave cities a flourishing life. Like the commercial activity between Europe and the West Indies in the 15th century, today we witness the intense economic and the increasing political activity taking place in the vast Pacific region. In the background we find a map from 1418 that displays the world according to the explorations made by the Chinese admiral, Zheng He. According to the Chinese characters inscribed in the original bamboo paper, it is possible to read the words “general chart of the integrated world.” Today in the digital era, we use the cartography laid by Google to connect to each other. The Google Maps pins scattered in the metropoles from both sides of the Pacific serve as a representation of an integrated world. Like the ancient maps, this new digitalized cartography is shaping our sense of belonging to the world.
The Rise of Latin America

Available April 2013

Christopher Sabatini • Leonardo Gasparini and Guillermo Cruces
Osvaldo Rosales and Sebastian Herreros • Albert Fishlow
Harold Trinkunas • Gabriel Marcella • Cynthia Watson
Andrew Selee • Thomas Trebat • Michelle Bachelet
Santiago Levy • Sergio Fajardo • Pablo Piccato
John H. Coatsworth • Claudio Lomnitz
Letter from the Editor

Issue 10, Summer 2013

n November 2011, Foreign Policy published the article “America’s Pacific Century” by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, making official what many scholars and policymakers had been predicting for decades: that the 21st century would mark a shift from a centuries-long Atlantic center of trade and power toward the Pacific. As we enter the second decade of the 21st century, many questions remain about what this Pacific Century will look like: who will be the new key actors, what shifts in trade and security will occur, how do we employ the term itself (as Pacific, Asia Pacific, and Asian Century are all used in different contexts)?

One thing is certain, which is that the concept of the Pacific Century is an acknowledgment of different actors who are gaining increasing importance in international affairs. The Pacific Century is not just a nod to China’s rise, but to the importance of other countries in the region—Japan, Australia, South Korea, the ASEAN states. It also highlights the importance of long-overlooked countries in the Western hemisphere, as Mexico, Canada, Chile, and others on the Pacific Rim have shifted the focus of their own policies eastward. And while no longer considered the sole center of trade and influence, the United States remains a key actor. With all these states vying for political, economic, military (or territorial as a nod to the Sino-Japanese island dispute and the renewed US military presence) and even cultural influence both regionally and globally, the need for public diplomacy is at an all-time high. An emphasis on collaboration, understanding, and exchange is recognized by most, if not all, of the major actors.

Dialogue and people-to-people interaction are now publicly emphasized at the highest levels of governance. Public diplomacy, it seems, is set up to have a central role in the increasingly complex network that is the Pacific Century.

This issue of Public Diplomacy Magazine is a collection of articles that explores public diplomacy in the Pacific Century. In order to demonstrate the breadth and depth of change, we have sought to provide a wide representation of policies and initiatives embarked upon by a range of actors involved in the Pacific Century. The resulting compilation shows the different ways in which over a half-dozen nations are interpreting the role of public diplomacy in the Pacific Century, including two articles that approach the Trans-Pacific Partnership from vastly different perspectives. Finally, we continue a tradition we began in the last issue by introducing the topic of our Winter 2014 issue in the endnote: gastrodiplomacy.

As always, the staff of Public Diplomacy Magazine hopes that this collection of articles will serve as a starting point for further discussion on the role of public diplomacy in the Pacific Century. We welcome you to visit www.publicdiplomacymagazine.org to engage further on the ideas presented here.

Kia Hays
Editor-in-Chief

Oscar Castellanos del Collado    David Mandel    Timothy McBride
Sarah Myers    Riccardo Ruffolo
Senior Editors
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Australia in the 21st century sits on the edge of a transforming and dynamic Asian region. Unprecedented shifts in the global landscape have brought Australia’s ‘near North’ more clearly into focus and given impetus to a foreign policy approach constructed around the so-called ‘Asian Century.’

While the language of an Asian Century is new to Australia’s foreign policy discourse, the underlying theme of enhanced engagement with Asia is not. It is a theme that has evolved through a series of incremental and at times difficult economic, political, strategic and societal reorientations, and over time has levered the Australian gaze towards the possibilities of a previously ‘alien’ Asian region. Yet this time there is a twist to the familiar theme. This time, Australia’s revived interest in Asia coincides with the United States’ strategic pivot towards the region under the banner of a Pacific Century. This case study examines Australia’s strategic policy approach to the Asian Century within the context of America’s Pacific Century, highlighting key differences and similarities between the two and drawing out potential implications.

**Australia In The Asian Century**

In September 2011, Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard introduced the language of an Asian Century in a key speech, observing that “Asia has never been of greater global significance as global economic and strategic weight shifts from West to East.” changing the “social and economic, strategic and environmental order of our world.” Gillard went on to announce the commissioning of a policy White Paper to fully “comprehend the implications of the Asian century.” The White Paper, she argued, would present a strategic blueprint for responding to rapid change within the region and would guide Australia’s policy development over the long term. Economist and public servant Ken Henry was appointed to lead the White Paper taskforce with whole-of-government support, and a mandate to consult intensively within the Australian community. Henry came to the position with strong credentials as the former head of the Australian Treasury Department and a track record in strategic policy reform.

The White Paper process attracted public interest across Australia. It provided an important opportunity for domestic publics to be both informed and involved. Numerous public forums and several hundred written submissions brought the views of government, private and non-government sectors, as well as academics and individual citizens to the fore of the policy development process. The *Australia in the Asian Century* White Paper was delivered to the Australian public in late 2012. Delivery of the paper marks a positive step in Australia’s relationship with its own Asia-Pacific region, though in policy and funding terms there are many gaps still to be addressed. For most Australians the question is no longer whether to engage with Asia, but rather precisely how to engage with Asia?

The first task of the White Paper was to define the geographic parameters of Australia’s strategic view for the Asian Century. Recognising the profound diversity of the Asian region, the White Paper hones in on the diverse “group of nations that stretch from India through Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia, including Indonesia, other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members, China and Japan.” Five nations: i) China, ii) India, iii) Indonesia, iv) Japan, and v) Korea are specifically identified within this group as holding particular economic, strategic and diplomatic priority for Australia’s strategic agenda.

With the geographic parameters of Australia’s focus established, the second task of the White Paper was to set out a clear strategic framework. It identifies five key action areas: i) strengthening the domestic Australian economy and productivity through an emphasis on skills...
and education, innovation, infrastructure, tax reform and regulatory reform; ii) developing the skills and capabilities of Australians, including improving Asian literacy skills; iii) encouraging collaborative trade and investment partnerships; iv) ensuring sustainable security through cooperative bilateral and multilateral relationships; and v) nurturing deeper social, cultural, political, and economic connections across all sectors and throughout the region. [7]

A further 25 objectives with associated policy pathways are set out in each key area, with ambitious performance targets to be achieved by 2025.

While the White Paper covers significant ground, two key features emerge. First, the strategic agenda leads with domestic policy issues and reforms. Given Henry’s background, it is not surprising that Australia’s strategic policy towards the Asian Century integrates a strong focus on domestic policy, including tax, productivity, and regulatory reform. Each of these issues sits at the forefront of economic and political domestic debate, and together they set the framework for Australian commercial and trade engagement.

Yet the prominence of domestic content has sparked legitimate criticisms about the real foreign policy intent behind the Asian Century, prompting one commentator to suggest that Australia’s Asian century strategy “is not really about Asia,” but uses Asia “to promote domestic reforms within Australia.”[8] For others, this domestic focus is both timely and necessary. As the Australian economy comes to terms with the combined effects of strong currency, shrinking mining investment, lackluster business confidence, high living and labor costs, and some political instability, the strategic blueprint is seen as “an excellent way of snapping the metaphorical fingers, breaking the trance and refocusing strategic focus is both timely and necessary. As the Australian economy comes to terms with the combined effects of strong currency, shrinking mining investment, lackluster business confidence, high living and labor costs, and some political instability, the strategic blueprint is seen as “an excellent way of snapping the metaphorical fingers, breaking the trance and refocusing the government and the entire country on the real task at hand.”[9] Whatever the view, the domestic messages within Australia’s Asian Century strategic blueprint are clear and set the tone and direction for its implementation.

Second, notable emphasis is placed on collaboration, understanding, and relationship-building, underscoring Australia’s approach to the Asian Century. While the phrase ‘public diplomacy’ is used sparingly, four of the five key areas emphasize the roles of understanding, collaboration, linkages, and trusting relationships, including at the people-to-people level. Such linkages “will broaden the flow of ideas and enable the acquisition of new knowledge and capabilities.”[10] The language employed in the White Paper aligns with contemporary notions of public diplomacy “as an instrument to understand cultures, attitudes and behavior; build and manage relationships; and influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance … interests and values.”[11] Furthermore, it reaffirms a two-way iterative process of understanding and engagement, whereby “stronger relationships will lead to more Australians having a deeper understanding of what is happening in Asia and being able to access the benefits of growth in our region. In turn, more of our neighbors in the region will know us better than they do today.”[12] Bringing these elements of public diplomacy into view reflects an important shift in Australia’s foreign policy discourse, which has been reluctant to accept public diplomacy as relevant to the strategic policy agenda. For example, the White Paper sets clear objectives to integrate Asian studies within the Australian school curriculum, to improve Asian literacy amongst the highest levels of corporate and government decision-makers, and to expand Australia’s diplomatic footprint across Asia, particularly within the priority countries.

While the rhetoric of the White Paper suggests positive moves to bring engagement to the fore of Australia’s Asian Century agenda, it is undermined by a lack of substance on funding. Australia’s diplomatic network, already weakened by decades of budgetary pressure, is not well placed to pick up on the White Paper’s forward plan, at least in the short term. Similarly, Australia’s key public diplomacy instruments, including the Australian Studies Centers, the Australia Network, and Australian Education International, struggle to remain competitive in a diverse and challenging economic environment. Cognizant of the funding limitations, the White Paper suggests that responsibility for public diplomacy falls well beyond traditional government players. As Rory Medcalf observes, it calls for everyone including “business, unions, migrant communities, universities, the media, even the humble tourist…to contribute to the new diplomacy.”[13]

For Australia’s leading strategic analysts, the optimistic tone of the Asian Century White Paper falls short on matters of strategic security, failing to seriously address the possibility of destabilization or disruption within the transforming region. Referring to the White Paper as “Australia’s Pollyanna Asia Policy,”[14] Linda Jakobson observes that it provides minimal strategic guidance for Australia in navigating a new course in an increasingly complex and competitive region. Similarly, Rory Medcalf suggests the White Paper’s blinkered focus on the
“oceans of gold”[15] to Australia’s near north pays insuffi-
cient heed to an Asian Century also marked by serious
interstate tensions, strategic mistrust and, in the case of a
nuclear North Korea, greater unpredictability.

However, a broad scan of the public submissions re-
ceived through Henry’s consultation process confirms
that the White Paper was generally not seen as the ap-
propriate mechanism for contemplating such matters of
strategic security. They reveal a collective call for policy
to focus on building the infrastructure, skills, and op-
portunities for improved engagement within the region,
whereby “engagement and exchanges are the key to find-
ing shared ground and strategic convergence.”[16] While
rightly criticized for gaps in strategic
substance, the White Paper quite sim-
ply reflects and responds to the broad
public view.

Australia’s Defense White Paper, scheduled for release later in 2013,
will provide the appropriate vehicle
for filling these gaps in Australia’s
strategic security policy, taking a far
longer view through 2050. Although,
given the diplomatic backlash that
followed the release of the 2009 De-
fense White Paper, there is little doubt
that greater sensitivity will be exercised in naming signifi-
cant strategic threats within the region. Furthermore, the
prevailing budgetary environment will contain Austra-
lia’s military and defense ambitions. In the face of hefty
defense spending cuts, there is likely to be greater em-
phasis on developing niche capabilities, the exploration
of burden-sharing arrangements, and improved bilateral
security partnerships, both with the US as well as with re-
gional players, such as Indonesia. Within this context, the
public diplomacy initiatives identified through the Asian
Century White Paper offer potential over the long term.
By improving understanding, confidence, and trust in key
bilateral and regional security relationships, public diplo-
macy contributes to an overall approach aimed at mitigat-
ing and minimizing conflict within the region. Yet here
too the detail, including on funding, is lacking.

**Australia’s Strategic Approach In The
Context Of America’s Pacific Century**

Former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton intro-
duced ‘America’s Pacific Century’ shortly after Gillard
had made her first reference to the Asian Century. Clinton,
too, noted the profound economic and strategic impli-
cations of a transforming Asian region, and foreshadowed
the US’ pivot towards the Asia-Pacific arena. The state-
ments made by Gillard and Clinton have much in com-
mon. Both reflect on the importance of fairness, openness,
and transparency within the transforming region. Both
highlight North Korea as a significant regional security
challenge. Both assert that choice, not chance, would de-
dtermine their respective successes in the changed land-
scape, and both point to the need for deep and compre-
hensive diplomatic engagement within the Asian region.

Fundamental differences in approach are also evi-
dent. The obvious difference is in
terminology, with Australia referring
to a place within the Asian Century
on the one hand and the US staking
its claim to a Pacific Century on the
other. Quite simply, such language
reveals the different geopolitical and
historical perspectives of each na-
tion. However, while Australia notes
a close strategic friendship with the
US, it does not specifically include
the US within the geographic delin-
eation of the Asian Century. Early
criticism of the White Paper suggested that it downplays
the US’ part in supporting Australia’s strategic play into
the region. Indeed, there may be some value for Australia
in creating at least a perception of distance from the US
as it establishes its own strategic approach, particularly if
it is ever to shake off the unhelpful perception of being
America’s deputy sheriff in the region. A closer look at
the content of the White Paper and subsequent political
statements by Gillard counter suggestions that the US has
been overlooked.[17] Rather, they reveal a deeper perspec-
tive of the US as Australia’s indispensable partner, shar-
ing both its values and interests, in the region. Australia’s
Foreign Minister, Senator Bob Carr, reaffirmed the latter
point most recently in his remarks following bilateral dis-
cussions with his new US counterpart (and Clinton’s suc-
cessor as Secretary of State) Senator John Kerry, noting
“how closely we cleave to one another when it comes to
core values.”[18] Common values count for a great deal in
these strategic and political maneuverings.

Additionally, the Pacific Island nations do not rate a men-
tion in Australia’s Asian Century blueprint. Prima fac-
cie, Australia’s narrow view of the geographic scope of
Asia reflects Australia’s targeted policy focus towards its
near north. Again, it reflects the domestic intent under-
scoring the White Paper consultation process and policy; that is, as one commentator noted, “to change the way Australians think about Asia.”[19] Moreover, as the largest trade and aid partner to the Pacific Island nations, Australia has developed a reasonably strong framework within which to engage its Pacific neighbors. Nonetheless, this omission is of concern. Though small in relative material terms, the Pacific Island nations bring a combined strategic and diplomatic significance to the changing China-US interplay. This interplay is not lost on the geographic scope of Clinton’s Pacific Century, which explicitly addresses these limitations by stretching to the Western shores of the Americas and encompassing the Pacific Island community.[20]

In terms of strategic approach, Clinton’s “forward-deployed diplomacy”[21] asserts confident US leadership, backed up by military positioning in shaping the architecture of the region. Clinton is forthright in naming key human rights and governance concerns within the region, and articulates clear US expectations for change. Six key lines of action are identified: “i) strengthening bilateral security alliances; ii) deepening our working relationships with emerging powers, including with China; iii) engaging with regional multilateral institutions; iv) expanding trade and investment; v) forging a broad-based military presence; and vi) advancing democracy and human rights.”

While Clinton affirms public diplomacy initiatives, they do not feature as prominently and consistently in US rhetoric as they do in Australia’s. For Clinton, America’s Pacific Century is underpinned by a military pivot—a pivot away from wearisome military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan toward an expanded and invigorated presence within the Asia-Pacific. The difference in approach is not to be overstated. Australia and the US, whilst strategic allies and longstanding friends, are set apart by clear power differentials that define and determine their strategic and foreign policy interests and actions. Building primarily on notions of connection, collaboration and understanding is an approach befitting the middle power Australia desires to engage as, rather than as an outsider in Asia. However, for the US, there is no alternative other than to claim a leadership role. These differences in approach may lead to opportunities for Australia and the US to effectively complement, rather than duplicate, each other’s efforts within the region. Such complementarity has already been well established within the alliance. Although as both nations grapple with domestic budgetary challenges, their respective aspirations in the Asia-Pacific region will be harder to achieve, putting more pressure on the partnership.

### Conclusion

Australia’s strategic blueprint for the Asian Century builds on the image of a “constructive and engaged middle power.”[22] It brings collaborations and people-to-people linkages to the fore. If supported and funded over the long term, the strategic blueprint would offer Australia the opportunity to reshape its domestic structures and secure niche positioning within the complex Asian region. It usefully distinguishes Australia within the region from the more assertive and potentially competitive US. At the same time, subtle complementarities in approach underscore a deeper confluence of interests between the two strategic allies that may prove mutually beneficial in a tight budgetary climate. However, while efficiencies might be identified, shortcuts should not be an option. Securing sufficient funding and investment is critical if both Australia and the US are to successfully deliver on their respective policy visions within the complex and diverse region.

The significant challenge for Australian policy-makers and diplomats in the Asian Century will be to develop and maintain Australia’s distinct approach to the region. This would include building and maintaining positive relationships with identified key players, within the broader context of its longstanding strategic alliance with the US. It would be helpful for neither Australia nor the US if Australia were to slide into the slipstream of America’s Pacific Century. Careful management, coordination, and funding will be required to secure Australia’s place in this strategic century.

### References and Notes


4. Ibid.


21. Ibid.


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At one point in his now famous dance number ‘Gangnam Style,’ the irresistible music artist Psy declares himself to be ‘a guy who has bulging ideas rather than muscles.’ His meaning is that the ‘soft power’ of attraction that flows from cultural factors like intellect and education can achieve as much in the world as the ‘hard power’ of compulsion through physical strength. This theory is, of course, applicable to nations as well as to individuals. The insight lies at the core of the operation of public diplomacy: the practice of pursuing foreign policy goals by engaging a foreign public. Yet as Korea and other countries have discovered, it is a lot easier to throw around grand slogans than to actually make public diplomacy work in practice. The purpose of this paper is to set out some guidelines for developing effective public diplomacy. It will do so by addressing some of the most commonly asked questions about public diplomacy in general and then address the specifics of the Korean case.

Where Did Public Diplomacy Come From?

While the term public diplomacy originated only in the 1960s in the USA, since ancient times wise leaders have understood the value of engaging foreign publics in their foreign policy. The core practices of public diplomacy are: Listening (engaging through the study of a foreign public and feeding that into policy formation); Advocacy (engaging through explanation of one’s policies); Cultural Diplomacy (engaging through facilitating the export of one’s culture); Exchange Diplomacy (engaging through arranging for one’s citizens to obtain personal and sustained experience of life among a foreign public and for members of that foreign public to gain the experience of one’s own country). The final element is the subsidized distribution of news, which had its early modern equivalents but in the twentieth century became International Broadcasting. While the term public diplomacy has a certain convenience, most democracies have learned the value of allowing separate agencies to conduct each function. The United States is an exception in this regard and its public diplomacy has suffered as a result.

Public diplomacy as a practice has evolved over the past century. In the West, large scale communication intervention in foreign policy began with the ideologically driven propaganda of the First World War, which had little regard for the truth or long term credibility. In the UK and US during the Second World War and Cold War, this evolved into a fact-based approach in which advocacy and one-way communication through broadcasting tended to predominate. The post-Cold War period saw a widespread transition to a commercially oriented approach, when nations presented themselves as competing industrial and cultural brands in the market place. Our own time has seen the emergence of an approach based on networks and exchanges, which is particularly suited to the era of the Internet and social media. Like the phases in the evolution of life on earth, these phases in the evolution of public diplomacy are not mutually exclusive. Ancient creatures like sharks and crocodiles coexist with relative newcomers like human beings, and in the same way various forms of public diplomacy coexist. The most forward-looking states are coming to terms with the era of networks, while some still put their faith in crude propaganda (North Korea) and others trust to advocacy and one-way outreach (the dominant strategy in China). South Korea is still in its commercial phase. Each state owes it to its people to ensure that its public diplomacy approach is truly that which is best suited to its goals and not just the product of habit or bureaucratic inertia.
How Should Public Diplomacy Respond To Current World Order?

While issues of image have always had a role in world affairs, recent decades have seen concerns about public engagement move from the periphery of foreign policy to the core. In fact, the significance of publics in foreign policy may be the defining characteristic of foreign policy in our age. The proliferation of communication technologies is one reason for the change. The lowering of barriers to entry to the field of international communication has made it possible for many more voices to be heard, including those of international organizations, non-governmental organizations and corporations. Conversely, at the very moment that the number of players has exponentially increased, many states are experiencing extreme limits on their resources. For this reason, partnership has emerged as a key strategy in contemporary public diplomacy. Fortunately, the idea of partnership, with a coalition of actors addressing a shared problem, is a strategy well-suited to a world in which audiences are increasingly fragmented into niche networks, as they offer the opportunity to work with people who are already part of the target networks rather than attempting to break into them from outside. The smart players in world affairs will increasingly be those who work well in partnerships.

How Does Public Diplomacy Play A Role In Smart Power?

Public diplomacy offers a mechanism to leverage soft power and manage national reputation as part of a smart power strategy: a foreign policy strategy which integrates hard and soft power. It is not soft power by itself. One irony of soft power is that the theory emphasizes the importance of attraction in world affairs but presents that attraction as a mechanism for getting one’s way, which is potentially an unattractive objective. The most attractive countries do the right thing not because they hope for power or influence, but because they actually believe in the principles they espouse and could not do otherwise. Too much discussion of soft power is counterproductive. On the positive side of the ledger, the listening aspect of public diplomacy is especially significant, as it is essential that the currents of international opinion be fed into the policy process. A smart foreign policy actor needs to engage with its reputation in the world as it really is, not as it might fantasize it to be. Smart public diplomacy needs to consider who is credible to the audience with which one wishes to engage. It is seldom that the actor’s own voice is the most credible to the audience. The optimal strategy is often to seek partnerships to empower others to speak, rather than speaking for oneself.

What Do Historical Examples Tell Us About The Best Way To Approach Public Diplomacy?

Considering the history of public diplomacy in the West over the past half century, five core lessons emerge. The first lesson of public diplomacy is that a communicator should listen first before speaking or initiating a foreign policy. Sadly, there are many more examples of nations ignoring international opinion and paying the price than paying careful attention and reaping the rewards. Secondly, it seems clear that public diplomacy matters and can be a multiplier of successful diplomacy. The great successes of diplomacy – such as the transitions in Eastern Europe or South Africa – have a prominent public diplomacy component. Thirdly, public diplomacy is a ‘long game’. Success is seldom instant, and public diplomacy assets like exchange networks or cultural programs require constant care and maintenance. This said, once established – for better or worse – reputations are long-lasting. The accumulated data from multiple studies of international reputation and nation brand show surprisingly little volatility. For example, the reputation of the Soviet Union for technical excellence won with the launch of Sputnik endured long into the period of Soviet decline. Fourthly, public diplomacy is not purely an international issue. The smart actor has to manage elements of their domestic scene. Domestic media, citizen behavior and policy can damage an external reputation. Just as a corporation has to ensure the integrity of its products, so the nation-state has to manage its own people and society to ensure than they do not undercut diplomatic initiatives, hence public diplomacy begins at home. The best example of this is the way in which, during the Cold War, the United States was obliged to address domestic race issues in order to retain a credible claim to be a voice for freedom and democracy on the international stage. Finally, history makes it clear that public diplomacy

SMART PUBLIC DIPLOMACY NEEDS TO CONSIDER WHO IS CREDIBLE TO THE AUDIENCE WITH WHICH ONE WISHES TO ENGAGE.
has its limits. It cannot make a bad policy magically good, but it can make a good policy better.

**What Are The Implications Of All This For South Korea?**

In a relatively short period of time, South Korea has emerged as a significant practitioner of public diplomacy. Its diplomats are now experienced listeners and advocates for the country. Since 1992 the Korea Foundation has advanced a comprehensive range of cultural and exchange diplomacy activities. The Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) and Arirang TV both ensure that Korea is represented on international airwaves, though audiences are not what they might be. Korea has its King Sejong Institutes – centers for cultural performance and exchange – in 90 countries. It has its smaller scale initiatives: the Korean Corners. It has also invested heavily in branding with global marketing campaigns overseen by a presidential commission. Importantly, this initiative has paid attention to the domestic foundations of Korea’s international reputation, encouraging Koreans to be welcoming to foreigners and individually to play their part in showing the best face possible to the world. On top of this, South Korea has an admirable record of hosting and participating in international events: the Seoul Olympics of 1988, the Taejon World’s Fair of 1993, the World Cup of 2002 (co-hosted with Japan) and the Yeosu Expo of 2012. But these activities all require careful management and political will to succeed and, for all its achievements, South Korea is still only at the beginning of its public diplomacy career.

While history suggests that public diplomacy repays investment, success requires patience and is seldom timed to short cycles of domestic politics. South Korea has publicly declared ambitions to advance the position of its ‘national brand’ in global rankings, but success will require more than clever slogans or well-placed advertisements. The essence of maintaining a high-level international reputation lies in being relevant to the audience. In a competitive marketplace with many nations striving for international attention, Korea needs to consider what it can best provide the world. Obvious candidates are:

1) Korea can be relevant by being a good global citizen. This story is made more resonant by the spectacle of Korea’s journey from an aid recipient to a global donor nation. Korea is hardly less relevant as the non-threatening face of a region which has intimidated some in the past and – with the rise of China – continues to awe some observers. Such approaches are connected to the notion of Korea as a middle power regularly heard elsewhere in foreign policy circles.

2) South Korea can be relevant because of its entertaining popular culture which continues to win friends and revenue around the world. While the appeal of popular culture is notoriously unpredictable and mixes poorly with politics, Korean entertainment presents a logical partner for and multiplier of Korean public diplomacy. The same is true of Korean Taekwondo or cuisine, both of which inspire a special connection with the country in foreign fans.

3) South Korea can be relevant because of its reputation as the origin of quality manufactured products, enhanced by excellent design. Each piece of Korean technology serves as a little ambassador for the country, and it is in the nation’s interest to ensure that the Korean point of origin is clear to the consumer and that the experience remains positive. The corporations, who understand that Korean origin requires a cut in the asking price, may take some persuading to continue to assert their Korean-ness indefinitely. Korean technology should be presented as an extension of Korean ingenuity and the logical next step in the export of Korea’s knowledge economy.

4) South Korea can be relevant as the home to tens of millions of potential members of international networks. Social scientists tell us nothing is as convincing as a peer’s professional or personal outlook. South Korea should work to connect its citizens with others around the globe who share their interests in art, science, law, medicine, electronic gaming or any other niche. One feature of contemporary South Korea is its religious profile. South Korea’s millions of Christians have a special relevance to other Christians around the world. The upcoming hosting of the World Council of Churches in the summer of 2013 is a case in point.

5) South Korea can be relevant by accomplishing its reunification with North Korea. To be truly relevant to the world and to lift South Korea’s image into the first rank of nations, the country needs to be part of a truly spectacular story. The reunification of the Korean peninsula is exactly
such a story. It would remove a negative— the shadow of the North Korean regime— and provide a positive picture of peace and reconciliation.

**Where Does South Korean Public Diplomacy Go From Here?**

Overall, the story of Korean public diplomacy is a successful one, however, the Korean government has been a little unrealistic in its expectations about what public diplomacy or branding activities can achieve. The government would do well to increase the level of investment in the Korea Foundation and other public diplomacy tools, and accept relatively low returns in the medium to long term. Korea would also do well to note that it is not the only player in town; that images form regardless of whether or not an actor attempts to manage the process, and that it is wise not to let something as critical as image formation go by default because of underfunding. One thing that does seem out of date is the current declared mission of Korean public diplomacy to ‘win hearts and minds’. While this plays well with politicians and domestic publics, it is misleading to conceptualize public diplomacy in ‘win’ or ‘lose’ terms. In social relationships the idea of winning is problematic and likely to lose ground with the target of the attention. It would be better to speak of define the role of public diplomacy as ‘engaging hearts and minds in search of mutual success’. Such an objective is intrinsically attractive, and there can be no harm in the public diplomacy strategy of a country contributing to its soft power.

The bottom line is that public diplomacy has a lot to offer South Korea, and with appropriate investment in the existing mechanisms at the foreign ministry and Korea Foundation, more can be achieved. Korea should seek ways to develop its relevance to global audiences and emphasize especially the creativity behind their technology and the popular culture. After all, it is a fine thing, as Psy reminds us, to have ‘bulging ideas rather than muscles.’

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There are two interlinked stories about the role of soft power in China’s rise. One story, often termed as the country’s ‘charm offensive,’ has received much attention in press commentary, policy analysis and academic studies. The other, however, is less noted. It concerns how the rest of the world has stepped up its outreach toward China and the implications of such efforts for Chinese worldviews and public life. And this, I believe, is of far greater significance and consequence for China and the world, in the long run.

Case in point: 190 countries, including 22 countries without formal diplomatic relations, participated in the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai to showcase their cultures to the Chinese populace. The Expo provides countries with an opportunity to engage directly with a mass audience. The USA Pavilion, for example, attracted 7.36 million visitors over the six-month Expo. At least 95% were Chinese citizens, more than the American embassy and consulates in China will receive over the next decade. The day before the closing of the Shanghai Expo, the number of visitors to the Denmark Pavilion reached 5.55 million, equal to that country’s population.

The international soft-power outreach toward China is important to understand, because the nature of China’s rise to global power is apt to be shaped as much by how the Chinese will come to view the outside world as by how other countries will deal with its ascent. As the historian Martin Jacques has argued, the Chinese attitude toward difference - cultural, political and economic - will be a crucial factor in determining the outcome of its rise. As the world’s second-largest economy (by absolute GDP count), China not only serves as a critical link in the global supply chain for many multinational companies but is also a coveted consumer market of goods and services. While the country continues to be a major destination of foreign direct investment, it is fast becoming a source country of investment. China’s outbound direct investment soared from $5.5 billion in 2004 to $65 billion in 2011, and is projected to reach $150 billion by 2015. Between 2005 and 2012, China’s outbound tourism had grown from 31 million visitors a year to 83 million, with almost 90% being personal travels.

Not surprisingly, China is now an indispensable player in addressing myriad global and regional challenges, from climate change to peace on the Korean Peninsula. With a vast, growing, Web-savvy middle class, the role of average Chinese people in public life, as citizens and consumers, is increasingly prominent and significant. Given China’s dynamic role in the world’s economy and politics, and its ever more variegated domestic information environment, how countries are perceived and regarded in China cannot be ignored.

The growth of the Chinese middle class is significant both economically and politically. It also has important implications for how China conceives its relations with the world. As Cheng Li of the Brookings Institution pointed out, “to some extent, the Chinese middle class has already begun to change the way China engages with the international community, both by playing an active role in this increasingly interdependent world and by keeping abreast of transnational cultural currents.” Meanwhile, with China’s growing international presence, other countries have also displayed a keen—if not existential—interest in grasping how China and the Chinese public fathom the world.

China’s rapid economic growth over the last several decades has not only lifted hundreds of millions people out of abject poverty, it has also transformed the nation from a mostly rural population to an increasingly urban society. In 2011, for the first time in Chinese history, more Chinese lived in urban areas than in the rural countryside. Just two decades ago, only about one quarter of the Chinese population resided in cities. A substantial number of urban residents belong to the fast-growing middle class, but its exact size is under much debate due to varying definitions and modeling criteria. Based on household income adjusted for purchasing power, 44% of the urban
population could be categorized as lower middle class in 2011, according to a McKinsey & Company report; by 2025, more than half of the urban population will be considered middle class.\(^7\) In addition to household income, other models take into account factors such as occupation, education, and self-identification, and suggest that about one-fourth of the urban population is middle class.\(^8\) The Euromonitor forecast put the size of the Chinese middle class at 700 million by 2020, double the projected US. population.\(^9\)

This large, emerging middle class is concentrated in urban China and along the coast, the most prosperous parts of the country. In contrast to its counterparts in developed countries, the Chinese middle class tends to be younger.\(^10\) It is also a heterogeneous group in terms of the pathways through which individuals attain the middle-class status, including, for instance, government officials, entrepreneurs, professionals, and intellectuals and other cultural elites.\(^11\) Politically, the Chinese middle class desires social stability rather than dramatic political change, but is more and more vocal and assertive about quality-of-life issues.\(^12\) It is expanding its interactions with the world through work, leisure and—increasingly—international travel. And it is poised to not only transform the Chinese consumer market, but also shape China’s worldviews and its evolving international identity.

With China’s re-emergence as a global power and its expanding international engagement, the Chinese worldview becomes crucial and consequential, particularly its temporal aspect. For most of its history, China didn’t have a national identity per se, let alone an international one. As the renowned Chinese philosopher Liang Qichao noted at the turn of the twentieth century, “China has for thousands of years remained in uninterrupted isolation. When our people refer to the land, they call it the universe (tianxia) rather than a country (guo).”\(^13\) China saw the world as an extension of itself and prided itself on its cultural superiority to all other states. For example, this worldview was expressed in the tributary system, premised on the idea of a hierarchical international system with China at the top and center.\(^14\)

But this conception of the world was shattered with the Western colonial expansion into China in the mid-19th century. China entered the phase generally called the ‘Century of Humiliation,’ which lasted from the First Opium War of 1840-1942 to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. During this period, China’s internal weaknesses were fully exposed, and the country suffered a series of defeats at the hands of the industrialized powers, battering its self-confidence and dealing a psychic blow to the ‘Middle Kingdom’ mentality. The country barely “limped along in the international system,” neither a Western colony nor a modernized state.\(^15\)

China’s remarkable socio-economic achievements in recent decades and its growing international role have ushered in a new phase of a re-emergent, more confident China. It exhibits multiple and conflicting international identities. William A. Callahan calls contemporary China a ‘pes-softpower’ nation: “a nation defined by a mix of positive and negative feelings, and an interplay of pride and humiliation.”\(^16\) Likewise, David Shambaugh argues that “China has no single international identity today, but rather a series of competing identities,” ranging from isolationist tendencies at one end of the spectrum to global engagement on the other.\(^17\)

The rise of China has aroused profound shared anxiety around the world about the direction of its development. The darker scenario of an arrogant, belligerent China worries many. On the other hand, a more benign version depicts a cosmopolitan China, which seems far more reassuring and desirable.\(^18\) As the story of China’s ascendance unfolds, there is no doubt that how the vast Chinese middle class comes to understand the world and China’s place in it will have a powerful hold on the country’s global imagination. According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project surveys, an overwhelming majority of the Chinese public (consistently more than 80 percent since 2006) feel satisfied with the direction of the country, and most think their economic situation is either very good or somewhat good.\(^19\) In the meantime, the Chinese increasingly believe that the West seeks to resist China’s rise by curtailing the country’s growth and influence.\(^20\) It is at this critical juncture that public engagement between China and the world gains strategic importance and urgency. And it is time that we broaden the current discussion on the role of soft power in China’s rise from a singular focus on China’s ‘charm offensive’ to a look at an interactive system of China being not only a sponsor but also a recipient of soft-power efforts.\(^21\)
References and Notes


8. Li, ed., China’s Emerging Middle Class.


11. Li, ed. China’s Emerging Middle Class. 18

12. Ibid., 21.


18. Li, China’s Middle Class. 5.


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started thinking about writing a blunt, pragmatic précis soon after I realized that public diplomacy was unlike anything I had ever encountered in political communications. I was also frustrated to find that the public diplomacy experts of the time did not seem to know how to do what they were telling us to do. Those of us in the field – speaking directly to a complex and dynamic global public – had no guidebooks to help us. So I set out to write one:

1. Go Where The People Are.
For the public diplomat, it would seem the first order is to reach the public. But, almost immediately, organizational imperatives dictated by limited resources, strategic communications priorities, bureaucratic fracking, "opinion leaders," and other distractions will push you away from people – real people, the critical mass where public opinion is actually formed about material issues affecting daily life. The farther you get from people, the more time you spend away from people, the less you understand them and what they care about, and the less able you become to speak to them in language that they recognize. Finding and going to the people is critical not just to being effective but in doing the essential job of public diplomacy. You will have to fight for this every day, and the longer you do this job the more you will have to fight.

There is probably no better indication of the importance of people than the fact that Hillary Clinton held public town hall meetings – both with live audiences and by satellite from the State Department -- at the rate of more than one a month during her tenure as Secretary of State. Clinton held 59 in all, not including the nearly one million miles she traveled and 112 countries she visited. During virtually every one of those trips she participated in outreach, and not just with opinion leaders or the press, but directly with the public.

2. Know Your Audience.
People are plural. Wherever you go, they will be profoundly different from what you have ever known and experienced. Fortunately, different people tend to congregate in groups of sameness, so you’re likely to meet them in these homogeneous groups. Get to know them beforehand so you know what they care about, what they are like, and why they think what they think, and do what they do. They will constantly surprise you, and the more you drill down into who they are, the more surprised you will be. But the better prepared you are, the likelier you will be to connect with your audience (and to like them). The more groups you meet, the more respect you will have for a country’s or region’s political and cultural diversity and the better you will get to know them – and the more likely they will be to like you, identify with you, and like your country.

I’ve met Serbs who like NATO, Europeans who think we should attack Iran (and Iranians who think we should, too), Muslims amused by atheists, Arabs unconcerned about halal strictures, Cubans who complain about Fidel’s loquacity, Danes who want to kill terrorists, French who want to learn English, Poles who speak Russian, and Russians who laugh at German jokes. That’s a lot to prepare for – mental gymnastics to pull off without moving your feet.

3. Go The Distance.
Too many public diplomacy officers practice by parachute, dropping in for their scheduled hour to talk to an assembly before packing off back to the office. The organization does not usually support it, but you will have a manifestly greater advantage over others if you go early, linger a while, listen to other panels, stay late, and meet people. You’ll learn something, meet more people, and gain their trust the longer you stay with them. You are not there simply to tick a box: you are there to build relationships. Going the distance demonstrates a sincere interest not just in them, but in the subjects they care about. They have probably worked three to six months or more to carry this off. They’ll remember you if you stay.

George W. Bush’s greatest legacy will not be Iraq. It will be the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, which poured $15 billion into the fight against AIDS/HIV and fundamentally altered the dynamics – and the debate – of the disease in Africa. To punctuate his initiative, he spent four days in Tanzania in 2008 visiting clinics, hospitals, schools and churches – a tremendous amount of time for a visiting head of state. The Tanzanians have not forgotten it, and on
Bush’s second visit to Tanzania in 2011 as a retiree, he spent six days in the country. By contrast, when President Obama visited Indonesia, his childhood home, he spent barely a half day there in 2010.

4. Keep It Real (But Not Too Real).

People want to know that you are a human being – not an automaton, cog or bureaucrat carrying out your particular task for the day. Be who you would want to meet that day. Focus on your audience’s needs, wants, fears and desires. Leave your policy brief, jargon and acronyms at the office – or if you must bring them, express them in plain language, that is, what they mean to real people in real life. Talk about your personal experience or the experiences of people you know. Be careful, however, how much you share: nobody cares that an official struggles with bureaucracy day to day or what you accomplished last year. They only want to know that you get it right.

Hillary Clinton was never a better example of this than when she explained how she ran her heart out against the man who beat her in the Democratic primaries but for whom she would eventually serve as Secretary of State. She demonstrated the resilience both of American democracy and of herself as an individual. It was a personally revealing moment but also a political statement. By contrast, during a 2009 visit to the Congo, in a fit of pique, she made a little too clear who conducted policy at the State Department. Every-thing else she said was quickly forgotten.

5. Demonstrate Respect Through Knowledge.

It is one thing to submit to your audience and admit ignorance (we can’t know everything -- after all, we were not raised in the culture and politics that they carried from the womb), but it is another to build a deep knowledge to carry on informed conversations with your interlocutors. If imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, then knowledge is the firmest form of respect. Audiences are profoundly insulted by willful ignorance, but they respect deep, obvious, multidimensional knowledge, even if it is at odds with their own opinion.

When the President and Michelle Obama visited India in 2010, an enduring image of the trip was the First Lady playing hopscotch with children she met there. That was no simple game, but a vocabulary-building exercise in a school for orphaned girls. Mrs. Obama specifically visited the Make the Difference charity in Mumbai to help them and the Indian government, who were struggling with a high rate of female infanticide, low rates of girls’ education, and related social problems. The First Lady demonstrated an extraordinary sense of purpose and respect by recognizing the challenges where she traveled in the friendliest way imaginable.

6. Demonstrate Respect Enough To Argue.

Don’t duck confrontation for the sake of comity. You show respect for another person by engaging in thoughtful, reasoned argument. Failing to engage suggests you don’t know enough about the subject or you don’t care enough about that person to grapple with them. Arguing means you’re listening and caring enough to devote thought to the subject and your adversary. You may not convince them right away, but you also may get them thinking and ablate their opinions in front of others. Perhaps nobody has ever had the temerity to debate them before. Show you’re willing, out of interest and honor, to continue the discussion (and even to change your mind).

The boldest approach by the Bush Administration was to recognize publicly that the conventional American approach to Arab regimes during the past 30 years was no longer working. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s 2005 speech in Cairo was an argument, and there is no better demonstration of its influence than the strict denial by supporters of the Arab Spring that it had anything to do with the uprisings. Reagan’s exhortation to bring down the Berlin Wall was at least as important as an open-air statement of reality as a proximate cause of the collapse of communism.

7. Quality First, Then Quantity.

Focus on getting the job done right first, and then the audience will follow. You can’t reach the audience unless your job is done perfectly. If your work is shoddy, you’ll reach less of your audience. The better you are, the higher the percentage you’ll reach, hold and convince. Once you’re consistently hitting high marks, then you can focus on reaching a wider audience. If you perform perfectly in front of a classroom of 20, you’re more likely to do well in front of a broadcast audience of two million.

Nobody has demonstrated this better than Barack Obama, who at age 25 was by no means a gifted speaker but was nonetheless taking every opportunity to practice speaking in front of small groups. In less than a decade he has improved dramatically – learning along the way – so that today he can move thousands when he speaks, no matter their language.

8. Know Your Country Better Than They Do.
You will meet people who love, hate and understand your country far better than most of your countrymen. Some will display a depth of knowledge – historical, cultural and political – that will surprise and delight you, but also put you on guard and off your game. You need to know your own country better than they do, which means there is nothing, large or small, about the United States that can escape your attention. You have to go beyond the main, almost clichéd points of American culture and history – the Revolution and the Constitution, the Civil War, the Depression, World War II, Civil Rights and Vietnam – and dig deep into the rich loam of our culture, folklore and regional history. A good way to start is to pick a subject of interest and become an expert on it. Start with your own hometown, which will give you a confident point of entry into America through its history, culture and politics for you to learn everything you can.

Preparing to speak before a group of about 100 European Union stagiaires on Inauguration Day 2009, I had been asked to brief on the newly minted President’s likely effect on foreign policy. Yet as soon as we got started, the moderator threw out that brief and started asking questions, the first of which was my thoughts on the speech. I offered what the only American on the panel could: an overview of the tradition and a comparison to past inauguration speeches: Kennedy’s, Lincoln’s Second, Reagan’s First, Bush’s Second, and so on. You never know what kind of question will put you on the spot.

9. Look To The Analogous Arts For What Works.

Public diplomacy is unique in communications and should never be confused for anything else: it is not advertising, filmmaking, speechwriting, stagecraft, webcasting, branding, journalism or photography, and it fails utterly when it pretends to be one of these things. Nevertheless, it borrows elements from all of these, so you must constantly watch and learn from the sister trades to find out what is new, fresh, innovative, interesting, and effective. Be sure also to seek out examples of bona fide propaganda and learn from those dark masters of the form, both present and past, to discover what not to do, and to avoid written and visual language coded in our cultural DNA.

Visiting the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam, I viewed Rembrandt’s Night Watch. A common-Enough genre of his time, Rembrandt turned the otherwise prosaic group portrait of a local militia into a dynamic set piece, a dramatic diorama of personality and symbolism. So much to present! So much to absorb! It makes one so much less tolerant of the staid grip-and-grin, the grim podium, the posed lineup and all the usual suspects we tolerate to illustrate what we do. I would watch a wordless Pixar short, trying to imagine how to communicate without any words at all, how to write visually, thinking in pure symbols. Good public diplomacy can be that fun, that creative, but we have to learn how to do it from other arts.

10. Take Risks.

Effective public diplomacy is inherently creative, and therefore risky. The organization you work for will be less tolerant than you will be of risk-taking. But it is only by being creative, by doing what hasn’t been done before and exploring the unknown, that you will reach new audiences, multiply the audiences you have, and capture the people you are trying to hold. In creativity failure is inescapable and acceptable, as long as you learn from failure, adapt, and improve. The earlier you fail, the better, so start failing now. Try to find people who are similarly willing to take and learn from risks, and work for those who appreciate creativity and hazard. Leave people who are suspicious of creativity and seek safety, who care most about what the bureaucracy or the front office think (rather than what people think), who prefer to show rather than a show. Seek superiors who nurture creativity and tolerate risk-taking and work for them, and cultivate colleagues who do well what you can’t.

Karen Hughes, a former broadcaster, recognized that risk-taking and making mistakes were the only way to learn. This is why, as Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy, she made public diplomacy a requirement for advancement in the State Department. But she also effectively eliminated risk by encouraging creativity and never punishing failure if a good-faith effort was made. You can’t create if you don’t spill the paint.

11. Don’t Depend On Technology To Do What You Can Do Better.

There is tremendous temptation to automate or interpolate as much as possible in public diplomacy – to put on the Web or social media what you can do yourself. These new tools do provide extraordinary power and efficiency to communicate, to tally audiences in hard figures and tangibly measure effort in output. But there remains the risk that we let technology reign where people should. Public diplomacy is about putting people first. With the intermediation of technology, something human always dies. Asking where the people are, how to reach them, and how to make public diplomacy more human, humane, and real before leaping towards technology will always remain vital. Common sense (reinforced by social science research) tells us that the indelible human experience – meeting some real person, hearing and seeing someone or something extraordinary – lingers most in mem-

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ory, changes minds and alters destinies. Do what you can do better than machines. It makes the difference.

Visiting the Voice of America headquarters for the first time, I took part in a public tour. The capstone of the visit included a 10-minute video extolling the organization. I didn’t need it – I was sold already – and I couldn’t help but think it was wasted time. At least they didn’t charge a fee (a UN agency infamously did this, without the tour). Why not meet the staff, editors, reporters? Have questions, answers, discussions? The building was full of people who could do far better in person what they had spent time and money to produce the video for the same outcome. After all, most of the people in the video worked right in same building I had just visited.

12. Travel.

In an era of limits and shrinking budgets, the first thing to go is often the travel budget. This is a mistake in public diplomacy. Not only does it restrict you from meeting people, but it keeps you from seeing, experiencing and understanding the environments that form those you intend to influence. By traveling and immersing yourself in foreign places, you will really learn to communicate. It gives you credibility, both in the knowledge gleaned from what you can’t find in books and in the experiences you can only gain outside of the office or Embassy. If the organization will not send you, you must take the responsibility to do it yourself. And you must see more than what the locals want you to see.

Only when you put your feet on the ground in sub-Saharan Africa do you understand that for economies to work, you need roads which have not been flooded by the rainy season, and electricity, which has become a form of control wielded by the kleptocratic switch. Only when you put your ears to the ground in Central Asia and understand that poppies are a capital asset because they can be put on a shelf indefinitely, or moved over mountains by pack animals, which you can’t do with apricots or tomatoes. Or when your own eyes see what first the Nazis, and then the Soviets, did to the Central European countryside: they erased the people, imprinting the empire right into the land in steel-reinforced concrete. Then you really begin to understand people.

13. You Are An Insurgent Within The Organization.

The organization you work for will try to defeat your endeavors, destroy what you build, suppress your successes, and punish your failures. The organization views you as a liability and the work you do as a corporate risk. The organization considers you a renegade before you even turn coats. Embrace the organization’s view of you and your mission for no other reason than to cohere the dissonance that would otherwise jangle your mind. As an insurgent you will be free to wage an internal fight against the bureaucracy, to win battles on your own ground. Do not expect to prevail in any conventional sense or to receive commendation or promotion from the organization, for remember always that your success is not an asset but a threat to the organization. But then, you are not fighting for the organization but for the minds of people outside it – the strategic ground that constitutes public diplomacy.

You need go no further than Peggy Noonan’s memoir of speechwriting during the Reagan revolution, which reads like a schizophrenic’s attempt to reconcile competing personalities. She was, more than any other besides the man himself, the President’s voice to the world. And yet the book is filled with competitors, antagonists, pitched battles with the mice and moles of a feckless bureaucracy who ground the president’s lyricism down to less than mere prose. She wrote and she fought, for years thinking that only dimwits and philistines who stood in her way. No, in the end, it was a battle for power, for ultimate control over “the only American poet who could sing outdoors,” and she was the only one who saw him that way, and that is why she lost in the end.


The world is a battleground for the brains and souls of men and women, right now fought by insurgents who have fought longer, harder, and more passionately than you or your countrymen have. So you must fight smarter, harder, and more creatively because the organization will not allow you to fight as long as they have. In the field, you are a counterinsurgent fighting for the ideas, passion and reason of those people who may, in many cases, have no other cause to believe in. If you give them one, if you set a mind free on a chart now marked with new and startling waypoints, you could change forever one person’s destiny and then one nation’s. Learn the terrain, learn the way, then go and fight.

James Snyder served on the NATO International Staff Public Diplomacy Division in Brussels from 2005 to 2011. His book, The United States and the Challenge of Public Diplomacy, will be published this year by Palgrave Macmillan USA.
Assessing the Role of Middle Powers

Middle power states have become important players on the world stage, carving out a unique and significant role in international politics. Their foreign policy considerations are different than those of superpowers or of developing states.

They face a delicate balancing act that is both an opportunity and a challenge. Middle states are clamouring for a larger role in global politics. They are seeking more recognition of their economic importance and their political clout, as well as cohesive greater role in international organizations.
Trades in the Pacific Century

- US: 15.66 trillion
- EU: 15.07 trillion
- MEX: 1.75 trillion
- BRA: 2.36 trillion
- CHL: 319.4 billion
- 256 billion
- 238 billion
- 83.66 billion
- 70.2 billion

[1] Comparison to World

Data from Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, *ASEAN data calculated by adding individual state members’ trade balance
Call for papers at the Asian Journal of Public Affairs

“The Asian Journal of Public Affairs is a global public policy journal in Asia committed to encouraging dialogue and debate about critical issues that affect the Asia Pacific region.”

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Submission Deadlines
Volume 6, Number 2, Fall 2013: 15 August 2013
Volume 7, Number 1, Spring 2014: 15 Jan 2014
Volume 7, Number 2, Fall 2014: 15 Aug 2014
n January 2013, a group of nine Chinese and American USC Master of Public Diplomacy students traveled to Beijing, China as part of a research trip on the study and practice of public diplomacy in China. Through site visits to several Chinese universities and organizations involved in practicing public diplomacy in the Beijing metropolitan region, the students engaged in research on innovative areas of public diplomacy, including film diplomacy, sub-state diplomacy, corporate diplomacy, media, and the Internet. Public Diplomacy Magazine interviewed the group about their findings upon their return to Los Angeles.

Part One
Why China?

Sarah Myers: Xinru and I had been talking about China’s public diplomacy and how it was reaching a really interesting point of change, particularly with President Xi’s coming to power, and I think we felt that especially because we had so many people from China or interested in China in the USC public diplomacy program, it just made sense that now would be a good time to go over there and see what it was like on the ground. A lot of the research we were reading wasn’t giving us a clear picture of what is going on with public diplomacy in China and where it is headed. So we felt that getting there and talking to people would be the best way to fill that gap.

Xinru Ma: We planned the trip during our first year of the public diplomacy program, and during that time we had been learning so much about China’s PD without much literature from Chinese scholars, practitioners, or diplomats. So we decided if we want to learn about China’s public diplomacy, we should use the first element of public diplomacy - listening - and go to China and listen to what the Chinese people want to say about their own PD.

Sarah: As we were starting to frame what the idea of this trip was, many of us had been on the trip to DC last February, and we decided that we really wanted to have a mix of American and Chinese perspectives. We’ve been to DC, we’ve heard the American perspective of public diplomacy. We wanted to go to China and hear the Chinese perspective. So threaded throughout all our research was the idea that we really wanted to pair American and Chinese students tackling both sides of all of these questions to get a comparative view of where these countries are going.

Amanda Hu: Although I’m originally from Beijing, my knowledge of PD only started here in the US. Thanks to our DC trip, I’ve been exposed to some image of what PD tools are like in America, so I was interested in what China’s PD is like. I am thinking someday I’ll move back to China and work in this field, so I want to be more exposed to China’s PD. By this comparison between China’s PD and America’s PD, I could gain some knowledge and contribute more. As a lot of people have acknowledged, China’s PD is at an elementary level.

Jessie Liu: The DC trip was also one of my major motivations for joining this trip. I think we learned a lot about America’s PD here at USC, and we went to DC to see what American PD was like there. But I don’t think I know as much about Chinese PD as I do about America’s – which is ironic because I am from China, and I also wrote about China’s cultural diplomacy for my bachelor’s thesis. At the time, most of the academic papers talked about the main problem of China’s PD being the lack of strategic planning. Although many departments are doing PD work, there seemed to be no overarching strategy. After so many years, I was wondering what Chinese PD was like and if there had been any progress.

Xinru: Two words summarize the objectives of this trip. One is listening and the other is bridging. We wanted to go to China and listen to Chinese perspectives on PD, and bridge American and Chinese perspectives on PD through communicating with Chinese practitioners. So with these words we can understand why we set up so many different meetings and why we had peer-to-peer engagement.

Dao-Chau Nguyen: As an American student studying corporate diplomacy in the US, I wanted to go to Beijing to better understand how businesses abroad are affected by their respective government institutions. Coming from a Vietnamese-American background, I have always been
interested in how Communist countries develop and sustain relationships with democratic countries.

Frank Cheng: I wanted to see the reality of PD in China. I think coming from the West, I often can be critical of Chinese public diplomacy and China as a whole. I felt similar to the Middle East, since my view of the region changed after going there—I wanted to see if the same thing would happen with my perception of China. Also, I am Taiwanese American and speak Chinese fluently, so I felt as if I would be able to have a unique experience in the meetings on public diplomacy.

Part Two
Carnegie-Tsinghua Center For Global Policy

David Mandel: Carnegie-Tsinghua is a partnership between the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Tsinghua University. The professor who hosted us invited a number of students from Tsinghua University, as well as interns at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center, and they represented not only Chinese perspectives but also some other East Asian perspectives. So that was a really great opportunity for us, because it was the first time that we were able to compare the way that we learn and talk about PD to the way that PD is taught in China.

Sarah: One of the striking things that we found was we went around and asked the students what they were planning on doing with their degree and what drove them to study public diplomacy, and they’re actually quite similar to ours—particularly in that few of them are planning on going straight into government. They’re looking at corporate work, looking at NGOs, there is a surprising amount of work being done outside of the government in public diplomacy. This is unusual for China because most diplomacy has to fall directly under the government. It’s not the same setup in the US. They understand the different demographics of users in different platforms (for example, Ten-
cent vs Sina) and design their topics accordingly. I feel this is the only organization we visited that knows their audience well enough to design an effective strategy.

Sarah: Their goal was not to communicate a particular view of the US; their goal was to give a better understanding of the US at large. And just to make sure the public has access to information that will help them better understand America.

Part Four
Charhar Institute

Amanda: The Charhar Institute is the only PD and international relations think tank in China. It claims to be an independent think tank but it’s actually sponsored by the CPPCC – the China Political Party Consultative Conference.

Xinru: I feel the Charhar meeting was representative of our tentative conclusion about Chinese PD – that Chinese PD is not coordinated as we had imagined. In that meeting there were so many mixed views of Chinese PD, from academics, from diplomats…. In that meeting we heard a lot of things that we don’t agree with, but it shows us that China’s PD is not coordinated and everyone has different purposes and definitions of PD. Different agencies can cancel out each other’s efforts.

Sarah: One of the examples that was brought up in that meeting was the “Made in China” campaign, which was a series of messages brought to Times Square. There’s relatively little praise for it on the American side because we don’t like to be advertised to – we see it as propaganda. I think one of the strong outcomes at Charhar is that there are a lot of different views and just like in the US, what we see in Chinese PD comes down to the structural setup, the bureaucratic challenges, and the differing views. That really shows PD in formative stages. One of the impetuses for forming the Association is to steer Chinese PD better, so that’s something we need to keep watching. There’s a strong feeling that this is the beginning of PD in China.

David: What crystallized for me at the Charhar meeting, and again at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was that there is a big difference between people who talk about PD in China or study it and people who work internationally, especially at an embassy. In general those people who have worked internationally are much more open to talking and being transparent. They had a much better understanding of what PD meant internationally. They were more willing to discuss with us and people who hadn’t had that experience were much more reserved. It shows the importance of getting out there and not just studying this in a closed system. That’s a lesson for China – that Chinese PD practitioners have to be able to talk to people and communicate what they’re doing to international audiences in a constructive way.

Amy Zheng: One thing we discussed was how China sees domestic PD as a big component, and we’ve talked about this privately and don’t understand it, because Americans would see this as propagandizing its own citizens. So we brought this question to a lot of institutes and they explained that the general public in China cares more and more about what is happening with Chinese companies overseas, so that’s why they focus on the domestic audience.

Dao-Chau: From a corporate diplomacy perspective, the leaders of the Charhar Institute have different ideas of what role corporations should play in their country compared to what I had previously studied. This meeting made me realize that those in China working outside the field of business philanthropy and corporate social responsibility do not see corporate diplomacy as a strategic tool that can save companies money in the long-term or that they can be used to create positive perceptions about its home country.

Part Five
Ministry Of Foreign Affairs

Amy: One interesting point would be comparing how the lady in the MFA does social media through Weibo versus how the guy at the US Embassy does it.

Sarah: Just for context, the MFA has a few social media accounts, but they’re all in Chinese. The reason for this is that one of their key roles is explaining what they do to the Chinese public. The Weibo account is primarily used to explain international issues to the Chinese public, rather than representing China to an international public.

David: One of the things we ran into at the MFA is this international vs. domestic issue. The MFA spends a lot of its time dealing with domestic issues, and when they’re dealing with international issues it’s after a crisis, telling
other organizations how to respond. So there didn’t seem to be an established long-term PD strategy for communicating with international audiences. That being said, what was different about the MFA from other organizations was that the MFA seemed genuinely interested in what our perspective was. They spent the second half of the meeting asking us what we thought about Chinese public diplomacy and seeing what we thought worked and what didn’t work, what could work. I felt as a delegate that they took an interest in what we had to say and what our skill set was. It showed an understanding on some level that they need to expand the reach of their PD and the strategy behind it.

**Dao-Chau:** The panel at the MFA was honest about the lack of a concerted government and corporate effort to solve China’s current social and environmental problems. While they seemed hopeful that more public-private partnerships will be created in the future, I believe progress towards a strategic corporate diplomacy plan will be slow until the government prioritizes social and environmental issues on its national agenda.

### Part Six

**Final Thoughts And Reflections**

**David:** I think the most important takeaway is the importance of exchange and person-to-person interaction in successful public diplomacy. People asked us all the time what works, and I got a better impression of China just by being there for a week than I would with any public diplomacy directed towards me from China in the United States. There’s no better way to learn about a place than to go there, and so that’s where the emphasis should be for both countries moving forward.

**Sarah:** One of my key takeaways is that there is so much need and promise for continued research, particularly in the communication field. Media was brought up by almost every person we talked to; concern over China’s representation in the media and how they can fix it. So I think there’s a big place for communication research in trying to understand public diplomacy in China and US-China relations.

**Xinru:** My biggest takeaway is that listening is important. Without listening you can never get a diverse perspective. For China’s PD I feel they have a lot of emphasis on an extension of domestic politics which is different from what we see in the US. On a lighter note, the air in China is really bad. I grew up in China and I never thought it was that bad, but this time when I came from the US I had a physical reaction.

**Danni Li:** China is definitely buying into the concept of PD because it has nothing to do with the external propaganda they used to do, and also because other Asian countries like South Korea and Japan are doing it, which makes them want to be more competitive. They want to do it in a Chinese way, so they interpret PD in a different way from the West. But although it’s a gloomy picture, there’s hope for improvement.

**Jessie:** I see that we could have futures in helping to develop China’s PD, largely because China is doing PD so poorly. So many people are talking about doing PD, but in terms of locating their audience, I think they don’t have any idea of that. In our MFA meeting, we asked the Head how evaluations worked and she didn’t know how to answer. They really need people who are professionally trained in PD to do that work.

**Amy:** For me, I think we gained a better understanding of what Chinese PD is like. The situation for China is special because they’re dealing with the international and domestic audiences. They’re trying to demonstrate their international credibility, but also their domestic governing legitimacy. So like my colleagues, I’m happy that China has attached so much significance to PD.

Members of the USC Master of Public Diplomacy Delegation to China: Frank Zac Cheng, Shaocong (Amanda) Hu, Xinru Ma, David Mandel, Sarah Myers, Danni Li, Cong (Jessie) Liu, Dao-Chau Nguyen, Yu (Amy) Zheng
case studies
eighteen months ago, David Gordon and Sean West of the Eurasia Group called the Trans-Pacific Partnership “the most important trade deal you’ve never heard of.”[1] In a relatively short time, the agreement has become the centerpiece of US trade policy. The TPP negotiations are the club that everyone wants to join. What makes this different from other free trade agreements (FTAs), and are the likely results worthy of the hype?

Trade agreements, especially those negotiated following the WTO Uruguay Round, concluded in 1994, reduced most industrial tariffs to a relatively low level. Thus trade agreements negotiated post-Uruguay are mostly about relative positioning and relative gains, that is, expressions of geopolitical economic policy. Most modern FTAs provide little in the way of immediate reduction of trade barriers or discernible short-term benefits for business, but they are important to building cross-border business relationships, reducing transaction costs, and mitigating risk. They are also a public signal of intent, similar to the rules applied to dating and courtship. Entering into free trade negotiations says to the partners involved: I want to get to know you. I believe we can create a mutually profitable union.

The economic benefits of the Trans-Pacific Partnership for the US (and indeed Canada, Mexico, and other countries who have been actively negotiating regional and bilateral free trade agreements around the globe) are relatively minimal. The United States already has free trade agreements with six of the current eleven TPP members. Also, in trade negotiations, the smaller economies do better in terms of relative market access gains than larger ones. [2] Peter Petri estimates that US annual GDP gains from the TPP bloc[3] (not counting soon-to-be entrant Japan) would yield 0.12% of GDP annually. An expanded bloc that includes India, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand would bring the US annual gain to 0.53% of GDP. [4] Unless and until the United States is able to negotiate a free trade agreement with China, an economy of similar size, the market access gains for the United States in Asia will not be large.

However, straight-across market access gains are not the main rationale for the US interest in the TPP. The size and dynamism of the Asian market are major inducements. The emerging economies in the TPP have growth rates that are roughly double those of the United States’ traditional trading partners in Western Europe and Canada. The APEC countries - of which the TPP members are a subset - account for 44% of world trade and 55% of global GDP. [5]

International trade is no longer a matter of single producer exporting to single buyer. A significant portion of Asia-Pacific trade involves components of manufactured products, providing a large share of value-added trade. [6] Value-added trade generates jobs and FTAs that cover the major nodes of a supply chain, reduce costs of inputs for manufacturers, and increase regional competitiveness. The investment provisions of the TPP should also help to reduce the risk to investors wishing to acquire or establish businesses in new territories.

Each trade agreement a country negotiates imposes compliance costs, because each agreement has different requirements for product certification, inspection, proof of origin, etc. The TPP should reduce these costs by simplifying and consolidating dozens of smaller agreements currently in force between partners.

The TPP is important to the United States because of the locational advantages it offers and because it provides US exporters and investors with opportunities in growing markets. However, the TPP has probably been oversold in terms of its level of ambition. The 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is the template upon which the US has based most of its subsequent trade agreements. Because NAFTA is nearly twenty years old, changes in shipping technology, electronic service delivery, globalization, and outsourcing mean that old rules need to be refined and improved. The TPP offers nego-
tiators the opportunity to craft rules that more accurately reflect the realities of the 21st century economy, but it is unlikely that these commitments will run very deep at first. We are still in the courtship stage with many of these new trading partners. Moreover, different levels of economic development and varying experience with domestic implementation of trade commitments mean that the first set of rules that everyone can agree upon will be relatively light.

For example, when Canada and the United States launched their bilateral FTA in 1989, there were significant differences in our domestic commercial rules and processes. Nearly a quarter of a century later, the integrative effects of the FTA have moved the two economies into closer alignment, where deep commitments such as regulatory harmonization and trusted trader programs are possible. Neither goodwill nor hard bargaining could have achieved these outcomes in 1989.

As the rounds of TPP negotiations tick by, the level of ambition is dropping precipitously. During the early rounds, negotiators and politicians touted an agreement covering substantially all trade, dealing with issues previously unaddressed in trade agreements with no exceptions or carve-outs for sensitive sectors. But the reality of finding common ground among 11 trading partners with disparate interests is forcing the parties to lower the bar. Another reason is Japan. For more than a year, TPP partners have been holding their breath in hopes that the world’s fifth largest economy would join the negotiations. Except for its membership in the WTO, Japan has been a no-show in regional and bilateral FTA forums. It has held back because of a number of domestic protectionist measures, the most important of which is protection for domestic rice farmers. The prospective value of preferential access to the Japanese market provides TPP negotiators with an excuse to lower the level of ambition and consider exclusions for sensitive sectors, at least during a ten year phase-in period.

The United States is likely to try to retain tariffs on sugar. For Canada it’s dairy. Vietnam wants to keep protections for state-owned enterprises. Australia is opposing investor-state dispute settlement and New Zealand is likely to block measures that would affect its pharmaceutical pricing system.

As we approach the 17th round of negotiations, to be held in Lima in May, assurances that the talks will be complete by the end of 2013 seem mistaken. With a dozen economies now scrambling to put markers on the table for sensitive sectors while also trying to address the regulatory realities of an integrated, digitized global economy, it appears that the honeymoon is over, and the real work in the relationship has begun.

References and Notes


2. Imagine that one child has a super-deluxe Lego set and another child has a basic set. When told to share their blocks, the child with the smaller set will always be relatively better off than his buddy, no matter how generously he shares his own blocks.

3. Until recently, the 11 TPP negotiating parties were Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States and Vietnam. On March 15, 2013 Japan announced its intention to join the talks, with the hope of completing admission requirements in time for the APEC Trade Ministers’ Meeting in Indonesia in mid-April.


6. Petri, 3.

Laura Dawson is the President of Dawson Strategic and provides advice to business on cross-border trade, market access and regulatory issues. Previously, she served as senior advisor on US.-Canada economic affairs at the United States Embassy in Ottawa. As a specialist in US.-Canada economic relations, Dawson contributed to the launch of the US.-Canada Regulatory Cooperation Council, the Border Vision Strategy, and the bilateral Government Procurement Agreement. She is a Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and a Senior Fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute conducting research in North American competitiveness, supply chains and energy policy.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), if successfully negotiated, will be the world’s most ambitious free trade agreement. It would include some of the leading economies of the Asia-Pacific area, including Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam. While the negotiation was launched only in 2008, the initiative takes advantage of a long-term process initiated by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), a more modest trade treaty known as P4, and the tangled net of bilateral trade agreements among its members.

The TPP could be evaluated from several viewpoints. It may contribute to a harmonious legal environment for businesses by opening markets within emerging economies for goods and services, especially for the US information sector. It may challenge the increasing influence of newly industrialized countries in the Pacific, particularly China and India, which are not part of the negotiations. The TPP may also reverse the failure of the recent Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), which covers the core of ongoing negotiations and was rejected already by two key signatories, the European Union and Mexico.

A less explored potential effect of the TPP is its impact on international trade governance at both global and local levels. The TPP challenges the leadership of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in international trade governance by adopting new and binding commitments on a broad range of matters, with higher standards than those enforced by the WTO. These include institutional arrangements and enforcement mechanisms between a subset of countries, whose economies represent over 40% of global trade. In practice, this will move the gravitational center from an established international organization to a new multilateral forum, a setting that would reduce interference by developing and newly industrialized countries. If the TPP succeeds, relevant and emergent issues would be discussed there, rather than at the WTO.

The TPP may also affect the local governance of countries involved in negotiations, particularly those with democratically elected governments. Unlike some other international forums, the negotiations of the TPP are not transparent. Texts under consideration are kept secret, critics are silenced, and civil society is excluded, except for a limited number of business advisers. This eliminates public deliberation of proposals and increases misunderstandings, particularly by governments that lack technical expertise. Some consumer protection advocates say this qualifies as a policy laundry practice, in which trade agencies push for higher standards in international forums in order to extort lawmakers for implementation into domestic law. Ultimately, countries would be forced to endorse the TPP “as is,” leaving almost no room for deliberation within domestic forums, an unacceptable outcome for democratic societies.

Most of the TPP’s texts remain secret, except some brief and cryptic governmental statements and a few leaked texts on the intellectual property and investment chapters. Government officials have neither confirmed nor denied the authenticity of any of the leaks, but all of them gratefully accept suggestions based on those texts. Moreover, leading proposals were tabled by the United States, replicating the model language propelled by American negotiators in other forums, a fact admitted by negotiators. The content of these chapters confirms the aforementioned concerns on how the TPP may challenge current rules of international trade governance.

Intellectual property is probably the most contested issue included in the TPP negotiations. From the rights holders’ point of view, adopting and enforcing high standards of protection for intellectual property are essential. For its detractors, higher standards are an obstacle to development, blocking access to affordable medicines and knowledge, diminishing consumers’ protection, and compromising human rights. The latter view has been made concrete in several initiatives before the WTO and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the specialized agency of the United Nations, including a proposal to extend the deadline for achieving full compli-
ance with international standards on intellectual property to less developed countries, and a treaty proposal to grant access to copyrighted material to people with disabilities, among others. This is an attempt to subvert international forums through having an agenda more flexible than that of the TPP.

The TPP promises to raise the bar for protection and enforcement of those rights, without proper consideration to public interest concerns. On one hand, it requires adopting substantive protections higher than those in place by other international instruments, for instance, by providing protection to trademarks and copyright online. On the other hand, the TPP demands enforcement mechanisms before both domestic and international forums. At the domestic level, the TPP confers ex-officio power to customs authorities, requires companies that provide access to Internet to enforce copyright rules against online infringers and criminalizes copyright infringement, among other relevant issues. At the international level, the TPP aims to facilitate private enforcement of this agreement through the investment statute by allowing not only other governments but also private actors to sue states that fail to provide the prescribed protection.

The TPP’s emphasis on strong protection for intellectual property primarily reflects the concerns of the information, entertainment, and pharmaceutical industries that are advising on the process. Neither consumers nor civil society organizations have had a real chance to take part in it. Not even elected officials at the US. Congress have achieved access to negotiations, in spite of their insistence. Lack of transparency, public deliberation, and political accountability on the form and content of the TPP agenda on intellectual property undermines the democratic process and places an obstacle to achieving any proper balance.

The TPP may succeed in opening some markets to free trade, but along the way, it circumvents the international agenda by considering only private interests, disempowering international organizations already in place, diminishing public participation, and eroding the democratic lawmaking process. No wonder previous analogous attempts through ACTA failed when tabled at domestic forums in the European Union and Mexico. In spite of critics who say otherwise, the TPP has more chance of success than ACTA. This is due to the absence of balancing power between negotiators, lack of technical expertise by some countries, the secrecy of the process, training acquired by negotiators when dealing with ACTA and, unlike this ACTA’s sole purpose as an intellectual property enforcement agreement, the TPP is a comprehensive trade agreement, with potential benefits for industries other than those related to intellectual property. But the TPP’s success will challenge and change global and local governance on international trade.

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THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF JAPAN’S SOFT POWER EDGE

By Michael J. Green and William Colson

In a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in February, Japan’s resurrected Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said that “Japan is Back.”[1] Abe was not only referring to Japan’s recovery from the devastation of the March 11th earthquake, nor only to a new approach towards tackling its decades long economic stagnation. In this case, Abe was referring to Japan’s return to the world stage as a major player in international affairs -- he also has in mind Japan’s emergence as a “soft power superpower.” Constrained by Article Nine of the Constitution, Japan has long had to rely on non-military aspects of power. Throughout most of Japan’s post-war history this has meant economic power, but increasingly ‘soft power’ has become a key part of Tokyo’s toolkit.

Japan’s soft power can be felt throughout the world, and nowhere more so than in the United States, Japan’s most important ally. While Korea’s ‘Gangnam Style’ was a massive global success, Japanese artists continue to top US. iTunes charts with regularity, though the Japanese government spends less than one-sixth of what South Korea does on the arts.[2] At the same time, the number of Japanese restaurants in the United States has increased by more than 50% between 2005 and 2010[3] and anime conventions have flourished throughout the country. This influence has paid strategic dividends: from 2006 to 2012, the number of Americans viewing Japan as a partner rather than a rival increased from 73% to 80%. Meanwhile, the number of Americans who believe that Japan practices fair trade has risen from 58% in 2010 to 63% in 2012.[4] This is a remarkable turnaround, given that Japan’s economy was considered the greatest threat to American security in some polls taken in the late 1980s.

Japan’s soft power edge is not limited to the United States. The BBC World Service 2012 poll showed that respondents from around the world viewed Japan as having the most positive influence on international affairs.[5] Japan’s soft power is particularly strong in Southeast Asia, where a 2008 Chicago Council on Global Affairs poll ranked Japan as having greater soft power in countries like Indonesia and Vietnam than any other nation could claim. The same survey found that Japanese products were considered highest quality and were most likely to be bought in those countries.[6] In the 1970s, the Japanese Prime Minister’s car was stoned when he visited Southeast Asia due to memories of the war, but after several decades of economic investment, official development assistance, and cultural exchange, Japan is viewed as a more positive actor in the region than the United States or China. Abe intends to capitalize on this soft power edge. He made Southeast Asia his first overseas destination as Prime Minister, in large part to send a signal to China that Japan is not isolated in Asia. There, he released a bold five-point foreign policy vision for Southeast Asia, emphasizing freedom, democracy, human rights, freedom of navigation, enhanced trade and investment, exchanges, culture and traditions.[7] Japan’s new Finance and Foreign Ministers, too, made Southeast Asia their first destinations. Japanese business also supports this charm offensive, since the rate of return on Japanese investment in Southeast Asia has been higher than in China.[8]

Northeast Asia is another matter, however. Sino-Japanese relations have sunk to new lows in recent years. Japanese now have a strongly negative view of China. A Yomiuri poll conducted in February demonstrated that more Japanese people consider China to be a military threat than North Korea, with 88% of Japanese polled saying they trust China “not very much” or “not at all.”[9] Chinese views of Japan are equally negative, and Japanese soft power appears to be providing relatively little ballast. Indeed, as the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has intensified, Chinese protestors have targeted name Japanese brands for boycotts and vandalism. Moreover, Japanese soft power is consistently undermined by official Chinese patriotic education and propaganda, which emphasize Japanese war crimes in textbooks, television dramas and museum displays. Nevertheless, Japan’s economic clout in China is not inconsiderable and may have more of an impact than Tokyo’s battered soft power. From 2001 to 2011, Japan’s outward FDI grew threefold and
over 10% of that investment was into China.[10] In 2012 Japan represented 7.4% of China’s total trade.[11] IMF estimates that a China-Japan-ROK free trade agreement would represent 22.5% of world GDP.[12] While Japan cannot stabilize its relations with China through soft power alone, economic interdependence may provide a solid foundation for an otherwise deteriorating relationship.

After President Kim Dae Jung and Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi agreed to open Korea to Japanese cultural exports in 1998, Japanese soft power buoyed bilateral relations, as did the ‘Hallyu’ (Korean wave) of dramas and music into Japan. When Abe was first prime minister in 2006, his wife famously learned Korean by watching South Korean dramas and fawned over the Korean stars of dramas such as ‘Moonlight Sonata’—a phenomenon repeated across Japan at the time. Since then, bilateral ties have worsened. Former President Lee Myung-bak’s sudden visit to the Dokdo/Takeshima Island in 2012 and his insistence that the Japanese ‘King’ (a demotion of ‘emperor’) apologize before coming to Korea infuriated Japanese across the political spectrum. Koreans remain angry at Abe and other conservatives for their 2012 Japanese election campaign promise to revise Japan’s official apologies both for the war and for the treatment of Korean ‘comfort women’ sent to brothels for the Imperial Japanese Army. There is anger, too, over Japanese textbooks’ treatment of the annexation of Korea. Today, 74.3% of South Koreans and 68.7% of Japanese polled think that bilateral ties are deteriorating.[13] Still, Japanese and Koreans do not consider the other nation to be a serious security threat in the way that both populations (and particularly Japan) view China. Seoul and Tokyo are also linked through trade, with Japan representing 7.1% of South Korea’s exports and 13% of their imports,[14] and through their respective alliances with the United States.

Ultimately, Japan does have a soft power edge in every part of the world other than China and South Korea. Intensifying nationalism across Northeast Asia partly explains this exception. Legitimacy challenges to the ruling parties in Beijing and Seoul are also to blame: the Chinese Communist Party uses anti-Japanese nationalism to respond to domestic pressures, and Korean conservatives are perpetually under assault from progressives for their historic ‘collaboration’ with Japan going back to the annexation period. Beijing and Seoul do not have a monolithic view of history problems with Japan, however. China’s official use of anti-Japanese propaganda is far more systematic and reflects a new and enduring structural and ideological conflict with Tokyo. In the case of Korea, however, Japan must bear much of the blame for deteriorating ties and the deflation of soft power, particularly with respect to the debates over the tragic and indefensible treatment of the comfort women. As Kim Dae Jung and Keizo Obuchi both demonstrated in 1998, the two democracies in Northeast Asia are capable of reaching common ground in a way that will prove far more elusive for a non-democratic People’s Republic of China. Abe should be able to woo Korea far more successfully than he has thus far.

Surveying Japan’s relations in Asia, it may be a poor metaphor to call soft power a ‘tool.’ Military alliances, economic investment, diplomatic alignment, trade agreements -- these are all instruments that the government can wield to advance its national interests. They are like hammers and wrenches and screwdrivers. Soft power is more difficult for the state to wield, and depends on popular culture and attitudes beyond government remit. In that sense, soft power is like glue used to reinforce a relationship after it is fastened together with more traditional tools of statecraft. In Southeast Asia and the United States, Japan’s soft power added a cohesive element not represented by trade, investment and alliance, which would not have been as effective without hard power elements in place first. Soft power is not going to solve Japan-China or Japan-Korea relations, but it can create closer ties after geostrategic and economic factors come into play.

Over time, Japan’s soft power edge has paid off in key relationships. And it is likely to do so again. As Abe responds to a Chinese strategy aimed at isolating Japan from the rest of Asia, he may take great satisfaction from the net effect of manga, anime, sushi and pop music on the nations he is turning to for help.

References and Notes


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f, as some analysts have predicted, the 21st Century will be the ‘Pacific Century,’ Chile seems to be a promising actor. Since the 1980s, the country – which during the last three decades has championed free trade in Latin America -- has extended its diplomatic and economic ties beyond what could be considered its ‘natural’ partners, that is to say, the United States and Europe. Chile has established relations with Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, and has signed free trade agreements with Australia, Malaysia, Vietnam, South Korea, Japan and China. In addition, in 1994 Chile joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Around the same time, the country created the ‘Pacific Foundation,’ an institution aimed at bringing Chile into trade cooperations with Asia. More recently, in 2012 Chile became, along with Peru, Mexico, and Colombia, one of the founders of the ‘Pacific Alliance,’ a bloc that promotes economic integration and free trade, and which has a particular focus on Asian markets.

Chile’s interest in the Asia-Pacific region needs to be seen in relation to the economic model of the country, which drives it to search for new markets and attract foreign investment. Therefore, it should not be a surprise that since the country recovered its democracy in 1990, it has paid increasing attention to the image that it projects to the world in an effort to shake off the shadow of Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship. Consequently, during the last two decades Chile has used soft power tools in an attempt to improve its reputation and craft a narrative that portrays it as a stable country, as well as a gateway to the Latin American market.

A notable example occurred in 1992, when the country participated in the Universal Exhibition of Seville. The main attraction of its pavilion was an iceberg brought directly from Antarctica, which was intended to communicate the coldness and efficiency of Chile's economic success, in contrast with the Latin American stereotypes of chaos and inefficiency. The exhibit was considered a success because it allowed Chile to be ‘seen’ by the world. Chile had another chance to showcase its credentials in 2004, when it hosted the APEC Summit and welcomed world leaders such as George W. Bush, Hu Jintao and Vladimir Putin. In 2010, Chile was in the global media spotlight with the successful rescue of 33 miners who had been trapped 2,300 feet underground. The story was watched by an estimated audience of one billion people around the world, who followed it live through networks such as BBC, CNN and China’s CCTV.

Trade has arguably been the main driver behind Chile’s interest in promoting its image abroad. The need for consistency in marketing efforts developed by various public and private Chilean actors led the country to outline in 2005 a strategy of nation branding that, at least in theory, would involve every sector of society. This strategy was developed by ProChile, the Chilean Trade Commission. However, some of the decisions made were rather controversial, such as the short-lived slogan ‘Chile, All Ways Surprising’. This slogan was eliminated because predictability and stability were considered preferable characteristics with which to represent the country.

A different direction was taken at the end of the decade with the creation of Fundación Imagen de Chile, an institution aimed at coordinating and capitalizing on public and private efforts that help to promote Chile across the world. One of its first actions was the development of the slogan ‘Chile hace bien,’ unveiled in 2010, meaning both ‘Chile is good for you’ and ‘Chile works well’. However, only the first translation was disseminated to English-speaking countries, leaving the idea of the country’s efficiency overlooked. Although some of the officers of the Fundación have described their work as public diplomacy, it seems the current efforts are understood almost exclusively in terms of nation branding, that is to say, development of slogans or logos rather than as engagement in long-term relationships with foreign publics.

It is not possible to know how much Chile’s soft power efforts have contributed to the economic accomplishments of the country, particularly in relation with the Asia-Pacific region. Chile is far from being the most successful country in Latin America in terms of its global reputation. However, its economy is one of the strongest in the
region, it has signed free trade agreements with over 60 countries and has occupied a non-permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council twice. The fact that in 2010 Chile became the first South American member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) confirms its relevance in the ‘Pacific Century’.

However, the Pacific Ocean has also become a source of controversy between Chile and its neighbors. In 2008, Peru filed a lawsuit against Chile before the International Court of Justice to resolve a claim for 35,000 square kilometers of the Pacific Ocean currently under Chilean sovereignty. The verdict will not be known before mid-2013, but the dispute has been widely covered by the media of both countries and arguably has highlighted the failure of earlier attempts to negotiate a solution. Chile only has consular relations with Bolivia, and interactions between the two nations have been characterized by tension over Bolivia’s demands to recover its coastal access. Relations with both Bolivia and Peru have been particularly strained since the end of the 19th century, when the two countries joined forces against Chile during the ‘War of the Pacific’, a conflict driven by the ambition to control nitrate fields on Bolivian soil. By the end of that war, Chile had increased its territory by one third, Bolivia had lost access to the Pacific Ocean, and the Peruvian city of Arica had been annexed to Chile.

So far, it seems that the ‘Pacific Century’ is a concept that has been understood mainly in commercial terms, driven particularly by the rise of China as a major economic power. However, the 1990s demonstrated that a strengthened economy alone does not guarantee a safer and better-engaged international arena. If Chile really wants to be a relevant actor in the Pacific during the coming decades, it should address some of the aforementioned disputes. They have impacted the country’s trade, energy, and even its security. Additionally, Chile’s global reputation has been somewhat tarnished, leading it to be perceived at times as isolated.

A full resolution of these conflicts is beyond the realm of public diplomacy. However, it may play a role in easing tensions. Chile should increase its efforts to enhance its soft power within the immediate region. In doing so, it could mitigate unfavorable opinions amongst the citizens of neighboring countries.[113] This is particularly important given that the elites of Chile, Bolivia, and Peru have occasionally agreed on political and economic issues, but their jointly proposed policies could not be enacted due to their unpopularity with Bolivia’s and Peru’s general public, who perceived them as too favorable to Chile. One of the most obvious examples is the Bolivian ‘gas war’ of 2003, which involved a series of popular uprisings against the government’s proposition to route gas sold to the United States through Chile. The outcry forced then-president Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada to put an abrupt end to his administration.[14]

Chile’s implementation of regional public diplomacy should follow a slightly different approach to the efforts aimed at other regions, including the ones targeted at Asia. The goal should not be exclusively to increase trade, but also to forge alliances with citizens of neighboring countries and to project a more appealing image of Chile. Thus, the emphasis should be on Chile not just as a nation unique within Latin America – as the iceberg of 1992 did in Seville – but instead as a reliable friend with positive historic ties to Bolivia and Peru. In doing so, Chile should pay attention to the opportunities offered by each country or, using the terminology of public diplomacy, it should do more ‘listening’.

For example, in 2004 I had the chance to spend a summer volunteering in Bolivia. At that time, the media reported extensively on squabbles between Presidents Carlos Mesa, from Bolivia, and Ricardo Lagos, from Chile. It was the same old story: Bolivia demanded the return of its Pacific coast, and Chile responded that there were no pending issues on borders available for debate. At the same time, I noticed that every Sunday afternoon, Bolivians met religiously in front of their televisions to watch ‘Operación Fama’, the country’s first reality show. Across Bolivia, viewers followed the story of a dozen young, aspiring celebrities competing for the final prize: a trip to take singing lessons in Chile.

Arguably, for a couple of hours, neither the contestants of ‘Operación Fama’ nor its Bolivian audience perceived Chile as a rival or aggressive nation, but rather as a place full of opportunities to materialize their dreams. Perhaps this can inspire future public diplomacy efforts to increase understanding between these historically linked countries.

**References and Notes**

2. *Chile Pacific Foundation*.


7. Ibid.


11. Ibid.

12. See the Country Brand Index of 2012: Chile was listed number 39 among 50 countries of the Nation Brand Index of 2011 and 34 among 118 countries.

13. According to a 2010 survey in the Chilean newspaper La Tercera, 78% of Peruvians and 61% of Bolivians do not trust Chileans.


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f this is truly the Pacific Century and not simply the Asian Century, the conceptual dimensions of the Asia-Pacific ought to include the Pacific Island Countries (PICs). While these relatively small, isolated communities lack the financial resources to play on the international political stage, their national interests are no less vital to their citizens. Their challenges are no less real. How then can they ensure that the Pacific Century includes the Pacific Islands?

Part of this effort will require much greater engagement with the international community. Essentially, this means a more effective strategy in allocating resources and targeting partnerships that help inform and influence global public opinion. PICs need public diplomacy strategies. They need to build alliances that are mutually beneficial, and show the world what is to gain by recognizing their contributions. With global powers repositioning and reinvesting in the Pacific, opportunities abound.

A Pacific Scope

The notion of a Pacific Century has thus far focused almost exclusively on East Asian economic development, maritime trade, and increased securitization in Australasia.[1] What it has not focused on are the asymmetries of power within the broader Asia-Pacific. A political power vacuum was created as the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Pacific Commonwealth Countries slowly receded from the region in the 1990s.[2] With Australia primarily focusing on security in only a few of its larger neighboring states,[3] the vacuum has quickly and quietly been filled by the Chinese.[4] But while the Chinese have increased their efforts in regional development and economic integration, the national interests of PICs still remain largely subservient to the broader geopolitical interests of Western and now East Asian powers. It is no wonder that PIC diplomats sometimes see China and ANZUS as “two sides of the same coin.”[5]

The problem is that PIC national interests are not always the same as their development partners’.[6] While major powers focus on issues like free trade, maritime security, and terrorism, the national interests of PICs are much more focused on human security, food security, and climate change.[7] The reality of the matter is that PICs do not have the economic clout or the military might to influence major regional organizations like the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) or the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). What are their alternatives?

Public Diplomacy

To truly have a say in the Pacific Century, stronger public diplomacy must become the cornerstone of PICs’ engagement with foreign powers and their publics. Traditional diplomacy will not suffice. With minimum human, technical, and financial resources, PICs simply lack the capacity to globally promote themselves by establishing diplomatic missions. Papua New Guinea and Fiji have established 16 missions each, but they are the exception. Tuvalu and Tonga have four. Kiribati has one.[8] And for most PICs, this is more the rule: It is unrealistic to expect a minimal diplomatic corps to achieve major gains abroad.

Without direct representation, the majority of PICs rely on their United Nations mission websites as their primary point of interaction. Yet these sites are often lacking in content, out of date, and full of broken links. As the complexity of global interaction evolves with technological advances, it places PICs at a disadvantage. As Kiribati’s Honorary Consul to the United Kingdom, Michael Ravell Walsh, said recently, “covering the angles is a recurring problem if you are a micro-state, purely because of lack of resources and intelligence bandwidth.”[9] The question then becomes how best to invest PICs’ finite capacities toward the most efficient returns. Amplifying this bandwidth—advancing public diplomacy—will require strategic targeting of opportunities and partnerships with regional bodies.

The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) has become the primary regional vehicle for strategic development of late. Yet this is problematic in its own right. Heavily influenced
by Australia, many PICs remain skeptical of the PIF’s ability or interest in building a broader Pacific brand. So where else could PICs provide value to a major political organization? The Commonwealth is one possible answer. As it repositions itself in the Pacific, partnering with PICs on international issues could lend needed legitimacy to the Commonwealth as a geopolitical player and protector of its most vulnerable members.

The Commonwealth

The Commonwealth has been pledging increased commitment to the Pacific for years now. Back in 2010, at the 41st PIF Leaders Meeting in Port Vila, Secretary-General Kamalesh Sharma insisted, “small states’ concerns and needs are the central, powerful heart of the Commonwealth Secretariat’s work.” Following his visit to Kiribati last December, Sharma again outlined the Commonwealth’s “agenda of reform and renewal,” and recognized that it holds “a special responsibility in advocacy in respect of the needs of small and vulnerable states, and in protecting and advancing their interests.” This renewed advocacy role could be pivotal in terms of potential for PICs’ public diplomacy. “The Commonwealth is redefining itself and its relevance now,” according to Papua New Guinean High Commissioner to the United Kingdom Winnie Kiap. “It could become the best advocate for developing member states including the Pacific countries both in the near-term and in the future.”

Still, it is questionable whether the Commonwealth truly sees itself serving this function. It has certainly taken many steps in that direction, including the creation of the Commonwealth Small States Office in Geneva in January 2011. Based in one of the most influential hubs of international development and governance, the offices provide subsidized space for diplomatic missions and delegates from small member states. Tenants currently include the Maldives, Solomon Island and the PIF Secretariat, with others set to move in in the future.

Perhaps more importantly, the Commonwealth has also been partnering with PICs in hosting alternative public events. For example, a Pacific Island Night was recently organized by the Commonwealth Secretariat and held at its headquarters in London. The event featured Pacific Islander designers and featuring Pacific Islander models.

Events like these provide tremendous value to PICs. Presenting Pacific culture to international audiences creates new diplomatic space. Eddie Walsh, President of the Pacific Islands Society, provided the closing address, noting: “It is generally not a lack of interest in the region that is the biggest hurdle for the Pacific Island Countries; instead, it is a lack of familiarization. Through cultural relations, Pacific Island Countries can bridge the geographic divide that separates Pacific Islanders and Europeans and remind the latter of the enduring importance of the Pacific.”

The Commonwealth thus helps PICs gain access to foreign publics in unique ways beyond what they might be able to achieve through traditional diplomatic missions and economic organizations. They create awareness, build relationships, and attract interest. Partnership in promoting cultural events and exchanges should be a primary tool of PICs’ public diplomacy. But they ought to be implemented with strategic objectives in place.

In the case of the Pacific Islands Night, that wasn’t the case and arguably not the intent. Despite hosting over 150 prominent members of the Commonwealth Secretariat, London-based High Commission staff, and the broader UK-based Pacific Island community, there was no promotion of the event beyond a Facebook page. It wasn’t covered as news on the Commonwealth website or listed in its events calendar. This highlights unrealized potential in these types of partnerships and events. While the Commonwealth can be an invaluable partner in PICs’ public diplomacy, a more comprehensive strategy must be envisioned and enacted to ensure this potential is fully realized.

Outlook For The Future

The potential is here. The organizations and institutions are in place. But is the strategic vision? PICs already recognize the need to pool resources and build broader partnerships, but they lack a coordinated and comprehensive public diplomacy strategy that focuses on these types of achievable alternatives to traditional diplomatic efforts. If they cannot provide these themselves, they will seek out partners who can. The question then becomes who these
partners will be. Will it be the PIF and Australia? Will it be the Melanesian Spearhead group led by Fiji? Will it be another former colonial power like the French government? Or will it be something completely new, involving new actors like China? The Commonwealth is uniquely positioned to play this role, but it remains to be seen if this partnership will play out. In the end, if PICs are to join the Pacific Century on a more equal footing, they’ll need a successful public diplomacy strategy in place. Without one, these small island states are just stepping stones as the world’s superpowers hopscotch through the Pacific.

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13. Personal Interview.


15. Online event page posted by photographer:

16. Prepared Closing Remarks of Michael Edward Walsh, President of the Pacific Islands Society, at the event. (Provided to Author)

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A LAVISH WELCOME: RUSSIA’S $21.5 BILLION APEC MEETING AND ‘THE POTEMKIN VILLAGE’ MALAISE

By Stanislav Budnitskiy

While geographically speaking three-quarters of Russia lies in Asia, culturally, politically, economically, and demographically the country is overwhelmingly European. However, in recent years and particularly in 2012 the Kremlin has become increasingly aware of the Asia-Pacific’s significance for Russia’s future development. The annual meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation organization, held in Vladivostok last September, was by far the most prominent of such indicators. The $21.5 billion international forum was also a pronounced reminder of the country’s centuries-long “Potemkin village” tradition, rooted in a culture of excess, corruption, and mismanagement.

Potemkin villages were mock settlements established in the Crimea region by the Russian minister Grigory Potemkin to impress Tsarina Catherine II on her visit to the area in 1787. Whether historically accurate or not, the notion has firmly established itself in the language and has come to mean the construction of a façade—literally or figuratively—to obscure reality. Located nine time zones to the east of the Crimea, Vladivostok’s APEC meeting was its modern-day exemplar: an über-wasteful, propagandistic spectacle without any significant outcomes.

Russia joined APEC during the organization’s latest expansion in 1998. In 2006, Russian leaders put forward a proposal to host the 2012 summit in Vladivostok. The Far Eastern port city of over 600,000 was to be the site of the highest-profile meeting in APEC’s 150-year history. Russia was sending a message—both domestically and internationally—that after two decades of neglect, during which thousands of people migrated from the Eastern to the Western part of Russia in search of a better life, the federal government was at last turning its attention and resources Eastwards.

It was not only a symbolic commitment. Russia’s government was willing to allocate immense investment to the region. While using a mega-event to regenerate Vladivostok’s long-neglected infrastructure was understandable, even laudable, the proposed and ever-increasing sums were staggering. In January 2007, President Vladimir Putin announced that the meeting would cost 100 billion rubles (approximately $3.76 billion) – at the time, three times the regional budget of the whole Primorsky Krai, where Vladivostok is located. At the APEC Sydney press conference in September of the same year, the region’s governor Sergey Darkin announced a new estimate of 147.5 billion rubles ($5.76 billion). In November 2008, a deputy minister of regional development stated that the funds earmarked for the summit would total 284 billion rubles ($10.4 billion).

In the end, according to Russia’s Accounts Chamber, during the 2008-2012 period 689.6 billion rubles ($21.5 billion) were allocated to the construction of summit-related infrastructure and the region’s socio-economic development. Whatever the rationale, the sheer number is astonishing, especially compared to the cost of some previous meetings (see Table 1).

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Vladivostok, Russia</td>
<td>$21.5 billion</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Honolulu, USA</td>
<td>$28 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Yokohama, Japan</td>
<td>$277 million</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
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Table 1. APEC meeting expenditures 2009-2012.

Formally, only 37% (still nearly $8 billion) of the funding came from the federal budget. Informally, most of the remaining expenses were provided by an array of quasi-state corporations, such as Gazprom and Russian Railways, regional budgets, and other state-affiliated sources. The miniscule number of truly private investments was criticized by the Accounts Chamber, which had entertained now-futile hopes that the business community would enthusiastically embrace the grandiose project.

Despite the potential for a full makeover granted by the budget, Vladivostok was only partially spruced up with new or modernized treatment facilities, a water-supply system, an airport building, a campus for the Far Eastern Federal University on Russky Island where the meeting
took place, as well as two major bridges and several highway strips. Among them was the $1 billion Russky Bridge across the Eastern Bosphorus Strait. Hailed as the world’s largest cable-stage bridge, Russky was scandalously washed out during the very first rainfall after its completion. Russia’s blogosphere also had a field day with the $8.5 million spent on a fireworks display to celebrate the end of the summit.

The forum engendered many more shortcomings and violations. Only 23 of the 67 planned infrastructural projects were finished before the summit, prompting Putin to remark that the meeting had taken place at a construction site. The Accounts Chamber revealed major violations in construction-related paperwork of almost all projects. In November 2012, the monitoring body announced that summit-related financial violations amounted to fifteen billion rubles (approximately $47 million), providing evidence which led to the initiation of several high-profile criminal investigations. Only a month later, trying to pacify the tide of criticism that the initial report had generated, the Accounts Chamber reduced the figure to just 8.1 billion rubles worth of violations. The dramatic difference between the two calculations released just a month apart was never fully addressed.

Such organizational mishaps are part of Russia’s broader tendencies in handling mega-events, which are connected to the country’s deeper cultural and historic traditions of costly grandiosity. To recall some of the more recent examples, Eurovision 2009 in Moscow was by far the most expensive in the music competition’s history, until it was surpassed by Azerbaijan in 2012—a telling sign, another major ex-Soviet oil exporter with authoritarian leanings and international image aspirations. Reportedly, Eurovision 2009 cost $42 million, with $30 million coming from the government. Organizers used 30 per cent of the world’s entire stock of LED screens to decorate the performance stage.

The 2014 Winter Olympics, to be held in Russia’s subtropical Black Sea resort of Sochi, offers another case in point. The Games, according to the official estimates of the Olympic preparation commission, will cost Russia $50 billion. The price tag is five times the original estimate, more than the cost of any Olympics to date (the 2008 Beijing Games cost $40 billion and London 2012 $19 billion), and more than the cost of all prior Winter Olympics combined.

Just a year before the Games it is still unclear whether they will be worth the cost. During the numerous major international test events of the 2012-2013 winter season, dozens of visiting sportsmen from across the world poured out their frustration and anger at the catastrophically poor logistics—most notably, tedious waiting at the customs and hotel check-ins—through social networks.

Sochi’s subtropical location as one of Russia’s southernmost cities has forced organizers to begin storing snow a year in advance of the Games, in case the weather is too warm in 2014. It also meant that 85% of the Olympic infrastructure had to be constructed from scratch, since the region had never boasted a culture of winter sports. Maintaining Olympic objects after the Games will require an additional $20 million a year. It is still undecided where the money will come from. Even turning Sochi into a winter tourism Mecca, a hope that government officials nurture, will not guarantee a return on the current extraordinary investments in years to come.

Mega-events, if organized and executed cleverly, can serve as a launching pad for major and long-term tourism and image-building campaigns by a host city or country. Eurovision and the Olympics in particular are hailed as perfect opportunities for embarking on international image-(re)defining endeavors. For instance, Estonia started a full-fledged nation-branding campaign following the Baltic nation’s Eurovision hosting in 2002. Similarly, Greece and Turkey launched major tourism campaigns after hosting Eurovision finals.

But pouring tremendous amounts of money into staging an event does not in itself do the trick—something Moscow has failed to realize time and time again. Such a thoughtless approach also fails to contribute to the nation-building potential of these grand, long-term projects, around which a whole population could rally—an ideal held by many nation-branding proponents.

Moreover, shameless and pointless overspending is bound to breed further mistrust, cynicism, and ridicule among citizens. Thus, within days of Sochi winning the Olympic bid in 2007, the Internet was flooded with sarcastic Olympic logos featuring images of a saw (See Picture 1). The logos played on the term “to saw,” which in Russian slang refers to the process of stealing money by entities involved in government-funded activities and projects.
Will Russia be able to break with this dubious tradition by 2018, when it is set to host the soccer World Cup, and stage the massive event in a clever, considerate, and transparent fashion, making the most of the colossal opportunities it offers both domestically and internationally? Or will it be business as usual? To put the question in the broader context of Russia’s political culture: will the powers that be finally stop paying lip service to the problem of cancerous corruption and start taking meaningful action? Unlike in 1787, the media-saturated environment of the 21st century makes Potemkin villages all too easy to spot.

References and Notes


Since 2012, Stanislav Budnitskiy has been pursuing PhD studies in Communication at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada. Previously, he earned a BA in Business and Political Journalism (2009) and an MA in Media Management (2011) at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Russia. He also hold an MA in Nationalism Studies (2012) from the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. Both of his graduate theses explored various aspects of nation branding. Coming from a journalism background, he has interned and worked as a freelance journalist and producer for the likes of Reuters, The Los Angeles Times, BBC radio and television, CNN International, Showtime, and others. His research interests include, but are not limited to cultural and public diplomacy, cultural economy and creative industries, nationalism and national identity, nation branding. He can always be reached at stanislav_budnitskiy@carleton.ca.
DOMESTIC ANTI-CORRUPTION AS FOREIGN POLICY THROST: A CASE STUDY FROM THE PHILIPPINES

By Lisandro E. Claudio

In August 2010, Benigno ‘Noynoy’ Aquino III—son of former Philippine president Corazon Aquino and anti-dictatorship martyr Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr.—was elected President of the Philippines by a landslide margin. Aquino ran under a strong anti-corruption platform, vowing to clean up government bureaucracy and punish corrupt officials from the previous regime. His campaign slogan ‘kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap’ (without corruption, there will be no poverty) resonated with an electorate that had witnessed one corruption scandal after another unfold during the 9-year presidency of the deeply unpopular Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

Three years after his election, anti-corruption remains the central leitmotif of Aquino’s presidency. It is not just the fulcrum of domestic policy; it is also the discursive foundation of the president’s foreign affairs platform.

In recognition of his efforts, the World Economic Forum Partnering Against Corruption Initiative invited Aquino to deliver a plenary address at Davos. In his address, Aquino confidently noted that:

“We have now ignited a virtuous cycle, where justice breeds the predictability of outcomes; where crimes do not go unpunished, and following the rules has its own rewards. Stability ensues, and stakeholders begin to buy into the system—investors flock in, economic gains are channeled into investments in our people's future such as those in health and education, and the citizenry is empowered to spur further growth.”

This statement reflects the primary goal of Aquino’s foreign policy: to project the Philippines as a country that respects the rule of law and a place conducive to foreign investment. The president has cause for optimism. In the third quarter of 2012, the Philippine economy grew by 7.1%, making it the second fastest-growing economy in Asia, next to China. “The acceleration of domestic demand,” notes the World Bank, “reflects the country’s strong macroeconomic fundamentals, stronger government finances, and high confidence in the Aquino government’s commitment to reform.” Bloomberg predicts that economic growth will continue and that the Philippines will join the ten fastest-growing economies in the world this year. The growth, it adds, has occurred as Aquino increases government spending even while reducing the budget deficit.

The President credits his success to an increase in government transparency. In 2012, for example, the Department of Public Works and Highways saved an estimated 300 million dollars through preventing fund leakages and ensuring more transparent bidding, which encouraged competition among contractors.

Despite these positive indicators, however, a significant portion of economic growth remains contingent on remittances from overseas work. Critics argue that this situation reflects a continued lacuna in domestic employment. The various legal front organizations of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), which have become Aquino’s main critics, view current growth as cosmetic. As the Communist-affiliated Migrante, a group advocating migrant rights, notes, “The Aquino administration, while mouthing local job generation as its core program to eliminate forced migration, continues to hail the ‘remittance bonanza’ to further promote labor export in the attempt to offset the downtrend in growth rate.” Ironically, this position of the far left mirrors that of a small coterie of rightwing pundits, who are against Aquino and support his discredited predecessor. This position negates other reasons for sustained growth (noted earlier), which can be attributed to Aquino’s robust macroeconomic policy and anti-corruption drive.

As extreme as criticisms of Aquino may be, they do have some merit. While the Aquino government views the continued increase of remittances from overseas work as positive (from 1.7 billion dollars in early 2012 to 1.9 billion in early 2013), the country’s dependency on foreign labor raises questions concerning the sustainability of the
country’s growth.[8] Moreover, economic growth remains uneven. 76.5 percent of last year’s growth accrued to the forty richest individuals in the country, and poverty rates remain high.[9]

**Narrating An Anti-corruption Foreign Policy**

The growth of the Philippine economy reflects not only the effects of robust domestic economic policy, it also attests to the resonance of anti-corruption discourse for foreign investors. Much of the growth is driven by the perception of good governance in the country, and this perception is constantly buttressed by Aquino’s pronouncements in fora such as Davos. Aquino’s international economic strategy is based as much on a constructed image as it is on concrete policy (one hesitates to call this an exercise in soft power, as any Filipino is hesitant to describe his/her country as bearing any power). In both local and international settings, Aquino projects his regime as a departure from that of the discredited Arroyo’s. Aquino’s success lies in his ability to establish trust. It is no coincidence that both Aquino’s high domestic popularity mirrors the upgrades in ratings accorded the Philippines by credit rating agencies.

Anti-corruption discourse has a distinct advantage in foreign policy settings: it is above ideology, as nobody will deny that fighting corruption is good economic policy. Unlike leftwing Latin American leaders, for example, who govern economies with historical similarities to the Philippines’, Aquino has not projected himself as an economic nationalist. In fact, the focus on anti-corruption as a means to attract foreign investment signifies Aquino’s clear intention to grow the country through increased international trade. Concomitantly, Aquino has not resorted to critiques of international financial institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, or the WTO to explain the causes of poverty in the Philippines. For the president, it is ultimately corruption that causes underdevelopment. Discussions of the structure of the world economy are irrelevant, at least in the short term.

Aquino’s emphasis on good governance, as such, is not a significant departure from the economic foreign policy of previous post-authoritarian Philippine presidents (from Aquino’s mother, who took office in 1986, to his disgraced predecessor). The Philippines remains committed to economic norms established by international financial institutions.

In domestic policy, Aquino has been surprisingly receptive to a progressive, center-left lobby: he supported legislation to increase taxes on tobacco and alcohol companies in defiance of corporate lobbyists, and he supported a controversial reproductive health bill in defiance of the conservative Catholic Church. This same civil society lobby, however, has not pushed Aquino to the left in terms of international economic policy.

The implications of Aquino’s position on international economics are difficult to determine. So far, Aquino’s non-ideological anti-corruption discourse has allowed him to rally a broad array of groups, both domestically and internationally, to support his programs. The unevenness of the Philippines’ growth, however, may force the president to re-examine the limits of anti-corruption. This re-examination will probably not result in a fundamental repositioning of the Philippines in international geopolitics. If it does occur, it will be through rhetoric acceptable in global foreign policy settings. Aquino is more likely to use the World Bank’s economic buzzwords like ‘inclusive growth’ rather than launch critiques of neoliberalism.

In the short-term, however, Aquino is certain to ride out the success of his current efforts, and the Philippines will continue being the darling of global financial analysts. This is good news for most Filipinos.

**References and Notes**


4. Yap, "Consumer Boom Fuels Philippines as Asian Exports Falter."


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The essence of public diplomacy is to build up a positive relationship with foreign publics in order to create a favorable foreign policy environment. In the theatre of neopolitik,[1] in contrast with that of realpolitik, public diplomacy (PD) aims to influence people’s perception of a selected country through both strategic and dialogic use of soft power. Media visits coordinated by the foreign ministry have been one of the instruments of PD, but being hosted by a government agency has always made journalists wary of being subjects of propaganda.

A major challenge faced by the US and Australia is how best to engage with countries in the Asia Pacific region through PD. Are university media teams in a better position than government agencies to engage with foreign media in order to increase the latter’s knowledge and understanding of the former’s country?

Certainly the university context provides an opportunity to investigate the perceptions of visiting media in order to uncover frames in the minds of the host country, frames being “mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals’ processing of information.”[2]

Introduction To The Action Research Project

The objectives of ECMP were (1) to identify whether and how the individual frames of Australia in participants’ minds become more diverse and how positive framing, or valence, of Australia is affected through an action research project; (2) to observe and record co-investigators’ experiences as participants in the action research project in order to assess project effectiveness as a soft power initiative of a university media team. The project was to be evaluated through noting how participants’ frames of Australia grew to be more comprehensive and testing possible growth in valence for Chinese participants as evidenced by a comparison of pre- and post-program focus group results.

Research Design

Four Beijing-based journalists participated in the project. They were drawn from mainstream national media in Beijing, including a TV station and broadsheets. Two journalists were from CCTV, the only national TV station in China; two others were from People’s Daily, the most influential party newspaper in China. Two of the journalists were in senior positions in their media organizations, while the other two were in middling positions. One TV journalist had expertise in economic coverage and a print journalist had expertise in health reporting. The other two were news professionals with particular interests in politics and culture.

ECMP lasted two weeks in September 2011. During the first week participants were hosted on the MU campus to the northwest of the Sydney Central Business District (CBD). In the second week they were hosted in Ultimo in the Sydney CBD in close proximity to ABC. The first week’s program was largely at MU and the second week’s program was at the ABC. The MU program included a visit to a neighborhood high school and attending interactive workshops on higher degree research (education) and the economy; meeting with senior Australian politicians from the government and opposition in Canberra (politics); undertaking individual interviews with selected scientists (science), visiting the state-of-the-art MU library with its roboticized book retrieval system and the new MU Hospital and Clinic (technology), engaging in
an Aboriginal cultural workshop called the Darug-Anora program and visiting art galleries in Sydney and Canberra (culture). This article reports on the programs held in the first week, though the second focus group was held after the ABC program which would have influenced participants’ perceptions about Australian media.

This project was conducted employing three methods – questionnaires, focus groups and observation – coordinated under the MQ Human Ethics protocol. The main methods were questionnaires and focus groups. There were two rounds of questionnaires for the participants – one before the program started and one after the program concluded. There were eight open-ended questions in relation to the various aspects designed in the questionnaires. Firstly, the coordinator explained the research objectives and gave participants one hour to fill the questionnaires. Secondly, the coordinator encouraged participants to exchange perspectives and experiences from their visit. The coordinator made records of what was said and what she observed during the focus groups as well as all other programs. Recorded data was subjected to content analysis.

### Results

There were eight questions related to their overall perceptions on Australia, their perceptions on media representation, Australian culture, science, technology, education, economic life, and media. The frames contributing to the overall image of Australia in these journalists’ minds before their visit included the following:

- Historical connection with Britain and British influence on education and research in Australia
- Unique nature and landscape
- Great tourism destination
- An ideal place to migrate
- Alliance with the US

The individual frames regarding the overall image of Australia are very similar to the participants’ notions of representation of Australia in the Chinese media. The result clearly shows the absence of alternative frames in these journalists’ minds to those they recall from the Chinese media.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Frames</th>
<th>Pre-visit</th>
<th>Post-visit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Cultural diversity</td>
<td>Multicultural</td>
<td>Multicultural &amp; Aboriginal culture is an ornament of mainstream culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>Aboriginal community has its history</td>
<td>Simple, tasteful lives, different values, loved by Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Advanced, middle level, not outstanding, lag behind</td>
<td>Top, leading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Research tradition</td>
<td>Follow British tradition</td>
<td>Great investment in research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Advanced, nothing special, lag behind</td>
<td>Top, leading, nothing special</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leading fields</td>
<td>Resource-based technological development; computer and software; green technology</td>
<td>Cognition, geology, bio-technology, climate change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Average, top level of education but no advantages</td>
<td>First class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advantages</td>
<td>Creative education at pre-school and primary stages; International teaching resources</td>
<td>Language and education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Features</td>
<td>Different system; diverse; vibrant; inclusive; equal; free; similar to the US and Europe</td>
<td>Good research environment; impressive research ethics; strong research tradition; free academic atmosphere; encourage critical thinking and personal development; simple college life</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Participants | Change (Y/N) | Details
---|---|---
A | Yes | The religion and the concept of family play a crucial role in the development of the country.
B | Yes | Before – ‘A country sitting in a mining car’ and ‘a country riding on sheep’
After- Diverse culture, inclusive personality, capacious and spectacular landscape, super natural environment, simple and friendly interpersonal relation, and admirable life style.
C | Yes | Deepened vision and perception on Australia in a profound way. Learnt about Australia’s foreign policy, its political structure, economic life, cultural diversity, education, beautiful scenery and its friendly people.
D | Somewhat, not completely | Before- culture like UK and the US
After – a mixture of many cultures

Table 1: Representation of Pre- and Post-visit Frames

Table 2: Change in Perceptions
Discussion and Conclusion

Even though the participants were drawn from Chinese national media, the pre-visit frames of Australia in their individual minds were limited and very similar to their recollection of frames in Chinese media.

Table 1 reveals the generic frames in the participants’ individual minds and the differences between the pre-visit and post-visit with regard to culture, science, technology, education, economic life and media. The generic frames of each aspect mainly contain rank, strengths and features. The changes between the pre-visit and post visit are reflected as follows:

1) Frame positivization: For instance, all the journalists formed the view that Australia was a world leader in science in Australia after their visit.

2) Frame diversification: The cognitive structure of journalists in the areas identified in the research has been reformed by their experience during their visit. For instance, the table reveals the impression that the journalists have about several areas such as Australian research ethics, cognition, geology, bio-technology and climate change, areas to which they were exposed in seminars and visits to laboratories and the hospital.

Table 2 shows that all the participants believe that their perceptions about Australia were changed during this short visit; also, it shows that the change was one of positivization.

In conclusion, the research project demonstrates the effectiveness of university-media collaboration in public diplomacy projects that sought to diversify frames in media participants’ minds and increase the valence in specific areas. It should be noted the ECMP sought to expose the visiting journalists to a range of views and to both sides of politics. Australia is an ally of the United States and a trading partner of China. There is enormous scope for US and Australian public diplomacy/soft power centers at universities to collaborate and work on public diplomacy projects that seek to increase knowledge and understanding of their societies by media in the Asia-Pacific region, employing the ECMP model.

References and Notes


3. SPARC inauguration was officially launched in April 2012. The Soft Power and Public Diplomacy Group (SP&PDG), at Macquarie University, the predecessor of SPARC, initiated and conducted this project.

Professor Naren Chitty A.M. is the Inaugural Director of the Soft Power Advocacy & Research Centre (SPARC), Associate Dean (International) of the Faculty of Arts and Foundation Chair in International Communication at Macquarie University. He is the Editor-in-Chief of The Journal of International Communication and has previously served as Secretary-General of the International Association for Media and Communication research. He was a senior public diplomat posted to Washington DC during the Reagan Administration. His current research is in the area of soft power, public diplomacy and international communication. His PhD was in International Relations and was awarded by the School of International Service of the American University in Washington D.C.

Dr Li Ji has completed her doctoral training and research in the field of International Communication at Macquarie University, Australia. Her dissertation is entitled Cooperation and Image in the Climate Change Context: Australia Frames China as an Environmental Actor; it examines environmental images of China in the Australian mainstream media, conceptualizing a new image type and a framework for the evaluation of environmental image in other international contexts and assessing China’s soft power and public diplomacy strategy in Western discourse. Her research interest is in the construction of national image through bilateral and multilateral environmental cooperation, straddling the fields of international communication, international relations and environmental communication. She has published three articles and has a forthcoming book chapter. Dr Li Ji currently lectures at Macquarie University in an MA course on ‘Public Diplomacy and International Public Relations’, and is also attached to the Soft Power Advocacy and Research Centre (SPARC) at the same University.
Branding History

The US pivot to the Pacific Rim is underway.[1] Given events such as the ongoing Arab uprisings, and difficult US relationships with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran, this decision is either farsighted and strategic, or impatient and premature. Certainly the prospect of economic markets and opportunities is prettier in the Pacific than in Peshawar.

In this article we examine American efforts to export democracy and its brand of the liberal international order. We suggest that efforts stray in part because of how leaders think about their own history, and how this in turn affects policymaking across diplomatic, economic, development, and military spheres.

The US’ popular historical narrative is brief: a collapsed timeline along which nothing much of consequence happens between Creation and the American Revolution – itself a Second Creation, with Washington, Jefferson, Adams etc. increasingly venerated as the new apostles. Policymakers view American history through a telescope which has the effect of shortening time. This results in overly optimistic expectations of the potential for other countries to emulate the US. When other countries fail to evolve as quickly as the US (supposedly) did, optimism is replaced by impatience, frustration, dismissal, and a “pivot.”

But what is a realistic timeframe for the nation-building required to create a ‘Western’ liberal democracy? Despite their advantaged position, it took American colonists a generation for the foundations of democracy to be built: from George III becoming king in 1760, through the Revolutionary War and the 1783 Treaty of Paris before they were able to put the Constitution into effect in 1789. And that’s prior to the subsequent years of legislative effort, punctuated by a Civil War, to achieve a modern state and the theoretical equality of all its citizens.

While Walter Russell Mead, Niall Ferguson,[2] and others have documented the historic British influence on the US’ founding, the mainstream American view downplays or outright ignores historical legacies, in particular Britain’s contributing role in creating a US democracy to the US’ supposed instant arrival at mature liberal democracy. The ‘Great Man’[3] theory of politics is regularly supplemented by historians (Ellis, Ferling, Chernow, Beschloss, Meacham, McCullough)[4] chronicling the Revolutionary period, who single out the early founders’ organic genius and perpetuate the myth that democracies are so easily forged. A recent example of this Second Creationism is the emotional debate over gun control – for which all arguments must be referred back to the Founding Fathers and the Constitution. The implication is that nothing binding or worthy of note has been said on the subject either prior to or since the Second Amendment.

Turning the question on its head, how well did the US import its brand of democracy? Less revolution and more evolution, the Founding Fathers inherited a suite of centuries-old institutions and traditions from imperial Britain – the Magna Carta, habeas corpus, a parliamentary system that evolved through the English Civil War and Restoration, the Bill of Rights, a liberal international order already in the making, protected sea lanes, security from external threat, a spirit of commercialism, individualism, and rationality, and a gentrified political class able to dabble in politics and ideas. In short, the U.S. was handed the tools – intellectual, institutional, historical – as well as the time to develop, and so hit the ground running on the way to a functioning liberal democracy.

By contrast, the exceptionalist myth of America’s founding by an ‘assembly of demigods’[Thomas Jefferson’s description of the Constitutional Convention] hinders the application of ‘smart power’[5] today, undermining American credibility, the ability to promote American values abroad, and efforts to achieve preferred outcomes. This narrative is fine for domestic consumption, but distorts thinking, strategies, and outcomes when incorporated into foreign policy, especially the exporting and enabling of democracy and a prescriptive international order. As the US has learned, it is difficult or impossible to replicate its own narrative any-
where else (viz. Iraq, Afghanistan where full regime change was undertaken, but even in success stories like Japan post-1945).

America’s uniqueness was originally described by outsiders like de Tocqueville and Voltaire,[6] and has been embraced by policymakers of all political stripes to this day, including President Obama.[7] Neo-conservatives employ the term to imply superiority: ‘A shining city on a hill.’[8] This creates an inherent contradiction to U.S. foreign policy goals revolving around democracy: exceptionalism is, by definition, unique, and therefore cannot be exported or replicated. Nicolas Bouchet put this in a different way recently: “The seemingly paradoxical idea of a state being exceptional by virtue of uniquely being built on universal principles is central to understanding the idealist tendency in US foreign policy, as the urge to reconstruct international order and other states is usually labelled”[9] (emphasis is the author’s).

The American Revolution was less a singular creationist event, and more an evolutionary waypoint that began with the arrival of European settlers and what they brought with them. The US should acknowledge its debt of inheritance at founding. If this were conceded, the country might become less exceptional in the eyes of some but more sympathetic in the eyes of others: an identifiable and admittedly senior peer amongst nations, a more effective, better understood combination of origins and values in a globalized, increasingly interdependent world.

**Branding Foreign Policy**

The United States is a Pacific nation. Tired of waiting for Kabul to cram several hundred years of evolution into a decade, it seems the new focus is leaning towards Beijing. This latest foreign policy pivot is towards greener pastures. The US hopes to influence the circumstances of the liberal international order, the thinking being a rising tide should lift all boats, provided the US remains the biggest afloat.

Views on the future of American power range from declinist on its own merits or because of the rise of rivals, to varying shades of plucky optimism. Designed to sell books through either comfort or alarmism, implicit is that what matters most is whether the US remains no. 1. The Indian Ocean is interesting, but really only as it relates to the United States 7,000 miles away.

China, the other BRIC nations, and the EU each hold national, regional and economic power, but have not assumed the burden of global responsibility the U.S. bears. To many, the fear and responsibility that drive American power and interests seem self-inflicted. The Cold War and the brief era of ‘the global policeman’ are long gone. So what benefits and risks does American pre-eminence bring to itself? What preferred outcomes accrue that wouldn’t if America assumed a lesser role? Freed of fear and responsibility, what would America do? Is engagement necessary on anything other than economic and diplomatic terms?

In 2011’s *Future of Power*, Joseph Nye concedes that American economic and cultural power will decline somewhat this century, at the same time that the power resources of state and non-state actors rise.[10] He promotes a strategy that would invoke power held mutually with others, rather than over others, to accomplish U.S. goals. This is welcome, but seems to run counter to the exceptionalism practiced in reality, with America acting outside international norms and organizations when it chooses to. UAV/drone missile strikes on shaky legal grounds are only the latest example.

Legitimacy is key to effective communication, as are words backed by action. Extralegal smart power is almost an oxymoron. Outside of the US, young people still covet US dollars, a student or immigration visa to the US, a job in Silicon Valley or failing that, at least an Apple product. Unseen US activities remain in high demand, including US Navy protection of seaways and maintenance of free skies and cyberspace, keeping open lines of communication and the circumstances of globalization. By contrast, force-feeding democracy, American institutions or traditions accomplishes the least-desirable ends of soft power—it repels rather than attracts.

There’s a sense that America has lost its leadership role, that it is not doing a good job at one of its historic competencies: managing. A loss of power manifests in a loss of relevance. Sophisticated information audiences can see hard and soft power are working against each other, canceling out any possible gains. If you live in Sierra Leone, Argentina or Vietnam, there are growing indigenous sources of inspiration and information, as well as competition from other emerging markets.

We would stress the need for indigenous customization of democratizing initiatives: local finishing of concepts or products developed elsewhere. Just as the US took British institutions, traditions, and values and adapted them to the colonies, people elsewhere now use American-designed iPhones to improve their lives, foster progress, change, coordinate revolutions, and build free markets. Despite the factory-issued packaging, these products are only half-finished when they arrive in the hands of the consumer. They are tools, to be shaped to local uses. Give people the tools and they will decide the message.

Anyone who’s travelled to Africa recently knows that the mobile phone is being put to uses unheard of as yet in
the West – for example, the growth of mobile money and mobile health (mHealth) applications. Rising education and income levels mean people from indigenous cultures are able to shop, screen, import, and adapt concepts, institutions, and tools from an array of sources, not only America. The US is one possible example of a successful democracy, but not the only one; the American historical experience and democratic model is a starting-point, not a ‘how-to’ book for other countries.

US foreign policymakers might re-assess the complex and lengthy lineage of America’s distinctive values, focusing on the long evolution, multiple influences and near-term adaptability that took place, rather than on the gilded legacy of a few good men. By doing so, they will perhaps be better equipped to understand, assess and advise on the effect of diverse origins on other aspiring countries, themselves going through their own unique, imperfect evolutions.

References and Notes


8. The term believed to have been employed first in the American context by Massachusetts colonist John Winthrop in a 1630 sermon; used subsequently on various occasions but popularized by President Ronald Reagan during his terms in office.


Alexander Wooley is a Professional Communicator and former British Royal Navy officer. An MA graduate (2005) of Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program, he spent the subsequent six years in Washington, DC working for clients in public diplomacy, defense, and international development.

Tom Perigoe is a Canadian whose career includes roles in both the private and public sectors. He holds a B. Comm. (Major in Management) from Sir George Williams University. His interest in history has caused him to think about the comparison between the cumulative history that benefits us and the immediacy of democratic expectations for other countries in political flux. The views expressed here are personal.
book reviews
The leading figure in China’s public diplomacy, Zhao Qizheng, has previously published books about public diplomacy from a Chinese perspective. Zhao’s latest publication is a collection of his dialogues on public diplomacy with political leaders, academics, journalists, and practitioners from South Korea, the US, and Japan. Also included are a few of Zhao’s recent speeches which address the definition and practice of China’s public diplomacy.

One of the major themes Zhao addresses is the misconception of China in the international community. He claims that this is the key problem and the biggest challenge for China’s public diplomacy, and mentions this topic in almost all of the dialogues in the book. Zhao thinks that cultural barriers, the difference between political systems, and imbalanced media coverage are the major factors contributing to the misunderstanding between China and the Western world. The best way to solve this problem, according to Zhao, is to expand international exchange programs between Chinese and Americans, especially for young people, because they are crucial to both countries’ futures.

A majority of the dialogues occurred during a trip by a delegation from the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) to the United States, led by Zhao in 2011. In those dialogues, Zhao and the American foreign affairs leaders he met with agreed that public diplomacy is an important channel through which both China and America should address their foreign policy goals in the coming years. Moreover, they all believed that public diplomacy would help to reduce the mistrust between China and America.

In his conversations with academics, Zhao recognizes that there are various definitions of public diplomacy in different countries and among different people. He believes it is important for people in this field to exchange ideas in order to develop the field better. In his dialogue with professors from the USC Annenberg School of Communication and Journalism, Zhao outlined his own definition of public diplomacy as “all cross-cultural communication involving the public, whether they are active participants or passive receivers, to present the national conditions of their country to the people of another country.”

During a conversation with Nicholas D. Kristof from the New York Times, Zhao discuss sensitive issues for journalism in China. Despite the fact that there are no restrictions on question topics, Zhao feels that the foreign journalists do not ask enough questions. He encourages journalists to attend his next press conference and ask questions because “the more sensitive the issue is, the more necessary it becomes to receive coverage.” Zhao also suggests that there are differences in cultural and political aspects that can’t be overcome. But through friendly discussion between the Chinese officials and foreign journalists, they can reach “limited consensus” to mutually accept each other’s opinion on certain issues.

In these dialogues, Zhao points out that China’s public diplomacy is still in its infancy. There is a long way to go for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the CPPCC and other organizations, to find the right direction for China’s public diplomacy.

For those who are interested in understanding China’s approach to public diplomacy, this book will serve as a good starting point. However, some of the themes and content are repeated throughout the dialogues. It is not as thorough as one would expect, but it will give readers a sense of the Chinese understanding of public diplomacy and its direction.

References and Notes

1. Page 185
2. Page 85
3. Page 89

Yu (Amy) Zheng is a Master’s of Public Diplomacy student at USC. From Chengdu, China, she has been studying in America for the past four years. Her experience as an intern at the National Council for International Visitors at Washington D.C. during summer 2012 inspired her interest in international exchange. Currently, she is a CPD researcher intern on the Cultural Underbelly of Public Diplomacy project. Her responsibility is managing an online blog about the role of culture in public diplomacy, especially the impact of misunderstanding of people from different cultures on public diplomacy.
THE GREAT CONVERGENCE:
ASIA, THE WEST, AND THE
LOGIC OF ONE WORLD
AUTHOR: KISHORE MAHBUBANI

Reviewed by Lauren Madow

Kishore Mahbubani is a Professor of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore and served as a Singapore diplomat for several decades, beginning in the 1970s. The Great Convergence is a book about global concepts—the ‘global village’, global governance, a global economy—but Mahbubani uses his own life story to frame his central argument: an increasingly multipolar international system is the new reality, and Western powers clinging to an outdated system in which the “West is best” will suffer grim consequences down the road.

One of the book’s central arguments depicts a “population divergence and income convergence,” which has caused more and more of the world’s population to converge in the middle class. Mahbubani experienced this trend personally growing up in 1950s Singapore: “Singapore was then a British colony. No one believed that Singapore could become as prosperous as London. Yet the unthinkable happened. Now this ‘impossible’ feat is being replicated in all corners of the world.” Mahbubani argues that this convergence has reduced suffering by lifting millions out of poverty, decreasing violence, opening access to education, and establishing a set of globally shared values.

Though he is convinced that the West will eventually embrace “one world logic,” Mahbubani is well aware of entrenched state resistance to global governance, having witnessed it firsthand during his stint representing Singapore at the UN. “To put it bluntly,” he states, “humanity lacks both the imagination and the courage to deliver bold new solutions” that would allow for a collective reconception of global order. Until we get there, Mahbubani suggests, we should direct our energy toward strengthening the UN, ASEAN and other cooperative transnational institutions.

The Great Convergence is a survey of Mahbubani’s takes on major global issues, neatly divided into lists and sub-lists (chapters include “Seven Global Contradictions” and “A Theory of One World,” composed of Four Pillars). His style is simple and jargon-free, in accordance with his absolute belief in openness and transparency. Mahbubani’s frustration with leaders who do not share this belief in openness is evident throughout the book and his chief complaint, unsurprisingly, is with the US.—though China scores several mentions in this arena as well. He points to the US’ reliance on sanctions in Iran as an example of wrong-headed, isolating policy which only breeds resentment. A superior, though slower, strategy would be to open to and engage with Iran, particularly through inviting Iranian students to study in the West. Likewise, Mahbubani credits Myanmar’s increasingly open society partly to ASEAN’s continued engagement with the state, offering its leaders exposure to relatively democratic practices through attending ASEAN conferences.

Mahbubani is a fair critic, unwilling to idealize or demonize any institution or actor. He provides an exhaustive supply of data to support his ideas and offers concrete suggestions for improving faulty global governance mechanisms. The Great Convergence amounts to a powerful argument that although acknowledging shifts in global power dynamics may be anathema to the West, continued denial of a converging world could eventually lead to its downfall.

Lauren Madow is a journalist and documentary filmmaker. She is a regular contributor to Global Post, a researcher at the Knight Program for Media and Religion, and an Executive Producer at Neon Tommy. She is currently pursuing her Master's in Public Diplomacy at USC.
endnote
The Winter 2014 issue of Public Diplomacy magazine will focus on perhaps the tastiest form of diplomacy that exists—gastrodiplomacy. More than just good food, gastrodiplomacy is one of the most effective ways to promote cross-cultural understanding to a wide variety of audiences. To start off the conversation, Public Diplomacy Magazine interviewed Silvia Kofler, the Spokesperson and Head of Press and Public Diplomacy Delegation of the European Union to the United States on the role gastrodiplomacy plays in the EU Delegation’s public diplomacy strategy. Ms. Kofler shared the ways that food is used to express the rich diversity of the EU, and how it encourages further cultural engagement between the EU and the United States. We look forward to furthering this discussion in our next issue.

PD Mag: The EU Delegation to the US. represents the EU as a united entity, in addition to most of the EU member countries having their own formal representation. How does the EU Delegation function alongside member states’ representation?

We are a full-fledged diplomatic mission, and we represent the European Union in dealings with the US government in areas that are part of the EU’s remit.

For example, the EU has exclusive jurisdiction and speaks on behalf of the Member States in areas like customs, trade policy, and antitrust rules, so the Delegation takes the lead in these areas.

On the other hand, we share jurisdiction with our Member States in areas like the internal market, agriculture, the environment, consumer protection, transport, and energy, so we work in these areas in close collaboration with our Member State Embassies and Consulates in the US.

On a daily basis, we present and explain EU actions to the US. Administration, Congress, and other stakeholders; we actively engage with political actors, the media, academia, business, and civil society; and we raise awareness of EU issues and concerns, and promote the importance of the EU-US. relationship with the American public.

PD Mag: What is the role of public diplomacy in the EU Delegation to the United States’ mission?

It is key to our mission, because our goal is to use public diplomacy to enhance and open the transatlantic relationship beyond the policy arena. Because public diplomacy offers a powerful tool to promote understanding with the broader public as well as with governments, it is essential to building the mutual understanding and long-term relationships between partners like the EU and the US.

Our specific public diplomacy initiatives include media relations (including social media), visitors’ programs, academic programs, grants, cultural events, and long-term relationship-building programs, to name just a few. Gastrodiplomacy is a relatively new area for us, but one where there is substantial opportunity for growth.

PD Mag: Gastrodiplomacy is often defined differently by different actors. What is the EU Delegation’s definition of ‘gastrodiplomacy’?

I think we can all agree that gastrodiplomacy is the art of sharing the authentic experience of a country or a region through its cuisine. In almost every culture, in all traditions, sharing a meal is about building relationships, whether social, business, or diplomatic, and that is why it is such a good fit with more traditional public diplomacy tactics. It builds upon what is already a natural act to achieve a level of mutual understanding.

PD Mag: How can gastrodiplomacy help promote
culture and increase understanding of the EU?

The EU's motto is 'United in Diversity,' and European gastrodiplomacy exemplifies that. How better to celebrate the differences in our 27—soon to be 28—member countries than by sampling cuisines from lands that stretch to the furthest corners of the European continent? Whether you first encounter a savory squid dish in Portugal, a Karpathy fish fillet in Hungary, Bigos in Poland, or a Tyropitta cheese pie in Greece, culinary diversity enriches not only meals, but knowledge of the many cultures in Europe.

PD Mag: How does the EU Delegation to the US use gastrodiplomacy to promote European culture and customs to Americans?

All of our EU Member States are justifiably proud of their culinary heritage, and we at the Delegation want to draw attention to their valuable contributions to European gastrodiplomacy whenever possible through joint events.

For example, every year on the closest Saturday to Europe Day (May 9)—the EU’s ‘national day’—the Delegation and the Embassies of the EU Member States open their doors to the public as part of our annual EU Open House event. An important part of these festivities is always the refreshments, which generally showcase a country’s signature cuisine.

Another annual event is Washington's Euro Night, a public event where EU Member State Embassies spotlight their culture, history, and music, and feature some of the best of their culinary heritage.

Gastrodiplomacy can also be about giving back. Last year, the Delegation arranged to have our Ambassador's chef collaborate with the chef at a local homeless shelter to craft and sponsor a meal for around 200 chronically homeless guests. Our staff, including the Ambassador, even helped serve the meal.

PD Mag: What are some gastrodiplomacy initiatives that you have recently undertaken?

Our flagship gastrodiplomacy initiative is our Delegation cookbook, "What's on the mEnU?,” which is designed to not only share the wealth of cuisines of our EU Member States, but also highlight the closeness of the transatlantic relationship through a collection of European and American recipes contributed by the Delegation staff.

Both diplomats from EU countries and locally recruited members of our team put their best culinary feet forward, providing recipes that specifically reflected their nationality, state, or region. We are a very transatlantic staff here in the Delegation, and the cookbook has been both a bonding and enlightening experience—public diplomacy close to home within the Delegation.

We also have used gastrodiplomacy to highlight key policy areas. For example, in 2012, the EU and the US signed an Organic Trade Agreement that ensures mutual recognition of organic food standards. In order to raise awareness of this achievement, we hosted an organic luncheon buffet on Capitol Hill and invited small European and American companies to provide samples of their organic food and drink. We had an organic buffet lunch for approximately 200 attendees, including officials from Congress, the US. Administration, and EU and Member State diplomats.

PD Mag: With the EU comprised of so many distinct cultures, how does the delegation ensure that all that are represented 'at the table' for official functions?

Sometimes we have to get very creative! One of my favorite examples is from our formal celebration on December 10, when the EU was officially awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The buffet at the event featured an enormous bûche de Noël, which featured the flags of all 27 of our Member States in addition to the flag of the European Union.

On Europe Day, Member State Embassies showcase their particular cuisine...and not just "national" dishes, but culinary specialties from various regions. What an outsider might consider to be national cuisine, is really a collection of regional traditions and practices.

Where I come from in far northern Italy, very close to Austria, has its own regional cuisine. Our version of dumplings, or Knödel, are comparable to the Canederli found in other parts of Italy. But our recipe, although closer to what is found in Austria, nevertheless uses olive oil, an ingredient more closely associated with Mediterranean cuisine. Regional cuisine can be a surprisingly tasty blend of different traditions.

PD Mag: People often associate certain foods with
specific European countries. How do you think gastrodiplomacy can be used to present Europe as a more cohesive entity?

The many different cultures and culinary traditions and techniques in Europe are an enormous asset for the EU. Broadly speaking, much of the originality and success of the EU stems from our ability to respect the varied and intertwined traditions of our Member States, while forging common rules that guarantee peace, stability, and prosperity. This holds true in terms of our cuisine as well as in many other areas, all of which contribute to a shared European heritage.

PD Mag: Gastrodiplomacy can run the risk of contributing to cultural stereotypes (Italian pasta, Spanish paella, French baguettes, etc.). How do you make sure that the EU Delegation’s gastrodiplomacy initiatives encourage understanding member states rather than “feeding into” stereotypes?

In this case, stereotypes can be attractive, not negative. EU Member States are justifiably proud of their individual culinary traditions and frequently promote them (Belgian chocolates, Dutch cheese, and French pastries, for example).

Through our joint events, we help facilitate and enhance individual Member State efforts to showcase their specialties. In addition, our cookbook includes a wide array of both traditional and non-traditional recipes for national specialties.

But today, contemporary European cuisine is creative and innovative and goes well past traditional stereotypes. Italian pasta is not simply Italian pasta, but instead reflects specialized regional preparations, as is the case with the dried squid ink pasta that is black in color and available in the region around Venice.

European cuisine also incorporates the culinary evolution that promotes sustainability—using seasonal products available locally whenever possible. And many dishes are fusions of various regional culinary traditions.

For example, Noma Restaurant, in Copenhagen, is considered by some as the world’s best restaurant. Noma’s philosophy is stated on its website: "In an effort to shape our way of cooking, we look to our landscape and delve into our ingredients and culture, hoping to rediscover our history and shape our future."

PD Mag: Does gastrodiplomacy play an important role in the nation-branding of European countries?

I believe so. By drawing attention to the best of its cuisine, any nation or region promoting its brand can positively influence an audience, especially on the European continent, which has a particularly rich history of local and specialized agricultural production.

You may have heard of Geographical Indications (GIs)—forms of identification that certify that a product has originated in a region or locality in a particular country. In this case, the reputation for quality or authenticity of a product is intimately linked to its geographical origin, and over the years European countries have taken the lead in identifying and protecting their Geographical Indications.

European GIs include Cognac, Roquefort cheese, Scotch whisky, Sherry, Parmigiano Reggiano, and Tuscany olives. Incidentally, the US. also has its own GIs: for example, Napa Valley wines are protected by Geographic Indications.

PD Mag: The UNESCO Mediterranean diet has been getting a lot of positive attention lately. Does the EU have any plans for using this to promote regional gastrodiplomacy?

Many of the EU’s southern countries are already associated with the Mediterranean diet. However, whether or not this specific diet is promoted, the EU strongly advocates healthy eating, good nutrition, and physical activity to combat the rising obesity trend in the developed world.

PD Mag: What role does gastrodiplomacy play at State Banquets?

Because of our unique status, the EU doesn’t hold the type of state dinner that would take place at the White House, for example, where specific regional cuisine is typically featured.

But Member State cuisine, including regional interpretations, is showcased at events like Europe Day.

PD Mag: Looking forward, what role do you see for gastrodiplomacy and other culturally-based engagement initiatives?

Cultural engagement is a very effective way to enrich relationships and move them forward. Looking at gastrodiplomacy, nothing is more human than sitting down and sharing a tasty meal. What better way to experience another culture in a tangible fashion than by sampling its cuisine?

The same can be said for other types of cultural engagement. You can learn a great deal about a culture through its art, its music, and its theater.

Endnote


Silvia Kofler is a veteran public diplomat who has worked in some of the most dynamic media centers in Europe, Asia, and North America. Currently, she serves as the Spokesperson and Head of Press and Public Diplomacy at the Delegation of the European Union to the United States, where she oversees media relations, public outreach, academic and cultural programs, long-term relationship building initiatives, and information products and services. Prior to joining the EU Delegation in Washington, Ms. Kofler spent four years leading press, public, and cultural affairs at the European Commission Delegation in Tokyo. During her time in Japan, she was instrumental in launching an education program that reached more than 50,000 Japanese schoolchildren. From 2004 until 2006, Ms. Kofler was posted in Brussels, where she streamlined communications efforts regarding EU trade policy.

Ms. Kofler also headed press and information operations at the European Commission Delegation in Moscow, where she was posted from 2000 until 2004. While in Russia, she helped create a permanent symbol of the links between St. Petersburg and European countries through the establishment of St. Petersburg’s “European Walkway,” commemorating the city’s 300th anniversary. Ms. Kofler first joined the European Communities in Brussels in 1992, working on development policy issues for EU Council of Ministers before moving to the Council’s press office. From 1994 to 2000, she attended every meeting of both the EU Foreign Ministers and the EU Finance Ministers, giving her unique insight into the workings of the European integration process at ministerial level.

Ms. Kofler launched her career in 1986 in the banking centers of Luxembourg and Milan, where she became an authority on ECU bond markets. She studied law in Austria (Innsbruck) and Italy (Padua) before earning a degree in international law from the University of Padua. Ms. Kofler was born into a German-speaking family in the Italian Dolomites and speaks five EU languages fluently. She is also fluent in Russian.
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