Re: S.T.O.P. Comment on NYPD’s Draft Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) Systems Impact & Use Policy

Dear Commissioner Shea:

The Surveillance Technology Oversight Project (“S.T.O.P.”)\(^1\) hereby submits our comment in response to the Draft Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) Systems Impact and Use Policy (“Policy”) published by the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) on January 11, 2021 pursuant to the Public Oversight of Surveillance Technology Act (“POST Act”). Not only did S.T.O.P. work extensively to promote passage of the POST Act, the law’s enactment was one of the reasons we were founded. Sadly, upon review, the Policy is so grossly inadequate that it not only undermines public trust and accountability, it violates the NYPD’s reporting obligations under the POST Act.

Instead of publishing an impact statement that tells New Yorkers what surveillance tools the NYPD uses, we were provided copy-and-paste responses that are opaque, misleading, and, at times, blatantly wrong. As written, the Policy primarily tell New Yorkers one thing: the NYPD cannot be trusted to use CCTV Systems and the video or images obtained from them.

**Data Sharing Agreements**

The POST Act requires the NYPD to enumerate all entities which are able to access the Department’s CCTV Systems data. However, instead of providing any meaningful information, the Policy merely states that unspecified “agencies at the local, state, and federal level . . . have limited access to NYPD computer and case management systems.” Similarly concerning, the Policy notes that non-NYPD stakeholders which provide the NYPD with access to their own CCTV cameras may access the Lower Manhattan Security Coordination Center (LMSCC) to view security footage.

At a minimum, the Department must provide a full accounting of all agencies that access the LMSCC or any CCTV Systems data, along with the frequency of access and any limitations on how such data is used and retained. The NYPD would also need to provide a copy of any/all agreements with external agencies pertaining to the scope of agency access and the volume of data retained.

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\(^1\) S.T.O.P.” is a non-profit organization that advocates and litigates for New Yorkers’ privacy rights, fighting discriminatory surveillance. For more information see https://www.stopspying.org/.
Vendors and Product Disclosure
Perhaps no aspect of the Policy is more antithetical to the text and spirit of the POST Act than the Department’s systematic failure to specify the make and model of equipment used for CCTV Systems. The driving impetus for the POST Act was the Department’s historical failure to disclose what tools it purchased to monitor New Yorkers until years or decades after the fact. This type of surreptitious procurement is antithetical to democratic government and the role of the City Council in overseeing agency purchases. Rather than comply with the POST Act’s reporting obligations, the Policy describes the Department’s CCTV Systems and equipment in vague, non-descript terms. The Policy fails to include a single vendor name, let alone the comprehensive listing of tools that lawmakers required to be provided. At a minimum, the revised policy must include the name of every single type of CCTV system employed by the NYPD, the system’s manufacturer, and the names of any other vendors involved in creating or operating the system. The NYPD should also provide a comprehensive evaluation of what data is accessed and/or retained by vendors.

Racial, Ethnic, and Religious Bias
Racial discrimination and bias have defined New York City’s policing since before the NYPD was even founded, and that deadly legacy of injustice has continued to this day. The POST Act provided the Department with a unique opportunity to address the ways that its surveillance operations have been driven by, and in turn fueled, discrimination for decades. Sadly, rather than addressing this challenge head on, the Department simply ignored the POST Act’s requirements, responding with a terse and unbelievable claim that “The NYPD prohibits the use of racial and bias-based profiling in law enforcement actions.” This statement is patently absurd. The NYPD has long been emblematic to the country as a symbol of biased-policing, and after the Department’s violent and discriminatory response to recent protests, it’s clear just how little has changed. CCTV Systems may be used to exacerbate officers’ bias, discriminating against BIPOC and LGBTQ+ communities, putting over-surveilled New Yorkers at risk of wrongful arrests and worse. Notably, while the Policy states that the NYPD’s CCTV systems “do not use artificial intelligence, machine learning, facial recognition, or any other biometric measurement technologies,” nothing in the Policy prevents images from CCTV from being used as inputs for these discriminatory and biased systems.

Retention Periods and Access Rights
To meet the minimum transparency requirements set out in the POST Act, NYPD must also clarify how long data is saved and how the access rights to the information is determined. The Policy does not provide sufficient information about the retention periods of the data collected through CCTV Systems. While video stored on CCTV system hard drives are purportedly overwritten every 30 days, the Policy fails to place any limits on the retention of video “identified to be retained for security purposes or for criminal investigations.” Instead, the Policy contains broad boilerplate language, referring to “applicable laws, regulations, and New York City and NYPD policies” without disclosing which these are or what they entail. The Department also fails to clearly and coherently describe access rights for NYPD employees and contractors to access this exceptionally sensitive data. Bland phrases stating that access rights are given to personnel with an “articulable need” and


that access is “further limited based on lawful duty” are feeble efforts to circumvent the reporting obligations set out in the POST Act.

**NYPD Data Security**

The NYPD is not just asking New Yorkers to allow the Department access to huge volumes of intimate data about our private lives, they want us to let that data to be accessible to anyone who can break into the NYPD’s systems. Sadly, we have no way to judge the risk that this data could fall into the hands of any hacker, criminal, or rogue state that could breach NYPD security measures. That is because the NYPD’s data security promises are full of repetitive and empty phrases. The section contains general descriptions about the safeguards in place for the Department’s case management and computer systems, stating that NYPD uses a “multifaceted approach to secure data and user accessibility.”

Not only is the provided information insufficient to build public trust and accountability, it is also so generic as to be almost completely useless from a technical standpoint. The NYPD references its use of Lightweight Directory Access Protocol, dual factor authentication, Secure Sockets Layer, and Transport Layer Security. These rudimentary encryption and security features are so ubiquitous that it would only be notable if they were not used as part of the NYPD’s data security policy. This is about as persuasive as arguing that a car is safe simply because it has functioning seatbelts; the real surprise would be finding a car that did not. The enormous amounts of highly sensitive data processed through the NYPD’s CCTV System call for higher security standards than what is described in the Policy. This is especially true in light of the fact that, per the Policy, certain NYPD personnel may remotely access live video streams from the Department’s CCTV systems via the NYPD Domain Awareness System and through an app on NYPD issued portable electronic devices. This raises the possibility that somebody who compromises or breaks into an NYPD smartphone, tablet, or laptop could suddenly gain access to the Department’s live CCTV surveillance feeds. Unfortunately, nothing in the Policy inspires confidence that NYPD has adequate safeguards in place to ensure the security of data captured by its CCTV Systems.

**NYPD Training**

The Policy recognizes the self-evident truth that training is an important factor for the NYPD’s use of CCTV Systems. For example, the Policy states that NYPD employees who use CCTV systems “receive command level training on the proper operation of the technology and its associated equipment.” Sadly, this is not the introductory clause to an expansive training policy, this is almost the whole of the Policy’s details on the topic. The Policy’s training section is grossly insufficient to say the least.

**Comparison of the POST Act to other CCOPS Jurisdictions**

The Department’s failure to provide the public with meaningful details is particularly egregious in light of the strong national record of compliance with analogous efforts. As of today, more than a dozen localities have adopted Community Control Over Police Surveillance (CCOPS). The POST Act is an outlier, both in that it is one of the weakest laws in the country and because the NYPD’s response has shown an unprecedented effort to circumvent even the most minimal transparency
While many municipalities’ legislations require acquisition approval, bans non-disclosure agreements and provide a right of action for private citizens, the POST Act only requires the NYPD to provide annual reports and use policies. Notwithstanding this, NYPD has shown unable to meet the requirements set out in the POST Act, by only providing opaque or boiler-plate responses in the Policy, hiding the details needed for meaningful public engagement. As a result, it is clear that more aggressive legislative responses are required.

**Concluding Remarks**

The cumulative impact of the forgoing errors and omissions is clear: the NYPD is breaking the law. The POST Act is not a formality, it is not a nicety, it is binding legislation with full force of law. When the NYPD fails to comply with the statute, it seeks to overturn the will of the New York’s elected leaders, accomplishing by force what it failed to do through lobbying. If the NYPD persists in this flagrant disregard for its statutory reporting requirements, it will simply hasten the enactment of far more sweeping changes to the Department’s surveillance powers in the coming months.

Sincerely,

/s/
Albert Fox Cahn, Esq.
Executive Director

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4 Hogan Lovells and Surveillance Technology Oversight Project, *New CCOPS On The Beat* (Feb. 10, 2021), [https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5c1bfc7eece175995a4ceb638/t/602430a5ef89df2ce6894ce1/1612984485653/New+COPS+On+The+Beat.pdf](https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5c1bfc7eece175995a4ceb638/t/602430a5ef89df2ce6894ce1/1612984485653/New+COPS+On+The+Beat.pdf).