Driving out the enemy: Cicero’s Philippics and the danger of exclusionary rhetoric

In this paper I want to examine the danger that exclusionary rhetoric of the kind employed by Cicero in the Philippics poses in a political system in which discourse and debate play an important role in the decision-making process. My focus will be on the way Cicero’s rhetoric sought to exclude M. Antonius from the political debate after Caesar’s death and on the problems that this kind of argument created at Rome in a time of crisis. In addition, I want to suggest that such an examination might shed light on similar problems in contemporary political debates and that such a comparison is worth considering given the continual need for Classicists to make a case for our subject’s relevance in the modern educational environment. This last issue constitutes something of a jump and is very much a work in progress, but it is a jump I think worth making – albeit briefly, right now. However, before we can make it, we need to look at the ancient ‘example’ (in air quotes).

In the months after Caesar’s death Cicero formulated a particular understanding of Roman citizenship first in de Officiis and then in the Philippics. According to this the citizen’s first duty was to the stability and security of the res publica, rather than to himself. Indeed, he argued in de Officiis that it was not truly in the citizen’s interest to do otherwise, claiming that what was inexpedient for the res publica could not be expedient for any individual citizen…”.

Throughout de Officiis his description of the qualities of the good Roman citizen – knowledge, wisdom, justice, kindness, generosity, greatness of spirit and decorum - are defined in relation to the res publica. For Cicero the res publica was a legal and political union of Rome’s citizens - without it citizenship was meaningless. Therefore, the qualities of a good citizen must be those that upheld this union: it was in the citizen’s self-interest to be ‘good’ and preserve the political community that protected him. This idea of citizenship, expressed philosophically in de Officiis underlies Cicero’s political arguments in the Philippics.

This is primarily the case from the Second Philippic onwards. The First Philippic is slightly different - it shows Cicero expressing the desire to bring the consuls Antonius and Dolabella ‘in from the cold’ and to work with them to restore Rome (albeit not without criticism of their recent activities). However, after Antonius’ attack upon him in response to the First Philippic, Cicero changed tack. He no longer sought to co-opt Antonius but to remove him from the debate as a danger to Rome. In the rest of the Philippics Cicero’s rhetoric aims to isolate and exclude Antonius, using character description (or assassination) alongside a series of legal arguments to claim that Antonius was not a good Roman citizen. Indeed, Cicero argues that as Antonius’ activities endangered the stability of the res publica, he was not really a citizen at all, but a hostis. This is invective, of course – but it is a particular kind of invective, which aims not just to denigrate, mock or shame and disprove opposing arguments by association, but to delegitimize his opponent’s voice in the political discourse and exclude him – legally – from the debate and from the Roman res publica.

To examine the way that Cicero made this argument we can look first at his descriptions of Antonius as a citizen and as consul, and then at his understanding of the res publica as a legal community, with reference to de Officiis, finally coming to his argument that Antonius’ behaviour breaks the bonds of this community.

The Philippics include vivid descriptions of Antonius’ improper behaviour: his debauchery; his relationship with Curio; his tendency towards violence, and his abuse of his magistracies. In the Third Philippic Cicero asks rhetorically, “What is there in Antonius save lust, cruelty, insolence, audacity? He is wholly compacted of these vices. No trace in him of gentlemanly feeling, none of moderation, none of self-

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1 Cic., Off., 3.101.  
2 Off., 1.15.  
3 Cic., Phil., 1.29, 35.
respect, none of modesty.” Cicero referred frequently to Antonius’ audacia – a quality that in de Officiis is defined as courage that is not inspired by public service but by self-interest. In the Philippics he uses it to identify Antonius as unrestrained and reckless, a man who did not care if his actions harmed others or the res publica as long as they provided him enjoyment or benefit. For example, at the opening of the Second Philippic Cicero uses audactor in comparing Antonius’ behaviour to that of Catiline, making it clear that he regarded Antonius as the greater of two evils.

In addition to detailing Antonius’ less than lovely personality, Cicero also described Antonius’ activities after Caesar’s death – refusing a litany of corruption in the Third Philippic: “He emptied Caesar’s well-stocked house, plundered his gardens, transferred all their ornaments to his own; he sought to make the funeral a pretext for massacre and arson; having passed two or three good senatorial decrees in the public interest, in all else he thought only of profit and plunder; he sold exemptions, granted freedom to others he thought only of profit and plunder; he sold exemptions, granted freedom to.

As Jill Harries has discussed, Cicero’s presentation of law in the Philippics plays out on two levels: that of statutes, rights, tradition and precedent (lex and ius) and that of a higher law or standard of right action,
which she has called law-as-philosophy, and which came into play when man-made law failed to protect the res publica. These levels are never fully separable since the law, in the form of the leges, mores and instituta of the ancestors, must be upheld by good citizens who act in support of the res publica. However, if the first level of law fails to protect Rome, then the good citizen may act in defence of the res publica through the exercise of his reason and wisdom. This situation is what Agamben has described as a 'state of exception'. An extraordinary constitutional action is legitimised by a state of emergency - creating a fictional lacuna in public law, where the law remains in force but with its application suspended, justified by the principle that law is ordained for the well-being of men. Declaring that Rome was in a time of crisis, Cicero argued that only actions that supported the res publica were legitimate and that because they were legitimate they must be legal. Logically, therefore (Cicero-logic) – actions which damaged the res publica must render the citizen who performed them not a citizen, but an enemy of Rome. In this way he made the character and behaviour of the citizen the arbitrator of legitimacy and legal and constitutional action.

In the Philippics Cicero’s rhetoric moves from claims about the way that Antonius’ character and actions were ‘bad’ (as described above) to the association of their ‘badness’ with the damaging of the res publica and on to the argument that Antonius was, really, a hostis, not a citizen. So, for example at Phil., 3.12 when Cicero described the way that Antonius had behaved at the Lupercalia in 44 he made it clear that it was unconsular, unRoman, and that it could have turned the res publica into a monarchy. In other examples of the way he endangered Rome, Cicero claims that as consul Antonius ignored and even fabricated the auspices, passed laws by force, murdered Roman citizens, and broke faith with the Senate by undermining the settlement made after the Ides of March. All these activities, in Cicero’s opinion, damaged the res publica and consequently de-legitimised Antonius’s citizenship. At Philippic 4.14-15 Cicero claimed that Antonius had deliberately thrown off the consilium publicum – abandoning the directives of the Senate and people of Rome, rousing civil strife and becoming a bandit. Cicero did not limit himself to this - regularly describing Antonius as a hostis because of his behaviour. At 3.6 he says that Martian Legion have judged Antonius an enemy of the Roman people; at 5.27 Antonius’ attack on Decimus Brutus is compared to Hannibal’s attack on Rome, implying his status as an enemy. The honouring of Octavian for his actions against Antonius is also cited as proof of the proconsul’s illegitimacy. Finally, in the Fourteenth Philippic Cicero demands, “How long then shall this man, who has outdone in crime all public enemies, go without the name of public enemy?”

By using rhetoric like this Cicero sought to exclude Antonius from the debate over the future of the res publica. Of course, Antonius was already physically absent from the city, but he could make his views known by writing to his supporters in the Senate and court popularity amongst the people. Cicero’s attacks upon Antonius and his declaration of him as a hostis aimed to delegitimize Antonius’ voice and arguments within Rome’s political discourse –excluding him from the political communion of the res publica by marking him as an enemy of Rome.

In de Officiis Cicero presented a philosophical argument for the importance of good citizenship in the successful res publica hoping to influence and explaining in detail why his understandings of a citizen’s qualities, such as virtus, were the correct ones. In the Philippics, however, his rhetoric necessarily removed

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12 Agamben (2005) pp.23-25, 31. clearly a matter of context and perspective: Cicero’s argument was not accepted by all at Rome.
13 Cic., Phil., 1.16-23; 3.9; 5.8-9.
14 Phil., 5.10. Phil., 13.5.
16 Cic., Phil., 3.6; 5.27.
17 Cic., Phil., 4.4-5
18 Cic., Phil., 14.6
this process of exposition – the form encouraging the use of these terms as tags. *Virtus* is a quality of the
good citizen who serves the *res publica*, but the specific qualifications for this status remain largely hidden
Cicero simply aimed to demonstrate that a man had or did not have *virtus*. Cicero refers to Octavian,
Hirtius and Pansa – amongst others as men of *virtus*, and defines their possession of the quality in relation
to their position towards Antonius. By employing *virtus* as a tag to describe citizens, making its
definition appear incontestable, Cicero was able to demonise and de-Romanise his enemies, and making it
harder for them to fight back in debate.

Ultimately (if one takes the end point of the debate as the formation of the Second Triumvirate and
Cicero’s death in the proscriptions) Cicero’s campaign against Antonius can be seen as fundamentally
unsuccessful. Cicero did not manage to save the *res publica* or to restore it in the form that he wanted.
But despite this, Cicero’s argument against Antonius in the *Philippics* did have an impact upon Roman
politics. It was not necessarily the one Cicero wanted, nor, I would argue, was it one that was conducive
to solving Rome’s problems in this period and re-establishing harmony and stability.

If we look at the historical narrative of 44-43 – which I don’t want do in detail here – we can see the
steady escalation of the crisis in Rome. Once the immediate settlement was made after Caesar’s death
Cicero remained largely uninvolved in public political affairs until nearly the end of that year, with the
exception of the *First Philippic*. His letters show that he was in contact with Octavian by early November
– although he was still uncertain of how best to deal with the young man. The *Second Philippic*, written
late in 44, marks the beginning of this exclusionary rhetoric - an explosive example of the arguments that
would make up the speeches that followed. In early December he wrote to Decimus Brutus to encourage
him to stand against Antonius, and not long after, gave the *Third Philippic* in the senate – arguing in
support of Decimus against Antonius. His letter to Decimus encapsulates the problems that, I think, his
public rhetoric exacerbated. He writes, “For if once your province falls into the hands of the man you
wrote of – though indeed I was always his friend until I became aware that he was waging war not only
openly but joyously against the *res publica* – I see no help of salvation left.” Cicero’s rhetoric allows for
no possibility of negotiation with Antonius and the action it encouraged for dealing with him was military
action against an enemy of the *res publica*.

As Manuwald has noted, Cicero’s definition of law and legal action in the *res publica* allowed him to take
his own assessment as his guideline for his arguments, determining the welfare of the community
subjectively. Cicero makes it clear that Antonius doesn’t understand law – but that HE does, and he
knows that Antonius is no legal Roman citizen. Antonius, the louche drunk who makes war on Rome in
order to secure his own position is denied the chance to challenge this authority by Cicero, the consular,
who had saved the *res publica* from Catiline. Cicero seeks to own the discourse, both with regard to
the sheer volume of noise he could make at Rome – and with regard to the terms and concepts used to
define the good citizen.

The danger of the kind of exclusionary rhetoric that Cicero used against Antonius in the *Philippics* lies in
its nature as an extreme argument against an individual/party that drives the opposition to extreme action
in return. Cicero expressed absolute certainty of the right course of action, pursuing a line of attack that
sought to drive his opponent out of the discourse. To do this, Cicero presented his audiences with two
mutually exclusive options, favouring his own point of view and not fully elaborating on the other,

19 *Cic., Phil.*, 3.27, 38. See also his proposal that Hirtius, Pansa and Octavian be declared *Imperator* for the defeat of
Antonius at Mutina in the *fourteenth Philippic* (11) where he cites their *virtus*.
21 *Cic., Fam.*, 11.5.1-3. See also 11.6.
23 *Cic., Phil.*, 6.2. See also, 2.1, 11, 118.
refusing to allow any other conception of the situation. For example in discussing the conspirators at \textit{Philippic} 2.31-32 he argued that, "There is no middle ground: if they are not liberators of the Roman people and preservers of the Republic, I confess them to be worse than assassins, worse than murders, worse even than parricides." However, he went on to emphasise that it was not possible for them to anything but liberators – because if they were not, Antonius would not have treated them with the respect he had.\footnote{Cic., \textit{Phil.}, 2.31-32 makes the technique explicit. \textit{Cf.}, \textit{Phil.}, 5.5; 8.11-13; 13.49. Ramsey (2003) pp.209-210; Harries (2006) pp.201, 218; Manuwald (2007) p.305.} Antonius’ later attacks on the conspirators therefore marked him as an enemy of Rome.

Cicero’s rhetoric allowed for no subtle interpretation or negotiated resolution of the situation, but helped to create rifts so deep and positions so entrenched that they could not be resolved by means of verbal debate – they had to be fought over. Cicero’s successful proposals - such as the legitimisation of the positions of Decimus Brutus and Octavian – pushed Antonius towards military action and helped drive Rome into civil war. Of course, Cicero was not the only party responsible for the situation in Rome and there is no point blaming him at this distance. However, his contribution to the strife does make it make it possible to suggest that, according to his own understanding of the good citizen as one whose actions must benefit the \textit{res publica}, Cicero was not necessarily a good citizen. He, of course, would dispute this suggestion – arguing that it was absolutely in the best interests of Rome that Antonius be removed from the equation even at the cost of civil war. Yet, Cicero’s refusal to allow the validity of contesting this position may be seen as being as much one of Rome’s problems at this time as the armies and ambition of Antonius or Octavian.

So, now we come to the slightly wild jump, and the idea that readings of rhetoric in the ancient world may be of benefit in engaging with rhetoric in modern politics. There are other ways in which the sort of analysis carried out above might feed into contemporary discussions about the state of our politics and society – but I just want to look at this one, as I think this is an argument worth making in light of the regular questioning of the validity of Classics in the modern curriculum - from the comments of Ed Balls in the spring of 2010 that Latin is boring and pointless, to the threats to various Classics departments. Simply letting Boris Johnson speak for us – whilst often entertaining – is not always helpful, and I think it’s important that we start defending the importance of Classics – both in terms of its value on a broad scale and in terms of specific examples of the way that the skills we use regularly might be employed in other areas. My particular area of interest is politics – so I’m going to make the argument that being able to critique political rhetoric is not just a useful skill for the Classicist, but is also of vital importance dealing with the whirl of spin, argument and ‘debate’ in modern politics. I also want to, tentatively, suggest that an understanding of the way Cicero’s use of exclusionary rhetoric contributed to Rome’s problems in the period between Caesar’s death and the establishment of the Second Triumvirate might help us identify – and debunk – similar uses of rhetoric today to try and avoid the problems that can accompany it.

I thought about using a British example for this, but then I thought everyone would be sick of British politics by now.\footnote{This paper was initially given in May 2011, shortly after the general election} So, I am going to turn to a comparison with contemporary American politics: the furious argument for the guardianship of America’s soul from the right of the Republican party since the 2008 Presidential elections – an argument that defines the Democrats in general and President Obama in particular as un-American and dangerous. So we have two examples, nos. 13 & 14 on the handout. In his speech at the Republican Convention, President Bush said: “Fellow citizens: If the Hanoi Hilton could not break John McCain’s resolve to do what is best for his country, you can be sure the angry left never will.”\footnote{For the full text of the speech, see Bush (2008)} Bush’s comment was followed in the next month by Sarah Palin’s declaration that Obama: “Is
not a man who sees America as you and I do - as the greatest force for good in the world. This is someone who sees America as imperfect enough to pal around with terrorists who targeted their own country.”  
Political bloggers Marc Ambinder and Matt Yglesias both commented on the way in which such rhetoric aimed to push Obama and the Democrats out of legitimate political debate because they were un-American. Yglesias described Bush's comment as an, “Imputation of bad faith — that right and left can't just disagree about what's best for the country... in Bush’s view the left is self-consciously pushing a bad-for-America agenda.” Ambinder translated Palin’s statement in the following way: “It's that Obama, ‘is not a man who sees America as you and I do.’ This is the message that opponents of Obama began with: he's not one of us. He's culturally foreign. He doesn't share your values. He's dangerous.”

The way the debate has disintegrated since the election into the fury of the Tea Partiers and the anti-Health Care reform campaign on one side, and the almost disbelieving mockery of the likes of Jon Stewart and Rachel Maddow on the other - in which both sides appear to be talking past the other while their opponents refuse to listen, dismissing them as the proverbial, mad, bad, and dangerous to know, and the difficulties of passing legislation through the US Congress right now only serves to highlight the danger of exclusionary rhetoric to the political process.

If we accept that the ability to read rhetoric is a skill that can be taught by the study of Classics and Ancient History, and that it can translate into an ability to read contemporary rhetoric, we must then ask whether this can help us justify the relevance of our work – and how. I'm not convinced that there’s a demand that we necessarily *do* anything great and dramatic with this ability or make any big claims, for example that knowledge and skill will make people ‘better’ politicians or ‘better’ political commentators. But I think we could do a better job of arguing that a classical education – and in the case of this example, the skills honed in reading rhetoric – has the ability to make us better able to engage in the political discourse around us – even to read the newspaper. In a commencement address given at Kenyon College, David Foster Wallace said, “Twenty years after my own graduation, I have come gradually to understand that the liberal arts cliché about teaching you how to think is actually shorthand for a much deeper, more serious idea: learning how to think really means learning how to exercise some control over how and what you think. It means being conscious and aware enough to choose what you pay attention to and to choose how you construct meaning from experience. Because if you cannot exercise this kind of choice in adult life, you will be totally hosed.”

And I think considering the impact of Cicero’s use of exclusionary rhetoric in the *Philippics* upon Roman politics might be helpful in enabling people to avoid being ‘hosed’ by politicians using similar techniques today.

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