On the Prospects for Democratic Deliberation: Values Analysis Applied to Australian Politics

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Democratic theorists increasingly stress that democratic legitimacy rests primarily on authentic deliberation. Critics of deliberative democracy believe that this hope is unrealistic—that deliberation either will prove intractable across political differences or will exacerbate instability. This paper deploys some tools of political psychology, notably Q methodology and values analysis, to investigate the conditions under which effective deliberation is likely to occur. These tools are applied to contemporary political debates in Australia, concerned with how the Australian polity should be constituted in light of a reform agenda underpinned by a discourse we term “Inclusive Republicanism.” An investigation of the character of the basic value commitments associated with discursive positions in these debates shows that some differences will yield to deliberation, but others will not. When two discourses subscribe to different value bases, deliberation will induce reflection and facilitate positive-sum outcomes. When a discourse has a value base but finds its specific goals opposed by a competitor that otherwise has no value base of its own, deliberation will be ineffective. When one discourse subscribes to a value base that another questions, but without providing an alternative, deliberation can help to bridge idealism and cynicism.

KEY WORDS: values, discourses, democracy, Q methodology, Australian politics.

The theory (and, to a lesser extent, the practice) of democracy has in the last 10 years or so taken a “deliberative turn.” That is, the idea that democratic legitimacy rests on authentic deliberation—rather than, say, voting or interest aggregation—is increasingly stressed by democratic theorists (see, e.g., Benhabib, 1996b; Bessette, 1994; Bohman & Rehg, 1997; Cohen, 1989; Dryzek, 1990;
Deliberative democrats pin their hopes on the transformative power of deliberation. They argue that if it proceeds in suitably unconstrained and egalitarian circumstances, deliberation induces individuals to think through their interests and reflect upon their preferences, becoming amenable to changing the latter in light of persuasion from other participants. Thus, whether a decision rule of consensus, unanimity, or majority rule ultimately prevails, deliberative democrats believe that to the extent effective deliberation occurs, political outcomes will secure broader support, respond more effectively to the reflectively held interests of participants, and generally prove more rational. Some theorists believe in consensus as an orienting feature of deliberative democracy, though most are careful to postulate this as merely the regulative ideal of all rational debate, rather than something at all plausible in the real world. In practice, the goal of deliberation is workable agreements, such that deliberators can agree on what is to be done without agreement on the reasons for the action (Dryzek, 1990, pp. 16–17; Eriksen, 1994). Yet it is crucial that participants understand and accept the legitimacy of each other’s reasons. It is the prospects for these sorts of agreements that we explore here.

Critics of deliberative democracy argue that very different and much less benign outcomes are more probable. Social choice theorists believe that the conditions of openness, equality, and lack of formal constraint favored by deliberative democrats are exactly the conditions that foster chaotic and arbitrary outcomes, for these conditions mean that opportunities for strategic behavior are unrestricted (e.g., Knight & Johnson, 1994; van Mill, 1996). Under these conditions, the kind of arbitrariness in democratic preference aggregation highlighted by Riker (1982) comes to the fore, and so we can expect only chaos and disequilibrium to be promoted by deliberative democracy. From another direction, difference democrats fear that deliberation will erase differences and coerce those who are different to agree (e.g., Young, 1994). The fears of social choice theorists and difference democrats are direct opposites, the former fearing diversity, the latter uniformity. A larger group attuned to the simple existence of myriad conflicts in plural societies is skeptical that political talk will change anything much, but sees no need to ground that skepticism in the elaborate theoretical apparatus of either social choice theory or the postmodern political theory of identity and difference.

For all their disagreements, the defenders and various critics of deliberation share one belief: that matters can be resolved at the level of theoretical stipulation, with little recourse to empirical evidence beyond illustrative anecdotes. The only exception to this generalization is the work of James Fishkin (1997) and his associates on deliberative opinion polling. Administering the same issues questionnaire to participants before and after their participation in a deliberative microcosm on a public policy issue or issues (usually lasting 2 days), Fishkin found that significant shifts in opinion do indeed take place as a result of participation in deliberation.
Here, we deploy some tools of political psychology to illuminate the possibilities for productive dialogue across fundamentally different political points of view. We also attempt to demonstrate the circumstances under which such dialogue is problematic or even impossible. Our conclusion is that some kinds of conflicts can yield in productive fashion to democratic deliberation, whereas others will not. It all depends on the character of value conflict that turns out to be at issue.

Some theorists view deliberation as taking place within well-defined institutional locations with relatively small and well-specified memberships, such as the U.S. Supreme Court or Congress. A more ambitious project looks to polity-wide deliberation that transcends such locations. Such a model is associated especially with Jürgen Habermas (1996), who wrote of the generation of public opinion through deliberation in the public sphere, followed by transmission to the state and public policymaking (see also Dryzek, 2000; Fraser, 1992). In this way “communicative power” can make itself felt over “administrative power,” to use Habermas’ terms. It is the prospects for this more ambitious model of deliberative democracy that we address here. It would be a daunting task to investigate empirically the psychological processes attending such real-world cases of society-wide deliberation in action, but with a little ingenuity we can undertake and analyze some more indirect observations.

Before we can do so, we need to specify a bit more precisely just what deliberative democrats mean by the generation of public opinion through deliberation. This is made easier by thinking in terms of discourses. A discourse can be defined as a shared set of understandings embedded in language that enables its adherents to put together pieces of information and other sensory inputs into coherent wholes, organized around common storylines. The public sphere will normally be home to a constellation of discourses, some of which may be direct competitors. For example, discourses of sustainable development and industrialism (which recognizes no ecological limits) compete in environmental affairs.

The importance of discourses has been highlighted in recent encounters between the theories of deliberative democracy and difference democracy (see especially Benhabib, 1996a). Difference democrats (e.g., Connolly, 1991; Young, 1997) stress that different individuals bring different kinds of identities to politics. Identities are tightly bound up with the discourses in which individuals move, and which in large measure constitute identities and their associated points of view. Thus, democratic politics is largely about contestation across different discourses; as Nancy Fraser (1992) put it, adherents “aspire to disseminate [their] discourse to ever-widening arenas” (p. 124). Examples of such widening dissemination would include the rise in recent decades of feminist and environmental discourses. In this

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1 Habermas himself did not recognize discourses in this sense, because of his commitment to a Kantian rationalism in which individuals should ideally see through the unspoken assumptions that define discourses.
light, public opinion at any point is the provisional outcome of the contestation of discourses in the public sphere (Dryzek, 2000, chapters 2 and 3).

Such contestation is often engaged by spin doctors, demagogues, and propagandists. Deliberative democrats pin their hopes on the degree to which contestation can instead be accompanied by participants’ reflection upon their own positions and engagement with the positions advanced by others, in which all are open to questioning complexities and ambiguities. Yet, as Connolly (1991) feared, what may transpire instead is a dogmatic and sectarian assertion of identity and difference, and an associated denial of the claims to legitimacy of alternative identities and their associated discourses. Think, for example, of the dogmatism associated with right-wing Christian fundamentalism in the United States, whose denial of gay and feminist identities and discourses is (literally) an article of faith.

When will differences across discourses yield to effective deliberation and thus contribute to democratic legitimation rather than to dogmatic reinforcement? Most theorists do little more than state their hopes and fears on such issues. We hope here to do better, by deploying values analysis to show that reflection and openness across discourses is possible in some circumstances but not in others.

Our inquiry proceeds in the context of the possibilities for deliberation about fundamental issues concerning the political structure of society. Such issues provide the key opportunities for deliberation. Indeed, theorists such as Ackerman (1990), Estlund (1993), and Rawls (1993) expressed the belief that deliberative democracy should be sought only on such issues, not on day-to-day matters of public policy. The theory of deliberative democracy is in large measure a theory of democratic legitimacy, and the most important aspect of legitimacy arises in the context of collective choices about society’s basic institutional fabric. We can call these issues “constitutive” ones because they are about how society and polity should be constituted. The term “constitutional” is less appropriate here because it connotes only the formal procedural rules embodied in a constitution, and we wish to cast a broader net.

Here we consider a particular society (Australia) with an unsettled institutional order, where constitutive issues as we have defined them are a contentious part of the political agenda. We explore the factors that underlie observed patterns of conflict across different discourses on these issues, as well as the prospects for productive deliberation over these conflicts. Our analysis turns on answers to two empirical questions. First, is there coherence in beliefs about constitutive issues, and are these beliefs organized around a limited number of discourses? Second, are there core social values (those with which few members of society disagree) that are basic to these discourses? We answer both these questions in the affirmative. The methodological tools we deploy come from two research traditions, featuring Q and R methodology, respectively.

In the tradition of cognitive consistency theories (Abelson, 1983; Festinger, 1957), a discourse can be interpreted as an interconnected set of beliefs, attitudes, and values that individuals share with others and use to contextualize and interpret
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political events and experiences. Cognitive consistency theorists claim that individuals are motivated to select beliefs that will sit comfortably alongside each other and to discount information that is perceived to be incompatible with those beliefs, giving rise to an interconnected cognitive system that can be used to make sense of political events. Much of the work emanating from this tradition has focused on how decisions of a certain kind are made by individuals: which beliefs are primed in certain circumstances, how beliefs are traded off, or how schemas are derived in order to fast-track decision-making (Lau & Sears, 1986; Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986). This paper takes a different approach. The purpose is to take findings from values-attitudes research rooted in consistency theory and theories of political socialization (Braithwaite, 1982, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c; Rokeach, 1973, 1979) and to use them to address the problem of how different political persuasions can engage in constructive dialogue with each other.

Within the shared set of cognitions that constitute a discourse, there may exist a set of core values. Rokeach (1973) defined a value as an abstract principle concerning an ideal goal in life or way of behaving that is considered preferable to the opposite goal in life or way of behaving, personally and socially, and that transcends specific objects and situations. Kluckhohn (1951) placed an additional constraint on his definition of value: Values are shared understandings about what is desirable for the society as a whole, and as such are standards of behavior internalized during the process of socialization.

If discourses are to have any political bite, then they must contain both evaluations of the present and prescriptions for the future (even if those prescriptions are “do nothing”). Otherwise, the discourse would be silent on key aspects of public affairs. Given the established power of values as an analytic category, it would seem fruitful to try to link the specific normative propositions associated with political discourses to the more general kinds of values enumerated in the psychological tradition of values analysis. From the perspective of attitude-value consistency theory (Rokeach, 1973; Rosenberg, 1956), values that are embedded in discourses should be both salient and resistant to change. These qualities, combined with the fact that such values are rarely rejected by individuals, make them a potentially important bridge across discourses.

Constituting Australia

Although Australia is normally classified as a stable liberal democracy, its established institutional order is under challenge on three fronts, which can be described as follows:

Republic versus constitutional monarchy. Australia is a constitutional monarchy with a British head of state. Today we find substantial support for, but some resistance to, the idea that this postcolonial anachronism should give way to a republic. Minimalist republicans merely want to replace the British monarch with an Australian head of state with equally limited authority. More radical republicans
see an opportunity to imbue the polity with principles from the republican tradition of political thinking, notably institutions that would accommodate a less deferential and more active citizenry.

**Multiculturalism.** Multiculturalism is a reform agenda, committed to mutual recognition and respect across ethnic groups, that moves beyond the traditional Anglo-Celtic dominance of Australian culture and politics (expressed as recently as the 1950s in terms of a “white Australia” immigration policy). This agenda meets resistance from those who see in it “politically correct” privilege for non-European minorities and a denial of Australia’s own cultural heritage.

**Reconciliation.** Legal impediments to Aboriginal citizenship were fully removed in 1967. Reconciliation today involves atonement for a history of oppression and reccompense for past wrongs. Although few Australians would deny that the abuses took place, there is resistance to the “black armband” view of history that sees Australian nation-building only in terms of wrongs done to the Aboriginal population. The issue plays out most strongly in terms of claims to land, with “native title” competing with the more conventional property rights of graziers, miners, and loggers.

These three issues can be linked. Indeed, at the Constitutional Convention called in 1998 to address the republic issue, moves were made to insert new text in the Constitution recognizing Aborigines as the original inhabitants of Australia and characterizing Australia as a multicultural society. We contend that the reform agenda on each of these three issues is driven by a single discourse, which we call “Inclusive Republicanism.” Inclusive Republicanism was identified using Q methodology in conjunction with political discourse analysis (Dryzek, 1994, pp. 226–227; for complete methodological details, see Dryzek & Berejikian, 1993). The Inclusive Republicanism discourse is summarized in narrative form in the following terms:

Our political system is currently distorted by television, advertising that brainwashes ordinary people, the undue power of the rich, a lack of female representation, and pervasive economic rationality. However, matters can be changed. I favour affirmative action, multiculturalism, greater representation for women in parliaments, and replacement of the monarchy by a republic. Everyone should get a fair go, and be able to have a say in politics. We can and should be a better democracy, a more humane and equitable society which nurtures individuals and provides for more in the way of competent and public-spirited citizenship. People shouldn’t just be motivated by self-interest when it comes to voting and politics. Markets by themselves cannot achieve social goals, so governments should take an active role in promoting social justice through public policy (and there may be a role for expert advice here). Democracy means the protection of minorities as well as the rule of majorities.
Before proceeding further, a brief description of Q methodology is in order (for more details, see Brown, 1980, 1986).

**Q Methodology**

A Q study involves modeling the orientations of people toward a particular domain through reference to their reactions to a set of statements about the domain (64 statements in our case, drawn from the political language of Australia). Each subject is asked to order the statements, in our case into 13 piles from “most agree” to “most disagree.” This ordering is called a Q sort; it represents the entirety of the disposition of the subject to the domain in question.

As an intensive methodology, Q methodology normally works with small numbers of subjects; we used a sample size of 60 subjects. Our selection sought to maximize variety in social characteristics such as age, education, occupation, income, sex, and ethnicity. We also sought supporters of different parties (and of no party) and the politically active as well as the apathetic. Interviews were conducted in a variety of urban and rural locations throughout Australia. [These 60 subjects are the same set for which the discourses reported in Dryzek (1994) were identified.]

Unlike the more widely used R methodological techniques, Q methodology is concerned with identifying patterns within and across individuals, rather than across variables. The Q sorts of different subjects are compared, correlated, and (usually) factor-analyzed in a search for patterns across individuals. Factor analysis reveals patterns of similarity and difference across the subjects. We used centroid factor analysis (as is standard among Q methodologists) followed by varimax rotation. A loading for each subject on each factor can be calculated, representing the degree to which the individual supports the discourse at hand. This loading can vary from −1 to +1. The loadings for our 60 subjects are presented in Table I. In this study, each factor represents a political discourse. The equivalence between factors and discourses is established by our application of principles of political discourse analysis in our construction of a sampling frame for selection of the 64 statements, together with the fact that these statements are drawn from the political language of Australian society (rather than contrived by the researchers).2

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2 This sampling frame was a 4 × 4 matrix. On one dimension, the four categories were ontology (entities whose existence is recognized or denied), agency (the ascription of the capacity to act or be acted upon to some of these entities), motives (for agents), and relations regarded as natural (such as equality, competition, and hierarchy of various sorts). The four categories on the other dimension were about the kinds of claims that can be made: definitive (concerning the meaning of terms), designative (concerning empirical matters), evaluative (concerning the worth of what exists), and advocative (concerning what should exist). Combining these two dimensions yields 4 × 4 = 16 cells. Initially we gathered around 300 statements derived from transcripts of discussion groups and published sources. These 300 statements were classified into the 16 categories, then four statements were selected at random within each category to give 64 statements for use in the Q sorts.
Table I. Subjects’ Factor Loadings on Four Discourses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject occupation and self-description</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. M, musician, Christian democratic socialist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. F, retired nurse, conservative</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>54*</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. F, retail business proprietor, Christian</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>62*</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. F, nurse, broad-minded</td>
<td>60*</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. F, office manager, conservative/cynical</td>
<td>49*</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. M, property salesman, broad-minded</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-16</td>
<td>61*</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. M, retail manager, inquisitive/conservative</td>
<td>56*</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. M, struggling small business owner, small-L liberal</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>59*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. M, pharmacist, apolitical</td>
<td>56*</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. M, marine engineer, socialist</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. M, sales consultant, swinging voter</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>46*</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>53*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. M, self-employed electronic technician, democratic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>68*</td>
<td>-16</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. F, student, equal representation for women, minorities</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>61*</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. F, nurse/manager, moderate left feminist/humanist</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>60*</td>
<td>-15</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. F, secretary, interested in political/social issues</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. F, senior corrections manager, politically aware</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>59*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. F, enrolled nurse, open-minded</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. F, enrolled nurse, interested</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. M, bottle shop manager, finds Australian politics boring</td>
<td>57*</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. F, journalist, leaning to the left</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-24</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. F, television producer’s assistant, swinging voter</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>51*</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. M, dental prosthetist, votes for policies</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. F, nun, believes in law/order, national security, etc.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-17</td>
<td>56*</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. F, teacher/accountant, flexible</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>45*</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. F, admin. assistant/teacher’s aide, conservative/open</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>48*</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. M, securities analyst, moderate</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. M, mechanic/concrete finisher, considers all sides</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>45*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. F, hairdresser, interested until Whitlam was sacked</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>55*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. M, student, Marxist</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>47*</td>
<td>-17</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. M, driving instructor, don’t place emphasis on politics</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. F, litigation officer, not very involved</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-15</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. M, slaughterman/tire builder, don’t care</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. M, small businessman, extremely strong views</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. M, computer programmer, free education fundamental</td>
<td>52*</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. M, cafe owner, ignorant on everyday politics</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. F, disability pensioner, relatively conservative</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>-29</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. F, social worker, social democrat</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>72*</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. F, manager, right-wing Labor</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table I. (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject occupation and self-description&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Factor&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. M, housekeeper/eldercare, versatile</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. F, clothing designer, apolitical Labor/Green</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. M, self-employed artisan, active</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43. M, cartage contractor, disenchanted</td>
<td>−1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44. F, home duties mother/grandmother, swing voter</td>
<td>−23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45. M, solicitor, former Liberal, hates both parties</td>
<td>76*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46. M, valuer, extreme right-wing racist</td>
<td>53*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47. F, retired shop chain owner, swinging/votes own interest</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48. M, accountant, Labor supporter</td>
<td>69*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49. M, salesperson, right-wingish</td>
<td>66*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50. F, waitress, not attached</td>
<td>69*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51. M, cab driver, staunch Labor</td>
<td>71*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52. F, mother/housewife, confused</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53. M, product management, right-wing Liberal</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54. F, clerical, swinging voter tending Labor</td>
<td>−1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55. F, buyer, swinging voter</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56. M, retired architect, swinging voter</td>
<td>−45*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57. M, psychologist, swinging voter</td>
<td>57*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58. M, greenkeeper, unenthusiastic</td>
<td>46*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59. F, clerical, fairly ignorant until election time</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60. F, sales assistant, doesn’t think of self politically</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>M, male; F, female.

<sup>b</sup>Factor A, Resigned Acceptance; factor B, Inclusive Republicanism; factor C, Right-Minded Democracy; factor D, Anxious Egalitarianism. Loadings have been multiplied by 100 for easier reading.

<sup>c</sup>Gough Whitlam, Labor Prime Minister 1972–75.

<sup>*</sup>Significant at the .01 level.

### Competing Discourses

We have already noted that the republican, multicultural, and reconciliation reform agendas in Australian politics are united and underwritten by the discourse of Inclusive Republicanism. The inclusive aspect of this discourse refers to the affirmation of previously excluded groups or categories and their acceptance into full political membership in Australian society. The discourse is republican in both its rejection of monarchy and its sense of invigorated citizenship. Support for reconciliation can be discerned in the discourse’s respect for minority rights and its identification of the need for positive government action to redress past wrongs and promote social justice.
Now, we cannot say with any confidence just how many Australians subscribe to this discourse (it would be easy, but expensive, to devise a national survey to find out). What we can say with confidence is that this discourse does exist in the larger society. With equal confidence we can claim that three other discourses exist, both among our subjects and in the larger society. These three additional discourses, identified through our Q factor analysis and again summarized in narrative form (see Dryzek, 1994, pp. 226–230), are as follows.

**Resigned Acceptance:** This is a society with an upper class and a lower class in which the rich can use the political and legal systems for their own advantage. Money controls politics. Thus, the political system cannot be described as a true democracy, and I am very cynical about it. Voting is ineffective in changing matters, as we’re confronted with an appalling set of parties from which to choose, and we cannot hold our representatives accountable. Being able to vote doesn’t make us equal. Ordinary people are rarely asked their opinions, and cannot influence politics. It would be nice not to have Canberra telling us what to do, and to have a political system less controlled by minority interests, but the system we’ve got is inflexible and unlikely to change. So we are stuck with the system we’ve got, and it is probably the best we can realistically expect. A republic would be acceptable, but it wouldn’t change much.

**Right-Minded Democracy:** Democracy is about majority rule, and we should not let concern for minorities (particularly racial minorities) get in the way. Free democratic debate is important, and everyone should get their say, no matter what their views. Government’s main task is to maintain peace and justice, and otherwise not to interfere in people’s lives. Free markets are better than bureaucracy. Australia is not a class-divided society. And there is nothing much wrong with our political system (including the monarchy) or the choices it gives us. However, the particular governments that are elected can produce bad results (for example, by failing to promote the market) and be unwilling to share power with right-minded people. Ordinary right-minded people shouldn’t let themselves be downtrodden. If enough of them stand up and apply pressure on their local members, they can turn situations around. What we need is strong, honest, realistic leadership, putting into practice tried and trusted principles like those found in the Bible.

**Anxious Egalitarianism:** We live in a genuine representative democracy whose procedures work reasonably well, and we are given real choices. It certainly works better than any alternative system we’ve seen. However, we need to protect democratic procedures against loud minorities. I’m worried about the domination of unrepresentative minorities in politics. Affirmative action is fine, but we shouldn’t give special political rights to
anyone. For example, we should not ensure that women have equal representation in parliament. We’re all Australians, and so we’re all equal. All we need is informed voting and political equality in the act of voting; nobody should be given special treatment. Everyone should be allowed to have their say and be represented, and perhaps proportional representation in elections might help. Active democratic government can help produce a more equitable and humane society, and correct for class divisions.

An examination of the content of these three competing discourses shows why the threefold reform agenda associated with Inclusive Republicanism faces opposition in Australian society and politics. Resigned Acceptance has little interest in reform of any sort, but it is willing to go along with movement toward a republic, though expecting nothing will change for the better. Beyond this, Resigned Acceptance believes that reform is pointless in a fundamentally unequal society, and this discourse legitimates disengagement from the political process. Right-Minded Democracy sees no reason to overhaul the political system, and so is hostile to the reform agenda. Its identified need is for strong leaders espousing traditional values, not any reshaping of Australian society and its institutions. Anxious Egalitarianism opposes multiculturalism—and reconciliation, if that involves singling out Aborigines for special treatment—but is willing to accept movement toward a republic, again without much enthusiasm.

The reform agenda associated with Inclusive Republicanism cannot simply wish away these competing discourses. The problems and obstacles encountered by this agenda can be explained in large measure by the presence of these competitors. What are the possibilities for more productive deliberation across Inclusive Republicanism and its competitors? A closer look at the value commitments associated with each discourse will help to elucidate the patterns of both irreducible conflict and potential dialogue.

The Value Dimension of Discourses

As already noted, constructive dialogue between disparate groups requires sympathetic engagement with, and understanding of, the position of the other, as opposed to the dogmatic assertion of identity (Connolly, 1991; see also Deutsch, 1973). This requirement is reinforced by empirical work on compliance and cooperation that has highlighted the importance of feeling respected by the other, a perception that is more likely if mutual respect can be expressed genuinely by both parties (Braithwaite, 1995; Braithwaite & Makkai, 1994; Makkai & Braithwaite, 1994).

The values concept we introduced earlier provides the required basis for building mutual respect (Braithwaite, 1994, 1998a; Braithwaite & Blamey, 1998; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Values are abstract principles that individuals have internalized as desirable standards of behavior for themselves (personal values) or
society (social values) (Kluckhohn, 1951; Rokeach, 1973; Scott, 1960). They motivate individuals toward action (Inglehart, 1977; Kluckhohn, 1951; Rokeach, 1973, 1979; Williams, 1968), represent the socialized individual’s reconciliation of self and society’s needs (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, 1990), and are used to justify actions to ourselves and others (Kristiansen & Zanna, 1994; Stephenson, 1974). They have a collective focus, in that they are widely shared in the community, embedded in social institutions, and stable over time (Braithwaite & Blamey, 1998). Although individuals differ in how they prioritize values and argue about their practicality, few contest their desirability (Rokeach, 1973, 1979). Furthermore, links with related constructs such as ideologies, attitudes, and beliefs have been well established (Feldman, 1988; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987; Inglehart, 1990; Rose & McAllister, 1986; Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986).

The consensus surrounding the desirability of the core values examined in this paper has been empirically established. The majority of these values are accepted to some degree by 90% or more of the Australian population, with considerable stability extending over a 20-year period (Braithwaite & Blamey, 1998). Differences that emerge relate to the strength of commitment to values as principles that should guide decision-making. Thus, one might view responses to these core values as ranging from acceptance with indifference to acceptance with commitment.

Social values, as shared and stable societal aspirations, are therefore an attractive starting point for the exploration of constructive interchange across discourses. They have the added advantage of being limited in number (Kinder & Sears, 1985; Rokeach, 1973). Intensive semi-structured interviews with a randomly selected sample of Australians produced the 18-item Social Goal Values Inventory (Braithwaite, 1979, 1982, 1994), representing the goals that citizens believe should be used as guiding principles for how society should evolve. During this exercise, value categories were derived from the experiences and interpretations of citizens, rather than psychological theory (McKennell, 1974). The values cohere around two dimensions that are relatively independent of each other, a security value orientation and a harmony value orientation (Blamey & Braithwaite, 1997a; Braithwaite, 1982; Braithwaite & Law, 1985). Where correlations have emerged between the factors, they have been positive, suggesting that those who consider security-oriented values as being of prime importance to a society also are inclined to consider harmony values as of prime importance (Braithwaite, 1994).

The cluster of harmony values has been associated with egalitarianism, environmentalism, post-materialism, political activism, support for progressive social policies, and the political left. The cluster of security values has been linked with individualism, free markets, materialism, support for conservative institutions and policies, and the political right (Blamey & Braithwaite, 1997a, 1997b; Braithwaite, 1994, 1997, 1998b; Braithwaite, Makkai, & Pittelkow, 1996; Heaven, 1990a, 1990b, 1991; Thannhauser & Caird, 1990). The central thesis of the security-harmony values model is that both individual and collective behaviors are framed by a security orientation that is concerned with the protection and allocation of
society’s material and social resources, and by a harmony orientation that represents the humanistic expression of integrity, peace within and with the external world, and the realization of human potential (Braithwaite, 1998d).

In this paper, the items of the Social Goal Values Inventory are the focus of the empirical analysis, rather than the overarching values scales themselves. The advantage of Q methodology is that it is sensitive to differences within the community in cognitive constructions. Although security and harmony values cohere in aggregated form, there is no reason to assume that, as clusters, they help to define each of the discourses outlined above. A particular discourse may feature one or two specific values from the security or harmony cluster, or it may draw on values from both clusters, or from neither cluster.

**Hypotheses**

Previous work suggests that any discourse that emphasizes egalitarian, humanitarian, and social justice objectives pursued by a tolerant and active citizenry ought to be linked with values from the harmony cluster (Braithwaite, 1998b). Among our four discourses, Inclusive Republicanism meets this description. We also predict from this work that Right-Minded Democracy, with its commitment to free markets, tradition, and minimum government interference, should be most likely to be associated with values from the security cluster (Braithwaite, 1998b; Heaven, 1990b). Previous research has shown that strong commitment to values from one cluster does not imply indifferent acceptance of values from the other cluster (Braithwaite, 1994). If anything, those who are committed to harmony values also feel committed to security values (Blamey & Braithwaite, 1997a; Braithwaite, 1994). Given these findings, we expect that supporters of Inclusive Republicanism and Right-Minded Democracy would be unlikely to marginalize the values articulated by the other.

This argument contradicts the assumptions of most attitude research about the incompatibility of left and right values (Feather, 1979), but it is entirely consistent with the way values have been defined and measured here. Few would argue that harmony and security are undesirable states or that either should be recklessly abandoned. Priorities may differ in particular contexts, but it is conceivable that political decisions can be made that respect both kinds of values. Thus, our central thesis is that in cases where security and harmony values play a central role in justifying discourses, a bridge is available that can provide at the very least a basis for mutual recognition and respect. This bridge might even point to creative ways of constructing options that prove mutually satisfactory, thus lending credibility to deliberative democrats’ hope for rational political consensus.

In the case of Resigned Acceptance and Anxious Egalitarianism, value connections are less easily anticipated. Resigned Acceptance conveys the kind of disenchantment with politics that might lead one to expect displays of skepticism toward all societal goals. If ideals are unattainable, values may be accepted with indifference at best.
Beyond this observation, it is difficult to generate specific hypotheses. Although values are presumed to anchor attitudes and beliefs within the psyche of individuals and society’s institutions, individuals can hold coherent sets of attitudes and beliefs that are neither derived nor justified in terms of a value system (Rokeach, 1973). We hypothesize that Resigned Acceptance and Anxious Egalitarianism may be discourses of just this type.

Method

The Social Goal Values Inventory requires respondents to rate each of 18 goals in terms of their importance as guiding principles or standards used by them to make judgments about national policies and about world and community events. Individual items are rated on a scale ranging from 1 (“I reject this”) to 7 (“I accept this as of the greatest importance”). The items are presented in the Appendix.

As noted above, an individual’s loading on each of the Q factors, which can range from −1 to +1, represents the degree to which the respondent subscribes to the discourse represented by the factor in question. We used these factor loadings to represent the dependent variable, the individual’s support for each discourse. The independent variables were value scores collected after the 60 subjects had completed their Q sorts.

Correlating variables such as the value measures with Q factor loadings is an unusual combination, but it does not undermine the integrity of either Q methodology or the values analysis. Discourses (as represented here by Q factors) are social phenomena, yet they can be uncovered using information about individuals (via the Q sort procedure). The converse is also true: Individuals can be measured in terms of their loading on each of the four discourses. Values for their part have a cultural aspect, even if many scholars argue that they are universal (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). Although values can acquire their own special meanings for individuals, theory and research suggests that there is also a core shared meaning that endures across time (Blamey & Braithwaite, 1997a; Braithwaite & Blamey, 1998) and across cultural contexts (Schwartz, 1992). Because our interest lies in the role played by the shared meaning of values across cultural (or discursive) contexts, R methodology is appropriate for the derivation of our value measures.

Results

The dependent variable, factor loadings for individuals on each of the discourses, meets the requirements of ordinal measurement but not of interval measurement. Kendall’s τ coefficient was used to compute the correlations between support for each discourse and value commitment. The results appear in Table II.

3 The distance between .2 and .3 is not equivalent to that between .8 and .9. Meaningful comparisons of difference require squaring of the coefficients. This procedure loses information about the sign of the coefficients, which is critical in identifying the nature of the relationship between discourse and values. The present analyses proceed using factor loadings and assuming ordinal levels of measurement.
As hypothesized, Inclusive Republicanism is significantly and positively associated with 9 of the 11 harmony values. Those who subscribed to the discourse of Inclusive Republicanism expressed stronger commitment to the values of a good life for others, greater economic equality, equal opportunity for all, social progress and social reform, international cooperation, preserving the natural environment, a world of beauty, rule by the people, and a world at peace. Also as hypothesized, Inclusive Republicanism was not significantly associated with marginalizing security values as desirable goals to live by.

Right-Minded Democracy was associated with a subset of values from the security cluster, as anticipated, but not with the majority of them. Right-Minded Democracy was most likely to be endorsed by those who were strongly committed to national security, upholding traditional sexual moral standards, and reward for individual effort. It is noteworthy that upholding traditional sexual moral standards did not have the high levels of acceptability of other core values, attracting support
from only 73% of the population (Braithwaite & Blamey, 1998). Consequently, the capacity of this value to build bridges across discourses is less than that of others in the Social Goal Values Inventory. As anticipated, Right-Minded Democracy was not associated systematically with the rejection of harmony values.

The negative correlations in Table II between Resigned Acceptance and many of the values show that Resigned Acceptance is the discourse of those who downplay the importance of society’s ideals. Supporters of the Resigned Acceptance discourse responded to 8 of the 11 harmony values with indifferent acceptance, as evidenced by negative correlations with a world at peace, a world of beauty, a good life for others, human dignity, rule by the people, greater economic equality, equal opportunity for all, and preserving the natural environment. They also were relatively uncommitted toward national security and upholding traditional sexual moral standards. Conversely, those who held strongly to these security and harmony values as principles to live by were those who were least likely to adopt the discourse of Resigned Acceptance in relation to their society’s governance.

The fourth discourse, Anxious Egalitarianism, did not correlate significantly with any of the values measured by the Social Goal Values Inventory.

Discussion

The analysis revealed that core values were associated, in a positive sense, with two of the discourses. Inclusive Republicanism incorporated a strong value base from the harmony values. Right-Minded Democracy had associations with a subset of the security values. Most important, neither marginalized the value priorities of the other. The option for constructive dialogue remains feasible in light of these results.

For the remaining discourses of Resigned Acceptance and Anxious Egalitarianism, values were less obviously a point of leverage for building constructive dialogue. In the case of Resigned Acceptance, values provided cohesion for cynicism. Resigned Acceptance emerged as the discourse of individuals who had little commitment to harmony values. They were not only cynical about the current state of Australian politics, but also about ideals of cooperation and equality. This cynicism extended to some extent to security values, with low priority being placed on national security and upholding traditional sexual moral standards. In the case of Anxious Egalitarianism, the absence of any value correlates suggests that for this discourse, there is no value-attitude cohesion at all.

Having identified some discourses with a value base, and some without, how do we answer the question of whether values can be used to build bridges across discourses that, on the surface, appear to be so different? If shared values are central to building respect and cooperation in dialogic settings, what hope is there for making deliberative democracy work in society when no positive value base exists? The next section puts forward an analysis of conflict across discourses from a values perspective.
Conflicts across discourses can relate to value differences in three ways. First, discourse A and discourse X may have different value bases. Second, discourse A may have a value base, and find that its specific goals (but not its value base) are opposed by discourse Y, which has no value base of its own. Third, the value base of discourse A might meet with indifference from discourse Z, which in the terms we have developed lacks a value base of its own. In other words, X opposes A because of their different value bases, Y opposes A because of A’s specific goals, and Z opposes A because it has no interest in A’s value base. (A fourth kind of conflict—rejection of A’s value base—is logically possible, but in practice it is unlikely. As we have noted, the harmony and security values do not meet with rejection; reactions to them range from indifferent acceptance to committed acceptance.)

As it turns out, Inclusive Republicanism faces value conflicts of all three types. If A is Inclusive Republicanism, then X is Right-Minded Democracy, Y is Anxious Egalitarianism, and Z is Resigned Acceptance. Before proceeding, we should stress that when we say that a discourse has no value base, this does not imply that the discourse contains no normative positions. Rather, what we mean is that the discourse lacks any association with the socially recognizable core values whose centrality to social and political life has been established in earlier work. We now examine the implications of the three very different kinds of conflict for Inclusive Republicanism and its associated reform agenda.

Inclusive Republicanism versus Right-Minded Democracy. Both Inclusive Republicanism and Right-Minded Democracy were discourses that expressed societal values. The discourse that was most firmly based on pursuit of societal ideals was Inclusive Republicanism, whose associated value commitments are to social progress, international cooperation, greater economic equality, equal opportunity, a good life for others, preserving the natural environment, a world of beauty, peace, and rule by the people. These societal goals are the components of the harmony value orientation, which has consistently emerged as the value base for support for policies and parties of the left (Braithwaite, 1994, 1997, 1998b, 1998c). Consistent with these findings, Inclusive Republicanism was popular among supporters of the left (Dryzek, 1994, p. 233).

In contrast, the discourse of Right-Minded Democracy has empirical links with three values that are more security-oriented than harmony-oriented: upholding traditional sexual moral standards, reward for individual effort, and national security. These values have links with the security value orientation (Braithwaite, 1994) and have been associated with political and social conservatism (Braithwaite, 1994, 1997, 1998b, 1998c). Right-Minded Democracy was favored by supporters of the right (Dryzek, 1994, p. 233).

Both Inclusive Republicanism and Right-Minded Democracy are discourses that are likely to make their presence felt at the party political level. The values on which they are based not only command support in the community, they are also
central to the platforms of the major political parties. The coherence that is evident among values, beliefs, attitudes, and partisanship suggests that these discourses are established and institutionalized in the community. They articulate two visions of democracy that are consistent with the views of political elites.

In terms of their political affiliations with the left and right, respectively, these discourses might be expected to be incompatible at a negotiation table. However, a close look at the goals associated with each discourse suggests that this need not be the case. Both discourses express optimism about democracy, support citizen involvement, want a society that is peaceful and just, and support government’s role in achieving this outcome. In this sense, both discourses show a commitment to making democracy work: They are engaged in the political process.

Differences between Inclusive Republicanism and Right-Minded Democracy emerge in the degree to which they believe social structures need to be changed to meet these shared objectives. Inclusive Republicanism advocates social change to empower disadvantaged groups and to share the benefits of social life more equitably. Right-Minded Democracy denies that social inequalities are the problem, instead seeing solutions within individuals. Better morality on the part of stronger leaders is the change advocated within the narrative of Right-Minded Democracy. These points of conflict are not unfamiliar, representing one of the fundamental differences between the left and right (Skitka & Tetlock, 1993). Debate along these lines is well institutionalized in adversarial politics, and we should not expect it to produce genuine normative consensus. Yet the extent of their shared commitment to making democracy work suggests that deliberation across Inclusive Republicanism and Right-Minded Democracy can have some shared points of reference. Moreover, because the two discourses are orthogonal rather than diametrically opposed when it comes to the values on which they differ, there should be plenty of scope for positive-sum outcomes of deliberation. Deliberation is also likely to stimulate reflection, inasmuch as both sides begin with a value base to reflect upon, and this value base is not opposed by the other side.

Inclusive Republicanism and Right-Minded Democracy may establish a more constructive approach to their conflict than any other combination because their values are different (though not diametrically opposed). Each commands enough support in the wider community to warrant respect at the negotiating table, mapping quite easily onto conventional political divisions.

Matters are quite different when it comes to the two other kinds of conflict in which Inclusive Republicanism is involved. Neither Resigned Acceptance nor Anxious Egalitarianism has a positive value base in the terms we have used. If they are not discourses that have developed from a concern about furthering shared societal goals, we must ask what function they do serve and why they have emerged. The answer is that they represent discontent that is not easily expressed through the ballot box, where conventional options on the left and the right cover most of what is on offer. They are essentially reactive discourses. Australian political analysts might suggest that the object of their reaction is the agenda we
have associated with Inclusive Republicanism, especially multiculturalism and reconciliation with the Aboriginal peoples.

**Inclusive Republicanism versus Anxious Egalitarianism.** In the case of Anxious Egalitarianism, the absence of any value correlates suggests that this discourse may reflect specific and circumscribed concerns about aspects of Labor Party policy. Legislation mandating programs of affirmative action among employers has led to a community backlash against affirmative action measures, which has been given occasional voice in the press and in parliamentary debates (Braithwaite, 1998a). Concerns in relation to affirmative action for women were addressed seriously through the media, but less systematic attention was given to the defense of Aboriginal benefits or multiculturalism during the years when the Labor Party was in office (1983–1996). The singularity of the concerns expressed through the Anxious Egalitarianism discourse may have resulted in them not being taken too seriously during this period. The subsequent backlash in the community against “political correctness” was used to advantage by the right-wing alliance of Liberal and National Parties, and in its wake came attacks on multiculturalism, Aborigines, and migration, which in 1997 became the rallying point of the newly established One Nation Party. Attacks on Aboriginal rights and multiculturalism have appealed to some voters’ sense that ordinary Australians are not getting their fair share of the country’s resources. The expression of this view in itself is part of the democratic process, but because (as we have shown) it has been unaccompanied by concessions to society’s shared values, be they security- or harmony-oriented, the conflict has been an unproductive one. It has been difficult to identify common goals, even at the most abstract level, let alone debate evidence for the advancement of such goals through particular policy initiatives.

From the perspective of Inclusive Republicanism, Anxious Egalitarianism opposes structural change to empower currently disadvantaged groups and ignores the values that underlie its political reform agenda. Indeed, with its specific message of opposition to the empowerment of women and minority groups, Anxious Egalitarianism can be pretty much defined as a reaction against the inroads of Inclusive Republicanism. Without a shared value base, anxious egalitarians project an attitude of personal injury, a feeling that one is missing out, while others who may be less worthy are having life easy.

The disquiet expressed in this discourse, together with the finding that it is not anchored systematically to a set of values, suggests that it may be both transitory and volatile. While proving an irritation to the discourse of Inclusive Republicanism, it might eventually be captured by either Right-Minded Democracy or Resigned Acceptance. Anxious Egalitarianism could lead to destructive conflict because its bridge to other discourses is its singular opposition to Inclusive Republicanism. In this respect, it poses a greater challenge to Inclusive Republicanism than does the more visible, established, and conventional opposition associated with Right-Minded Democracy. And it is hard to see any deliberative process changing matters. From the point of view of difference democrats, this is
the worst kind of case, where the encounter of discourses produces only the
dogmatic reassertion of identity.

**Inclusive Republicanism versus Resigned Acceptance.** The value analysis
confirmed the cynicism that pervades Resigned Acceptance. As a discourse it
stands for nothing in terms of desirable societal goals, instead regarding as futile
the energy with which Inclusive Republicanism pursues its goals. Resigned Ac-
ceptance may, therefore, highlight a different kind of reaction against a long-serv-
ing Labor government that failed to deliver on the goals associated with Inclusive
Republicanism.

Inclusive Republicanism has its roots in a strong commitment to harmony
values such as equality, peace, cooperation, and social justice. Resigned Accep-
tance is the discourse of those who accept such values only with indifference, and
certainly not with conviction. When these two discourses are juxtaposed, the
potential for conflict is apparent. Inclusive Republicanism is a highly idealistic
discourse, with an idealism that is spurned by the cynical discourse of Resigned
Acceptance. From the perspective of Resigned Acceptance, Inclusive Republican-
ism is likely to be viewed as impossibly romantic.

Constructive dialogue across these two discourses must therefore involve
concessions on both sides. The challenge for Inclusive Republicanism and its
reform agenda must be to turn idealized values into achievable goals, and to argue
convincingly that certain courses of action will advance such goals. The concession
they must seek from those who adhere to Resigned Acceptance is to ask that the
latter listen with an open mind rather than a closed one. Nonbelievers and cynics
they may be, but there is nothing in Resigned Acceptance that is antithetical to
tolerance and giving others a go at making things better. Thus, deliberation across
these two discourses can be productive, although in a different sense than for the
Inclusive Republicanism–Right-Minded Democracy pair. Positive-sum outcomes
are unlikely to be at issue, because there are few obvious goals sought by Resigned
Acceptance to which such outcomes might respond. Rather, effective deliberation
here might produce more reflective and sympathetic understanding on the part of
Inclusive Republicanism for a different section of the community. For Resigned
Acceptance, deliberation might create an openness to the possibilities for political
change that were previously dismissed.

**Conclusions**

In this paper we have tried to unpack the nature of contemporary constitutive
politics in Australia, using some methodological tools provided by political psy-
chology. We have revealed that a reform agenda comprising multiculturalism,
republicanism, and reconciliation is driven by a single discourse: Inclusive Repub-
licanism. We have explored the relationships between Inclusive Republicanism
and its competing discourses in terms of the value commitments associated with
each. Values analysis sheds light on the character of discourse differences and
compatibilities by alerting us to strategies that might prevent the deliberative process from degenerating into the restatement of dogma, unproductive conflict, or stalemate. This analysis can also provide insight into ways in which deliberation can promote reflection on preferences and creative problem-solving. Further, the analysis shows that some kinds of conflict do seem to be destined only for impasse.

This kind of impasse is observable in the relationship between Inclusive Republicanism and Anxious Egalitarianism. Anxious Egalitarianism arguably owes its very existence to its opposition to the policies of Inclusive Republicanism, but this opposition does not connect in any systematic way with a values base that is seen to have legitimacy in the community. So on the face of it there is no other way to reach Anxious Egalitarianism, and no opportunity for the production of workable agreements that would encompass partisans of the discourse. Thus, there is no point in making any concessions to the group as a whole. Failure to identify a systematic preference for some values among anxious egalitarians, however, does not mean that individuals in this group are unable to connect their beliefs to socially shared values. Individual A may link an anti-Aboriginal stand to a concern for security, while individual B may link the same belief to a concern for equality. If anxious egalitarians are a mixed bag in the values they espouse (and this is what the absence of significant correlations in our data suggests), their discourse may have an exposed flank once dialogue with other discourses is formalized. Such dialogue might be expected to expose diversity in fundamental values among anxious egalitarians and fracture the group’s cohesion.

Matters are much more tractable when it comes to Right-Minded Democracy and Resigned Acceptance. Inclusive Republicanism and Right-Minded Democracy are both engaged in the political process, and there is plenty of opportunity for positive-sum outcomes in the interactions of these two discourses, precisely because they are committed to different kinds of values.

When it comes to Resigned Acceptance, the issue involves Inclusive Republicanism proving that it is realistic rather than romantic in its aspirations. In return, Resigned Acceptance might listen with an open mind and shed at least some of its cynicism, because that cynicism is not underwritten by any strong value commitment, but rather by skepticism about the importance of values.

We can generalize our conclusions to the prospects for deliberative democracy as follows.

1. If two discourses subscribe to different basic values, then productive deliberation is possible. It will rarely produce any kind of normative consensus, but it will inspire each side to reflect on its own interests and to consider the legitimacy of the interests of opponents who subscribe to another discourse. Positive-sum outcomes can be facilitated.

2. If one discourse has a value base and finds its specific goals opposed by a discourse that has no value base of its own, then deliberation between groups
is likely to prove unproductive, in the sense that it will yield only dogmatic reassertion of positions.

3. If one discourse subscribes to a value base that a competing discourse questions without proposing an alternative, productive deliberation is again possible. Deliberation is here mostly a matter of bridging the gap between idealism and cynicism; in such a process, both sides may be called on to reflect upon the character of their proposals for practice.

The relative frequency of these three kinds of conflict is again an empirical matter, which we cannot begin to resolve here. If our analysis holds true, however, the prospects for deliberative democracy are rosy to the extent that conflicts take these first and third forms, and dim to the extent that the second form prevails.

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REFERENCES


Prospects for Democratic Deliberation


**APPENDIX: The Items of the Social Goal Values Inventory**

*Harmony Values*

A good life for others (improving the welfare of all people in need)
Rule by the people (involvement by all citizens in making decisions that affect their community)
International cooperation (having all nations working together to help each other)
Social progress and social reform (readiness to change our way of life for the better)
A world at peace (being free from war and conflict)
A world of beauty (having the beauty of nature and the arts: music, literature, art, etc.)
Human dignity (allowing each individual to be treated as someone of worth)
Equal opportunity for all (giving everyone an equal chance in life)
Greater economic equality (lessening the gap between the rich and the poor)
Preserving the natural environment (preventing the destruction of nature’s beauty and resources)
Freedom (being able to live as you choose while respecting the freedom of others)

Security Values

National greatness (being a united, strong, independent, and powerful nation)
National economic development (having greater economic progress and prosperity for the nation)
The rule of law (punishing the guilty and protecting the innocent)
National security (protection of your nation from enemies)
Reward for individual effort (letting the individual profit from initiative and hard work)
Domination of nature (controlling nature and making use of the forces of nature)
Upholding traditional sexual moral standards (opposing sexual permissiveness and pornography)