Is COVID-19 Deadly to the Fourth Amendment?

By Albert Fox Cahn, Esq. and Zachary Silver

Our location history reveals much about who we are, showing what businesses we patronize, what doctors we see, and if we engage in political protest. They reveal who we cross paths with, both intentionally and unintentionally, and when we do so. They reveal our “familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations,” and when we choose to engage in such associations.

So our alarm bells of course went off when the Wall Street Journal reported in late March that the mobile advertising industry is providing to governments at all levels the GPS location data it collects from millions of cell phones to aid their studies of the Coronavirus’s spread in major cities. Since most Americans have a cellphone within a few feet at all times, our phones’ locations often are our locations. And those same alarm bells rang louder than an air-raid siren at the revelation that this location data may also be used by law enforcement.

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution generally requires the government to obtain a warrant before conducting a search. For much of the Twentieth Century, law enforcement circumvented warrant requirements by invoking the “Third-Party Doctrine,” which allows warrantless information collection from banks and other companies. But, in 2018, in Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court limited Third-Party Doctrine’s reach, holding a warrant was required to obtain a week or more of cell phone tower location data (so-called “CSLI”) without a warrant. Such data could create a comprehensive record of a person’s movement, which is nearly tantamount to “attach[ing] an ankle monitor to the phone’s user….”

By its terms, Carpenter was limited to a single tracking method: CSLI. But the Constitution’s framers did not limit the Fourth Amendment’s protection to a single technology, let alone one unimaginined at the time; rather, they spoke to general principles to be applied to all forms of privacy invasion. The same pragmatic factors that guided Carpenter also require protections against other

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3 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 395 (2014) (citing Harris Interactive, 2013 Mobile Consumer Habits Study (2013)).
5 Id. at 2216–20.
6 Id. at 2218.
7 Id. at 2220.
forms of location monitoring such as GPS cellphone tracking. GPS cell phone tracking precisely—and more accurately—mimic the dangers that alarmed the Court.\(^8\)

So long as location data is collected, the privacy dangers are impossible to avoid. Many who claim to “anonymize” location data later learn true anonymization is nearly impossible.\(^9\) Even aggregated data can provide law enforcement a window to “the privacies of life.”\(^10\)

If government agencies using mass surveillance to track COVID-19 realize that they are well beyond the limits of the Third-Party Doctrine, they may attempt to invoke the “Special Needs Exception,” which permits warrantless searches when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable….”\(^11\) While the Special Needs Exemption has not yet been evaluated in this context, it’s unclear why the outcome should be any more permissive. No matter what doctrine is sited to justify new location tracking, the pragmatic considerations that undergird Carpenter remain.

Beyond the Fourth Amendment, federal officials also face statutory obstacles. The Privacy Act of 1974 prohibits federal employees from disclosing individual’s information except under narrowly defined circumstances.\(^12\) Since COVID-19 tracking data is easily identifiable and reveals sensitive details, it should be subject to similar restrictions.\(^13\) At a minimum, any cell phone data collected to track the virus’s spread must be restricted to policymakers, and it’s completely indefensible if that data is provided to law enforcement for social distance enforcement, let alone general criminal investigations. Furthermore, while any mass collection of location data is constitutionally suspect, such practices are particularly egregious if the data is retained longer than the current crisis. Currently, it’s unclear how long agencies will retain this data and if their surveillance records will outlive the coronavirus.

When rights are curtailed to address crises, those temporary exceptions often become the new default rule. From the growth of Cold War-era war Presidential powers, to red scare-era loyalty oaths, to post 9/11 passage of the USA PATRIOT Act: many of the emergency measures of the past live with us to this very day. COVID-19 is the gravest health crisis in generations, and we must do more to safeguard American lives. But creating vast surveillance measures will do little to protect our families, while putting the rights of millions at risk.

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\(^8\) Id. at 2217–18. Indeed, the Carpenter majority directly analogized CSLI tracking to GPS.


\(^10\) Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 403).


\(^12\) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3).

\(^13\) Cf. id. § 552a(e)(7) (prohibiting agencies from maintaining records “describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment” except in limited circumstances).
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