A PANEL REPORT
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY

FORWARD STRATEGIC EMPOWERMENT:
SYNERGIES
BETWEEN CINCs,
THE STATE DEPARTMENT,
AND OTHER AGENCIES

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The Center for the Study of the Presidency convened a series of roundtable
discussions to examine and define possible solutions to the current lack of forwardly
empowered State Department capabilities. To strengthen regional forward
empowerment, the Center for the Study of the Presidency offers options for
synergizing between the State Department, the regional Commanders-in-Chief
(CINCs), and other U.S. agencies.

The working group includes extraordinarily talented and experienced practitioners.
Among them is a General who served as both CINCEUR and CINCSOUTH, a
former Army Chief of Staff, a Rear Admiral who also served as Director of
Strategy, Plans, and Policy for CINCPAC, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense
responsible for Special Operations Command’s policy and resources, ten U.S.
Ambassadors, a former Director General of the Foreign Service, and three former
Undersecretaries of State.

The discussions focused solely on the major geographic CINCs of CINCSOUTH,
CINCEUR, CINCENT¹, and CINCPAC. Recommendations for the State
Department center primarily on the role of Ambassadors, Assistant Secretaries,
Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and the Political Advisors (PoLAd). It was agreed that
efforts to bring together CINC and State Department strategic planning is of critical
importance and there are several options for pursuing this. This report reflects the
input of a variety of experts on the difficulties presented by the changing
international environment, and how U.S. forward empowerment might be feasibly
strengthened.

David M. Abshire
President
Center for the Study of the Presidency

¹ Dovetailing on the lack of State Department forward presence and the CINC proclivity for it, the
group discussed briefly that CINCENT, headquartered in Tampa, Florida, is the only regional unified
command not forwardly based. It was suggested that possibilities for stationing CENTCOM in its area
of responsibility ought to be considered. Egypt was offered as a suggestion.
Proposed recommendations in brief:

*Develop joint education and training mechanisms for future military and diplomatic leaders.*

- This would be best pursued under the joint tutelage of the National Defense University and the Foreign Service Institute.

- Newly appointed CINCs should be immersed into a brief orientation curriculum that illustrates the regional dynamic of a Unified Command and the necessity to approach challenges with a “team” approach that includes State Department expertise in particular.

- To enhance the orientation program for new ambassadors, PolAds from the major regional Unified Commands should be incorporated.

*Strengthen the ability of military and State Department leaders to operate regionally, beginning with strategic relationships in Washington.*

- CINC and State Department geography should be brought into harmony to reduce overlap and allow for improved cooperation.

- The Political Advisor (PolAd) position should be filled by a talented ambassador on his or her way up. The PolAd position needs to be treated as a career enhancer.

- The CINC and the Regional Assistant Secretary of State (RASS) should be consulted in the process of selecting a PolAd.

- CINCs should be kept in command for three to four years.

- To the same end, a specific term of at least three years should be set for the PolAd, thus reducing turnover and increasing consistency for developing institutional practices of coordination and integration.
Centralization of regional expertise in Washington must be overcome.

- Not only do State Department regional experts need to work more closely with the PolAd and CINC, they need to be decentralized and placed in the field more frequently.
- Interaction between State Department officials and forward deployed experts needs to be institutionalized to reflect the demands of increasingly multifaceted contingencies.

Establish a Regional Interagency Contingency Planning Center (RICPIC) for each CINC region to synergize long-term contingency planning among the Departments of State and Defense, as well as the U.S. intelligence and international development communities.

- The RICPIC should be administered by the region’s PolAd and should draw on embassy staff (from a variety of agencies) for regional planning.
- This Center would integrate political, military, and economic forward planning resources.
- Those government agencies with relevant missions in the region would detail staff to RICPIC planning and training initiatives.

Regional Assistant Secretaries of State (RASSs) should be supported by a new Deputy for Plans.

- Primary responsibilities of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Plans would include coordinating with the Regional Interagency Contingency Planning Center.

Designate a Military Advisor (MilAd) for each Regional Assistant Secretary of State to advise on military implications of foreign policy decisions and to ensure greater harmony between political goals and military objectives.

- The MilAd should be a flag rank officer stationed in the RASS’s front office.
- The MilAd would maintain extensive contacts in the Pentagon and with the region’s Unified Command leadership.
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Regional security problems of the 21st Century are dramatically multifaceted, increasingly interrelated, and demand a new type of "jointness." To successfully fulfill its mission of creating, conveying, and carrying out American foreign policy, the State Department requires accurate and firsthand knowledge to pool a wide variety of resources. Furthermore, the growing number of agencies and resources that are essential to the State Department meeting its objectives makes integration key—as well as a major challenge. Moreover, State Department forward presence beyond the U.S. ambassador does not exist. As a result, planning and preventive capabilities have suffered. Indeed, during the last decade, the State Department staff and resources have become markedly reduced and its functional capability has been undermined.

Consequently, the role of the regional Commander-in-Chief (CINC) has proportionately enlarged. The following is a series of recommendations to strengthen State Department capabilities in forward planning and to enable practical coordination between State Department officials and the CINCs in order to better anticipate and prevent crises, and to enhance the overall forward presence of the State Department.

**Joint education and training of future military and diplomatic leaders is crucial. Given that the lines of responsibility between the two have begun to merge, bringing rising diplomats and military officers together in comprehensive training environments has become a necessity.**

Several existing structures, under alternating leadership of the Department of Defense and the Department of State, could be synergized for joint training. For example, the Nimitz Center (Asia), the Marshall Center (Europe), the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (Latin America), and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, under the joint tutelage of the National Defense University (DoD) and the Foreign Service Institute (State), could conduct joint simulations training with rising diplomats and military officers.
Setting aside language training by the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), a great deal of overlap exists between FSI instruction and the regional centers of NDU. However, there is also a distinct lack of understanding of relationships between the diplomats and soldiers in the field. An all too common result is a shortfall in coordination for planning, prevention, and, inevitably, implementation.

Institutionalizing joint training and doctrine that fosters integration would ensure a more cohesive education and training system between NDU and FSI. Turning out ambassadors and CINCs more inclined toward regional and strategic approaches to planning would also ensure more effective means of carrying out missions in the field. Of course, to pursue a viable and effective training mechanism, additional funds should be appropriated to NDU and FSI for this added capability.

Another opportunity for coordinated training is the two-week orientation course that newly appointed ambassadors are required to undergo in order to gain a better understanding of their State Department and overseas duties. CINCs have no such course, but they do not require the type of introductory instruction from which new ambassadors may benefit. Training and instruction on regional dynamics, however, and new interfaces such as those between the CINC and the diplomatic, intelligence, and development communities will be key.

Embassies and Unified Commands would vastly benefit from newly appointed CINCs being brought into a similar program as that for the new ambassadors, which would deal heavily with the importance of jointness between the two Departments, especially in the areas of contingency planning. Furthermore, the current curriculum for ambassadors would be greatly enhanced if the Political Advisors (PolAds) from all four major regional CINCs were incorporated.

In addition to joint and integrative training in the U.S., continuation of joint training and education while stationed in the field is vital. A tenable option for institutionalizing continued joint planning and training is described below (the Regional Interagency Contingency Planning Center).
Create relationships in Washington and in the field that strengthen the ability of military and State Department leaders to operate regionally in a more coherent fashion.

Two immediate hurdles exist to improving the relationship between the CINC and the regional Assistant Secretary of State (RASS). The first barrier is jurisdictional. No RASS has responsibility for a region as large as any one CINC. As a result, the CINC will have to build a line of communication with more than one RASS and those Assistant Secretaries will need to coordinate among themselves as well. Reconciling CINC areas of responsibility and State Department regional geography is necessary for cohesive policy execution. The second hurdle is the frequency with which CINCs, RASSs, and the CINCS’ Political Advisors (PolAd) are rotated. High turnover deteriorates efforts at coordinating and integrating.

A crucial position in coordinating CINCs and State Department forward presence is the PolAd. Traditionally of ambassadorial rank, the tendency is to appoint an ambassador on his or her way out, rather than on the way up. A common, but not consistent, result is that the best-qualified and ambitious are less likely to apply for this position.

The PolAd positions should be treated as a career enhancer. Up-and-coming Foreign Service Officers, perhaps with a previous ambassadorial posting, should compete for one of the four major PolAd slots. A way of strengthening the PolAd would be to designate it as an ambassador-at-large, thus reflecting the regional nature of this role. To ensure a level of competition, the PolAd service should be considered a valuable prerequisite for a major country ambassadorial post. This way, a regional expert on Latin America, for example, could pursue the PolAd assignment as a step in consideration to be ambassador to one of the major embassies in the region.

If more ambassadors are trained via PolAd positions, the inclination to view policies regionally and in an integrative way—including resources and expertise beyond that of the State Department—would be all the more prevalent in our forward-based diplomats.
The CINC and the RASS should be consulted during the process of selecting a PolAd. A specified term of at least three years should be set for the PolAd, thus reducing turnover and increasing consistency in the development of institutional practices of coordination and integration. Furthermore, CINCs ought to be held in command for three to four years to foster advanced regional knowledge, and, of equal importance, to convey to the leaders of the region that both our military and political leadership ascribe high value to the area by pursuing continuity.

By their jurisdictional nature, CINCs carry out a regional mission whereas ambassadors to countries tend to approach responsibilities in a country-by-country manner. The regional nature of modern contingencies demands that more than one agency and embassy will always be involved in crisis management. Consequently, the onus in comprehensive planning rests upon an Assistant Secretary of State in a comparatively remote C Street office in Washington, DC.

Relationships with counterparts in other agencies such as DEA, CIA, and FBI are generally not focused on forward planning. A formal interface between the CINC structure, the Ambassador, the regional Assistant Secretary of State, and the relevant agencies needs to be institutionalized. For the Department of State to truly acquire any useful level of integration and forward planning capacity, with the CINC structures or not, the centralization of regional expertise in Washington must be overcome. The Unified Command structure illustrates a desirable advantage with its robust, and usually forward-deployed, headquarters. State Department regional Assistant Secretaries need to work more closely with the PolAd and CINC in order to gain a more detailed knowledge of developments in the field.

The private sector also is illustrative of the importance of placing resources strategically. If a multinational corporation, for example, was headquartered in Belgium and carried out business in Latin America, stationing a regional manager back in Brussels would be simply bad business. As any military commander or CEO knows, if answers are needed they are found in the theater. Regularly
scheduling phone calls between the RASS and CINCHQ, however, is an inadequate proposal. To reflect the reality of increasingly multifaceted contingencies today, real integration is vital.

**Establish a Regional Interagency Contingency Planning Center for each CINC region to synergize long-term contingency planning among the Departments of State and Defense, including the international development, law enforcement, and intelligence communities.**

The Regional Interagency Contingency Planning Center would introduce a “teaming” approach on the regional level. Located at CINCHQ or, more appropriately, at the region’s major embassy (Bonn for Europe and Tokyo for Asia, for example), these Centers would convene representatives from relevant agencies and departments to co-develop cohesive crisis management simulations and concerted preventive measures. Led by the region’s PolAd, the Interagency Contingency Planning Center would integrate political, military, and economic forward planning resources. As such, other agencies would participate in the activities of these Centers. DEA, Treasury, FBI, CIA, and AID, to name a few, would contribute staff of a comparable level to the Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary (possibly already stationed in regional embassies) to participate in joint contingency planning.

The complexity of implementing foreign and defense policy magnifies when pursuing the one objective that brings seemingly unrelated initiatives together: anticipation. Integration becomes evermore challenging when decision-makers are tasked with planning ahead. But anticipation is impossible without plans and planning in the post-Cold War strategic environment is flawed at best—indeed counterproductive at worst—if not conducted in an integrated fashion.

To shore up this vulnerability in the decision-making and planning process, the Panel proposes establishing Regional Interagency Contingency Planning Centers (RICPIC) to harness
specific capabilities of relevant agencies in the field for planning “beyond the horizon.” RICPICs would formulate feasible contingency plans and carry out joint training efforts aimed at developing and strengthening integrated initiatives. The responsibilities of the RICPIC could also include constructing practical templates for more seamless interaction between a variety of these military and diplomatic initiatives.

The PolAd would be responsible for administering the RICPIC. This would prevent the CINC or the RASS from becoming overburdened and would avoid overpopulating a region with official Americans vying for influence in the process. Locating the RICPIC in a major embassy, as opposed to the CINC headquarters, however, would ensure State Department responsibility but would also tie the Center’s perspective closely to the CINC, as the CINC’s PolAd would serve as administrator.

To demonstrate the importance of the State Department’s preventive missions, the regional Assistant Secretary of State should be provided with an additional deputy (or comparable assistant) responsible for integrating State Department contingency plans in the region. This Deputy for Plans would maintain frequent contact with the RICPIC. The embassies of the region would involve their defense attachés and/or deputy chiefs of mission for the country-specific interests and views that contribute to the mosaic of region-wide planning that the RICPIC would undertake.

As each region is different, they would require varying combinations of participants in the Interagency Contingency Planning Centers. For example, in European Command’s area of responsibility (AOR), NATO and the European Union (with American ambassadors at each) factor into the planning process. In Southern Command’s AOR, however, the Organization of American States may play a part. Furthermore, other agencies from the U.S. intelligence and development communities would pursue varying missions in different regions, and the level and nature of their participation in a RICPIC would reflect this.
Designate regional Military Advisors (MiLA) to each regional Assistant Secretary of State to act as a counter-part to the PolAd and to advise on regional military implications of foreign policy decisions, and to ensure greater harmony between political goals and military objectives.

Military objectives become increasingly relevant when the RASS formulates regional plans as opposed to those that are country specific. As the PolAd aids the CINC by facilitating coordination of military planning in the region with foreign policy priorities, the Pentagon should consider developing a cadre of Military Advisors or MiLAds. Located in the RASS’s front office, these flag rank officers would serve as the principal political/military advisor.

The MiLA would inform the RASS of military objectives and missions that affect diplomatic initiatives in the region. By maintaining extensive contacts throughout the Pentagon and the Unified Command of the RASS’s region (combined with a new Deputy Assistant Secretary for Plans), the Assistant Secretary of State can better understand the regional military implications of his or her policy decisions, and better coordinate political goals with military objectives.

When the Center for the Study of the Presidency initiated this series of meetings and roundtable discussions to strengthen long-term planning at the State Department, few illusions remained about how difficult the task would be. Simply isolating the complex shortfalls and inadequacies proved to be as difficult as finding the solutions. To reflect the increasingly blurred line between diplomatic initiatives and military objectives today, the recommendations described above intend to both articulate the problems that inhibit State Department integration and preventive capabilities, as well as highlight the changed nature of implementing comprehensive foreign policy.
A new “jointness” between CINC structures and the State Department would add traction to the State Department’s far-reaching mission to “coordinate, and provide support for, the international activities of the United States,” as well as to manage “the U.S. government response to international crises of all types.”

It will certainly be an exceptional challenge for the President to follow through with institutional change of this degree, regardless how needed it is. As with the Center’s other related panel report on Comprehensive Strategic Reform, we view the first year of this Administration as a formative period—a rare window of opportunity—during which much substantive change can be achieved.

Several polarizing issues with laudable goals, from Social Security reform to Education funding, will certainly consume political capital. Fortunately, the debilitating problems caused by an outdated national security structure (affecting more parts of the State Department and the general national security complex than can be treated in this more focused project), attract support from both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue and both sides of the aisle. However, to achieve progress in bridging stovepipes and unifying the decision-making process to reflect the realities of a post-Cold War environment—and to build a more robust diplomatic capability that contributes to a cohesive foreign, defense, and national security policy—that support needs to be harnessed and acted upon before it evaporates under competing pressures.
Participants

David M. Abshire
David Abshire is President of the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Vice Chairman of the Board of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He was CSIS co-founder in 1962, and served as its chief executive for many years. He served as Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations in the early 1970s and, later, as the first chairman of the U.S. Board of International Broadcasting. He was a member of the Murphy Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and the President’s Task Force on U.S. Government International Broadcasting. He has also served on the Advisory Board of the Naval War College and on the Executive Panel of the Chief of Naval Operations. From 1983 to 1987, he was U.S. Ambassador to NATO. During the Iran-Contra investigation, he served in the Cabinet as Special Counsellor to President Reagan.

Ralph Cossa
Ralph Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum and a member of the steering committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and is executive director of the U.S. Committee of CSCAP. He is also a board member of the Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies. Mr. Cossa is a former national security affairs fellow at the Hoover Institution.

Edward P. Djerejian
Edward Djerejian is the founding Director of the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University. Prior to serving as United States Ambassador to Israel, Ambassador Djerejian served both President Bush and President Clinton as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs and President Reagan and President Bush as U.S. Ambassador to the Syrian Arab Republic. Ambassador Djerejian served as Special Assistant to the President and Deputy Press Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the White House, as Political Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and as Deputy Chief Mission in the Kingdom of Jordan.

Ambassador H. Allen Holmes
Allen Holmes is Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University and was Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (1993-1999). He also served as Ambassador at Large for Burdensharing and as Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs from 1985 to 1989 when he directed the negotiation of the Missile Technology Control Regime and co-chaired the U.S.-Israeli Joint Political-Military Group. Holmes was Ambassador to Portugal from 1982 to 1985. State Department assignments in Washington include Director of the Office of NATO and Atlantic Affairs and Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs from 1979 to 1982.

General George Joulwan, USA (Ret.)
George Joulwan is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point (1961), the Infantry Officer Basic Course, the Armor Officer Advanced Course, the Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College. He was Director of Political and Economical Studies at the Army War College and has held a variety
of command and staff positions during two combat tours in Vietnam, two tours in Washington, DC, and five tours in Europe. General Joulwan commanded the 3rd Armored Division and V Corps from 1988 to 1990. He was promoted General in November 1990 and served as Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Southern Command (CINCSOUTH) until October 1993 to serve as Supreme Allied Commander Europe and CINCEUR until July 1997.

**L. Bruce Laingen**

Bruce Laingen is president of the American Academy of Diplomacy. He served as U.S. Ambassador to Malta (1977-1979), and in mid 1979 he was stationed in Iran for a second tour as charge d'affaires of the American Embassy before being held hostage in the Iran hostage crisis from November 4, 1979 to January 20, 1981. Following his release, Ambassador Laingen served as Vice President of the National Defense University in Washington, DC until his retirement from the Foreign Service in 1987. He was Executive Director of the National Commission on the Public Service (Volcker Commission) from 1987 until the Commission completed its work in 1990. In 1998 Ambassador Laingen held the Sol Linowitz Chair in International Relations at Hamilton College in New York to teach on the Iranian Revolution.

**Admiral T. Joseph Lopez, USN (Ret.)**


**Richard T. McCormack**

Richard McCormack was Under Secretary of State for economic and agricultural affairs. He served as Ambassador to the Organization of American States and was Assistant Secretary of State for economic and business affairs from 1982 through 1985. He served on the staffs of both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, on the staff of the American Enterprise Institute as a consultant to the president, as a consultant to the Department of State on international economic matters, as Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for international economic affairs, and as a trade negotiations consultant to the White House during the Ford Administration. Ambassador McCormack was also a staff member with the Peace Corps. He was Director of Operations Research with Philco Ford Corporation in South Vietnam in 1968 and a foreign affairs staff member of the 1968 Republican Presidential Campaign organization.
Rear Admiral Michael A. McDevitt, USN (Ret.)
Michael McDevitt is Director of the Center for Strategic Studies for the CNA Corporation (CNAC), a not-for-profit research center in Washington, DC. At CNAC, McDevitt also directs a multi-year initiative known as Project Asia. RADM McDevitt is a member of the Board of Directors of the Atlantic Council of the United States and serves on its executive committee. He is also on the Board of Directors of the US Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). In 1990, he was the Director of the East Asia Policy office for the Secretary of Defense. He served for two years as the Director for Strategy, War Plans and Policy for the Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific and Indian Ocean region (CINCPAC). During his navy career RADM McDevitt held four at-sea commands: a minesweeper, a destroyer, a squadron of nine destroyers, and an aircraft carrier battle group.

General Edward C. Meyer, USA (Ret.)
General Meyer served as a rifle company commander and a battalion staff officer through three campaigns in the Korean War, as a brigadier commander and division chief of staff during the Vietnam War, and, in Germany, as commander of the 3rd Infantry Division. He was Deputy for Operations and Plans on the Army General Staff from 1976 to 1979 and, from 1979 until his retirement in 1983, was Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Since retirement, General Meyer has served on the President’s Strategic Defense Initiative Panel, the Defense Science Board, and other governmental and industrial advisory boards and panels. A graduate of the United States Military Academy (1951) and the George Washington University (MS, 1967), he was the first Federal Executive Fellow at the Brookings Institution. General Meyer is Chairman of Mitretek Systems, Managing Partner of Ciluffo Associates, L.P., President of Army Emergency Relief, and Chairman of The George Marshall Foundation.

The Honorable Richard M. Moose
Mr. Moose is the President of the Institute for Public Research at The CNA Corporation. As a former Senior Fellow at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), he coordinated CNA support for the Department of the Navy’s Business Reform Initiatives from 1997 to 1999. From 1993 to 1996, Mr. Moose served as Under Secretary of State for Management and was a member of the President’s Management Council. In late 1996, he directed the work of the independent task force created by the Council of Foreign Relations and the Brookings Institution to study the consequences of the decline in resources for foreign policy. Before leading the international advisory activities of Shearson Lehman Brothers as Managing Director, Mr. Moore was Senior Advisor for international banking at Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb until joining American Express in 1988 as Senior Vice President, International and Government Affairs. In 1977, Mr. Moose was Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management and, from 1978 to 1981, he was Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Mr. Moose was Staff Secretary at the National Security Council under Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, and, from 1969 to 1974, he was Senior Staff Member on the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. From 1966 through 1968, he was a Special Assistant to National Security Advisor, Walt W. Rostow, and Senior Staff Member at the National Security Council.
Ambassador Langhorne A. Motley
Langhorne A. Motley was United States Ambassador to Brazil from 1981 until 1983 and Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from 1983 to July 1985. In 1975, he headed the Department of Commerce and Economic Development for the State of Alaska. In 1977, he took charge of Citizens for the Management of Alaska Lands to secure federal legislation providing balanced use of Alaskan lands. Since July 1985, he has co-chaired the Department of State's ambassadorial seminars. More than 650 first-time ambassadors in 65 separate two-week sessions have attended the seminar, which is the principal orientation for this position. In 1999 Ambassador Motley was appointed by Secretary of State Albright to the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel, a bipartisan body charged with analyzing and making recommendations on our overall interagency structure overseas. Ambassador Motley serves on the Board of Directors of the U.S-Brazil Business Council, Junior Achievement International, and the American Academy of Diplomacy.

Robert Oakley
Robert Oakley retired from the Department of State in 1991 after 34 years of diplomatic service. His positions included Ambassador to Pakistan, Zaire, and Somalia; Coordinator for Counterterrorism; Assistant to Vice President for Middle East and South Asia on the National Security Council staff and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Affairs. Ambassador Oakley subsequently served President Bush and Clinton as Special Envoy to Somalia.

Thomas R. Pickering
Thomas Pickering is Senior Vice President for International Relations with the Boeing Corporation. Ambassador Pickering served as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 1997 through 2000. He holds the personal rank of Career Ambassador, the highest in the United States Foreign Service. Prior to becoming Undersecretary, he served as the President of the Eurasia Foundation and, from May 1993 until November 1996, as Ambassador to the Russian Federation. He also served as Ambassador to India from 1992 to 1993, Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 1989 to 1992, Ambassador to Israel from 1985 to 1988, to El Salvador from 1983 to 1985, and to Nigeria from 1981 to 1983. He was Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs from 1978 to 1981. From 1974 until 1978, Ambassador Pickering was the United States Ambassador to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Between 1959 and 1961, Ambassador Pickering served in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the State Department, in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and from 1962-1964 in Geneva as political adviser on disarmament. In 1967, he became Deputy Chief of Mission in Tanzania and returned to Washington in 1969 to become Deputy Director of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the State Department. From 1973 to 1974, he was Executive Secretary of the Department of State and Special Assistant to Secretary Rogers and Secretary Kissinger.
Anthony C. E. Quainton
Anthony Quainton is President and CEO of the National Policy Association. During the last two years of his 38-year career in the U.S. Foreign Service, Quainton served as Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of Personnel. He was Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, U.S. Ambassador to Peru, Ambassador to Kuwait (1984-1987), to Nicaragua (1982-1984), and to the Central African Empire (1976-1978), and Deputy Inspector General of the State Department from September 1987 to November 1989. Ambassador Quainton headed the U.S. government’s counter-terrorism program as the Director of the Office for Combating Terrorism from 1978 to 1981.

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Richard Solomon is President of the U.S. Institute of Peace. He served as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (1989-1992), and was U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines (1992-1993). Previously, he served as Director of Policy Planning at the Department of State (1986-1989) and senior staff member of the National Security Council (1971-1976). From 1976 to 1986, Ambassador Solomon was head of the social science department at the RAND Corporation.

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Harlan Ullman is Senior Fellow and chairs the Senior Seminar Program at the Center for Naval Analysis, and is Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies where he was director of the program in political-military and maritime studies. As Distinguished Senior Fellow at the National Defense University from 1998 to 2000, he chaired the project on “Globalization and National Security.” Dr. Ullman is Senior Advisor and Vice Chairman of two companies in the high technology sectors and is a Distinguished Visiting Scholar at the Stevens Institute of Technology in New Jersey. The author of several books, his latest is Friendly Fire: America At Risk.

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Charles Vollmer is the founder and CEO of VII Inc., a management consulting firm specializing in strategic planning, systems engineering and the development of new organizational and operational concepts for government and industry. Mr. Vollmer was Senior Engineer and Director of Marketing for McDonnell Douglas Corporation, Vice President and General manager for General Dynamics Corporation’s business and technology division, and a Partner and Vice President at Booz-Allen & Hamilton Inc.

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Jonah Czerwinski, Coordinator for this project, is Research Assistant to the President at the Center for the Study of the Presidency. In early 1999, he worked with the program in International Finance and Economic Policy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and then as research assistant to founder and long-time CSIS president, Dr. David M. Abshire. From July 1999 to January 2001, he served as a consultant to CSIS and as coordinator for the Trinity National Leadership Roundtable.
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About the Center for the Study of the Presidency

The Center for the Study of the Presidency, founded in 1969, is a non-profit, non-partisan 501(c)(3) organization dedicated to serving as a central resource addressing issues affecting the modern Presidency. As the foremost organization in the United States dedicated to this effort, the Center endeavors to examine all aspects of the American Presidency. The Center also publishes the award winning Presidential Studies Quarterly (ISSN 0360-4918).

In late 1999, the Center for the Study of the Presidency began a series of projects and initiatives focusing on a variety of related issues that led to a report to the President-elect in early 2001. Working with scholars, practitioners, and seasoned government experts, the Center completed the aforementioned by publishing a book of case studies and an in-depth review of Presidential decision-making in Cold War and post-Cold War military interventions. Efforts that contributed to this work eventually identified new challenges to, as well as new solutions for, Presidential leadership in the 21st Century, and this project is a part of that on-going dialogue.

OTHER CSP PUBLICATIONS INCLUDE:

A Report to the President on Comprehensive Strategic Reform
(Washington, DC, 2001)

A Call for Transformational Leadership: U.S. and Japan (Tokyo, 2001)

Triumphs and Tragedies of the Modern Presidency: Seventy-Six Case Studies in Presidential Leadership (Preager Press, 2001)


Dialogues on Presidential Leadership: The President, Congress, and the Media (Washington, DC, 2000)

In Harm’s Way: Intervention and Prevention (Washington, DC, 2000)