February 25, 2021

NYPD Commissioner Shea
New York Police Department
One Police Plaza
New York, NY 10038
Via Email

Re: S.T.O.P. Comment on NYPD’s Draft License Plate Readers (LPR) Impact & Use Policy

Dear Commissioner Shea:

The Surveillance Technology Oversight Project (“S.T.O.P.”)1 hereby submits our comment in response to the Draft License Plate Readers (LPR) Impact and Use Policy (“Policy”) published by the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) on January 11, 2021 pursuant to the Public Oversight of Surveillance Technology Act (“POST Act”). Not only did S.T.O.P. work extensively to promote passage of the POST Act, the law’s enactment was one of the reasons we were founded. Sadly, upon review, the Policy is so grossly inadequate that it not only undermines public trust and accountability, it violates the NYPD’s reporting obligations under the POST Act.

Instead of publishing an impact statement that tells New Yorkers what surveillance tools the NYPD uses, we were provided copy-and-paste responses that are opaque, misleading, and, at times, blatantly wrong. As written, the Policy primarily tell New Yorkers one thing: the NYPD cannot be trusted to use LPR.

Data Sharing Agreements
The POST Act requires the NYPD to enumerate all entities which are able to access the Department’s LPR data. However, instead of providing any meaningful information, the Policy merely states that unspecified “agencies at the local, state, and federal level . . . have limited access to NYPD computer and case management systems.” In fact, the Policy admits to sharing data with “partnering law enforcement and city agencies” and “authorized agents within the state of New Jersey,” which constitutes highly vague access granted to an alarmingly broad range of entities. This raises serious questions about the security and integrity of the LPR data that is controlled by the NYPD. At a minimum, the Department must provide a full accounting of all agencies that access such data, along with the frequency of access and any limitations on how such data is used and retained. The NYPD would also need to provide a copy of any/all agreements with external agencies pertaining to the scope of agency access and the volume of data retained.

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1 S.T.O.P.” is a non-profit organization that advocates and litigates for New Yorkers’ privacy rights, fighting discriminatory surveillance. For more information see https://www.stopspying.org/.
Vendors and Product Disclosure
Perhaps no aspect of the Policy is more antithetical to the text and spirit of the POST Act than the Department’s systematic failure to specify the make and model of equipment used for LPR. The driving impetus for the POST Act was the Department’s historical failure to disclose what tools it purchased to monitor New Yorkers until years or decades after the fact. This type of surreptitious procurement is antithetical to democratic government and the role of the City Council in overseeing agency purchases. Rather than comply with the POST Act’s reporting obligations, the Policy describes the Department’s LPR program in vague, non-descript terms. The Policy fails to include a single vendor name, let alone the comprehensive listing of tools that lawmakers required to be provided. Although the NYPD admits to using two different categories of LPRs (stationary and mobile), the Policy provides absolutely no details about the exact versions of the LPR hardware and software used by the Department. At a minimum, the revised policy must include the name of every single LPR system employed by the NYPD, the system’s manufacturer, and the names of any other vendors involved in creating or operating the system. The NYPD should also provide a comprehensive evaluation of what data is accessed and/or retained by vendors.

Importantly, since the Policy does not specify the exact make and model of LPR technology that the NYPD uses, it leaves open the question of whether error-prone and biased artificial intelligence and machine learning systems are integrated into the LPR tools used by the NYPD. Since we know for a fact that the newest versions of some LPR tools use AI and ML systems, it is crucial for the NYPD to reveal the models of LPR tools it uses in order to provide the transparency required by the POST Act as well as to allow the public to assess the true consequences of the use of such technology.

Racial Ethnic, and Religious Bias
Racial discrimination and bias have defined New York City’s policing since before the NYPD was even founded, and that deadly legacy of injustice has continued to this day. The POST Act provided the Department with a unique opportunity to address the ways that its surveillance operations have been driven by, and in turn fueled, discrimination for decades. Sadly, rather than addressing this challenge head on, the Department simply ignored the POST Act’s requirements, responding with a terse and unbelievable claim that “The NYPD prohibits the use of racial and bias-based profiling in law enforcement actions.” This statement is patently absurd. The NYPD has long been emblematic to the country as a symbol of biased-policing, and after the Department’s violent and discriminatory response to recent protests, it’s clear just how little has changed. LPR provide officers with another tool to exacerbate biased-policing that discriminates against New Yorkers of color, putting over-surveilled citizens at risk of wrongful arrests and worse. We know for a fact that LPR can be prone to significant rates of error, and law enforcement action based on inaccurate information from LPR use have led to documented civil rights violations that disparately impact BIPOC and LGBTQ+ communities.

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Retention Periods and Access Rights
To meet the minimum transparency requirements set out in the POST Act, NYPD must also clarify how long data is saved and how the access rights to the information is determined. The Policy states that data collected through LPR are retained for five years, without providing a reason for this long retention period. Further, the Policy contains broad boilerplate language, referring to “applicable laws, regulations, and New York City and NYPD policies” without disclosing which these are or what they entail. The Department also fails to clearly and coherently describe access rights for NYPD employees and contractors to access this exceptionally sensitive data. By stating that LPR data is accessible to all authorized NYPD personnel through the NYPD Domain Awareness System (DAS), the Policy does little to explain what, if any, safeguards there are to prevent abusive or unauthorized access to this data. Finally, by allowing historical searches under a wide range of circumstances, the Policy seems to validate all-encompassing surveillance with no regard to the privacy interests and constitutional rights of New Yorkers, granting officers access to a huge repository of comprehensive data on virtually every citizen with a car.

NYPD Data Security
The NYPD is not just asking New Yorkers to allow the Department access to huge volumes of intimate data about our private lives, they want us to let that data to be accessible to anyone who can break into the NYPD’s systems. Sadly, we have no way to judge the risk that this data could fall into the hands of any hacker, criminal, or rogue state that could breach NYPD security measures. That is because the NYPD’s data security promises are full of repetitive and empty phrases. The section contains general descriptions about the safeguards in place for the Department’s case management and computer systems, stating that NYPD uses a “multifaceted approach to secure data and user accessibility.”

Not only is the provided information insufficient to build public trust and accountability, it is also so generic as to be almost completely useless from a technical standpoint. The NYPD references its use of Lightweight Directory Access Protocol, dual factor authentication, Secure Socket Layer, and Transport Layer Security. These rudimentary encryption and security features are so ubiquitous that it would only be notable if they were not used as part of the NYPD’s data security policy. This is about as persuasive as arguing that a car is safe simply because it has functioning seatbelts; the real surprise would be finding a car that did not. The enormous amounts of highly sensitive data processed through the NYPD’s LPR systems call for higher security standards than what is described in the Policy.

NYPD Training
The Policy recognizes the self-evident truth that training is an important factor for the NYPD’s use of LPR. For example, the Policy states that every NYPD employee who gain access to LPR must receive “command level training on the proper operation of the technology and associated equipment.” Sadly, this is not the introductory clause to an expansive training policy, this is practically the entire extent of the Policy’s details on the topic. The Policy’s training section is grossly insufficient to say the least.

Comparison of the POST Act to other CCOPS Jurisdictions
The Department’s failure to provide the public with meaningful details is particularly egregious in light of the strong national record of compliance with analogous efforts. As of today, more than a dozen localities have adopted Community Control Over Police Surveillance (CCOPS). The POST
Act is an outlier, both in that it is one of the weakest laws in the country and because the NYPD’s response has shown an unprecedented effort to circumvent even the most minimal transparency requirements.⁵ While many municipalities’ legislations require acquisition approval, ban non-disclosure agreements and provide a right of action for private citizens, the POST Act only requires the NYPD to provide annual reports and use policies. Notwithstanding this, NYPD has shown unable to meet the requirements set out in the POST Act, by only providing opaque or boiler-plate responses in the Policy, hiding the details needed for meaningful public engagement. As a result, it is clear that more aggressive legislative responses are required.

Monitoring Political Rallies
The Policy does not address whether the NYPD uses LPR technology to surveil New Yorkers on their way to or from mass public gatherings, including political rallies and peaceful protests. The NYPD must specifically explain whether the location tracking capability of LPR tools is used to track New Yorkers who engage in their First Amendment right to assemble.

Concluding Remarks
The cumulative impact of the forgoing errors and omissions is clear: the NYPD is breaking the law. The POST Act is not a formality, it is not a nicety, it is binding legislation with full force of law. When the NYPD fails to comply with the statute, it seeks to overturn the will of the New York’s elected leaders, accomplishing by force what it failed to do through lobbying. If the NYPD persists in this flagrant disregard for its statutory reporting requirements, it will simply hasten the enactment of far more sweeping changes to the Department’s surveillance powers in the coming months.

Sincerely,

/s/
Albert Fox Cahn, Esq.
Executive Director

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