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Its unique mission is to provide a common forum for the views of both scholars and practitioners from around the globe, in order to explore key concepts in the study and practice of public diplomacy. PD is published bi-annually, in print and on the web at www.publicdiplomacymagazine.org.

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As an organization, APDS seeks to promote the field of public diplomacy as a practice and study, provide a forum for dialogue and interaction among practitioners of public diplomacy and related fields in pursuit of professional development, and cultivate fellowship and camaraderie among members. For more information please visit www.uscapds.org.

Renewable resources were used to produce this publication. As a result, a donation to America’s Forests of forty trees was made on behalf of the Master of Public Diplomacy Program at the Annenberg School. This was made possible by Public Diplomacy Magazine’s participation in the Green Print Alliance.
The word Innovation is commonly defined with notions linked with generating ideas, a process in which the newest idea tends to superpose the older one; it also makes reference to the organizing process of inventions, a necessary circuit of knowledge leading to productivity.

However, this cover is inspired in the inherent complementarity within the process of innovation. For the latter to be ignited, the encounter between one idea, which is usually the one in practice, and a second idea, which supposedly comes to existence to improve and finally replace the former idea, is a sine qua non condition. Thinking of innovation as this infinite series of encounters, leads us to consider the need of an opposite idea. The recognition of the latter and the progress it has engendered, suggests assembling puzzle pieces. This is where ultimately the complementary aspect of innovation lies.
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FROM THE EDITORS

Issue 8, Summer 2012

The problem with predictions made by futurists, according to astrophysicist Neil de Grasse Tyson is that they’re frequently extrapolated from current trends. Decades ago the popular imagination (and popular fears) may have been fueled by the prospect of giant mainframe computers that would monopolize control and transform 1984 into 1984. Look back through the annals of technological prediction and it is possible to see such visions of the future as skies full of personal zeppelins. In the 1970s retrofuturism, the art of depicting the future as envisioned in the past, came into vogue, perhaps fostered by a growing maturity about the inherent challenges of predicting a future that is still decades or centuries out.

Our original inclination in deciding on a theme for the Summer Issue of “Public Diplomacy Magazine” was to probe the future of public diplomacy; but we decided that the future generations whose mores we were about to characterize would be better served by a focus that was at once narrower and broader. The theme “Innovations in Public Diplomacy” is narrower because it focuses on emerging trends that may or may not have an impact on what Dickinson College President Bill Durden calls “a world that does not yet exist.” Yet, it is also broader, in part because it doesn’t confine itself to fanciful predictions or a honed vision of a potential future but instead is open to the cornucopia of current developments that are shaping public diplomacy going forward.

What a cornucopia it is. Paul Levinson captures the zeitgeist of public diplomacy with his argument that everyone is a diplomat in the digital age. He argues “[J]ust as authors communicate indirectly to the public through editors who decide whether or not and how to publish the work, so the voters influence policy by electing representatives who in fact make the policy.” The digital media of the late 20th and 21st centuries have fostered the rise of what Manuel Castells calls “mass self communication,” the ability of the individual to interact directly with billions of fellow human beings. That ability, analogous more to participatory democracy than representative government, has made governments of all types more porous and helped foster the rise of public diplomacy in all its permutations.

Globalization and the interdependence of the world’s financial markets and political systems raise their own diplomatic questions. Mai’a Davis Cross asks, for example, “whether the European Union (EU) is becoming a credible security actor capable of contributing to global stability” as “influential diplomatic actors” move toward greater integration. Steffen Bay Rasmussen notes that public diplomacy is critical to the European Union since the European Union is “a new kind of political entity based on the redefinition of sovereignty in Europe,” its “public diplomacy faces a communicative challenge which the nation states do not.”

Much has been made of the increasing role of non-state actors in a globalizing world, but what of sub-states? In the opinion of Ellen Huijgh, “they bridge the gap between state and non-state actors.” Political entities such as the American states, the Canadian and Italian provinces, Belgian communities, Swiss cantons, Spanish and Czech regions, Scotland and Greenland have all become players in the give and take of public diplomacy.

www.publicdiplomacymagazine.org
Challenges remain. Jaehyang So states that while governments have made significant progress in achieving the Millennium Development Goal of halving the number of people without access to safe drinking water and 89% of the global population has access to same, there are regional inequalities. Nevertheless, some innovative approaches are being tested to address the challenges of the 21st century. So describes a Water-Hackathon, developed by the World Bank and the Water and Sanitation Program following a model set by Random Hacks of Kindness, a partnership involving NASA, Google, Yahoo!, Microsoft, HP and the World Bank. Brendan Ballou describes how Google Ideas brought together former terrorists and gang leaders, along with academics, activists and leaders in the public and private sectors, to try to understand why people join and leave violent groups.

Mark C. Donfried argues that cultural diplomacy is underutilized as part of a multi-level strategy that “can complement other, more traditional ways of increasing security (military measures or increased access to intelligence), by means of exposing and challenging destructive ideologies.” Maytha Alhassen explores the power of music in public diplomacy through a cultural envoy and musical exchange program called “Hip Hop Ambassadors,” launched by Remarkable Current, an American musician collective. Cari E. Guittard lists water, women, entrepreneurs, emerging markets and economic development as corporate diplomacy trends for 2012 and explores areas of research she says can help women succeed globally.

Advances in technology afford new opportunities and present new ethical dilemmas. Former President Jimmy Carter’s critique of the Obama Administration’s use of drones is a case in point. As Pamela Falk notes, drones both familiar and fanciful are bound to become more ubiquitous in domestic life as well as military conflict, prompting new questions about civil liberties. Ali Fisher argues that the increasing ubiquity of big data will create its own challenges and opportunities for public diplomats as the relationship of content producer to target audience is replaced by the last three feet between communities of participants and potential collaborators.

Any analysis of public diplomacy or technology must take into account the potential for unintended consequences, since both involve interventions in complex systems. The question is whether some of those consequences are truly unintended or whether they are simply less obvious. Case in point: the universe as public diplomacy. Neil deGrasse Tyson agrees with an interviewer’s assertion that American public diplomacy reached its zenith during the Apollo 11 mission, which put human beings on the Moon for the first time. More importantly, he argues that doubling NASA’s budget could help to recreate a culture of innovation, a dimension of identity that has been a signature part of the role of the U.S. in the global economy.

His assertions and those of our other contributors highlight one fairly certain prediction about the future: public diplomacy will be of increasing importance in the years and decades to come.

And speaking of the future, stay tuned for the Winter Issue, which will probe an aspect of public diplomacy that uses the extremes of human potential to unite the planet: sports diplomacy.

If “all the world’s a stage”, as Shakespeare asserted, public diplomats are some of its most influential players. Game on.
In Memoriam

All of us at “PD Magazine” mourn the untimely passing of Staff Editor Elgin Stafford. His enthusiasm, intellect and infectious smile will be sorely missed.
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By Jerry Edling
We once lived in a world in which all communication was oral and anyone could communicate any time he or she pleased. Unfortunately, that kind of communication only worked among people with physical proximity. Also, since there was no record of the discussion, the only way people who were not physically present could be apprised of the conversation would be by spoken accounts, which were ever subject to the vagaries of memory and the potential for deception. Diplomacy, such as it was in those days, was entirely dependent on words in the mouths of emissaries.

The introduction of writing stabilized the process by committing information to communiques. The infinitely malleable word of mouth was replaced by words fixed on papyrus, parchment, and paper. Democracy also became more feasible in this early literate environment, as written laws supplemented and supplanted the mercurial pronouncements of leaders. But even in this world of writing, diplomacy was still dependent on the speed at which emissaries could travel from place to place. Roman viae and the Silk Road were as much conduits of information as of goods and services.

The printing press disseminated information to millions of people in the world at large, but did little to change the need for emissaries traveling by the fastest possible physical means. Whether handwritten or printed, the document in hand was dependent on the horse, wheel, rail, or sail for delivery. Printing, however, did become a foundation for representative democracy, as newspapers and books engendered an educated public which could vote with some knowledge of the issues. There is an analogy between the workings of printed media and representative democracy: just as authors communicate indirectly to the public via editors who decide whether or not and how to publish the work, so the voters influence policy by electing representatives who in fact make the policy.

The advent of electronic media in the 19th and 20th centuries finally eliminated diplomacy’s utter dependence on physical speed. Although the diplomat himself was still reliant on the speed of air flight, information could now be conveyed at the speed of light. The telegram and the hotline became the common and ultimate diplomatic tools. Electronic media, however, further concentrated the power of gatekeepers—or editors—of the news, and supported not only democratic but also totalitarian government. FDR and Hitler, Churchill and Stalin; each made effective
use of radio. And in the second half of the 20th century, television was a mainstay of politics in the USSR as well as the USA.

All of that would change in the 21st century, with the advent of media that allowed anyone and everyone to communicate with anyone and everyone in the world, wherever the communicator happened to be.

The New Diplomat

Until the advent of Facebook (2004), YouTube (2005), Twitter (2006), and the first smart phone (2007), any person desirous of getting her or his ideas out into the world was at the mercy of an editor or producer. The communicator, in other words, had to be certified or authorized prior to the communication. Similarly, the diplomat had to be appointed as such and instructed as to what to communicate.

The rise of the personal computer and the first digital systems available for personal and public use in the 1980s began to change the traditional editorial (in media) and representative (in politics) regimes. But until the marriage of the Internet to mobile technology—the smart phone—the author liberated from editing was still obliged to be in a fixed location to communicate to the world. This created its own kind of buffer to immediate and unmediated reporting. And until the rise of social media, the opportunities on the Web for placement of unmediated communication were relatively few and far between.

I think social media are better described as “new new” media because all media - including newspapers which we may talk about and TV shows that we watch with friends, family, and colleagues - are inherently social. But Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter are “new new” rather than “new,” because new media such as Amazon, iTunes, and The New York Times online by and large still operate via traditional gatekeeping methods. John Q or Mary J Writer cannot put a text or song up on iTunes, or The New York Times site at the instant they may want to, and, in most cases, not at all.

Consider, in contrast, Wael Ghonim, whose Facebook page helped trigger the Egyptian part of the Arab Spring in early 2011. Ghonim was a Google employee, but he did not need Google’s or any editor’s or government’s permission to start his anti-Mubarak Facebook page. He needed only his own initiative. He became a new kind of diplomat, and his communiques had more impact on the world than did those of all the duly authorized diplomats at the time.

Direct Democracy in The Global Village

The Arab Spring would reach some 17 countries by 2012, with mixed results. The path of true revolution never did run smooth. But the dynamic of ‘everyone a diplomat’ soon reached democracies as well as dictatorships, in every part of the world.

I first got wind of this more widespread Spring in Barcelona, at the end of May 2011, where I was giving a keynote address about the relevance of Marshall McLuhan and his notion of the global village in understanding the Arab Spring. In the evenings, my wife and I noticed protesters on La Rambla, a main, bustling thoroughfare in Barcelona. I asked my hosts what the protests were about. The economy, perhaps? Not really, I was told. The protests were about the inadequacies of the Spanish
democratic government itself, and the need for more effective democracy. I was seeing the Indignatos, the first stirring of what would come to be known in a few months as Occupy Wall Street or the Occupy movement: a resurgence of direct democracy which most famously had held sway in ancient Athens, in a world in which speech and handwriting were the only media in town.

Ancient Athens, by contemporary standards, was more like a village than a city. In the fifth century BC, some 30,000 men out of a population of 250,000 had the right to not only vote but in effect sit as government. Deeply flawed—as evidenced by the eventual sentencing of Socrates to death—ancient Athens was still more directly democratic than even the most representative democracies today.

Marshall McLuhan wrote in the 1960s that the electronic, non-digital media of his day were transforming the world into a global village. The statement was astutely predictive but not accurately descriptive. There was indeed a new, massive community watching television, but these communities were national and local, not international. It was a one-way community, not a village, in which members could receive information but not generate information or communicate, except to people who happened to be sitting next to them or were in the same offices the next day. What we had in the 1960s and the rest of the 20th century were a series of national villages of viewers - neither global nor a village at all. The people continued to have only the most indirect connection to government - the people could vote once every two or four years for representatives who comprised the government.

Tweets, YouTube videos, and Facebook pages changed all of that. Was McLuhan clairvoyant? More likely he was in touch with the profound human need to have an oar in the water, to be in the mix, which new new media accommodated and afforded. Politically, this need is best expressed in direct rather than representative democracy, in which people can make things happen without having to work through proxies.

The Reaction and the Future

I was on a panel on a local Fox news station in New York in the fall of 2011, tasked with discussing Occupy Wall Street. I was asked why the Occupiers did not have a list of demands, or even one key demand, as was the case with protesters in the past. I replied that the need for a key demand was akin to a need for a headline or a lead story - a product of the old media environment in which space, time, and placement of content was limited and therefore at a premium. In contrast, the world of new new media is not limited in these ways - anyone can only tweet but also tweet as many times as he or she wants.

The resurgence of direct democracy facilitated by new new media, like these media themselves, is still in its infancy, and faced with lack of comprehension and misunderstanding by both representative democratic governments and the traditional media. WikiLeaks has been prosecuted by governments afraid of their secret activities becoming public. These prosecutions miss the point that in a world in which everyone is a diplomat, in which anyone can instantly transmit an eyewitness report or a thought to anyone in the world, the very notion of a classified document becomes unworkable and moot. Limiting the readership of a classified document in a world in which it can be so easily disseminated is akin to limiting who among the people in a small room can hear someone talk.
The traditional gatekept media are under daily pressure from the new digital wave. Tim Pool, who won acclaim for his continuous 21-hour reporting of Occupy Wall Street, came by my class at Fordham University in early 2012. His main advice about news coverage was “we’ve got to get rid of the idea of editing” - by which he meant, the public deserves and now can get an unedited visual transcript of events. Pool does his work with a smartphone, which relays what Pool sees to UStream, a free Internet site available to everyone.

But why should we trust Pool to point his phone in the right or truthful direction - why should we trust any new new media report or any digital diplomat? How did we know that Ghonim was telling the truth? The answer is that any one of us, unless we happened to be in Cairo when Ghonim was reporting or in Manhattan when Pool was live streaming, did not. But other people were, and they are the best check for truth and accuracy in reporting and diplomacy. The world at large at long last has a voice, and it can be used not only for initial reporting but correction.

Several years ago, the number of errors on Wikipedia, whose articles can be written and vetted by anyone, and in the Encyclopedia Britannica, whose articles are by appointed experts, were compared and found, statistically, to be the same. At the very outset, the communication via new new media was found no more prone to error than communication via a traditional press. With the world at large as Wikipedia's editors, errors were quickly discovered and corrected. That was back in 2005, at the very beginning of the new new media age, the debut of the age of the digital diplomat. If the past few years are any guide, that ratio in favor of truth and participation of more people is only likely to get better.

Dr. Paul Levinson is Professor of Communication & Media Studies at Fordham University in New York. His eight nonfiction books, including The Soft Edge (1997), Digital McLuhan (1999), Realspace (2003), Cellphone (2004), and New New Media (2009; 2nd edition, 2012) have been the subject of major articles in the New York Times, Wired, the Christian Science Monitor, and have been translated into ten languages. His science fiction novels include The Silk Code (1999, winner of the Locus Award for Best First Novel), Borrowed Tides (2001), The Consciousness Plague (2002), The Pixel Eye (2003), and The Plot To Save Socrates (2006). His short stories have been nominated for Nebula, Hugo, Edgar, and Sturgeon Awards. Paul Levinson appears on "The O'Reilly Factor" (Fox News), "The CBS Evening News," “NewsHour with Jim Lehrer” (PBS), “Nightline” (ABC), Dylan Ratigan (MSNBC) and numerous national and international TV and radio programs. His 1972 LP, Twice Upon a Rhyme, was re-issued on mini-CD by Big Pink Records in 2009, and was re-issued in a vinyl remastered re-pressing by Sound of Salvation/Whiplash Records in December 2010. He reviews the best of television in his InfiniteRegress.tv blog, writes political commentary for Mediaite, and was listed in The Chronicle of Higher Education’s "Top 10 Academic Twitterers” in 2009.
Europe as a Security Actor

By DR. MAI’A K. DAVIS CROSS

Introduction

Despite all of the attention given to Europe’s financial situation lately, the question now more important than ever is whether the European Union (EU) is becoming a credible security actor capable of contributing to global stability. This question goes back to the very founding purpose of the EU’s ambitious experiment in collective security more than fifty years ago, when forward-looking European leaders sought to end the possibility of another war by pooling production of key military resources and calling for the creation of a common European defense policy. Since then, despite the scale of intra-European economic, trade and monetary issues and their global impact, the European Union has always been - whether explicitly or not - about security integration. Is this integration achievable on the ground, or was it merely an idealistic notion?

In the 21st century Europe faces key threats in the form of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological attacks, illegal migration, and the cross-border trafficking of humans, drugs, and weapons. Often the sources of these security threats are failed and/or weak states in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. A few high-profile setbacks and a handful of vocal Euroskeptics tend to conceal the EU’s remarkable advances in combating these threats through the composite EU states’ achievement of security integration – that is, the transfer of policy authority from the national to the supranational level – both in its external and internal dimensions. As the EU’s former foreign policy chief Javier Solana recently wrote, “The paradox is that the sensitive nature of security and defense policy should make it the last ‘hold out’ in the progressive development of the EU. But in the past few years, [European Security and Defense Policy] is probably the area where we have made the most progress in the EU.” Moreover, there has been even greater progress with internal security integration – dealing with border control, visas, privacy and data protection, cross-border investigations, prosecutions and arrest warrants, among other things – as the original package of intergovernmental policies has been relocated to the Community sphere of decision-making. Despite a few highly publicized difficulties, EU member-states are gradually agreeing to dismantle certain barriers to security integration that previously stood at the very core of traditional state sovereignty.

The current scholarly debate over European collective security is broadly divided between those who see the conflicting national interests of the EU’s biggest member-states – the UK, France, and Germany – as posing insurmountable barriers to cooperation, and those who see growing evidence for shifting preferences among member-states towards increasing regional cooperation. I argue that while the preferences of member-states are crucial, they are only a part of the story. While the influence wielded by member-states does tend to pull towards maintaining national sovereignty in the security area, any analysis that focuses exclusively on the member-states misses the crucial role played by various types of influential diplomatic actors. These actors, largely based in Brussels where the main EU governance institutions are located, are pulling in the opposite direction, towards greater integration. I argue that the intra-European diplomacy in which they engage is rapidly transforming the EU in the area of security.

Ambassadors, military generals, scientists, crisis management specialists, and others supersede national governments in the diplomatic process of security policy decision-making. They comprise transnational networks of experts or epistemic communities, and they are at the heart of the process of security integration, making headway at a remarkable speed by virtue of their members’ shared expertise, common culture, professional norms and meeting frequency. Altogether these qualities determine an epistemic community’s ability to effectively persuade member-states of their policy goals. The actors who make up these epistemic communities have engaged in a dialogue with some degree of success about how to combine resources, power, and decision-making about security, and how they may persuade member states to transcend cooperation to achieve integration. Many of these actors are both connected as territorially sovereign nation-states, as well as operate beyond strict state control in carrying out their European functions. In the process, they are redefining this regional entity that encompasses half a billion of the world’s citizens.

Two strong examples include the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) both of which are housed within the Council of the EU, the EU’s main decision-making body. I briefly discuss the composition and contributions of these two groups below, and suggest that cohesive epistemic communities are more likely to be persuasive diplomatic actors, achieving security goals that would have otherwise been very difficult if left to the member states alone.

The EUMC & External Security

EU military representatives (milreps) have worked their way up through the ranks of their national armies or navies for an average of 35 years. In this time, career experience, education, and training give them a high level of technical knowledge. Many of them have served as commanders and chiefs of staff, and have been posted as faculty at defense colleges, among other things. The significant similarities in training and education add to a culture of shared values and worldviews. The EU

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4 Interview with Greek EUMC representative Kourkoulis Dimitrios, June 2009.
mireps find that by the time they begin work in the EUMC, arriving at consensus is unproblematic. Their training and career experiences give them a body of shared knowledge that is often virtually taken for granted.

The key source of the EU mireps' ability to agree so readily is their high level of tactical expertise. They have specialized knowledge of how to most effectively devise the best military strategy on the ground and during an operation. Over the past few years, this knowledge has also come to include a range of other military activities in which states are occupied, such as crisis management, civil-military relations, and humanitarian intervention. Any disagreements over tactics usually derive from a lack of information rather than any profound difference in knowledge.

Naturally, mireps may find that they have redlines from their capitals that they cannot cross. But if they are able to successfully persuade their capitals to shift their political positions, agreement in the EUMC comes very quickly as a result of their shared professional expertise. As General de Rousiers said, “We have trust in each other due to previous backgrounds, trust in that what we say will not be our own operation, but an operation that has been matured by ourselves, team, and capital.”

Formal EUMC meetings are on the agenda every Wednesday, and additional meetings are quickly scheduled if there is a crisis. But it is really during the informal meetings – in the form of working coffees, lunches, or dinners – that the mireps get to know each other and discuss sensitive topics. They often have dinner together as many as five times per week.

Whether or not real deliberation actually occurs, the quality of these meetings is indicated by the scope and range of shared professional norms that govern the interaction among mireps. An example of a professional norm is the distinction between flags-up and flags-down. Flags are up in formal meetings, when mireps are obliged to be mouthpieces for their chiefs of defense. Everything they say is recorded and then distributed as official papers to those with security clearance. When flags are down in informal meetings, discussions are more open, and the mireps can express their ideas as professionals, rather than just as transmission belts for states. They can rely on their personal expertise, and distance themselves more from their instructions. The point is for them to achieve consensus as quickly as possible.

The strength of the common culture that binds military officials to each other in the EUMC is an important determining factor of the strength of their collective persuasiveness. European military culture has social, historical, and strategic properties to it, some with roots centuries-old. Although Europe has been the locus of long and violent wars for much of human history, these battles as well as various alliances have also resulted in military emulation and convergence over time, especially when it comes to tactical and strategic expertise. Today, EUMC's mireps share similar career paths, and have much in common with each other even before they arrive in Brussels. As Dutch General Van Osch put it, “We have the same language, same jargon, same kind of military thinking, and we read each other's military philosophers.”

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5 Interview with French EUMC military representative General Patrick de Rousiers, May 2009.
6 Interview with Dutch EUMC military representative General A.G.D. van Osch, March 2009.
7 Interview with Dutch EUMC military representative General A.G.D. van Osch, March 2009.
8 Interview with Dutch EUMC military representative General A.G.D. van Osch, March 2009.
There is also a political element to their work. As General Van Osch described it, “Both the military aspects and other aspects are important at our level. We always think of the population. Factors of influence are numerous. There are clearly military, political, and economic arguments.” Thus, while there is a tendency to imagine that military officers simply follow orders, and that this is fundamental to military culture, the milreps are at the top of the hierarchy, and find they often make decisions with political impact. Additionally, the EU takes a more comprehensive definition of security than is typical in other settings. For example, security includes the civilian dimension of crisis management in third countries. During the negotiations to launch operation NAVFOR Atalanta, which addressed the threat posed by pirates off the coast of Somalia, milreps spent significant amounts of time discussing the development of a legal framework to govern what would happen to pirates after they were captured at sea. They argued that a successful operation would not just tackle the threat at sea but would also deal with the effects on land, where it was necessary to dismantle the financial system upon which pirates relied. Milreps had to look beyond the military dimension to find solutions.

Beyond the internal dynamic within the EUMC, the relationship between the milreps and their capitals is crucial to understanding the group’s influence as an epistemic community. Formally, Ministries of Defense in the capitals are responsible for preparing instructions to milreps. In practice, however, it is a two-way street in which milreps play a strong role in writing their own instructions. The German deputy-EUMC representative, Peter Kallert, said “Our three-star general...gets guidance from Berlin, it’s not an order; it’s guidance.”

Thus, milreps are not simply following orders. The British head of military-defense for Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) Adam Sambrook said, “Policy formulation happens somewhere in the space between Brussels and London...It is not the case that they have to consult London every time they do something.” In Portugal, the emphasis is even more on Brussels decision-makers. Very few personnel in Lisbon are involved in CSDP issues, and so it is difficult for them to keep fully abreast of developments, especially those that are of a technical nature. Officials from the Dutch foreign ministry view the EUMC as having a special role. Henrick van Asch of the Dutch MFA’s Security Policy Department said, “The EUMC has to give independent military advice. Officially, they shouldn’t really be instructed in a sense. Otherwise, you get the national perspective. Mostly, they write their instructions themselves.” Thus, expert advice is seen as more valuable when it is not politicized, but derived from shared expertise. However, EUMC agreements always have political implications.

Two CSDP military operations – NAVOR Atalanta and EUFOR Chad – provide illustrative examples of how milreps are able to regularly achieve consensus even when member-states disagree from the start. In the case of NAVFOR Atalanta, not all member-states supported the launching of such an operation at the outset. There were a number of issues at stake. First, it was to be the EU’s first naval operation.

10 Interview with German deputy-EUMC representative Colonel Peter Kallert, June 2009.
11 Interview with British Head of Military-Defense CSDP Adam Sambrook, May 2009.
12 Interview with Portuguese MFA, Director for Security and Defense Affairs, João Pedro Antunes, April 2009.
and there were many non-EU ships in the region already, seeking to deal with the pirates in their own ways. Second, as the largest donor to Somalia, the EU wanted to ensure that World Food Program (WFP) ships were all safely escorted to ports. Third, 30% of EU oil is transported through this ocean region. Tackling the growing problem of piracy was clearly something that needed to be addressed, but some member states believed that the best course of action did not necessarily involve a formal CSDP operation. The milreps, however, saw the naval operation as both politically attractive and with a high potential for success because of the EU’s unique experience at incorporating the civil dimension into military initiatives, bringing together other (non-EU) actors, and promoting international stability.

Discussions within the EUMC resulted in a compromise to launch a formal CSDP operation contingent upon the creation of a coordination network between ships, including those from non-EU nations, such as China, Russia, and India, as well as between these ships and ground personnel. In addition, they called for advance agreements with nearby countries on procedures for dealing with captured pirates on the ground. In the end, the milreps essentially pushed for a wider mission, and by relying on military logic and expertise, they were able to persuade those in the capitals. In particular, their top priority was to ensure the safe passage of World Food Program ships, followed by the second priority of providing protection for merchant ships. Member states eventually agreed that a formal CSDP operation under EU command would be the best route to take given the nature of the threat and their shared goal of ensuring that humanitarian aid reached Somalia. Once the political mandate was in place, it only took a matter of days before the actual operation was launched on 10 November 2008. Since that date, not a single WFP ship has been lost to pirates, and member states have agreed to renew the operation, which is still ongoing.

Similarly, in the case of EUFOR Chad – a humanitarian operation to bring security and relief to refugees and displaced peoples – member states initially disagreed about getting involved in an operation so far away from the EU that did not have any immediate political and economic interest for them. At the same time, they did feel increasing pressure to do something about the ever increasing number of displaced Darfur refugees – nearly 400,000 people – in Chad. Because of their colonial ties to Chad, the French put forward the proposal to launch a military operation. Within the EUMC, milreps importantly decided to set aside the debate about interests versus moral obligation and focused instead on whether such an operation could achieve successful results. Given the reluctance of some member states to contribute troops, the answer to this question was not straightforward. Several attempts to generate promises of troop contributions had not resulted in the necessary level of participation, which led to an initial shortfall of 2,000 troops (it was thought that 6,000 were needed). Several member-states saw this as further reason not to go forward with the operation. However, milreps determined that despite this shortage, there were enough reserve forces to satisfy the requirements, alongside an extra contribution from France. They stipulated that the chances for success were high as long as the UN took over as planned one year later, and that the EU operation complemented the UN’s efforts to protect civilians, refugees, and humanitarian facilities. They determined that EUFOR Chad should not address the

14 Interview with Italian Chief of the Operations & Exercises Branch, Colonel Italian Air Force Benedetto Liberace, June 2009.
core causes of the conflict – violence between different ethnic groups and armed militia – as this was not best resolved through military force. Despite great hesitance and division among member-states initially, the expertise and persuasiveness of the milreps served as a catalyst for the launching of a new operation on 15 March 2008 that would not have otherwise gone forward.15

Both examples show how milreps are often able to find military solutions that overcome political obstacles stemming from the capitals, and enable an integrated approach to dealing with crises. They do this through constant dialogue among themselves as well as with their capitals. Their expertise and high status play no small role in enabling them to influence at several levels. However, the impact of their military expertise is not limited to the short-run; milreps are also heavily involved in shaping long-term military planning in terms of increasing capabilities and achieving interoperability.

Coreper & Internal Security

Coreper is equally important to consider as an example of highly effective Brussels-based diplomacy. It is a committee comprised of an ambassador from each member state, but in practice its influence as a knowledge-based network is far stronger than its formal role would suggest.16 Among other things it has had tremendous influence in developing the internal security side of EU integration.

Coreper’s members undergo a rigorous selection and training process as part of their professional development. Professional selection begins right out of university and is repeated when diplomats are subsequently promoted to new positions over time. The fact that they come from the same top universities contributes to a similar social and networking background. Training occurs at the foreign ministries, but it is clear that actual time in the field – performing the daily duties of a diplomat, navigating through difficult multilateral negotiations and learning the nitty-gritty of foreign policy – is a crucial component of this. As Ambassador Mavroyiannis of Cyprus said, “Expertise comes from experience, long exposure, and whether you know the people, issues, and procedures.”17 Coreper ambassadors originate from this process, and after decades of service, have shown themselves to be the best at what they do. Among senior diplomatic postings, a Coreper appointment is considered one of the most prestigious and challenging to attain. It is comparable to postings to London, Washington DC, Berlin and Paris; and for many member-states it is the most important appointment.

These elite diplomats meet frequently in informal settings, and share a multitude of key professional norms. Face-to-face meetings give members of an epistemic community the opportunity to cultivate relationships, engage in real deliberation, and develop a common culture. This is where shared norms evolve and are reinforced. Coreper meets formally once per week, following a pre-circulated agenda including certain professional protocol. It is during informal meetings,

15 Interviews with EUMC General Endahl (Sweden), Admiral Treviño-Ruiz (Spain), General Coelmont (Belgium), Major General Békési (Hungary), Brigadier General Graube (Latvia), and Colonel Liberace (Italy).
16 Formally, Coreper is only mandated to prepare the work of the Council. Article 16 (7) Treat on European Union.
17 Personal interview, January 2009.
however, that the real discussions take place, and these occur daily through working coffees, lunches, or dinners. They are so much a part of Coreper’s activities that one ambassador said, “We are not only ambassadors, but friends on the other side of the table...We are permanently together.”

Coreper has a strong ability to foster cohesion among its members and to reach compromise on key issues. Ambassadors strive to be as efficient and results-oriented as possible, and this is reflected even at the very moment that they decide something. Like in the EUMC, Coreper never votes. Instead, ambassadors strive to ensure that everyone is on board with each individual policy, regardless of formal voting rules. As one ambassador explains, “There is a gentleman agreement to search for unanimity.” Ambassadors also try to avoid escalating an issue to their ministers if at all possible. If they cannot come to agreement amongst themselves, the ambassadors feel they have failed.

The common culture of Coreper’s ambassadors holds the group together, and results in a similar worldview that enables them to more easily reach consensus and persuade their capitals of further integration. Coreper’s esprit de corps is manifested as a feeling of being part of a club and empathizing with each other. One ambassador said, “A very special kind of solidarity bonds us...we have a duty and natural inclination to respect each other for past achievements and accomplishments...” New member-states are no exception to this feeling of solidarity. This enlargement has brought to the table a greater number of voices and interests, but not new geographic dividing lines. The seniority of the ambassador matters much more than the seniority of the member state he or she represents.

What does this wealth of expertise and common culture lead to in terms of actual policy goals? First, members of Coreper to a great extent believe that integration is inevitable and good for Europe. Ambassador Store expressed the idea concisely: “What is good for Europe is good for Finland, even if we didn’t get all that we wanted.” The ambassadors consistently describe themselves as pro-Europe, and in most cases, more pro-Europe than their capitals. Given that they could just as easily approach negotiations as a game of bargaining and strive to gain as much as possible for their national interests, this norm is significant. Cypriot Ambassador Mavroyiannis described, “We are conscious of the need for us to reconcile pursuit of national and pursuit of general interest. This has to do with the idea that one should never - except in extreme cases - put one above the other.” One manifestation of this is that there are no fixed alliances among certain member-states. They genuinely deal with each issue on its own terms, based on their expertise and ability to get the capitals on board. They feel that they are serving European citizens in common, as one constituency, and that the Council is in effect a kind of EU government.

Given that these ambassadors do share substantive beliefs, even when it comes to the contentious issues of security, how successful are they at convincing their capitals? In fact, they face much resistance from the capitals where the tendency

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18 Personal interview, January 2009.
19 Personal interview, January 2009.
20 Personal interview, March 2009.
21 Personal interview, Ambassador Store, January 2009.
22 Personal interview, January 2009.
23 Personal interview, March 2009.
is to try to directly control the direction of internal security policy and to guard national regulations, some of which have been in place for centuries. As Austrian Ambassador Schweisgut explained, it is a “situation where the ministers of home affairs are obsessed with secrecy and obsessed with keeping information as close to their chests as possible. They are reluctant to give things early to Coreper. They pre-cook things to the extent possible.”

The nature of such resistance does vary somewhat depending on the member-state.

Generally, the main way in which a capital has leverage over its ambassadors is through formal instructions, and the main way in which ambassadors exercise agency is through flexibility with those instructions. While receiving instructions from capitals is a big part of how the epistemic community of diplomats operates and is constrained, in practice, the instructions serve as a more formalized means of coordination and persuasion between the ambassadors and capitals. Instructions are rarely set in stone for high-ranking ambassadors; rather, they serve as a basis for deliberation.

Ambassadors each report that they have a high degree of flexibility with their instructions but they gain flexibility and autonomy through their own initiative. Those in the capitals recognize, trust, and respect Coreper. They understand that their ambassadors have gained a much deeper perspective of security issues by virtue of their time in Brussels, and previous experience working on European issues. Emma Gibbons, head of the EU section of the International Directorate in London's Home Office, said “It’s about being on the frontline, exposed to the day-to-day dynamic.”

Rita Faden of Portugal’s Ministry of the Interior said, “Trust in the ambassador is really important….In the capitals, we may not have the complete picture…[Coreper ambassadors] have asked to change the instructions, and we have been flexible.” Dutch policy officer Rogier Kok said, “In the end, if [the ambassador] doesn’t want to say something, he doesn’t. In the end, he’s in charge. He’s in control. It’s his interpretation of what’s important or not, and what’s achievable.” Thus, ambassadors are able to persuade their capitals of compromises that they reach in Brussels. Sometimes there are certain red lines, but even then the obstacles are not insurmountable.

The example of the 2005 Strategy on Radicalization & Recruitment (SRR) provides a brief illustration of how Coreper is able to infuse a particular policy with the shared beliefs of the ambassadors. The SRR was designed to define the terrorist threat to the EU, highlight the challenges the EU faces in overcoming extremist ideologies and threat vulnerabilities, and outline the pro-active measures the EU will take to undermine Al Qaeda’s radicalization and recruitment in Europe. Coreper sought to advance particular goals that emphasized their twin norms of achieving more security integration alongside the strengthening of the EU legal space.

First, the ambassadors argued that the EU should enact a comprehensive response. They agreed that there is a dangerous, distorted version of Islam that must be combated with efforts to integrate Muslims into European society and empower moderate voices. To accomplish this, the ambassadors emphasized the importance of non-state, transnational actors like NGOs, alongside state-driven

24 Personal interview, January 2009.
25 Personal interview, April 2009.
26 Personal interview, May 2009.
27 Council document 14781/1/05, 2005.
solutions, decreasing the responsibility of member states in tackling the problem alone. Coreper believed that these efforts to empower moderate voices and involve NGOs would weaken the influence of extremist Islam.

Second, the ambassadors wanted to elevate the perception of threat. They believed that more people were at risk, and more citizens could be impacted by terrorist activity than had been previously anticipated, as recruitment was occurring in prisons, educational institutions, religious training centers and places of worship. Ambassadors asserted that even if a specific country had not been a target, that it was still not immune. They called upon member states to approach the problem of radicalization and recruitment as a *European* problem. Estonia, Finland, and Slovakia, for example, do not have problems with radicalization, yet all three ambassadors agreed that they must take a European approach and engage in the debate about what should be done. The Estonian ambassador said, “The EU provides a collectively prepared understanding. We’re not specialists on Islam so we can use the whole EU’s approach.” The Slovakian ambassador indicated that his country does not even have a single mosque, and yet radicalization and recruitment is still a European problem. He stressed that the fact that the Dutch were surprised when they started to hear radical ideas coming from their mosques could be a lesson for everyone.

Third, they agreed that any action taken by the EU with respect to radicalization and recruitment must be legitimated. To accomplish this, they added to the SRR’s final draft specific mention of protecting fundamental rights, putting in place a legal framework, encouraging a political dialogue, and involving experts such as academics in shaping policies. The idea of protecting fundamental rights, common to all citizens of the EU, once again demonstrated the idea that through asserting “Europeanness” radicalization and recruitment to extremism could be counteracted. Since much of EU legislation already rests on a strong legal system and respect for rights, the ambassadors argued that the effort to combat terrorism was no exception.

As the Strategy was made public on 24 November 2005, Coreper has revised its policy goals every six months to take into account actual progress and their ongoing deliberations. The SRR became part of the more general EU Action Plan for Combating Terrorism, a policy for which Coreper also performed the preparatory work. The new initiatives include: a public diplomacy campaign to explain and legitimate EU actions to the international community and to put forward a common EU image; information sharing across member-states; setting up both funding for individual research that would aim to strengthen the relationship between civil society and European authorities, and multinational funding to generate policy proposals that would require a European approach to combating terrorism; and a new approach to extremism that would treat it as a danger within all religions, instead of emphasizing Islam alone.

Biannual progress reports show that major initiatives have been successfully launched along these lines, including: the implementation of a media communication strategy; the development of a “common lexicon of terms”; a signed agreement among member-states to abide by EU laws criminalizing both direct and indirect incitement of terrorist activities; multinational meetings to promote interfaith and intercultural dialogue, direct involvement of major NGOs, and others. In the end, Coreper persuaded member-states to envision the EU as a contiguous “homeland” in which policy would be legitimated. One year after the launch of the SRR, a progress report stated:
Radicalization has moved from a somewhat specialist issue to a central theme with profound implications for the future of our society. [SRR] has brought this issue to centre stage and focused minds on how we tackle the problem collectively (Council document 15386/06, 2006).

Despite the fact that the majority of member-states had not even experienced the problem of radicalization, Coreper successfully reframed the issue as European thereby significantly advancing internal security integration.

Conclusion

These two examples, as well as many others, show that knowledge-based experts, or epistemic communities, are playing an important role in shaping the future of European security policy. The diplomatic processes among these actors are gradually contributing to more innovations in European integration, reaching into traditionally contentious policy areas for member states. The EU is now surpassing NATO in the variety of initiatives it can do around the world, and milreps are even taking on a kind of post-modern character; their aims go beyond traditional national security goals. EU citizens must be protected on multiple levels, from traditional defense to food security to environmental security, and they have common external borders. The chief goal of high-ranking military generals and admirals is to provide this security, and increasingly, they find that the best means of achieving this is to encourage member-states to work together in an integrated way.

In terms of internal security, the EU increasingly resembles a federal model. The reality of shared borders has led to a number of initiatives that secure Europe through common approaches. Coreper has been at the forefront of achieving internal security integration by virtue of its expertise and persuasive abilities vis-à-vis the member states. More examples abound.

Security integration is the real test for how far the idea of an “ever closer Union” might go. However, the idea of security integration is still little discussed in the halls of national governments, EU institutions, and among the general public. To really understand the extent to which it is moving forward, it is necessary to open up the black box of formal decision-making, and examine the dynamics that occur behind the scenes in Brussels, among the true movers and shakers.

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The Future of Sub-State Public Diplomacy

By ELLEN HUIJGH

Summary:

In virtually no time, sub-states from across the globe have warmly welcomed the notion of public diplomacy and have started developing it in high gear. Compared to national governments they are relative late bloomers, but they have been catching up by immediately striving for more contemporary approaches to public diplomacy. In the long run, pushing public diplomacy development at a breakneck pace is no blueprint for success, however. While the future of sub-state public diplomacy holds potential, there remain several challenges to overcome.

Introduction

It has become commonplace over the last decade for the (new) public diplomacy literature to claim that states are not the sole governmental actors in public diplomacy, and that public diplomacy no longer resides solely within the sphere of governments. Scholarly pleas to involve a multitude of players other than the ‘traditional’ actors of national governments in public diplomacy have resonated with sub-states. Though not the only newcomers in public diplomacy, they bridge the gap between state and non-state actors. Though like nation-states, sub-states cover territory within which the population and governmental structures are associated with their authority, their powers do not reach the threshold of traditional sovereign nation-states. Sub-states are diverse and run the gamut from the American states, the German and Austrian Länder, the Canadian and Italian provinces, the Belgian communities and Swiss cantons to the Spanish and Czech regions, and sub-states such as Scotland and Greenland, which are part of the UK and Denmark respectively.

They have been shaped by specific socio-cultural and politico-economic climates, different constitutional structures and vary in their international relations.

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1 This essay builds upon the author’s interviews with representatives of sub-national governments and speeches on the future of sub-state public diplomacy, such as from the Association of Public Diplomacy Scholars Conference on The Future of Public Diplomacy (University of Southern California, 6th April 2012), the International Studies Association Annual Conference’s panel on 21st Century Public Diplomacy: Looking Ahead (Montreal, 17th March 2011), the EU Committee of the Regions International Workshop on a ‘third wave’ in Sub-State Diplomacy (Brussels, 19th January 2010). The author wishes to thank several sub-national governments, particularly California, Catalonia, Flanders, Greenland, Québec and Scotland for their cooperation and their sharing of insights and information.

competencies. While these intrinsic features make it hard to generalize such a diverse group, they nevertheless share common features in the field of public diplomacy. This essay briefly explains why sub-states show interest in public diplomacy, why their seeming disadvantages can turn out to be advantages, and why, though their future may look bright, it holds potential long-term pitfalls.

**Broader Context and Narratives**

Five years ago sub-states did not readily employ public diplomacy terms, yet in virtually no time several from across the globe have embraced the notion of public diplomacy and have started developing it rapidly. In little time it has grown to be an increasingly high priority on sub-states’ foreign policy agendas. With this in mind, while they may be considered relative late bloomers, especially when compared with national governments, they are not complete strangers to the practice of public diplomacy. Many activities related to public diplomacy developed in sub-states before the term ‘public diplomacy’ was adopted such as nation-building, (re)branding efforts and international cultural, tourism, economic and education promotion. When scholars consider sub-states to be newcomers, they are mostly referring to how public diplomacy has become an integral part of their foreign policy vocabulary, structures and strategies.

This magazine’s home state of California illustrates this. While since the 1970s it has been ranked among the world’s ten largest economies, and despite the Senate office of International Relations’ attempts at using a variety of non-binding policy tools (such as sister-state relationships and exchange programmes), this US state’s public diplomacy continues to be developed in a somewhat unsystematic and scattered fashion within its daily commitment to promoting political, economic, educational and cultural relations.³

This being noted, sub-states’ general interest in and rapid development of public diplomacy has to be understood within a broader context. Their interest in public diplomacy has not occurred in a vacuum. Public diplomacy has been affected by broader tendencies in society that influence foreign-policy making and diplomacy, of which it is an intrinsic part. It may in fact even be merging with diplomacy, as the latest round of public diplomacy scholarship increasingly suggests.⁴

In brief, several tendencies have increased sub-states’ international exposure, such as: foreign policy democratization, decentralization, and the expansion of international policy competences to government levels that traditionally have had only a domestic mandate. While sub-state diplomacy (also previously labeled ‘para-diplomacy’) has come of age over the last decades, it is especially within the context of a so-called ‘third wave of sub-state diplomacy’ (referring to a blurring of

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boundaries in diplomatic activity between central and non-central governments) that developing public diplomacy has gained traction among sub-states.

This is perhaps unsurprising when the underlying narrative behind sub-states’ interest in public diplomacy is exposed. After all, effective public diplomacy increases the influence of those with little traditional power. Public diplomacy empowers them to influence and shape the international agenda in ways that go beyond their politico-economic capabilities and their lack of hard-power resources. It also allows them to increase positive perceptions of their distinctiveness at home (within the nation-state of which they are a part) and abroad. For sub-states, public diplomacy’s significance is threefold. It is a means of (1) self-legitimization and expansion of its international exposure and roles; (2) integrating and coordinating foreign policy initiatives and working more horizontally across sectors; and (3) building upon initiatives which come from their civil societies and of recognizing their contribution to the sub-states’ international relations and image. Moreover, with sub-states, less can become more as their apparent disadvantages can turn out to be advantages.

**Less is More**

In the field of public diplomacy sub-states appear to have certain advantages over nation-states.

The fact that they are relative newcomers to the field can be a blessing in disguise. They can learn from national governments’ historical evolutions and know-how as well as their mistakes and initially avoid similar problems in coping with changes in diplomacy. They carry neither nation-states’ outdated bureaucratic baggage nor commitments to dated public diplomacy norms which have fallen behind the evolving environment and which hinder further progress.

The less power sub-states have in traditional terms, the greater the importance they place on public diplomacy in their foreign policy agendas. This provides them an alternative to traditional diplomatic paths and can help consolidate their position on the international stage. The fact that they have fewer (human) resources than nation-states not only forces them to bundle their efforts around specific niches, priority themes, audiences, and geographic areas, but also pushes them to rely on their citizens as partners in public diplomacy and move ahead with multi-actor approaches.

A few of the most telling examples illustrate how sub-states have sought to put public diplomacy into practice over the years. To a certain extent it also demonstrates the cascade effect in sub-states’ development of public diplomacy wherein sub-states influence one another through policy transfer.

**Some Examples**

One of the early trendsetters in a more systematic and strategic approach to sub-state public diplomacy has been Canada’s province of Quebec. In 2007, the Ministry of International Relations’ public diplomacy division developed a public diplomacy strategy and action plan wherein public diplomacy perceived as a “specific way of working abroad”: within pre-existing constructs; on a policy  

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objective; with partners; through influence-networks and with follow-up and measures. In the implementation of this approach and the further maturing of its public diplomacy, Quebec aims to identify the links between pre-existing activities containing public diplomacy components and strategically connect them in a content-wise fashion to its international policy and its U.S. and European strategy. For example, the division launched two three-year long-term pilot projects focusing on climate change and the associated role of regional governments, including a series of complementary and issue-specific public diplomacy activities. Shorter term projects that link cultural activities to public diplomacy have also been developed. Public diplomacy therein needed to more strategically associate cultural activities of representations abroad with an international policy theme. Nowadays the distinction between short and long term has become less relevant through support for medium term projects while public diplomacy’s domestic and digital components have gained attention.6

Among sub-states, the Government of the Flemish community in Belgium utilizes far-reaching legislative competences in international relations. Partly inspired by Quebec, the Flemish department for Foreign Affairs’ communication branch has developed a public diplomacy plan with strong attention paid to economic, academic and cultural sectors. It reaches out to the international community through its customized and theme-related ‘Flanders Inspires International Visitors Program’ and a structural agreement with the Flemish expat organization ‘Flanders in the World.’ It recently established an agreement with the rectors of the universities in Flanders to support them through a coordinated action plan and by aiding them financially in liaising with peers abroad (Flanders Knowledge Area). Additionally, it has also delivered on efforts to broaden domestic public support for its foreign policy. Examples of this include the integration of a strategic advisory council of non-governmental experts in the department, a fixed budget for EU sensitizing actions prior to the Belgian presidency of the European Union Council, the remembrance of the 100th celebration of the great war of 1914-1918, and digital policy discussions held within the context of the Flanders in Action 2020 Pact.

The autonomous region of Catalonia in Spain, built upon Quebec’s and Flanders’ experiences while customized to its specific cultural context and constellation, dedicated numerous pages to public diplomacy in its Foreign Affairs Strategy of 2010-2015 wherein it suggested that its public diplomacy ought to face inwards and outwards at the same time and is transversal in nature. In the beginning there were attempts by the recently unfolded directorate for ‘International Promotion of Catalan Organizations’ to institutionalize public diplomacy in an administrative unit in the government’s Ministry of External Affairs and Cooperation. A public-private consortium, the Catalan Council of Public Diplomacy (before April 2012 known as the Patronat Catalunya Món), is responsible for the creation, implementation, and generation of synergies between different public and private entities active in public diplomacy. Next to public diplomacy training for students of international relations, it currently organizes consultations, workshops, and public forums with stakeholders in various foreign policy areas to seek agreement on a public diplomacy action plan.

in which these civil society actors are simultaneously public diplomacy partners. Besides the ongoing and familiar support for the internationalization of Catalan sport, multilateral and other non-governmental partners, the modernization of Catalan communities abroad is another example of Catalan public diplomacy. 

In 2009 Greenland moved from ‘home rule’ to ‘self-governance’ status within the Kingdom of Denmark. With limited official representation abroad, it has undertaken public diplomacy action in cooperation with non-governmental organizations in order to profile itself internationally in specific niches such as international Arctic policy, indigenous rights and international fisheries agreements. Its government is currently considering creating positions for public diplomacy with a strong domestic component. As has been the case in Greenland (prior to, during and after its self-governance referendum), a convergence of public diplomacy activity at home and abroad in moving towards greater autonomy can be expected to appear in other sub-states with similar ambitions, such as Scotland. As part of Great Britain, Scotland has mainly developed public diplomacy within the context of its broader nation branding strategy in the areas of culture, economics, tourism and education. Many of its public involvement actions, both at home and abroad, are also concentrated around its Action Plan on European Engagement, which is also a stepping stone in Scotland’s current quest for independence. 

Sub-states’ public diplomacy may not yet have generated a critical mass of programs, has room for improvement and maturation, and non-Western cases need further exploration. Nevertheless, even a glance at some of the present examples indicates that once sub-states get the ball rolling, public diplomacy evolves quite quickly and boldly - in the sense that it has sought to think outside of the box of the so-called ‘old-style’ public diplomacy of linear communication with foreign audiences in favor of cooperation with a panoply of non-state actors on international issues of shared concern. The question of what to expect for the future of sub-state public diplomacy can be raised. At the risk of oversimplifying, the glass can be seen as half full or half empty.

**Looking Ahead: Potentials and Pitfalls**

From a forward looking - and somewhat optimistic - perspective, it can be expected that in the near future these examples will no longer be exceptions to the rule. Over the next decade it is probable that peers will follow suit, and more importantly, innovate. There are at least three likely developments for sub-states’ public diplomacy’s near future.

First, more sub-states will seek to move their public diplomacy beyond reputation management and the crafting of information tools towards foreign policy cooperation and networking. Second, more of them will develop overall strategies to add focus to pre-existing activities by aligning them to one another and foreign policy content, and by filling specific niches. Third, more of them will initially include a domestic dimension in their public diplomacy so as to turn at-home citizens into partners in the public diplomacy conducted abroad. While there remains dissent among scholars as to whether public diplomacy ought to include a domestic dimension, or said otherwise, involve its domestic constituencies both as publics and partners in foreign policy input and output processes, sub-states seem to show
less tentativeness towards this evolution than national governments. Due to limited representation abroad and a lack of resources, greater investments will likely go into alignment of public involvement practices at home and abroad as this could provide a competitive advantage to do more with less. Faster and more, however, is no guarantee of better.

Despite the potential, the distant future of sub-states’ public diplomacy will not necessarily be rosy. It could also become a flash in the pan, as there are several challenges to surmount. A few are mentioned below.

First, sub-states may be tempted to readjust somewhat outdated risk-averse practices of nation states in the implementation of their newly established public diplomacy strategies. Though there are many, the means with which to put public diplomacy into practice are not endless. While the ‘new’ (public) diplomacy literature has emphasized innovation from non-traditional actors, the most recent literature on the future of diplomacy also points towards a readjustment of national governments’ practices by new non- and sub-state actors alike. In short, understanding multi-actor and network relational public diplomacy ideals appears to be much easier than putting them into practice, even at the sub-state level. Trendsetting Quebec’s long-term pilot project designs reveal ambitions for policy networking and cooperation, but its execution has relied on comfortable formulae such as journalist visits and official government representation at conferences that have not been extended. The Flanders in Action policy e-discussions have also not appeared to have delivered the desired response, due to a lack of transparency and follow-up. There is also a risk that the long term projects which are fundamental in relationship building with foreign publics will be replaced by short-term ones that deliver quicker results.

In an earlier contribution on this matter, it was noted that there remains a risk that sub-states will become mired in the means by which they conduct public diplomacy. Namely, that identity-related public diplomacy risks becoming a euphemism for marketing communication; institutionalized public diplomacy for corporate communication; and public diplomacy’s domestic dimension for public affairs. Over the years these last two have been shown to be less troublesome than the first. Sub-states’ current attention to nation branding approaches of public diplomacy (e.g. Catalonia, Scotland and Flanders’ brand policies and Quebec’s ‘gestion de l’image’ plan to provide a more integrated image of the region) holds potential for extensive public consultation and bottom-up involvement of civil society stakeholders to reach out to foreign peers on shared foreign policy concerns. It also runs the risk of being solely developed as a quick fix for internal social issues and for ‘rectifying’ a specific international image – as per the desires of the government - and if developed as such will struggle to succeed.

Second, sub-states tend to develop public diplomacy out of identity-related interests, but appear to have difficulty stepping away from the idea that their society’s nature and identity is not as homogeneous as it once was. After all, sub-states are not disconnected from larger tendencies in societies which are growing more heterogeneous and which increasingly consist of more diffuse populations such as diaspora communities. Civil societies are also believed to be gradually evolving into

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more pluralistic and transnational areas of personal interest, which challenge notions of distinctiveness founded solely on traditional geopolitical grounds. Contemporary or future (public) diplomacy is arguably also evolving from territoriality towards more virtual forms of authority grounded in symbolic systems, such as expertise which is not necessarily related to a specific territory. The future of sub-states' public diplomacy will presumably encounter the need to increasingly learn to deal with identity pluralism, rather than distinctiveness on the basis of past identities, in the input and output phases of foreign policy making. While there is no space to go into detail here, this begs further research on how future sub-state public diplomacy will challenge tensions along the lines of territorial versus non-territorial representation, or whether it will put these tensions into greater perspective.

Third, the strategy of creating distinctiveness through public diplomacy may for other reasons not offer a long-term solution. To avoid becoming counterproductive in the long-term, sub-states - and indeed any governmental actors - need to look at the bigger picture of public diplomacy which offers no venue for competition increases. Governments, regardless of level, are trying to reach out to their sometimes overlapping foreign publics and their ‘own’ citizens, but this sometimes appears to interfere with interactions between governments despite pre-existing consultative bodies within the political system. Parallel development of public diplomacy risks failure when it is directed at the same public opinion but serves different international agendas and strives for different kinds of social cohesion. In the long term this can hamper efficiency and damage credibility. Bluntly put, though this might stand in opposition to common sense, thinking ahead to further progress in the development of the public diplomacy of sub-states also means stressing the necessity of centering the pendulum. Adoption of a multi-actor model which outsources to non-governmental actors should not be detrimental to interaction between governments.

The ‘new diplomacy’ literature has put much focus on the potential of non-traditional actors such as sub-states and their difference from and even power to undermine or replace traditional actors (nation-states). More recent contributions to this debate on the future of diplomacy, which is gradually finding its way into public diplomacy literature, better puts this view into perspective. It increasingly describes traditional and non-traditional (public) diplomacy actors as part of an evolving configuration of social relations wherein old and new practices coexist in a mutually constitutive relationship. The latter lies at the core of the future of public diplomacy and moves beyond categorical thinking of ‘old’ and ‘new’ towards the development of insights on the intersections and relations between actors in public diplomacy.

Finally, when looking to public diplomacy’s future and the enthusiasm it sparks among ‘new’ actors such as sub-states it is also worth mentioning that despite its popularity and functional value, public diplomacy may also slowly become a victim of its own success. The more popular it has become and the more it has been a fertilizer

of change, the more it has been applied to different contexts and by different actors; gradually turning it into a blanket term and hollowing out its meaning. The more it is considered to be ‘a way of working’ in the diplomatic practices of various actors, the less relevant distinguishing the term from diplomacy, or even considering it as a totally separate field, becomes.

**Conclusion**

Sub-states have an interest in public diplomacy because it allows them to expand their international exposure and increase awareness of their distinct identity. They may be late bloomers, but have begun to catch up by immediately aiming for more multi-actor and network relational modes of public diplomacy, which are more in tune with the demands of a global governance agenda in which national governments are no longer the sole players. In the near future it can be expected that much more sub-state public diplomacy will be seen, but in the long run faster and more programs are not necessarily a guarantee of better public diplomacy. While innovation in public diplomacy can come from the least expected of corners, if sub-states fail to address the potential big picture speed bumps of a collaborative public diplomacy then they risk merely being part of the public diplomacy crowd rather than the drivers of change in the future of public diplomacy.

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Corporate Diplomacy Perspectives: Global Mindsets, Global Skillsets & Women Who Aspire to Lead – The View from Dubai

By CARI E. GUITTARD

In a Center on Public Diplomacy blog post from last summer, I listed four key corporate diplomacy trends for 2012: Water, Women, Entrepreneurs, Emerging Markets & Economic Development. The list, which I prepared for my lecture at the USC CPD Summer Institute, is by no means exhaustive. The notion of women, especially women advancing in business and women as entrepreneurs will continue to be lead public diplomacy areas for both traditional and corporate diplomats. Additionally, and of foundational importance in pursuing any of the trends listed is the notion of a Global Mindset. Developed by researchers at the Thunderbird School of Global Management, the Global Mindset Inventory is a tool for measuring global skillsets and dispositions for success in global environments. Last fall, while attending GMI certification at Thunderbird, I delved deeper into the three capitals of the GMI which I’ve outlined below. For public diplomacy practitioners, government leaders and corporate diplomats, a global mindset is essential and something all should be aware of as they develop and progress through their careers.

Last December, I travelled to Dubai where I taught in the Hult Pocket MBA for Women Who Aspire to Lead seminar. The setting on Hult’s Dubai campus was an intimate, transformative and engaging platform, unlike any I’ve ever experienced. Hult knows how to create a collaborative learning environment as they are one of the largest international MBA programs globally and their students rotate through campuses in Dubai, Shanghai, London, San Francisco and Boston. The Hult Pocket MBA for Women was a 2-day intensive program which brought 60 mid-career women from throughout the region to their Dubai campus for an extraordinary learning experiment. It should be noted that demand for this seminar was overwhelming – nearly 300 requested to participate in

the free seminar as well as others asking if we would reprise the course in Cairo, Tunis, Manama, Doha and Riyadh. Given the turmoil and upheaval in the region over the past year, it is gratifying to see people are hungry for programs that empower and advance women in business.

**Pocket MBA Key Take-Aways & Insights**

The faculty and presenters assembled to teach in the pocket MBA ranged from social and behavioral psychologists, to representatives from global management, communications, finance, and HR. Dr. Amanda Nimon-Peters², Managing Director and Founder of Sara Black International, led the course with an opening candid discussion of influences contributing to self-belief and self-doubt, factors that subconsciously affect performance in women. She gave an illuminating overview of relevant experimental social psychology research which included a candid discussion of stereotypes, the negative effects they have on women in the workforce, and how they contribute to self-sabotage on a subconscious level. She further underscored the importance of role models for women and noted that they increase a woman’s belief in her ability to succeed particularly when women have overcome relevant difficulties on their paths to success. Unfortunately, there are too few women in senior leadership identified and showcased for more junior women to emulate. When it comes to leadership role models, men dominate the headlines. Additionally, more and more women in the mid to senior career levels are opting out. Perhaps, capturing and showcasing women who achieve senior leadership positions in the corporate world will inspire more women to continue their paths.

*Key Take-Aways – Role models matter for women and stereotypes do harm on a subconscious level. Bottom Line: You can’t be what you can’t see.*

For my session on **Global Mindset, Global Skillsets & Global Leadership**, I shared two areas of research which highlight key traits and skillsets for women succeeding globally - The Thunderbird Global Mindset Institute (GMI)³ and Stanford’s Graduate School of Business⁴. The work of the GMI is spearheaded by Dr. Mansour Javidan⁵, Dean of Research at the Thunderbird School of Global Management. I have been following Dr. Javidan’s work for some time now as he served on the Board of Business for Diplomatic Action and is a noted expert on cross-cultural management and executive leadership. Recently, I had the opportunity to become certified to teach the GMI by Thunderbird and the more I engage in the work of the GMI, the more evangelical I become about sharing the insights and tools with global leaders. The GMI defines, measures, and develops a Global Mindset to help global leaders succeed. It tracks nine characteristics of a Global Mindset which have been tied to performance. The nine characteristics are bucketed into three main areas which Thunderbird refers to as capitals: *Intellectual, Psychological, and Social Capital.*

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² [http://sarablackint.com/](http://sarablackint.com/)
³ [http://www.thunderbird.edu/about_thunderbird/inside_tbird/truly_global/global_mindset.htm](http://www.thunderbird.edu/about_thunderbird/inside_tbird/truly_global/global_mindset.htm)
⁵ [http://www.thunderbird.edu/wwwfiles/pdf/about_thunderbird/faculty/faculty_alphabetical/mansour_javidan.pdf](http://www.thunderbird.edu/wwwfiles/pdf/about_thunderbird/faculty/faculty_alphabetical/mansour_javidan.pdf)
Overview of Thunderbird’s Global Mindset Capitals

1. **Psychological Capital** – Enthusiasm for diversity; Self-assurance, self-confidence, and willingness to challenge oneself; Involves leveraging intellectual capital; Toughest to develop, takes a long time, based on experience.

2. **Intellectual Capital** – Knowledge of industry, market, competitors, cultures, world events; Easiest to develop.

3. **Social Capital** – Ability to build trusting relationships with people from different parts of the world; Involves excellence in networking, listening, and negotiating.

For anyone working in or considering a global career these capitals provide a roadmap for development and long-term success. Additionally, I believe women - and in particular mothers - have an edge when it comes to developing these capitals. Despite this, we are known for diminishing our strengths in these areas, particularly with regards to psychological and social capital. Regardless, a global mindset is essential for not only those of us currently pursuing or thinking of embarking on global careers but for the next generation of women who will compete in the workforce.

In addition to a global mindset, there are several key traits we should focus on developing and leveraging throughout our careers for long-term success as per research by the Stanford Graduate School of Business⁶.

The key success traits for working women they identify include:

- Women who are aggressive, assertive, and confident but who can turn these traits on and off, depending on the social circumstances, get more promotions than either men or other women

- For women to be successful they must simultaneously present themselves as self-confident and dominant while tempering these qualities with displays of communal characteristics.

- A double-edged sword -- Women with ultra-feminine traits are still seen as less competent in traditional managerial settings

The research resonated with the class, as many women shared their difficulties in balancing what they felt were expected “masculine” traits with their innate

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“feminine” traits in the workplace. Finding balance and adapting while navigating a global career is the Holy Grail of success. As women we need to develop additional opportunities like the Hult Pocket MBA to not only candidly discuss how to best develop and leverage these traits but to also share resources and develop a network that supports our continued learning in this space.

Key Take-Aways: For generations to come, a global mindset will be an essential trait that we must begin cultivating at an early age to compete and succeed. In addition, women who are best able to adapt to any environment will achieve and succeed long-term.

The Power of Women in Business & The Men Who Get It

We ended the Pocket MBA with a powerful panel on Men Who Contribute to Boosting Women’s Careers or what I like to call The Men Who Get It. Here were three educated, successful men married to equally sharp, successful women. They shared frank views on the balance of power in their relationships and the positive benefits they derived from having a working and succeeding spouse. One shared how he had sacrificed his career for his wife to pursue an expansive global role and the fulfillment he obtained by looking after their children fulltime. Another shared three advantages to having a successful wife:

• **Arithmetic** – two working spouses means more resources and a power advantage for the family

• **Strength** – both of them working and achieving allows for each to pursue what their passionate about rather than being locked into a career for the sole purpose of financial stability

• **Less Stress** – the man is not relied upon as the sole earner which reduces stress

The last panelist, the one who had been married the longest with five children, offered that he and his wife are a team who share in each other’s successes and noted how important it is to celebrate even the smallest success, **together**. All of the men cautioned those in the audience who weren’t married to “recruit well” and find a partner who supports their career aspirations as much as their own. The panel’s sensitivity to work-life balance and deep appreciation for women’s contribution to and strengths in business was evident and applauded. It is also important to recognize that we were having such a discussion in the UAE, a nation which is leading the region when it comes to women’s rights and the empowerment of women. Women in the UAE and throughout the region are increasingly optimistic about not only advancing their roles in business but succeeding as entrepreneurs as well. The development and progression of women featured prominently in the UAE’s recently celebrations of its 40th anniversary.

“As the UAE marks its 40th anniversary, we all share in the celebration of its enormous achievements, not least of which is its rapid social and economic development. We warmly applaud the fact that women’s contribution towards the country’s development and prosperity are now highly valued and women are regarded as essential to the continuing success and transformation of the UAE.”

– Dr Shaikha Hind Abdulaziz Al Qasimi,
Can Two Days Really Make a Difference?

I must admit, even I was skeptical that a two-day program - even as packed full of practical take-aways, relevant research, and in-class exercises as our pocket MBA was - would make a difference. Would there be measureable impact and results? Indeed, there were. Dr. Nimon-Peters and her team at Sara Black measured outcomes which revealed the following:

- The Pocket MBA had a measured direct impact on the self-confidence of the audience, resulting in an average increase in the audience’s ratings of 1) overall self-confidence, 2) confidence in mathematical/numeric ability and 3) confidence in likelihood of achieving career success.

- The results demonstrate the high impact that environmental and contextual factors have on women's beliefs about their own confidence and abilities. This effect was found despite the fact that the group rated itself as having above average self-confidence at the beginning of the course.

There was nothing pocket-sized about the energy in the room during our Pocket MBA. When women get together like this, transformation occurs. We acknowledged that we spend so much of our lives focused on what we think we’re supposed to do, that we rarely discover what we’re meant to do. Many of the participants in the Pocket MBA shared that this two-day intensive sparked in them the confidence to seek out a new direction, an exploration into finding their true passions and to develop their unique talents and abilities.

Whether they know it or not, women yield a tremendous amount of power and influence in business globally. Much of this power is hidden, underestimated, and undervalued many times by women themselves. It is important to reflect on the impact women have in business and to find a way to capture and hold up stories of relevant female role models, abolish stereotypes, and find new creative ways to support and empower them. Even the smallest of efforts can make an extraordinary impact. I flew a very long way to hopefully inspire and leave an impact on a group of women who are just beginning to realize their own power in the global workforce. What I didn’t anticipate was how much I would learn from them and how I would be the one leaving inspired, optimistic and energized for the future. There are ample opportunities for public diplomacy practitioners both traditional and corporate to engage and partner with women in business and women entrepreneurs. Partnerships with organizations, governments, and corporate entities leading such efforts will bear tremendous fruit in 2012 and beyond.

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Current Challenges to European Union Public Diplomacy

By DR. STEFFEN BAY RASMUSSEN

Although no general consensus exists, public diplomacy is typically analysed in terms of the intent of a given country to influence the perception of foreign publics so that these come to hold a positive view of that country and increasingly share its founding values and, perhaps, political priorities. As a key instrument of soft power, the importance of public diplomacy is destined to increase in a globalized world where political influence increasingly comes through the soft power to shape situations and make friends, rather than through the hard power to coerce potential enemies into submission.

Putting the soft power instrument of public diplomacy to work is particularly pertinent for a European Union which has few hard power resources at its disposal for direct influence on the ground. On this point there seems to be a general consensus among analysts, reflected in the characterization of the EU as a civilian power, normative power, structural power or, indeed, soft power. Furthermore, as a new kind of political entity based on the redefinition of sovereignty in Europe, EU public diplomacy faces a communicative challenge which the nation states do not: apart from trying to influence global public opinion on specific policy issues, it is for reasons of legitimacy and recognition pertinent for the EU to communicate effectively which kind of entity it is and what the European Union is all about. This is a difficult task because of the highly complex nature of the EU.

The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor

EU diplomacy in general is not simply an additional supranational layer of activity added to that of the Member States. Rather, EU diplomacy, and EU public diplomacy as part hereof, exist as a consequence of the functional disaggregation of the Member States. Whereas each state continues to realize certain activities, other state functions are exercised jointly through the institutions of the EU, among them parts of diplomacy.

Perhaps the most notable feature of European Union diplomacy is therefore its organization in a network characterized by the continuing centrality of state actors and diffuse structures of legitimacy and political authority, but also by the increasingly common decision-making and implementation process. The actors executing EU diplomacy

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diplomacy are of a different nature and have different sources of legitimacy. State
governments, supranational political bodies, and both state and supranational
administrative bodies participate in the network. Adding to the complexity is that
the network functions differently depending on the specific international setting and
it also functions differently depending on the political issue area in question.

EU Public Diplomacy

In consequence of the nature of EU diplomacy generally, and even if only
considering the activities at the EU level, public diplomacy is carried out by many
different actors and through activities of different budget lines and even includes
delегating communicative responsibility to NGOs through the financing of specific
projects. Historically, the responsibility to communicate about the EU and its policies
has been delegated out to desk officers working with different policy areas in the
Brussels institutions and in the EU Delegations abroad, with central coordination
taking place only at a very general level.

The coordination of public diplomacy has taken place within the Commission
in Brussels, and has only been partially successful in making all the different actors
of the EU diplomacy network communicate a more or less coherent message about
the EU to the world, a fact reflected in the repeated calls for the EU to increase the
coherence in its public diplomacy.5

So on one hand, the delegation of communications authority to desk officers
and people ‘on the ground’ in other countries should in principle make for a better
communication with local audiences, since EU representatives can this way easier
adapt core EU messages and communication techniques to local audiences. On the
other hand, the result of the extensive decentralization of EU public diplomacy has
meant a general lack of uniformity in terms of both the content of the messages
and the communicative practices. This is again related to obvious differences in
funding and professionalization from one EU delegation to the next. In the US, the
EU Delegation has an entire unit dedicated to public diplomacy and with funding to
make a difference, whereas in many sub-Saharan countries, all EU public diplomacy
is often handled by a single Press Officer.

However, the lack of an EU single voice is not merely a technical problem
of EU public diplomacy that can be solved with better funding, coordination
mechanisms or strategic planning. This may be so with respect to improving
the horizontal coherence of the EU, i.e. the coherence between different policy
areas and the communication of a core EU message by all desk officers and EU
representatives abroad. The challenge in this respect is to ensure coherence among
each of the policy-specific messages and between these and the identity-driven
messages of the EU. Coordination and strategic planning of communication should
to some extent alleviate this problem, and there is a great scope for improvement.
But another main obstacle to the EU having a coherent public diplomacy across
the board is the lack of vertical coherence within the EU, i.e. between the EU level

5 For studies dealing particularly with the issue of coherence, see: P. Fiske de Gouveia, European
infopolitik: Developing EU public diplomacy strategy, Foreign Policy Centre, 2005; D. Lynch,
Communicating Europe to the world: what public diplomacy for the EU, EPC working paper no. 21,
European Policy Centre, 2005; A. Michalski, “The EU as a soft power: The force of persuasion”, in J.
Melissen (ed.), The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations, Houndmills, Palgrave
and each of the Member States. In policy areas where the Member States are not in agreement, there of course cannot be any single EU communication to foreign audiences, but rather a cacophony of voices. This has also meant that EU-level public diplomacy has traditionally focused on uncontroversial issues where the Member States are largely in agreement, such as human rights, climate change or identity-driven messages. This fact points to a general structural impediment to an efficient EU public diplomacy. Often, the EU cannot respond to the demand for communication of foreign audiences and engage in a dialogue about the topics they care most about, since it depends on the existence of a general agreement within the EU among the Member States.

In sum, the EU’s lack of hard-power resources, both in terms of material capabilities and political will, seems to indicate that public diplomacy, as a soft power tool, should be an area of specific attention for the European Union. Nevertheless, the structural impediments of the EU’s diplomacy in general have also impeded the EU from turning its public diplomacy effort into a soft power tool capable of making up for the loss of hard-power influence.

The European External Action Service and EU Public Diplomacy

With the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in 2010, the European Union set off to solve the most pressing problems of its external relations. The EEAS was designed to unify the representation of the EU, which hitherto had been divided between the Commission (issues of EU competence, such as trade and development aid) and the Member State holding the rotating Presidency of the European Council (foreign policy generally). At the same time, the High Representative of the Union, which formerly was a representative only of the European Council and thereby the collective will of the Member States, is now also Vice-President of the European Commission and Head of the External Action Service. The potential for improved horizontal coherence is therefore great, since the representation of the different foreign policy issues is now unified in the same administrative structure. Nevertheless, the strategic planning still takes partially place in different Directorate-Generals of the Commission, as well as among the Member states in the Council structures, and it remains to be seen whether the new EEAS will be able to assume an authoritative position and lead the policy-making in areas with foreign policy implications. Also, it is still unclear how the new Service will handle public diplomacy. Initial plans included a Department within the EEAS dedicated to public diplomacy, but now this Public Diplomacy Unit has been located administratively within the Commission, on the margins of the EEAS. This raises questions of the extent to which it will be able to improve on the strategic planning and execution across all policy areas, thereby ensuring a greater degree of consistency. With respect to the public diplomacy emanating from the Union Delegations in third states and international organizations, the potential for enhanced coherence is even greater. Now these Delegations represent the EU in all policy areas, which should make coordination easier. Coupled with the reforms of the Brussels structures, this should reduce the complexity in the eyes of foreign publics and enhance the visibility of the EU. The real impact of the EEAS on public diplomacy, nevertheless, still remains to be seen.
Current Challenges to EU public diplomacy

Although institutional innovation potential increases the coherence of EU public diplomacy, it does not in itself address the principal challenge to EU public diplomacy in the short term, which stems from the fact that the EU lacks a firm and generally accepted and coherent message about itself and its role in the world. Without clarity in this respect, there is a limit to how much the recent institutional informs can do for EU public diplomacy, since the individuals executing public diplomacy will lack the ‘great picture’, without which communication will necessarily be fragmented. Clarity of message would reduce the need for coordination, since each person to whom communicative authority has been delegated, could easily fit in the specific policy-related message with a large narrative about the nature and purpose of the European Union.

In my view, the most basic challenge to EU public diplomacy currently stems from the fact that the EU is an ontologically insecure international actor. Following Anthony Giddens, ontological security can be considered as when an actor has a stable and positive view of self and is able to maintain a sense of order and continuity with regard to past experiences, current relationships and actions, as well as expectations for the future. Currently, the EU is not able to connect in an overarching narrative the elements necessary to be an ontologically secure actor: A generally accepted and stable vision of the nature of the EU, its historical experiences, its current actions and future objectives. This is of course a problem when seeking to communicate about these issues through public diplomacy. The main tension is between the EU identity as a model for structural peace among states, which in the EU construction makes it a qualitatively different kind of international actor based on universal values, on one hand, and the increasingly assertive foreign policy behaviour defending EU economic and geopolitical interests ever more effectively through the EEAS on the other, which seems a quite traditional, and not qualitatively different, approach to international relations.

Drawing on Brent Steele’s work in Ontological Security in International Relations, the notion of ontological security helps define four elements of that are vital for EU public diplomacy to be efficient. First of all, there must be clarity about identity, which involves the capacity of the EU to link its historical experiences with its present configuration as a political entity. It is fundamental for public diplomacy to be based on a stable and generally accepted biographical narrative. Second, to communicate about a specific topic there must be clarity about causality, in the sense of a stable perception about what drives developments within a specific policy area (and thereby what the effect of different lines of action will be). Third, there must be strategic clarity, in the sense of how EU identity leads it to have certain strategic objectives and interests within that policy area. Fourth, there should be tactical clarity, in the sense of which policies should be pursued as a logical consequence of the former three elements: clarity of identity, the understanding of how a policy issue area develops and the EU’s most basic interests in this area.


7 This section is inspired by the theoretical reflections by Brent Steele, see: B. Steele Ontological security in international relations, New York, Routledge, 2008.
The main point here is that, particularly for an actor as decentralized as the EU, the ontological security stemming from clarity on the four dimensions is vital for the individuals that design public diplomacy initiatives and execute them around a specific event or a given policy area. First, clarity on the 4 elements reduces the need for hierarchic control or horizontal coordination. For instance, an official of the Commission’s Directorate General TRADE can adapt her public diplomacy initiatives and communication lines to the overall narratives, as can a DG DEVELOPMENT or an EEAS official. Thereby, the execution of EU public diplomacy by a decentralized network will be less problematic, and the challenge of coordination will be reduced (except for cooperation with the aim of achieving synergy effects of various initiatives).

Second, the literature on public diplomacy generally stresses the importance of dialogue and taking two-way communication seriously. The EU can only do this if it is ontologically secure. If, as now, there is no overall clarity on the four elements identified above, it will be difficult for an EU public diplomacy official to engage in a dialogue, for instance at public events or via social media. A true dialogue requires the ability to think on one’s feet and respond immediately to questions or affirmations of foreign publics. Obviously, this can only be done well if there is clarity about the core EU biographical narrative as well as the policy-specific narratives, true not only for the European Union, but all actors engaging in public diplomacy.

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Everybody's getting hooked up: Building innovative strategies in the era of big data

By DR. ALI FISHER

Introduction:

The potential in the era of big data comes not from drowning in a sea of data but navigating the most useful ways to derive insight and develop innovative strategies from that data.

Faced with complex problems, limited resources and an increasingly small world, many private and public diplomacy organisations are seeking to increase reach and influence through developing partnerships or unlocking their innovative potential through collaboration.¹ At the same time the development of new technology has spawned new ideas, opportunities and approaches to engaging with people around the world. Protesters demonstrated the ability to construct dispersed communication networks and coordinate action in the ‘battle in Seattle’, as recorded by John Sullivan.² Similar network-based approaches to public diplomacy have been identified in a recent article in Foreign Service Journal and at a conceptual level by Brian Hocking.³ As a result of these shifts, there is now potential to develop innovation in public diplomacy through “big data”.

As a UN Global Pulse white paper noted big data is “an umbrella term for the explosion in the quantity and diversity of high frequency digital data. These data hold the potential—as yet largely untapped—to allow decision makers to track development progress, improve social protection, and understand where existing policies and

Hocking, B. ‘Changing the terms of trade policy making: from the “club” to the multistakeholder model’. World Trade Review, (2004) 3(1), 3-26
programmes require adjustment”.

In the context of public diplomacy big data allows organisations to look far beyond the daily tactical data, whether web metrics or shifting numbers of “friends”, “followers” and klout scores. Today public diplomacy strategists and practitioners are able to develop innovative strategy using insight from diverse sources of big data.

The potential to use big data for innovation comes with certain challenges. One challenge is to ensure that the people who receive insight from big data have the appropriate skills and authority to act on that data. The second is to recognise the technology has to be used for an appropriate purpose. These challenges were highlighted during field exercises run by the Pentagon through the Force XXI project and following the sinking of the U.S. expeditionary fleet during the Millennium Challenge exercise, conducted in the summer of 2002.

If the challenges can be addressed, a big data approach can uncover rich information about the communities with which public diplomats seek to engage and can reveal new perspectives about the world in which public diplomacy operates. Through the resulting insight, organisations can empower public diplomats and support the development of innovative strategies to bridge the ‘last three feet’.

This article discusses a big data approach to public diplomacy, first by highlighting the wider environment and sources of data. Subsequent sections discuss how big data can be applied within public diplomacy and finally how the resulting insight can support innovation.

**Framing the big data environment**

In 2008 I argued that as the practice of public diplomacy develops and the barriers to entry become lower, there was an increasing need to consider new approaches, which could be added to the toolbox of existing methodologies. These new approaches include a shift towards an open-source approach to public diplomacy, through which to develop collective action with engaged communities.

2008 was the year Google announced it had identified 1 trillion (as in 1,000,000,000,000) unique URLs on the web at once. It was also the year Facebook closed the gap on MySpace and metrics providers began naming it

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7 We knew the web was big..., Google Official Blog, 25th July 2008 (http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/07/we-knew-web-was-big.html)
as the biggest social network site. Twitter traffic grew by 752 percent and users collectively sent an average 300,000 tweets per day.\(^8\)

Just three years ago these numbers sounded huge, but today they are dwarfed by the contemporary big data era. In 2011, tweets per day had reached 200 million while ITU, the U.N.’s International Telecommunications Union, estimated there were “over five billion mobile users and two billion subscribers to the Internet.”\(^9\) In addition, the rise of services such as Weibo further emphasise the growth of participative communities. Gone are the imagined herds of potential followers with hearts and minds only capable of being won over to your side or that of the enemy. Public diplomacy of the 21st century will rest on bridging the ‘last three feet’ between communities of “participants” and potential collaborators with whom to cooperate and co-create, rather than the hierarchical view of content producer and “target audience.”

In parallel with the growth in digital users there has been a massive increase in the availability of systems that allow the individual user or small organisation to store data, connect different data sources and visualise the result. Free data storage systems, include mongoDB, eXist, mysql, and the Apache Hadoop project which “develops open-source software for reliable, scalable, distributed computing.”\(^10\) These storage systems combined with data visualisation programs and low cost access to flexible server space, have lowered the barriers not just to communication but to the production of analysis and insight.\(^11\)

For example, when researchers analyzed the entire Facebook network of 721 million active users and 69 billion friendship links, the commercial value of the hardware they used was “only in the order of a few thousand dollars.”\(^12\) The size of the data storage in this example (72 GiB of memory and 1 TiB of disk space) is vastly bigger than most public diplomacy organisations will deal with regularly. However, access to the technical means to analyse data creates the potential for insight to support innovation in public diplomacy.

One of the most dynamic demonstrations of this evolution is “Cascade,” produced by the NYTLabs using MongoDB and the electronic sketchbook

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Also see; Bank On It: Facebook Will Pass MySpace in US Popularity, Mashable, 18th December 2008 http://mashable.com/2008/12/18/facebook-us-traffic-beats-myspace/

9 200 million Tweets per day, Thursday, Twitter blog, June 30th, 2011, http://blog.twitter.com/2011/06/200-million-tweets-per-day.html


11 eXist - http://exist-db.org
MongoDB - http://www.mongodb.org/
MySQL - http://www.mysql.com/

Processing. Cascade shows who shared a specific NYT story and when. According to the project page, this “allows for precise analysis of the structures which underly sharing activity on the web”.

Other more accessible services include Many Eyes, Yahoo Pipes, Google Fusion Tables, Impure, OpenDX, Processing, 3DEM and Blender amongst many others. These easy-to-access and often “software as service” options allow anyone with a quick enough internet connection to access data visualisation.

On the back of developing technology, the delivery of more complex data visualization is rapidly becoming a service in itself. For example, the data visualization and mapping team “Development Seed” is helping Internews and NAI expose patterns of violence against journalists on the ground in Afghanistan. In addition, the humanitarian technology network “Crisis Mappers”

“leverages mobile & web-based applications, participatory maps & crowdsourced event data, aerial & satellite imagery, geospatial platforms, advanced visualization, live simulation, and computational & statistical models to power effective early warning for rapid response to complex humanitarian emergencies”.

Used effectively, tools for making sense of big data have potential to further empower practitioners who operate in the complex architecture of human networks that straddle geographic borders.

A big data approach in public diplomacy

The “last three feet” in the big data era

In complex human networks influence flows in multiple directions and coordinates around numerous hubs or focal points. In response, public diplomacy strategists increasingly identify the potential influence which can result from pursuing genuinely collaborative approaches with these interconnected communities.

Innovative strategies utilizing new technology have at times been framed in tension with the long established physical meeting of people. Such tensions regularly pivot on the often-cited “last three feet.” As Edward Murrow put it, “The really crucial link in the international communication chain is the last three feet, which is bridged

13 Processing “is an electronic sketchbook for developing ideas”: http://processing.org
Cascade page of NYTLabs: http://nytlabs.com/projects/cascade.html
   Processing - http://processing.org/
   Impure - http://www.impure.com/
   OpenDX - http://www.opendx.org/
   3DEM - http://www.visualizationsoftware.com/3dem/
   Blender - http://www.blender.org
16 Development Seed - http://developmentseed.org
17 Crisis Mappers - http://crismappers.net/
by personal contact — one person talking to another.”

However, the effective use of big data rests on synergies between digital and physical strategies.

From a strategic perspective the bridge across the “last three feet” is built on the type of interaction which participants find meaningful. Some individuals will prefer physical contact while others tend to interact via digital platforms; for example the use of Google Hangouts. Equally there are increasingly examples of digital and social media networks being used to identify participants for “physical world” public diplomacy events. Innovative strategy will frame public diplomacy as a combination of physical and digital interactions based on the preferences of participants and insights from online and offline research.

The success of bridging “the last three feet” will continue to rest largely on the intercultural skills of those charged with the conduct of public diplomacy. However, organisations cannot rely solely on the ability or skills of the individual practitioner. Public diplomacy, at a strategic level, has the opportunity to capture the richness of complex societies and derive insight through which to empower the professionals working at operational and tactical levels. To put this into action, the first step for an organisation is to recognise the value of data and identify the instances in which a particular dataset is valuable.

**What value to put on data?**

All data are not of equal value. This is particularly the case when engaging with big data. Specific types of data are generated and are relevant at different stages of public diplomacy practice. Using the right data at the right point in the conduct of public diplomacy can allow innovation to flourish. Conversely, a dataset used at the wrong point will choke both existing and innovative practice.

One way to identify the most appropriate point in public diplomacy practice to use a specific big data source is to model activity based on interconnected planes, the “Action Plane” and the “Analysis Plane.” Within the action plane activity exists at strategic, operational and tactical levels. Subsequently, each level on the activity plane has a counterpart on the analysis plane.

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19 An example of Google Hangouts in use, see: [http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/video/2012/may/21/economics-google-debate](http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/video/2012/may/21/economics-google-debate)

20 The importance of recognising the distinction between strategic and tactical levels was made forcefully by Maj Ric Cole in his presentation: The Role of Information Operations in the ‘Battle of the Narratives’ and the use of ‘the Media as a Proxy’ at, *Information Ops Europe: Impact of Extremism* 2012
**Tactical actions** tend to produce largely raw data – for example, who was invited to an event, who attended and their demographic characteristics. Equally, data from digital interactions can provide tactical data. This includes volume measures of those engaged online through the classic metrics tools delivered by services such as Google analytics or the numerous twitter analytics services.

**Operational level** decisions provide a framework for tactical actions. The counterpart level on the analysis plane exists as a location for raw data to be aggregated, whether produced through the tactical actions of a public diplomacy organisation or data-streams available from other sources, including social media and open data. At this analytical stage the data can be collated and filtered to identify the most useful data within the vast array that was available. This should inform operational decisions or feed into the process of delivering actionable insight to be used at the strategic level.

**Strategic level** decisions provide the purpose and framework within which operational and tactical actions take place. These decisions require insight, whether derived from specifically conducted reactive research, unobtrusive research observing the behaviour of specific communities, open data or data produced during operational activity. It is likely innovative strategy will come from a dynamic synthesis of data from a diverse range of sources. As a result, innovative strategy exists in a symbiotic relationship with the data delivered from tactical and operational actions, and subsequent aggregation and filtering on the analysis plane.

**Where can we get data?**

As a McKinsey Global Institute report noted in 2011, an “organization that intends to derive value from big data has to adopt a flexible, multidisciplinary approach” which can engage with numerous sources of data.\(^{21}\) In public diplomacy terms, big data can come from combining a range of different approaches, including reactive and unobtrusive research, along with data from operational activity and open data sources.

- **Reactive research**, such as that commissioned by the US Broadcasting Board of Governors and the USIA Office of Research, can provide valuable information on reported perception, intention and action.\(^{22}\) This data can be gathered via phone or face-to-face interview. New technology also allows panels of mobile phone users to provide rapid answers to specific questions via text. Further innovation including smart phone applications such as “Show of Hands” expands the options for combining reported opinion into a big data approach.\(^{23}\)

- **Unobtrusive research** is probably less familiar within public diplomacy, but with increasing use of social media this approach has growing potential to contribute significantly to the big data approach.\(^{24}\) In digital and social media many

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\(^{22}\) Examples can be found in the Roper Center Dataverse: http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/roper


\(^{24}\) Description of the distinction between reactive and unobtrusive research see: Raymond Lee, Unobtrusive Methods in Social Research, Open University Press; 1 edition (August 11,
Discussions and information sharing networks are open to unobtrusive research. In public diplomacy terms, there is opportunity to genuinely listen to the way users express themselves about a specific event or issue.

Sentiment analysis may be a useful guide for easily identifiable concepts or brands, but it has significant limitations around complex issues. An alternative, combining semantic, discourse, and network analysis, creates the potential to identify the focal points for specific communities within a wider trending topic or complex issue. This allows the public diplomat to understand the nature of these conversations and engage with communities on their terms. For example, research into the use of Twitter during the protests which followed the 2009 Iranian Election distinguish among a range of communities using the tag #IranElection. Other examples include evaluating the response in social media to a presidential visit, as shown in the InterMedia white paper on the impact of #ObamaInBrazil.

• **Operational activity** provides another opportunity to aggregate tactical data to support operational and strategic decisions. This can be as simple as recording attendance lists in an efficient manner. These are particularly likely to exist for events held in “secure” buildings; for example, embassies, consulates or High Commissions but should be good practice for almost all events. This type of data is also available for other types of public diplomacy.27 For example, data from exchange programmes can inform future activities at both a tactical level, by identifying individuals who could be engaged in further activity, and at the strategic level, by aggregating the involvement of individuals to identify wider trends or patterns in the levels and types of engagement. In the U.S., for example, much of this data is available through the Interagency Working Group (IAWG) on

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- **Open Data** has become an increasingly important source which can provide context to bespoke research or specific analysis. These open data sources include that from international organisations such as the World Bank and national data, including that from Kenya, U.S. and U.K. Further datasets are aggregated via initiatives such as datacatalogues.org and opensource.gov provides foreign open source intelligence. These sources of data have the potential to supplement research specifically commissioned to support public diplomacy. The open approach is a growing initiative, and the information available is a valuable source for practitioners and scholars alike.

**Building innovative approaches**

Big data exists. As Antti Halonen, of the Finnish Institute in London, argued, “We live in a data society ... whether this is an inconvenient truth or a nerd's dream ... we must face the situation and make the best of it”. The key question for the practice of public diplomacy is how can we use it? This section identifies two potential areas where a big data approach can be used: first, in analysing the operational activity of an organisation, and second, observing the greater networks of communication between communities around the world.

**Dashboards and organisational data**

The use of dashboards is a growing area within current public diplomacy practice, as they offer easy access to often complex data. However, it is imperative to identify whether the data being represented is intended to be used at a tactical or strategic level, as inserting inappropriate data into the development of strategy will lead to inefficiency rather than innovation.

Dashboards can provide access to numerous perspectives on tactical data from social media, but they are only useful for the specific purpose for which they are built. For example, showing the trend in followers over time, or identifying individuals with the most followers, makes specific assumptions about what or who delivers influence in a community. Equally, if dashboards include metrics of “influence,” it must be clear to the user how these have been calculated. Otherwise there is a serious risk of chasing an increasing “influence score” rather than genuine impact.

In addition to constructing dashboards, data tools make it possible to easily identify the countries in which an organisation has a particular focus and compare

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28 Cross government data on exchange: http://www.iawg.gov/  
And via http://data.gov  
A more limited dataset is available about U.K. Chevening scholarships:  

29 http://datacatalogs.org/,  
http://data.worldbank.org/,  
https://opendata.go.ke/,  
http://data.gov.uk,  
http://www.data.gov/

this with those they engage through social media. For example, the locations of programmes highlighted in the recent EUNIC Yearbook for 2011 Europe’s Foreign Cultural Relations can be used to show the countries in which the organisation focused its activity. The aggregated data shows that many of the priority countries, in terms of number of activities, were in Europe despite the emphasis on “Foreign Cultural Relations.”

The connections between physical world public diplomacy events and social media are increasingly becoming part of public diplomacy operations. With the growing availability of open data, these findings could then be placed in a context, relevant to the specific issues of a public diplomacy organisation.

31 Europe’s Foreign Cultural Relations, can be downloaded here: http://www.eunic-online.eu/node/465
An index of projects appears at the back of this report.
Observing the "greater networks" of communication

While the potential for big data to provide insight into the projects of a public diplomacy organisation, their "egosphere," there is at least equal potential to analyse the wider "ecosphere," the "greater network" of communication and influence. This allows public diplomacy practitioners to genuinely listen. It allows them to hear what others are saying and place public diplomacy activity in the context of other sources of influence which are experienced by communities around the world. This is particularly relevant given the growth of collaborative strategies in public diplomacy.

For example, a number of newspapers now make their archive available via an API (application programming interface.) which makes the automated longitudinal analysis of the shifting themes of discussion easier to achieve.

Examples of this type of analysis have been produced by Jer Thorp on his Blprnt blog using The “New York Times” API and David McCandless on his site “Information is Beautiful”.32 In addition, technological designs by Marcos Weskamp have added Newsmap and Flipboard to the design led approaches to filtering the flow of news content.33 Many of these tools make information filtering easy and the results clear and aesthetically pleasing. Further options, including Seesmic, allow people to create their own bespoke digital media management systems.34 Many of these are not social media publishing or tracking tools, but instead provide an important opportunity for scholars and practitioners to understand the nature of the information environment in which they work.

In addition, analysing the information environment in which a public diplomacy initiative will be conducted is a combination of the commonly conducted volume-based reach measures and developing an understanding of the interconnected landscape created by the media consumption behaviour of the community. For example, if conducting public diplomacy via radio, rather than asking about who is listening, there is potential to focus on which media outlets citizens are choosing to access. This is a subtle nuance, but the result is radically different.

When considering public diplomacy within the “greater network,” research can identify the information landscapes created by the media consumption behaviours across the community. This blends offline research with methods more familiar to digital media analysis and allows the position of a particular radio broadcaster, television channel or newspaper to be viewed relative to other providers in the media landscape.

This approach allows public diplomacy organisations to look beyond "reach" numbers to identify combinations of media consumption behaviours. For

32 Blprnt blog - http://blprnt.com/
Information is Beautiful - http://www.informationisbeautiful.net
34 http://seesmic.com/
example, do international broadcasters, such as BBC World Service, tend to reach the same audience as other international broadcasters, including Deutsche Welle and CCTV? Or do their audiences come from distinct communities? Equally this approach allows for the identification of communities who choose similar combinations of media. For example, a community may read a particular newspaper and also watch a specific TV channel. At the strategic level this insight can be used to engage with a particular community through their preferred combinations of media sources.

The use of digital media also creates the opportunity for public diplomacy practitioners and scholars to identify communities that focus around a specific issue. An innovative strategy can be created in response to a dynamic situation such as the Arab Spring, if an organisation can identify the sources to which people turn for information during a crisis.

For example, this may start with the question, which media sources were shared during the Arab Spring? To answer this question, a public diplomacy organisation could aggregate the available data and filter the resulting dataset to focus on retweets, for example. This would allow analysts to identify specific news brands that were shared by different communities. In addition, analysts could also begin to identify users who fulfill different roles within the network (or networks) of information sharing. In the example of the Arab Spring, some journalists, primarily responsible for producing content and information, were much more active digitally, becoming “information brokers” who aggregated and filtered content. The result was that some journalists were important in driving traffic to particular news stories, blogs, videos and tweets. This type of insight can allow those conducting public diplomacy to contact specific journalists or information brokers, based on who regularly engages with the social media content they produce.

In future crises the identification of information brokers in a specific network could become an operational priority. At the strategic level, a public diplomacy organisation could make the decision to focus on developing information brokers, with the goal of generating more interest and attracting greater numbers of users to a news brand or organisation. Alternatively, there is potential to drive traffic toward particular stories and specific news organisations. These are some of the many possibilities for future innovation which can be supported by big data and which can allow a public diplomacy organisation to see the world from different perspectives.

Conclusions

Innovative strategies can be built on insights drawn from appropriate sources of big data. A “deep dive” into the available big data, contextualised by

Bespoke research can provide a valuable insight and foundation upon which innovative strategies can be developed.

Reflecting on the potential for innovation in the era of big data, navigating the most useful ways to derive insight from that data is only a start. While it is true, as a McKinsey Global Institute publication noted, that, “innovation, and growth simply couldn’t take place without data”, 36 it is equally important to recognise that data is only one of the building blocks in developing innovation in public diplomacy.

Data can empower a public diplomat. Open source methodology can deliver greater opportunities for collaborative strategies. However, innovative strategies require a combination of insight from big data and implementation by those with strong intercultural communication skills who are able to build relationships and work collaboratively. Even in the era of big data, it is still up to the individual who bridges the last three feet to deliver results.

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The Transformation of Airspace in the Age of Technology: U.S. Privacy Rights & International Law in the Age of Predator Drones

By DR. PAMELA FALK

Remotely-controlled unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, have already transformed the nature of war, and drone technology has now been authorized for domestic chores from forest fire fighting to crime surveillance. But the moral, legal and tactical issues that drones present have barely been addressed.

Today, Americans do not object when the President launches a drone attack on the home of an al-Qaeda leader, even when collateral damage includes innocent children. Perhaps understandably, Americans feel justified in these attacks, given the mass slaughter of innocents on 9/11, and are relieved that American soldiers are not in harm’s way. On the domestic front, the prospect of saving lives seems to mute concerns about high tech “big brother” invasions of privacy.

Drones are the technological answer to terrorism. They allow the U.S. President himself to approve attacks on non-military, non-state- sponsored combatants on a case-by-case basis. And, drones have been used on the U.S. – Mexican border for several years.

Research by scientists to modify insects to create a hybrid form of an electronic and biological bug that can, for example, turn a moth into an unmanned aerial vehicle, was first reported three years ago and continues to develop. Thus, in the not-too-distant future, that bug that you swat on a hot summer day may be government surveillance equipment.

And now, drones have been authorized under U.S. law for use in domestic airspace by government, law enforcement, first responders, and yes, the public. Does that mean your neighbor could buy a drone to check when you let the dog out? Or, could candidates for the U.S. Presidency buy their own drones to oversee campaign events of their challengers? Or, can a drug cartel purchase drones to watch the police department? Might a suspicious spouse purchase a drone to check on the whereabouts of his or her partner?

The answers to the questions are not yet clear, since the regulations are yet to be written by the Federal Aviation Administration. The rules will deal with privacy, safety, and priorities.

In early 2012, the U.S. Congress passed, and President Obama signed, without a lot of fanfare, the Federal Aviation Administration Air Transportation Modernization and Safety Improvement Act of 2012, which gives authorization for the integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into U.S. national airspace on a schedule of dates,
beginning with some use this year and opening up more areas for their use by 2015.

News organizations and filmmakers, farmers and builders will all have a legitimate interest in the innovation that drones can give their industries. There have been questions raised by Congressional representatives. In April, in a bipartisan request, Reps. Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.) and Joe Barton (R-Texas) sent a letter to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) saying that “[t]he surveillance power of drones is amplified when the information from onboard sensors is used in conjunction with facial recognition, behavior analysis, license plate recognition, or any other system that can identify and track individuals as they go about their daily lives.”

Another Congressional proposal would limit the use of drones by the government except when a warrant is issued for its use in accordance with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, but that has not received support.

The new law authorizing the opening of U.S. airspace, has not gone totally unnoticed. Congressional representatives, bloggers, and the ACLU have questioned how the new law will work and whether or not the drones can be hacked. But the bill passed, and the details will be in the Regulations.

Some of the issues facing the regulators of the domestic use of drones may be found in the questions raised by critics of drones in international affairs.

The use of drones, or unmanned aerial vehicles, has revolutionized the battlefield since the war on terror expanded in the wake of the attacks of September 11. The search for perpetrators of terror has transformed what world powers have thought of as combatants, and the use of advanced technology will continue to grow as an integral part of military strategy to aid U.S. military forces, to replace boots on the ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan, for the detection of nuclear plants in North Korea and Iran and for aid in the transition of governments.

With the rapid advance of technology in armed conflict come moral, ethical and legal questions about its use. The answers to the questions will become the basis of international engagements as well as the blueprint for the use of drones by individuals and among law enforcement and first-responders within the U.S.

Growth in the use of larger drones by the U.S., from a few dozen in the 1990’s to an estimated 7,000 today - has been exponential; and they have been used in Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. At the U.N., the use of unmanned aerial vehicles has been a topic of heated debate as is the possible use of retrieved data if drones are recovered by a hostile nation.

U.S. drone strikes in the tribal area of North Waziristan have been the subject of controversy and tension between the U.S. and Pakistan. Military analysts and U.S. government officials point to the success in the reduction of the Pakistani Taliban and of al-Qaeda in the region as well as the killing of Osama bin Laden, but the killing of two dozen Pakistani soldiers in a NATO air strike in November, led Pakistan to close supply routes to U.S. troops in Afghanistan and for Washington to suspend drone use for a few months.

Pakistan's U.N. Ambassador Abdullah Hussein Haroon offered a broader perspective on fighting insurgents on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and on strikes not authorized by Pakistan: “Politics should be transactional, not coercive. We want success. We don’t want this mess on our doorstep for the next 100 years. It’s not of our making, not of our choosing, not of our doing. We’ve paid the highest price for this war.”
Hoping to continue the use of U.S. drones in the fight against al-Qaeda in Pakistan, U.S. officials offered to give advance notice of any strikes within Pakistan’s borders, but Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar called for a halt of all drone strikes after Pakistan’s Parliament voted for a cessation of their use.

The U.N. has been the venue for some of the complaints about unmanned aerial vehicles. In December 2011 Iran sought U.N. action with regard to a downed U.S. drone for surveillance, which it called an “act of provocation.” As state-run television in Tehran broadcast images of an RQ-170 Sentinel drone, Iran’s U.N. Ambassador, Mohammad Khazaei, sent a letter to the Secretary General, the President of the General Assembly and the Russian President of the Security Council, calling their attention to the increased “provocative and covert operations against the Islamic Republic of Iran by the United States Government.”

Drones have also been central to the protection of civilians during the revolutionary turmoil of the Arab spring. In March 2011, the U.N. Security Council authorized member states to take all “necessary measures” to protect civilians from attacks by now-deposed Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi’s forces in a vote that established a no-fly zone. As a result, President Barack Obama authorized the deployment of drones in the NATO-led action that followed.

To better understand their lawfulness under international law, U.N. investigations and legal analyses on the use of drones have flourished. Philip Alston, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, presented one of the most comprehensive studies to the Human Rights Council in May 2010. “The use of drones for targeted killings has generated significant controversy,” Alston wrote. “The greater concern with drones is that because they make it easier to kill without risk to a State’s forces, policy makers and commanders will be tempted to interpret the legal limitations on who can be killed, and under what circumstances, too expansively.” Central to this issue is the question of distinction: who is a lawful combatant, and what constitutes direct participation in hostilities? “The proportionality of an attack must be assessed,” he said, “for each individual strike.”

In addition, a background note for the American Society of International Law Annual Meeting, published by the Human Rights Institute of Columbia Law School in March of last year, said that none of the controversies in the use of drones in war focus on the fact that drones are inherently unlawful: “To the contrary, most observers recognize the potential benefits of drone technology to minimize unintended casualties or damage to property.”

The Columbia Law School study foreshadowed a larger question: ‘drones may be the future of warfare, and the U.S. may soon find itself at the ‘other end of the drone,’ as other government and armed non-state groups develop drone technology.” The report called for clarity on U.S. and international law regarding their use.

Elisabeth Bumiller and Thom Shanker, writing in the “New York Times”, said, “The Pentagon has asked Congress for nearly $5 billion for drones next year, and by 2030 envisions ever more stuff of science fiction: ‘spy flies’ equipped with sensors and micro cameras to detect enemies, nuclear weapons or victims in rubble.”

U.N. agencies and analysts of international humanitarian law – as well as the U.S. Congress – have just begun to fully assess the impact of and criteria for the use of advanced technology in modern warfare and the protection of civilians, but
there is little doubt that advanced aerial technology has shaped modern warfare and intelligence and will be used extensively both on the battlefield and within the U.S. in the coming years. U.S. and international airspace is the new frontier.

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She received her J.D. from Columbia University School of Law and her Ph.D. from New York University. She is Distinguished Lecturer of American Foreign Policy and International Relations & Law at Hunter College of the City University of New York, where she is on the Faculty of the Human Rights program, Director of the Roosevelt Scholars Program, and the Faculty Advisor of the College’s Model U.N. Team.

Dr. Falk reports on all areas of international relations from the U.N. and traveled with the U.N. Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon to the Middle East. Dr. Falk’s career has involved work in academics, international organizations, for the U.S. government on Capitol Hill, and the private sector and she has written and edited six books on international relations.
INTERVIEW

Space Chronicles:
The Universe as Public Diplomacy
An Interview with Astrophysicist Neil deGrasse Tyson

By JERRY EDLING

Space exploration has always had a grip on the human imagination. Ever since Jules Verne and H.G. Wells fearlessly conceived of a future in which humankind would loose the surly bonds of Earth, the desire to go to what’s out there, as opposed to just wonder about it, has been an unimpeachable part of our culture. Wonder is a powerful force; but, as astrophysicist Neil deGrasse Tyson argues, wonder alone is not sufficient to motivate nations to commit the resources necessary to take human beings to the places that populate the night sky. He has identified three motivators that, in his view, have underpinned the capital-intensive expeditions that have mapped the Earth and are beginning to chart the Universe.

Tyson explores these three motivators in his book Space Chronicles: Facing the Ultimate Frontier. In this wide-ranging interview with Editor in Chief Jerry Edling, he argues that space exploration is far from being the exclusive province of impractical dreamers. In Tyson’s view, space exploration is a force for economic progress and one of the most potent tools available for public diplomacy.

J.E.: You argue fundamentally in the book that space exploration is not a luxury, that it drives innovation and technology and that nations, especially superpowers, that forego space exploration do so at their peril. Could you expand on your central thesis a little bit?

N.d.T.: Sure. Just my read of the history of major funded projects – we could quibble over the details of this list – but the sense of it would be resonant. So, for example, you have things like the Great Pyramids and the great voyages of Columbus and Magellan and the Manhattan Project and the Apollo project, just make the list; and we all agree these are really expensive things – you know, church building in Europe – these are episodes of cultures where lots of human and financial capital was invested in them, sort of significant fractions of the total available resources of the day. And if we’re going to go to Mars, for example, in a big way, that, I think, would be expensive and big, like the rest of these other projects.
So, I was curious some years ago, I asked, what would it take to motivate America to go to Mars if it’s very expensive? I thought maybe I could take a cue from previously-motivating activities. And so, when you do this, you go through this exercise, what you find is that there are three principal drivers of why nations spend large sums of money. And there’s not more than three; there’s just three. And the obvious, the most obvious is war. Nobody really wants to die, and you’ll spend whatever money it takes to prevent it. And that gets you the Great Wall of China; that gets you the Manhattan Project. It also, by the way, got us the Apollo project, which was a Cold War activity. We’ll get back to that in a minute. And also another important one is the search for wealth, the promise of economic return. That’s what gets you the Columbus voyages. Queen Isabella was not interested in Columbus coming back and describing the plant life and the animal life. She said, here, take this satchel of Spanish flags, plant them wherever you go; and, meanwhile, find a shorter trade route to the Far East. There are economic incentives.

So, what I’ve come to learn is that if we’re going to go into space, sure, we would do it for military reasons. We already did. That’s why we went to the Moon. But no one wants that to be the emergent reason; or, at least, I don’t. But it could also easily be justified for economic reasons, because the innovations that advancing a space frontier require – require daily, even – those innovations and those patents and those discoveries are the engines of tomorrow’s economies, especially this, the 21st century. So, it became clear that if we are in economic hard times and we’re not investing in space, we’ll just continue to slide while the rest of the world passes us by.

It’s not a matter of just the spinoffs that come from investments in space. There are always spinoffs, and who doesn’t love a good spinoff? I’m talking about the innovation culture that the act of advancing a space frontier brings upon the entire nation, whether or not you’re employed in the STEM fields – you know, the science, technology, engineering and math – if you’re part of this culture... If you’re a journalist, you’ll write a story about some discovery in space. If you’re a producer, you’ll do some extra documentaries surrounding it. If you’re an artist, you might be inspired by cosmic themes. Everyone becomes a participant, and everyone wants a piece of that tomorrow, just the way we did in the 1960s, because that was what the World’s Fair was all about. It was all about tomorrow, a tomorrow brought to you by the scientists and technologists.

**J.E.:** So, do you think we’ve lost this innovation culture?

**N.d.T.:** Oh, it’s long gone. We haven’t had it since the 1980s. By the way, there are other innovations. Don’t get me wrong. I mean, the entire sort of microelectronics universe is a universe unto itself; and that required daily innovation. The portfolio of Apple products, for example, is widely regarded in the field of innovation and industrial design. So, it’s not that you can’t have innovation without space; but, in terms of the effect that innovation would have on your culture and on the pipeline of students who want to decide what they want to be when they grow up, I know of no force as great as that of space exploration.

**J.E.:** Much has been made lately in foreign policy of the value of soft power to nations, soft power being defined as the power of attraction. The U.S. has
derived much of its soft power from its image as the land of opportunity and freedom; and I’d suggest that U.S. soft power may have reached its zenith at the time of the Apollo 11 moon landing. Is that a fair statement? And how essential is space exploration to U.S. soft power and its competition, if you will, with nations like China, Russia and the entire EU?

N.d.T.: First, I agree entirely with that assertion. If you go back to the 1960s, here we have NASA, which was conceived in a Cold War climate almost exactly a year after Sputnik was launched. The ham radio operators at the time will remember that it had a little radio transmitter inside that just went beep-beep; but the military folks took notice because it was a hollowed-out intercontinental ballistic missile shell. And so, here’s this innocent craft, Sputnik translates to fellow traveler. Sounds innocent enough, until you realize that they had the new high ground. This spooked the military, it spooked our democracy, our leadership in the free world. We founded NASA as a civilian agency, but then every astronaut, except for two of all the astronauts of that era, every one of them was drawn from the military.

So, when you consider how we actually played it out over that decade, the military motive’s fine; but now, watch what happens. We land on the Moon. Those astronauts who went to the Moon become not only national heroes but international heroes; and, as was portrayed in that film of interviews of all of the moonwalkers. One of them said, you know when we go to all these remote countries and they wouldn’t say, “You did it. You did it.” They’d say, “We did it. We walked on the Moon.” There was a shared vicarious participation in the act of having walked on the Moon. Humans walked on the Moon. And so, NASA, even at a time when we are in the middle of the Cold War and we’re fighting a hot war in Vietnam and the hottest period of the Civil Rights movement and the leaders are getting assassinated...the shiniest jewel, the only jewel with any shine at all in the American crown was the space program, and people came to view the space program not simply as an American activity but as a cultural activity of our species, and if that’s not soft power, I don’t know what is.

J.E.: Moving forward from that, so where did we lose the momentum that that generated?

N.d.T.: Oh no, it’s because we went for war. We did it for war purposes, and when we found out [Russia was] not going to the Moon, of course we stopped going to the Moon. Mars was never in our sights as long as it was not in the sights of the Russians. This is part of the delusion of our memory of that era. By the way, the alternative title of my book, which was rejected by the publisher because they said it was too depressing, is Failure to Launch: The Dreams and Delusions of Space Enthusiasts. That’s my original title, which was rejected. A lot of the book – not all of the book, but a lot of the book – highlights delusional thinking of space enthusiasts.

Leading the list of delusional thought was that we’re on the Moon by the 60’s, we’ll be on Mars by the 80’s. That’s if discovery were the driver, sure; but discovery was never the driver. So, it’s retrospectively obvious that we would go to the Moon and then stop. And so, the momentum was militaristically driven. Period. So, to say, what happened to the momentum... it was never there beyond just beating the Russians, beating the Communists, showing that we have a better system than they do. Let’s not fool ourselves. Once you assess the actual causes and effects of
decisions of that era, then it’s clear why all that momentum went away.

I would maintain that having a healthy economy is a pretty good thing that everyone kind of wants, and using space... If you don’t care about discovery, if you don’t care about new frontiers and new vistas, in a free market society you probably care about not dying poor, okay? So, then take on the lens of the economy for how our activities in space can serve it, and when you do that then it becomes our directive on our politicians rather than waiting around for the whims of one politician or another to sort of give NASA a handout on whether we can afford to explore space from one economic cycle to the other. Until you learn that NASA is the driver of the economic cycle, you’re stuck thinking that NASA is only getting handouts every year rather than not only driving the economy but driving part of the nation’s identity as well.

J.E.: So that brings up a couple of points. First of all, how do you think politicians should articulate that particular vision? One thing you mention in the book is, for example, that when President Kennedy articulated the idea of going to the Moon in ten years in the background he had said privately to his advisors that he wasn’t really all that interested in space, but he got the idea that if the Russians beat us, it would not be a good thing. So, in terms of the economy and NASA as the driver of the economy, if you were President Obama’s advisor right now, how would you advise him to articulate the vision so we’d recapture that momentum?

N.d.T.: You say that as the health of NASA’s frontier goes, so, too, does the economic health of the nation. And so, you take NASA’s budget and double it. Double it, as an example; and that would be sufficient to get back to space in a big way, where we’re not just saying we might land on Mars in the 2030s sometime, under the watch of a president to be named later on a budget not yet established, which is the current configuration of NASA. What you would do is, you would bring all of that into the near future and consider all of space, all of the solar system your backyard; and that would then drive not only the science, but tourism and mining, and there could be geopolitical reasons why one would want to go into space; and that culture, the discoveries and advances on that frontier would create an innovation culture; and it’s that innovation culture that drives the economy.

Yes, there are the direct spinoffs that will help drive local economies or for various products and services; but I’m really referring to the broader impact that adventure would have. That’s what I’d tell him to do. If he didn’t want to do it, I’d say, “I don’t care what you think; this is the mandate of the people, and you work for us at the end of the day.” Being advisor to the President means you still report to the President, as does the head of NASA, and you’re subject to the whims of the President; but in the end it’s the President who is subject to the wishes of the electorate.

As an educator and as a scientist my interest is in the electorate, because they can ultimately create the mandate that politicians must follow and thereby remove it from the table of debate about whether it should or shouldn’t happen. For example: veterans’ benefits. That is not a subject of competing candidates because it is a mandate of the people that there are veterans’ benefits. If there are discussions,
it’s on the edges of how it’s administered or, or what is the nature of the, of the services; but whether it exists or not is not even on the table. So, the doubling of NASA’s budget: people say, well, we can’t afford it. Of course you can afford it. You can especially afford it once you know that it’s an investment. That’s what investment means. You put down money now, and you get more later. That’s how that works. And so, of course there’s money. It’s a matter of how you choose to spend it. All those who are concerned about how much we’re spending in space versus how much we’re spending on the ground, we hear that a lot right? Why are we spending the money up there and not down here? If you actually look at the budget, to just look at the budget; first of all, in America the Department of Education, its budget is three times that of NASA. There’s already three times, the factor of three higher. Then you add to that all the money that social programs get. Often, NASA is contrasted with social programs. There’s a competition of need. You add that all together, it is 50 times the NASA budget. So we are spending money on important issues down here. And so, there is no real argument against this. Like I said, if the President doesn’t want to do it, I don’t care. We’ll get the public to mandate it of him, because he works for us.

J.E.: And, indeed, one positive thing you bring out in the book is that there is a huge reservoir of support for space exploration in the public, as evidenced by, say, the popularity of the National Air and Space Museum and things like that.

N.d.T.: Yes, and it’s not only that; I mean, there’s some even more crass measures of it; for example, the popularity of science fiction films. Just look at how successful Avatar was, for example. Look at how successful and recurring the Star Trek series is. Even the sitcom The Big Bang Theory on CBS. Just look at it. There’s an appetite for it that goes far beyond just the geek set and the technically trained people. It goes deep into our culture. It’s there, we want it, we like it, and some of the highest-grossing films of all time had space-based themes, from E.T. to Close Encounters of the Third Kind to even disaster movies like Armageddon and Deep Impact and Carl Sagan’s Contact. These are all, films that have captured our imagination and go beyond just the science and engineering community to be embraced by all.

I’m reminded of the 1960’s – I’m old enough to remember – where people spent a lot of time imagining a tomorrow that they knew the scientists and the technologists would bring. And that is what the 1964 World’s Fair was all about. It wasn’t about yesterday; it wasn’t about today; it was about tomorrow. And the people who I hear, they say, “I want to dream about tomorrow again; let’s create another world’s fair.” It’s like, no, you don’t get it. It was the fact that people were dreaming about tomorrow in the 1960s; that culture was in us. It is that culture that bred the World’s Fair in our society. The World’s Fair is a symptom of people wanting to dream about tomorrow. It didn’t create it. It is a symptom of it, and the kind of symptom you want to have, I think. Maybe I’m biased. The Amish clearly live in the past and they [are] perfectly happy doing so. So I don’t want to force a future on people that they might not want; but what I will do is, as an educator, is to alert you of causes and effects of your decisions and the causes and effects of your non-decisions. And in a free market democracy, you vote for how you want your future to be. Most people I know don’t want to die and they don’t want to die poor, and so here’s a recipe to resolve that.
J.E.: Do you think some of these large-scale missions going forward, say, to explore the asteroids or to go to Mars or anything that involves such huge expenditures or such a huge commitment - should that be a national effort or should it be an international effort? Should we make an effort to create a consortium or should it be that the U.S. commits itself as a nation to put a foot on Mars by a certain year?

N.d.T.: Consider that the International Space Station is the greatest collaboration of nations outside of the waging of war that there ever was. Just consider that. So, I guess we can call the Olympics a collaboration of nations, but the cost of the Olympics doesn’t rival that of the Space Station. So, there is strong evidence that nations can collaborate and do collaborate and share technologies and so these are the geopolitical reasons why someone might want to go into space. When I said earlier that in a healthy NASA, at one percent of the tax dollar, doubled from one-half a percent, a healthy portfolio would be spacecraft that could go to any destination we choose: the near side of the Moon, the far side of the Moon, the asteroids, Mars, the moons of Jupiter, and send people, send robots, you could go for scientific reasons, for touristic reasons, for the reasons of exploiting resources, such as mining, and, possibly, geopolitical reasons, there could be military reasons for going into space. All of this would be served by this set of launch vehicles.

Now, normally, the role of collaboration is that because one country can’t afford it you pool your resources; but if it’s an investment, because you know it returns back on your economy, it’s not a matter of not being able to afford it. It’s a matter of who’s got the money to invest. So, I can imagine other countries investing with us and they share in the technologies and they share in the benefits, and heroes are made - local heroes, national heroes - and so, that could stoke the economies of multiple nations if people want to participate as co-investors. Beyond that, I remind you that China was disinvited from participating in the Space Station. We cited human rights violations in it, but the consequence of that was, well, China still wanted to go into space. That didn’t stop China from wanting to go into space, so they built their entire own space program with their own astronauts. And that’s what happens when you’re motivated. The threat of America to say you can’t play in our sandbox fell on, all it did was motivate them more to sort of leapfrog their space initiatives; and now they’re talking about going to the Moon and on to Mars. That’s kind of an adversarial competition, non-militaristic - you know, I think of an adversary as kind of a friendly foe, right? Chess opponent: that’s my adversary.

So I don’t think of an adversary as necessarily military in this context; but sometimes competition will stimulate more innovation than participation. I’m not going to vote one way or another. All I’m saying is that if you view it as an investment, and in a global economy you don’t care where your investors come from. It’s just that they have the money to participate. And in this case, it’s the investment of nations feeding back to the innovations of the businesses, and, just to complete that thought, once the patents are awarded and the risks are assessed and the costs are established, then you can stimulate a capital market participation in it because then you can make a business model for it and there’s a literal return on investment that can be calculated. So this movement underfoot today, where private enterprise is vying for the contracts to take astronauts back and forth to the Space Station -
and cargo, by the way - this is a good thing; but that's not a space frontier. Private enterprise cannot advance the space frontier because the space frontier cannot be capitalized in the way that capital markets require for you to obtain investors.

**J.E.:** Well, just discussing commercial space ventures just for a second, do you think that commercial space ventures could serve as a vehicle for commercial integration among nations in the same sense that, say, the European Coal and Steel Community served as a vehicle for commercial, and eventually geopolitical, integration among nations of Europe which had been warring and now are in an integrated economy. Do you see that happening in space or vis-à-vis space going forward?

**N.d.T.:** The little I know of history and war tells me that if you have a completely intertwined economy, you're less likely to go to war against each other, because there's a mutual interdependence; and so it's true that all the countries of the International Space Station are at peace with one another, including the United States and Russia, sworn enemies for an entire generation, for 1945 to 1989. So it is possible that enemies can become friends - that's certainly the case - and sustain friends through such collaborations; but you don't specifically need space for that. You can have just simply multinational corporations that do business in multiple countries and - so, that alone is not the ticket to prevent war, I don't think, but it can certainly help. So you can see it as an activity of nations initially, for sure; but the next wave of participation, this sort of corporate business venture participation, that needn't be any one country or another.

In a global economy, if I'm running a business, I want to have tourist jaunts to the Moon, I need the best technology I can find. So, is there a piece I need in India that engineers have invented there, I've got it. Something I need from Japan, something I need from Europe, something from Brazil. Brazil has the third-largest aerospace industry in the world, by the way, unbeknownst to most Americans, who, when you just mention Brazil, all you think of is soccer and thong bikinis - we have our own stereotypes of how we think of nations and nations who have themselves risen up and have embraced innovations in science and technology. While we are saying we're at the top of the world, the rest of the world has been putting themselves on top, and we wake up one day quite surprised how backwards we are. So, I don't see why the business ventures wouldn't be completely multinational. That would be a fascinating future in store for us all; and in that way multiple nations share in the fruits of the resources that space provides.

**J.E.:** In terms of technology and science, one of the things you touched on in the book and in some other writings is the decline of science and what you call brain regression as opposed to brain drain. Could you discuss that a little bit?

**N.d.T.:** Actually it's just the trajectory of the educational system. So back in the late '70s and early '80s graduate schools in engineering and in the physical sciences of chemistry, physics, even astrophysics started getting a higher and higher participation of foreign nationals, in particular from Japan, Taiwan, India and a few other places. Beginning in the early 1990s you started getting people from the former Eastern Bloc nations. They would come, they get their advanced degrees - Masters and Ph.D.s -
and they would stay. And so we’re getting the best and brightest around the world coming to America. We train them, and they stay. This is sort of the ideal immigrant scenario, where the person from another country enhances what it is to live in the country they emigrated to.

But you have to ask, how long will this continue? Will they ever want to go back to their country? Well, over those years their home countries have started to improve their own economies and they have growth trajectories that were greater than that of the economic growth here in America. So, what we started getting was students coming here, getting their degrees and then returning to their home country because that’s where the opportunities were. That’s at best, sort of neutral, right? That’s sort of neutral. We get some who publish papers while you’re in graduate school or may they hang out for a few post-docs. There’s some participation in the nation’s goals. The next step in that evolution is those that return to set up their own schools of education so that the people never have to come here to begin with, and when that happens, we’re hosed.

So much of what we identify as America was built on the sweat equity of immigrants who came here – hard-working immigrants who helped to define what the future of this nation would be. Hard-working, smart and motivated, emphasis on motivation. So, if they never come here to begin with and it’s just us, I fear for America. I just fear for what our future will be. All the more power to these other countries, of course; but, I’m being a little jingoistic here, right? Because I’m American, so it would be nice if we didn’t lose this intellectual capital, but our loss is the gain of other nations. So, that levels the playing field in ways that I would hope America would still sort of rise to the task; but I don’t see that in the cards.

J.E.: *One of the other points you make is that it also stops us from having to negotiate. I think the example you give is that the Europeans have developed the Galileo system and that we may be put into a position where to fly into their airspace we may have to pay to use this system, whereas, in the past, we’ve been so far ahead technologically that we could just give away what we have.*

N.d.T: Yes, exactly, and the modern version of that would be the concern today that our jobs are going overseas. Of course, in a global economy it is not only expected, it is almost required that if a company can make their widget cheaper in another country that that’s what they should do, because that would maximize shareholder value and that’s the only real point of the existence of the corporation. So, we can’t simultaneously expect to be a participant in a global economy and then cry foul when a factory moves overseas. But the fact that the factory jobs are moving overseas and that we’re complaining about them means that we somehow didn’t want to give up those jobs. Well, why? Well, because there’s no other job to take its place. If we are in an innovation culture and in an innovation economy, then the jobs in our factories stay here because no one else has figured out how to do it yet. It’s a new idea, it’s a new concept, it’s a new product, it’s a new way of earning money; as long as you stay active on that innovation frontier, there’s a point where other countries can catch up with you and then the jobs go overseas. At that point, you don’t care because you have a list of seven other jobs waiting for you to occupy.
So the innovation culture solves many current problems, and, you're right, because, what are we doing now? We think the solution to that jobs problem is, well, let's put tariffs on the product or let's create tax incentives so that the company keeps their factory...and these are Band-Aids. These aren't solutions. I don't know how to solve this, so this'll temporarily stem the hemorrhaging, right? The real solution is to innovate.

J.E.:  One thing you mention in the book – and it’s a negative in terms of moving the space program forward – is the infusion of partisanship into the whole debate. And the fact that there is a debate is, as you mentioned earlier, is kind of a new development. Could you elaborate on that a little bit?

N.d.T.: It’s quite a new development, and it disturbs me greatly. There’s always been politics in space, so that’s not the issue here. NASA was created in a geopolitical environment. So, as an academic I’m prone to complain about politics because it’s always between where you are and what your goals are; but in Washington, politics is the currency. So, you don’t go to Washington and say everything’s fine except for the politics. That is how it works. So, I’m not so naïve to complain that politics is there. What concerns me is the partisanship. So, I would say this sequence of presidents, going from George W. Bush to Barack Obama, has the biggest swing of partisan divide I’ve ever seen in my life. So, there are all the people who didn’t like George W. Bush, vociferously, for whatever is in the list, whether it was his absence of intellect or his policies on war or the environment or on religion. Then we have Obama, and then all the people who were Bush supporters now hate Obama with the same fervor that the Obama supporters today would have hated Bush.

What that means is that we have these two camps who have knee-jerk reactions to political policy on a level where they seem to be even incapable of giving a complimentary nod to something that actually deserves it. So, for example, when George W. Bush proposed the next generation space policy, it actually was quite sound. It said we’ll phase out the shuttle, use the saved monies to then build a new vehicle that’ll get us back to the Moon and on to Mars and beyond. Okay. That was sound, but the knee-jerk of the Bush haters was, send Bush to Mars. Why is he even doing this? We’ve got other problems here on Earth. Okay. So then Obama gives a space speech, and he phases out the shuttle. He’s blamed for phasing out the shuttle. The Obama haters, their lens prevents them from noticing this; and so they blame Obama for phasing out the shuttle. And then Obama said, you know, we’ve already been to the Moon. Let’s stay ambitious and go to Mars.

I was at that speech; and, of course, it rang well with the audience; but then you realize, if you don’t go to the Moon, which is your near-term launch goal, then all the people engaged in near-term launches don’t have a job. So tens of thousands of people lost their job by that very one sentence, let’s skip the Moon and go to Mars. So, then, all of a sudden, you had the people accusing Obama of killing the space program when he said explicitly I love Mars, I want to go to Mars and on to asteroids. So people were blind to information and interpreted information in ways that fulfilled their partisan perspectives. If you have a partisan divide, given even what are normal political challenges, and given the annual hat-in-hand handout conduct that NASA
required with Congress to get its budget each year, this is not helping. NASA has historically not only been bipartisan; it’s been nonpartisan. You could not know if a person supported NASA just by learning of their political leanings. It somehow transcended that; and I thought that was always its strong point.

J.E.:  So what’s your vision going forward? To use your term, if you were the “Pope of Congress,” which I love …

N.d.T.: (Laughter) The Pope is all-powerful, right?

J.E.:  Exactly. What would you mandate, and where do you see the U.S. and the world in space in a perfect world in, say, 20, 30 years?

N.d.T.:  The Pope of Congress would be an all-powerful position; but then I realized, no, that’s not the most powerful position you can be in. The most powerful position you can be in is to convince the public that this is what should happen, because, at the end of the day, the Congress and the President work for the public. So I’m back-treading on my previous imaginings of being “Pope of Congress” and saying, let the public understand that a healthy NASA matters to the culture of innovation in the country in which we live. The culture of innovation stokes the economies that we so desperately need to lift out of its doldrums. Once the public decides that space is in their economic interest as well as in the interest of their dreams - once they recognize it’s in their economic interest, the public then mandates it of the lawmakers and of the leaders and of the elected officials. So I don’t want to just convince Congress and then two years later - since 88 percent of all of Congress is re-elected every two years or has to run for re-election every two years - have to do it again. I want that mandate to be so fundamentally part of what it is to be American that the senators and congressmen and president are simply executing our will. And it’s not a matter of the political whims that they represent or capture.

Neil deGrasse Tyson is an astrophysicist and the director of the Hayden Planetarium at the American Museum of Natural History. He has begun production on a new Cosmos television series, which is due to premiere in Spring 2013. He lives in New York.
CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

Reducing Global Risks and Increasing National Security

By MARK C. DONFRIED

Governments in the 21st century are faced with a variety of global security risks including terrorism, war and conflicts, stereotypes/ misconceptions and ideological conspiracies, to name but a few.

These risks have manifested themselves in a variety of different ways, by actual violent attacks on citizens (September 11th, 2001) or through “verbal attacks” expressed via social media.

These social media assaults work to create negative public opinion trends that, in turn, cause citizens to suspect and mistrust governments and institutions. The power of ideology is immense, and it can reel in people who would normally never be attracted to terrorism, encouraging them to participate in destructive activities against their own as well as other countries. Osama bin Laden, to name the most prominent example, managed to attract individuals to subscribe to and glorify his ideology by demonizing the US and the West via verbal propaganda.

Any attempt to analyze how to prevent and tackle the many forms of global risks that plague our world today must review the primary causes and incentives for individual and group attraction to terrorism. Important factors to consider may arise from ideological reasons, lack of access to basic resources and rights, and the pervasive belief that individuals’ voices (no matter the values they espouse) are not being heard.

Therefore, it has become apparent in today’s interdependent world that the legitimacy of cause is of vital importance to both state and supranational governments. In establishing legitimacy in both the domestic and international spheres with the ultimate goal of reducing global risks and increasing security, a multi-level strategy is an absolute necessity. Despite its vital importance, the use of cultural diplomacy in addressing global risks remains largely underutilized. In many ways, the application of cultural diplomacy practices can complement other, more traditional ways of increasing security (military measures or increased access to intelligence) by means of exposing and challenging destructive ideologies.

By helping to educate, enhance and sustain relationships, the application of cultural diplomacy can assist in building and improving dialogue, understanding and trust between governments and citizens all over the world at the local, national and global levels. The stronger the relationship between citizens and government, the more trust will be fostered and the less ideological incentives there will be for
citizens to resort to terrorism and violent activities. Bringing governments and citizens together into a constructive dialogue will profoundly increase mutual understanding. Cultural exchange programs and grass-roots community initiatives supported by governments can facilitate the formation of confidence and trust.

By engaging the fields of art, music, sports, religion and civil society and by working in partnership with representatives of those fields and other cultural diplomats, governments can more effectively communicate their messages within and beyond their borders and move closer to their citizens. This closeness will be sustained over time; however it can also immediately reduce major gaps or conflicts.

In addition, by endorsing cultural diplomacy, which is generally accepted as a positive and constructive activity throughout the world, governments can demonstrate their support for cultural diversity and multiculturalism and improve their image abroad.

The most notable benefit of including cultural diplomacy practices and tools into the national agenda, however, is that it is cost effective compared to alternatives such as military or police action. In addition, cultural diplomacy is inherently constructive in nature, rather than these destructive alternatives.

While cultural diplomacy as an international relations tool can be applied across the board, implementation of particular strategies and tactics of course need to be crafted on a case-by case basis, taking into account all relevant historical, political, economic and cultural factors.

After completing his undergraduate studies in European History and French at Columbia University, Mark Donfried then pursued graduate research at the Freie Universität Berlin and at the Institut des Études Politiques where he wrote his thesis on “la diplomatie du jazz.” In 2001 he founded the Institute for Cultural Diplomacy (ICD - www.culturaldiplomacy.org), a non-partisan, independent, international, and non-profit and non-governmental organization in New York City and then in 2002, he moved the International Headquarters of ICD to Berlin, Germany. Over the past decade the ICD has grown to become one of Europe’s leading cultural exchange organizations with programs extending to every continent of the world. Donfried is author of numerous articles as well as the recent book “Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy (co-edited with Prof. Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, Berghahn Books, Nov 2010).
Remarkable Current: Music as Public Diplomacy

By MAYTHA ALHASSEN

Dr. Curtis Sandberg, Senior Vice President for the Meridian International Center, asked the question in a recent article: “Does jazz have a healing role in a world divided by conflicting ideologies?” This question could have been posed to a member of the audience at a Dizzy Gillespie concert in Zagreb in 1956. In fact, an attendee, one of many in the region who were given the opportunity to hear Gillespie perform as part of a Jazz Ambassador tour of the region, remarked, “What this country needs is fewer ambassadors and more jam sessions!”

The comment remains poignant today. Tunisian youth activist Achref Aouadi recently asserted, “Remarkable Current has more of an impact on Tunisia than Secretary Hillary Clinton.” What is Remarkable Current, and how could it have more of an impact on U.S.-Tunisian relations on a grassroots level in post-uprising Tunisia than seasoned, internationally-recognized politicians?

In 2006, Remarkable Current, the American musician collective founded by Anas Canon, launched a cultural envoy and musical exchange program called “Hip Hop Ambassadors.” This initiative is modeled after an earlier century’s “Jazz Ambassadors,” a program that emerged from the Cold War context of the mid-1950s to the 1970s and was run by the Department of State. Led by jazz greats Louis Armstrong, Dizzy Gillespie, and Quincy Jones, these tours included concerts and “jam sessions” of intercultural dialogue and musical exchange. In keeping with this mission, Remarkable Current (RC) intentionally recruits American musicians who are eminent in their fields and “exude a loving spirit and a disposition of universal inclusiveness.” Canon explains, “When walking on to the stage or visiting an orphanage, you don’t have to speak the local language to communicate that you are there to share yourself with them. People can feel when you are as excited to meet them as they are to meet you.”

Having toured Tunisia, Algeria, Indonesia, Tanzania, Turkey, Morocco and Egypt, Remarkable Current artists have created a unique formula for engagement, building on the successes of their predecessors, the Jazz Ambassadors. Jazz envoys were highly influenced by the cultures they encountered. In many cases they experimented with the traditional musical styles and scales of countries they visited on these tours and learned from largely informal “spontaneous exchanges” with locals. In contrast, RC’s Hip Hop Ambassadors appear to be more intentional with their mission to build cross-cultural relationships through the medium of music and people-to-people interfaces. In every country they tour the Hip Hop Ambassadors aim to work with local musicians, speak with press and facilitate workshops with youth around questions of American culture, foreign policy, and music. For example,

in Indonesia RC auditioned local talent to join the band on its 2010 countrywide tour, filling the positions of bass and guitar. In Tunisia they fruitfully worked with their U.S. Embassy sponsors to arrange studio time interspersed among Hip Hop Ambassador tour rehearsal sets, sound checks and workshops to collaborate with Tunisian hip hop artists such as El Général and Empire and record tracks about the Tunisian revolution. The first song RC recorded, “A Young Man’s Spark (Bouazizi),” was inspired by the 26 year-old Tunisian street cart vendor whose self-immolation has been popularly mythologized as the catalyst to the Arab revolutions. Amen Ben Koussa of the rap group Empire testifies, “There was a positive message through the song, and that’s what motivated us and connected all of us. ‘Bouazizi’ a martyr, as a symbol of peace, as a call for justice, gave us the power and feelings that bridged the gap between us and that’s what totally impacted our collaboration with Remarkable Current.”

The other song that Remarkable Current recorded while on tour in Tunisia, “Pick Up The Pieces,” was co-written by Anas Canon, Kumasi Simmons and El Général after an inspiring meeting the band had with this notorious rapper in his hometown of Sfax. El Général received worldwide recognition after penning what has been deemed “the anthem of the Arab revolutions.” “I was excited to meet this guy,” Canon said, “because he was into using his music to express an important socio-political message, which is one of the reasons that I still produce hip hop music today.” Canon recognized the unique opportunity at hand. After hearing that local recording studios in Sfax were booked, he set up a make-shift studio in his hotel room for El Général, so that fans in the region and the U.S. could be a part of this collaborative experience.

Both collaborative songs have been played on Tunisia’s national radio station Radio Mosaique and were made available online by RC for free digital download, as were their accompanying music videos. Creatively employing today’s technological innovations in its catalogue of programming is a bold example of how Remarkable Current distinguishes itself from its ancestors, the Jazz Ambassadors. The technology of the time did not allow for the Jazz Ambassadors to record spontaneously on the ground with the local artists during their tours. Advances in technology and Canon’s skill set as a producer enabled him to write, collaborate, record and share these experiences in the form of songs/videos with far-reaching impact.

Local artists were not the only in-country collaborators. On the last day of RC’s Tunisian Revolution Tour, the American Corner library and community center hosted a workshop with the Hip Hop Ambassadors and local university students. “I have been waiting for this opportunity since I saw this on Facebook,” began Institut Superieur de Science Humaine de Tunis (ISSHT) student Amir Weslati during his enthused introduction to the roundtable. “I love hip hop music and rap. I cannot spend a day without listening to music.” During the workshop, he shared “Free Tunisia,” a rap written on his phone during one of the nights he and other community members volunteered to guard their community from Ben Ali’s militia. The song demanded the collective action, “Let’s get rid of Ben Ali’s ghost.” Multifarious views

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on the U.S. role and response to international conflicts, and even an artist’s allegedly creative responsibility to “speak out” against “injustices” were complicated. Also complicated were monolithic, and for the most part mass mediated, impressions of African American culture.

RC rapper Kumasi Simmons reflected on the exchange during the workshop, arguing that it, and others like it, “are bigger than a concert.” This is an educational moment for Tunisian college students trying to design incorporation into their state’s democratic transition and for band-mates from the U.S., who learned from the people they encountered and grew from those exchanges. Throughout the workshop, RC artists were surprised to hear Tunisian college students’ well-versed backgrounds on African American history. At times they exhibited their veneration for Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X by quoting them. The students even explained how they appropriated American civil rights movement sit-in tactics to protest certain decisions made by the transitional government.

Beyond valuable interpersonal exchanges, the tours have been a dramatic personal growth experience for the young Hip Hop Ambassadors, who tour under the mentorship of older, more experienced artists in the collective. 21 year-old Hip Hop Ambassador Quanti Bomani’s reactions to touring Tunisia and Algeria in the summer of 2011 exemplify this sentiment: “As a young artist, Remarkable Current amplified the power of the voice I have as a musician. My passion for the arts lay in the fact that true appreciation for music still exists. My horizons were broadened and love for the universal language reassured, while first-hand I got to witness the power a small group of musicians can have on a country that rarely sees visitors or one in the midst of a revolution. When the music begins to play, the smiles and entranced movements of the spectators instill a hope within my soul. Co-existence lies within the arts.”

In keeping focused on youth outreach in the era of social networking, Hip Hop Ambassadors continue to collaborate with artists they have met on the road; and they have made lifelong friendships with concert-goers, workshop attendees, and embassy staff, which are now easily sustained through Facebook, YouTube and Twitter. The success of RC’s Hip Hop Ambassadors program can be attributed to its emphasis on people-to-people exchanges at a grassroots level, speaking the global youth language of hip hop. Canon explains that, “what jazz was for earlier generations, hip hop is for today’s generation.” Canon clearly understands what former Jazz Ambassador Louis Armstrong knew, “A note is a note in any language.” If cultural diplomacy can be characterized as an “exchange of ideas, information, values, systems, traditions, beliefs, and other aspects of culture, with the intention of fostering mutual understanding,” as political scientist Dr. Milton C. Cummings defines it, then Remarkable Current’s Hip Hop Ambassadors are an innovative update to the 1950s and 60s Jazz Ambassador program and to the entire field of cultural diplomacy. The initiative’s vision, one that centralizes the use of today’s music, continues the tradition of the soft power of cultural outreach and using music to build bridges of understanding.

*(co-producers of the photographic exhibit “Jam Session: America’s Jazz Ambassadors Embrace the World”)* (http://www.meridian.org/jazzambassadors)

“A Young Man’s Spark” Free Download Here: http://soundcloud.com/remarkablecurrent/anas-canon-a-young-mans-spark
“Pick Up The Pieces” Free Download Here: http://soundcloud.com/remarkablecurrent/pick-up-the-pieces-anas-canon

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A Case Study of Innovation in Water Diplomacy: The World Bank

By JAEHYANG SO

With the support of the international community governments have made significant progress toward achieving the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation by 2015. Between 1990 and 2010 more than two billion people gained access to water and 1.8 billion people gained access to sanitation. Currently, 89% of the global population has access to safe drinking water.

Unfortunately, this global progress masks regional inequalities. In Sub-Saharan Africa only 61% of the population has access to improved water sources. In some countries, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, access levels to improved water sources are as low as 50%. As governments, communities, and civil society struggle to improve access gaps, stress on the world’s water is growing. Increasing urbanization, climate change, and competing uses of water are critical challenges that we all face while trying to manage global water resources.

51% of the world’s population, or 3.3 billion people, now live in cities or towns. By 2030 that number is expected to grow to almost 5 billion. Unplanned urbanization has meant that local governments and service providers have often been unprepared for the scale and location of urbanization and are faced with an increased demand for water services.

Climate change is also putting stress on global water resources in ways that we do not yet fully understand. What we do know is that the impacts of climate change are being manifested locally as a consequence of extreme weather and that developing countries have the least resources to manage water variability.

This is a serious problem. As a result of the drought in the Horn of Africa in 2011, 13.3 million people in Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti are in urgent need of humanitarian aid. 40% of Somalia’s population is affected and living as internally-displaced people or at refugee camps. There are also challenges involving excess water. The floods in Pakistan in 2010 caused more than 20 million people to become homeless. The Government of Pakistan has estimated that US$1.7 billion is needed for reconstruction. The funds have to be diverted from essential development problems.
Competing uses of water also pose challenges for global water management. In 2000, per capita water consumption in India was about 90 liters a day. This will almost double by 2050, with most of the growth coming from industry. The demand for additional water comes from three sources: increased water intensification, of agriculture, industrialization and urbanization.

Developing countries must manage this resource better if they are to grow sustainably. The World Bank understands the urgency associated with water; it is the largest external financier of water projects. With active commitments reaching US$25 billion in FY11, water is a significant part of the World Bank’s overall lending portfolio, which includes all aspects of water management: water and sanitation, water resource management, irrigation, and others.

However, we cannot hope to reach billions of people one community at a time. We need some game changing strategies that will allow governments to approach water related issues differently. This requires us to reach out to non-traditional problem solvers and engage with civil society, youth, and technical experts outside the sector. We need to move away from an era during which water policy was developed exclusively by high-level government officials working behind closed doors. A more globalized world has demanded that public diplomacy become more open and engaging. The same can be said for the water sector.

In the water sector we have begun to capitalize on the extensive reach of technology as a way to engage with new partners to find innovative solutions to water and sanitation development challenges. The World Bank and the Water and Sanitation Program developed the first ever Water Hackathon, which brought together computer programmers, designers, and other information technology specialists to compete simultaneously for 48 hours in 10 cities around the world. Their aim: to create the easily deployable, scalable, and sustainable technological tools that respond to specific water and sanitation challenges in developing countries.

The Water Hackathon followed the model set by Random Hacks of Kindness (RHoK), a partnership involving NASA, Google, Microsoft, Yahoo!, HP, and the World Bank, in which subject matter experts and local stakeholders submit actual water problems, which are then tackled by volunteer technology specialists at Hackathon events around the world. The concept of the Hackathon is not new, but for the first time it was held in developing countries.

Much effort and resources went into identifying the actual water challenges people face. For example, more than 100 problems were collected from citizens, communities, World Bank staff, and other experts. One of the challenges came from Botswana, where the water utility’s customer service center is often overwhelmed by calls requesting bill status updates. Customers encounter busy signals, become frustrated and sometimes abandon payment efforts altogether. Others have to travel to the service center to have basic questions about their bills answered.

A solution to that challenge was developed by two students from George Mason University at the Washington, DC Water Hackathon. The team built a functional prototype that simulated how a customer in Botswana could send an SMS message inquiring, “What is my bill?” and instantly receive billing information on his or her mobile phone from the utility’s database. In addition to saving customers time, this simple technological solution can potentially improve the utility’s revenue collections and operating efficiency.
That application was one of more than 50 submitted at the conclusion of the 48 hour hacking marathon. Nearly 1000 participants, 73% of whom were under the age of 30 and 20% of whom were women, with support from over 40 local civil society partners and private sector sponsors, found mobile technology solutions to the problems identified.

Some of the other winning applications included a prototype for a mobile-to-web complaint system in Kenya, a location codification system that allows Tanzanians to report water related problems through SMS and a winning app in Lima that integrated hydrological data from the Ministry of Education on an open street map.

As a result of this event we learned that much remains to be gained from the opportunity provided by the mobile technology industry. We also learned that identifying, articulating and broadly publicizing the many barriers preventing people from accessing safe water and sanitation is of great value in identifying solutions, since the solutions can come from unexpected places. Lastly, we learned there is an opportunity for scaling-up many of these exciting solutions if we effectively connect them to policy makers.

Today approximately one third of the world’s people live in countries with moderate to high water stress. Experts predict that Yemen may become the first country in modern history to run out of water. We can now firmly establish the urgency of global water challenges as central issues facing our world this century. The time is now for governments to face water challenges differently by engaging in a new type of water diplomacy, one that encourages diverse partnerships and invests in innovation.

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Prior to joining WSP, So was the Lead Infrastructure Specialist in the South Asia Regional Infrastructure Department working primarily on Bangladesh and Pakistan on urban water and sanitation sector programs. So has also worked on the World Bank’s corporate strategy and risk management development, leading the team preparing the World Bank Group’s Sustainable Infrastructure Action Plan and the World Bank’s response to the global economic crisis.

Prior to joining the Bank, So was with Monitor Company in Cambridge, Massachusetts, where she advised Fortune 100 level companies on corporate strategy issues in the United States, Canada, Europe, and Japan. She is a Korean national, and holds an MBA and a BA in Economics from Stanford University.
‘Crouch, Touch, Pause, Engage!’: Moving Forward In the Scrum of International Sport and Public Diplomacy

By DR. GEOFFREY PIGMAN

During each match in the 2011 IRB Rugby World Cup, millions of global viewers heard referees repeatedly issue these four commands to the two opposing sides in a rugby scrum. The scrum, which demands a complex balance of effective communication, positioning, and ball skills and requires cooperation from both sets of competitors in order for the game to proceed, is emblematic of the challenges of contemporary diplomacy and the communication tasks that are ever more integral to its success. International sporting competition has played a role in diplomacy since at least as long ago as the ancient Olympiad. The Olympic Truce, during which time warring governments suspended conflict to enable competitors and spectators to travel to and attend the Olympic Games, consecrated the principle that sports are integral to diplomacy’s mission of mediating estrangement and overcoming alienation between governments and between peoples. Competitors in international sporting events have always possessed the capacity to represent their governments, peoples (and sponsoring firms) not only to foreign governments, but also to specific foreign populations and to the global public more broadly. Spectators supporting different sides at live international sporting events are brought together, ideally at least, by a shared love of the game. The communicative power of international sport has been amplified dramatically by the revolution in information and communications technologies over the past several decades, which has enabled the audience for major sporting events to expand by word of mouth to over one third of the global population who at least have access to audio broadcasting. This transformation has, in effect, made international sport a primary avenue through which public diplomacy is communicated and implemented. Yet the means by which public diplomacy interacts with international sport has been paid scant attention as of late.

To address the broader need for research on the relationship between international sports and diplomacy, Drs. J. Simon Rofe (University of London – SOAS), Stuart Murray (Bond University) and I co-founded the Diplomacy and International Sport research group in 2011. One of our early observations was that a significant portion of the functions of sporting events fall under the heading of public diplomacy. At a recent paper presented to the International Studies Association’s 2012 annual conference, Stuart Murray and I proposed a taxonomy for understanding how international sport and diplomacy interact, each category of which applies to public diplomacy. At the broadest level we distinguish between international sport used as a tool of diplomacy by governments on the one hand and international sport-as-
diplomacy, on the other. The former category tends to be better known to students
of diplomacy than the latter, but international sport plays a significant part in public
diplomacy through both categories.

Governments Using International Sport as a PD Tool

International sport is one of many public diplomacy instruments in a
government’s toolbox. When governments use sport as a tool for carrying out PD,
it can be in the service of traditional, haute politique, security-related objectives. One of the most common objectives of this kind of diplomacy is to secure popular support for diplomatic engagements and relationships. When the governments of the United States and the People’s Republic of China agreed that a U.S. ping pong team would tour China in 1971, one of the primary objectives of both governments was to use the tour to gauge how each country’s population would react to the prospect of a thawing in and eventual normalization of relations between the two governments. The ping pong tour received major media coverage in each country. Both governments’ assessments of public reactions to the tour were very positive, which paved the way for U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s visit to China a few months later and President Richard Nixon’s groundbreaking visit the following year.

In a more troubled diplomatic relationship, governments may choose to communicate to a foreign public as part of a strategy, seeking to influence that population’s government. Again, sport is an important instrument in the PD toolbox. Yet in such situations, a government’s decision not to play can also be seen as an effective message to the foreign public. When the England and Wales Cricket Board (ECB) decided that England’s cricket side would not play a World Cup match scheduled to be played in Zimbabwe as part of the South Africa-hosted 2003 World Cup owing to concerns about players’ security, the U.K. government was faced with a difficult choice from a public diplomacy standpoint. The International Cricket Council had decided that the ECB’s security concerns were not valid reasons for refusing to play, meaning that failure to compete would result in forfeiture of the match to Zimbabwe. The U.K. government was aware that, irrespective of the merits of the security question, its position would be interpreted by the global public in the context of the troubled Zimbabwe-U.K. diplomatic relationship. By deciding to support the ECB’s decision not to play the match, the Westminster government garnered approval from a broad swathe of the global public by taking a principled stand against the tyranny and human rights violations of Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe, whilst risking the alienation of a significant minority of the global public who sympathize with Mugabe’s anti-colonial rhetoric. It was difficult for the U.K. to score a clean ‘win’ in public diplomacy terms. Likewise, it was challenging to measure the impact of the government’s decision on public opinion in relevant countries, Zimbabwe and South Africa in particular.

By far the largest public diplomacy component of how international sport is used as a diplomatic tool falls under the rubric of place branding and its concomitant promotion of investment, trade, and tourism. Over the past century a number of governments have attempted with varying success to use sport as an identifier in the minds of the global public to represent an idealized image of their desired state and society. Hitler’s National Socialist government in Germany sought to use the
1936 Berlin Olympiad as a showcase for Nazi accomplishments and values, but it faced international opprobrium for its attempts to exclude non-‘Aryan’ competitors. After World War II, the Soviet Union and its satellite states (particularly the German Democratic Republic) invested heavily in programs to train international-standard competitors in many sports in order to be seen as dominant on the global stage. The Olympics rapidly came to symbolize this effort as television became ubiquitous in Western industrialized countries. The Soviet Government made it a mark of achievement, particularly in the eyes of the publics in its satellite states and across the developing world, to best the United States and other Western competitors in Olympic medal totals. In various instances, however, these substantial sporting accomplishments were tarnished by subsequent revelations that competitors had used performance-enhancing substances that, if not banned already, were later proscribed.

More recently international sporting events have been viewed by many governments as an ideal venue for place branding to showcase a country, its cities, and its people to the world as attractive destinations for tourism and investment. Place branding is by definition the transmission of information and images of a country to familiarize the global public with the nation and thereby enhance its reputation. National governments routinely team up with domestic sporting federations, local governments, and private sector interests (sponsoring firms etc.) to bid for, finance, and coordinate the hosting of such events. ‘Mega-events’ such as the Olympic Games, World Cups of major sports such as soccer/association football, rugby, cricket, major competitions of ‘tour’ sports such as tennis (e.g. the Australian Open and Wimbledon), golf (e.g. the U.S. Masters), cycling (e.g. the Tour de France), and motor sports (e.g. Formula 1’s Malaysian Grand Prix) offer a range of channels for place branding. Thousands of spectators travel to sporting mega-events to view the competition live, and many of them combine their spectator visits with additional tourism in country. Many global travel, lodging, leisure, and tourism firms have the opportunity to bid on and participate in the construction and operation of the infrastructure required to host these competitions. These firms can become key partners for governments in tourism promotion both during and after the sporting event. Global media coverage of the competition – print, television, radio, and Internet – can serve as a continuous, extended, advertisement of the merits of the host country, sometimes reaching over half of the world’s population. That translates as a boon to the host country if the games are perceived as a success.

Two recent success stories in terms of place branding and promotion of investment and tourism have been the 2008 Beijing Olympiad and the 2010 Football (Soccer) World Cup in South Africa. The Chinese government spared no effort in producing an Olympic Games that showcased China as a country at the forefront of technology. As a direct result of the Games, China was perceived to have the most sophisticated infrastructure and facilities and people who are open, friendly, welcoming, and worldly. The creation of architecturally superb facilities such as the Bird’s Nest stadium and the staging of complex, spectacular, and culturally rich spectacles at the opening and closing ceremonies conveyed these images of China to a global audience numbering in the billions. Even shutting down major industrial production in the Beijing province for two months was not too high a price to pay for having cleaner air during the Olympics, creating a somewhat illusory impression of
China’s accomplishments in environmental management. Prior to the 2010 Football World Cup there were concerns that South Africa, the first African nation to hold a global sporting mega-event, would be pressed to provide adequate transport and lodging infrastructure for spectators and would be unable to guarantee the security of competitors and visitors because of high crime rates following the 1994 transition to majority rule. The South African government took on the challenge of showing live spectators and the global media audience a nation that is developed economically, rich in opportunities for tourism and investment and, above all safe for visitors. They undertook a massive infrastructure program, including new construction and major refurbishing of ten stadiums around the country, significant rebuilding and expansion of the country’s motorway network and construction of the initial leg of Africa’s first high-speed rail system to connect O.R. Tambo International Airport to central Johannesburg. To ensure effective security provisions the government assumed significant additional police powers, including the creation of special courts to deal with violations during the World Cup on an expedited basis, integrated the nation’s military into the security infrastructure, put a huge number of additional law enforcement personnel onto the streets of cities hosting matches, and resettled dwellers from informal settlements (shantytowns) near World Cup venues to other locations.

In proportion to their size, smaller countries have also benefited, from place branding, investment and tourism promotion by hosting international sporting events. Regional competitions for major sports and international competitions in sports with smaller or niche followings can bring a significant number of visitors in keeping with the capacity of small and mid-sized venues and provide a measure of international media visibility. For the Cook Islands (CI), a Pacific island state in free association with New Zealand with a total population of around 13,000, tourism is the largest industry, bringing in approximately 100,000 visitors annually. Over the past decade the islands have undertaken several projects to construct competition facilities, including a 3000-seat national stadium for outdoor events and an indoor stadium. These investments paid off handsomely in terms of securing significant international sporting competitions of appropriate scale and scope. For instance, the islands hosted the quadrennial Pacific Mini Games, in which competitors from 22 Pacific nations compete in 15 sports; the world youth netball championships, in which 20 national teams from around the world were expected; and the Air New Zealand-sponsored Golden Oldies Rugby Mini Festival. Of perhaps even greater impact in shaping the CI brand identity in the minds of international spectators, however, is the participation of Cook Islands competitors, both CI residents and the diaspora community, in major international sporting competitions abroad. The Cook Islands won the ‘bowl’ competition at the 2009 Wellington 7s, one of the major international rugby 7s events, accruing CI positive publicity through the 34,500 in attendance and the millions worldwide watching the television coverage.

**International Sport-As-Diplomacy and PD**

Since its inception, international sporting competition has been organized primarily by civil society, not by governments. For example, national sporting federations host international events (e.g. the Tennis French Open at Stade Roland Garros); international sporting bodies organize tour events across many countries
(e.g. the FIS – International Ski Federation World Cup) and major events in single or paired countries (e.g. the International Cricket Council cricket World Cup finals); and private international sporting bodies host major tour events (e.g. the Formula 1 motor racing tour). International sporting competitions take place with or without support from or engagement with governments; however, when international sporting events take place, diplomatic relations between nations are affected. Hence, governments’ public diplomacy strategies and results are affected as well. International-sport-as-diplomacy has an impact upon public diplomacy in two significant ways. The first is the direct effect of international sporting competition upon diplomacy between governments, which affect how those governments conduct public diplomacy and what they accomplish with it. The second is the specialized diplomacy of international sport - the diplomacy and public diplomacy that that international sporting bodies, such as non-state diplomatic actors like the International Olympic Committee and FIFA (the Federation Internationale de Football Association) must conduct to carry out their mission of organizing international sporting competitions.

International-sport-as-diplomacy affects the public diplomacy of nations directly in a number of ways. Case in point: when a domestic sporting league succeeds in becoming the league of choice for the highest level of global competitors in a sport. The National Basketball Association (NBA) in the United States the (soccer/football) English Premier League (EPL) in the United Kingdom, the National Hockey League (NHL) in Canada and the United States, and, more recently the (cricket) Indian Premier League (IPL) in India attract the best players worldwide in their respective sports to play for different teams in the league. Hence, each season of the league and each game/match between any two teams in the league qualifies as an international competition of note. For the nation in which the league resides, the league provides a major public diplomacy and place-branding venue. That carries both opportunities and risks. On the positive side, global fans of the sport are attracted to the host country to watch games in which their home country players are competing. Millions of fans follow the league globally, giving each city’s team a global in addition to a metropolitan and national fan base. This creates further opportunities for particularly famous sides like the EPL’s Manchester United, Arsenal and Chelsea to undertake tours of the Americas and Asia, further increasing their global visibility. Governments are not in a position to engineer the dominance of their nation’s league in the global marketplace for a particular sport as part of their PD strategy, yet they reap the benefits from the generally positive national image that the presence of a top sporting league engenders worldwide. However, a scandal or other events that bring a league and its reputation into disrepute can bring with it a serious hit to the national brand, which governments are similarly limited in their capacity to remedy. Scandals in Italy’s Serie A and Serie B football/soccer leagues in 2006 and 2011 devalued the reputation of Italian football across Europe, which may affect potential investors in tandem with Italy’s ongoing reputation for political corruption, even as Italian tourism continues to benefit from a superior global brand (with the fifth highest global tourist arrivals in 2008).

Foreign players competing in top leagues abroad can bring PD benefits to their country of origin as well as PD advantages to the country in which the league operates. When Chinese basketball player Yao Ming played for the NBA’s Houston Rockets in the 2000s, he attracted a huge fan following in China, in Houston and
around the United States; amongst the worldwide Chinese diaspora and amongst global basketball fans. Attendance at NBA games, NBA TV ratings and merchandise sales and participation (players and spectators) in China's domestic basketball league all benefited from Yao Ming's presence. However, to achieve PD success for their home nations, their teams and their host leagues, players must be PD ambassadors in every respect, in that intense media scrutiny means that their lives off the pitch/court/field are on view just as much as their competitive lives. In a more notorious incident of disreputable behavior off the pitch, talented Romanian footballer Adrian Mutu, who played for EPL side Chelsea, was suspended in 2004 after testing positive for cocaine use and was linked by tabloid newspapers to purported sex-and-drugs sessions with prostitutes. The Mutu scandal did no favors for the reputations of either Romania or the EPL at a time when the high-living lifestyles of their players and their partners being lampooned by the globally popular TV soap opera Footballers’ Wives, which ran from 2002 to 2006.

Governments can also suffer negative effects on their public diplomacy efforts when they are unable to meet basic requirements of international sporting bodies for planned competitions to take place, such as security, freedom from labor disputes and threats to health and safety. For example, the management of Formula One decided to cancel the 2011 Bahrain Grand Prix in light of the political unrest in Bahrain during the Arab Spring uprisings. The decision came as a blow to the Bahraini government, which had been at pains to convince Formula One organizers that they could provide adequate security for teams and drivers. The annual Grand Prix is one of Bahrain’s most highly visible place branding events. Continued unrest led the holding of the 2012 Bahrain Grand Prix to be cast into doubt as well, with government officials once again taking great pains to communicate to Formula One officials and the sport’s global fan base that Bahrain was a safe and welcoming venue for the event.

International-sport-as-diplomacy also affects public diplomacy through the specialized diplomacy of international sport. In order for a major international sporting competition to take place, an organization must coordinate and manage it. In many cases, including the Olympics and many sports that hold World Cup format tournaments (e.g. soccer/football, cricket, rugby, basketball, etc.), the facilitating organization is an international sporting body constituted of representatives of national and, in some cases, regional sporting federations. Producing an Olympiad or World Cup tournament requires extensive diplomatic negotiation and communication with all of the stakeholders in an event – host country and city governments, global firms that sponsor the event, global media firms that broadcast it and in some cases civil society organizations concerned with issues such as human rights and environmental protection. Moreover, international sporting bodies must continually communicate with all of the partnering national and regional sporting federations and, in some cases, the individual competitors themselves. Hence, in order to achieve their objectives, international sporting bodies must be in the business of diplomacy on their own behalf, engaging in representation, communication, negotiation, promotion, and all of the other activities that diplomats of governments and of other non-state actors (e.g. the World Trade Organization, the United Nations, etc.) do. They must hire professionals skilled at these types of tasks to practice the specialized diplomacy of the organization full time.
One of the keys to success for international sporting bodies such as the International Rugby Board and the Federation of International Lacrosse is that they must be perceived by all of their interlocutors, and to at least some degree by the global fan base, as legitimate and competent. Thus, each organization needs to undertake its own public diplomacy to inform the global public about its purpose and promote its objectives. All major sporting organizations have their own rich and informative websites, which often promote the organization in ambitious, if not grandiose, terms linking the importance of sport with world peace, economic development, education, inclusiveness, and other lofty human values. The mission statement of the IOC reads much like a global human rights charter. The first detailed objective in the IOC mission statement is: “to encourage and support the promotion of ethics in sport as well as the education of youth through sport and to dedicate its efforts to ensuring that, in sport, the spirit of fair play prevails and violence is banned”. Similarly, FIFA's mission phrase is: “(d)evelop the game, touch the world, build a better future”, or, in other words: “(w)e see it as our mission to contribute towards building a better future for the world by using the power and popularity of football.”

The difficulty that many international sporting bodies face from a PD perspective is that public perception of their actions regularly falls short of the image that they seek to project. Organizations like the IOC and FIFA have been beset by scandals in recent years that have called into question their adherence to principles of sound governance and transparency. Accusations of bribes being paid by bidders for the 2002 Winter Olympics and, more recently, the resignation of Caribbean football federation president Jack Warner amidst accusations of direct attempts to influence the 2011 FIFA presidential election cast serious doubt upon the probity of the governance of international sporting bodies. For both the IOC and FIFA, the scandals set in motion processes of reform intended to increase operational transparency and enforce higher ethical standards that, in FIFA's case anyway, are far from complete. The difficulty for the PD of international sporting bodies, as for that of governments and other institutions, is that reputational damage often takes much longer to repair than it did to occur. Yet sporting organizations are in a somewhat fortunate position. The next Olympiad or World Cup, if the event is a success, can distract public attention at least somewhat from the ongoing impact of potential scandals.

**International Sport and Public Diplomacy: Looking Forward**

As governments seek to make decisions about how best to incorporate international sport into their PD strategies, and as international sporting bodies seek to use PD most effectively in pursuit of their missions going forward, both are faced with the most common challenge for any PD practitioner: how to measure and assess the effectiveness of PD strategies effectively. Whilst the impact of specific, discrete initiatives, such as an Indian cricket tour of Pakistan, on the target country’s public can be measured through polling before and after the tour, the impact of ongoing PD strategies geared towards place branding and investment promotion is inherently more difficult to capture. Similarly, it can be difficult to disaggregate the effect of a particular sport-related PD initiative or of a particular scandal from ongoing public perceptions of a government or international sporting body. To what extent will a
hugely successful 2014 football/soccer World Cup in Brazil neutralize negative public perceptions of FIFA resulting from the 2011 scandal? Only time will tell. The impact of any given PD event or negative data point may be marginal at most. One of the objectives of the Diplomacy and International Sport research group is to collate best practices for measuring and assessing sport-related PD and to use that information to generate normative recommendations for government strategies and for reforms to international sporting bodies. The relationship between international sport and public diplomacy is still in its infancy, so the opportunities for each to serve the other better remain vast.

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Rethinking Radicalization

By BRENDAN BALLOU

In June, 2011 Google Ideas, the think tank of Google Inc., brought together academics, activists, public and private sector leaders as well as former terrorists and gang members from across the world to understand the common means by which individuals join and leave violent groups. The gathering included, among others, former members of Al Shabab, the Irish Republican Army, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, the Latin Kings, the Hammerskins, and Ansar-e Hezbollah. Also included in this “Summit Against Violent Extremism” (SAVE) were the former president of Colombia, senior officials at the U.S. Department of State, survivors of suicide bombings and kidnappings, and family members of those who died in extremist violence.

The “business model” of Google Ideas is to conduct original research, convene unorthodox stakeholders and build proof-of-concept products that test the role technology plays in changing global challenges. We began this effort – Google Ideas’ first effort since its founding in late 2010 – with two hypotheses.

Our first was that individuals’ motives for joining and leaving violent groups cut across political and geographic contexts. While ideology may have played some role in their actions, equally important were the social, environmental, and personal motivations that pushed people towards violence. Our second hypothesis was that so-called “formers” – individuals once involved in violent extremism who now renounced such behavior – were under-consulted by intervention and de-radicalization practitioners. These formers could be potent tools for intervention in their communities.

The discussions from our summit largely validated these two hypotheses. From formers we heard story after story of individuals who turned to violence in an effort to find community, identity, or a sense of purpose. As one former told us, “I think all young kids, at a certain point in life—whether it’s chess club, football, gangs—they all want a sense of belonging...This gave me my identity. This gave me my purpose in life. This gave me everything I was lacking.”

We also learned about the important local work that formers were already doing: a local hockey program for individuals at-risk for joining right-wing groups; a jobs program for kids in gang-afflicted neighborhoods; a women empowerment project in a conflict zone, among others.

Since our summit, we’ve conjectured that three things should be changed in governments’ counter-radicalization strategies. First, we need to change the messenger. As mentioned, most counter-radicalization projects are run through governments. While they play an important role, counter-terrorism agencies are not well placed to de-radicalize individuals at-risk for violent extremism. Though more research must be done on the subject, we’ve seen anecdotal evidence that formers can be positive role models in their local communities. That they experienced the same traumas and motivations as young people considering violent activity gives them especial credibility. They, more than anyone else, can speak to the hollowness of membership in violent groups.

Second, the medium needs to change. Because terrorism is an international

1 Former right-wing extremist.
problem, most counter-radicalization and intervention programs are run through national governments. However, violent extremists do not materialize without context: they too live in neighborhoods and communities. Ultimately, successful intervention projects must be local, and their messages adapted to local needs and contexts.

Third, the funding model needs to change. We found that there were numerous important projects happening at the neighborhood level, run primarily by formers. However, because these projects are intended to stay in a specific geography, they have little opportunity to see national attention or find major funding. What these projects need is a clearinghouse to connect those doing interesting work with those who wish to support it.

Following our summit, Google took a first step by funding the creation of the “Against Violent Extremism” network. The network is two things: a web platform for former and survivors to advertise themselves and their work and a program infrastructure, including full-time staff to help formers join the network and to identify funders and in-kind support.

The AVE network launched in April, and the site is live at www.againstviolentextremism.org. Yet even before the official launch we began to see organic collaborations among formers, survivors, and the private sector come together. On the final day of the SAVE conference, Christian Picciolini, Arno Michaels, Angela King, and several other former right-wing extremists together formed Life After Hate, an online news journal and intervention program for at-risk individuals. After the summit Paul Carrillo, a former gang member and leader of Southern California Crossroads, teamed up with Jane Rosenthal of Tribeca Enterprises to organize a 18-week documentary training program for at-risk students around Los Angeles. Since then their organization has grown to encompass gang as well as skinhead violence. And finally, just before the official launch of the network, Buzzmouth and eBoost Consulting, two digital marketing services, dedicated over $100,000 in in-kind marketing services to select projects from the summit to help build formers and survivors’ online brands.

We hope and expect that these organic collaborations will grow and multiply as the network expands. We’ve partnered with the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, a think/do tank based in London, to manage the project and site for the long-term. We are excited about the commitment and experience in building these sorts of networks, and are excited to see the collection grow in the coming years.

As mentioned above, one of Google Ideas’s core outputs are proof of concept products with the capacity to scale. This network is our first proof of concept, and its success will be determined partly by its ability to grow and sustain itself. But ultimately, its success will be determined by the ability of its members, connected and funded as never before, to influence at-risk individuals and desist them from violence. It will be several years before we can understand if this approach has worked.

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Bob Pastor’s most recent work, *The North American Idea*, explores how identity influences policy and provides an innovative vision of an integrated future for Mexico, Canada and the United States. The author argues that the problems plaguing the continent—drugs, energy, immigration—are transnational and can only be solved, or at least more efficiently managed, by all three countries through the adoption of a continental mindset. Pastor’s theory sheds new light on the ways in which practitioners in the field of public diplomacy can leverage identity to influence opinion.

In considering the future of public diplomacy, it is crucial to outline potential innovations in approach and method. Moving ahead in any field requires reassessment and re-equilibration. Pastor distinctly provides a thorough outline of the past, problems, and potential of the North American region. He warns his U.S. audience, “as a nation, we cannot see ourselves the way the world sees us, and until we do, we cannot lead the world through the new challenges that await us.” It is to be concluded that the author’s vision requires a new approach toward U.S. public and foreign policy and presents a great opportunity for public diplomacy.

The author promotes innovations in the ways that Mexico, Canada and the United States relate to each other and explains that the benefit lies in an improved standing in world politics. The book confronts sensitive issues such as free trade and the weak Canada-Mexico relationship with a keen mind and provides educated solutions to each problem currently facing the continent. The result of dissolving unilateral relations throughout the region is presented as shared prosperity and increased continental security.

Pastor paints a picture that seems within reach: new initiatives, increased communication and constant partnership. Public diplomacy techniques are apparent throughout the book, mainly in the tactics suggested to influence outcomes. For example, Pastor advocates that the post-9/11 response to terrorism would have been much stronger and more effective had it come from all three countries’ leaders, collectively giving a speech and implementing campaigns together. The basic idea
of increased solidarity across the continent would send stronger, more coherent messages to foreign publics, changing the dynamics of international relations and spotlighting the value of a new and integrated, North American identity.

Throughout, Pastor continues to suggest that we look at the continent in a different way and let it influence policy decisions. His argument is apportioned among seven chapters, the first of which provides detail on why North America has historically been a “piñata” for politicians and pundits, explains the evolution of NAFTA, and emphasizes the importance of sovereignty in recovering the promise of a united continent. The second chapter presents the “genetic code of North America” throughout history and finds common threads between all three countries and their contemporary codes. The third chapter discusses the values, identities, and conflicts between the nations of the continent.

The fourth and fifth chapters are devoted to transcending borders under the theme of “speed bumps, potholes and roadblocks on the North American Superhighway.” The author goes into detail in regard to the hottest topics currently debated within the region, topics that have the potential to be strategic in constructing a regional community. These include climate change, infrastructure, illicit markets, virtual borders and new transcontinental identities. The last two chapters are presented under the theme of “The North American Advantage”, outlining a vision for a North American community and a blueprint for new policies in the twenty-first century.

The North American Idea is a bright one: a future full of hard work, new opportunities and increased prosperity for the continent; but public diplomacy is necessary and true action is vital to the survival of Pastor’s vision of a cooperative continent.
I grew up across the street from a Cuban family who spent entire summers in their kitchen drinking root beer floats and watching soap operas like Days of Our Lives. They had HBO and could eat sweets more than twice a week, and so the girls on my block and I spent much of our time at the Sandoval house. Both daughters, girls around my age and the first to be born in California, never learned Spanish. Nobody in the family ever spoke of Cuba, and I never asked.

It was only when I decided to travel to Havana for a university-sponsored trip that I realized I knew nothing about life in Cuba. I had only the exotic images of antique cars on cobbled streets, sea-sand rum drinking and the cacophony of salsa music from colonial buildings. Public diplomacy is communication between a government and a foreign public, and Cuba had portrayed itself to the U.S. public as a mighty underdog against the hegemonic United States. I could speak of little else.

And so I stumbled on a blog written by a skinny Cuban woman named Yoani Sanchez, a brave dissident who challenged what I had read in guidebooks or seen in movies. After spending five years in Switzerland, Sanchez returned home to the frustrations of everyday Cuban life: not enough food to eat, two-day-long lines for bus tickets and a never-ending stream of friends and family defecting to Europe and the U.S. To deal with the hardships and her own disappointment, she began writing a blog.

At the time, Internet usage in Cuba was restricted to tourists, so Sanchez would pretend to be German and sneak into hotel Internet cafes to post her blogs. Once the government caught on, she began emailing her entries to friends and volunteers abroad, who would translate and post her writing to her blog, Generation Y. In 2009 her blog was published as a book, and in 2011 it was translated into English.

The book, Havana Real, is a collection of her blog entries from 2007 to 2010. It reads like a series of vignettes - cynical, sometimes bitter pieces of Sanchez's thoughts, a reflection of the sadness she feels at the state of Cuba. As she says, “...a thread of cynicism binds us all, the cynicism necessary to live in a society that has outlived its dreams, and seen the future already exhausted before we got there.” She shows us the preoccupation Cubans have with just trying to live - to buy some milk on the black market, to fix a broken shower, to pay an electricity bill. Simple tasks take hours, and a numbing amount of patience.

She even daydreams about a tourism campaign she calls “Come Stay a lo Cubano” (like a Cuban), where foreigners visiting Cuba use unreliable public
transportation, receive a ration of bread, and stay in dingy rooms or crowded shelters for hurricane victims, just like everyday Cubans. “(Tourists) will leave thinner, sadder, and with an obsession with food, which they will satisfy in their home supermarkets... the golden advertisements of mulatas, rum, music and dancing will not hide the collapsing buildings, frustration, and inertia of the Cuba they have known and lived,” she writes.

Cuba is changing, largely because of technology and the Internet. It is still difficult for Americans to hear the voices of everyday Cubans, but people like Sanchez are making it possible. Her book is a brave one, not only because she challenges the Castro regime, but also because she chooses to stay. When you live in a society with little hope for a future, sometimes it is easier to tune out or get out. Sanchez has decided to do neither.
David Brinkley, the renowned late U.S. news anchor, was once quoted as stating, “The news is what I say it is.” That statement, which may sound arrogant when taken at face value, was at once a reflection of the fact that someone had to choose which news to cover in a limited period of time or space - say, a half hour of television or a certain number of column inches - and a reflection of the subjectivity of the editor’s choice or choices. What is news? To a certain extent, it is a new development that is important to the consumer or the audience. It depends on the context. My cousin Steve has a company called “Shelves That Slide,” which is in the business of optimizing home storage. I think it’s an innovative concept. If he wins a major entrepreneurial award or his company becomes part of the Fortune 500, that is major news in our family; but to the population of California, where I live, the U.S. and the world as a whole, his accomplishment may engender barely a ripple. There has always been an ongoing debate as to whether news has to have a real impact on people’s lives or whether it can simply be something of interest. Take Paris Hilton. Please. By any standard her time in jail affected absolutely nothing but her criminal record; yet while I was on duty at KNX, the radio station where I work in Los Angeles, we had calls from stations as far away as New Zealand for interviews.

So who makes the choices of what news to cover? To paraphrase former President George W. Bush, it is the decider who makes that determination. So, what is news and who is the decider? I would argue that those questions are central to the future of journalism in a networked age and that the decisions we make as journalists and as citizens about freedom of expression and what U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has called the “freedom to connect” are critical to the survival of the profession, to making journalism, as the title of this speech suggests, safe for the 21st century. As journalists we have done a pretty good job of chronicling how the world has changed, but have we really adapted to that world?

Manuel Castells has argued that we live in a network society. By that he...
means, “a society where the key social structures and activities are organized around electronically processed information networks.” He goes on to say that “it’s not just about networks or social networks, because social networks have been very old forms of social organization. It’s about social networks which process and manage information and are using micro-electronic based technologies.” This is an important distinction. Castells uses what he calls “the global economy” as an example. That’s not the same thing, he says, as “the world economy” or “a highly internationalized economy” because it “is based on the ability of the core activities – meaning money, capital markets, production systems, management systems, information – to work as a unit in real time on a planetary scale.” You don’t have to watch CNBC to see the global economy at work. Just open a bank account in Burbank, California, as I did, and take money out of it in Berlin, as I have, and you are participating in the global economy.

What do the network society and the global economy have to do with journalism? I would argue that we as journalists have to start looking at the world as Castells does, because we deal in information and knowledge. As we all know, information is capital and knowledge is power. In a network society, information, as a form of capital, travels through social networks that process and manage information and are using micro-electronic based technologies. People do not necessarily get their news from centralized sources anymore. They aggregate it, they share it, they pass it around and, when possible, they act on it. They act less like an audience or a readership and more like a community, a community linked together by micro-electronics. You might say that the cracker barrel is back, although in this case it’s a virtual cracker barrel. The important point is that it is interactive and participatory, just like the forms of governance that are beginning to emerge in the network society. People in a news community like to talk back. They like to help. Newspapers and radio and television stations have recognized this. Viewers email video that becomes part of the 11 o’clock news. Crowdsourcing the news has become commonplace. Wikinews uses volunteers from around the world to write and update its site. Gannett has inaugurated a pro-am concept that blends contributions from readers and viewers with reporting in its newspapers and on its television stations. Home buyers in Florida were getting hit with massive bills – as much as 30 thousand dollars – for water and sewer line connections. One of Gannett’s newspapers, “The News-Press,” which is the newspaper of record in Fort Myers, Florida, decided to investigate. It began its probe with a short item in the newspaper and on its Web site, announcing that it was looking into those fees and asking if anyone had anything to share. Share they did. Documents surfaced, suggesting potentially illegal activity involving bids. Local engineers scrutinized bids posted online. These were posted and discussed in forums, which generated leads and drove follow-up coverage in print and on the Web. Executive Editor Kate Marymont called it “a whole different way of building a story.” If the “News-Press” had simply done a story for its readership, it might have done a good job. Who knows? By involving its community, it produced a story that was powerful.

We see some of this concept of community in the uprisings in Syria and Iran, when activists and citizens, often at the risk of their own lives, used the electronic tether that links together the network society to contribute video documenting their struggles to global news organizations, circumventing censorship and measures
barring journalists from entering.

We live in a collaborative culture. Just as the core activities of the global economy work together in real time and are connected by micro-electronics, the core activities of information gathering also work together in real time and are connected by microelectronics. This collaboration involves citizens as well as journalists, and it was made possible by advances in communication technology. I would argue that this is the fourth wave of collaboration in journalism, and it differs from the other three because it involves the people who consume news as well as those who produce it.

The first wave began with the invention of the telegraph. This technology, which began the first wave of globalization, was significant for journalism because it enabled the creation of the wire service. There were two models for this new innovation. One was the cooperative. The best example of that was the Associated Press. It started with Moses Yale Beach, publisher of the “New York Sun,” who created a pony express to deliver news of the Mexican War. The pony express took dispatches from Mobile to Montgomery, Alabama, from which mail coaches brought them to a telegraph point in Virginia. Beach offered an equal interest to newspapers in New York, and four of them (“The Journal of Commerce,” “The Courier and Enquirer,” “The New York Herald” and “The Express”) accepted. Menahem Blondheim argues that Beach’s decision to share news with rivals was “neither altruistic nor cost-driven” and that it recognized that “nothing could compete with the telegraph for speed, and all newspapers, rich and poor, would now be on a par.” The telegraph, as an equalizer, prompted the creation of a journalistic community of professionals who worked cooperatively as well as competitively.

The second model of a wire service was Reuters. It differed from the Associated Press in its business model, which was client-based, and its focus on information that had an impact on financial markets. Reuter followed the example of Charles Havas, who started a lithographic news service in Paris in the 1830s and for whom Reuter became a sub-editor. He offered targeted news services to bankers, newspapers, departmental prefects and French government ministers, then began selling news to subscribers in other countries. In the words of Donald Read, “Havas, in short, was the innovator who first organized the wide collection and sale of news as a marketable commodity.”

The second wave of collaboration was made possible by the development of the telephone. American Telephone and Telegraph used radio station WEAF, which it owned, as a laboratory for its manufacturing and supply outlet, Western Electric, which made transmitters and antennas. The Bell System, AT&T’s telephone utility, was developing technology to transmit voice and music programming over short and long distances. WEAF linked with WJAR in Providence, Rhode Island and WCAP in Washington, D.C. in a sort of ad-hoc network. Radio Corporation of America tried its own linkup using telegraph lines, but the quality was marginal. Eventually, AT&T decided to concentrate on telephones and sold WEAF to RCA, along with the right to lease its lines for network transmission. In 1926 RCA announced the creation of the National Broadcasting Company.

Content was needed to develop this technology, so news and entertainment programming grew. This programming was produced in the population centers of New York and Los Angeles. A new culture of collaboration grew involving the companies that produced the content and the affiliated stations, which in many
cases were owned by different companies. The network and its stations functioned as a sort of confederation. They traded news and entertainment, all within the family, so to speak.

The third wave of collaboration began with satellite broadcasting, which hit its stride in the 1980s. The satellite made possible the cable networks and the concept of niche broadcasting, or nichecasting. It also made possible the global 24 hour news network. As the cost of news gathering fell, due to this technology, the volume of news increased; and it became possible to supply a vast array of stations around the world. The result was the non-market-exclusive affiliate. CNN content was on multiple stations in the same market.

The distinguishing factor of these three waves was that they were all professional cultures of collaboration. Readers, viewers and listeners were the beneficiaries of these cultures of collaboration, but they were not participants. In each case an advance in technology led to a modification of an existing business model. The telegraph spawned the wire service, which was accompanied by the news cooperative in the case of the Associated Press and the emergence of information about capital markets as drivers of news production in the case of Havas and Reuters. The telephone spawned the network, a confederation of stations not necessarily under the same ownership but united in producing and carrying programming. The satellite spawned narrowcasting, the 24 hour news network, the CNN Effect and the non-exclusive market affiliate. In each case the business model changed.

The fourth wave differs from those three models in that the rise of the Internet, the World Wide Web, mobile technology and electronic text has spawned a culture of collaboration that involves the consumer as well as the producer. The task of researchers, journalism schools and the industry itself is to discover the business model that fits the latest culture of collaboration.

One starting point may be to go back to the cracker barrel, to an era when the news of the day was discussed in the country store or the town square. Rather than speaking to an audience or writing to a readership, we need to gather the community to read, to watch, to listen and to collaborate with us. The only difference between then and now is that our news communities are gathering around a virtual cracker barrel.

This model can work on many levels. At the local level, the concept of a news organization as a rallying point or a town square is almost as old as movable type. I would argue that we moved away from that model when the Industrial Revolution created the need for the more impersonal mass newspaper to carry news of commodity prices and other information that had an impact on capital markets within large port cities and from those cities to the farms that supplied the products. The community model of journalism also works at the global level. Witness how the world came together when a devastating earthquake hit one of the planet’s most vulnerable nations: Haiti. Amateur video of the destruction supplemented traditional news coverage. The courageous amateur videographers of Iran, Syria and other nations in the throes of change also became part of the community.

What about the bottom line? Some news organizations have become gated communities, at least in part, although even they haven’t been immune to the cutbacks in reporters and writers that threaten the industry’s vital role in checks and balances. I’m not a marketing expert, so I wouldn’t presume to offer any answers or panaceas.
I would suggest that one possible solution may lie in some of the innovations that are emerging in social media. Google Plus, for example, has inaugurated the concept of circles, based on the belief that users may want to share some of their information with only some of their online friends. Suppose that concept were adapted to a news community. Some content would be free. Other, more specialized content might be offered to subscription-based circles of interest. A subscriber interested in travel might join a news organization’s travel circle and receive not only content but targeted offers and deeply-discounted bargains. I’m not suggesting a blurring of the line between news and sales; but just as classified advertising has always been a selling point for newspapers, targeted discounts could be an incentive for a subscription. Groupon, for example, has used this concept to very profitable effect. The technology exists to customize content for each individual. After all, a community is made up of not only the town square but also shops and parks. Perhaps a virtual community concept could become the bottom line for news organizations.

The idea of communicating as a community has been embraced by the so-called Millennial Generation, the generation born roughly after the inauguration of Ronald Reagan as President of the U.S. If you subscribe to generational theory, you know that the Millennial Generation is a civic generation. Members of that generation are optimistic, and they believe in institutions and community service. They are constantly connected. They function as a community. And who are their heroes? 63 percent of young men surveyed said they would choose to be stuck in an elevator with Jon Stewart or another comic, compared to 15 percent who would choose Eli Manning or another athlete. 88 percent said that humor was crucial to their self-definition. According to Tanya Giles, executive vice president for research at MTV Networks, “One big takeaway is that unlike previous generations, humor, and not music, is their No. 1 form of self-expression.” In a 2007 survey, Stewart and Bill O’Reilly were tied as the top pick for favorite journalists among people under 30.

Why is this? One possible answer is that sources of news are so ubiquitous that you can get the basics online or by surfing the 24 hour news channels. You don’t have to rely on an evening news program. Jon Stewart then puts that news in an entertaining perspective. More importantly, perhaps, the bits on “The Daily Show” or on “The Colbert Report” are share-able. People use email, YouTube, social media and the shows’ websites to trade bits. They’re much more likely to ask whether a friend saw a bit on “The Daily Show” than to discuss how Scott Pelley or Brian Williams characterized gas prices. They consume the content as a community. That’s not to suggest that Jon Stewart should replace Wolf Blitzer or any other anchor. The takeaway is that people today consume news not as an audience but as a community. It is a virtual community, but a community nonetheless.

For public diplomacy professionals this transformation poses a unique challenge and a momentous opportunity. As virtual communities become the media for the exchange of information, practitioners of public diplomacy must develop program architectures that invite and, indeed, welcome participation and interaction. It is no longer enough to market a nation brand. Public diplomacy must facilitate the conversation rather than simply honing the message. As nations recognize the importance of this task, public diplomacy is bound to get the recognition and budgetary support it deserves.

I would suggest that the penultimate challenge of our time is to ensure that
this a community in which everyone can participate. Globalization has its points, but it has not benefited everyone. If you want to see a dramatic illustration of how globalization can marginalize, as Manuel Castells suggests, travel from Wall Street in Manhattan to the South Bronx. You will be traveling from what is arguably the nerve center of globalization to an area that has been marginalized by the global economy. Perhaps even more disturbing are the statistics from the Freedom House Index. According to the report “Freedom in the World 2012”, 43 percent of the world’s population lived in countries that were designated as free in 2011. 22 percent lived in countries listed as partly free, and 35 percent lived in countries described as not free. According to the report “Freedom of the Press 2011”, 15 percent of the global population lived in countries in which coverage of political news was robust, the safety of journalists was guaranteed, state intrusion in media affairs was minimal and the press was not subject to onerous legal or economic pressures. According to the report “Freedom on the Net 2011”, bloggers or Internet users were arrested for content they posted online in 23 of the 37 countries assessed. Governments have stepped up efforts to regulate and, in some instances, tightly control the medium. Measures have been proposed in such robust democracies as the United Kingdom and India that could potentially have a chilling effect on Internet use.

For those of us who cherish freedom of expression, the biggest challenge may be ambivalence rather than outright repression. We need to end the repression and the ambivalence with a strong statement that guarantees the right of all to access information and to associate freely.

Articles 19 and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are good starting points. Article 19 states, “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers.” According to Article 20, “Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. No one may be compelled to belong to an association.” These worthwhile passages were written before the Internet and mobile technologies became ubiquitous. It could be argued that if only the nations of the world would actually observe these guarantees, everything would be fine; but nations aren’t the only actors. When a search engine voluntarily or involuntarily filters content at the request or requirement of a nation-state, freedom of expression is compromised. When Twitter develops the ability to censor within a country, freedom of expression within that country is compromised. Some argue that those are simply the decisions of private companies, but when the protocols developed by those companies can affect freedom of expression, something needs to be done to create ground rules that will guarantee everyone a voice. This is a development those search engines and social media companies would probably welcome, since it would take the burden off them.

Perhaps an amendment to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights is needed, an amendment that would prohibit governments, search engines, web hosting services and Internet service providers from filtering content or blocking the ability to associate. Here’s one possibility: “Everyone has the right of access to the Internet, the right of freedom of expression in any medium and the right of peaceful assembly and association regardless of frontiers. No law or policy shall be enacted by any entity that abridges those rights.”

In the 21st century information is the most valuable commerce of all. Anyone
who tries to suppress information is guilty of restraining free trade. Cyberspace is unprecedented. It is both the Royal Library of Alexandria and the village square. To be isolated from it is to be excluded from the human community.

In that community the news is no longer what I say it is. It is what we say it is - all of us.

Jerry Edling is an editor with CBS Radio and Editor in Chief of “Public Diplomacy Magazine.” He has been nominated for three Emmy Awards, two Writers Guild Awards and a Mark Twain Award and has won two Golden Mike Awards and three Associated Press Awards. He is a member of the Academy of Television Arts & Sciences and the Writers Guild of America, west. This article was adapted from a keynote address he delivered at the Berlin International Freedom of Expression Forum.
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