HEREDITARY SUCCESSION IN MODERN AUTOCRACIES

By JASON BROWNLEE*

In summer 2006 a ranking member of Egypt’s ruling National Democratic Party speculated the party might nominate President Hosni Mubarak’s forty-two-year-old son Gamal in the next presidential election, then scheduled for 2011.1 Given Egypt’s recent history—including the overthrow of a monarchy in 1952 and subsequent rule by military officers—succession by the civilian Gamal appears unprecedented.2 Yet placed in global context, hereditary succession in Egypt would seem conventional. Beginning with North Korean president Kim Jong-il’s installation in 1994, the sons of autocratic executives have come to power at an average rate of one every three years. Regimes in Equatorial Guinea, Libya, and Yemen are poised for the same kind of transfer. What explains the phenomenon of extending authoritarianism through dynasticism?

Hereditary succession among republic-style autocracies was unheralded by earlier studies of authoritarianism and remains unexplained in the hybrid regimes literature. Samuel Huntington claimed that inherited authority and plebiscitary institutions would not long coexist.3 Another author stated more categorically that political rule through “heredity has come to an end.”4 Subsequently, students of autocracy

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2 Muhammad Abdul Aziz and Youssif Hussein, “The President, the Son, and the Military: Succession in Egypt,” Arab Studies Journal 9/10 (Fall 2001/Spring 2002); Samer Shehata, “Political Succession in Egypt,” Middle East Policy 9 (September 2002); and Mary Anne Weaver, “Pharaohs-In-Waiting,” The Atlantic (October 2003).

3 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), 168.


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tended to focus on regimes’ semblance, if not their substantive likeness, to electoral democracies. Such works illuminate autocracy’s latest republican features but do not address the countercurrent of supposedly defunct dynastic practices. Hereditary succession in Azerbaijan in 2003, Singapore in 2004, and Togo in 2005 overshadowed nominal multiparty competition, yet evoked little analysis. Hence, while focusing on elections comparatists may have neglected areas and actors more decisive for the allocation of political power. Research on comparative authoritarianism is beginning to address the historic and organizational sources of authoritarian resilience, but there is little ongoing research about how such regimes might operate when the present cohort of rulers departs.


9 Studies of succession have focused on the Soviet Union and Mexico, but have not established cross-regional explanatory frameworks. Mexico’s Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI, r. 1929–2000) selected a nonincumbent presidential candidate every six years, providing an exceptionally
This article opens a comparative investigation into hereditary succession in post–World War II autocracies. I draw upon prior research by John Herz and Gordon Tullock to test a political theory for hereditary succession. Tullock hypothesizes that hereditary succession provides a system for sustaining extant power distributions among the broader elite. The benefits of hereditary succession thereby spread beyond the immediate ruler and successor, ensuring continued status for extra–familial elites. I extend this argument to account for the contrast cases of orderly nonhereditary succession. Whether elites will abet hereditary succession depends on the precedent for leadership selection. Where rulers are predated by parties, surrounding elites will defer to the party as the recognized arbiter of succession. Where rulers predate their parties and elites lack an established precedent for the orderly transfer of power, hereditary succession offers a focal point for reducing uncertainty, achieving consensus, and forestalling a power vacuum. In these instances elites will accede to the ruler’s choice of heir apparent.

I test this theory using an original data set of 258 post–World War II autocrats who ruled for at least three years. A ruler’s longevity in office and his fortune at having eligible offspring are the preconditions for comparing hereditary and nonhereditary successions. From the full universe of autocratic rulers, I identify the relevant universe of potential hereditary successions based on two criteria: the ruler’s survival in office to the point of preparing an orderly succession (typically through the designation of an heir apparent) and the presence of a viable adult heir. In the resulting twenty–two cases I examine how surrounding nonfamilial elites responded to heirs apparent, including whether they backed the ruler’s choice or opposed it and installed an alternative figure. Outcomes among the potential hereditary succession cases are largely consistent with the theory developed from Tullock.
The institutional precedents structuring elite behavior match the divergence between hereditary and nonhereditary succession in seventeen out of twenty-two cases: five out of seven hereditary successions, twelve out of fifteen nonhereditary successions. Notably, elites overrode the ruler’s selection of heir apparent only in cases where the party enjoyed a precedent for selecting from within its ranks. In sum, hereditary succession predominated among those cases where the ruler’s authority predated the party’s and occurred very rarely when the ruler was himself the product of a preexisting party.\textsuperscript{12} Case synopses show this pattern, including the instances when elites from long-standing parties obstructed hereditary succession.

The study holds several implications for comparative scholarship on autocracy and succession. Popular culturalist accounts notwithstanding, hereditary succession appears to primarily depend on the political profile of the regime in question. While many a ruler may dream of founding a dynasty, a son’s rise hinges on the response of the broader ruling elite. Those elites are more prone to abet hereditary succession when they lack an orderly precedent for leadership selection and are wary of a leadership vacuum. Consequently, contemporary autocrats who overshadow the parties through which they rule are likely initiators for future hereditary successions. Indeed, in those cases, a wave of elite resistance to autocrats grooming their sons would be strong evidence disconfirming the theory presented in this article.

**Succession Practices in Modern Autocracies**

Leadership survival and succession has long been considered one of the most daunting challenges for authoritarian rulers. It seemed unlikely that developing states would devise institutions for regular, orderly succession as the Mexican regime achieved in the 1930s.\textsuperscript{13} More often, autocrats were expected to meet a violent and abrupt end before ever inaugurating a smooth transition.\textsuperscript{14} The subsequent record of fallen dictatorships largely supports these insights, and the appellation

\textsuperscript{12} In Egypt, Anwar Sadat made Hosni Mubarak his vice president and expected successor in 1975. Mubarak thus gained the status of heir apparent three years before Sadat inaugurated the National Democratic Party and installed Mubarak as the party’s vice chairman. On Sadat’s tapping of Mubarak and the NDP’s founding, see John Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 47, 369–71.


“president-for-life” is an unrealized aspiration for many despots.\textsuperscript{15} When scholars account for the heavy attrition rate among autocrats, hereditary succession appears to be a significant variant of a rare phenomenon: the seamless passage of power from one autocratic ruler to his preferred heir.

Hereditary succession can be distinguished from other forms of leadership change by the following three factors:

1. Transfer of top governing authority from father to son.
2. Preparation or initiation of power transfer prior to the ruler’s death.
3. Absence of formal democratic procedures (electoral democracy) or legal stipulation of familial rule (traditional monarchies).

A word on each of these points.

Regarding the first criterion, hereditary successions entail the transfer of \textit{de facto} power, not simply the formal transition of office from one figure to the next. Although the father-ruler’s control may be obscured by installing a figurehead placeholder—as Anastasio Somoza García did from 1947 to 1950 in Nicaragua and Lee Kuan Yew did between 1990 and 2004 in Singapore—substantive political control remains in his hands and it is this power which passes to the son-heir.\textsuperscript{16} Hereditary succession is also limited in this study to father-son leadership transitions deliberately implemented by the ruler before his death, the second conceptual restriction.\textsuperscript{17} While there are many possible family members who might conceivably take power, sons have been the predominant heirs. Brothers are typically of the same generation and fraternal successions are a less appealing course for reasons discussed below.\textsuperscript{18} Likewise, in post–World War II autocracies sisters and spouses


\textsuperscript{16} I discuss these examples in greater detail below. During the transition period in Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew and his eventual heir suppressed public discussions of hereditary succession, even charging the \textit{International Herald Tribune} with libel for an opinion column about dynastic politics in Singapore. Philip Bowring, “The Claims About ‘Asian’ Values Don’t Usually Bear Scrutiny,” \textit{International Herald Tribune}, August 2, 1994; and “Nepotism: A Little More than Kin,” \textit{Economist}, December 24, 1994. Subsequent events supported the \textit{Tribune} columnist’s argument that political authority had remained within the Lee family. A decade after Lee Kuan Yew’s putative handover of power, one observer remarked, “Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong still is seen by some to be functioning virtually on probation.” Raj Vasil, \textit{Governing Singapore: Democracy and National Development} (Singapore: Allen & Unwin, 2000), 137.

\textsuperscript{17} Under these strict definitions I omit the post hoc succession of Joseph Kabila in the Democratic Republic of Congo following President Laurent Kabila’s assassination in 2001.

\textsuperscript{18} Were Raúl Castro to succeed Fidel Castro, it would mark the only case in the data set where a long-ruling leader overlooked multiple eligible sons and inaugurated a brother-brother transfer of power. Juan O. Tamayo, “Castro’s Secret Life: Even the CIA is Left to Wonder about the ‘Maximum
have not succeeded their brothers and husbands. While they may remain influential actors, they have not gained top posts in the wake of the ruler’s passing. The closest case to spousal succession was Simone Ovid Duvalier’s custodial rulership during the early years of Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier’s presidency. In one apparent exception Isabel Perón had been the elected vice-president prior to her husband’s death and is thus omitted under the third and final regime type restriction, which confines the study to nondemocracies.

Hereditary successions in modern autocracies occur in regimes where rulers do not depend on regular, free, and fair elections to maintain their positions. Regimes that meet the minimum Schumpeterian standard for electoral democracy are omitted. The theory of hereditary succession presented here is not intended to address the persistent influence of political families in such electoral democracies as India, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Rather, this study concentrates on non-monarchical autocracies in which fathers installed sons. Table 1 lists the nine post–World War II cases identified by these measures (omitting the single fraternal succession, Nicaragua’s 1967 transfer of power from Luis Somoza Debayle to Anastasio Somoza Debayle upon the former’s early death by cardiac arrest at age forty-four).

Although that number seems low in absolute terms, it is impossible to assess the rarity of hereditary succession without also measuring the frequency of the alternative: During the same post–World War II period, how many orderly nonhereditary successions have occurred in modern autocracies? How many rulers passed power to any successor of their choosing? To answer these questions I composed an original data set on post–World War II autocrats who ruled for at least three years. Hundreds of autocrats have lost power during the post-War period and the three-year threshold limits the focus to those rulers who were at least minimally able to consolidate power. Two hundred fifty-eight met this criterion. I categorized those individuals based on seven processes through which they left office: hereditary succession (including fraternal succession); nonhereditary succession by the incumbent’s designated successor, without term limits; nonhereditary succession by the incumbent’s designated successor after a term-limited tenure;


Geddes (fn. 8), 1.
replacement by the ruling party (involuntary removal); replacement by a coup; replacement by an opposition victory (electoral or nonelectoral); and replacement by foreign imposition. The distribution of these outcomes is provided in Figure 1.

Given the political turbulence wrought by many autocracies, orderly nonhereditary successions are uncommon. Of 258 rulers, 196 (76 percent) were constrained by their parties or forcibly removed, depriving them of the chance to groom an heir unfettered. A further sign that events intervened upon succession options comes from data on the age of rulers when they left power. Figure 2 shows the distribution of leadership changes grouped by age of the autocrat at the time of his exit. The sixty-two prepared hereditary or nonhereditary successions are clustered among elderly autocrats—those who escaped the plots of party rivals, domestic activists, and other would-be usurpers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ruler</th>
<th>Successor</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Anastasio Somoza</td>
<td>Luis Somoza Debayle</td>
<td>Luis Somoza Debayle was succeeded by his brother Anastasio Somoza Debayle.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>García (r. 1936–56)</td>
<td>(r. 1956–67)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Rafael Trujillo</td>
<td>Rafael “Ramfis” Trujillo Martinez (r. 1961)</td>
<td>Under U.S. military pressure, Ramfis Trujillo passed power to then-nominal president Joaquín Balaguer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>François Duvalier</td>
<td>Jean-Claude Duvalier (r. 1971–86)</td>
<td>Jean-Claude Duvalier was nineteen years old when he assumed the presidency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Chiang Kai-shek</td>
<td>Chiang Ching-kuo (r. 1975–88)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>Kim Il-sung</td>
<td>Kim Jong-il (r. 1994–present)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Hafez al-Assad</td>
<td>Bashar al-Assad (r. 2000–present)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Heydar Aliyev</td>
<td>Ilham Aliyev (r. 2003–present)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Gnassingbé Eyadéma</td>
<td>Faure Gnassingbé (r. 2005–present)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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Sources: Consult references in case synopses in this article and data set (available from author).
Dictators who sufficiently entrenched themselves to survive in power past age sixty cleared the biggest hurdles to orchestrated leadership transitions, including hereditary handovers. Five of the nine rulers who passed power to sons died in their sixties; the remaining four were octogenarians at the time of succession. However, even among the most resilient autocrats there are still more dictators who implement nonhereditary successions. What explains the occurrence of hereditary succession as opposed to the installation of other designees?

A Political Theory of Hereditary Succession

Perhaps owing to its rarity amid the broader universe of autocratic leadership outcomes, hereditary succession has seldom received systematic explanation. The most prevalent treatment, by journalists, portrays hereditary succession as a cultural fluke. It is commonly treated as a curiosity of Arab politics. The *New York Times* editorial board claimed, for example, “While dynasties can be found all over the world, they have been most common in Arab countries.”22 That judgment elides the difference between

long-standing monarchies and republic-style autocracies. Although most traditional monarchies are found in the Arab world, the majority of nonmonarchical hereditary successions occur in non-Arab states. A span of successions stretching from the Caribbean to Southeast Asia belies the notion of inherited rule as an Arab proclivity.

In contrast to journalists, political scientists regard hereditary succession as the extension of an especially corrupt and personalistic autocracy.23 The practice, such scholars argue, originates not in the surrounding society but in the regime itself. Encapsulating this view, Samer Shehata writes:

Rather than being the product of an essential Arab political culture, the phenomenon is more likely specific to a particular type of authoritarianism—centralization of power in the person of the leader, a small ruling elite, a lack of institutionalized power centers outside the leader, a cult of personality, and long-serving rulers who have been able to eliminate potential rivals.24

Shehata correctly notes that hereditary successions outside the Arab world have often been overlooked. Even so, the diversity of cases also

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24 Shehata (fn. 2), 112.
suggests Shehata’s account is incomplete. Neopatrimonialism and personality cults have accompanied several hereditary successions, but they are not prerequisites. Table 1 includes Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and North Korea, all notoriously corrupt and repressive regimes. The same set also contains Taiwan and Singapore, governments known for their strong institutions. Hence, hereditary succession is not solely driven by personalism run amok. Rather, the prevalence of hereditary succession among otherwise dissimilar regimes signals a more basic political process.

The distribution of outcomes in Figure 1 indicates rulers should be just as concerned with threats from their ostensible coalition partners (in the ruling party and the military) as with threats from the opposition. This insecurity, which is endemic to authoritarian regimes, becomes more acute as dictators promote fellow elites into positions of influence, for in so doing they may engender their own downfall. As the ruler’s high-ranking associates accrue more power they become more capable of mounting a successful challenge and potentially more tempted to venture such a move. Herz dubs this security dilemma—the risk that by clearly grooming a successor the ruler positions a rival who may try to supplant him—the “crown-prince problem.” As Tullock describes the issue, “if [the ruler] anoints a successor, this gives that successor both strong motives for assassinating him and reasonable security that he will get away with it…Looked at from the standpoint of the dictator, then, it’s dangerous to have an official successor.”

And there is a further complication; failure to choose a clear successor heightens the likelihood of an unregulated power struggle in the wake of the ruler’s death (without eliminating the potential for a coup prior to that point). The ruler and his associates thus shoulder a double burden; they must provide for the incumbent’s security while the ruler is alive and for the regime’s continuation after the ruler departs. One mechanism for continuing the regime in an orderly fashion is a preexisting party through which elites may reach consensus about the in-

25 In their comparative study of developmental and patrimonial states, Peter Evans and James Rauch code the Dominican Republic and Haiti among the most personalized regimes of their data set (with scores of 2.0 and 4.0, out of a maximum of 13.50) while placing Singapore (13.50) and Taiwan (12.0) at the top of their rankings. Peter Evans and James E. Rauch, “Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of Weberian State Structures on Economic Growth,” American Sociological Review 64 (October 1999), 763.

26 For two influential examples see Bienen and van de Walle (fn. 15); and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (fn. 15).

27 Herz (fn. 14), 30.

28 Tullock (fn. 10), 151, 153.

29 Herz (fn. 14), 37.
cumbent’s replacement. Such parties are not always available, however, and the crown-prince problem is not easily solved.

In his book-length treatment of autocratic rule, Tullock hypothesizes that hereditary succession provides a method for regime stability during and beyond the ruler’s lifetime. By grooming his son for succession the dictator may resolve the crown-prince problem, affording mutual security to incumbent and appointee while dispelling the surrounding elite’s apprehension of a power vacuum. Rulers thus prefer sons over alternative figures more inclined to hasten the succession through assassination or coup attempts.

“[The] son is wise to simply wait for his father to die. He knows this, his father knows that he knows this and concern about assassination by son is less in a hereditary successional arrangement than if the designated successor is a high ranking official of the existing regime.”

Following this same logic, brothers and other coevals of the ruler’s family are less attractive as successors for they are more likely to be usurpers. The generational gap and genealogical line between a ruler and his son allow both individuals to enjoy security. By contrast, a brother or other relative close in age to the ruler is unlikely to patiently await the incumbent’s natural passing. In fact, a ruler who promotes a familial coeval may exacerbate the crown-prince problem. Among the universe of 258 rulers in the data set, so-called lateral successions occurred only in the Somoza regime (at a time when neither of the brothers had an adult son for passing power vertically to the next generation).

In addition to being an attractive option for incumbent autocrats, hereditary succession appeals to most of the surrounding political elites—the very pool of potential heirs not designated to fill the ruler’s post. With an established pattern for preserving the regime after a ruler’s death, other incumbent officeholders share an incentive to accept the ruler’s appointee rather than vie for power in an unbridled struggle.

30 Tullock (fn. 10), 163.
31 See Bueno de Mesquita et al. (fn. 15), 17, for historical illustrations of this problem.
32 The threat from nonfilial relatives shows in at least three cases where familial coevals attempted or successfully executed coups. In the Dominican Republic, Rafael Trujillo’s brother Petán plotted to seize power during the mid–1930s and was repeatedly posted abroad as a result. In Equatorial Guinea in 1979, current president Teodoro Obiang Nguema took power by ousting his uncle, Francisco Macías Nguema (eighteen years his senior). In Syria in 1983, Hafez al-Assad survived a coup attempt by his brother Rifaat, who was subsequently exiled. Robert D. Crassweller, Trujillo: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 140–41; Daniel Chirot, Modern Tyrants: The Power and Prevalence of Evil in Our Age (New York: Free Press, 1994), 363–64; and Patrick Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1988), 432–35.
33 Tullock (fn. 10), 151–57.
Tullock thus reasons there are few institutional arrangements through which autocrats favor nonhereditary succession and he forecasts that “hereditary monarchs” will gradually predominate among nondemocracies. Recent work by Michael Herb buttresses Tullock’s theory and illustrates the elite behaviors that converge on hereditary succession. Refuting earlier arguments that monarchies could not manage modernizing reforms, Herb found the Persian Gulf monarchies persisted through a form of power-sharing that placated would-be successors and prevented fissures in the ruling elite. In these regimes, even members of the royal family not tapped as heir apparent were invested in the regime’s survival because they held top cabinet posts including the prime ministership, the ministry of defense, the ministry of foreign affairs, and the ministry of the interior. Thus ensconced, when succession neared, they would band together rather than polarize and risk an internecine feud.

These works outline a political explanation for hereditary succession in modern autocracies. Because elites prefer maintaining their status to pursuing a potentially disastrous power grab, they commonly seek a nonsultanistic push for hereditary succession—one that extends beyond the immediate goals of the ruler’s family. This strategy is rational and arithmetically prudent. Only one individual can be the top ruler while many more than that can benefit from the regime or, alternatively, suffer from its downfall. When given the choice between low-intensity conflicts over policy issues and high-intensity struggles for the top posts in the regime, elites tend to avoid the second kind of conflict. Clearly, the ruler, son, and first lady may see a common good in preserving the family’s influence after the ruler’s departure. This aspiration is ultimately enabled by the son’s role as a second-best choice, after themselves, for each of the surrounding extra-familial elites. For party apparatchiks and other top regime supporters, hereditary succession is inherently exclusionary; it limits the rulership to the dictator’s lineage. However, it may be much less exclusionary than the rise of a new chief executive from outside the ruler’s family. Sheila Carapico notes that completed succession means the ruling coalition “remains

34 Ibid., 161, 166, 215.
36 David Waldner has differentiated between low-intensity elite conflict, in which elite status is not threatened, and high-intensity elite conflict, in which elites face permanent loss of elite status. For treatment of leadership succession, I treat conflict intensity as a product of elite strategies, rather than as an independent variable. David Waldner, *State Building and Late Development* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999), 29.
intact. . . . Policies might change, but political arrangements emerge unscathed, without struggle or upheaval.” 37 In this way, the son-heir provides a “focal point” for elite consensus once he is tapped for succession by the father-ruler.38 Additionally, senior leaders may expect to hold sway over an ostensibly inexperienced and pliable heir. Under this set of circumstances, hereditary succession becomes the most palatable of many possible outcomes, far preferable to the regime’s disintegration or to a series of purges by a wrathful victor.

IDENTIFYING CONTRAST CASES FOR THEORY TESTING

Historical comparisons and anecdotal observations support Tullock’s expectation, but no study has yet tested his proposition across the universe of succession outcomes in the developing world.39 To evaluate whether succession patterns accord with Tullock’s thesis, I contrast hereditary succession with alternative outcomes—the “contrast cases” to hereditary succession.40 The identification of cases that provide variation in the dependent variable (succession outcome) begins with two logical requisites for hereditary succession: political opportunity for succession (remaining in power to the point of grooming a successor) and biological opportunity for hereditary succession (presence of an adult male heir). These factors remove those instances in which the outcome of hereditary succession was already precluded and thereby hone in on the relevant counterfactuals.

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY

In the full universe of autocracies, hereditary successions seem rare. As illustrated above, most rulers are ousted long before they might choose to depart and thus they never transfer power to a desired successor. Consider, for example, Syria, where commentators remarked on the father-son succession in 2000 as unusual but said little about the historic rarity of orderly leadership transition in any form.

37 Sheila Carapico, “Successions, Transitions, Coups, and Revolutions,” Middle East Policy 9 (September 2002).
Hafez al-Assad commandeered the Baath Party in November 1970 and became president of Syria the following year. Over subsequent decades Assad held onto his office despite military defeat, popular revolt, a power grab by his brother, and the country’s loss of Soviet patronage. In 2000, then sixty-nine years old, Assad arranged for the presidency to pass to his oldest remaining son, Bashar. Bashar’s prior return from medical training in England and subsequent grooming for a leadership role in Syrian politics had drawn intense scrutiny. Yet the focus on the successor missed a fundamental point about the outgoing ruler. Hafez al-Assad engaged in a deliberate transfer of power without being forcibly removed from office or assassinated. A nonviolent succession of this kind was unprecedented in modern Syria. In the period 1947 to 1970, fifteen coups had been carried out there; Assad’s numerous predecessors had been ousted or slain long before they had the chance to contemplate a hereditary or nonhereditary succession. Thus, beyond being a case of hereditary succession, Bashar al-Assad’s inauguration was an instance of a prepared succession at the end of a ruler’s natural life. The novelty of Bashar’s ascent is exaggerated by contrasting it with the string of prior Syrian rulers who were unable to orchestrate either hereditary or nonhereditary transitions of power.

While political survival is a precondition for hereditary succession, an autocrat’s survival in office may also be influenced by the succession process, particularly once an heir apparent emerges. If elites balk at the prospect of hereditary succession they may conspire to remove the leader and choose his successor from among their own ranks. Tullock predicts otherwise, but to evaluate his theory one must consider the possibility that political survival is endogenous to the ruler’s succession plans. In order to pin down whether hereditary succession wards off dissension or invites it, I examine, where possible, how elites respond to the ruler’s designated heir apparent, a figure who typically emerges late in the dictator’s tenure. Was the ruler’s designated heir apparent accepted or opposed by the surrounding elites, the figures Tullock expects to rally behind a filial appointee?

Of course some events are censored from observation and in those cases whether elites would have gone through with a hereditary suc-

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44 Quinlivan (fn. 41), 134.
cession cannot be determined. One example of this is when a ruler has groomed his son, but he, the ruler, is removed by nonelite actors either through a revolutionary process or foreign conquest.\(^{45}\) There are, however, cases that are not censored in which elite dissent was apparent and in which elite opposition to hereditary succession did contribute to the ruler’s downfall. Hereditary succession plans were a salient factor in the removal of Alfredo Stroessner in Paraguay and Todor Zhivkov in Bulgaria. The cases of Stroessner and Zhivkov are therefore included among the contrast cases.

**Biological Opportunity**

Rulers who elude their foes and stay in power for decades are still not guaranteed the option of hereditary succession. They may have the chance to oversee succession, but may lack a viable heir, an adult son. At that point biological opportunity presents a secondary constraint and screens out many would-be dynasts. While the question of producing offspring is rarely a subject of political science discussions, the vagaries of genetics and matrimony have precluded hereditary successions for more than a few resilient autocrats. Houari Boumédiene in Algeria (r. 1965–78) and António Salazar in Portugal (r. 1932–68) were bachelor presidents. Francisco Franco in Spain (r. 1939–75) and Josip Tito in Yugoslavia (r. 1945–80) had no son in their presidential families. These long-ruling autocrats perforce enacted nonhereditary successions. To determine which leaders could entertain the option of a hereditary succession, I looked for the presence of a viable heir.\(^{46}\)

In addition, among the universe of 258 rulers, the average age upon entry into power was forty-nine years, twenty-nine days. The youngest ruler was Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier, who succeeded his father when he was nineteen years old. The second youngest ruler who came to power through an orderly succession was thirty-one-year-old Norodom

\(^{45}\) Two empirical cases in which succession was screened from observation are the December 1989 ouster of Nicolae Ceaușescu in Romania and the March 2003 deposition of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. In Romania, Nicu Ceaușescu had been the clear frontrunner to succeed his father. In Iraq, Hussein’s heir apparent was his son Qusay. But hereditary succession plans in these cases were not a proximate cause of the ruler’s removal. These cases are therefore not considered as confirming or disconfirming the present theory. On dynastic socialism in Romania and the overthrow of Ceaușescu see René de Flers, “Socialism in One Family,” *Survey: A Journal of East & West Studies* 28 (Winter 1984); Vladimir Tismaneanu, “Ceaușescu’s Socialism,” *Problems of Communism* 34 (January–February 1985); and Chirot (fn. 32), 256. On Saddam Hussein’s regime and Qusay’s promotion see “Iraq-Government Saddam Hussein’s Second Son Named to Governing Council,” *EFE News Service*, June 9, 2001, http://global.factiva.com (accessed June 18, 2007).

\(^{46}\) I treat biological opportunity as exogenous. For example, I do not seek to explain why António Salazar never married or why Francisco Franco sired no sons. Rather, I note those facts as they affect the question of why the Portuguese and Spanish regimes did not have hereditary successions while others, such as the Syrian regime, did.
Sihanouk of Cambodia. Accordingly, I operationalized “viable heir” as a son who was no younger than thirty years of age.

**Analyzing the Data**

The political and biological preconditions of hereditary succession help to discern relevant contrast cases. After considering political longevity to the time when a ruler begins to groom his successor and biological opportunity as the existence of a son to fill that role, the data provide fifteen nonhereditary successions (Table 2), the analytic foil to the hereditary examples of Table 1. These contrast cases help to evaluate Tullock’s theory and assess the conditions under which leaders pass power to sons, pass over them in favor of another designee, or attempt to pass power to sons and are thwarted by discontent elites.

**Explaining Variation in Succession Outcomes**

The cases in Table 2 provide variation in the dependent variable: contrast cases in which rulers with the political and biological opportunity to bequeath power to a son are instead succeeded by an alternative figure. These are the relevant counterfactual data for testing whether nonfamilial elites support hereditary succession and for determining whether sons play a role in preserving extant power arrangements. Tullock’s work offers one variable for explaining nonhereditary succession—the presence of an accepted organizational method for selecting leaders and designating a focal point.

Elites outside of the father-son dyad prefer the regime’s continuation over an unconstrained power struggle that endangers their posts. But if a practice for the nonviolent selection of a ruler already exists, leaders will defer to that method over a tradition-breaking filial appointment. In essence, leaders will opt for the least risky of the two courses, hereditary succession or nonhereditary succession. Their perception of the potential costs depends on the precedent of the incumbent’s installation. Did the present ruler come from the party or vice versa? If an organizational mechanism for leadership choice has already been used,

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47 In the data set there are six rulers who took office through coups while between the ages of twenty-five and thirty: Valentine Strasser (Sierra Leone), Michel Micombero (Burundi), Muammar Qadhafi (Libya), Samuel Doe (Liberia), Gnassingbé Eyadéma (Togo), and Marien Ngouabi (Congo-Brazzaville). Youth appears to be less a barrier to seizing power than it is for being granted power by an incumbent.

48 Following this operationalization, I exclude the Haitian case from subsequent inferences. Although the Duvaliers are an iconic example of hereditary succession, François Duvalier’s grooming of his son appears to be exceptional. Inclusion of Haiti in the analysis would strengthen the postulated relationship between institutional antecedents and succession practices. See David Nicholls, “The Duvalier Regime in Haiti,” in Chehabi and Linz (fn. 23).
elites will expectedly treat that practice as the default. In the absence of such a process—that is, when the ruler was either a personal appointee or the party’s founder—the ruler may promote his son while garnering the deference of regime elites who lack an accepted alternative route. The combined set of twenty-two succession cases provides the data to evaluate whether hereditary succession predominates in the regimes where rulers predated parties and elites had no prior practice in choos-

### Table 2
**Nonhereditary Successions: The Contrast Cases (1946–2006)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ruler</th>
<th>Potential Hereditary Successor</th>
<th>Actual Successor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>Joseph Stalin</td>
<td>Vassily Stalin</td>
<td>Nikita Kruschev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(r. 1922–53)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(r. 1953–1964)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>Leonid Brezhnev</td>
<td>Yuri Brezhnev</td>
<td>Yuri Andropov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(r. 1964–82)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(r. 1982–1984)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Enver Hoxha</td>
<td>Ilir Hoxha or Sokol Hoxha</td>
<td>Ramiz Alia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(r. 1944–85)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(r. 1985–1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Siaka Stevens</td>
<td>James Stevens</td>
<td>Joseph Saidu Momoh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(r. 1967–85)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(r. 1985–93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Julius Nyerere</td>
<td>Charles Makongoro or Nyerere</td>
<td>Ali Hassan Mwinyi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(r. 1961–85)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(r. 1985–95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Chiang Ching-kuo</td>
<td>Chiang Hsiao-wu</td>
<td>Lee Teng-hui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Todor Zhivkov</td>
<td>Vladimir Zhivkov</td>
<td>Petar Mladenov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(r. 1956–89)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(r. 1989–90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini</td>
<td>Ahmad Khomeini</td>
<td>Ali Khamenei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(r. 1979–89)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(r. 1989–present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>Alfredo Stroessner</td>
<td>Gustavo Stroessner</td>
<td>Andrés Rodriguez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(r. 1954–89)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(r. 1989–93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Deng Xiaoping</td>
<td>Deng Pufang or Deng Zhifang</td>
<td>Jiang Zemin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>Kaysone</td>
<td>Saysomphone</td>
<td>Khamtai Siphandon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Phomvihane</td>
<td>Phomvihane</td>
<td>(r. 1992–2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Mahathir Mohammed</td>
<td>Mokhzani Mahathir</td>
<td>Abdullah Badawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Jiang Zemin</td>
<td>Jiang Mianhang</td>
<td>Hu Jintao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Joaquim Chissano</td>
<td>Nyimpine Chissano</td>
<td>Armando Guebuza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(r. 1986–2005)</td>
<td>or N’naite Chissano</td>
<td>(r. 2005–present)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Consult references in case synopses in this article and data set (available from author).
ing from among their ranks. Table 3 sorts the cases into two columns based on institutional history and whether the ruler predates the party, and places them in rows based on succession outcomes.

Institutional variations match the hypothesized outcomes in seventeen of the twenty-two successions (77 percent), and were thus consistent with a political theory of hereditary succession. Additionally, with regard to the behavior of nonfamilial elites, in two of five attempted hereditary successions where parties predated the ruler, nonhereditary succession occurred despite the ruler grooming his son, i.e., elites rejected the incumbent’s heir apparent. A close look at all of the cases illuminates the behavior of nonfamilial elites in these abortive hereditary successions and in the other observed outcomes.

**Hereditary Succession: Ruler Predates Party**

In five of the eight hereditary successions, rulers predated the party in operation. In these cases—the Dominican Republic, Taiwan, Azerbaijan, Singapore, and Togo—surrounding elites facilitated the plan to install the ruler’s son.

General Rafael Leónidas Trujillo took power in the Dominican Republic through a coup d'etat on February 23, 1930.49 His opponents cowed, Trujillo soon won the presidency in a single-candidate race.50 He then created the Dominican Party, which was also permitted no competitor and whose accounts Trujillo managed personally.51 While in his sixties, Trujillo began positioning his son Ramfis as heir apparent.52 When a small band of aggrieved affiliates assassinated the president on May 30, 1961, Ramfis returned home from vacationing in Paris, took command of the country’s armed forces, and spearheaded the regime’s retribution against his father’s assailants.53 Although the regime at that point was visibly shaken by the death of its leader, the conspirators failed to catalyze a country-wide revolt or even a military coup. During this uncertain phase the security and military apparatus remained cohesive and brutally effective at repressing dissent. As Jonathan Hartlyn writes: “It took some eight months, with considerable

51 Pons (fn. 49), 510, 512, 521; and Crassweller (fn. 32), 99–100.
pressure and oversight by the United States, to move to a provisional
government that represented a clear break with Trujillo."54 Crucial to
this transition was the imminent threat of U.S. invasion—underscored
by American military ships looming off the coast of Santo Domingo—
which on November 18 compelled Ramfis Trujillo to resign and de-
part.55 Ramfis’s exit was followed by the rise of theretofore nominal
president Joaquín Balaguer.56

In regards to succession, elites in Taiwan, Azerbaijan, Singapore, and
Togo operated in a political context analogous to that of their coun-
terparts in the Dominican Republic—albeit with the absence of U.S.
pressure after the succession took place. As in Trujillo’s regime, top
officials in the regimes of Chiang Kai-shek, Heydar Aliyev, Lee Kuan
Yew, and Gnassingbé Eyadéma did not have an institutional precedent
for selecting a successor from their ranks and, when the time came,
they deferred to the ruler’s choice of heir apparent. Chiang Kai-shek’s

54 Hartlyn (fn. 50), 103.
55 In his discussion of hereditary succession Tullock asks, “Why did it take the direct intervention
by the American government after the death of Trujillo to prevent his son from remaining in control
of the family hacienda?” Tullock (fn. 10), 163.
rout from mainland China in 1949 concluded the country’s civil war and placed the defeated Chiang in control over the new Taiwanese state; Chiang controlled the ruling Kuomintang (KMT), which exercised “total political dominance” over the island’s population. This control persisted through Chiang’s lifetime. By the time he reached his mid-seventies, the unrivaled premier had begun preparing to bequeath this power to his son. Chiang Ching-kuo was made minister of defense in 1965, clarifying his status as frontrunner to succeed his father. The younger Chiang’s influence grew steadily; in 1972 he was appointed prime minister and later that year, when his father fell ill, he became de facto chief executive. When Chiang Kai-shek died at the age of eighty-seven on April 5, 1975, Chiang Ching-kuo continued to rule the country, notwithstanding Vice President C. K. Yen’s formal assumption of the presidency. After an interim period in which he governed from the premiership, Chiang Ching-kuo was nominated by the KMT for president and elected in 1978.

Heydar Aliyev founded the New Azerbaijan Party in 1993 as he consolidated his grasp on the presidency. By 1999, the septuagenarian autocrat was staging his son Ilham’s eventual succession. Maneuvers to manipulate the constitution and provide a legal veneer for the dynastic handover continued through the elder Aliyev’s final months, culminating in Ilham’s dubious election to the presidency on October 15, 2003. Less than two months later Heydar Aliyev passed away with Ilham settled in his new post.

Lee Kuan Yew founded the People’s Action Party and led Singapore into independence, first from the British and then from Malaysia in 1965.
In the 1980s he began positioning his son Lee Hsien Loong to succeed him. The younger Lee was elected to parliament in 1984, became Minister of Trade and Industry in 1986, and rose to Deputy Prime Minister in 1990. At the time, many Singaporeans correctly suspected that “Lee [Kuan Yew] was, and would remain, the government’s dominant force.” The Lees’ continued influence overshadowed the formal premiership of Goh Chok Tong (1990–2004). In those years, Lee Hsien Loong was effectively premier-in-waiting while Goh Chok Tong served as premier and Lee Kuan Yew oversaw both men from the newly created post of senior minister. On August 12, 2004, Lee Hsien Loong was sworn in as prime minister. Much like the handover from Chiang Kai-shek in the early 1970s, this “pre-mortem” transition ensured stability even as Lee Kuan Yew, then in his eighties, remained elder statesman.

Finally, General Gnassingbé Eyadéma (then a colonel), seized power in Togo on January 13, 1967, and formally became president on April 14. In 1969 he formed the Rally of the Togolese People, which remained the only permitted party until 1991. After surviving the tumultuous 1990s, Eyadéma began grooming his son Faure Gnassingbé for the presidency. Faure was elected to parliament unopposed in 2002; the following year he was the presumptive beneficiary of a constitutional change—pushed through by Eyadéma—that lowered the minimum age for the presidency from forty-five to thirty-five. In July 2003 Faure joined his father’s cabinet and acquired the ministry overseeing Togo’s lucrative phosphate mines. Despite the overt


expansion of Faure’s portfolio, President Eyadéma remained coy about his succession plans, all the while garnering the tacit support of other possible contenders in the regime. When Eyadéma died at the age of sixty-seven while out of the country for urgent medical care on February 5, 2005, leaders of the Togolese armed forces immediately declared Faure the country’s new president. In the following weeks the ruling elite around Faure cemented his hold on power through a series of legal maneuvers and a legitimating election, and thereby lowered the risk of a chaotic internal conflict.

Throughout these five cases, the leader’s departure posed an unprecedented challenge to the regime’s continuation. Consistent with Tullock’s expectation, the ruler’s grooming of his son as heir apparent was actively facilitated by the surrounding elite. Particularly in the Dominican Republic, Azerbaijan, and Togo, relatively young and inexperienced leaders with little to no independent institutional base were supported by nonfamilial elites due to the implicit security the heir’s presence offered these top officials.

HEREDITARY SUCCESSION: PARTY PREDATES RULER

In most of the regimes where rulers came to power via parties, those practices constrained the subsequent successions. Nicaragua, North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), and Syria are three exceptions. Rulers in these countries subordinated the preexisting party to their personal authority and successfully promoted their sons as heirs apparent. Surrounding nonfamilial elites did not obstruct hereditary succession and in Syria they clearly regarded the ruler’s designee as the optimal course.

Anastasio Somoza García climbed to the presidency of Nicaragua through a stilted election in 1936 in which he was jointly nominated by the country’s historically leading parties, the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party. Competition between the Liberal and Conservative parties had characterized Nicaraguan politics since the country gained independence in 1821. Under the custodianship of a U.S. military intervention, Liberals were in power in the late 1920s. In 1932 newly elected Liberal President Juan Bautista Sacasa grudgingly appointed

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77 John A. Booth, “Republic of Nicaragua,” in Delury (fn. 70), 2:802.
Somoza chief director of the National Guard. Four year later Somoza marginalized Sacasa and positioned himself for a carefully engineered presidential bid.\textsuperscript{79} In June the Liberal Party nominated Somoza for the presidency, which he won six months later in a race boycotted by the opposition. As the country’s traditional parties fell under Somoza’s sway, they were renamed the Liberal National Party and Conservative National Party.\textsuperscript{80} The Liberal National Party was to be Somoza’s titular political organization. Upon taking office in January 1937, Somoza merged the positions of president and National Guard chief director. He went on to rule for nearly two decades, actively grooming his sons for succession during the later years of his tenure. In 1956 Somoza appointed his eldest son Luis Somoza Debayle, First Designate (heir apparent), and his younger son Anastasio Somoza Debayle, acting chief director of the National Guard. When Samoza was assassinated in September 1956, the sons were prepared to carry on for him. At that point, the Liberal National Party and National Guard supported the Somoza brothers in maintaining the dictatorship against the country’s enfeebled but persistent opposition movements.\textsuperscript{81}

Kim Il-sung’s dictatorship in North Korea represents the sole case of hereditary succession despite the presence of a communist party. Kim had not founded the Workers’ Party of Korea. Rather, he and the party were installed by occupying Soviet forces after they invaded the Korean peninsula in 1945.\textsuperscript{82} Given this background, it would have been conventional for Kim’s successor to emerge through the party organization. Instead, Kim infused the party with his relatives while brutally eliminating his rivals. As Mark Suh writes, these purges yielded an unusually narrow elite for a communist party regime. “By 1961, Kim Il-sung’s absolute power position was consolidated, and by 1970 all the politburo members were identified as belonging to his faction or family.”\textsuperscript{83} Relatives as distant as Kim’s great-grandfather were idolized and even his cousins, nieces, and nephews occupied influential party posts.\textsuperscript{84} This extraordinary imposition of family over party presents its


\textsuperscript{81} Bulmer-Thomas (fn. 79), 342–44.

\textsuperscript{82} Mark B. Suh, “Korea (Democratic People’s Republic/North Korea),” in Nohlen, Grotz, and Hartmann (fn. 6), 2:395.

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., 396.

\textsuperscript{84} Tai Sung An, North Korea in Transition: From Dictatorship to Dynasty (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983), 137, 141.
own lessons for the political process of hereditary succession. Hereditary succession was predicated on the thorough expunging of traditional political elites who could have opposed Kim's cult of personality. President Kim designated his son Kim Jong-il as heir apparent in 1980. These plans drew the opprobrium of other communist nations and strained Kim's own erratic fealty to communist ideology.85 (In 1973 the regime had conspicuously removed the term “hereditary succession” from the state’s official *Dictionary of Political Terminologies.*86) When the elder Kim passed away in 1994 at eighty-two, his son’s succession marked the culmination of a plan begun much earlier.

In Syria, Hafez al-Assad did not eliminate the Baath Party after he seized power, but he ruled over the party as much as through it. By 1991 Assad had outlasted most of his domestic opponents and was far along in preparing his elder son Basil to succeed him.87 Yet this plan collapsed when Basil perished abruptly in an automobile accident in 1994. The mantle of president-in-waiting then passed to Bashar, the president’s next eldest son and a previously innocuous figure. Bashar’s ascent did not evoke resistance from top Baathists and was instead abetted by the surrounding elite when Hafez al-Assad’s health declined in the later 1990s. Baath Party leaders have described their support for Bashar’s succession—his father’s clear wish—as a regime-preserving choice that reduced the risk of internal feuding. As Eyal Zisser recounts: “Syria’s senior leadership, aware of Hafiz al-Assad’s impending demise, wished to deflect any possible threat, domestic or external, to the existence and stability of the regime. Bashar remained the best possible option.”88

In Nicaragua, North Korea, and Syria, rulers presided over hereditary successions without triggering a backlash from the party organizations that predated their tenure. As the contrasting cases of nonhereditary succession illustrate, such a course is unusual.

**Abortive Hereditary Succession: Party Predates Ruler**

Where rulers predated parties and groomed their sons, all five were successfully followed by their filial heirs apparent. By contrast, two out of the five autocrats who attempted hereditary succession in parties that predated their tenure were unsuccessful. Rather than support the

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85 Ibid., 4, 155.
86 The prior edition called hereditary succession "a reactionary custom of exploitative societies . . .” Ibid., 150–51.
son’s promotion to the top post, elites obstructed hereditary succession and rallied against the incumbent. Elite dissent in these two cases, Paraguay under Stroessner and Bulgaria under Zhivkov, bridges the modal cases of hereditary succession (where rulers predated parties) and nonhereditary succession (where parties predated rulers). Rulers in this set sought to circumvent prior institutional practices but they lacked the command over the organization that Somoza, Kim, and Assad had achieved. Regime officials subverted the incumbents’ plans to install their sons and oversaw nonhereditary succession instead.

Alfredo Stroessner came to power in Paraguay in May 1954 by forcibly removing embattled president Federico Chávez and then receiving the nomination of the historically dominant Colorado Party, which was founded in 1887. Stroessner was inaugurated president on August 15, 1954.\(^89\) Eventually elected president seven times as the Colorado standard-bearer, Stroessner made the party, the military, and the state apparatus the pillars of his regime.\(^90\) In 1984, with Stroessner in his early seventies, the Colorado Party began discussing possible successors.\(^91\) In a series of increasingly contentious party conferences, Colorado traditionalists argued the next president should come from within the party. Another faction, closer to Stroessner and less tightly wedded to the party, advocated that Gustavo Stroessner, an air force officer, succeed his father in the event of the dictator’s death.\(^92\) By late 1988, it was clear which course President Stroessner favored: Gustavo had been promoted to the rank of colonel and the elder Stroessner contemplated making him vice-president as well.\(^93\) These preparations alienated the Colorado Party’s leadership, which began to support the president’s disaffected associate, General Andrés Rodríguez. The backlash against an incipient hereditary succession reached its climax when Rodríguez propelled Stroessner’s violent ouster on February 3, 1989.\(^94\) The Colorado

\(^{89}\) Paul H. Lewis, “Paraguay since 1930,” in Bethell (fn. 49), 252.


\(^{92}\) Riordan Roett, “Paraguay after Stroessner,” *Foreign Affairs* 68 (Spring 1989), 124–42; Richard Snyder, “Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships,” *Comparative Politics* 24 (July 1992), 391; and Lewis (fn. 89), 265.


Party then nominated Rodríguez as its presidential candidate and he was overwhelmingly elected in the voting that quickly followed. Although this leadership change marked the end of the Stroessner era, it perpetuated the Colorado Party’s influence in Paraguayan politics. The country’s subsequent four presidents have all come from this party.

The portents of a similar internal clash appeared earlier in Bulgaria, where Todor Zhivkov ruled for thirty-five years as first secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP). Founded in 1919, the BCP had been Bulgaria’s ruling party ever since the country’s “people’s republic” had been established under Soviet auspices in 1947. Zhivkov came to power in 1954 from within the BCP’s hierarchy, following the course of his two predecessors who also headed the Central Committee. Over the subsequent decades, he consolidated his hold and, for a communist party chief, became conspicuously nepotistic, a tendency that was poorly received by his fellow communists. After his wife died in 1971, Zhivkov’s daughter Lyudmila assumed the role of Bulgaria’s first lady. Lyudmila Zhivkova was appointed by her father to be head of national culture in 1975; she joined the party central committee that same year and became a full member of the BCP’s politburo in 1979, leading outside observers to dub her “the second most powerful person in the country.” In July 1981, before the thirty-eight-year-old Zhivkova could be further groomed to succeed her father, she died suddenly under circumstances that remain disputed—suspected causes of death range from suicide to politically motivated assassination.

After Zhivkov’s aspirations for his daughter were cut short, the aging ruler began prodding his younger son Vladimir along the path trod by Lyudmila. In July 1989, Vladimir, thirty-six years old at the time, was brought into the BCP’s central committee to head a department of cultural affairs. A mere four months later, Vladimir’s rise was cur-

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95 Lewis (fn. 89), 264–66.
101 Bell (fn. 99), 129.
tailed when long-time foreign minister Petar Mladenov deposed Todor Zhivkov. Within a week of the elder Zhivkov’s “resignation,” he, his son, and their closest loyalists were expelled from the BCP’s central decision-making bodies. Much like the situation in Paraguay, non-hereditary succession had been promoted by the ruling party whose ranking members strove to preserve the organization’s influence. Following Zhivkov’s removal, the BCP’s rechristened itself the Bulgarian Socialist Party and went on to take a healthy majority in the elections of June 1990. Mladenov himself resigned shortly afterward under public pressure. Meanwhile, Zhivkov was placed under house arrest for crimes committed during his tenure. He was freed in 1997 and died the following year.

The nonhereditary transitions overseen by Paraguay’s Colorado Party and the Bulgarian Communist Party shed light on the conditions that obstruct dynasticism. In both countries, powerful and long-ruling autocrats were not only foiled in their attempts to install their sons, they were themselves ousted, in large part because of their succession schemes. Party elites in both regimes enjoyed a long experience in choosing successors from within the party and they did not view hereditary succession as the optimal route for preserving their status. When Stroessner and Zhivkov positioned their sons as heirs apparent they departed from the organizations’ prior practices and drew the ire of party elites.

Nonhereditary Succession: Ruler Predates Party

Among rulers who preceded party institutions, nonhereditary succession occurred in only two cases, Tanzania in 1985 and Iran in 1979. In Tanzania, Julius Nyerere was the founder and undisputed leader of the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) or “Revolutionary Party.” Originally


created by Nyerere as the Tanganyika National Union in July 1954, the party spearheaded Tanzania’s campaign for independence from Great Britain, which was achieved on December 9, 1961.\textsuperscript{107} For over two decades in power Nyerere demonstrated his devotion to social welfare and pluralism, leading one biographer to write: “Although not immune to the authorization of force in politics. . . [Nyerere] called ordinary citizens to their better instincts, toward nonracialism, cooperation, a code of moral conduct, and social justice.”\textsuperscript{108} This same pursuit of collective welfare characterized Nyerere’s self-abnegating decision to begin democratizing Tanzania and to institutionalize the CCM by naming Ali Hassan Mwinyi his successor at a special party congress in August 1985.\textsuperscript{109} He then retired from political life, gradually receding from party activities while continuing to practice the principles he had pursued in office.\textsuperscript{110}

Conditions surrounding nonhereditary succession in Iran were quite different. As the spiritual leader of the revolution that ousted the shah, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini enjoyed a preeminent status upon his return from exile on February 1, 1979. With Khomeini already in his late seventies at that time, succession was a pressing concern in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s first years. The country’s new constitution created an eight–six–member Assembly of Experts to select a successor, but the Assembly deferred to Khomeini’s choice. Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri was one of only fifteen or so grand ayatollahs in Iran and well known to be Khomeini’s preferred heir. During Khomeini’s lifetime, in 1985, the Assembly formally recognized Montazeri for that role.\textsuperscript{111} Due to his clerical credentials, Montazeri overshadowed all other contenders for succession, including Khomeini’s son Ahmad, a midranking cleric. Although Ahmad Khomeini was rumored to be a

\textsuperscript{107} Terry M. Mays, “United Republic of Tanzania,” in Delury (fn. 70), 3:1090–93.

\textsuperscript{108} Glickman (fn. 69), 213.


\textsuperscript{110} Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 130.


possible successor after his father’s death, he was never heir apparent. Rather, Montazeri remained Khomeini’s formally designated successor until March 1989, at which point a falling out between the two clerics cost Montazeri his status. When Khomeini passed away less than three months later, the Assembly of Experts selected President Ali Khamenei as the country’s new supreme leader.

The orderly assumption of office by Mwinyi in Tanzania and Khamenei in Iran occurred in dissimilar contexts, the first under a ruler who intentionally pursued gradual democratization, the second within an Islamic republic where religious credentials were supposedly the hallmark of authority. Notably in both cases, the ruler’s choice of a nonhereditary appointment was accepted by the surrounding elites. Thus, while Nyerere and Khomeini did not chart a course to hereditary succession, the path of succession they stipulated was followed by regime leaders. The rarity of founding rulers intentionally inaugurating nonhereditary succession stands in relief against the general trend, in which rulers pass power to sons unless constrained by antecedent institutional practices. The final subset displays this pattern in ten cases where parties predated rulers.

**Nonhereditary Succession: Party Predates Ruler**

Rulers who reach their posts through existing institutions establish or further engrain the organizational practices for selecting subsequent leaders. In such contexts elites have experience with a prior succession and the ruler’s departure does not presage an unregulated power struggle. To the contrary, intrafamilial succession would be a path-breaking departure from earlier practices where the ruler comes from the party and the party’s members look among themselves for his successor. This logic fits the majority of nonhereditary succession cases, six of which (in addition to Bulgaria) took place in communist regimes.

The communist leadership transitions that followed Joseph Stalin, Leonid Brezhnev, Enver Hoxha, Deng Xiaoping, Kaysone Phomvihane, and Jiang Zemin evince a general trend by which rulers’ political heirs come from within the conventional ranks of the party hierarchy. Potential dynasts in these cases were succeeded by party members who

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were not their sons. There is evidence that Stalin and Brezhnev attempted to promote their sons and that Jiang Zemin tried to protect his son’s business interests, but none of their offspring came within reach of the Soviet or Chinese premiership. In the Soviet Union, the party chose the successors of Stalin and Brezhnev.114 In the People’s Republic of China, Deng and Jiang cultivated heirs apparent from within the party and steadily ceded power to them: Deng to Jiang, Jiang to Hu Jintao.115 In Albania, Hoxha groomed neither of his sons and during his final years passed power to his premier and designated successor Ramiz Alia.116 Finally, among the cases of nonhereditary succession in communist regimes, in Laos in 1992 Kaysone Phomvihane was followed by long-time heir presumptive General Khamtai Siphandon as leader of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, an outgrowth of Ho Chi Minh’s Communist Party of Vietnam.117

Although communist parties are well known for their organizational resilience, there are several noncommunist cases where institutions structured leadership changes. In Sierra Leone, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Mozambique, rulers with viable adult heirs passed power via the same organizations through which they had reached their offices. The first of these, Siaka Probyn Stevens, led the All People’s Congress (APC) of Sierra Leone to an electoral victory in March 1967 in which the party won thirty-two of sixty-six seats and subsequently chose Stevens


118 Glickman (fn. 69), 275–57; and Steven Metz, “Republic of Sierra Leone,” in Delury (fn. 70), 3:981–82.
as premier. Stevens ruled Sierra Leone for nearly two decades and transformed the country into a presidential system and a single-party state. In 1985, at eighty years old, Stevens stepped down from office and the APC nominated Joseph Saidu Momoh, whom Stevens had been preparing for succession during the prior four years, as its presidential nominee. As with the ruling party in Sierra Leone, Taiwan's Kuomintang provided the vehicle for the country's leadership succession in the 1980s. Years before his death, Chiang Ching-kuo foreswore the option of hereditary succession, embraced the mantle of institutional reformer, and designated Lee Teng-hui as vice-president and official successor in the event of his death. When Chiang passed away in January 1988 at the age of seventy-seven, Lee was immediately sworn in as president of Taiwan. That summer he was made KMT chairman at the party's congress.

It is noteworthy that in Malaysia Mahathir did not replicate Singaporean Lee Kuan Yew’s model, but instead ceded power to his deputy in the ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO). Mahathir’s rise to the premiership in 1981 had been Malaysia’s third non-hereditary succession and the third such transition within UMNO. Although party leaders enjoyed great discretion in facilitating or obstructing would-be successors, no UMNO chief had ever designated his son. Despite his arbitrariness as premier, Mahathir operated within this tradition and ultimately continued it. In 1999, he expelled his long-time deputy and heir apparent Anwar Ibrahim from UMNO and oversaw Anwar’s eventual imprisonment through a widely discredited


judicial process. Mahathir then promoted a lesser-known party leader, Abdullah Badawi in Anwar’s stead. In the fall of 2003, at seventy-seven years old Mahathir relinquished his roles as premier and party president, ceding the political stage to Abdullah.\(^{124}\)

In Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano’s entry and exit bore semblance to Mahathir’s trajectory within UMNO. Chissano had been a high-ranking member of the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and was chosen by the party to succeed President Samora Machel upon his death on October 9, 1986.\(^{125}\) Just as FRELIMO’s leaders selected Chissano, they choose his successor by tapping a new presidential candidate from the party in fall 2004.\(^{126}\) As in Malaysia, succession came from the party, rather than from the ruler’s family.

These ten cases illustrate the conditions under which rulers are most likely to pass over sons rather than pass power to them. Consistent with Tullock’s theory, when elites have a precedent within the party for designating the successor, their collective security does not depend on the ruler’s choice. Under these conditions an incumbent’s pursuit of hereditary succession may be perceived as a threatening aberration to prior convention, pitting elites against the ruler as seen in Paraguay and Bulgaria.

**Comparative Implications**

There has been little cross-national research on hereditary succession. Recent analyses tend to treat the process in isolation without contrasting it to deliberate nonfamilial power transfers. That focus implies a large field of successions in which rulers either elect to eschew dynasticism or are compelled to do so by recalcitrant elites. A comparison of hereditary successions and their relevant contrast cases shows why this view should be revised. When there is no precedent for choosing a leader from within the ruling organization, elites may support hereditary succession as a method for preserving their influence and mitigating the uncertainty that surrounds an aging ruler and an impending leadership change. In seventeen of the twenty-two cases of possible hereditary succession, outcomes closely matched variations in antecedent

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institutions: sons succeeded fathers when the ruler’s authority predated the party’s. Of the seven cases where there was no precedent for choosing a leader from within the ruling organization, five rulers embarked on hereditary succession. In twelve of fifteen cases where rulers came from a party, elites deferred to that organization to name the leader’s successor. The data thus comport with the political explanation ventured by Tullock. That same theory can help comparativists gauge the likelihood that current autocrats will be replaced through hereditary succession.

There are a number of rulers presently grooming sons for succession. Three closely watched cases are Equatorial Guinea, Yemen, and Libya. Notably, rulers in these cases are now in their mid-sixties and elites in these countries have no prior experience managing succession through a ruling party. In Equatorial Guinea, President Teodoro Obiang Nguema took power in 1979 through a military coup and established the ruling Equatorial Guinea Democratic Party in 1987. President Ali Abdullah Saleh ruled North Yemen beginning in 1978 and unified Yemen after 1990, the year in which he created the still-dominant General People’s Congress Party. Based on the record considered above, Obiang and Saleh can harbor substantial hope that their colleagues in the regime will support their sons as successors when the time comes. Finally, in Muammar Qadhafi’s Libya there is no ruling party apparatus through which regime leaders may expect an alternative to Qadhafi’s third son and heir apparent, the London School of Economics-trained Seif al-Islam al-Qadhafi. Father-son transitions in these cases would be consistent with the pattern of prior cases.

**CONCLUSION: A NEW GENERATION OF AUTOCRATS?**

Rulers around the world have undertaken hereditary successions that augur not a new wave of democracy but a fresh generation of dictators. What explains this phenomenon? Earlier scholarship posited that he-

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reditary succession depends not simply on the will to power of geriatric dictators and their sons, but on the reception of those ambitions by the surrounding extra-familial elite. The above evidence supports that theory. In the absence of prior party practices for leadership selection, ruling elites tend to favor hereditary succession over a tumultuous free-for-all. By contrast, they are most likely to balk at a filial successor when the ruler himself emerged from the party.

The present investigation reopens the understudied subject of succession in modern autocracies. Its findings point to areas for further research. Future work can expand upon the present analysis by relaxing the scope conditions on cases and considering alternative explanations for the institutional patterns shown above, including looking at regional demonstration effects and underlying economic factors. Integrative case analysis might also be a productive step; the parallels between Tullock’s and Herb’s theories suggest modern autocracies and formal monarchies may have more in common than often thought. Additionally, the present consideration of institutional precedents can be embedded in research on the origins of parties, extending the causal chain back into the earlier histories of the regimes under consideration. Finally, comparativists may choose to study the impact of hereditary succession on subsequent regime outcomes, from democratization to enduring authoritarianism.

Recognizing that much work remains, this comparative study of succession responds to a question not readily addressed by an electoralist or transitions approach: Who will form the next generation of leaders in countries where autocracy persists? The above findings offer one provisional answer: Sons will succeed fathers whose power predates the party’s.