Humanness and Dehumanization

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The only true voyage of discovery, the only fountain of Eternal Youth, would be not to visit strange lands but to possess other eyes, to behold the universe through the eyes of another, of a hundred others, to behold the hundred universes that each of them beholds, that each of them is.

—Marcel Proust, 1922

Modern life makes physical distance almost meaningless. With sufficient funds, a person living in a developed country can wake up on one side of the planet and go to bed on the other. Without even getting out of bed, a person can see via webcam nearly any corner of the planet, talk to someone sitting nearly anywhere in the world, and view the weather from the South Pole to the North Pole and everywhere in between. Overcoming physical distance is nothing.

The greatest journey that no amount of technology can ever overcome is one of psychological distance—the distance between two minds. As the physical world shrinks, the psychological world expands. Cultures mix and mingle. Social classes collide. Political, ideological, or religious views are broadcast through radios and televisions, streamed live over the Internet, or exchanged through texts and e-mails. A person commuting into work in a metropolitan area could drive by persons from every income strata, ethnic group, religious affiliation, work classification, or educational background represented in a modern census. The modern world exposes us to a dizzying array of other people whose beliefs, attitudes, emotions, and worldviews may bear little resemblance to our own. The greatest voyage in modern life is not to move from one place to another but rather to be able to move from one mind to another.

Human evolution seems to have equipped us well for this psychological journey. Human beings are the most social primates on the planet today, with brains specially adapted to handle the demands of living in large social groups (Dunbar, 1992, 1998). Human brains have the unprecedented ability to reason about the minds of others; to think about others’ beliefs, attitudes, and intention; or to monitor others’ reputations and remember who
knows what within a group (Herrmann, Call, Hernandez-Lloreda, Hare, & Tomasello, 2007). As great as this mind-reading ability is, we suggest in this chapter that it comes with one major shortfall: others’ minds routinely appear dimmer—in fact, lesser—than one’s own.

Consider remarks made by the lieutenant governor of South Carolina, Andre Bauer, in 2010. Speaking about the problems of government assistance at a town hall meeting, Bauer argued that the poor should not be given food assistance because “they will reproduce, especially the ones that don’t think too much further than that... They don’t know any better.” Bauer’s quote, intended or not, implies that the poor have a relatively diminished capacity for foresight, or a reduced tendency to think carefully about the consequences of one’s actions. It implies that the poor have lesser minds.

Although this view of the poor as being mentally incapable has a long history in policy discourse (Bertrand, Mullainathan, & Shafir, 2004), we suggest that the perception that others lack the same sophisticated mental capacities that we possess is a much more widespread psychological phenomenon. It also extends to judgments of peers and neutral individuals. This tendency to perceive lesser minds in others can be thought of as a form of passive dehumanization, stemming from the inherent difficulty in perceiving another mind as vividly as a person perceives his or her own mind. Rather than resulting from intergroup conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000; Zimbardo, 2007) or from active attempts to justify or license wrongdoing (Bandura, 1999; Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006), passive dehumanization results from more subtle and frequent instances in which we subtly fail to recognize the full extent of others’ mental capacities (see also Cortes, Demoulin, Rodriguez, Leyens, & Leyens, 2005; Demoulin et al., 2005; Haslam, 2006; Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladin, 2007).

The Other Minds Problem Versus the Lesser Minds Problem

Other minds pose two problems. One is philosophical, typically termed the “other minds problem.” Because a person can only experience his or her own mental states directly, a person cannot be confident that any other mind exists besides one’s own. Most people get over this problem within the first few years of their lives and forever after reason about the minds of others without a hint of doubt. Whether in deep conversation with others, in the midst of a competitive negotiation, or simply in the checkout line at the grocery store, human beings understand each other through the language of intentions, emotions, goals, attitudes, beliefs, and other states of mind. Humans even attribute minds frequently to nonhuman animals and objects (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007). Practically speaking, the philosophical version of the other minds problem appears to be no problem at all.

The other problem that other minds pose in everyday life is psychological, what we refer to as the lesser minds problem (Epley & Waytz, 2010). Even
though it may be quite easy to think about others’ thoughts, feelings, or other mental states, the mind attributed to others may be systematically lacking in complexity, depth, and intensity. The minds that people attribute to their pets, for example, may be considerably more sophisticated than the mind their pets actually possess, but it is still less sophisticated than the mind that people recognize in themselves. Even the minds attributed to other people, we will argue, tend to be diminished versions of what people recognize in themselves.

Because the minds of others are inherently invisible compared to one’s own, inferences about other minds must rely on indirect information such as inferential theories, stereotypes, egocentric analogies, expressed behavior, and others’ verbal reports of their mental states. These indirect methods create a systematic bias, we believe, to perceive others’ mental capacity as lesser than one’s own—as less intense, less causally impactful, and less objective than one’s own. Because a mind is typically the defining feature of personhood for intellectuals and ordinary perceivers alike (Farah & Heberlein, 2007; Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007; Haslam, 2006; Leyens et al., 2000), the lesser minds problem represents a subtle form of dehumanization. Although subtle, the consequences of this form of dehumanization are highly influential and can lead to the denial of moral worth to others, further licensing wrongdoing toward these others (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012).

Although thinking of oneself as intelligent, competent, and mindful is surely self-enhancing, we believe the lesser minds problem is distinct from self-enhancement motives and the tendency to view oneself as better than others. Evidence consistent with the lesser minds problem comes from a wide variety of research programs in which people recognize fewer positive and negative mental states in others (Haslam & Bain, 2007; Leyens et al., 2007). This includes work on the subtle dehumanization of others compared to the self (Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005), work on egocentric biases in social judgment whereby people utilize mental states to predict their own behavior more than they do to predict others’ behavior (Epley & Dunning, 2000; Koehler & Poon, 2006; Van Boven, Loewenstein, & Dunning, 2005), and research on the “bias blind spot” in which others’ judgments appear less objective than one’s own (Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 2004). Having a lesser mind means being less capable of deliberate thought, planning, and conscious will, but also less prone to negative mental states such as shame, fear, disgust, and unwanted temptations.

The research we review in this chapter suggests a potentially general tendency to consider other minds to be less vivid and intense than one’s own, with other minds sharing similar but muted capacities. Not only might other minds seem less vivid, they may also be seen as being less varied and sophisticated as one’s own with a narrower range of emotion, intellect, preferences, motivation, and will. In this chapter, we suggest three routes through which the lesser minds phenomenon occurs and highlight illustrative examples for each potential route. These mechanisms apply not only to the minds of other people, but also to future and past versions of one’s own mind. Theoretically,
we believe this existing evidence suggests that perceiving another mind in its full humanity is not an automatic tendency but rather requires mental effort. Despite having an impressive and phylogenetically unique capacity to reason about the minds of others (Herrmann et al., 2007; Saxe, 2006), people may routinely fail to use this capacity to its fullest extent.

**Three Kinds of Lesser Minds**

The lesser minds problem takes three primary forms: that others have less mental experience than we do ourselves, that others’ inner mental experience is less causally important to behavior than our own, and that others’ inner mental experience is a less accurate reflection of reality than our own. The first form arises from the biological impossibility of accessing and experiencing another person’s mind as vividly as we experience our own minds. The second form arises from another discrepancy in the experience of self and others. One’s own thoughts arise quickly and automatically, typically before one’s own behavior. This temporal priority can create the perception—at least sometimes, if not always, an illusion (Wegner, 2002)—that one’s own thoughts, emotions, and other mental states cause behavior (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). Without the experience of causal priority of others’ thoughts and mental states, others’ minds may appear to be relatively weaker as well.

The third form arises from “naive realism” (Griffin & Ross, 1991; Pronin, Puccio, & Ross, 2002; Ross & Ward, 1996)—the intuitive experience that one’s own thoughts, feelings, attitudes, and opinions are an accurate representation of reality. This leads to the logical inference that others with different thoughts, feelings, attitudes, or opinions are more prone to bias and subjectivity than oneself. This form is particularly likely to emerge when it is clear that mental states differ between self and other, such as with people from different political, religious, or socioeconomic groups.

**Form #1: Direct Access to Own Versus Other Minds**

Nagel (1974) famously noted that no human could ever know what it is like to experience the inner life of a bat and could only reason about a bat’s conscious experience through analogy to one’s own inner life. Lao Tzu tells a similar story of two men—Chuangtse and Hueitse—looking over the water (Saxe, 2009). When Chuangtse observed, “See how the small fish are darting about! That is the happiness of the fish,” Hueitse responded, “You are not a fish yourself. How can you know the happiness of the fish?” Chuangtse responded, “And you not being I, how can you know that I do not know?” Both of these examples illustrate the biological impossibility of experiencing another’s conscious mind. In the same way that a kitchen light looks dimmer when standing outside on the sidewalk than when actually inside the room, so too do we suggest that minds of others look dimmer while viewing them from an outside perspective. The experience of having a
headache, for instance, is much more intense of hearing about someone else’s headache. We believe it is no coincidence that all headache medicine is now marketed as “extra strength.”

One manifestation of this difference in levels of access comes from studies showing that people consistently underestimate the extent to which their peers and friends report experiencing negative emotions. These studies show that this underestimation results from the tendency for people to keep negative emotions hidden or private (Jordan et al., 2011). In other words, people routinely experience negative emotions but do not always exhibit them in their behavior, leading observers to misperceive the amount of negative emotion that others experience. In particular, observers believe that others experience fewer negative emotions than these other people actually do.

Not only are some mental states kept hidden, but also one’s own emotional experiences loom larger in memory than do others’ emotional experiences, a bias that may make people feel like they experience them more routinely than do others. Consider embarrassment. In one study (Epley, Savitsky, & Gilovich, 2002), people considered a list of embarrassing situations and reported whether or not they had experienced each one. People also predicted the percentage of others completing the survey who would also report having experienced each situation. This list included 14 embarrassing situations, such as “spilled water on your pants so it appeared you had wet yourself,” “forgotten the name of an acquaintance,” and “had a bad hair day.” More people reported experiencing these events than they estimated for others, a pattern that emerged on 11 of the 14 events. People thought their own embarrassment was relatively—and inaccurately—unique.

The difference between experiencing an emotion directly and thinking about another’s emotions is also shown in neuroimaging studies that compare perceptions of one’s own pain versus perceptions of another’s pain. In these studies, experiencing one’s own pain involves both brain regions involved in the basic sensory perception of pain as well as regions involved in the affective appraisal of this experience. However, perceiving others experiencing pain primarily engages regions involved in affective appraisal (Singer et al., 2004; Zaki, Ochsner, Hannelin, Wager, & Mackey, 2007). Knowing that another person is in pain, and even empathizing with their pain, is not the same as actually being in pain. This neural distinction between immediate experience and conceptual understanding applies to other mental states as well, from emotions to thoughts to intentions (for review, see Zaki & Ochsner, 2010).

This gap between one’s own mind and other minds can make it easy to underestimate the intensity of others’ emotional experiences, including the physical pain experienced in torture (Nordgren, Morris-McDonnell, & Loewenstein, 2011), the social pain experienced from ostracism (Nordgren, Banas, & MacDonald, 2011), and the power of drive states such as hunger and thirst (Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2003). The only way to reduce these gaps, according to this research, is to actually put people in each of these
experiences. A person truly knows the intensity of another person’s experience only when experiencing it directly.

Just as one’s own pain seems more intense than others’ pain, so too is one’s own pleasure more intense than others’ pleasure. For example, people experience more positive emotion from an immediate monetary payoff (e.g., receiving $50 today) than they think others would experience. This experience is reflected both in self-reported valuation of the monetary reward as well as activation in brain regions involved in the subjective experience of reward. Ironically, the result of this more intense positive emotional experience is that people make more impulsive monetary choices for themselves (e.g., choosing $50 today vs. $100 in 2 weeks) than on behalf of others (e.g., choosing to wait 2 weeks for $100 vs. receiving $50 today) because it is more difficult to delay the intense gratification associated with the personal experience of reward (Albrecht, Volz, Sutter, Laiibson, & Von Cramon, 2011).

This fundamental difference in the experience of emotions produces similar results for a wide range of emotional states beyond simple pleasure and pain, including positive emotions as well as negative emotions (Chambers & Suls, 2007). For example, people believe that they experience more happiness in their relationships than others do (Buunk, 2001). But people also believe that their own experience of embarrassment is more intense and crippling than the others’ experience of embarrassment and therefore overestimate others’ willingness to perform potentially embarrassing behaviors (Van Boven et al., 2005). So too do people think that their experience of disgust is more intense than others’ experience of disgust and think that this experience is more likely to inhibit their behavior than others’ behavior (Pronin, Olivola, & Kennedy, 2008). People estimate that their experience of boredom with an unpleasant laboratory task will be more severe than others’ experiences of boredom (McFarland & Miller, 1990). Phobic individuals estimate that their sense of fear is more intense than the fears of other phobic individuals (Suls, Wan, Barlow, & Heimberg, 1990). In general, people also think their experience of fear, terror, and anxiety in response to emotional events is more intense than others (White & Van Boven, 2012). As a potential result, people also believe others are more interested in taking risky gambles than themselves, presumably because others are not as affected by the negative emotions that would come from experiencing a loss (Hsee & Weber, 1997).

One implication of these findings is that people may believe that their own behavior is guided more strongly by subtle, complex, and unobservable emotions than the behavior of others. Experiences like pride and shame, a sense of accomplishment or achievement, and a desire for meaning and purpose are all mental experiences that a person may feel directly but are difficult to observe—and impossible to experience—in the minds of others. Consistent with this possibility, numerous study populations from students in MBA classes to employees and managers at a large bank express what Heath (1999) referred to as the extrinsic incentives bias: the belief
that intrinsic motivations such as doing meaningful work or accomplishing new things in a job are more important to the self than they are to others. Workers at all levels appear to believe that they uniquely work for a sense of pride, meaning, and purpose—all internal mental experiences—whereas others work mainly for extrinsic incentives like money. We believe this extrinsic incentives bias is another example of the lesser minds problem, one that comes from experiencing one’s own varied motives directly but others’ motives only indirectly.

The impact of differential access to sophisticated motives is also on display in the inferences people make about choices. Choices can often be difficult to make, guided by complicated motives that are not necessarily revealed in a person’s behavior. When a person votes for a political candidate, for instance, the vote can be made either because a person truly likes a candidate or because a person deeply dislikes the alternatives. This latter avoidance-oriented choice reflects a complicated relationship between one’s inner preferences and observable decisions, one that is not directly apparent in the choices of others. In a U.S. presidential election, voters who chose one candidate over another for avoidance-oriented reasons nevertheless assumed that others voted for more simplistic approach-oriented reasons (i.e., because they liked the candidate). These voters knew they voted for a candidate mainly because they disliked the alternative but assumed a simpler relationship between others’ preferences and choices (Miller & Nelson, 2002).

Finally, differential access to inner mental states can create subtle forms of dehumanization, whereby people rate others as less inherently human than the self (Haslam et al., 2005). That is, people see others as possessing fewer traits considered to be essential to human nature and that require sophisticated mental capacities for introspection, projection, and perspective taking. This effect occurs because the complexity of such traits makes them more difficult to recognize in others than in oneself.

In an initial set of studies demonstrating this effect, Haslam and colleagues (2005) identified a set of traits that people considered to be unique to humans as well as traits that people considered to be essential to human nature. These human nature traits included traits such as curious, sympathetic, and imaginative, as well as negatively valenced traits like jealous and nervous, which clearly involve mental capacities and are linked to cognitive openness and emotional responsiveness (Haslam et al., 2005). When people evaluated how much they possessed these traits and how much their peers possessed these traits, they attributed these “human nature” traits more strongly to the self than to others. In other words, people perceived their personalities to be more complex than others’ personalities.

Research has shown that this tendency to see the self as more essentially human emerges in a number of other contexts (Bain, Park, Kwok, & Haslam, 2009; Haslam & Bain, 2007) and appears cross-culturally in Australia, Germany, Israel, Japan, and Singapore (Loughnan et al., 2010).
Furthermore, this tendency is not merely a reflection of a desire to see oneself as better than others. A parallel set of studies has demonstrated that people attribute more essentially human negative traits to their own group than to other groups and see their own groups’ flaws as more essentially human than other groups’ flaws (Koval, Latham, Haslam, Bastian, & Whelan, 2012). People appear to see themselves as more mentally complex than others both in their strengths as human beings as well as in their weaknesses (see also Leyens et al., 2007).

Form #2: Causal Importance of Own Versus Other Minds

Take a look at your finger. Whenever you feel so inclined, move it. This sequence of events is entirely unremarkable—you look, you want to move, and you move—except for two things. First, it appears to create an illusion that your thoughts about moving your finger cause your finger to move. When Libet (1985) asked people to do this very same thing while he monitored their motor cortex, he found that the neural activity responsible for moving a person’s finger was active before people were aware of wanting to move their finger. This does not mean that conscious experience never causes behavior, of course, but it does mean that the experience of thoughts preceding actions is what gives them their apparent causal force (Wegner, 2002; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). Second, you experience thoughts preceding actions only in yourself. You do not observe thoughts becoming active before another person moves his or her finger. We believe this difference in the temporal primacy of thoughts before actions for the self, but significantly less so for others, is the second cause of the lesser minds problem. For others, the causal sequence more often runs in reverse—inferring intentions or thoughts after seeing their behavior. People may therefore believe their own mental states—their intentions, goals, motives, and desires—are more influential in guiding behavior than are others’ mental states.

Perhaps the easiest way to observe this version of the lesser minds problem is to simply have people explain their own and others’ actions. The explanations that people provide show a systematic difference (Malle, 2006). People tend to explain their own behavior by describing mental states such as intentions, goals, attitudes, and motives, but they explain others’ behavior by describing past histories, observable actions, or other nonmentalistic causes. And when people do explain others’ behavior in mental state terms, they tend to use more simplistic mental states (e.g., desires) than they do when explaining their own behavior (e.g., beliefs; Malle, Knobe, & Nelson, 2007).

If people evaluate their own behavior in terms of mental causality more so than others’ behavior, then it also follows that people will tend to believe they have more free will than others do. That is, people may believe that their own conscious thoughts and plans and goals—their “free will”—will have a greater influence on their own behavior than will others’ “free will.” In one series of experiments testing this hypothesis
(Pronin & Kugler, 2011), participants reported that they had more choices available in their future lives than others do, and that their future behavior would be guided by their intentions and desires, whereas others would be guided more by circumstances outside of their volitional control. Despite the clear self-enhancement that would seem to come from having more free will than others, free will comes with a downside. Having the ability to make choices also enables the ability to choose badly. Indeed, these participants also reported being more likely to make bad choices in the future than others. Having a stronger sense of will for the self as compared to others appears to come, at least in part, from one’s introspective experience.

People not only believe that they possess a greater capacity for agency, but also that their agency is more powerful than others’ agency in guiding behavior. For example, when people predict their own future actions and others’ future actions, such as how likely they will be to donate blood in an upcoming blood drive, people base their predictions for self on their current intentions but fail to weight others’ current intentions in making predictions for others (Koehler & Poon, 2006; see also Kruger & Gilovich, 2004). When predicting their own future behavior, people look inward to their intentions and motives, adopting an “inside approach” to prediction. But when predicting others’ behavior, people rely more heavily on observable actions and base rates rather than consulting mental states of intentions and beliefs (Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 1994; Epley & Dunning, 2000; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).

Form #3: Perceived Objectivity of Own Versus Other Minds

An old subheading from the Wall Street Journal (How U.S., 2003) exemplifies this third form of the lesser minds problem well: “In Korean standoff, both sides claim reason.” One’s own beliefs, attitudes, knowledge, and preferences come to mind easily and automatically with little trace that they might be biased or distorted in some way. This experience leads to naïve realism—the intuitive sense that one’s own beliefs are relatively accurate reflections of reality (Griffin & Ross, 1991; Pronin et al., 2002; Ross & Ward, 1996). A natural consequence of naïve realism is that others’ mental states are likely to appear less objective and more prone to bias than one’s own (Ross & Ward, 1996).

This asymmetric perception of objectivity is demonstrated in a program of research on that Pronin and colleagues (2004) refer to as the “bias blind spot”. This work demonstrates the variety of ways in which people evaluate themselves as more rational and less prone to biased judgment than others. In one illustrative experiment, participants reported how much they exhibited a particular set of classic psychological biases and how much others’ exhibited these same biases. The biases that participants evaluated were self-serving attributions for success versus failure, dissonance reduction, the positive halo
effect, biased assimilation of new information, reactive devaluation of others' opinions, perceptions of hostile media bias toward one's own group, the fundamental attribution error, and judgments about the greater good based on one's personal self-interest. Participants judged their peers to be more likely to exhibit all of these biases than themselves (Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002).

This basic tendency for people to see other minds as more prone to bias manifests itself in a variety of other ways as well (see Pronin, 2008, for review). For example, people see themselves as more resistant to persuasive appeals and less susceptible to conformity than others (Davison, 1983; Perloff, 1993; see also Pronin, Berger, & Molouki, 2007). People also think that their own opinions are based on objective analysis but believe that others' opinions are based on self-interest (Miller & Ratner, 1998), irrational thinking (Kennedy & Pronin, 2008), and personal allegiances (Frantz, 2006).

If naïve realism implies that one's own mental states are more objective and accurate than others' mental states, then this form of the lesser minds problem should be exacerbated the more that the target of comparison differs from the self (and is likely to hold differing mental states). Indeed, an extensive literature on intergroup relations and intergroup conflict suggests that people perceive themselves to be superior in a variety of mental characteristics compared to distinctively dissimilar others from social groups who likely hold differing worldviews (Allport, 1954; Tajfel & Turner, 1985). Although these forms of intergroup bias may stem from motivational factors, naïve realism provides a compelling cognitive alternative: If I believe my view of the world is accurate, then those who hold apparently different worldviews must be somehow misguided, misinformed, or otherwise mistaken (Ross & Ward, 1996). Consistent with this account, participants in one experiment readily acknowledged being as biased as others when those biases were easily available to them (Pronin, Lin, et al., 2002).

This naïve realism account can explain a number of examples of dehumanization across different social groups whereby opposing ethnic or social groups attribute diminished mental states—including prosocial values, the capacity for compassion, complex morality, and basic intelligence—to each other (see Haslam, 2006; Kelman, 1976; Opotow, 1990; Struch & Schwartz, 1989). Notably, research on infrahumanization has illustrated consistently that people see their own cultural group as capable of experiencing both positive emotions (e.g., hope) and negative emotions (e.g., humiliation) that are considered to be uniquely human but do not view outgroups to be as capable of experiencing these emotions (Demoulin et al., 2004; Gaunt, Leyens, & Demoulin, 2002; Leyens et al., 2000, 2007).

Political disagreement also exacerbates tendencies for both sides to see each other as mentally inferior. People on opposing sides of political issues such as affirmative action and drug use see themselves as well reasoned in their positions but see the other side as biased and irrational (Kennedy & Pronin, 2008). Another set of studies extended this phenomenon to emotion, showing that people adequately infer the effects of discomforting visceral
states (e.g., feeling cold and feeling thirsty) for members of their own political party but not for members of an opposing political party (O’Brien & Ellsworth, 2012). Finally, this version of the lesser minds problem does not require large-scale disagreement or conflict. Simply disliking another person is enough for people to attribute lesser cognition, intention, and emotion to that person compared to the self (Kozak, Marsh, & Wegner, 2006).

Beyond Self-Enhancement

The evidence we have reviewed suggests that people may generally perceive the self to have more complex and influential mental capacities than other people across a wide variety of domains. Although having a sophisticated and strong mind is a desirable quality, we believe the lesser minds problem does not stem solely from a desire to think relatively well of oneself by thinking poorly of others. For one, many of the capacities on which people judge themselves to have more mind than others are, in fact, negative. People see themselves as possessing more mentally complex flaws than others (Koval et al., 2012); see themselves as experiencing more negative emotions such as fear, terror, disgust, dislike, and embarrassment than others (Chambers & Suls, 2007; Pronin et al., 2008; Suls et al., 1990; Van Boven et al., 2005); and attribute more negative emotional capacities, such as resentment and disarray, to themselves and their ingroup than to outgroups (e.g., Cortes et al., 2005). Furthermore, the lesser minds problem does not always lead to flattering outcomes. For example, people consider their emotional response toward an immediate monetary reward (e.g., the prospect of receiving $50 today) to be more intense than others’ emotional response toward that reward, increasing shortsighted decision-making for the self relative to decision-making on behalf of others (Albrecht et al., 2011). In addition, the tendency to see oneself as having more conscious will, and hence more possible courses of action, leads people to see their own futures as far more unpredictable than others’ futures (Pronin & Kugler, 2011). Self-enhancement motives are not solely responsible for the lesser minds problem. Although it certainly might feel good to perceive oneself as having more mind than others, this good feeling may be a consequence rather than a cause of the lesser minds problem.

Perhaps the best evidence that the lesser minds problem does not reflect self-enhancement is that the tendency to see less mind in others extends to the person many may love the most, our own future self. Substantial research has suggested that people consider others’ minds in the same way that they consider the minds of their future selves (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Tamir & Mitchell, 2011; Waytz, Gray, Epley, & Wegner, 2010). People tend to consider their future selves as ostensible others and, therefore, make decisions on behalf of their future selves similarly to how they make decisions for other people (Bartels & Rips, 2010; Ersner-Hershfield, Wimmer, & Knutson, 2009; Mitchell, Schirmer, Ames, & Gilbert, 2011; Pronin et al., 2008). Because of the convergence in how people
treat their future selves and others, the lesser minds problem also emerges when people judge the present self versus the future self.

One important domain in which the intrapersonal lesser minds problem emerges is in judgments of present versus future emotion. In particular, some evidence suggests that people may believe near-future emotion will be more intense than distant future emotion. One may expect to feel more anxious in the morning about an exam that will happen tomorrow, for instance, than he or she will in the morning a month from now. Much evidence for this difference in immediate versus distant emotional experience comes from research on hot-cold empathy gaps (Loewenstein, 1996). A person who is not experiencing an emotion often systematically underestimates the intensity and impact of “hot” emotions that he or she will experience in the future. A person who is not currently sexually aroused or angry, for instance, is likely to underestimate how much impact those emotional states will have on decision-making once that person is actually experiencing those emotional states (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006). These empathy gaps emerge in judgments of curiosity (Loewenstein, Prelec, & Shatto, 1998), nicotine craving (Sayette, Loewenstein, Griffin, & Black, 2008), fear (Van Boven et al., 2005), and pain (Nordgren, Morris-McDonnell, et al., 2011). For example, one study of pregnant women showed that those who chose to forego anesthesia during childbirth routinely reversed their decisions during the actual procedure, suggesting that they underestimated the extent to which their future selves would feel pain (Christensen-Szalanski, 1984).

Some evidence suggests that like judgments of the future self, people exhibit a lesser minds effect toward the past self as well, reporting the experience of previous emotions to be far less intense than present emotions (Huber, Van Boven, McGraw, & Johnson-Graham, 2011; Van Boven, White, & Huber, 2009). Ultimately, we believe these intrapersonal discrepancies suggest that self-enhancement is not the sole driver of the lesser minds problem. Although it may be preferable to view one’s future self to be just as mentally capable as the present self, lacking direct access to our future mental states may diminish the tendency to believe what we want about ourselves.

**Dehumanization as a Default State**

Arguably, the most fundamental divide in all of social life is between the mindful and the mindless. This distinction forms the intuitive dividing line between people and animals or between people and objects. Psychological research makes it clear that this dividing line is not fixed but rather is flexible depending on the surrounding context and the targets of judgment (Epley et al., 2007). Most important, we think that psychological research suggests a fundamental tendency to see others as being closer to the dividing line than the self. Whether the product of differences in access, causal importance, or apparent objectivity, others in a variety of ways may seem to be less mindful than oneself.
This suggests that recognizing that another person's mind is as capable and intense as one's own is not necessarily a default in judgment but rather requires a trigger to consider another person's mind in the first place. Social life in modern societies can be overwhelming, with tight urban spaces providing more opportunities for social connection than any one person could possibly manage. Might the default in social judgment be to treat these others as mindless unless triggered to actively engage with another person's mind? Several lines of work suggest this to be the case. First, encoding others' beliefs in the midst of social interaction seems to be an effortful, rather than automatic, process (Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, Chiavarino, & Samson, 2006; Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2010; Saxe, Schulz, & Jiang, 2006). Second, the state of diminished mind perception that typifies autism may appear to be better characterized by a lack of motivation or interest in connecting with other people, rather than being characterized by a lack of ability to do so (Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin, & Schultz, 2012). Third, neuroimaging suggests that regions necessary for mental state inferences are not activated when reasoning about typically dehumanized outgroups, such as homeless people or drug addicts (Harris & Fiske, 2006). However, when people are asked to engage directly with the minds of these outgroup members, such as by simply asking whether or not a homeless person would like a particular vegetable, then these neural regions become activated just as they are with higher status outgroup members (Harris & Fiske, 2007). A simple probing question about vegetable preferences is sufficient to engage people to consider another's mind, but otherwise this capacity remains disengaged and others may seem relatively mindless. A number of other factors function as triggers to mind perception, including motivations for accuracy (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004), behavioral prediction (Waytz, Morewedge, et al., 2010), and social connection (Epley, Akalis, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2008; Epley, Waytz, Akalis, & Cacioppo, 2008). Without a trigger to engage with another mind, others may, by default, seem relatively mindless.

This default characterization of other minds as "lesser" matters because the attribution of mind is central to the consideration of another person as a moral entity. Granting a person the capacity for thought, feeling, and intention grants them the capacity to perform moral acts and to be the recipients of these acts (Gray et al., 2007; Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012). Failing to consider others' minds denies them this moral worth. People often deny others' moral rights and responsibilities as an active act of hostility or dislike (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996), but the lesser minds problem suggests that people may also diminish others' moral worth simply through a passive and unintentional process of overlooking their mental capacities. The prevalence of the lesser minds problem suggests that not all acts of dehumanization are driven by antipathy, but rather by apathy (see also Cortes et al., 2005; Demoulin et al., 2005; Haslam, 2006; Leyens et al., 2007). Everyday acts of dehumanization occur when
people fail to appreciate fully the needs, desires, feelings, and hopes of others, rather than through actively suppressing the consideration of these mental states. In this sense, a failure to recognize others as fully human may not result from a deliberate attempt to deny a humanlike mind to others, but rather from a simple failure to trigger mental state reasoning in the first place.

References


