The Fellows Review

Selected Papers
Of the
2017-2018 Presidential Fellows Program

Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress

Editor
Erica Ngoenha
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The papers in this anthology represent the Fellows’ thoughts and research and CSPC in no way endorses their conclusions or positions.

The Fellows Review: 2017-2018

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FOREWORD

At a time when our politics are so divided, I am comforted to know that CSPC is training a new generation of leaders to engage in civil discussion and principled leadership through the Presidential Fellow program. The program is designed to teach students about good governance and effective leadership through the study of the Presidency and Congress. I am consistently impressed with the caliber of students that participate in our program. They give me hope that a brighter era of politics lies ahead.

In the pages that follow, you will find a selection of the 2017-2018 class of Fellows’ original research papers. Participants spend their Fellowship year examining today’s most pressing policy issues as well as historic events that provide an important lens for current trends. In addition, Fellows attend two leadership conferences over the course of their Fellowship year where they engage with academics, high-level government officials, and policy experts on today’s political challenges and innovative solutions. We hope these experiences will inspire them to pursue careers in public service.

The fourteen papers chosen for publication represent the highest caliber of rigorous, academic work. They range in subject matter from shifting international alliances to the war on drugs. Each year, CSPC offers special recognition to Fellows who have presented extraordinary research in five categories:

The David M. Abshire Award for Most Outstanding Paper by an International Fellow was awarded to Natalie Boychuk of the University of Toronto for her review of U.S. foreign policy responses to international secessionist movements (“Should I Stay or Should I Go? United States Foreign Policy and Support for Secessionist Movements Abroad”).

The Robert A. Kilmarx Award for the Best Military, Intelligence, or National Security Strategic Analysis was presented to Evelyn Burch from Angelo State University for her examination of great power competition between the United States and China (“Projecting Power: China and the United States’ Struggle for Dominance in the Era of Xi and Trump”).

Jason Sell from Emory University was recognized with the Donald B. Marron Award for the Best Historical Analysis for his research on the role presidents have played over time in combatting drug use (“Constructing the Drug War: Analysis of Presidential Leadership in Shaping Policy and Public Opinion”).

Matthew Schneider from Georgetown University won the James R. Moffett Award for the Most Original Paper on the Modern Presidency or Congress for his review on the power of Congress and the President to steer macroeconomic policy (“Do Political Inefficiencies Weaken the President and Congress’s Ability to Direct Macroeconomic Policy?”).

Finally, University of Southern California student Jamie Kwong was awarded the Richard H. Solomon Award for the Most Original Paper on Foreign Policy or Diplomacy for her research on U.S. treatment of nuclear weapons programs in China and North Korea (“Cold War and Post-
Cold War Rogues: U.S. Foreign Policy Responses to China’s and North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Programs”).

We are immensely proud of the work of these Fellows and all of their colleagues who conducted outstanding research. We are grateful to Carlota Cumella, Stephanie Lizzo, Sarah Weintraub, Crystal Staebell, and Madison Howell for their work editing the 2017-2018 Fellows Review under the guidance of Erica Ngoenha, Director of the Presidential Fellows Program.

We hope you enjoy reading this anthology and that you are as inspired as we are by our next generation of leaders.

Glenn C. Nye III
President & CEO
Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress
### 2017-2018 Endowed & Named Fellowships

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The Scholl Foundation

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Universidad Catolica Santa Maria La Antigua
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Part 1

Campaigns, Candidates, & Elections
How has the rhetoric of presidential candidates changed over time? Do electoral speech patterns mirror the already observed linguistic trends of presidents, contributing to a larger pattern of anti-intellectualization in political speech? This study applies Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level testing and qualitative word analysis by QSR NVivo 11 to the announcement, campaign, and election night speeches of every major party candidate to advance to the general election since 1972 in order to explore changes in candidates’ rhetoric over time. The author compares findings to already observed presidential speech trends and compares linguistic differences between Democrats and Republicans. The author finds that language complexity has decreased at a faster rate for Republicans than for Democrats. The paper concludes with proposals for future research in the field of presidential rhetoric.

INTRODUCTION

On September 17, 2002, President George W. Bush stood before an eager crowd of students, teachers, and school board members in Nashville, Tennessee. He addressed the War in Afghanistan, the importance of education, and the endurance of American ideals. The most memorable quotation from his remarks, however, did not mention freedom or the Constitution or America’s commitment to “[leading] toward a more peaceful world.” Rather, the biggest takeaway was this line: “There’s an old saying in Tennessee—I know it’s in Texas, probably in Tennessee—that says, fool me once, shame on—you. Fool me—you can’t get fooled again.”

Bush was often known for his “Bushisms”—linguistic errors in his public speaking. Though unintentional, this Bushism provides an example of wider reaching trends in presidential rhetoric. In 2002, Dr. Elvin T. Lim found that, over time, presidential speech has become more anti-intellectual, more abstract, more assertive, more democratic, and more conversational. In 2008, Lim broadened the scope of his research and applied Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level testing to presidential speeches, finding that the language complexity of presidents’ speeches has

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decreased over time. The public, he concluded, is victim to the anti-intellectualization of public speech; yet, it also demands it. It enables it.

However, does the campaign season follow the same pattern? Does the movement toward more anti-intellectual, abstract, assertive, democratic, and conversational speech already observed in presidential rhetoric hold true for campaign rhetoric? Perhaps linguistic patterns split among party lines with Democrats taking an intellectual approach and Republicans adopting populist colloquialism—in line with existing studies on political strategy regarding intellectualism. Or perhaps the anti-intellectualization of speech is a broader issue that permeates all of politics, paying no mind to partisanship. Maybe the campaign season is a different animal entirely.

In this study, I explore whether the trends Lim observed apply more broadly. The scope of my research covers the presidential campaigns of major party candidates who advance to the general election from 1972 to 2016. I explore historical trends in campaign rhetoric, and I observe differences in linguistic trends between Democrats and Republicans.

LITERATURE REVIEW

In 2002, Lim studied inaugural addresses and State of the Union addresses from George Washington to Bill Clinton. Using computer-assisted analysis, Lim studied the frequency of keywords in various word sets to understand changes in the substance of presidential rhetoric over time. He concluded that “presidential rhetoric has become more anti-intellectual, more abstract, more assertive, more democratic, and more conversational.”

In 2003, Teten took an approach similar to that of Lim’s. Also studying speech patterns in State of the Union addresses from Washington to Clinton, Teten observed that, beginning in the early twentieth century, the length of the State of the Union address has dropped significantly. At the same time, the president’s self-identification with the public, characterized by the use of words like “we” or “our,” increased significantly. The modern presidential rhetoric of short speeches and group words, Teten concluded, began with Woodrow Wilson.


built upon Teten’s study, expanding the dataset to include all State of the Union addresses rather than a sample of them. Murphy found that the modern rhetorical presidency began not with Wilson but with Franklin D. Roosevelt, attributing this demarcation to the advent of radio and the rise of mass media during the Roosevelt administration.4

In 2008, Lim greatly expanded upon this field of study. Applying Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level testing to State of the Union addresses, inaugural addresses, and the Public Papers of the Presidents, Lim demonstrated that language complexity of presidents has decreased over time. For example, while State of the Union addresses throughout the nineteenth century were at a college reading level, Clinton’s and G. W. Bush’s addresses were at eighth grade reading levels. Moreover, Lim showed that the substance of presidential rhetoric has become increasingly characterized by anti-intellectual elements such as “applause-rendering platitudes, partisan punch lines, and emotional and human interest appeals.” He argued that the shift toward anti-intellectual speech has been a deliberate, strategic choice.5 In a review of Lim’s 2008 work, DiSalvo pointed out that “part of the simplification of language may result merely from the fact that language changes.”6 Miroff, also reviewing Lim’s 2008 research, suggested studying another manifestation of anti-intellectualism: political elites’ disparaging of intellectuals in hopes of appealing to “ordinary Americans.” His suggestion implicitly aligns with the argument that anti-intellectualization is a politically strategic choice.7

In 2007, Shogan took a similar approach to what Miroff would later suggest, though Shogan’s research examined only a few presidents rather than political elites at large. Shogan argued that anti-intellectualism is a chiefly Republican strategy toward presidential leadership, providing three examples of Republican anti-intellectualization: Dwight D. Eisenhower, Ronald Reagan, and George W. Bush. In each case, Shogan argued that the candidate sought to posture himself away from his intellectual, Democratic opponent, establish an underdog persona, and build a populist base to appeal toward ordinary Americans.8

The first presidential rhetoric scholars defended the legitimacy of the field. As many

researchers explored the institutional norms of presidential rhetoric, some scholars like Lim and Teten took a different approach and analyzed qualitative trends in actual presidential speech transcripts. Around the same time, other researchers argued the possibility of anti-intellectualization as a deliberate, political strategy. Despite all this research, no qualitative word analysis on campaign speeches has been published. This study seeks to fill that gap.

**HYPOTHESES**

Shogan argued that anti-intellectualism is a politically strategic maneuver and that Republicans employ this approach more often than Democrats do. Anti-intellectualism allows Republican candidates to establish an underdog persona and appeal to the people through populist means. Assuming Shogan’s conclusions to be true, I present two hypotheses:

- **Hypothesis 1:** Across all campaigns, language complexity decreases at a greater rate for Republicans than it does for Democrats.
- **Hypothesis 2:** Across all campaigns, the frequency of anti-intellectual, abstract, assertive, democratic, and conversational language increases at a greater rate for Republicans than it does for Democrats.

**METHODS**

The scope of my research includes the presidential campaigns of major party candidates who advance to the general election since 1972. The starting data point is 1972 to account for the change to the plebiscitary nominating system. Each candidate’s campaign data is measured with three data points: his or her announcement speech, his or her convention speech, and his or her concession/victory speech. Since each of these speeches is a milestone in virtually every candidate’s campaign, I found them suitable for use as consistent data points.

The vast majority of data was generated from the *Public Papers of the Presidents*, found online at *The American Presidency Project*. Some announcement speeches and election night speeches were found on other speech-hosting databases. For any remaining speeches, I generated the transcripts myself by watching C-Span videos of the events.

The Flesch-Kincaid readability tests are tests which determine how difficult it is to read
or understand a passage in English. Of the two existing forms, I used the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level test, which presents the readability score as the number of years in the U.S. educational system generally required to understand a text. Because the score is defined by a simple mathematical formula, numerous computer programs exist that can calculate the total number of words, sentences, and syllables and score the text accordingly. For this study, I used readable.io to score the transcripts of the speeches in my dataset.

I used the qualitative word analysis program QSR NVivo 11 to explore linguistic trends throughout my data. In NVivo, a researcher is able to input keywords for the program to search throughout a text. NVivo delivers the total count of those words as well as the frequency of those words’ appearances, i.e., how often those words appear as a percentage of the total number of words in the text.

I modeled my research design after Lim’s 2002 study, in which he used a similar qualitative word analysis program to explore language trends throughout inaugural addresses and State of the Union addresses. Lim observed the changes in frequency of certain word sets over time and used this evidence to explain major trends in presidential rhetoric. For example, he argued that presidential speech has become increasingly anti-intellectual because the frequency of words that indicate cognitive processes, an understanding of inferences, and cause and effect has decreased over time.

The keywords for Lim’s word sets are not publicly available, but he provides example keywords included in his word sets. I modeled my word sets on the example keywords Lim provides in his own study. Admittedly, my word sets are not as expansive as Lim’s. Nevertheless, because every word set I use is equally limited by the inability to access Lim’s word sets, the data in my study is consistent amongst itself. In other words, the conclusions, while applicable to my sample of campaign speeches, must be taken with a grain of salt when applied to the population of all campaign speeches. Examples of the keywords I employed in my word sets are provided below:
FINDINGS

Figure A shows the aggregate average Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level of the dataset speeches in an election year. Though the average Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level fluctuates year to year, the data indicate an overall decrease in the average, as evidenced by the negatively sloped trend line. The R-squared value indicates that 55% of the variation in the average Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level is explained by the variation in time. The data lend support to my underlying assumption that language complexity in campaign rhetoric follows the same trend as presidential rhetoric.

![Figure A: Average Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level of all speeches per election](image)

The average Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level for 1972 is much higher than any other year.
measured. It should be noted that Nixon’s announcement communication, which was a letter and not a speech, is included in this average score. Letters tend to be more complex than speeches, but it is Nixon’s victory speech, not his announcement letter, that keeps the 1972 average so high. Nixon’s announcement letter scored only 12 on the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level test; his victory speech scored 19. With the announcement letter included, the average 1972 score is 11.88. Removing the announcement letter lowers the score to only 11.86. Ergo, inclusion of the announcement letter does not skew the overall trend, and I have kept it in the data set.

Figures B.1, B.2, B.3.1, B.3.2, B.4, and B.5 apply the five major trends in presidential rhetoric discovered by Lim to all major campaign speeches in general election years over time. While presidential rhetoric has used less intellectual speech over time, the same cannot be said for campaign speeches. An example of intellectual language—rhetoric that discuss analyses, inferences, causes, and effects—comes from Jimmy Carter’s 1976 announcement speech, in which Carter recommends changing the framework of the bureaucracy in order to produce more effective government outputs:

The mechanism of our government should be understandable, efficient, and economical…and it can be. We must give top priority to a drastic and thorough revision of the federal bureaucracy, to its budgeting system and to the procedures for analyzing the effectiveness of its many varied services. Tight, businesslike management and planning techniques must be instituted and maintained, utilizing the full authority and personal involvement of the President himself.9

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While language complexity is concerned with Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level scores, intellectual language is concerned with the substance and word choice within the script. Figure B.1 shows that the average frequency of intellectual language in major campaign speeches fluctuates greatly over time. The R-squared value indicates that only 4.3% of the variation in intellectual language frequency is explained by the variation in time, so there is little correlation between the two variables.

Figure B.2 portrays the frequency of abstract language—language that references lofty ideas like democracy, faith, and dreams. Hillary Clinton’s 2016 concession speech is an exemplar of abstract language:

Our constitutional democracy enshrines the peaceful transfer of power, and we don’t just respect that. We cherish it. It also enshrines other things: the rule of law, the principle that we are all equal in rights and dignity, freedom of worship and expression. We respect and cherish these values too and we must defend them.10

Figure B.2 shows that the average frequency of abstract language in all major campaign speeches has increased slightly over time, as evidenced by the positively sloped trend line. Nevertheless, the R-squared value indicates that only 10.5% of this variation is explained by the variation in time.

Figure B.3.1 demonstrates the use of assertive language, which is rhetoric that references victory and strength. An excerpt of George H. W. Bush’s 1992 announcement speech

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10 Hillary Clinton “Hillary Clinton’s concession speech (full text)” (Online by CNN, November 9, 2016).
demonstrates this:

We’re gathered here because the American people wanted leadership, and we answered the call. We didn’t do the easy things. We did the right things. From day one, I fought for strong and effective national defense. I stuck to my principles, and we kept strong, and we won the Cold War. And we stayed strong, and that enabled us to win a battle called Desert Storm.\(^\text{11}\)

Figure B.3.1 also portrays passive language, which is characterized by words like “avoid,” “doubt,” and “failure.” Walter Mondale’s 1984 concession speech, which included words like “loss,” “diminish,” and “helpless,” registered as markedly passive speech:

My loss tonight does not in any way diminish the worth and importance of our struggle. The America we want to build is just as important tomorrow as it was yesterday. Let us continue to seek an America that is just and fair. Tonight—tonight especially I think of the poor, the unemployed, the elderly, the handicapped, the helpless and the sad, and they need us more than ever tonight.\(^\text{12}\)

Figure B.3.1 shows that, contrary to the presidential trend, the average frequency of assertive language has decreased over time. According to the R-squared value, nearly 30% of the variation in the frequency of assertive language can be explained by the variation in time. The average frequency of passive language, has remained constant.


\(^{12}\) Walter Mondale “Text of Walter Mondale’s concession speech to supporters Tuesday” (Online by UPI, November 7, 1984).
The data in Figure B.3.1, however, may be skewed by the fact that both victory and concession speeches are included in the average frequency calculations for each election year. It would make sense that victory speeches include more assertive language while concession speeches include more passive language. Thus, Figure B.3.2 accounts for this by breaking down the data between winners and losers. After accounting for this factor, the data present a slightly different trend: the assertive language of winners has actually decreased over time, while assertive speech for losers has remained constant. 67.6% of the variance in the frequency of winners’ assertive language is explained by the variation in time. Like in Figure B.3.1, passive speech indicated by Figure B.3.2 has remained constant over time.

Figure B.4 shows the average frequencies of democratic language and institutional language over time. Democratic language is defined by the “Democracy,” “People”, and “Self-referential” word sets. Nixon’s 1972 convention speech serves as an example of speech intended to unite and rally audience members:

Americans don’t want to be part of a quota. They want to be part of America. This Nation proudly calls itself the United States of America. Let us reject any philosophy that would make us the divided people of America. In that spirit, I address you tonight, my fellow Americans, not as a partisan of party, which would divide us, but as a partisan of principles, which can unite us....I ask you to join us as members of a new American majority bound together by our common ideals.13

Institutional language, on the other hand is language that is concerned with other branches and institutions of government. Gerald Ford’s 1976 convention speech scored highly on the frequency of institutional language. In it, Ford called out Democrats in Congress—“the other party’s…own Congress won’t act”—more than three times. Multiple references to government entities other than the president register more highly on the frequency of institutional language use. The trend in presidential rhetoric has been an increase in democratic language juxtaposed with a decrease in institutional language. In other words, presidents increasingly talk about themselves and the American people and decreasingly talk about other branches and institutions of government. According to Figure B.4, campaign speech does not follow the same pattern. The use of democratic speech has increased over time, but, per the R-squared value, only 5.41% of its variation is explained by the variation in time. This is hardly correlative. Institutional language has remained constant.

Figure B.4: Average frequency of democratic and institutional language by election year (1972-2016)

![Graph showing the average frequency of democratic and institutional language by election year (1972-2016). The graph includes a linear trend line for democratic language with the equation y = 0.0371x + 3.1052 and an R² value of 0.0541.]

Figure B.5 portrays the frequency of conversational language. Conversational rhetoric is characterized by a speaker’s repeated self-references and references to the audience in attempts to be more relatable and informal. It is also characterized by colloquial language and anecdotes. Trump’s 2016 victory speech is perhaps one of the most nonpareil examples of conversational

rhetoric:

I’ve just received a call from Secretary Clinton. She congratulated us. It’s about us….We will get along with all other nations willing to get along with us. We will be. We will have great relationships. We expect to have great, great relationships….You’ve all given me such incredible support, and I will tell you that we have a large group of people. You know, they kept saying we have a small staff. Not so small. Look at all of the people that we have. Look at all of these people….So it’s been what they call a historic event, but to be really historic, we have to do a great job, and I promise you that I will not let you down. We will do a great job. We will do a great job.15

Figure B.5 shows that the average frequency of conversational language has increased over time. This mirrors the same trend seen in presidential rhetoric. Per the R-squared value, 17.2% of the variation in the frequency of conversational language is explained by the variation in time.

![Figure B.5: Average frequency of conversational language by election year (1972-2016)](image)

Hypothesis 1 stated: “Across all campaigns, language complexity decreases at a greater rate for Republicans than it does for Democrats.” Figure C indicates that language complexity indeed decreases at a greater rate for Republicans than it does for Democrats. While the rate of decrease for Democratic language complexity is -0.1505, the rate of decrease for Republican language complexity is -0.4205. Moreover, the R-squared values indicate that 30.2% of the variation in Democratic language complexity is explained by the variation in time, whereas 53% of the variation in Republican language complexity is explained by the variation in time.

15 Donald Trump, “Donald Trump’s victory speech (full text)” (Online by CNN, November 8, 2016).
As explained earlier, the average Republican Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level for 1972 is not skewed. Nevertheless, it remains much higher than any other average in the data set. Even after removing that average, however, the rate of decrease for Republican language complexity is -0.247 with an R-squared value of 0.454. With or without the 1972 average, Republican language complexity has declined at a greater rate than Democratic language complexity. Hypothesis 1, therefore, is supported by the data.

Hypothesis 2 stated: “Across all campaigns, the frequency of anti-intellectual, abstract, assertive, democratic, and conversational language increases at a greater rate for Republicans than it does for Democrats.” The data in Figures B.1, B.3.1, B.3.2, and B.4 refute parts of the underlying assumption that campaign rhetoric follows the same trends as presidential speech. Because the trends of increasingly anti-intellectual, assertive, and democratic language in presidential rhetoric do not even apply to campaigns in the first place, they would not cross over to an analysis broken down by Democrats and Republicans either. Indeed, when I analyzed the data for these situations, the trends were not correlative. Thus, I do not present data to portray the anti-intellectual, assertive, and democratic linguistic trends.

Figure D.1 shows that, for both Democrats and Republicans, candidates have increasingly used abstract language, though this increase is only slight. The R-squared value indicates that only 5.9% of the variation in the frequency of abstract language by Democrats is explained by the variation in time. Only 7.4% of the variation in the frequency of abstract language by Republicans is explained by the variation in time. Both correlations are weak. The abstract prong of Hypothesis 2 is not supported.
On the other hand, relationships between increasingly conversational language and time are meaningful. Figure D.2 shows that Democratic candidates have increasingly used conversational language over time. Though the increase is only slight, its correlation with time is notable: 39.9% of the variation in the frequency of conversational language by Democrats is explained by the variation in time. On the other hand, Republican use of conversational language has fluctuated greatly over time. The R-squared value is practically zero, indicating that almost no variation in the frequency of conversational language by Republicans is explained by the variation in time.

Because the correlation regarding abstract language is so small, I cannot conclude that the
data support this prong of Hypothesis 2. The data in Figure D.2 indicate that it is the Democrats, not the Republicans, who have increasingly used conversational language over time. Moreover, the R-squared value suggests that this correlation is moderate. Thus, I cannot conclude that the data support the final prong of Hypothesis 2 either. The data refute Hypothesis 2 on all fronts.

CONCLUSIONS

Campaign rhetoric does not perfectly mirror linguistic trends studied in presidential rhetoric. While there has been a decrease in the average Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level score of campaign speeches over time, there has not been a significant increase in the use of substantively anti-intellectual language across campaigns (i.e., disregarding political party).

The data support Hypothesis 1 showing that, when comparing political parties, Flesch-Kincaid Grade levels have decreased over time at a greater rate for Republicans than for Democrats. This conclusion may lend support to Shogan’s argument that Republicans deliberately take an anti-intellectual approach in order to develop an underdog persona; to distance themselves from intellectual, Democratic opponents; and to galvanize a populist base. While my data cannot necessarily explain the reasoning behind why Republicans may do this, they do support the claim that Republicans employ less complex language than their Democratic opponents do—a facet of anti-intellectualism. On the other hand, the data showed no support for Hypothesis 2. Increases in already observed presidential trends indicative of anti-intellectual substance are not more prevalent in one party than in another. The one exception here is conversational language, where Democrats have more frequently employed this rhetoric than Republicans, contrary to my assumptions.

Future studies should expand the database. My data were limited by three data points per candidate: the announcement speech, the convention speech, and the victory/concession speech. Perhaps clearer trends can be observed with more data and by breaking down the campaign season into more demarcations, namely the primary season and the general election season. Moreover, other trends may be found by observing linguistic patterns over the course of an individual candidate’s campaign as opposed to campaign averages by year.

Studies should also account for more forms of campaign communications. The campaign season includes more than just speeches: there are press conferences, interviews, rallies,
fundraisers, emails, and television ads. To fully assess the dynamic nature of campaign rhetoric requires accounting for all these forms. Particular attention should be paid to social media. Though only 140 characters, Tweets provide a novel insight into candidates’ genuine rhetorical forms. Murphy suggested that the true demarcation of the rhetorical presidency was with FDR and that that was driven by the rise of mass media. With new forms of social media on the rise, are we consequently ushering in a new era of presidential rhetoric?

The field of political rhetoric during the campaign season has yet to be fully explored. Nevertheless, from this research, I conclude that the rhetorical patterns of the campaign season do not mirror the rhetorical patterns of the presidency. Some elements—like decreasing language complexity—apply similarly. Still, the campaign season is largely a different rhetorical paradigm than the presidency, and its implications are yet to be fully explored.
Part 2

Presidential & Congressional Politics
MEDIA ATTENTION AND LEGISLATIVE PRODUCTIVITY

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Who are the most productive members of the U.S. Senate? Although many prominent senators receive extensive national media coverage, it is unclear whether this correlates to their effectiveness as a legislator. Politicians seeking to advance their ideologies or improve their images for presidential runs could receive more media coverage from national sources than quieter senators who focus more on passing legislation. On the other hand, more senior senators, those attached to prominent bills and those who chair powerful committees, could receive a lot of coverage while being more effective than newer, less powerful senators who receive little media attention. Finally, it is possible that media coverage does not have a relationship with the effectiveness of a legislator. In order to determine whether more effective senators receive more media attention or whether the senators with higher levels of coverage are less productive, I will develop measures for both media attention and legislative effectiveness, and then measure senators on both scales to determine if a correlation exists.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Why do members of the U.S. Congress behave in certain ways? Barbara Sinclair suggests that they follow the pattern of purposive behavior: senators have goals, and their actions reflect these goals.1 In this model, senators who seek media attention would logically orient their behavior to attract the attention of the media rather than to pass legislation. If the results politicians want is media coverage, then it will become their primary focus. If a negative relationship is found, it would indicate that focusing on legislation is an inefficient means to achieving this goal. However, if a positive relationship is found, it would indicate that being an effective legislator furthers the goal of achieving news coverage. A positive relationship does not necessarily indicate whether a senator’s goal is to attain high levels of media coverage or not. A senator whose goal is to attract media coverage would seek to be an effective legislator if there is a positive relationship between that and coverage. If no relationship is found, then under the

purposive behavior framework, senators would not further their goal, whether effective
lawmaking or national media coverage, by neglecting or embracing the other.

Wagner and Gruszczynski found that from 1993 to 2013, more extreme legislators
received significantly more attention from print and television news media than moderate
representatives. They based their measurements on media coverage by analyzing a national
newspaper of record, *The New York Times*, as well as broadcast television news coverage. Their
model provides an example of how to measure media attention of politicians, and suggests that
factors other than legislative effectiveness may contribute to news coverage.

Walgrave and Aelst state that opposition parties often do better at gaining media
coverage for their issues because they do not have the responsibility of maintaining a stable
government. This finding would indicate that the most useful strategies for attaining media
coverage are negative, and aligns with Wagner and Gruszczynski’s findings showing that
opposition legislators are more likely to attain news coverage. They add that their research finds
that politicians are in competition for news coverage and attain it by reacting to events rather
than shaping them. This description indicates that if a politician has receives high levels of press
coverage, then he or she must have been attempting to achieve it. Under the purposive behavior
framework, if this is true, a positive or negative relationship between legislative efficiency and
media coverage would lead politicians seeking media coverage to adjust their lawmaking habits
accordingly.

Weismel-Manner and Tsfati found that the international media rewarded media coverage
to legislators based on their physical appearance. Their research indicated that factors such as
legislative activity were not very successful in predicting the levels of media coverage that a
candidate received. They also believe that the differences in news coverage between politicians
can be primarily traced to “the amount of effort [a politician] exerts to obtain coverage and his or

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2 Wagner, Michael and Gruszczynski, Mike, “Who gets covered? Ideological Extremity and News Coverage of
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1077699017702836
3 Ibid, 1.
5 Ibid.
7 Ibid, 441.
her willingness to cooperate with journalists.” If they are correct, then the primary driver of media coverage is a politician’s own behavior, which, as mentioned above, would provide a clue as to that politician’s goals.

Various scholars use different definitions of legislative effectiveness. Miquel and Snyder base their measure of legislative effectiveness on opinions of legislators themselves, along with lobbyists and journalists. While this measure is useful through measuring the opinions of those who are part of the institution, it is limited by including both the media and the legislators themselves as judges towards effectiveness, which could skew the results based on their own biases. Jeydel and Taylor define legislative effectiveness by measuring the number of bills and amendments sponsored by a legislator that are actually passed into law, controlling for partisan affiliation, ideological position, and seniority. Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer measure the number of bills a legislator produces, as well as the percentage of these bills that move through each step of the legislative process. These measures, evaluating the actual legislative output of representatives, are better at showcasing their ability to legislate. In addition to enacting legislation, approving appointments and participating in official committee hearings are also valuable aspects of a Senator’s job. However, the key task of legislating is an easily measured metric.

DATA AND METHODS

I have focused this paper on the U.S. Senate rather than the entirety of the U.S. Congress for three reasons. First, comparing actors across the House and the Senate complicates matters by introducing two separate bodies, each with their own rules and processes that could distort a comparison between members of different chambers. Second, the U.S. Senate features a smaller number of members, making it more accommodating to examining each individual senator. Finally, within the U.S. Senate, only one third of the members are up for reelection each year.
the goal of a Senator is to get reelected, then he or she may alter their legislative behavior in order to gain favorable media attention, or dissuade negative media attention, for their reelection campaign.

I have chosen to limit the study to a single Congress, in order to focus on a specific set of individuals within a specific set of legislative and media norms, rather than comparing the behavior and effectiveness of contemporary individuals in the modern political environment to those in a previous environment where both media attention and legislative effectiveness may have been fundamentally different. I have chosen to look at the 114th U.S. Senate, which lasted from 2015 to 2017, for several reasons. The first, and simplest, is that it is the most recent Senate that is fully complete, thus the one operating in the most contemporary media environment. Second, it is the first Senate since the 108th from 2003 to 2005 that does not feature any resignations or deaths, retaining the exact same membership throughout its two years, as well as removing the possibility of Senators in terminal health or serving as temporary placeholders until special elections skewing the results by achieving very little coverage or accomplishing any legislation. In addition, the 2016 presidential election, which included the campaigns of several United States Senators for the party nominations, allows me to assess if Senators seeking higher office are more likely to seek media attention rather than work on legislation.

For measuring legislative effectiveness, I will use the Center for Effective Lawmaking’s metric, which uses a measure similar to Volden et al. above, while also taking into account whether the bill was a commemorative bill, such as one renaming an institution, or substantive and significant as defined by coverage in the Congressional Quarter Weekly. The Center for Effective Lawmaking has additionally given each member of Congress a benchmark measure of effectiveness, based upon their partisan affiliation, seniority, and committee rank, in order to demonstrate what level of legislative effectiveness is expected of a Senator in their position. By subtracting the benchmark effectiveness score from the actual effectiveness score, I will gain a measure of how much more or less effective than expected each senator in the 114th Senate was.

This number will then be plotted along the number of times each Senator was mentioned in articles by the New York Times throughout the duration of the 114th Congress in order to determine whether or not there is a relationship between the number of mentions and the

13 Ibid.
legislative effectiveness score. I will use the New York Times for this study as it is a reputable source with extensive archives that covers national politics. It should be noted that the national media is not the only media market that a senator may be interested in. Each state has its own local media. However, differences between the media culture and industries in different states make it difficult to compare the coverage of senators in completely different states. Furthermore, a comparison of multiple media sources, some of which may be more focused on national news than others, would be exceedingly difficult. Restricting the data pool to a single national source ensures that local variability in the media market does not impact the results.

In the interest of ensuring that there is no abnormality in the benchmark score, I will also compare the raw Legislative Effectiveness Score and the number of mentions in the New York Times during the 114th Congress. I believe that the comparison of the benchmark to the score is a more accurate representation of a legislator’s effectiveness for reasons outlined above. However, I think it may also be useful to see whether the factors that go into the benchmark of effectiveness effect any correlation between effectiveness and legislative coverage.

**ANALYSIS**

The results from this survey did not indicate any sort of strong statistical correlation between either the difference between the benchmark score and New York Times mentions or between the raw score and New York Times mentions. This preliminary result indicates that media coverage can neither be taken as a sign of high levels of effectiveness or ineffectiveness as a measure. However, some nuances in the data can still be examined, and indicate that the politicians receiving the most coverage are most likely not going to be the most effective lawmakers in the body. This conclusion, however, seems limited to the most mentioned senators, in particular those who are engaged in presidential campaigns throughout the Congress. The wide variation in the levels of national media coverage is particularly notable, with the three most prominent presidential candidates, Bernie Sanders (I-VT), Marco Rubio (R-FL), and Ted Cruz (R-TX), receiving more than 800 mentions each. However, they were not the only senators to receive unusual levels of media coverage.

Using this metric, the formula for the relation between New York Times mentions \( y \) and the difference between each senator’s legislative effectiveness score and their benchmark
The relationship between New York Times mentions and the raw score similarly does not demonstrate a strong correlation, as seen in Figure 2. With “y” as mentions and “x” as the effectiveness score, the slope is $y=109.35 - 21.06x$. While this once again indicates a negative slope, its standard error of 23.51 giving a confidence interval for the slope of -67.72 to 25.60. Once again, no relationship appears evident.

A comparison of the differences between the two graphs reveals no great difference. Both Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 have slight negative slopes. The primary difference is on the x-axes, with the entirely positive score axis in Fig. 2 having a higher concentration of lawmakers on the lower half of the range in contrast to Fig. 1. Fig. 1 shows a small group of ineffective lawmakers who receive very little attention, while Fig. 2 has the immediate spread in mentions beginning at the very start of the effectiveness scale.

The most striking feature of both graphs, however, is the minority of lawmakers with very high levels of media coverage. Only 15 senators were mentioned more than 100 times by the New York Times during the 114th Congress. Figure 3, graphing the residuals of Figure 1, illustrates this feature. The majority of lawmakers have only a few mentions, differing by slight amounts. However, a minority possesses increasingly high levels of media coverage. It is clear that some lawmakers possess an abnormal frequency of media coverage. Examining Figures 1 and 2 indicates that the majority of these outliers fall below average effectiveness. This is not an absolute rule, due to Senator Marco Rubio, mentioned 844 times by the New York Times, being both the third most mentioned Senator and also exceeding his benchmark by 0.534.14

A comparison of the two parties reveals that there is no strong trend for either in regards to media coverage. As seen in Figure 4, the Democratic Senate caucus’s slope has a 95%

14 See attached data
confidence interval of -153.37 to 23.60.\(^{15}\) Illustrated in Figure 5, the Republican caucus had a 95% confidence interval between -63.09 and 66.80. Despite the fact that the two parties have significantly different views on the mass media, according to Gallup polling, neither party’s representatives in the U.S. Senate have significantly different patterns of media coverage from the aggregate of the entire U.S. Senate.\(^{16}\) In a period of divided government, where the Democrats are in the minority in the Senate but the Republicans are the opposition to the Democratic White House, neither party’s senators are clearly in opposition and thus more likely to achieve more media coverage according to Walgrave and Aelst. Voters cannot judge their senator’s efficiency as a lawmaker through the quantity of media coverage received regardless of their senator’s party.

The high level of residuals indicates that a small group of senators is gaining more media coverage than the rest, but these unusually covered senators, while less effective on average, still have too great a variation in their legislative effectiveness score to demonstrate a clear relationship between the number of mentions a senator receives in a national media source such as the New York Times and their effectiveness as a legislator during any particular Congress. The senators with the highest amounts of media coverage are not among the most effective, while simultaneously not among the senators who fell below their benchmark the most. However, with highly covered senators proving to be of both average and low effectiveness, and most regular senators receiving similar levels of media coverage regardless of their effectiveness, a strong relationship is simply not present.

**CONCLUSION**

The initial assumption might be that this study did not succeed in producing a useful conclusion by failing to demonstrate a correlation between media coverage and legislative effectiveness. However, in the failure to prove a correlation, useful information can still be gained.

\(^{15}\) Including independents Bernie Sanders and Angus King (ME), both of whom caucus with the Democrats in the Senate

The first conclusion is that the level of national media coverage cannot be taken as an indicator of how efficient a senator is as a lawmaker. If a positive correlation existed, a citizen could conclude that if their senator received large amounts of media coverage, then he or she was very effective at legislating. If a negative correlation could be demonstrated, a citizen could conclude that if their senator frequently appeared in the national news, he or she would be seeking media attention rather than advancing legislation and was ineffective. A constituent cannot judge their senator’s skills as a legislator from the frequency of their appearances in the national media. In order to determine whether or not their senator is effective or not, individuals need to use databases such as the Center for Effective Lawmaking or other measures of legislative productivity rather than expecting the media’s coverage to provide them with the solution.

The lack of correlation also provides answers to a senator’s behavior under the purposive behavior framework. If a positive relationship had been found, then a senator whose goal is to attain media coverage would work to be the most effective legislator possible. In a negative relationship had been found, then that senator would instead rarely focus on legislating as it would be a hindrance to attaining media coverage. A senator whose goal was to be the most effective legislator, on the other hand, would either eschew or embrace the media, depending on which relationship was found. However, with no relation, senators, regardless of goal, should not concern themselves with the relationship.

While not possessing mathematical proof, the observation that the highest covered senators were those involved either in presidential politics, either directly or indirectly, may hold some merit. Ironically, the senator most criticized during the primary campaign for missing votes while running for president, including by his fellow candidate Rand Paul, Marco Rubio, was actually the one presidential candidate with above average legislative effectiveness. In fact, he was significantly more effective than his critic Rand Paul despite staying in the race longer. This fact indicates that while running a presidential campaign does not seem to make one a particularly effective legislator, it does not preclude a senator from effectiveness either.

18 Paul’s Legislative Effective Score was 0.433, coming at 0.414 below his benchmark. In contrast, Rubio’s Legislative Effective Score of 1.381 was 0.534 above his benchmark. Rubio was more than three times as effective at advancing legislation than Paul.
Finally, this study indicates that the media is not incentivized to reward senators for effective legislating. While the media does not appear to punish those who are diligent legislators, the candidates with the highest levels of media coverage are not those with the most effectiveness at legislating. If the media wishes to educate people about the primary job of legislators, then it should focus more of its attention on Congress on those who are most effective at advancing legislation.
APPENDIX: GRAPHS

Figure 1:

**New York Times Mentions vs. Difference Between Score and Benchmark**

Data Source: New York Times Archives and Center for Effective Lawmaking. Graph made on RStudio.

Figure 2:

**New York Times Mentions vs. Score**

Data Source: New York Times Archives and Center for Effective Lawmaking. Graph made on RStudio.
Figure 3

![Normal Q-Q Plot](image)

Figure 4: Graph of New York Times Mentions by Difference Between Legislative Efficiency Score and Benchmark, Democrats

Data Source: New York Times Archives and Center for Effective Lawmaking. Graph made on RossmanChance.com “Two Quantitative Variable” Applet.

Figure 5: Graph of New York Times Mentions by Difference Between Legislative Efficiency Score and Benchmark, Republicans

Data Source: New York Times Archives and Center for Effective Lawmaking. Graph made on RossmanChance.com “Two Quantitative Variable” Applet.

PRESSING MATTERS: A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL NEWS CONFERENCES DURING PERIODS OF WAR

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This study involves a systematic analysis of presidential press conferences during wartime to determine shifts and patterns in rhetoric and language as the war unfolds. The goal is to determine if presidents use similar approaches to persuade the public in response to similar situations. Particularly, this study aims to determine similarities in the usage of rhetorical devices across the timeline of a war to further understand persuasion in presidential press conferences. This has been done by coding for instances of ethos, logos, and pathos in press conferences in the Vietnam and Iraq War, and by comparing the usage of each device across time to the costs of, casualty rates of, and public support for the war. The study focuses on presidential press conferences in order to analyze frequent and less scripted presidential communications with the public. Upon examination of these press conferences, there seems to be certain rhetorical devices used more than others at each period of the war. However, presidential partialities for rhetorical devices seem to be a better indicator of their use than war time factors. The importance of press conferences is heightened by the differences between the scripted introductions and the responses to the reporter’s questions, where presidents may be caught off guard and rely on common phrases and rhetorical tools to put forth their views. Ultimately, the research hopes to draw greater conclusions about how a president interacts with and persuades the public while the country is at war.

INTRODUCTION

“The only thing we have to fear is fear itself.” “Four score and seven years ago.” “Ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country.” All of these presidential quotes have been memorialized for decades, and can instill the greatest surge of patriotism in anyone who recalls them. It is not by accident that these famous speeches have been remembered, as all inaugural and state of the union speeches contain rhetorical devices that directly target the public’s core values. Specifically, rhetoric involves logos, or an appeal based on logic and facts, ethos, an appeal based on the speaker’s credibility, and pathos, an appeal based on emotion. Speeches are an important way for the Presidents to put forward their policies and goals for the country and speak from the heart, while being completely scripted and in control. The influence of presidential speech has not gone unnoticed by political scientists and researchers alike, but speeches are not the only form of interaction with the public. A more common and impromptu form of communication is the presidential press conference. While
these press conferences are not as publicized, they are worth analyzing to note a president’s true rhetorical style and to see the president’s unscripted discussion about changing policies and breaking news.

Presidential press conferences typically consist of questions by media reporters, in which the presidents answer immediately and on their own. Although they have information and statistics in front of them, they rely on their own unique form of speech and rhetoric to answer these questions. This is unlike the Inaugural Address, State of the Union speech, and speeches across the country that are held on the president’s own terms. Therefore, this study specifically focuses on examining presidential press conferences during wartime. When the United States is involved in a conflict, typically half or more of the questions in a presidential press conference have something to do with the war. The questions become even more challenging, as the reporters hit on casualty rates, public opinion, plans for withdrawal, and overall purpose and justification for specific military action. These high stakes interactions can be very revealing when the president is put on the spot and forced to respond quickly. This study delves into the forms of rhetoric that presidents may favor or if presidents act in a similar manner and follow a common pattern of rhetoric throughout the timeline of the war. Perhaps, presidents even respond similarly to similar circumstances and events within the war. Ultimately, these press conferences hold the answer to how a president justifies his actions during war and how he personally can persuade the public, without a speech in front of him.

Literature surrounding presidential rhetoric has highlighted the president’s ability to connect with the American public through different forms of communication. Overall, presidential speech has become more conversational and bipartisan to appeal to a larger group of citizens. Presidents also use more abstract and emotional ideology to increase support for their real policies and objectives. Although these rhetorical trends are the same for most presidents within the last 50 years, presidents do have unique rhetorical preferences and varying success in

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using rhetorical devices. Especially during times of war, presidents deal with different political climates and war factors that affect their ability to persuade. This study looks at presidential press conferences, which are not typically studied, for further insight into political rhetoric during wartime and to determine whether presidents use rhetorical devices in a similar or distinctive manner.

HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY

In this study, I test the following hypotheses:

- Different presidents will use similar rhetoric in response to similar wartime situations. This hypothesis examines the question of whether presidents follow a common pattern of reaction to wartime factors, or if presidents have their own styles and tendencies.
- At the outset of the war, the most used rhetorical device is pathos. No matter the president, press conferences in the first year of the war will use pathos the most. There will be a significant use of pathos in the beginning of a war to garner emotional support and increase antagonist views of the enemy group.
- At the end of the war, the most used rhetorical device is logos. I believe at the end of a war, a president will have a specific plan for negotiation and withdrawal that he will be able to logically explain and support with evidence for the people.
- As causalities in the war increase, the use of pathos would increase and the use of logos would decrease.
- As casualties in the war decrease, the use of pathos would increase and the use of logos would decrease.
- Overall, the most used rhetorical device in press conferences throughout the entire war is ethos. Presidents will not want to take full responsibility for their decisions, but will mention members of their administration, ambassadors and diplomats, and other prominent figures that offer credibility to the strategies and policies the president puts forth.

Specifically, I delved into the use of logos, ethos, and pathos in all of the press conferences from 1961 to 1973 during the Vietnam War and 2002 to 2011 during the Iraq War. I began coding during the outset of the Vietnam War in 1961, with Kennedy in office, because this is when tensions truly escalated into military involvement. At the beginning of 1961, the Viet Cong launched several attacks on South Vietnam, which led to more requests for aid from the United States. Northern nationalist groups continued to pressure the South, and Kennedy realized the danger of a Communist threat. In October of 1961, Kennedy sent military advisors and
American helicopter units “to transport and direct South Vietnamese troops in battle, thus involving Americans in combat operations.”4 I ended in 1973, as the last American troops withdrew from Vietnam on March 29, 1973.5 Although the United States initiated war in Iraq on March 19, 2003, I began coding for the Iraq War in 2002.6 After 9/11, Bush began to discuss the possibility of sending troops to Iraq to support a democratic movement against Saddam Hussein, and on October 11, 2001, the Senate approved the Iraq War Resolution.7 I ended my coding of the Iraq War in 2011, as troops were withdrawn on December 18, 2011.8 In total, I coded about 300 press conferences by hand.

While coding, I followed a basic timeline of each war, marked the number of uses of each rhetorical device per press conference, and looked up duration, casualty rate, public approval for the war, and other specific events defining the war at the time of each press conference. I looked at presidential press conferences from the American Presidency Project archives, which are not typically analyzed in presidential rhetoric studies because of their frequency and number. Although many presidential press conferences are not highly publicized or scripted to include strong rhetorical appeals, these are the best updates on the state of the war and indications of potential shifts in how the president articulates his plans or goals for our conflict involvement. Furthermore, presidential press conferences typically allow questions from news outlets that request clarification or even demand answers to public concerns. I analyzed presidential press conferences from the Vietnam and Iraq War as two dissimilar conflicts occurring in different time periods and with different wartime rhetoric to expand the nature of this study beyond a single war and form more hypotheses to test in other foreign engagements.

The criteria I used for my coding of logos, ethos, and pathos is as follows:

- **Ethos**- ethical credibility and character, discusses expertise, ethical behavior, prescribes what they say as true or accurate due to their own or someone else’s

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credibility, gives credit to an advisor, ambassador, general, etc., or supports his own role as Commander in Chief, gives credibility to speaker or idea

  - **Example:** “The Joint Chiefs are a group of very able men. They are the finest in character and the best trained soldiers and sailors that we have. Their judgment is requested and respected, and certainly always carefully considered.” –Lyndon B. Johnson on September 1, 1967

- **Pathos**—emotional appeal, inspirational or inspiring, graphic language about death and destruction, patriotic or American values, evokes negative or positive emotion and action, plays on emotions, influences the read or listener

  - **Example:** “But nobody likes to see dead people on their television screens. I don't. It's a tough time for the American people to see that. It's gut-wrenching.”-George W. Bush on April 13, 2004

- **Logos**—logic/facts, logical conclusions, statistics, explanation, reasoning in response to question or to support argument, strong content

  - **Example:** “I saw in the papers this morning to the effect that our casualties for the immediate past week went from 400 down to 300.” –Richard Nixon on March 14, 1969.
FINDINGS

Figure 1: Percent of Each Rhetorical Device as the Primary Appeal by President in the Vietnam and Iraq War Press Conferences (1961-1973 and 2002-2011)

This figure depicts the percent of press conferences in which each rhetorical device was the primary appeal for every president in the Vietnam and Iraq War. The original hypothesis was that pathos would be most used by presidents in office at the outset of the war and that logos would be the most used device by presidents in office at the end of the war. This figure supports the hypothesis regarding pathos, because it is the primary appeal in the majority of press conferences for JFK, Bush, and Obama.

While logos is the most used device by Nixon at the end of the Vietnam War, this hypothesis does not ring true for the end of the Iraq War. Perhaps pathos as the primary appeal for both Bush and Obama can be attributed to the more emotional characterization as the Iraq War as the start of the “war on terror.” Or, perhaps this is because pathos is used more frequently by all modern presidents.

Source: Data Compiled by the author from the American Presidency Project at www.presidency.ucsb.edu
This figure reveals the percent use of each rhetorical device as the primary appeal by year in the Vietnam War. For example, in 1964, 76% of press conferences used ethos as the primary appeal. The original hypothesis was that pathos would be most prevalent at the outset of the war, logos would be the most used device at the end of the war, and ethos would be the most used device overall. This figure supports the hypothesis regarding pathos. In 1961, Kennedy would make statements in press conferences such as, “weapons now are so annihilating, it causes the American people to be rightfully concerned” and while “we happen to live in the most dangerous time in the history of the human race,” we have to deal with any threat to American security. This example of emotional rhetoric would make the American people feel as if they were in constant danger and encourage them to take action.

This figure does reject the hypothesis regarding ethos because pathos was the primary appeal in 42% of Vietnam War press conferences, compared to 37% for ethos and 28% for logos. Like Kennedy, each president would use emotional statements to persuade the public either making them feel for the people of Vietnam or the American troops that needed complete support for democracy to prevail. This figure also supports the hypothesis regarding logos,
because logos was used as the primary appeal in the majority of the 1973 press conferences. In one press conference, Nixon explains that troops were being withdrawn from Cambodia and Laos due to the “unequivocal provision that we made” to ensure a “cease-fire.” This is an example of logos, as he uses logic and information to describe how the war effort is coming to an end through the removal of troops.

Figure 3: Percent Use of Each Rhetorical Device as the Primary Appeal by Year in the Iraq War Press Conferences (2002-2011)

Source: Data Compiled by the author from the American Presidency Project at www.presidency.ucsb.edu

This figure reveals the percent use of each rhetorical device as the primary appeal by year in the Iraq War. For example, in 2002, 83% of press conferences used pathos as the primary appeal. The original hypothesis was that pathos would be most prevalent at the outset of the war, logos would be the most used device at the end of the war, and ethos would be the most used device overall. This figure supports the hypothesis regarding pathos. In the first year of the war, ethos was the primary appeal in 43% of press conferences, while pathos was the primary appeal in 76% of press conferences. In the last months of 2002, before entering the war, Bush repeatedly explains that Saddam Hussein “has so much hate in his heart, he’s willing to use a weapon of mass destruction not only on his neighborhood but on the people of his country.” This
emotional appeal marks the threat and danger of Hussein on the rest of the world and seems to offer justification for the events that begin to unfold in Iraq.

This does reject the hypothesis regarding ethos, however, because pathos was the primary appeal in 79% of all Iraq War press conferences, compared to 26% for ethos and 17% for logos. Overall, Bush and Obama seemed to prefer pathos to convince the “hearts and minds” of the people in Iraq, the American public, and countries around the world that the United States was doing what was necessary for democracy in Iraq. This figure supports the hypothesis regarding logos, because logos was used as the primary appeal in the majority of the 2011 press conferences. As explained in earlier write-ups, Obama would most often discuss the implementation of his removal plan in Iraq with logos. He would say that in Iraq, “we’ve drawn down our troops and the remainder of our troops will be coming out by the end of this year, but Iraq has been able to maintain a democratic government and tamp down violence there.”

Figure 4: Military Causalities vs Primary Rhetorical Device by Year in the Vietnam War Press Conferences (1964-1973)

Source: Data Compiled by the author from the American Presidency Project at www.presidency.ucsb.edu and the National Archives at https://www.archives.gov/

This figure reveals the percentage of press conferences in which each rhetorical device is the primary appeal by year and the number of United States military casualties by year during the
Vietnam War. This data was drawn from the National Archives and only included casualty numbers after 1964, when Johnson became president and increased the commitment of troops to help Vietnam. The casualties before 1964 were considered insignificant, at least by the collector of this casualty data. The original hypothesis was that as causalities increased, the use of pathos would increase and the use of logos would decrease. This figure does support the hypothesis about the use of logos because in 1968 when casualties were the highest, there were no press conferences in which logos was the primary appeal. As causalities began to increase, the use of logos as the primary appeal did decrease each year, and when causalities began to decrease, the use of logos as the primary appeal began to increase. This is perhaps because the presidents did not want to mention the statistics about the increased number of troops killed each year, but they did mention more statistics when the casualty number decreased and they began to withdraw troops. In 1971, when the casualty rate was lower, Nixon specifically noted “troop withdrawal will continue at its present level” and “10,000 Americans have come home in this period.” This is a factual and logical statement that proves the war is headed in a positive direction. The only year that seems to go against the hypothesis regarding logos is 1969, because causalities were the second highest, but logos was the primary appeal in the majority of press conferences that year. Also, the increase in logos did not correlate perfectly with the decrease in casualties each year, but there was an overall upward trend.

This figure seems to reject the hypothesis about pathos increasing with the casualty rate, because as causalities increased the use of pathos as the primary appeal decreased. In 1968, when casualties were the highest, each rhetorical device was actually used less than any other year in the war. In fact, some press conferences were marked by an overwhelming lack of rhetorical tools, so no rhetorical device was determined to be the primary appeal. Perhaps this is because the president knew the casualty rates were high, and he did not know how to persuade or inspire the public to support the war effort with any form of rhetoric. For example, LBJ would say,

If I could have one thing presented to me today that I would rather have than anything else in the world, it would be that I could bring back from Vietnam all the men I sent out there and that we could have peace in the world so that those men could come home and enjoy being with their families again.

However, he would not specifically discuss how the peace settlements in Paris were going, or what still needed to be done in terms of the war or agreement. Although this statement was emotional, it did not have any elements of persuasion to bring the public hope.
This figure reveals the percentage of press conferences in which each rhetorical device is the primary appeal by year, and the number of United States military casualties by year during the Iraq War. This casualty data was drawn from the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count and started from 2003 when Bush fully committed the troops to fighting in Iraq. The original hypothesis was that as causalities increased, the use of pathos would increase and the use of logos would decrease. This figure do not perfectly reject or support the hypothesis, because the casualty rate does not seem necessarily correlated to the use of rhetoric. It is true that in 2007, when the casualty rate was the highest, the majority of press conferences did use rhetoric as the primary appeal. Bush would make statements like,

Congress’s most basic responsibility is to give our troops the equipment and training they need to fight our enemies and protect our Nation. They're now failing in that responsibility, and if they do not change course in the coming weeks, the price of that failure will be paid by our troops and their loved ones.

This would emotionally appeal to American citizens and perhaps inspire action in Congress to adjust the defense budget to combat the growing casualty rate.
However, the majority of press conferences did use pathos as the primary appeal for every year in the war except 2011, and pathos as the primary appeal did not seem to rise or fall with the casualty rate. Similarly, the majority of press conferences did use logos as the primary appeal in 2011, when the casualty rate was the lowest. Obama would say, “like we've seen in Iraq--where we've drawn down our troops, the remainder of our troops will be coming out by the end of this year, but Iraq has been able to maintain a democratic government and to tamp down violence there.” He explains how the troops have been withdrawn and the end goal of the war, to keep democracy in Iraq, is still being upheld by the Iraqi forces. However, the use of logos as the primary appeal also did not seem to rise or fall with the casualty rate. Perhaps this is because the rhetoric in these press conferences were geared toward questions in regards to the end of the war and the purpose behind invading Iraq and helping with the Iraqi elections, rather than questions about the number of troops killed. Those questions would invoke the use of pathos for emotional support of the war and logos when the presidents had logical plans and statistics about the removal of troops.

CONCLUSIONS

Overall, this study wanted to look for rhetorical trends in presidential press conferences and determine whether presidents used similar rhetorical devices or if they had individual preferences regarding the use of rhetoric. My original hypotheses was that different presidents would use similar rhetoric in response to similar wartime situations. I did find that there were some rhetorical trends that were the same for all presidents, but mostly each president had their own styles and tendencies when it came to rhetorical device use. Based on the figures that show the heightened use of one rhetorical device over the others, it is more likely that presidents do have preferences for which rhetorical device they tend to use. Typically it is the device they feel is easiest to use and come up with quickly in response to a question. Or their preferred device may exist in recurrent statements like Bush speaking about “the war on terror” or LBJ praising “our top man- Ambassador Bunker.” Once the presidents realize the value of these rhetorical statements, they repeat them time and time again. Therefore, it is important to note that all of the hypotheses I analyzed to find rhetorical trends may be attributed more to presidential preferences for rhetoric rather than correlated to the timeline and factors of the war.
Going forward, I think it would be beneficial to continue this coding in other wars and military engagements to see if new trends arise or if existing theories continue to be supported or rejected. Both of these wars were very long and had similar instances of American troops training and handing over responsibility to local troops after supporting the establishment of a democratic government. I am not sure how the use of rhetorical devices would change if our military engagement was much shorter or had a different territorial or political purpose. I also would like to see a study that accounts for the effects of technology advancements on rhetorical devices or in presidential press conferences. Even today, it is very fascinating that there is a strong distrust in the media by the President and citizens alike. Perhaps this has increased the use of scripted opening announcements and remarks by modern presidents and this will shift the open discussion between the media and the president into another coordinated, pre-planned outlet for the president to discuss his policies. Or maybe technology will increase or decrease the use of each rhetorical device, such as increased use of pathos over logos due to the fear of “fake news” and evidence.

Ultimately, rhetorical tools will continue to exist and help define the president’s ability to persuade and communicate with the American public. Whether their rhetoric is effective is entirely subjective, but it is still important to analyze how speeches and press conferences encourage political action in terms of policy, voting, foreign relations, and even military budgeting and support. Meanwhile, the question will still remain whether presidents have similar tendencies based on the nature of the office, or if their individual characteristics and reasoning will be a better gauge of their actions. This study encourages future research on the expansive opportunities for presidential inquiry.
DO POLITICAL INEFFICIENCIES WEAKEN THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS’S ABILITY TO DIRECT MACROECONOMIC POLICY?

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When the financial crisis of the previous decade struck, the Federal Reserve became the main actor in launching efforts to stymie the further deterioration of the American economy and eventually to bring forth the recovery. The occupants of the White House of this period, President Bush and President Obama, directed economic policy to some extent, but delegated the government’s response largely to this monetary institution. Meanwhile, Congress, while serving as an important voice of concern regarding the increased role of the Fed, largely acted in a reactive way to the policies coming from the Fed and the White House. This recent phenomenon begs the question: in their interactions with the central bank, do Congress and the president cede authority on economic policy to the Fed in times of crisis, when a rapid policy response and economic expertise is required? Also, has this phenomenon been promoted by polarization, and the fiscal policy paralysis it causes? To study this question, I will investigate historical examples of the presidency and Congress interacting with the Fed during times of economic crisis and whether the executive and legislative branches have acted in ways similar to that described above. The other economic crises I will investigate are those that occurred in the 1930s and 1970s. If there are differences between previous economic crises and the most recent one, I will seek to explore what institutional factors have changed that have led to this development. I will also utilize quantitative methodology to determine if the Federal Reserve’s response to economic variables has changed with increasing polarization in Congress.

INTRODUCTION

During the Great Recession and in the period following it, the Federal Reserve (Fed) initiated a series of policies that were extraordinary in their scale and scope in order to confront the grim economic situation that the country faced. Certainly, the crisis at hand was extraordinary, but the inventive and novel policy solutions that the Fed implemented were absolutely central to the government’s response to the recession. The nature of these policies raises several questions about the role of the Federal Reserve in the economic policy of the nation. First, does the executive and legislative branch delegate economic policy authority to the Federal Reserve in times of crisis, when the response to rapidly changing conditions needs to be implemented quickly? The very nature of monetary policy versus fiscal policy appears to support this explanation, given that the former can be implemented quickly and the latter cannot be due...
to the sluggishness of congressional action. However, the nature of the response by the Federal Reserve in the case at hand appears to be more than just a product of this factor.

Therefore, a second question must be asked: does the polarization of contemporary politics and the decreased likelihood of congressional action in the face of economic crisis suggest that the Federal Reserve has and will play a greater role in macroeconomic policymaking? I seek to answer this question in the paper that follows. First, I will provide some background on the nature of the role the Federal Reserve played during the most recent recession. Then, I will utilize two case studies—one being the Great Depression, and the other the oil crises of the 1970s—to answer this question qualitatively. After taking account of the trends seen in these cases, I will utilize a quantitative regression model to elucidate this trend further. Subsequent sections will attempt to reconcile the results of the qualitative and quantitative elements of this study and will seek to predict how polarization will further affect the way the government responds to economic issues.

THE RESPONSE TO THE GREAT RECESSION

Several key actors were critical to the government’s response to the unfolding financial crisis and Great Recession that occurred from 2008 to 2010. From the beginning, it appeared as though the elected institutions in the government, the president and Congress, had little will to stave off a collapse of the financial sector, and eventually the real economy, if it meant taking the politically toxic steps of bailing out banks on Wall Street that the public mostly saw as overpaid, incompetent, and irresponsible. When it was clear to the main actors that potential economic risks were not entirely understood, or perhaps even ignored by these elected officials, unelected bureaucrats mainly stepped in, including the Federal Reserve, the Treasury Department, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

When the subprime mortgage crisis erupted in late 2007 after the collapse of the American housing market, Bear Sterns was the first firm to face certain bankruptcy. The Fed and the Treasury, fearing that the collapse of one of the major investment banks would wreak havoc on the rest of the economy and financial system, intervened quickly. Through the New York Federal Reserve Bank run by President Timothy Geithner, the Fed intervened directly, and helped facilitate a deal in which JP Morgan would purchase the failing bank in a fire sale in
March 2008. Later, in September of the same year, when the subprime mortgage crisis spread further and the financial sector teetered on the brink of total collapse, the Federal Reserve and Treasury became directly involved in attempting to save Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch, with Chairman Bernanke and Mr. Geithner working with Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson to compel other banks to buy these firms.\(^2\)

In addition to working directly with the private sector to combat the growing financial crisis, the Fed also conducted another series of measures more in line with their traditional role. In its role as a lender of last resort, the Fed made the discount window more attractive to encourage struggling firms to raise capital if they needed it (by lowering rates so that they were closer to the private rate, expanding borrowing terms, and initiating the term auction faculty program).\(^3\) Additionally, the Fed worked extensively with the Treasury Department before and after the passage of the Troubled Asset Relief Program in Congress and also worked with the FDIC, which increased insurance limits for transaction accounts and guarantees to banks wanting to issues corporate paper.\(^4\) This program was a part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, which failed in the House before passing on a second vote, only after Secretary of the Treasury Hank Paulson literally begged Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to whip her caucus for the package.\(^5\) The Fed also engaged with foreign central banks using currency swaps, enabling it to provide liquidity to foreign central banks, and by extension, foreign banking sectors.\(^6\) Again, many of these moves were roundly criticized as bailouts to bankers, by both the public and many Members of Congress.\(^7\)

When President Obama took office in 2009, the worst days of the financial crisis were over, but the real economy was suffering from a deep recession. In February 2009, Congress

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passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which refocused government efforts on helping those affected by the recession and shifted policy away from dealing with the financial sector. The package included a number of provisions aimed at increasing infrastructure spending, assisting state and local governments dealing with fiscal crises, and salvaging consumer spending.\(^8\) The Obama administration also created the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), which sought to assist homeowners facing potential foreclosure on their homes.\(^9\) Later, the Obama administration pushed heavily for the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which sought to regulate the financial sector more heavily in order to maintain financial stability and control the type of risks that led to the subprime mortgage crisis.\(^10\)

After the initial crisis subsided, the Federal Reserve led the way in recovery from the Recession, and engaged in both conventional and unconventional monetary policy to stimulate the deeply recessed economy. By the start of 2009, the federal funds rate, which the Fed uses to control short term interest rates, was virtually at the zero lower bound. The federal funds rate stayed near zero until December 2015, when the FOMC decided to raise it slightly, and has slowly and incrementally been raising it since.\(^11\) After the Federal Reserve reached the lower bound, and conventional monetary policy had reached the limit of its stimulus power, the Fed resorted to tactics that had never been tried before in American monetary policy. It launched a series of large scale asset purchasing programs, called quantitative easing, in an attempt to lower long-term interest rates and further stimulate the economy past what near-zero short term interest rates could accomplish.\(^12\) These actions greatly increased the size of the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve, and led some to speculate that such large asset purchases would lead to inflation when these assets would be sold off after the economy had recovered.\(^13\) In addition to quantitative easing and a zero interest rate policy, the Fed has also engaged in an unprecedented

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\(^9\) Ibid.


\(^11\) Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), Effective Federal Funds Rate [FEDFUNDS], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS, December 6, 2017.

\(^12\) Bernanke, Ben. The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis.

communications campaign, called forward guidance, in which the Fed has sought to use press conferences and other media to control expectations and set clear monetary policy goals. The goal of this program was to reassure the financial sector that the bank would be engaging in long-term stimulus.14

Finally, the Federal Reserve has also implemented policies on the regulatory side with the goal of shoring up confidence in the financial system and preventing another financial crisis from occurring in the future. Such measures included more stringent regulations on firms that are considered “too big to fail”, such as enforcing larger capital requirements, applying the Volcker rule, and implementing stress tests.15 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was also created to protect consumers in financial dealings, which might prevent the type of predatory loan behavior that led to the subprime mortgage crisis.16 Overall, in terms of how central banking is approached now, there is a much larger focus on financial stability policy, in addition to the traditional focus on monetary policy.

**CASE STUDY: THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE NEW DEAL**

The first case I examine is the Great Depression. Overall, I will discuss the main features of the government’s response to the collapse of the American economy in the 1930s in order to compare this case with the responses of the federal government during the most recent recession. I elected to study the Great Depression due to its similarities with the recent recession. It was the only economic crisis as severe as the Great Recession and it was similarly caused by an asset pricing bubble’s collapse in the financial sector that would end up spreading to the real economy and wreaking havoc among a variety of sectors. Of course, the Great Depression was far more damaging to the economy than the recent recession, but the lessons learned from the crisis might shed some light on how the president, Congress, and the Fed have acted in the past to combat economic decline. Additionally, this case might provide some interesting insight into how the federal government operates in an economic crisis when the presidency and both chambers of Congress are dominated by the same party.

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15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
Given the circumstances outlined above, the Great Depression produced what many consider to be the quintessential federal government response to an economic crisis: the New Deal. The New Deal, based on the Keynesian macroeconomic paradigm prevalent during the period, was a series of welfare programs designed to increase employment and substitute in federal spending in place of lackluster private spending and investment. New Deal legislation produced a variety of programs. These included the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), the Public Works Administration (PWA) prescribed by the National Industry Recovery Act, the Civil Works Administration (CWA), the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), and the Works Progress Administration (WPA), among others.\(^{17}\) Broadly, these programs were designed to provide economic relief either through direct transfer to struggling individuals or by investing in civil infrastructure and construction projects that created jobs for the unemployed.\(^{18}\) Additionally, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was created to prop up the housing sector, while the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) assisted homeowners at risk of defaulting on their mortgages.\(^{19}\) All of these programs were implemented by the Democratic Congress at the behest of President Roosevelt early in his first term. Additionally, these unprecedented efforts to turn the economy back from deflation and high unemployment represent an instance of legislative productivity not seen in recent recessions.

At the Federal Reserve, the policymaking process was far more lackluster and far less bold. Indeed, Federal Reserve policy throughout the beginning of the Depression actually exacerbated many of the pressures that buffeted the economy. For instance, the Fed’s insistence on raising interest rates in 1928 and 1929 contributed to the collapse of stock prices that would crush the financial sector.\(^{20}\) Additionally, the Fed, after the financial collapse of 1929, refused to lower interest rates and instead kept monetary policy quite restrictive, in order to maintain the gold standard for the U.S. dollar.\(^{21}\) These policies ensured that what started as a significant recession would descend into a depression. Further mistakes made by the Fed included a policy

\(^{18}\) Ibid.
\(^{21}\) Ibid.
of allowing banks to fail, as the conception of business in the era was that firm failure was a product of the company not being competitive, and was instead a natural and positive development. After the crisis started, the Fed did drop interest rates in 1932, but then reversed that decision after it appeared that bank failures were starting to slow because fewer banks were lending at the discount window. This led to another wave of bank failures and a worsening of the depression. Only when the gold standard was dropped did the money supply increase enough to lower interest rates and allow for recovery.

Importantly, in the academic literature, there is a significant amount of skepticism about whether the New Deal programs effectively improved economic conditions in the local geographies they targeted. However, more recent research that has used more developed data sets appears to suggest that fiscal policy actually did improve conditions in local economies. For example, a study by Fishback et al determined that economic relief and public works programs such as the PWA, WPA, FERA, and CWA actually had broad economic benefits on the local economies that were targeted by such federal spending. These benefits included increased incomes, more consumption spending, lower mortality and a decreased rate of crime. The same study also found that the HOLC and FHA prevented a precipitous drop in housing prices and maintained the rate of homeownership nationally. However, another study by Fishback found that the Agricultural Assistance Administration (AAA), which sought to increase agricultural prices by paying farmers to take land out of production, actually lowered incomes for farm tenants who were often forced to take less lucrative jobs as farm laborers, while farm owners benefited handsomely from such spending. Finally, in a third study, Wheelock points out that it is difficult to assess the full power of fiscal spending on ameliorating economic crises, as fiscal spending during the Great Depression was restrained by the quite large debt to GDP ratio at the time, which even exceeded the same ratio during the Recession. Overall, these studies suggest

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22 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Fishback, Price. "How Successful Was the New Deal? The Microeconomic Impact of New Deal Spending and Lending Policies in the 1930s."
that fiscal policy might be successful in combating an economic downturn, insinuating that Congress and the president do have economic tools that they can use in a crisis.

This is important, as it suggests that the legislative and executive branches can act on their own without waiting for the Federal Reserve to use monetary policy in such crises. These policy developments might also highlight the point that, in a political environment where the president and Congress were largely unitary in their policy preferences, these governmental institutions took charge of the response to the economic crisis. Additionally, being unable to blame the largely decentralized Federal Reserve, the impetus to respond lied solely with Congress and the president, forcing them to act decisively. Relative to my research question, these points might suggest that the Fed must take into account whether the federal government will implement its own policies and adjust its responses to economic downturns accordingly. Indeed, an analysis by Weatherford of the relationships between the Fed and the president suggests the same. Therefore, the lack of fiscal policy associated with polarization might lead the Fed to engage in systematically more expansionary economic policy. This thesis will be tested in the quantitative portion of this study.

**CASE STUDY: STAGFLATION AND THE OIL CRISIS**

Another insightful instance of government intervention to stymy an economic crisis occurred in the late 1970s, when inflation caused by a variety of supply-side shocks was reaching astronomical levels. This case is useful in comparison to the Great Recession because it involved a crisis in which the Federal Reserve played a much larger role in economic recovery than seen previously. Additionally, this period is more in line with current Federal Reserve capabilities and economic features, such as the end of the gold standard, the primacy of the Federal Open Markets Committee, unemployment rates below 15%, and the politicization of monetary policy.

The so-called “Great Inflation” occurred from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s. I choose in this case to specifically observe the policy decisions that were taken during the Carter administration from 1977 to 1981, as this period of time captures both the height of the inflation problem and the shift in monetary policy under Chairman Paul Volcker. Indeed, when Volcker

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took office as Fed Chairman in August 1979, inflation had reached 11%.\footnote{Bryan, Michael. “The Great Inflation.” Federal Reserve History, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, November 22, 2013, www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/great_inflation.} A confluence of factors led to the rise of inflation before President Carter was sworn in. First, large federal deficits and enormous government expenditures associated with President Johnson’s Great Society and the Vietnam War helped push up inflation and inflationary expectations. Additionally, the collapse of the Bretton Woods System under President Nixon allowed the U.S. dollar to float freely, as its value was no longer tethered to any real commodity resource.\footnote{Ibid.} Also, the oil shocks of the early 1970s, caused by OPEC’s embargo of the United States, caused energy prices in the United States to rise significantly, thereby increasing the prices of consumer products that were manufactured or transported using oil.\footnote{Ibid.} Finally, the Fed and Congress were inclined to focus more on unemployment than inflation, with the recent 1973-4 Recession and the Great Depression still influencing conceptions of the government’s role in keeping unemployment low.\footnote{Biven, W. Carl. \textit{Jimmy Carter’s Economy: Policy in an Age of Limits}. The University of North Carolina Press, 2002.}

In Congress, the reaction to growing inflation was quite minimal. As mentioned above, the Democratic-controlled Congress was largely focused on keeping employment low, and passed the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978 to outline its macroeconomic policy goals that included maximum employment, low inflation, and sound monetary policy.\footnote{Ibid.} President Carter was also subject to these anti-unemployment biases. The Carter administration pushed a tax reform stimulus bill in 1978 with the intention of increasing employment, increasing the incomes of lower income Americans, and speeding up economic growth, which had been slowing in the years preceding Carter’s term. This tax reform bill was significantly altered but eventually passed by Congress, with tax breaks shifted from lower income to higher income individuals. Carter was inclined to veto the bill, but was convinced by his advisors that it was the only way to increase growth.\footnote{Ibid.}

By 1979, however, Carter and his economic policy team came to regret this decision, as inflation soon became the epicenter of the economic problems the nation faced, and the tax reform risked overheating the economy and making inflation worse. After another oil shock in
1979, consumer prices continued to sharply increase. The Carter administration wanted to decrease spending in the 1979 and 1980 budgets that had already been passed in order to decrease the deficit and slow down inflation expectations. This move proved deeply unpopular among both Democrats and Republicans in Congress. The former group wanted to maintain social spending levels, while the latter wanted large tax cuts.

The Carter administration also attempted to fight inflation directly by implementing price and wage guidelines that sought to prompt labor and businesses to cooperate to keep prices stable. The measures were relatively weak and unenforceable, but were seen early in the administration as a better alternative to using restrictive monetary and fiscal policy to curb inflation. Additionally, stricter wage controls might have alienated the administration’s allies in labor. After these policies seemed ineffective in 1977 and 1978, the Carter administration implemented stricter and specific price and wage growth guidelines, and although some businesses agreed to conform to them, labor ignored them and demanded wage growth in line with inflation.

With Congress and the administration unwilling or unable to implement policies that would combat the growing inflation problem, the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy seemed to be the only set of instruments available to try to tackle the growing crisis. Under Chairman William Miller, the FOMC was highly hesitant to increase interest rates given the prospect of another recession being likely in the near future. When Paul Volcker was appointed to the chairmanship in 1979, he resolved to fight inflation even at the cost of a recession. Most importantly, Volcker and the FOMC increased interest rates to fight inflationary pressures. Additionally, Volcker’s Fed acted in ways that were politically savvy to ensure its own power was maintained. In one notable FOMC meeting in October of 1979, Chairman Volcker decided to implement monetary policy on the basis of monetary aggregates—such as the growth rate of the money supply—as opposed to setting an interest rate goal. This made Fed policy more understandable to the layperson, and showed the business community that the central bank was

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36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
serious. Since inflation was becoming a more salient issue to Americans and with Volcker’s credibility as an inflation hawk, the Fed was able to implement policy that would have been too politically poisonous for either Congress or the administration. After a couple of brief recessions in 1980 and 1981-2, it appeared that this strategy worked, with inflation dropping from the high levels seen in the previous decade.

These political phenomena are important because they represent that when Congress and the president are unable to act to counter some negative economic trend, be it because it is out of their policy purview or because of political gridlock, the Federal Reserve can act decisively to fill the gap. While this case does not represent a period of divided government, it does represent an instance where the president and the Congress were unable to find a compromise that would deal with an economic crisis. In place of restrictive fiscal policy, the government’s response relied heavily on the monetary policy restraint of the Federal Reserve. Additionally, this case highlights that the Fed has political power of its own, and can use this power to implement the policies it sees fit, even if they are unpopular. Previous research has suggested the same. For example, Goodhart finds that the Fed was successful during the tenure of Chairman Volcker because it offered services and solutions to issues that were unable to be implemented by other policy-making bodies. Additionally, Beck finds that the Fed can often serve as a political punching bag, and members of Congress and the administration can use the central bank to deflect criticisms about the economy, suggesting that they cannot force the bank to, for example, lower interest rates to increase employment. Again, these findings show that the Fed will often take on the political risk and utilize its perceived economic authority to act when others will not.

**QUANTITATIVE METHODOLOGY**

The case studies outlined above suggest that, overall, when the president and Congress have similar policy goals and are of the same party, they can and do act aggressively to combat an economic crisis with fiscal policy. When the Congress and president have incongruent policy

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43 Goodhart, Lucy. “Brave New World? Macro-prudential policy and the new political economy of the federal reserve.”
44 Ibid.
objectives, fiscal policy might be less utilized, and the legislative branches and executive branches might be more inclined to delegate the response to the economic crisis to the Federal Reserve. Naturally, however, these case studies might not be representative of all recessions and deal with extraordinary crises. In order to test this theory more broadly, I will use a quantitative model that might be able to shed some light on how the Fed reacts to fiscal policy stagnation as a result of polarization.

I intend to use a model that includes an indicator of monetary policy as a dependent variable and an index of polarization as my main explanatory variable. The dependent variable will be the federal funds rate, which was obtained on the Federal Reserve’s Economic Database (FRED). The main independent variable, the partisanship conflict index, was obtained from the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank, and represents the level of conflict between the political parties, Congress and the president, as ascertained from newspaper articles. Other independent variables will include economic variables similar to those that the Fed uses to determine monetary policy, including measures of inflation, economic growth and the unemployment rate. These variables can be easily found on the FRED database as well, and are utilized to control for changes in economic conditions of a period. This model is based on the standard Federal Reserve response functions outlined by Maier in his literature review on measuring central bank behavior. This model is run on data from 1981 to 2017, and all time series data sets were detrended to ensure stationarity (as confirmed with Dickey-Fuller tests).

Overall, I hypothesize that polarization will have a significant effect on the monetary policy decisions of the Federal Reserve during periods of high polarization, and will indicate that polarization has made the Fed’s interest rates systematically lower, or more expansionary, during such periods. Accordingly, if the coefficient of the polarization variable is negative, then this might suggest that increased polarization has been associated with a decrease in interest rates, and thereby more expansionary monetary policy emitting from the Fed. The results of the regression of this model are presented in Table 1, below.

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46 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), Effective Federal Funds Rate [FEDFUNDS], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS, December 6, 2017.
RESULTS

As mentioned above, it is hypothesized that the Federal Reserve, in times of crisis, does tend to act decisively due to factors such as expertise, speed of action, and lack of action by Congress and the president. Second, it is hypothesized that polarization has only made this role for the Federal Reserve more relevant. If the polarization index variable is significant, then it could indicate that congressional polarization, and thereby inaction, might also be predictive of monetary policy decisions that serve to assist the economy in the absence of fiscal policy.

Table 1: Quantitative Model Results

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Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The first three variables, which are the annual growth rate in the unemployment rate, annual growth rate in the consumer price index, annual growth rate in the industrial production
index (as a proxy for GDP growth) and the annual growth rate in the yield on long-term bonds serve as control variables (and are lagged three months to reflect available data at the time the Fed makes its decisions). Interestingly, in periods of less polarization, it appears that economic variables are the drivers of the federal funds rate. Meanwhile, in periods of intense partisan conflict (the 1990s and the period since the recession), the PCI variable is significant, while the economic variables appear to matter less in the formulation of monetary policy. However, in the 1990s, the PCI variable has a negative coefficient, as expected, while in the period after the recession, the PCI has a positive coefficient, indicating that polarization after the recession has led to a more restrictive monetary policy. The former result could be an outcome of the GOP-controlled Congress during the Clinton administration that strongly advocated for decreased fiscal spending. The latter result might be a symptom of greatly increased political attacks on the Federal Reserve after the Great Recession by Republicans, who largely supported more restrictive monetary policy. Either way, these results suggest that political polarization might have a role to play in monetary policy formulations of the Federal Reserve.

TECHNOCRATIZATION OF MACROECONOMIC POLICY

These results fall in line with John Freeman’s conception of “expert democracy.” For example, Freeman explains that expert democracy occurs when citizens of the democracy are unable or unwilling to make decisions about an issue, and thereby depend on “benign technocrats” to make these decisions for them.49 While the role of the Fed in conducting monetary policy alone and independently has been established for some time, it appears that this technocratization of American economic policy has expanded since the Great Recession and surge of partisanship. Freeman also explains that an important element of expert democracy is that the country’s democratic institutions allow actors that are sympathetic to the value of technocracy to block attempts to undermine it.50 This is certainly the case with American monetary policy in recent years, where Democrats appear to have largely shielded the Fed from

50 Ibid.
Republican efforts to prevent the central bank from implementing its quantitative easing programs. Indeed, the role of expert democracy might be increasing given the inability of members of Congress to decide amongst themselves on the direction of economic policies. Therefore, the central bank’s professional staff might be more relevant and might have preserved the independence of the Fed after the crisis.

Others have described this phenomenon in a similar way in the literature. For example, Walsh explains that the Fed was using fiscal operations in the form of credit easing to increase government liabilities and the debt available to the public, which allowed the government to act flexibly and quickly on something that would have taken Congress a very long time to enact.51 Additionally, Krampf explains that bureaucrats, motivated by career concerns (being good at their job) and held accountable by the general public and their professional peers, unlike politicians, have recently moved to fulfill additional roles in the policymaking sphere. He argues that in both the European Union and the United States, central bankers have subscribed to new ideational paradigms that have advocated for the expansion of the role of central banks in financial regulation, a decision that was made by central bankers and not through the legislative activity of elected officials.52

Clearly, there is some value to delegating more authority on economic issues to economic experts, with gains appearing in the form of quicker and more well-developed action. Nonetheless, Freeman does note that there are cost associated with the advent of expert democracy. For instance, interest groups might lobby executive or legislative branches (those who yield veto power over the actions of the technocracy), and thereby are still able to influence monetary policy decisions and redistribute wealth.53 Additionally, Walsh states that, in the long-term, the larger role in economic policymaking that the Fed delegated to itself could undermine some of its independence in the long run, given the intense opposition by some lawmakers regarding the Fed’s quantitative easing programs.54 Finally, and perhaps most concerning, is that

53 Freeman, John R. “Competing Commitments: Technocracy and Democracy in the Design of Monetary Institutions.”
54 Walsh, Carl E. “Central Bank Independence Revisited.”
taking more and more economic policy out of the hands of the public’s representatives undermines the democratic ideal of popular control over policymaking.

CONCLUSION

Overall, these results are interesting because they indicate that increased polarization and Congressional paralysis has led Congress, and, by extension, the president to cede economic policymaking to an unelected cadre of central bankers. Although the Federal Reserve has consistently acted in ways that aim to promote the welfare of the American people and remained relatively independent throughout its history, this development still might be concerning. At the very least, it highlights some of the costs of the increasing polarization on the ability of elected officials to affect policy outcomes.
Part 3

Domestic Policy
IMPACTS OF THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC IN THE UNITED STATES

ELIZABETH DINEVSKI
University of Cincinnati

In the 2010s, the United States saw a huge increase in drug overdose deaths caused by prescription and recreational opioid drugs. Starting in 2015, opioid overdoses began to spike rapidly and killed over 33,000 Americans. In 2016, opioid overdoses claimed over 59,000 lives and it is estimated that, over the next 10 years, over half a million Americans will lose their life to an opioid overdose. This huge spike in opioid related overdoses and deaths has been deemed the “Opioid Epidemic.” This problem has put tremendous stress on local governments and healthcare facilities to treat this crisis, but no one quite knows how to solve it. While the immediate impacts are felt in emergency medical services, law enforcement, and hospitals, this epidemic has huge implications for the American economy and the broader public.

WHAT IS AN OPIOID?

When someone hurts themselves, there are neural network signals transmitted throughout the body from pain receptors to nerves in the brain to register the feeling of pain. Opioids are a class of drugs that “are related and interact with the opioid receptors on nerve cells in the body and brain,” which inhibit the transmission of pain signals throughout the body.1 Prescription opioids are legal drugs that doctors prescribe as painkillers, such as codeine, hydrocodone, morphine, and oxycodone. The most common illegal opioid is heroin, which can be laced with ultra-potent synthetized drugs like fentanyl and carfentanyl.

With continued use, individuals taking opioids tend to build a tolerance, causing them to need higher dosages in order to get the same result. While opioids can be great for short term pain management – like serious accidents and surgeries – they can be extremely dangerous with long term use. There is a wide array of side effects resulting from prolonged opioid use; some of the more serious side effects are respiratory depression, hyperalgesia (extra sensitivity to pain), a weakened immune system, hormonal dysfunction, and addiction.2

2 Benyamin, Ramsin, MD, Andrea M. Trescot, MD, Sukdeb Datta, MD, Ricardo M. Buenaventura, MD, Rajive Adlaka, MD, Nalini Sehgal, MD, Scott E. Glaser, MD, and Ricardo Vallejo, MD, Ph.D. Opioid complications and...
An overdose occurs when an individual takes too much of an opioid which causes a diminished level of consciousness and slow or stopped breathing. If an individual is in this state for an extended period of time, it can lead to death. The most common way of reviving an individual in an overdose is the use of naloxone, otherwise known as Narcan. While naloxone is extremely useful in reviving someone from an overdose, the blockage on the opiate receptors only last on average 30-90 minutes, meaning that an individual could re-overdose if there is still a substantial amount of the drug in their system.

**CAUSES OF THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC**

Back in the late 1990s, doctors were faced with an increasing amount of acute and chronic pain patients. Pharmaceutical companies began to market opioid painkillers, like oxycodone and hydrocodone, as a way for doctors to treat these patients. While doctors were a bit hesitant at first, the pharmaceutical companies insisted that there were no serious side effects. The painkillers seemed to work well for treating pain patients, so the doctors began prescribing them at increasing rates. According to Healthcare Triage, there were roughly 76 million opioid prescriptions in 1991 while in 2011, there were 219 million.3

Today, there are over 100 million chronic pain patients in the United States, almost a third of the population, many of whom were prescribed some sort of opioid painkiller.4 Roughly 21%-29% of individuals who are prescribed opioids report misusing them and approximately 80% of heroin users admitted to abusing opioid painkillers before using heroin.5 It is not only chronic pain patients who are at risk for abusing prescription opioids; having more prescription painkillers in circulation increases the chances of family members and friends having access to opioids, putting them at risk for using and abusing.

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Many individuals have found themselves addicted to prescription painkillers but cannot afford their high cost, so they turn to illegal drugs like heroin. Heroin is a cheaper and more accessible opioid that causes a greater high than prescription painkillers. As the tolerance to the drug builds in an individual, they find themselves looking for a stronger substance to give them the same high, causing them to seek out alternative drugs. As a result, many users seek out heroin laced with fentanyl and carfentanyl. These two synthetic drugs are quick to enter the bloodstream, last longer, and provide a stronger high. Fentanyl is 50-100 times more powerful than morphine while carfentanyl is 10,000 times more potent than morphine. When already potent heroin is laced with fentanyl and carfentanyl, it makes the chances of overdosing much more likely.

**Current Situation**

Currently, each municipality has jurisdiction of how it fights this epidemic and there have not been solidified efforts to combat the crisis at the federal level. When an individual overdoses and emergency medical services is called, the individual must consent to a transport to the hospital to get help after receive naloxone. For the most part, there are no real action plans to help individuals access treatment after naloxone has been administered. Since addiction still has a stigma surrounding it, many are terrified and ashamed to seek help. When an individual does seek treatment, they are often faced with considerable medical costs.

The opioid epidemic has hit the Midwest, Appalachia, and New England the worst thus far, but it is starting to spread throughout the entire country. The areas most affected were manufacturing hubs, but when jobs left due to the Great Recession, people started to self-medicate, causing these once booming small towns to be ridden with crime and substance abuse.

Even though President Trump declared the opioid epidemic a public health emergency in October 2017, there have not been funds allocated to fighting the crisis. While bringing awareness to the problem is a small step in the right direction, it is not enough to see results. In

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President Trump’s 2018 State of the Union Speech, he stressed how his administration was going to be “much tougher on drug dealers and pushers” while also “helping get treatment for those in need.”

The media has not been shy about news stories surrounding the opioid epidemic from a local, to a national, and even international level. Images and videos have gone viral of adults overdosing around their children in public places, pulling the heart strings of many. While these new stories have been crucial to bringing awareness to the problem, they seem to perpetuate a desolate image of addicts. Stories about recovering are not covered nearly as much, most likely because they do not boost media attention. This issue of media coverage only increases the stigma surrounding addiction, adding yet another component to the issue.

**Past Drug Epidemics**

*Opiate Crisis in the Early 1900s*

This is not the first time the United States has been faced with an opiate problem. During the Civil War, morphine was introduced as a painkiller for soldiers who were injured in battle, who then became addicted to the substance. Several years later, opiates became commonly used as a method of pain, constipation, and cough relief. As more people were exposed to opiates, they became addicted and started to abuse them. Several pharmaceutical companies began to create brand name drugs to capitalize on this new market. In response, President Theodore Roosevelt appointed Dr. Hamilton Wright as the United States’ first Opium Commissioner in hopes to combat the issue.9 The Roosevelt Presidency made multiple strides in the regulation of food and drugs during the early 1900s with the creation of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and Pure Food and Drug Act. While this began curbing the use of opioids, many switched to cocaine as their method of medical treatment.

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In 1912, the Hauge International Opium Convention hosted several countries that faced severe issues from opium and cocaine. At the end of the conference, many countries decided to enact similar legislation to curb the impacts of commercialized drug sales. In response, Wright helped passed the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914, which “regulated the sale and distribution of opium and cocaine-based products” and was characterized at the “first main crackdown in a century of American narcotics prohibition.” There was a massive drop in number of doctors prescribing dangerous drugs, but there was a surge of individuals entering rehabilitation centers. Since these individuals could no longer legally obtain drugs, there was a spike in illegal drug trades, which ultimately lead to more crime.

*The Crack Epidemic of the 1980s*

In the early 1980s, the United States saw a large increase of illegal shipments of powdered cocaine. As the supply of the drug increased in a short amount of time, the price plummeted, and the number of users quickly grew. Drug dealers saw an opportunity to make the drug more profitable by turning it into a solid substance that was deemed crack. By 1985, it was estimated that nearly 5.8 million Americans were addicted to cocaine, which resulted in increase of cocaine-related hospitalizations and violent crime. Neighbors all over the United States were impacted and the issue was considered the “Crack Epidemic.”

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 passed strict criminalization guidelines for drug users and allocated around $6.5 billion to the drug control budget. In the law, it outlined that “offenses involving one hundred grams of heroin, five hundred grams of cocaine or five grams of cocaine freebase known as crack” would result in sentencing. At the time, issues stemming from crack cocaine impacted black communities while issues stemming from crack methamphetamine effected white communities. Even though similar problems were faced within both communities, the black communities were a larger target under the legislation because Congress believed that


12 The Harrison Narcotic Act, § 1 (1914)


crack was the “root cause of violence in the inner city, the decay of housing projects, and the rise of urban gangs.”\textsuperscript{15} As a result, there were huge drug crackdowns focused on these communities, leading to a mass incarceration of black individuals.

Educational programming was created in hopes to reduce drug use, gang membership, and violence in children. First Lady Nancy Reagan implemented the “Just Say No” campaign and the chief of the Los Angeles Police Department, Daryl Gates, created the Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) program, both which taught children to simply say no to drugs. These programs were later deemed ineffective because they told the students what to do, rather than educate them on how to make their own choices.\textsuperscript{16}

While these efforts reduced the use of cocaine and violence associated with it, it did not address the underlying issues involving addiction and socioeconomic opportunities. Since there was no interim improvement in public education, unemployment, and poverty, when the incarcerated individuals were released, similar problems resurfaced.

\textit{Takeaways from Past Epidemics}

While both the Roosevelt and Reagan Administrations strove to curb the drug epidemics that they faced, they did not address the underlying issues of the problem. While regulating the supply of a drug is necessary to limit its consumption, neither administration addressed the mental health aspect of addiction. It does not matter how well a certain substance is regulated if addiction is not treated because users can easily turn to another substance. Instead of getting individuals treatment during the crack epidemic, there was a mass incarceration targeting black individuals. The Reagan Administration’s pursuit of punitive polices was ill-advised and resulted in a perpetuation of the underlying issues of race inequality and mental health stigmas. The Trump Administration should learn from the shortcomings of these previous administrations as guidance for the current issue at hand.

\textbf{Impacts on the Government, Economy, and Healthcare}

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
The Government and Economy

In 2011, the pain management industry the United States was estimated to have an economic cost ranging from $560-635 billion. Roughly half can be attributed to the incremental cost of healthcare while the remainder stems from the loss of productivity. These numbers are relatively conservative since the number of cases surrounding pain management and opioid abuse has risen significantly since 2011. This is crucial for the federal government because not only does it impact the gross domestic product, workforce, and the overall economy, but it eventually pays for one-fourth of the costs through Medicare programs.17

In terms of local government, emergency medical services have been responding to an increase of opioid related events on top of their normal stream of incidents. All of a sudden, fire departments around the nation found themselves strapped for resources after exerting their budgets. Many municipalities have been applying for federal, private, and non-profit grants to help fund their operations to avoid raising taxes.

A study in South Carolina looked into patients who have repeatedly used emergency medical services as a source of treatment when overdosing. There were 925 patients involved in the study and 91.1% of them received a second administration of naloxone over a week after the first overdose treatment.18 While this is a small study, similar patterns are being seen in areas where the epidemic is hit the hardest. Many users will rely on emergency medical services to revive them for a chain of overdoses but refuse medical transport.

Middletown, Ohio has been one of the areas severely impacted by the opioid epidemic. They are currently spending around $100,000 on naloxone, which was 10 times their original budget. Thus far, the city has spent over $1.5 million in resources to combat the opioid epidemic.19 Due to this strain on the city, Councilman Dan Picard has been trying to implement

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17 Committee on Advancing Pain Research, Care, and Education. Relieving Pain in America: A Blueprint for Transforming Prevention, Care, Education, and Research.
legislation to prohibit emergency medical services from administering naloxone after two overdoses. Other officials, like Sheriff Rick Jones of Butler County, Ohio, also are pushing for cutting back on the amount of naloxone that is being administered. While these are two very unique and controversial examples, they illustrate the amount of stress that local government have taken on in order to fight the epidemic. This is a cry for help to the federal government to see more serious actions being taken.

**Healthcare Impact**

According to NBC News, there has been a rise in accidental deaths in the United States, which is attributable to the rise in drug overdose related deaths.\(^{20}\) Not only are the death tolls rising, but so are the number emergency room visits surrounding drug overdoses. Maryland has seen deaths related to opioids quadruple from 2010-2017 and has seen the largest number of hospitalizations in relation to opioid overdoses. Experts believe that the reasoning behind the spikes is that individuals are finding it extremely difficult to access proper treatment. Nationally, it is estimated that “1.27 million emergency room visits or impatient stays for opioid-related issues in a single year.”\(^{21}\)

Another issue that healthcare facilities have seen is an increase of HIV due to the intravenous methods of injecting heroin. In the Northern Kentucky area, there has been a nearly 250% increase of HIV positive cases amongst drug users.\(^{22}\) Similar outbreaks have been seen in rural areas of Indiana and Boston. All three areas have been trying to implement a needle exchange program in hopes to control the rapidly rising HIV rates.

**Current Strategies and Best Practices**

**Litigation at the State Level**


Attorneys general from multiple states that have been deeply impacted by the opioid epidemic are suing large pharmaceutical companies, claiming that there was false advertising of the drugs to doctors, causing them to overprescribe. In December 2015, Mississippi Attorney General Jim Hood was the first to file a state level lawsuit against the pharmaceutical companies. Mike DeWine, Attorney General of Ohio, and Josh Shapiro, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, followed in Mississippi’s litigious footsteps. Due to the huge rise in similar lawsuits, 41 states have decided to join their litigation efforts together in order to strengthen their arguments. These lawsuits hope to mirror precedent set in previous litigation efforts against tobacco companies for misleading advertising and misinformation.

Many stakeholders that are involved in these lawsuits in hope to use the financial damages as a source of funding to fight against the opioid epidemic since they have depleted their current funds. Mark Chalos, a lawyer from Nashville, Tennessee who has helped explore some of the lawsuits, stated that the crisis has “devastated county and municipal budgets,” so much so that some places in Tennessee “no longer can afford to do an autopsy for every expected overdose.” In most cases, these areas are trying to seek “monetary damages to help them recoup the money lost fighting the epidemic.”

As of now, these cases filed against the pharmaceutical companies are all civil cases surrounding consumer protection and misleading marketing. While unlikely, there could be criminal charges if deceitful information of top executives is discovered through subpoenas.

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24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.
Education and Public Health Campaigns

In 2015, Governor John Kasich of Ohio signed House Bill 367 which required public education to include discussing opioid use and prevention.\textsuperscript{26} The Governor’s Cabinet Opiate Action Team created the Health and Opioid Abuse Prevention Education (HOPE) curriculum that provides guidelines to public schools on how to teach the material. The HOPE curriculum varies from other state content standards because there is no associated standardized testing. Christa Hyson, the founder of the “Not Even Once” program, which embraces the HOPE curriculum at Oyler Elementary School, where high number of drug overdoses occur in the surrounding neighborhood. The “Not Even Once” program helps educate students from kindergarten to middle school about what drugs are, when they are safe, how to identify trusted adults, and to make their own decisions. Hyson meets with students once a week and engages them in hands-on exercises to learn the outcomes of the decisions they choose to make. In order to gauge their development throughout the program, Hyson administers exercises and surveys where students will explain their choice in certain situations. Hyson has seen improvements in the students’ abilities to make positive decisions and identify harmful substances.\textsuperscript{27}

Strategic Action Plans

Rhode Island was no stranger to the huge increase in opioid related deaths during the epidemic. In August 2015, Governor Gina Raimondo signed an executive order into action to create the Governor’s Overdose Prevention and Intervention Task Force, which would consist of experts of public health, public safety, healthcare, business, recovery, and other relevant areas to advise her on an action plan to combat the issue.\textsuperscript{28} On July 12, 2017, another executive order was signed by Governor Raimondo which outlined the action plan of her task force. The program sought to combat the issues in Rhode Island by aggressive preventative measures for patient safety through the Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, rescue from overdoses using naloxone, expansion of the quality and availability of treatment centers, and peer-recover services.\textsuperscript{29} In addition to the guidelines set from the program, the action plan outlines key

\textsuperscript{26} Ohio H.R. 367, 130th General Assembly. (2014) (enacted).
\textsuperscript{27} Hyson, Christa, MPH. \textit{Interview with Christa Hyson}, Interview by author. February 1, 2018.
deliverables, metrics, and proposed action taken for each focus. The plan’s overall goal is to “reduce opioid overdose deaths by one-third within three years” and has allocated $4 million to the expansion of medication-assisted and peer recovery treatment. Rhode Island saw fewer deaths related to opioids in 2017 than in 2016, which Governor Raimondo claims is “a ray of hope… [but] we are not out of the woods yet.”

Quick Response Teams

In many areas hard hit by the epidemic, an overdose response team composed of a paramedic, police officer, and social worker responds to an overdose. The idea behind this is to encourage the individual to seek treatment after an overdose. A week after the incident, the team will go to the individual’s house and talk to them in hopes of getting them into treatment. While this has been partially successful in encouraging people to seek treatment, it has been criticized since users are very unlikely to open up their door to a police officer. Including a recovering user in the quick response team could create new jobs for individuals looking to enter the workforce post-addiction, encourage more users to seek and stay in treatment, and increase the chances of an individual in recovery to remain sober.

Casey’s Law

In response to the drug-related death of Matthew “Casey” Wethington, the state of Kentucky passed Casey’s Law, a formal process of civil commitment. When an individual is deemed a danger to themselves or others due to the mental illness of addiction, a family member, friend, or law enforcement officer can request for court-order involuntary treatment. The program has been very successful in Kentucky and other hard-hit states are planning on implementing similar legislation. Similar laws have been in place, but an event like a suicide attempt or drunk driving accident would have to occur in order for a police officer to require

33 Brumfield, Tracy. *Interview with Tracy Brumfield*. Interview by author. April 4, 2018.
34 Casey's Law. “Casey's Law Kentucky - About.” [Casey's Law Kentucky, caseyslaw.org/KY_Files/About.htm](http://caseyslaw.org/KY_Files/About.htm).
involuntary commitment. Casey’s Law expands the mental health aspect of civil commitment to include addiction and allows family members and friends to request involuntary treatment.

**Policy Suggestions on Combatting the Opioid Epidemic**

At the core of this problem are every day Americans who are struggling with addiction. They are mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters, coworkers and peers, friends and neighbors. At the end of each data point is a life that is lost to not only a drug, but of a mental illness. When policy is being created to combat the opioid epidemic, policy makers need to remember that these are average Americans who are struggling and need holistic help.

*National Emergency Status*

It has been several months since President Trump declared a public health emergency, but there has yet to be a strategic action plan or allocated funding. In his 2018 State of the Union speech, President Trump mentioned how in 2016, there were 174 deaths per day resulting from drug overdoses, totaling to 64,000 Americans.\(^{36}\) Even if the current rate of overdoses and deaths decelerates, the United States will still see thousands of accidental deaths related to drug overdoses. This issue has already had huge cost implications for the government (federal, state, and local), the economy, and healthcare.

By changing the status to a national emergency, the opioid epidemic would finally have funding from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). These funds could aid states and municipalities in their reactive and proactive programs since their current funds have been depleted. With funding, however, there should be certain stipulations to ensure that the finances are used appropriately following a strategic action plan set forth by the federal government.

*Revise the Current Opioid Task Force and Create a Strategic Plan*

President Trump should improve the opioid action team that is currently being led by Kellyanne Conway, someone with no expertise or background on the subject matter. The current

team has been notorious for being secretive and many Senators and Representatives from the hardest hit states are skeptical of how effective the current team will be.\textsuperscript{37} This team should mimic that of Rhode Island’s to ensure that professionals from public health, public safety, healthcare, and other relevant areas share their insights and expertise in order to shape a cross-sectional action plan.

\textit{Legislation for Required Medical Transport}

There are many cases of individuals overdosing and calling emergency medical services for naloxone treatment multiple times per month, even per day, as illustrated in the South Carolina study. When an individual does not consent to medical transport after an overdose, it results in higher costs for responders, local government, and tax payers. It could be beneficial for the federal government to pass legislation that requires an individual to be transported to a hospital and receive some sort of treatment if a certain amount of naloxone is administered within a certain time frame. This could encourage struggling individuals to potentially seek treatment if they are physically taken to a healthcare facility.

\textit{Incentives for Quick Response Teams}

As federal funding becomes available to states and municipalities, one stipulation should be requiring quick response teams while responding to overdoses. There has already been success with long-term implications with the current quick response team structure and providing a financial incentive will encourage more states and municipalities to partake. Congress and the President could also consider requiring or incentivizing quick response teams that include recovering users since research has shown that individuals who are struggling with addiction are more likely to be successful with the support of others.\textsuperscript{38}


\textsuperscript{38} Brumfield, Tracy. \textit{Interview with Tracy Brumfield.} Interview by author. April 4, 2018.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and other Healthcare Legislation

When an individual decides to seek treatment, they then have to find a facility that accepts their health insurance or does not require health insurance. Even with health insurance, the cost of treatment can be expensive and prohibitive. When the new tax plan was passed in 2017, it included a clause that eliminated the individual mandate for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), which was one of the cornerstones of the legislation. This could be a huge problem for combatting the opioid epidemic because there will be a smaller pool of individuals insured by the ACA, causing insurance costs to continue to rise. There was also discussion on repealing certain sections of the ACA that would limit the mental health resources that would be covered.

Congress and the President need to consider proactive measures in treating addiction in order to combat the current opioid epidemic and attempt to prevent future crises. If users are able to access treatment facilities and are covered by health insurance, their chances of becoming a productive member of society increases. Part of the issue surrounding access to treatment is cost and access to health insurance. A long-term approach should be taken to invest in preventative healthcare, so the United States can stop another crisis like this from occurring again in the future.

Wide-scale Implementation of Civil Commitment

Many policymakers, despite party, believe it was evident that the mass incarceration that occurred from the Crack Epidemic was not effective. The Trump Administration should avoid mass incarcerations like this and, instead, encourage users to get treatment. Thus far, Casey’s Law and similar legislation have been successful in getting users into rehabilitation centers to treat the underlying cause of the crisis – addiction. Creating a formalized process at the federal level will gives states the guidelines to create similar programs. To incentivize states to participate, this could be a requirement when a state or municipality receives funding.

Expand Funding and Grants to Treatment Facilities

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Enacting a wide-scale civil commitment law has implications on the structure of treatment facilities. As of now, many treatment facilities are at full capacity and not many medical professionals are interested in rehabilitation due to the lack of available funds. In order to incentivize growth, Congress could extend some of the funds from the national emergency status to grants for treatment facilities as well as offer more Medicare subsidies.

One issue in the current structure of treatment facilities is that there are no overarching guidelines or benchmarks that are identified. Congress and the president should look to create certain treatment outcome processes and goal benchmarks with help of the opioid task force. This can gauge how successful treatment facilities are, resulting in funding and grant implications.

**Promote Biotechnology Startups and Research**

Since the Opioid Epidemic is rooted in the over-prescription of opioid painkillers, incentivizing firms to research alternative medical treatments could proactively prevent another drug crisis from occurring. Biotechnology is a rapidly growing industry in the United States and could be promising in discovering alternative methods for pain treatment. Relaxing regulations, providing research grants, and offering tax benefits could help stimulate more startups in biotechnology, leading to new medical treatments.

**CONCLUSION**

The Opioid Epidemic is a multifaceted issue with roots in the over-prescription of painkillers and lacking infrastructure to treat addiction. With over 100 people dying per day, this is an extremely serious issue that needs to be addressed. The President and Congress should learn from past drug epidemics and consider current best practices in order to form an action plan. By changing the status to national emergency and opening up funding from FEMA, the federal government can create a strategic plan and implementation action to start a widespread fight to save American lives.

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WHITE HOUSE WONKS: LESSONS FROM THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS IN THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION

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Since its foundation in 1946, the President’s Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) has played numerous roles. However, scholars have not comprehensively documented its role during the Obama administration. This paper aims to document the variations in the role and influence of the CEA during the course of the Obama administration. In addition, it will explain why the relationship between the president and CEA chair is a key determinant of the CEA’s influence.

CONTEXT AND ARGUMENT

“Like all institutions, the Council of Economic Advisers has experienced peaks and valleys - times of influence and times when its advice was ignored or perhaps only rarely sought. Yet, it has more than survived, while other entities have passed from the scene.”1

– Roger B. Porter

If one were to discuss the topic of the Council of Economic Advisers with the average American voter, the most common response you would probably receive is “What is the Council of Economic Advisers?” The simplest answer to that question is that the CEA is a group of economists who assist the president and his economic policymaking team. Since its founding in 1946, 29 chairmen have worked for 13 different presidents. Depending on one’s definition, it is the third oldest component of the Executive Office of the President still extant today, with only the White House Office and the Office of Management and Budget, originally called the Bureau of the Budget, predating it. Four chairmen of the Federal Reserve previously served as CEA chairman and many renowned economists have worked at the CEA. It is required by law to publish the Economic Report of the President on an annual basis, a task that it has performed for 71 consecutive years. It has offices in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building as well as in the New Executive Office Building.

For many years, the history of the CEA was well documented. In 1984, Erwin Hargrove and Samuel Morley published a compilation of interviews with every living past CEA chair.

Former chairmen such as Herb Stein, Martin Feldstein, and Joseph Stiglitz wrote academic journal pieces about their time at the CEA. Even scholars who did not work at the CEA, such as Ray Canterbery, Werner Sichel, Hugh Norton, and Roger Porter, have written on the CEA’s history. But in the last 20 years, there has not been a single academic journal piece on the CEA. While some news articles cover bits and pieces of the CEA’s role, the only comprehensive attempt to chronicle the Council’s role during this time period was the historical chapter on the CEA in the 2016 Economic Report of the President. Even then, that document was much more focused on the 20th century history of the organization instead of its more recent activities. In short, academic interest in the CEA has waned.

By the time of the Clinton administration, the CEA’s organizational structure had remained stable for a period of over 40 years. The Employment Act of 1946 established the position of member on the Council of Economic Advisers. The organizational structure of the CEA was altered at the beginning of the Eisenhower administration in a reorganization plan championed by Arthur Burns. It has remained remarkably stable ever since. The structure includes a chair, who is Executive Schedule level II, and two members, who are Executive Schedule level IV. That remains the current arrangement. The president nominates the chair and members but the Senate must confirm them. The members under President Clinton all had PhDs in economics. This was also the pattern during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, and H.W. Bush administrations. Senior staffers were also PhD trained economists with a wealth of experience. The CEA looked for a team of economists that covered the range of public policy issues that were relevant at the time. They hired PhD economists who had over a decade of experience in economics and public policy since finishing their PhD work. Each senior staffer had a particular area of expertise on which they focused. The CEA then chose a group of staffers that possessed diversity in their fields of expertise in order to create a team that could face the issues that were salient at the time. The economists they chose were all respected professionals.

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3 Author’s note: Before 2011, all CEA members had to be confirmed by the U.S. Senate. Since the passage of the Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act of 2011, only the chair must be confirmed by the Senate.
Junior staffers were chosen for their capability to serve as research assistants to the senior staffers. The individuals chosen for these posts were typically younger people who had recently finished their undergraduate work or were in the middle of their graduate degree studies. Junior staffers had a strong background in economics from their time at university. They were then assigned a senior staffer to work alongside during their time at the CEA. Outside of these three groups of staffers, the CEA has a small support staff to assist its efforts. Altogether, the CEA has had a total staff of approximately 35, making it a very small organization relative to other government agencies.

This paper was written with two key objectives in mind. The first objective is to provide data and evidence on the role of the CEA during the Obama administration. This paper will show that the role of the CEA under President Obama was generally stable but that its level of influence within the White House was largely dependent on the individual who served as CEA chair. Secondly, it will aim to explain why the relationship between the CEA chair and president is such a key factor in determining that level of influence.

SUMMERS TIME: THE CEA UNDER CHRISTINA ROMER

When Barack Obama became president-elect on November 4, 2008, the state of the American economy was in dire condition. In the month of October 2008, the U.S. economy had shed over half a million jobs. In the next three months, over two million more jobs were lost. All this was taking place before he had taken the oath of office, which was to occur on January 20, 2009. Amidst this backdrop, President Obama wasted no time in assembling his economic team and putting them to work on policy.

For his first chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, President-Elect Obama chose Christina Romer, an economist from the University of California at Berkeley. Although the CEA chair and many other members of the economic team would need to be formally confirmed by the Senate in order to take up their posts once he assumed the Presidency, their confirmation was largely a bygone conclusion due to the Democrats’ control of the Senate.

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6 Andrea Taverna, e-mail message to author, November 17, 2015.
Romer and the rest of the economic team quickly went to work to develop policy that President-Elect Obama could enact once in office. The bulk of the economic team was announced remarkably early on November 24, just 20 days after the election.9

During this transition period, the staff that was available to Romer was significantly limited compared to what she would have at her disposal once she formally took up her position at the CEA. According to Romer’s account in the 2016 Economic Report of the President, the only staff at her disposal were the two other members-designate of the CEA and two graduate school students. During this time period, President-Elect Obama’s economic team worked on developing an economic stimulus package that would eventually be known as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. In December of 2008, Obama’s economic team, led by NEC Director-designate Larry Summers, presented a 57-page memo to the President-Elect outlining the economic situation that faced him upon his entry into office, including several recommendations for a stimulus package.10

The debate over the size of the stimulus package proved to be an early sign of the role that the CEA would play during Romer’s time as chair. Romer had been pushing for a package that was in the range of $1.8 trillion. She believed the stimulus needed to be this large in order to close the output gap in the economy at the time. Summers told her that amount was not politically feasible. She revised her draft of the memo down to include three proposed amounts: $1.2 trillion, $850 billion, and $600 billion. Summers at first made it seem that all three figures would be included in the memo. In the end, he ended up striking the $1.2 trillion number altogether because it was viewed as dead on arrival in Congress. OMB Director-designate Pete Orszag remarked the following about Romer’s $1.2 trillion recommendation being left out of the memo: “I think there’s a basic principle that if a senior member of the economic team wants something presented to the president, it should be presented—with the pros and cons. I do not think it’s the role of the economic team to play politics.”11

Clearly, Romer’s influence over policy was significantly outweighed by that of Summers. Romer had come from academia and lacked any Washington experience. Summers, on the other

10 Ibid.
hand, had served in the Clinton administration for 8 years. He also brought experience as a Ph.D. economist to the table. Reporting from the time indicates that Romer was hesitant to question Summers on political matters due to his wide-ranging experience. She had fought for the $1.2 trillion number but eventually backed down for this reason. According to The New York Times, this led to tension between Larry and Christina Romer. Reporting from The Washington Post indicates that Summers was seen as a “powerhouse” inside the economic policymaking team once President Obama took office. Summers had the ear of the President and was a person upon whose advice the President placed a high value.

During Romer’s time as CEA chair, all indications are that the CEA continued to maintain the same structure it had in the Bush administration. Romer was quickly confirmed as CEA chair by the Senate on January 28. Her fellow members, Austan Goolsbee and Cecilia Rouse, were confirmed on March 10. This follows the model of a chair and two members that had been in place since the Eisenhower administration. In addition, there were no indications that the two-level staff structure was any different from that of the Bush administration.

All data gathered in this research indicates that on a day-to-day basis, the CEA continued to play a strong role in providing high quality economic analysis. The president’s economic policymaking team extensively utilized this information during both Romer’s and Austan Goolsbee’s time as chair. Nikhil Joshi, who was a staffer at the NEC during both Romer and Goolsbee’s tenures, described the division of labor at the time in the following way:

Each group had a slightly different role to play. NEC is usually the 'quarterback', responsible for driving the process forward, and isolating decision points that need input from more senior officials, ultimately the President. The DPC plays a similar role, but usually on domestic issues that have less of an economic component (e.g. guns). The CEA is responsible for doing the 'heavy economics' work - forecasting the macroeconomic impact of a policy proposal, consulting the economics literature / experts. Unlike the NEC, which is more process-oriented and sensitive to the politics of a question, the CEA usually engages purely on the economics of an issue. Meanwhile, the OMB complements the role of the CEA, and is responsible for 'scoring' a policy proposal, and determining what the 10-year budget impact will be.

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15 Nikhil Joshi, email message to author, December 16, 2015.
In most respects, this division of labor is almost identical to that in the Bush White House. Former Bush NEC Director Keith Hennessey, when discussing the role of the different councils, organizations, and actors within the Obama White House, inferred that the overall structure was relatively similar to that of the Bush administration. The key structural differences between administrations, he noted, were the following:

President Obama meets with a few of his principal economic advisors daily. Gut reaction: this is both a blessing and a curse. President Bush met with different configurations of his advisors as needed, rather than with the same group each morning. During normal times this averaged 2-3 meetings with the President per week. During the financial crisis it was almost every day, and sometimes more than once on a busy day. The proliferation of White House czars means that economic policy processes and decision-making are more dispersed in the Obama White House. As best I can tell, NEC did not run the health policy process for President Obama in 2009-2010, nor the cap-and-trade policy process, as it did during the Bush era. You can decide whether that’s good or bad. The current NEC Director has previously served as Treasury Secretary and is a leading academic economist in his own right and would be extremely well qualified to chair the CEA. This makes him at least a potential threat to both Secretary Geithner and the CEA Chair, and it means that everyone needs to work extra hard to make sure their roles are understood and that they can function together as a team.16

THE PRESIDENT’S OLD PAL: THE CEA UNDER AUSTAN GOOLSBEE

Austan Goolsbee’s tenure as CEA chair, which began in September of 2010, was marked by several differences with Christina Romer’s. Firstly was Goolsbee’s relationship with President Obama. Unlike Romer, who did not have an extensive relationship with President Obama before her appointment, Goolsbee had a long-lasting and extensive relationship with the President, dating back to when Mr. Obama was a law school professor. Goolsbee had been an economic adviser on Obama’s 2004 and 2008 campaigns.17 In addition, Larry Summers’ departure from the administration in December of 2010, just three months after Goolsbee was elevated from CEA member to Chairman, meant Goolsbee no longer had to “compete” with a PhD economist at the head of the NEC. On an operational level, neither of these changes caused

a major alteration in the CEA’s policy analysis role. However, it is not unreasonable to believe that Goolsbee was more of an influencer in economic policy discussions than Romer was.

As far as the CEA’s role in policy formation, it seems to have had no discernible differences under Goolsbee and Romer. As seen earlier in this chapter in comments from NEC staffer Nikhil Joshi, whose tenure spanned both Romer’s and Goolsbee’s tenures, he saw the division of labor and the day-to-day role of the CEA as consistent throughout his time in the White House. However, data on this directly from Dr. Goolsbee, who was a CEA member during Romer’s tenure, would be useful in providing a more in-depth assessment of this argument.

“UNVARNISHED ANALYSIS”: THE CEA UNDER ALAN KRUEGER

Goolsbee departed as CEA chair in August of 2011 to return to his academic post at the University of Chicago, making the way for Alan Krueger to be nominated. For over a year before that point, Krueger had been serving as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Economic Policy. He had originally stepped down from that position to resume his academic work at Princeton University but agreed to come on as CEA chair. He was eventually confirmed in November of 2011. Krueger, although an administration official, did not have the long personal history with the president that Goolsbee possessed. Although he played a sizeable role in policy discussions, former White House staff have indicated that the depth of his relationship with the President was closer to that of Romer’s than it was of his successor, Jason Furman.18

Based on a conversation conducted over email with Krueger, the CEA’s day to day responsibilities and the expectations it faced from the rest of the administration did not noticeably differ from when Goolsbee was at the helm. He said that he viewed the primary role of the CEA as “advising the President on economic policy and the state of the economy.”19 As far as what he saw as President Obama’s goals for the CEA, he stated the following:

President Obama made clear what he expects from CEA when he nominated me: "I rely on the Council of Economic Advisers to provide unvarnished analysis and recommendations, not based on politics, not based on narrow interests, but based on the best evidence -- based on what’s going to do the most good for the most people in this country."20

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18 Joshi, email message.
19 Alan Krueger, email message to author, December 13, 2015.
20 Ibid.
The division of labor between the CEA and other actors within the president’s economic policymaking team appear to have remained fairly stable as well under Krueger. He described the interactions of the CEA with other institutions as follows:

- NEC coordinated economic policymaking process. CEA worked with Treasury and OMB on economic assumptions underlying the budget. CEA worked closely with OIRA on regulatory cost-benefit analyses. CEA worked closely with Treasury on housing and tax policy development.\(^{21}\)

Former NEC Director Jeff Zients further confirmed this allocation of responsibilities, which is strikingly similar to what was seen in Nikhil Joshi’s account of the state of affairs under Romer and Goolsbee. Zients had the following to say about the variations in the role of the CEA across chairs:

- I was exposed to Austan Goolsbee, Alan Krueger, and Jason Furman. President Obama likes data, likes expertise, is a consumer of information, and ultimately a decision-maker. All three of them were trusted advisers who presented the President with key information. They all had different styles, but I think that all three were very successful at providing the President with the information and expertise that were needed to make a decision. I didn’t see a lot of variability, actually. I think it was because there was one client, the President. The CEA serves senior decision-makers across the government and particularly in the White House, but the President is the most important client. That client was a consistent consumer of information, a believer in economic analysis, and a crisp decision-maker.\(^{22}\)

**THE SAVVY VETERAN: THE CEA UNDER JASON FURMAN**

Krueger’s successor, Jason Furman, instituted several changes upon his ascension to the chairmanship. Although he became chairman in August of 2013 during President Obama’s second term, Furman was a veteran of the administration and had served on the Obama campaign in 2007 and 2008. According to his predecessor and Ph.D. advisor Greg Mankiw, this experience benefited him tremendously:

- Jason has a long history of working with the Obama team. He’s been working with them since the campaign in 2008. He probably knows the political and legislative apparatus better than most CEA chairs do. Most CEA chairs are nerdy academics like me who come in for a couple years. Jason has spent much more of his career in policy circles and therefore he knows everybody. I had a very steep learning curve in meeting people when I got there. I’m sure it’s to his benefit that he came from that circle. It sure makes it easier to know which meetings you want to get

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\(^{21}\) Ibid.

\(^{22}\) Jeff Zients, interview by author, June 1, 2017.
invited to, to know who you need to talk to if things aren’t going well, know who’s on what side of what issue. I’m sure that his long history with the Obama team is a good thing.\textsuperscript{23}

As a result of this experience, he not only was able to form a deep relationship with the President, but he was also able to be more comfortable in navigating the political landscape of Washington.\textsuperscript{24} Unnamed Source 1, who served as a senior CEA staffer during the Obama administration, said the following about Furman’s political acumen:

I think it’s kind of wrong for CEA Chairman to pretend to know about politics. That said, we’ve had a few exceptions, Jason Furman being the main one. He actually came up through political channels. When he became CEA Chair, he didn’t need to pretend to be a cool kid. He actually was one. And to a lesser extent Austan Goolsbee, who was a Chairman earlier in the Obama administration. He worked for the Obama campaign for a long time and in fact he knew Obama when he was a state senator in Illinois. He was sort of in that group to begin with.\textsuperscript{25}

During his time as chair, Furman described what he saw as the role of the CEA as four-fold:

I conceived the CEA as having four roles: internal policy analysis to help develop an economic agenda and to figure out what should be in the State of the Union, what should be in the budget, how should we respond to different things. External communication, which I thought was a really important part of our role, that we were doing analysis that we were sharing with the public, we were helping to educate the public, helping debates…The third area would be monitoring the macroeconomy…The last thing is I viewed us as a conduit to and from the economics profession.\textsuperscript{26}

Probably the most revealing line of Furman’s quote was the last sentence about serving as a conduit to and from the economics profession. It indicates that the CEA, at least under Furman, saw the economics community as one of its key audiences. This fits in line with what was heard from Joseph Stiglitz as well as Glenn Hubbard about how individuals who work at the CEA are very aware of their reputation with the economics community, a factor that distinguishes it significantly from other institutions within the White House.

As far as division of labor between the CEA and other parts of the President’s economic policymaking team were concerned, most things remained the same. While Furman did take an elevated role in public communications, as seen by comments from former NEC Director Jeff

\textsuperscript{23} Greg Mankiw, interview by author, November 11, 2015.
\textsuperscript{24} Joshi, email message.
\textsuperscript{25} Unnamed Source 1, interview.
\textsuperscript{26} Jason Furman, interview by author, October 4, 2017.
Zients, not much changed in the division of labor between Krueger and Furman. The NEC remained as the “quarterback” of the economic policymaking process, ensuring that debates on policy were held with all of the relevant stakeholders in the administration. According to former CEA Chief of Staff Andrea Taverna, the CEA did the following in that process: “Look at the relevant economic research on whatever topic we’re discussing, sometimes doing our own data analysis, sometimes doing our own modeling, providing estimates or briefings or potential scenarios to that group as an input in their decision-making process.”

In many ways, Furman’s tenure as CEA chair represented a high-water mark for the influence of the CEA chair. According to multiple sources, he would meet at least weekly if not more frequently with the President. He played an outsized role in public communications for the White House. In addition, his depth of experience and political acumen allowed for the CEA to be well positioned to have a seat at the table for every pertinent policy discussion.

THE CEA’S PUBLIC ROLE

As far as the public role of President Obama’s various CEA chairs is concerned, there were notable differences amongst the different chairs. Relative to President Obama’s other CEA chairs, Romer was not utilized frequently by the administration to argue publicly for administration policy. She had the lowest frequency of appearances at White House press briefings of any of President Obama’s CEA chairs. However, she was featured in a YouTube video posted by the President-Elect’s office in January of 2009 to promote the positive job creation effects of the proposed stimulus package. It was the first evidence of a CEA chair ever appearing on a social media site.

Austan Goolsbee, on the other hand, played a much larger public role. Even before becoming CEA Chairman, Goolsbee was a frequent guest on TV programs. During his time as a CEA member, he appeared on the Colbert Report and on The Daily Show with Jon Stewart four times. Ben Smith of Politico called him “an ubiquitous spokesman for the President’s economic policy.” In response to questioning about his numerous public appearances, Goolsbee said the following: “I like defending the president’s policies – he’s on the right track, and there’s a

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27 Andrea Taverna, interview by author, May 24, 2017.
certain level of combativeness from an old debate guy, especially on cable, where they’re into that.”29 As a further sign of his public profile, he was voted as the “Funniest Celebrity in Washington.”30 Upon becoming Chairman, he appeared on Jon Stewart’s show four more times and made a second appearance on Stephen Colbert’s Comedy Central program. Goolsbee also made numerous appearances on social media, conducting 5 YouTube Q&A sessions as well as 8 “White House White Board” segments that appeared on the White House’s YouTube channel.31

Alan Krueger seemed to take a much lower public profile than Goolsbee did during his tenure as CEA Chair. He never delivered a single piece of Congressional testimony and the frequency of news mentions of him was less than half that of Romer and Goolsbee. Although he did host a live YouTube Q&A session, there was no other evidence that he was a social media or public relations expert.32

As seen in his statement on what he saw as the CEA’s roles, Jason Furman believed public communications to be incredibly important for the CEA. During his time as CEA Chair, he started a Twitter account for himself, started a blog for the CEA that he posted to frequently, appeared several times on the White House’s YouTube and Facebook accounts, and made thirty appearances on C-Span’s live programs.33 What really stands out about Jason Furman’s tenure was the sheer quantity of op-eds and white papers released during his time. The CEA under Furman released more white papers online than it did under every previous CEA chair combined, averaging a white paper release every 17 days. The data below, although only showing 10 op-eds, does not account for the numerous pieces he wrote for Vox.com as well as the 71 public

speeches he delivered while he was Chair, according to the Obama White House website archive.\textsuperscript{34}

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**EXPLAINING THE CHAIRMAN-PRESIDENT RELATIONSHIP**

These data points paint a picture of the CEA that can be fairly simply summarized: although the role of the CEA is fairly consistent, its level of influence is largely dependent on who is serving as its chairman. In particular, the CEA’s heavy reliance upon its chairman’s relationship with the president is key for understanding the CEA. The importance of the


\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{41} Author’s note: the frequency of each form of public communication is the aggregate number in the first chart divided by the total tenure of that CEA Chair. A lower number represents more frequent occurrence of that variable. For example, the chart can be read as indicating that a news article mentioning Christina Romer was published on average once every 2.6 days. Further discussion of each of these variables as well as their sources can be found in the Data and Methods chapter.
relationship between the CEA Chair and the president was stressed upon again and again by interviewees. When that relationship is strong, it has led to periods of significant influence for the CEA, such as under Jason Furman. If that relationship is weak, such as it was under Christina Romer, the CEA has had less influence. Unnamed Source 1 said the following about the relationship between the chairman and the president:

> Everything depends on whether we’re powerful or not, whether the CEA Chairman has the ear of the President or not. It depends on the personal relationship between them. There’s nothing automatic about it. And to a lesser extent it depends on the relationship with all the other members economic team and the people who are important in the West Wing... If the CEA Chairman has the ear of the President, everything else falls into place because then all these other White House characters know that they have to listen to the CEA Chairman because the President is listening to the CEA Chair.\(^\text{42}\)

Unnamed Source 1’s statement about “other White House characters” listening to the CEA chair is perhaps the most insightful part of his quote. In order to understand why this is the case, one must remember that the president has limited cognitive processing power. If it is known to actors within the economic policymaking team, who desire to have the information they want to present put in front of the president, that the president has devoted part of his information processing to the CEA chair, that has huge implications.

First, it means that the CEA chair has framing powers, meaning that the president will be viewing subsequent information and data in the context that has been set forth by the CEA chair. The other actors, as a result, have to adjust their information to account for the framing that was created by the CEA chair if they wish for their information to be accepted by the president. In a practical sense, this usually takes the form of ensuring that a policy recommendation holds up to economic theory and analysis. Second, it means that if an actor wants information presented to the president, giving that information to the CEA could serve as a conduit to the president. For instance, if an actor has a policy recommendation, such as a change in the tax code, showing that to the CEA and acquiring their support can greatly increase the chance of the president deciding on that policy if the CEA chair is someone to whom the president listens.

\(^{42}\) Unnamed source 1, interview.
CONCLUSION

The CEA is a fascinating institution whose history should be of great interest to scholars of the American presidency, economics, and policymaking more broadly. What this paper has done is to give insight into just one chapter of that institution’s history, focusing on its role during the Obama administration. Its role remained fairly consistent, with its formal and informal functions, as well as structure, showing little to no change. Its level of influence, however, varied from chair to chair. The level of influence largely depended on the strength of the relationship between the chairman and the president. This is due to both framing effects and information processing restraints that face the president when making decisions.

Going forward, it is my hope that other scholars will continue to study the CEA and document its history. It is intriguing in of itself and examination of it helps one to understand the dynamics that are at play in the Oval Office and in the White House. I hope to contribute to that discussion myself by writing a subsequent paper on the CEA in the George W. Bush administration, about which I have acquired a significant amount of primary source data.
A COMPARISON OF THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND RONALD W. REAGAN

HUNTER ALEXANDER MILLIMAN
University of North Georgia

Economic policy in the United States has gone through various changes over the past century. In the 1930s President Roosevelt ushered in a new economic era of high levels of government involvement in the economy, high levels of taxation, and expansions of government services. These programs sought to combat the Great Depression. In the 1980s President Reagan entered office criticizing government involvement in the economy for high unemployment rates, high inflation rates, and low GDP growth. Under his economic policy of Reaganomics, he cut taxes and government programs in hopes of creating a better economic environment for businesses and individuals. This paper examines both policies and compares their outcomes in relation to unemployment levels and GDP growth and concludes that economic policy is not concrete but rather specific to the times in which it is implemented.

INTRODUCTION

Economic policy in the United States has changed drastically over the course of the past century. As a country we have faced period of high economic turmoil, such as the Great Depression and Great Recession, and all sorts of problems in between. When reflecting back on presidents who touted powerful economic policies, it is easy to think of Franklin Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan. Franklin Roosevelt came to office in wake of the Great Depression promising comprehensive changes in the form of government work programs, social services, and stimulus packages. Ronald Reagan took a drastically different approach, blaming government for the economic issues of the decade leading up to his presidency he touted the idea of free-market, trickle-down economics. With one of these presidents focusing heavily on government involvement in the economy and the other finding government to be the problem, it is helpful to examine the policies they implemented as well as their outcomes so that we may produce the best policies for our economy today.

Before I can begin an extensive examination of the policies of the two, it is important to understand the context in which both came to power and pursued policies. Franklin Roosevelt

came to office at the height of the Great Depression in 1933. Unemployment in 1933 is estimated to have been 24.7% by December and the GDP growth was -1.3% (when converted to 2009 dollars). Just a year prior to taking office, GDP growth was an astounding -12.9%. When examining the economic condition under which Reagan entered office, we find that unemployment was at 7.5% and GDP growth was at 12.2%. GDP growth in the year before Ronald Reagan took office was -0.2%. These numbers tell two different stories about when the presidents took office. For President Roosevelt, it was about rebuilding an economy that had entirely failed. For President Reagan, it was about improving an existing economy.

THE GREAT DEPRESSION, FDR, AND THE NEW DEAL

When Franklin Roosevelt took office in 1933, the country was four years into the Great Depression. People were struggling greatly, poverty was at an all-time high, and Franklin Roosevelt was their last hope. His campaign promise to deliver a New Deal to revitalize the American workers began as soon as he took office. Within his first 100 days, he introduced programs such as the Works Progress Administration, the Civilian Conservation Corps, and various other work agencies within the Federal Government. These programs were accompanied by reforms to banking policies and relief programs for a variety of individuals ranging from farmers to workers. These programs and reforms were extensive, pouring millions of dollars into the economy and workforce. New Deal agencies offered work that many Americans accepted, and from 1933-1934 the Civil Works Administration employed 4.2 million people, or nearly 8% of the entire workforce. The CWA ended operations in 1934 when Roosevelt noticed rises in the costs of goods, but unemployment levels remained high. As a

4 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 “New Deal,” (2018)
8 Ibid.
result, other programs were allocated more funds via the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act which provided over $5 million to create work for some 3.5 million people.\textsuperscript{10}

With the passing of the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act, the “Second New Deal” came into play. Most of the programs under the Second New Deal were responses to attacks by political opponents of Roosevelt. Programs were overhauled and reformed to meet changing demands by the public.\textsuperscript{11} This “new New Deal” as it is sometimes referred had the goal of “additional social reform . . . a reorganized executive branch with enhanced national planning and administrative capability . . . and turned to the “new economics” of compensatory fiscal policy.”\textsuperscript{12} This “new economics” was a distinct shift in American economic policy from traditional laissez-faire practices and towards a government-regulated economy.\textsuperscript{13} This new economic principle was brought to prominence by John Maynard Keynes, and is referred to as Keynesian Economics.\textsuperscript{14} Keynesian Economics focusses on increasing public spending during times of economic recession in order to help economies bounce back up. This practice known as “pump-priming” dominated the 1930s until it failed to prevent a second recession in the latter half of the decade, after which the Federal Government moved towards ‘continuing compensatory public spending’ in which the Federal Government would consistently pump money into the economy as opposed to giving it short bursts of money.\textsuperscript{15} This led to a 7% increase in overall government expenditures as percent of GDP from 1930 to 1940.\textsuperscript{16} This increase in government spending created a need for more government revenue, and in the 1930s President Roosevelt increased the top marginal individual income tax rate to 79% from 63%.\textsuperscript{17}

While President Roosevelt definitely increased government spending for his various New Deal programs, he had a desire to balance the federal budget and decided to cut government spending in 1937.\textsuperscript{18} This, accompanied by the $2 million that was taken out of circulation from

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\textsuperscript{10} Reed C. Rollins and John Naisbitt, “United States,” (2018)
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{13} “New Deal,” (2018)
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} Reed C. Rollins and John Naisbitt, “United States,” (2018)
\end{flushleft}
Social Security taxes, led to the aforementioned recession in 1937. In reaction to this recession, President Roosevelt instated a “spend-lend program” to go towards work programs and public works. The unemployment rate had increased from 14.3% in 1937 to 19% in 1938, and as unemployment increased President Roosevelt’s popularity decreased. He was incapable of maintaining a progressive foothold in Congress with conservative Democrats and Republicans preventing many of his new policies from passing with few exceptions. Of the few new pieces of legislation he managed to get through Congress, the Fair Labor Standards Act and U.S. Housing authority were crucial in that they created a minimum wage and a maximum work week, and provided low-cost public housing.

In addition to his struggles with Congress, President Roosevelt also faced opposition from the Supreme Court. The Court found many New Deal programs to be unconstitutional for going beyond parameters set in the Constitution in regards to regulating industry and commerce. Roosevelt was able to combat Court by proposing his court packing bill which would allow him to appoint six new justices in hopes that they would vote in favor of his programs. While the initiative ultimately failed due to staunch opposition from conservatives in Congress as well as the public, the Court became much more lenient in its rulings on New Deal policies.

Ultimately the New Deal was Franklin Roosevelt’s attempt to rebuild a failed economy and to lift up the American workforce by providing jobs and basic funds. It sought to minimize unemployment with the implementation of various government work agencies such as the CWA and create public safety nets with programs such as Social Security. This shift in economic policy would shape the economic landscape in America for decades, with increased government involvement in the economy as well as a trend to increasing government spending for a variety of social welfare programs. It set a new precedent for fiscal policy in America by giving the

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19 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
Federal Government a permanent role in economic policy. Gone were the days of pure, laissez-faire economics.

**RONALD REAGAN AND REAGANOMICS**

Ronald Reagan took office in January of 1981 touting desires to change the economic system in the United States by reducing the American people’s “reliance upon the Government.” When he assumed office, President Reagan faced increasing inflation, stagnated economic growth, and increasing unemployment. GDP growth in his first year increased from -0.2% to 2.6%, but quickly fell down to -1.9% by his second year in office (in 2009 dollars). This drop in GDP is directly related to a recession that hit the United States from July 1981 through November 1982, and was the result of restrictive monetary policy what was aimed at reducing the high inflation rates that had carried over from the 1970s. When the recession ended in 1982 the policy had achieved its goal, and inflation dropped from 11% to 5%.

While President Reagan attacked inflation early on in his presidency, it was but one of many policies he would begin to enact while in office. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 focused heavily on decreasing taxes and helping both businesses and individuals. From 1981 to 1986 the Reagan administration passed a series of tax cuts, reducing the highest tax bracket from 70% in 1981 down to 50% in 1986 and the lowest tax brackets from 14% to 11%. These cuts in taxes did lead to deficit spending and an increased national debt. President Reagan nearly tripled the national debt by the time he left office in 1989 from $1 trillion to $2.8 trillion. Passing these drastic tax cuts was no easy task for the Reagan administration. The Democrat-controlled Congress was in starch opposition, but following a failed assassination attempt, Congress passed the tax cuts.

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27 “Ronald Reagan”
28 Ibid.
29 United States of America, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “National Economic Accounts”
31 Ibid.
34 “REPORTS”
These tax cuts were the beginning of comprehensive economic reform under President Reagan, with him implementing supply-side economics, which focused on “influencing the supply of labor and goods, using tax cuts and benefit cuts as incentives to work and produce goods.” In conjunction with his tax cuts, Reagan was able to implement comprehensive reform to government agencies, especially those that dealt with social welfare programs. The premise of these reforms was to cut government waste, decrease spending, and reduce reliance on government programs. These changes came under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, and urged agencies to make improvements to address the waste and spending issues raised by President Reagan.

While President Reagan focused on cutting social programs and in many cases succeeded, he did manage to increase the national debt tremendously for the time. Most of this increased spending is attributed to an increased military budget that the Reagan administration carried over from the Carter administration. This would ultimately result in the previously mentioned $1.8 trillion added to the national debt during Reagan’s presidency.

Though President Reagan did increase the national debt (a clear deviation from his principle of minimizing government spending), his cut to social programs and changes in economic policy were met with a fair public approval rating of 55% in 1983. He was able to pass comprehensive tax cuts equating to 25% in cuts while also reducing inflation and overcoming a recession in the early years of his presidency. Ronald Reagan ushered in a new era of conservative economic policy based on supply-side principles that have carried on through today. These policies were implemented at a time of economic stagnation along with high inflation rates and unemployment rates to stimulate the economy. When he left office in 1989, unemployment was at its lowest point since 1974 at 5.4%, and GDP growth was steadily

38 Ibid, 482
remaining near 4% growth.\textsuperscript{43} It was a shift towards laissez-faire economics for the first time since the Great Depression.

**COMPARING THE OUTCOMES OF THE NEW DEAL AND REAGANOMICS**

For the sakes of comparison, we will only compare the first eight years of Roosevelt’s Presidency to Ronald Reagan’s eight years as president. This is due to the latter half of Roosevelt’s time in the White House being dedicated to World War II. During the War, the economy thrived greatly due to the War. It would be an unfair comparison to include the war years or any additional years over eight as Reagan did not have the same advantage. It is also important to note that President Reagan took office in a much more stable time, economically speaking. The economy during Roosevelt’s presidency was much more volatile than that under Reagan. Also as mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the goals of the economic policies were different. President Roosevelt aimed the New Deal at rebuilding the economy, whereas President Reagan’s focus was improving the economy.

As with any economic policy, however, sustainable and steady economic growth is the end goal. President Roosevelt let the government take a much more hands-on approach via government work programs and social welfare programs. He also considerably increased taxes to help fund these programs. President Reagan, on the other hand, focused on reducing government programs, spending, and involvement in the markets. President Reagan cut income taxes by nearly 25% while also addressing concerns of waste and overspending by introducing his Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981.\textsuperscript{44}

As I compare the outcomes of the New Deal and Reaganomics, I will examine unemployment rates and GDP growth. Figure 1.1 shows the December unemployment rates for both Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) and Ronald W. Reagan (RWR) for their first 8 years in office. Figure 1.2 shows GDP growth chained to 2009 dollars.


What can be seen immediately in Figure 1.1 is that unemployment under both presidents was declining. In regards to unemployment levels under President Roosevelt, it is obvious the decline is directly correlated to the introduction of government work agencies such as the CWA and CCC. When it comes to the steady decline in unemployment during Reagan’s Presidency, this is more likely due to increased private sector jobs, as his tax cuts would leave more funds in private businesses. Another key point to examine is the change in unemployment from year one to year eight for each president. President Roosevelt was able to cut unemployment by 10.3% in his first eight years in office. Again this ties into his government work programs, where the

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46 United States of America, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “National Economic Accounts”
CWA alone employed 8% of the workforce in the years it operated. President Reagan, on the other hand, cut unemployment from 8.5% to 8.3% in his eight years in office.

This graph shows that ultimately both the New Deal and Reaganomics were capable of reducing unemployment rates, however, by the end of his eighth year President Roosevelt still had very high levels of unemployment. Unemployment would not drop below 10% until 1941 following the Pearl Harbor attack which brought the United States into the Second World War. It is difficult to discern whether unemployment levels would have continued to decline at the rather quick rate they had for his first eight years, as American involvement in WWII minimized unemployment in the 1940s. President Reagan’s legacy on unemployment is easier to examine as unemployment after he left office remained relatively constant with few exceptions, such as the recession in the early 1990s and the Great Recession that started in 2009. Before the Great Recession hit in 2009, unemployment levels only exceeded 6% four times.

When examining GDP growth, it is obvious President Roosevelt was able to reach higher levels of growth than President Reagan. Where a distinction can be made is that under President Roosevelt, GDP growth seemed much less consistent than under President Reagan. Also, WWII greatly boosted GDP growth following the first eight years of Roosevelt’s Presidency. Following the war, GDP growth fell to -11.6% in 1946 before bouncing back up to 8.7% in 1950. Following 1951, GDP growth began a slow downward trend that eventually led to the stagflation of the 1970s and ultimately President Reagan’s election to office. While in office, President Reagan was capable of maintaining steady GDP growth, but after he left office GDP growth slowed again. GDP growth after Reagan’s Presidency has surpassed the 4.2% growth he left office with only three times since he left office in 1989, most years GDP growth has been less than 3%.

49 United States of America, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Unemployment Rate”
50 Ibid.
51 United States of America, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “National Economic Accounts”
CONCLUSION

The New Deal and Reaganomics are distinctly different economic policies. The New Deal under President Roosevelt pushed for heavy government involvement in the markets, reducing unemployment, and rebuilding the failed American economy. Reaganomics under President Reagan criticized government involvement in the economy and even cited it as the cause of stagflation. Ronald Reagan focused on cutting taxes and government agencies to free up the markets and allow them to dictate the economy in hopes that it would revitalize the stagnant economic situation in America. It is apparent that neither economic principle achieved its ultimate goal of creating a long-term, robust American economy. The economy under President Roosevelt hardly improved until the United States of America entered WWII, and President Reagan was incapable of creating long lasting economic growth and maintaining minimal unemployment. That being said, while both presidents were in office their economic policies did do some good. President Roosevelt managed to cut unemployment down to 14.6% from 24.9% and create several years of intense GDP growth. President Reagan cut taxes by nearly 25% cut unemployment rates to below 6% and boost GDP growth to above 4%. All of these are successes by the standards of the time in which the two men were presidents.

The difficult task for our government is to discern what to do in different economic times. Are we trying to rebuild our economy, or are we trying to improve our economy? Which economic policies will benefit the most people at lowest cost? How much government involvement should there be in the economy? These questions obviously have no concrete answer, and lead to many heated political arguments that we have today. I believe the key takeaway from this research is just that point: there is no concrete answer. Both of these policies had profound influences over the American economy that are still in place today, and neither policy is wrong nor is either one right. It is up to the government with the support of the public to determine which economic principles will do the most economic good during that specific time.

It is hard to think that implementing Reaganomics in the 1930s would have ended the Great Depression.

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53 United States of America, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “National Economic Accounts”
56 United States of America, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “National Economic Accounts”
Depression, as the government work programs gave millions of people money to pay for necessities such as food for their families. Conversely, it is hard to see the New Deal being implemented in the 1980s to combat stagflation and government waste. Economic policy is a very time specific thing. There is no one policy that will be perfect forever.
CONSTRUCTING THE DRUG WAR: ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP IN SHAPING POLICY AND PUBLIC OPINION

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Drugs have played a major part in American foreign and domestic affairs for nearly a century. This paper aims to explore the historical underpinnings of the War on Drugs, and illustrate that presidents have demonstrated discriminatory reactions to drug epidemics throughout the 20th and 21st century. This work pays particular attention to the influential role that Republicans have had in shaping public opinion surrounding the nature of drugs use and the populations that use them. Through the use of a most-similar case analysis, the Nixon, Reagan, and Trump administrations are explored to reveal a dichotomy of drug-related rhetoric based on race. The socio-political implications of using racially charged rhetoric are explored, showing a trenchant ability to permeate the media and public opinion. Finally, this paper illuminates Trump’s divergence from traditional Republicans on the topic of drug abuse due to the current racial composition of the opioid epidemic.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

Prohibition Imbedded in U.S. Policy and Attitudes

Drugs have been an issue in American politics for a long time. Substance abuse is deeply engrained in the history of the United States, and its prevalence stretches back to the formation of our nation. The strong temperance movements that emerged during the 19th century, combined with the increasing availability of opium derivatives and cocaine, set the foundation for a prohibitive mentality to emerge. As early as the 1910s, campaigns to criminalize drugs took a racial dimension. A set of New York Times articles published in 1914 propagated facts about the dangers of drugs by almost always propelling the myth of a racial threat, stating that cocaine “complicated the negro problem of the South” and that the “cocaine crazed negro brain” incited attacks on white women.¹ Following these reports, Congress passed the Harrison Act of 1914, the first federal ban on non-medical narcotics, including cocaine.

From 1920-1933, the Eighteenth Amendment prohibited the manufacture and sale of alcohol. Although repealed, the failure of alcohol prohibition left behind a number of institutional structures and individuals that allowed the prohibitive mentality to linger. In 1930, Harry Anslinger was appointed the first commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN), an agency that has since evolved into the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). Many agents, including Anslinger, were former prohibition agents, which serves to explain the rise of punitive tactics. Acting as the nation’s first drug czar, Anslinger formed an alliance with William Randolph Hearst, a newspaper tycoon who used his knowledge of mass psychology to sensationalize stories of drugs and fabricate public opinion.2

Prior to the 1930s, both cannabis and hemp were widely tolerated in the United States. The plant was a major cash crop in the southern United States and rivaled cotton as a major industrial product. However, the Mexican Revolution and the influx of Mexican immigrants into the United States provided Anslinger the perfect opportunity to advance his agency’s agenda by praying on the public’s fears. From 1933-1937, Anslinger and his team launched a massive offensive on cannabis. Anslinger vituperated minorities and published an article titled *Marijuana – Assassin of Youth* to bolster public support for punitive drug measures. The article depicts a number of stories that connect marijuana use to “cases of murder and degenerate sex attacks,” thus vilifying users, associating drug use to fringe populations, and urging states to take action.3 Newspapers across the nation took hold of the FBN’s direction. Stories of the marijuana menace filled the headlines, reporting egregious stories and making unfounded claims about the drug’s effects.4

Anslinger’s use of propaganda was extremely effective, and in 1937, Congress passed the Marijuana Tax Act, criminalizing the drug at the federal level. The persecution paradigm only intensified moving forward. The Boggs Act 1952 and the Narcotics Control Act 1956 both increased punitive measures and instituted mandatory minimum sentences for marijuana possession, and both occurred under Anslinger’s rule.5

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3 Anslinger, Harry. "Marijuana-Assassin of Youth." February 1937
5 "A Summary of Historical Events." Schaffer Library of Drug Policy.
In all, Anslinger’s scare tactics worked, and in fact, they continue to influence the War on Drugs today. Anslinger’s publicity campaign, coupled with biased media reporting, successfully deceived the public into thinking that drugs needed to be ousted by any means necessary. His tactics standardized the U.S method of combating substance abuse. The use of demagogic tactics to demonize a minority, sensationalize the effect of drugs, and garner support for harsh anti-drug legislation would become a centerpiece of future anti-drug efforts. Indeed, fear mongering on the threat of illicit drugs tends to be incredibly effective at swaying public opinion.

The history of the United States’ early drug policies is one that should not be overlooked. Anslinger’s influence over federal drug policy rivals the legacy of any president to date. His thirty-plus year reign at the Federal Bureau of Narcotics created a culture of persecution and incarceration. His tactics, although more implicitly applied, would become the basis of the modern War on Drugs, and his vestige would build the culture behind mass incarceration.

*Presidential Leadership and the Modern Drug War*

The reigns to the drug war shifted to the president following Richard Nixon’s 1968 presidential campaign. The cultural revolution that occurred during his presidency represented a strict departure from the conservative American values he had hoped convey. Nixon’s opponents all had one thing in common: drugs. Nixon’s anti-drug obsession was fueled by prejudiced undertones for this exact reason.6

When he found himself in the Oval Office, he was tasked with enforcing the tough-on-crime language he employed during his campaign. In 1971, Nixon formally declared war on drugs in a speech to Congress. “Drug abuse,” the President said, was “public enemy number one.”7 He claimed that the problem of drug abuse had “assumed the dimensions of a national emergency,” even though it only represented a miniscule public health problem.8 Nevertheless, the White House rhetoric quickly became filled with the “us vs. them” language employed during Anslinger’s anti-marijuana crusade.9 The administration’s anti-drug crusade was

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6 Baum, Dan. "Legalize It All." Harper's magazine.
8 Baum, *Smoke and Mirrors*, 21.
9 Ibid.
successful, and this set an enduring foundation for the punitive drug measures that would emerge later. Drugs rose to the top of the public’s list of concerns, and the efforts to combat it began assuming a racial dimension.

Following the Watergate scandal, public and governmental concern for the drug war weaned. The draconian attitudes towards drugs and drug policies that were established during Nixon’s reign began to fade in certain parts of the country. Decriminalization efforts started to take shape, and President Ford expressed some interest in this approach. This resulted in a growing political consensus which supported the notion that persecuting drug users was ineffective. However, Ford maintained an unwavering stance on drug traffickers, instituting additional mandatory minimum sentences for distributors.

The Carter administration continued the pattern of leniency by actively supporting the decriminalization of marijuana and emphasizing harm reduction strategies for other drugs. Like Ford, Carter continued to focus on punitive measures for drug distributors, but insisted that users be treated differently. The public health-based measures taken during the Ford and Carter administrations were some of the last to be mentioned until recently. Political scandals and weak leadership, coupled with a host of adverse social and economic hardships, gave rise to the staunch conservative movement, effectively ending any leniency towards drug users.

By 1979, the conservative movement had taken grip in America, and Ronald Reagan burst onto the scene as a powerful Republican candidate with an ability to appeal to American values. Similar to Nixon, Reagan ran a campaign focused on law and order, and drugs quickly became a centerpiece of his presidency. Playing on nationalist sentiments, Reagan announced from the White House lawn that “we’re running up a battle flag” on the problem of drug abuse. When Reagan officially declared war on drugs to Congress in 1982, public opinion on the matter was limited. However, Nancy Reagan’s “Just Say No” campaign bolstered the voice of the Parents Movement, and set in motion a resurgence of media drug coverage.

The emergence of crack cocaine in inner cities across America coincided perfectly with the anti-drug efforts of Ronald and Nancy Reagan. It also coincided with an unsympathetic conservative political climate and a public that vehemently opposed drug use. The Reagan

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10 Ibid, 87.
11 Ibid, 95.
12 Baum, *Smoke and Mirrors*, 166.
antidrug campaign, combined with media’s erroneous reporting, resulted in an outpouring of hyperbolic claims about the drug’s effects and prevalence.\textsuperscript{13} Combined together, the alignment of these socio-political conditions gave rise to a drug hysteria that captivated the nation. The resonating images that emerged out of the crack epidemic paved the way for the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act in 1986, and the mass incarceration that ensued. By the end of Reagan’s term, zero tolerance policies exemplified good leadership, and the executive branch became tasked with guiding anti-drug legislation.

The George H.W. Bush administration continued to deepen drug interdiction efforts. In his first televised speech as president, Bush appeared in the Oval Office with a bag of crack cocaine, stating that “our most serious problem today is cocaine and, in particular, crack.”\textsuperscript{14} He immediately called for tough law enforcement to combat the drug problem, and justified the use of the death penalty and armed forces in extreme cases. His allocation of funds towards law enforcement, rather than treatment programs, reflected this rhetoric.

Following Bush’s tenure in office, the tough-on-crime model had become the prevailing ideology on both sides of the aisle. For 12 years, Republican leadership had shaped political discourse surrounding the criminalization and persecution of drug users and traffickers. These sustained efforts had a remarkable impact in influencing public opinion, and any candidate that had hopes of getting elected during this time had to embrace a similar mentality. Bill Clinton did just that. Once elected, Clinton championed the seemingly bipartisan “three-strike rule,” which extended mandatory minimums for repeat offenders.\textsuperscript{15} He continued to work off of these anti-drug/anti-crime sentiments to guide his agenda. In the following years, Clinton ended traditional welfare programs, barred drug offenders from public housing assistance, and continued to alienate drug users through prohibitive policies.

George W. Bush continued to reinforce the dangers that drugs posed on society, but reiterated his messages more humanely. In particular, he pointed to the increase of drug usage among high-school students, and pushed for the implementation of drug testing and drug education in schools. Interestingly, Bush often used faith-based messages to recount his own struggles with alcohol, pointing to a sympathetic shift that occurred during his time in office.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid, 163.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid, 288.
President Obama initiated a major shift in the conceptualization of the drug war. Drug policy reform was a centerpiece of his campaign, and remained an emphasis during his tenure in office. Obama worked to reverse the discriminatory mandatory minimum sentences that were a centerpiece of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act. In 2010, the passage of the Fair Sentencing Act reduced the disparity between the amount of crack cocaine and powder cocaine needed to trigger federal penalties from 100:1 to 18:1. This reformative legislation also eliminated the mandatory minimum sentences attached to simple possession of crack cocaine. Beyond policy reform, Obama varied remarkably from other presidents both in his language and attitudes towards drugs. His honesty about his own drug use continued to change the ways people thought about drug users, furthering the sympathetic responses that were taking shape during the time.

Currently, the Trump administration has demonstrated conflicting narratives on the issue of drug abuse. In 2017, President Trump declared the opioid epidemic as a national public health emergency, and called on his administration to devote time, effort, and money to combat the issue. Yet, in his 2018 State of the Union Address, Trump only mentioned opioids once, citing overdose statistics, but emphasizing that “we must get much tougher on drug dealers and pushers if we are going to succeed in stopping this scourge.” Recently, President Trump and Attorney General Jeff Sessions have adamantly supported the persecution of drug traffickers, and embraced the use of the death penalty for large-scale distributors. How this administration chooses to treat drug users will be extremely telling of our progression as a society. Many questions remain on the current administration, but the tough-on-crime rhetoric seems to be reemerging as a solution to stop the incidence of drug use and trade.

REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP AND THE DRUG WAR

Since the inception of the drug war, the executive branch has retained prominence in guiding anti-drug policy efforts, as well as attitudes towards drug use. With the exception of

17 "Fair Sentencing Act." American Civil Liberties Union.
20 Breuninger, Kevin. "Attorney General Sessions Outlines When to Use Death Penalty on Drug Traffickers." CNBC.
President Clinton, Democrats and Republicans have exhibited conflicting views on the drug problem. Through the efforts of Nixon and Reagan, Republicans effectively built a culture of persecution regarding drugs. The draconian policies that emerged during these presidencies is indicative of punitive attitudes created by the combination of harsh political rhetoric and media sensationalization. Until President Obama, Democrats remained relatively powerless in dictating the direction of anti-drug policies. However, Obama’s efforts demonstrated a pronounced move away from the salient persecution paradigm. Trump has adopted the views of both sides, but varies from traditional Republicans in his treatment of drug users. This section analyzes the similarities of the Nixon, Reagan, and Trump administrations, and suggests that Trump’s divergence away from traditional Republicans is due to the demographic makeup of the current opioid epidemic.

Nationalism and its Relationship to Drug Use

Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and Donald Trump all exhibit a number of striking similarities that defined their presidential campaigns as well as their time in office. Each candidate appealed to a conservative constituency through the use of a nationalist rhetoric, and continued to make use of polarizing language throughout his time in the White House.

Richard Nixon was elected president during a time when American’s were deeply divided over social issues and foreign affairs. The Civil Rights Movement, Vietnam War, and counterculture posed themselves as major obstacles to politicians on both sides. Drugs became a major vehicle through which Nixon could attack his political enemies. His boisterous personality allowed him to highlight the disarray among youthful war protesters, hippies, and people of color by publicizing their drug use and violence. The political dialogue and media coverage began combining stories of heroin and marijuana, vilifying those involved with either drug and assuming a racial dimension as well. Nixon’s effort to mold public opinion was further strengthened by FBI crime statistics that propelled the notion of the black criminal. As Baum notes, “black murder was an image that stuck. So did the image of the black junkie.”21 This reinforced the notion of a dangerous other that needed to be persecuted, and proved incredibly effective at sparking public concern over the drug problem.

21 Baum, Smoke and Mirrors, 4.
Ronald Reagan came into office during a similar period of social and economic hardship. By stressing law and order and attacking welfare systems, it was clear that Reagan meant to appease the same constituency as Nixon.\textsuperscript{22} He frequently made use of implicitly racist terms during his run for presidency, citing “welfare queens” and criminal “predators” as a major cause for the country’s hardships, and calling for punitive measures to combat crime.\textsuperscript{23} Within the first year of his presidency, Reagan employed one of his most effective rhetorical tools, painting crime and drug abuse as “ultimately a moral dilemma.”\textsuperscript{24} In doing so, Reagan reconceptualized the source of social problems in America by vesting the root of drug abuse in the individual, rather than the greater societal forces in play. When crack cocaine emerged, the notion of a dangerous other was already in full effect, resulting in the explosion of violent media coverage, harsh law enforcement measures, and punitive policies that unfairly targeted minorities.

Donald Trump’s presidential run was marked by a similar cultural divide. His campaign was saturated with nationalist messages meant to garner the support of the same conservative constituency that defined the Nixon and Reagan presidencies. Trump has made frequent use of alienating language directed towards minorities, but has generally avoided associating derogatory terms with drug users. Instead, Trump has reiterated the severity of opioid abuse on public health. The nature of the opioid epidemic as well as its demographic makeup explains this mentality shift.

\textit{The Opioid Epidemic and the Republican Constituency}

The opioid epidemic represents a departure from conventional drug problems in America. The current epidemic was created out of the irresponsibility of doctors and pharmaceutical companies who either overlooked or lied about the high addictive potential of opioids. The manifestation of this crisis also varies from previous drug epidemics in that opioid users are majority white and middle class.\textsuperscript{25} This combination of factors has spurred sympathetic responses from politicians and media outlets alike.

\textsuperscript{22} Alexander, \textit{The New Jim Crow}, 51.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} Baum, \textit{Smoke and Mirrors}, 150.
\textsuperscript{25} The Kaiser Family Foundation. Opioid Overdose Deaths by Race and Ethnicity.
Regardless of political orientation or ethnicity, opioids have adversely affected the lives of millions of Americans, and represent one of the United States’ most pronounced public-health crises to date. However, conservative America has been hit especially hard by this epidemic. The white, conservative constituency of the Nixon, Reagan, and Trump presidencies are now some of the heaviest afflicted by opioid dependency and drug addiction. Only now are drug users receiving the attention that they need. Although the Trump administration seems to remain draconian on drug traffickers, Republicans have clearly altered their approach to users of drugs. This sympathetic shift in tone may suggest a conscious effort by Republicans to help these populations which compose a large portion of their constituency.

“US VS THEM” LANGUAGE GUIDING SOCIAL RESPONSES TO DRUG USE

Until the turn of the 21st century, drug use was generally viewed as a phenomenon isolated to particular racial or economically disadvantaged groups. Decades of alienating language directed towards drug users gave rise to a powerful “us vs. them” dialogue surrounding the nature of drug use and the populations that use them. Furthermore, the disproportionate focus on minority drug users in socio-political discourse helps explain why arrest rates, unlawful searches and seizures, and incarceration rates among people of color have skyrocketed, despite the fact that drug use occurs at similar rates across racial groups. The opioid epidemic has started to illuminate the dichotomy of treatment based on race. Treatment models have become the prevailing solution to opioid abuse, whereas punitive models used to dominate discourse over crack cocaine. This shift in political rhetoric is telling of the” us vs. them” mentality still permeating society.

As demonstrated above, presidents have addressed the drug problem in varying ways, largely based on party orientation. The anti-drug efforts during the Nixon and Reagan administrations were all built upon the “us vs. them” mentality that demonizes drug users through the use of harsh, racially charged political language. Republicans left behind a vestige of persecution that Democrats have been unable to reverse, largely due to their control of the media and ability to construe public opinion.

26 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Results from the 2013 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Summary of National Findings.
The correlation between presidential attention to the drug problem and media coverage of drugs during this period is striking. Whitford and Yates analyzed the *Public Papers of the President* for any mention of the drug problem, finding spikes consistent with the anti-drug crusades of the past, namely during the Nixon and Reagan presidencies (see Figure 1). Furthermore, the authors catalogued the media’s devotion to the drug problem during the same time (See Figure 2).

![Figure 1: Presidential Attention to Narcotics](image_url)

**Figure 1: Presidential Attention to Narcotics**


Together, these figures demonstrate a highly correlated relationship between the president’s language and the media’s coverage of politically charged topics. This relationship is not surprising, but the tonal shift in coverage following the emergence of crack in inner-city communities is extremely telling of the racial vilification that occurred in the late 1980s. While crack constituted a serious problem in many cities across the nation, the coverage it received only seemed to propel racial stereotypes of a dangerous other. In fact, a study of news coverage of the time found that cocaine became increasingly associated with people of color during Reagan’s time in office.29

 Reeves and Campbell describe the adoption of a “siege paradigm” during this time, which continued to perpetuate the “us vs. them” mentality present in previous drug crusades.30 The nightly news became infatuated with violent, drug related content. By depicting dilapidated households, famished children, and dark-skinned addicts, the media portrayed the situation in impoverished inner-city communities as other worldly. This deliberate fear mongering tactic had a lasting impact on the public’s mental image of a drug user. A study conducted nine years after

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29 See Reeves and Campbell, Cracked Coverage, Figure 5: Changing Demographic Profile of Anonymous/Pseudonymous Drug Transgressors, 66.
the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act found that when people were asked to envision a drug user, 95% pictured black person, truly confirming the Reagan legacy.  

The current opioid epidemic perfectly demonstrates the dichotomy of coverage based on race. The sheer prevalence of opioid dependency, addiction, and overdose deaths paints the picture of a national crisis, and the media has treated it as such. Major news outlets commonly report on statistical evidence that demonstrates the devastating impact opioids have had on mortality rates, citing drug overdoses as the leading cause of accidental deaths. The media’s public health focus, combined with Trump’s declaration of the opioid epidemic as a national public health emergency, has shifted public opinion on drug interdiction. Today, 76% of the public agrees that the problem of prescription opioid abuse is a serious public health problem. Additionally, public opinion regarding the role of government has shifted, with 67% of the public now wanting the government to provide treatment to illegal drug users.

The “us vs. them” mentality that has been present in the drug war since its inception continues to play a major role today. Opioid users are majority white, while crack cocaine users were majority black. Historically, the president’s reaction to each group, respectively, illustrates that drugs associated with whites are met with sympathy and medicalization, while drugs associated with people of color are met with harshness and criminality. Today’s situation is no exception; it only represents an ideological and demographical shift in the “us vs. them” dialogue. Before, drugs were associated with extremist, fringe, minority groups. Now, they permeate all populations, namely white people. The alienating language of previous anti-drug campaigns has vanished due to the fact that white users comprise the majority of the current epidemic.

President Trump varies from traditional Republicans in his political rhetoric pertaining to drug abuse. Instead of demonizing drug users, his health-focused language suggests our treatment of drug users is progressing away from punitive measures and towards medical-based

treatment models. However, Jeff Sessions continues to reinforce the tough-on-crime rhetoric that is characteristic of previous Republicans. Additional research should continue to document the Trump administration’s rhetoric on the nature of drug use and the treatment of drug users. To summarize, the relationship between presidential rhetoric, media coverage, and ability to influence public opinion on the drug problem is extremely complex, and this paper does not adequately address the sheer multitude of confounding variables in play. However, the historical examination of early prohibitive policies as well as the highly correlated relationship between presidential language and media coverage outlined in this paper illustrates an important finding. This suggests that the “us vs. them” (i.e. racialized) language that has permeated the War on Drugs for decades has continually influenced public opinion on the matter. As our society continues to entrench itself in the information age, this relationship warrants further attention as it carries a number of implications for whom our society deems worthy of treatment, rehabilitation, and sympathy.
Part 4

Foreign Policy & National Security
Should I Stay or Should I Go? United States Foreign Policy and Support for Secessionist Movements Abroad

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The track record of United States’ intervention in and recognition of secession movements is, at best, inconsistent. Presidents from Woodrow Wilson to Barack Obama have often said that self-determination is a “peculiarly American idea,” while simultaneously limiting its practical “scope and meaning.” Cases throughout administrations since Wilson’s Presidency show that national security is more predictive of United States intervention and recognition; geopolitics plays a more significant role in influencing decision-making than moral concerns, except where moral concerns overlap with security considerations. A combination of internal and external factors impact the strategic concerns in U.S. support or denial to assist secessionist movements. This paper will explore the Bangladesh and Kosovo cases using the “Biggest Neighbor” framework in order to identify consistent factors that lead presidents to recognize the legitimacy of secessionist movements, either by diplomatic acknowledgement or commitment of military forces. I will then analyze U.S. adaptation of the One China Policy as an example of successful balancing without recognizing a secessionist group. Using the same framework and taking lessons from Taiwan, I will then make predictions and recommendations for U.S. policy towards a Kurdish state in the contexts of a Trump Presidency and the fight against the Islamic State (ISIS).

INTRODUCTION

Former President Clinton once argued that if the United States set a precedent of support for secessionist groups abroad, “we might have 800 countries in the world and have a very difficult time having a functioning economy or a functioning global polity.” And yet, despite his and others’ hesitation, the history of United States intervention in and recognition of secession movements has proven to be inconsistent. Presidents throughout administrations have often said that self-determination is a “peculiarly American idea,” while simultaneously limiting its practical “scope and meaning.” The United States has intervened militarily, economically, or diplomatically in support of certain secessionist groups, while limiting similar support or recognition, either formal or informal, to others. This paper will explore the cases of Bangladesh and Kosovo in order to determine the internal and external factors that lead to decisions to

intervene in support of a seceding group or recognize the seceding state diplomatically. I will argue that external geopolitical and security concerns override moral obligations to intervene on behalf of an ethnic minority, domestic ethnic connections, and public opinion, regardless of the administration in office. I will then analyze the potential for U.S. support for an independent Kurdish state behind the Iraqi Kurdish population. While concrete or official support for Kurdish secession is unlikely, a more nuanced approach could limit tensions in the Middle East. The United States’ adoption of the One China Policy is an example of successful balancing without recognizing a secessionist group. Using the same framework and taking lessons from Taiwan, I will make recommendations for U.S. policy towards a Kurdish state in the context of a Trump presidency and the fight against the Islamic State (ISIS).

SIGNIFICANCE/DEFINING SECESSIONISM

Secessionism can be defined as a “formal withdrawal from a central political authority by a member unit or units on the basis of a claim to independent sovereign status.”3 According to Hechter, secessionist movements are above all “disputed claims to territory,” with primarily ethnic underpinnings. Since the close of the Second World War and the rise in debates on the rights of post-colonial states to national self-determination under international law, secessionist movements have become an increasingly important issue in international affairs, with the potential to destabilize world order. Between 1945 and 1996, the number of nation-states rose from 45 to 185.4 The wave of nation-states created through national self-determination and secessionist movements in the last century has not been peaceful; approximately 171 member states in the United Nations reported that secession had caused violent political conflict within their borders.5 Consequently, the rise in secessionist movements has the potential to drastically destabilize the international system.

There is no cohesive framework that determines the legitimacy of groups attempting to secede from a given state. The 1960 UN Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People gives an automatic right of self-determination to colonial entities.6 While

non-colonial secessionist movements constitute the majority of modern movements for independence, international law has remained ambiguous in regards to the rights of non-colonized people to secede from a central authority. For example, the Kosovo Advisory Opinion by the International Court of Justice found that the Kosovar’s decision to unilaterally secede did not violate international law, but did not comment on the legitimacy of its claim to independence. Despite this legal ambiguity, Kosovo is recognized by 114 members states in the United Nations, showing that recognition relies highly on external recognition in an extra-judicial sense.

Lacking a definitive framework in which a minority group can pursue legitimacy as an independent state, some scholars argue secessionist movements depend on the intervention and/or recognition of third-party states to successfully separate from the host state and to maintain control of the territory in question. Analysts have argued that “foreign support to secessionist groups is the determining factor in the success or failure of secession.” Seceding groups with recognition of other states in the international system are able to make treaties, become members of intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations and the World Bank, and can bring perceived grievances to the International Court of Justice, showing that external recognition is a requirement to a secessionist movement’s participation in the international system.

It is arguably more significant to gain the recognition of a great power, given its ability to sway other states in the secessionist movement’s attempts to attain a “critical mass” of external recognition. This is particularly significant in analyzing the foreign policy of the United States, which was a rising power in the post-Cold War period. Scholars have typically seen support for secessionist movements as “a cornerstone of post-1945 United States foreign policy,” which is consistent with United States’ history of anti-colonialism.

Yet, in practice, support for secessionist movements has often been limited and paradoxical. For instance, Woodrow Wilson, whose Fourteen Points Speech established

7 Ibid 9.
8 Ibid 10.
11 Bridget Coggins. “Secession, Recognition, & The International Politics of Statehood.” 46
12 Ibid ii.
postcolonial self-determination as a human right in the eyes of the United States, once argued that “unrestrained right of self-determination” would have “potentially destabilizing consequences,” claiming that there existed a “necessity that its availability be limited.”

Similarly, Wilson recognized that ethnic violence arising in secessionist conflict “often overflows into neighboring countries, consequently jeopardizing the very walls of the nation-state system.” In this way, even a president characteristically supportive of seceding groups also recognized the potentially catastrophic security effects of unrestricted state creation. Similarly, contemporary social scientists have consistently viewed state secession as a “Pandora’s box” that could lead to “state fragmentation, genocide, or the proliferation of states too small or too primitive to merit self-government.” Former President Richard Nixon submitted a report to congress in 1972 that simultaneously established self-determination as a principle of United States policy and as a “perilous” concept.

Understanding contemporary presidents’ uneasiness to support secessionist movements abroad is particularly interesting given the United States’ own history with domestic secession; in the midst of the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln argued that allowing a region to secede would open a door “in which secession is increasingly seen as the answer to political problems,” increasing instability. And yet, despite this hesitation, the United States has intervened or otherwise supported a number of secessionist movements.

Recognition can be defined as “an acknowledgement of or a perception of a phenomenon or condition.” Most actors in foreign policy note that recognition is a formal process and is not inferred by the extension of diplomatic privileges, the signing of treaties, or the direct provision of aid. This paper will understand state recognition in this way, but will not understate the value of diplomatic provisions or economic and military support, as extending support often allows a secessionist movement to operate like a formally recognized state in the international

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17 Ibid.
19 Ibid 51.
20 Ibid.
system. For this reason, this paper will consider cases where the United States has provided material or diplomatic resources or official recognition as supported by the United States.

**THE “BIGGEST NEIGHBOR” FRAMEWORK**

In *The Management of Ethnic Secessionist Conflict: The Big Neighbor Syndrome*, Navaratna-Bandara argues that external factors are more determinative of the success or failure of a secessionist movement. In particular, Navaratna-Bandara cites the importance of the “Big Neighbor” in intervening on behalf of secessionist groups. He defines the “Big Neighbor” as a neighboring state which is “relatively larger, by any meaningful measure, and which has the capability to intervene in the affairs of the secession-affected country by economic, political, or military means,” but which is not necessarily a great power or hegemon.21 His hypothesis follows that the Big Neighbor will be more likely to intervene in a variety of ways if the following conditions are met: common strategic resources, common security zone, common territorial boundary, and ethnic ties with some part of the affected country. The United States has often used military forces abroad to protect U.S. citizens or promote national interests. As a global hegemon, the United States could be considered the “Biggest Neighbor,” intervening in secessionist movements abroad to protect its national interests even where the affected country is not geographically proximal to the United States.

I will be adapting the “Big Neighbor” framework to analyze the likelihood of U.S. intervention in a number of important ways. Navaratna-Bandara’s hypothesis, while providing a thorough explanation as to why ethnic ties increases the likelihood of diplomatic or political intervention, does not evaluate the diverse domestic determinants beyond shared ethnic identity that can influence the likelihood of a Big Neighbor state committing military or other resources to intervene.

For instance, increasing United States partisanship has influenced debates in humanitarian intervention involving military commitment. Recent scholarship recognizes that while studies have previously focused primarily on the role of elites, and specifically the president, that “it is essential to consider the role of Congress, which has the power to limit the

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use of force by the executive.”22 In many cases, the likelihood of success in humanitarian intervention is low; as a result, the high probability of electoral punishment means that opposition party members will be unlikely to join the president across the aisle. As a result, strategic considerations of the chances of success can influence a state’s desire to commit resources to intervene. Similarly, constituents and other stakeholders’ aversions to or inherent support of intervention abroad is largely informed the by global political context in the period and can influence the likelihood of U.S. involvement independent of ethnic ties.

To account for these additional factors, this paper will analyze a number of internal and external factors that could account for U.S. military or diplomatic support for a secessionist movement. Externally, the international political context, the affected state’s geopolitical position, and the political ideology of involved parties influence the likelihood of support, recognition, or intervention. Domestically, public opinion in the given political context, and the ideology of the executive can play a role in determining United States recognition of the secessionist group or lack thereof. I argue that the degree of oppression the minority group is facing is significant to decision-making insofar as the level of oppression is so great and so publicly known, that it could harm support for the executive domestically or abroad and therefore affect American security. This paper operates with a defensive realist lens and as such, sees that “in anarchy, security is the highest end… the first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their position in the system.”23 I will argue that factors that are relevant to the United States’ security are consistently prioritized over moral or idealistic concerns, except where such concerns influence United States security.

LIMITATIONS

Given the scope of this paper, it is impossible to analyze every secessionist movement to which the United States has granted or refused support. In addition, it is difficult to quantify the degrees to which different concerns mattered in decision-making. As a result, conclusions are not comprehensive but attempt to find broader conclusions across administrations and differing

international contexts on the factors that lead to U.S. support for secessionist groups. In addition, this paper will focus on Clinton’s military intervention in Kosovo rather than Bush’s recognition of the Kosovo state in 2008. The 1999 military intervention proved crucial to Kosovo’s international recognition in 2008.

NIXON AND BANGLADESH

East Pakistan’s secession from West Pakistan to become the modern state of Bangladesh would seem to be a war fought primarily between East and West Pakistan. However, the United States, the Soviet Union, and others became involved in a proxy war due to Cold War interests. The United States under Nixon stood staunchly with West Pakistan, refusing to intervene even as telegrams documenting atrocities committed against primarily Hindu Bengalis were sent to the White House. Some estimate the genocide in East Pakistan to be “bloodier than Bosnia” and in the “same rough league as Rwanda.”

Nixon’s support for West Pakistan under Yahya Khan was driven primarily by Cold War realism; Pakistan had been an ally of the United States since the inception of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization to counter communist influence. Nixon generally said that he found the Pakistani people to be “staunchly anti-communist and pro-American.” His high opinions of Pakistan as a state and Yahya as a leader directly contrasted his distaste for India, which had maintained a “non-aligned but friendly” stance towards the Soviet Union. In a similar way, there was little incentive to support the Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman because Mujibur was an advocate for socialism who would not have been aligned with the United States in the fight against the spread of communism. Furthermore, maintaining a unified Pakistan was important from a geopolitical perspective. Since the loss of East Pakistan “acknowledged India as a major regional power,” Nixon’s desire to maintain a single Pakistani state was quite rational.

A more powerful Pakistani state could balance a Soviet-supported India in the region. The United States also needed strategic relations with China and Pakistan to counter Soviet power in the east, making the Bangladesh Liberation War more of a strategic move for power politics than a situation requiring humanitarian intervention. Kissinger outlined the strategic importance of maintaining a strong unified Pakistan by saying, “we had… every incentive to maintain Pakistan’s goodwill. It was our crucial link to Peking; and Pakistan was one of China’s closest allies.”

Domestically, partisanship also played a role in Nixon’s unwavering support for West Pakistan throughout Operation Searchlight. Considering that Democratic President John F. Kennedy had taken a pro-India line, Nixon saw, “Democratic obsequiousness toward India as a prime example of liberal soft-headedness.” Nixon called popular support for India in America a “psychological disorder,” disliking American admiration for the hippie counter-culture. Similarly, his aversion to Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India at the time of the Bangladesh Liberation War, was partially due to Republican values. An aid of Henry Kissinger said that, “some of this [dislike of India] was a traditional Republican reaction to India and the Indians,” demonstrating that partisan concerns must also be analyzed in the contexts of the security concerns of the time, saying that, “this is the Cold War era, and her left-wing approach to things, her socialist approach, her dalliance with the Russians, made them very, very suspicious of them.” In this way, Hoskinson supports the notion that domestic issues such as partisan politics play an important role in decision-making, but security concerns are always front of mind.

The Bangladesh case is unique in that public opinion and ethnic lobbies have little relevance in Nixon’s decision not to intervene on behalf of the East Pakistanis facing genocide in their attempts to secede from West Pakistan. Secrecy around the atrocities the American consulate in Dacca (known today as Dhaka) was witnessing against a largely Hindu group of East Bengalis prevented direct public dissent of U.S. inaction. In addition, research shows that mainstream news in the United States at the time of the genocide did not put emphasis on the humanitarian aspect of the conflict, instead emphasizing the military dimension. For instance,

30 Hossain 532.
31 Bass 6.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid 12.
The New York Times published stories with a military frame on the conflict using primarily official sources, which tended to pass over the violence individuals were facing, preventing possible public dissent. The media relied on official sources for foreign news and conflict in the Cold War, leading some scholars to believe that Western media became “part of the propaganda of their respective governments in many instances.” It is no surprise, then, that despite popular United States support of India, there was little public dissent that incentivized Nixon to intervene on behalf of the Bengali people.

CLINTON AND KOSOVO

Intervention in Kosovo by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) proved to be critical to the state’s successful move towards independence. Conflict began between primarily ethnically Albanian, Muslim Kosovars against the Serbian state in about 1990. While the group did not successfully achieve secession until 2008, “the international community’s generally positive attitude toward Kosovo’s independence was initiated in part by the US-led military intervention, United States support for Kosovo’s independence, and the disappearance of Soviet power from the Balkan geography.” Considering that United States intervention proved to be catalytic in Kosovo’s international recognition later, it is critical to understand the impetus for NATO’s intervention in general and Clinton’s support more specifically.

The international political context was particularly telling of Clinton’s willingness and ability to intervene; according to some scholars, the post-Cold War context’s more “ambiguous” structure and the U.S. rise to power as a global hegemon “produced expectations that America would use its military force for good.” This is well demonstrated by the fact that in the 234 instances of United States force abroad between 1798 and July 1993, all “exclusively humanitarian” interventions occurred in the early 1990s. The United States was significantly more powerful than all potential adversaries at the end of the Cold War, with an economy approximately 40% larger than its nearest rival and a defense budget equal to the budgets of the

34 Hossain 532.
35 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
six next top-spending states, combined, many of whom were United States allies. Analysts at the time noted that, “the United States leads the world in higher education, scientific research, and advanced technology, which will make it hard for other states to catch up quickly.”\textsuperscript{39} As a result of U.S. preeminence in the post-Cold War period, Clinton had a luxury not afforded to Nixon in determining a possible intervention in Bangladesh.

Despite the clear difference in the international political environment during the Kosovo case due to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, NATO intervention still has roots in the desire to promote security interests abroad. Patrick T. Egan argues that NATO’s intervention had more than humanitarian incentives, writing that “NATO intervened to address what its leaders perceived to be threats to international peace and security in the Balkans region, threats that the UN Security Council affirmed but failed to resolve.”\textsuperscript{40} The real reason for military intervention beyond humanitarian concerns, according to Egan, is the “threat to peace and security in the region” caused by President Milosevic’s attacks on the Kosovar people.\textsuperscript{41} Furthermore, while Clinton had the luxury of sitting as president after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a main goal of his administration was to “dampen security competition and reduce the risk of major war in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East,” because global instability could undermine U.S. hegemony.\textsuperscript{42}

In addition, the Balkans could be considered geopolitically important to the United States because oil travelling to Western Europe must travel through the region. Instability in that area could threaten U.S. economic interests and make the maintenance of U.S. defense more difficult.\textsuperscript{43} In this way, it is clear that even where humanitarian concerns seem to be the primary cause of intervention, they are not often the impetus for action unless there are complementary security concerns underlying idealistic arguments. In a post-Cold War context, “although… various wars and conflicts [post-Cold War] have/had regional dimensions, they are primarily the United States response to the opportunities and challenges opened by the demise of the Soviet

\textsuperscript{39}Stephen M. Walt. “Two Cheers for Clinton’s Foreign Policy.” 2000, 63.
\textsuperscript{41}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{42}Walt, “Two Cheers”: 65.
The disintegration of the Soviet Union was, according to Waltz and other neorealists, an opportunity for NATO states to extend their power and influence into Europe.45

Domestic support for humanitarian intervention abroad also played a significant role in U.S. intervention. For instance, by 1999, approximately two-thirds of American citizens believed that the United States had “a moral obligation to launch attacks on the Yugoslav forces.”46 Largely as a result of a newly unipolar system, the majority of Americans believed that the United States had a responsibility to participate in attempts to stop genocide.47 The 1990s, were in essence, a period where “the notion that human beings matter more than sovereignty radiated brightly, albeit briefly.”48 O’Loughlin and Kolossov write that citing humanitarian concerns was more effective in garnering support for intervention in NATO than arguments about U.S. security interests. Although most of the documented coverage of the reasons for NATO intervention discuss humanitarian concerns, there were underlying security interests at play in United States decision-making.49 This notion of complementary humanitarian and security concerns is well-reflected in Clinton’s speech addressing the nation on the Yugoslavia strike, where he laid out his justification for U.S. intervention: “because we care about saving innocent lives, because we have an interest in avoiding an even crueler and costlier war, and because our children need and deserve a peaceful, stable, free Europe.”50 Clinton elaborated to say that, “by acting now, we are upholding our values, protecting our interests, and advancing the cause of peace,” clearly showing that national security interests are playing an important role even in a conflict primarily identified by its humanitarian needs.51

44 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Weiss 143.
49 Ibid.
50 “Transcript: Clinton Addresses Nation on Yugoslavia Strike - March 24,1999.”
51 Ibid n.p.
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS: A POTENTIAL MODEL IN TAIWAN

As has been previously established in the Bangladesh and Kosovo cases in this paper, security concerns override moral considerations in determining U.S. support for secessionist movements. It is not surprising, therefore, that the United States has not extended formal recognition to Taiwan. The Council on Foreign Relations wrote that, “no relationship will be as important to the twenty-first century as the one between the United States… and China.” Given China’s rapid economic and military growth, as well as its geostrategic position bordering Asia and Russia, its policies have the potential to rapidly destabilize U.S. foreign policy. Appeasing Chinese interests and “managing the rise of China” is therefore a crucial safeguard of U.S. strategic interests. In managing the increasingly stable relationship enjoyed with China, a crucial aspect is respecting its territorial integrity, which Premier Enlai established as one of the “five principles of peaceful growth” in 1954. China’s land disputes in Arunachal Pradesh, Tibet, and Hong Kong, as well as its disputes over islands in the South China Sea, make it impossible for China to cede its territory in Taiwan without consequences for its other land disputes.

Given this need to balance Chinese interest in maintaining the territory of Taiwan, the United States has taken a more nuanced position in maintaining the ambiguity of the One China Policy to carefully balance Taiwanese and Chinese interests. A State Department memo on U.S. relations with Taiwan published in September 2017 writes that, “the United States does not support Taiwan independence,” citing a 1978 Communiqué that established a “One China Policy.” In the context of U.S. foreign policy, the One China Policy has three objectives: maintain positive relations with China, “protect and assist” Taiwan, and prevent war over the Taiwan Strait.

The Communiqué stated that although the official U.S. position would be to consider Taiwan a part of China, that it would “maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial

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55 “Taiwan.” U.S. Department of State.
relations with the people of Taiwan.” While the United States officially ceased to recognize Taiwan with the Communiqué, it maintains an unofficial embassy in the American Institute of Taiwan, provides military equipment to the Taiwanese army, and helps promote Taiwanese democracy.

In this way, the United States has been able to appease China while also providing enough assistance to Taipei that it can remain “functionally independent.” The security concerns incentivizing the United States to deny recognition of Taiwanese independence are clear; former President Barack Obama recently said in reference to U.S.-China relations that “there’s probably no bilateral relationship that carries more significance and… if that relationship breaks down or goes into a full conflict mode… everybody is worse off.” Since the Taiwanese question is critical for China, which has concerns about inspiring secessionist groups in Tibet and other regions, appeasing China on the Taiwan situation is critical to U.S. security interests. Conversely, since Taiwan’s geopolitical position would be a “potential strategic asset for China that could be used as a platform for aggression against… United States interests in the region,” it is in the best interest of the United States to maintain a relatively independent Taiwan without stoking tensions in U.S.-Chinese relations.

America’s version of the One China Policy, then, while “not completely satisfactory to any parties involved, has kept the peace and allowed the Taiwanese to be a pretty successful… people who have a high degree of self-determination,” according to Obama. The case of Taiwan provides a significant lesson in balancing competing interests in U.S. decision-making regarding secession; in using its resources to guarantee relative autonomy without official recognition, the United States has been able to maintain relatively positive relations with China without significantly weakening the Taiwanese state. While not perfect, the model could prove useful in other cases of competing strategic interests, as will be explored in the Kurdistan case below.

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58 Fisher 2016.
59 Ibid.
60 “Obama Says China Would Not Take Change in U.S. Policy on Taiwan.” 2016
61 Fisher 2016.
62 Ibid.
63 Rampton 2016.
PREDICTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR KURDISTAN

The Kurdish people have received increasing attention recently as a result of Kurdish participation in the fight against the Islamic State (ISIS). Kurdish fighters have been critical to assisting the United States in the fight against ISIS, with approximately 160,000 fighters working with the United States as “the sole United States allied force operation on the ground against ISIS in Syria and Iraq.” The Kurdish question is particularly controversial for the United States’ Turkish allies, who consider a Kurdish group in Turkey known as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to be a terrorist organization. The Turkish government has engaged in oppressive practices against Turkish Kurds, banning the word “Kurdistan,” prohibiting the Kurdish language, and attempting to erase the culture. While Turkish relations with Iraqi Kurds historically involve cooperation, Turkey’s threat on Kurdish oil following the Kurdish independence referendum shows its fear of its own ethnic secessionist movement.

Official U.S. recognition of an independent Kurdish state could therefore jeopardize U.S. relations with Erdogan’s Turkey, which are also strategically important in fighting ISIS and maintaining power over Russia. Turkey is geopolitically important to the United States as a state that straddles Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Caspian Sea. Turkey has also provided its military bases for the fight against ISIS, reaffirming its strategic importance in a post-Cold War context. Especially considering the increasingly warming relations between Turkey and Russia under authoritarian leaders Erdogan and Putin, appeasing Turkey is in the best interest of the United States. As a result of this complex set of alliances and geopolitical factors that complicate any U.S. decision to support an independent Kurdistan, scholars have been debating how President Trump should respond to the situation. It is the position of this paper that like the case of Taiwan, the optimal U.S. position involves continuing to financially and politically support Kurdish fighters in the battle against ISIS without formally recognizing the state. By maintaining the relative autonomy of the people without threatening Turkish interests by guaranteeing that the Kurds will not pursue independence, the United States can

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65 Ibid.
guarantee continued support from the Kurds in the fight against ISIS while maintaining U.S. ties with Turkey and preventing Erdogan from moving closer to Putin.

The Kurdish population already has extensive autonomy through its own military forces, government, language, and flag. The Council on Foreign Relations suggests that a confederation model could give the Kurdish population increased control over foreign affairs, giving Kurdish representatives diplomatic status abroad, while maintaining the area as a part of Iraq. Similarly, the United States should continue to work with the Kurds in northern Iraq to provide military assistance if Iraqi forces continue to strike in Kurdish-controlled areas in order to prevent fighting that could distract from objectives against ISIS.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, the United States has taken varied positions towards secessionist groups seeking military or diplomatic support for independence. As the “Biggest Neighbor,” the United States is often forced to decide if and how to support minority groups in their attempts for independence. As the cases of Bangladesh and Kosovo show, even where intervention is seemingly purely humanitarian, there are always underlying strategic and security considerations that influence decision-making. The United States, as a global hegemon functioning in a chaotic international system, must prevent the rise of threats to international peace and security that could harm its unipolar system. The Taiwanese case is unique because it presents a nuanced approach that falls between the lack of action observed in Nixon’s foreign policy towards Bangladesh and Clinton’s preemptive humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. U.S. foreign policy towards Taiwan shows that in cases where a minority group is attempting to secede and there are competing strategic interests at play, relative support can exist without official recognition. Similarly, the case of Kurdistan presents an opportunity for the United States to creatively respond to competing strategic interests. It is the recommendation of this paper that the United States continue to support Kurdish fighters in order to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria, but use institutional means to provide guarantees to Turkey that it will not back a Kurdish secessionist movement for independence.


69 Ibid.
While the Trump administration is still developing its foreign policies, recent actions hint at future strategies for projecting power in the face of increasing global competition. One of the most significant challenges to U.S. influence in the Asia-Pacific region comes from the People’s Republic of China. Analyzing the United States and China’s military actions and policies as instruments through which they wield influence yields greater understanding of their complex relationship as these nations project hard power. This research offers a preliminary overview of military power projection at a pivotal point in U.S.-Asian affairs during Trump’s first year in office.

INTRODUCTION

Following World War II and four decades of Cold War with the Soviet Union, the United States has developed and maintained an unrivaled global military presence.1 While the United States is the sole country that can claim superpower status, China has emerged as the best-poised nation to challenge U.S. power in the Asia-Pacific region. Some analysts see China’s rise as potentially indicative of power competition with the United States. G. John Ikenberry considers this shifting Pacific power balance:

For more than half a century, the United States has played a leading role in…East Asia…Over the decades, the United States found itself playing a hegemonic role in the region…Today, this regional order is giving way to something new. Within Asia, a regional power transition is taking place, driven by the rise of China… And, under the shadow of the rise of Chinese economic and military capabilities, the region is taking on a more explicit balance of power dynamic. The region is…experiencing…new signs of great power competition.2

These hard power capabilities referenced by Ikenberry are achieved “through military threat or use, and by means of economic menace or reward.”3 Both Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump appear to favor military strength, driven

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by the world’s largest economies, to project power. This paper compares military investments, policies, and actions of China under Xi Jinping and the United States during the first year of Donald Trump’s Presidency to assess power projection and influence within and potentially beyond the Asia-Pacific.

CHINESE MILITARY POWER PROJECTION UNDER PRESIDENT XI

In 1978, China entered a period of greater openness and economic reform through its pivotal “Four Modernizations,” which included national defense. China increased military expenditures following the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis during which China conducted missile tests and military exercises in a show of force near Taiwan. This continued as Taiwan prepared for its first direct presidential election, sending a strong message intended to “deter the United States from promoting Taiwan independence.”4 As indicated in Figure 1, China’s estimated military spending has increased steadily since the 1990s. In 1995, China’s military expenditures were estimated at $26 billion, compared to an estimate of $214 billion in 2015.5 Sustained economic growth has spurred these increases in spending and the ability of Chinese President Xi Jinping to modernize China’s military.6 China’s estimated military expenditures have remained generally proportionate to China’s gross domestic product (GDP); expenditures have averaged approximately 2% of GDP since 1990.7 China’s GDP in 1995 was approximately $735 billion in current U.S. dollars; by 2015, this figure had risen to over $11 trillion in current U.S. dollars.8

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SIPRI defines military expenditures as “all current and capital military expenditure on: (a) the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; (b) defence [sic] ministries and other government agencies engaged in defence [sic] projects; (c) paramilitary forces, when judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and (d) military space activities”. This methodology, as well as SIPRI’s method for estimating China’s expenditures, can be found at https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex/sources-and-methods.
In 2013, Liff and Erickson recalled U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s question regarding China’s defense spending at the June 2005 Shangri-La Dialogue: “Since no nation threatens China, one must wonder: Why this growing investment? Why these continuing large and expanded arms purchases? Why these continued deployments?”9 Liff and Erickson, however, concluded that the motivations behind China’s military modernization and spending increases are less opaque when considered in aggregate, are largely focused on regional considerations, and are intended to compensate for inflation and prior neglect.10 Several years into Xi’s Presidency, Erickson took a different tone regarding China’s military capabilities, claiming that the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) power projection abilities are expanding in the Pacific and, that soon, “…Beijing will have very few peers in the increasingly expensive combination of quality and quantity that makes a truly great power military.”11 This assessment is in line with Xi’s stated military objectives and strategies. While China may soon lack for peers militarily close to home as Erickson concluded, Zha, however, reminds readers in Asian Perspective that “…Chinese observers are puzzled by the US [sic] characterization of China as a military threat; by any objective measure, China is decades away from military parity and may never attain it.”12

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10 Ibid., 826-827.
may indeed be decades away, the gap is narrowing. As noted in the National Intelligence Council’s *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds* report:

Heated debates are occurring among China’s elites, for example, regarding whether China should move away from its traditional policies—not having overseas bases or major military alliances and not interfering in the internal affairs of other countries—as its overseas interests expand. The outcome of these debates will be critical indicators of whether China intends to become a global superpower, which in turn will have major implications for the prospect of future great power competition.13

Some of these policies have already shifted since *Global Trends 2030* was published in December 2012. China recently established its first overseas military base in Djibouti near critical shipping routes as part of its Belt and Road economic expansion and development strategy. Xi intends for the Belt and Road initiative to increase trade with China’s neighbors in Asia and also Europe, which will enhance China’s capacity “to project military power through these modernized lines of communication.”14 The Djibouti location defends strategic trade flows and the installation is reportedly outfitted with military infrastructure and large-scale docking facilities, leading some analysts to claim that Beijing intends the base specifically to expand China’s sphere of power projection.15 In addition, China is engaging more frequently with other militaries—particularly with Russia—through military exercises, military-technical cooperation, and through high-level military-to-military contacts.16

Currently, China is also the “largest troop-contributor among the permanent members of the Security Council and second largest contributor to the peacekeeping budget,” despite China’s traditional opposition to interventionist actions.17 As noted in a forecast on potential for future Chinese intervention (which would most likely be portrayed as international cooperation “as opposed to…protection of Chinese national interests”): “Beijing will continue to restructure its military and sculpt policy to allow it to intervene more easily

These developments and assessments confirm the stated goals of China’s leadership. A key component of the “Chinese Dream” (a slogan Xi frequently invokes) of national rejuvenation is “building a powerful military” with modernized defense and armed forces. Xi discussed these measures in his October 18, 2017, speech to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.

Historic breakthroughs have been made in reforming national defense and the armed forces…This represents a revolutionary restructuring…We have stepped up weapons and equipment development, and made major progress in enhancing military preparedness.

Xi later claimed in the same speech: “This will enable us to effectively shape our military posture, manage crises, and deter and win wars.” According to a RAND research report, China is pursuing military capabilities to counter U.S. power projection operations through the same technologies and systems that have enabled U.S. force dominance in the post-Cold War era, including “systems for real-time reconnaissance, data transmission and processing, precision guidance, robotics, propulsion, and even stealth technology.” Through these breakthroughs, to quote Xi, China can more effectively challenge U.S. power projection in the Asia-Pacific by undermining the “credibility of U.S. security guarantees.” With continued opposition to China’s maritime claims, confrontations in the South and East China Seas, and pushback against China’s One-China policy, many prospects exist for conflict in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States would likely be involved in a conflict through its collective defense arrangements in the region (with Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Japan, and the Republic of Korea).

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has noted China’s increasing ability to project power through “peacetime operations” as well as an “expanding capacity to contest
U.S. military superiority in the event of a regional conflict.”\textsuperscript{25} With over 2.3 million military personnel, excluding the PLA reserves and paramilitary police force, China maintains the world’s largest standing military; China is also the world’s second-highest military spender following the United States.\textsuperscript{26} The DOD iterates that China’s officially disclosed budget information as well as spending estimates are not precise measures of military investments due to China’s “poor accounting transparency and incomplete transition to a market economy,” and also that “China’s published military budget omits several major categories of expenditure, such as R&D and the procurement of foreign weapons and equipment.”\textsuperscript{27} As discussed earlier, investments appear concentrated on enhancing China’s ability to project power regionally; however, China also appears to be seeking future expansion of these abilities through engagement outside its periphery.

China’s State Council Information Office published China’s military strategy in a 2015 white paper. This document only references the United States twice explicitly; however, there are indirect references to the U.S. military and its activity in the Asia-Pacific region. The white paper references “threats from hegemonism, power politics and neo-interventionism” as well as “competition for the redistribution of power, rights and interests.”\textsuperscript{28} Additionally, the paper criticizes “external countries” for provocative behavior and “meddling in South China Sea affairs;” this document also calls for the Chinese “to seize the strategic initiative in military competition.”\textsuperscript{29}

Deputy Chief of General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army Admiral Sun Jianguo further explicated China’s strategies and policies in 2015 at the 14\textsuperscript{th} Shangri-La Dialogue. Sun emphasized the Chinese military’s role in UN peacekeeping missions, including China’s status as the largest force contributor to peacekeeping among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.\textsuperscript{30} Sun touted China’s naval contributions to protecting Chinese and

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
foreign ships in the Gulf of Aden from acts of piracy; Sun also noted China’s more overt means of military power projection, stating that, “up to now [2015], the Chinese military has conducted over 100 joint military exercises and training activities with more than 50 countries.”

One aspect of power projection Admiral Sun expressly de-emphasized was China’s territorial expansion in the South China Sea, where China has asserted claim over uninhabited islands in violation of other countries’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs), created artificial islands, and built military installations on both uninhabited and artificial islands causing widespread international outcry. These claims expand China’s military reach as well as Chinese access to fishing stocks and hydrocarbon reserves. Despite skepticism and condemnation, China has refused to halt its efforts. Wu Shengli, Commander of the Chinese Navy, vowed to U.S. Admiral John Richardson that China will “never give up halfway” in its construction of islands and that China is prepared to respond to provocations and infringements on its claims. Figure 2 displays both China’s maritime claims, the EEZs China’s claims violate, as well as the locations of contested islands in the region.

**Figure 2.** Approximate locations of contested islands, Chinese maritime claims, and selected EEZs in the South China Sea, excluding the Gulf of Thailand.

*Source: EEZs of the South China Sea, contested island features, and China’s claimed territorial waters [map]. April 2018. 1:15,000,000; generated by the author using ArcGIS Version 10.6.*

Despite evidence that indicates otherwise, China has emphasized peaceful development since Xi assumed power. A 2013 white paper titled “The Diversified
Employment of China's Armed Forces” stresses the following: an “independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense policy that is defensive in nature;” that China “opposes any form of hegemonism or power politics;” and that China will “never seek hegemony or behave in a hegemonic manner, nor will it engage in military expansion.”\[^{33}\] This emphasis is in line with DOD’s analysis of China’s priorities in a 2015 report to Congress on China, which includes the following evaluation:

> China remains concerned that if regional States come to view China primarily as a threat, they may act to balance against China, potentially with the United States. China balances the imperative to persuade countries that its rise is peaceful with the imperative to strengthen its control over existing sovereignty and territorial claims.\[^{34}\]

This same report notes that China’s efforts to project a peaceful development strategy are complicated by its defense of national sovereignty in conflict with its neighbors and growing economic and military capabilities, manifested in “more forceful rhetoric and confrontational behavior.”\[^{35}\] Xi’s verbal message of peaceful development is undermined by China’s actions, particularly in the South and East China Seas, where China has shifted from soft power influence to overt hard power through militarization and coercion; under Xi, China has maintained claim to a “nine-dash” line, encompassing much of the South China Sea, including disputed islands.\[^{36}\]

Xi claimed in his October 2017 address that China offers “a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence” and that China is expanding its “international influence, ability to inspire, and power to shape” backed up by regional economic and military dominance.\[^{37}\] This seems to contradict declared policies of non-expansion and opposition to hegemonism and power politics. Furthermore, for China’s neighbors, actions speak louder than words. China has used punitive trade policies for coercion, blocked Philippine supply missions, and deployed deep-


\[^{36}\] David Ochmanek et al., U.S. Military Capabilities and Forces for a Dangerous World: Rethinking the U.S. Approach to Force Planning.

\[^{37}\] Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” 6 & 9.
water mobile hydrocarbon rigs in waters also claimed by Vietnam. These are several examples that contradict China’s message of peace.

President Xi has framed reductions in military personnel numbers as a facet of the PLA’s goal to “carry out the noble mission of upholding world peace.” This claim was echoed by China’s Ministry of National Defense spokesperson Yang Yujun, who stated that personnel reductions initiated in 2015 demonstrated China’s “sincerity and aspiration to join hands with the rest of the world to maintain peace” as well as China’s support for “international arms control and disarmament.” Nonetheless, Yang also stated that reductions would optimize the military’s scale and structure, increase capabilities, and contribute to modernization efforts—and that cuts would constitute “troops equipped with outdated armaments, office staff, and personnel of non-combat organizations.” These reductions cut ground forces while personnel and investment in the naval and air forces—which have greater power projection potential—increased. The DOD’s 2015 report on China reflects regional consternation:

China’s lack of transparency surrounding its growing military capabilities and strategic decision-making has also increased concerns in the region about China’s intentions. Absent greater transparency, these concerns will likely intensify as the PLA modernization progresses.

China’s prosperity in the 21st century has fueled Xi’s Chinese Dream, enabling the modernization and streamlining of China’s military. China is expanding its ability to project power regionally through its maritime claims. China has also begun an aircraft carrier program; has made substantial advances in its missile forces, anti-ship and air defenses; has increased independent and joint military exercises in order to expand its sphere of influence; and is reaching outside of Asia through the Belt and Road initiative and military basing in Africa. These developments and others present challenges to the Trump administration,

40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
which first wavered on policy toward China through most of 2017 prior to declaring China a strategic competitor in its first National Security and National Defense strategies.

**U.S. MILITARY POWER PROJECTION UNDER PRESIDENT TRUMP**

Donald Trump has long advocated for a powerful military to project American strength internationally to competitors, claiming on the campaign trail: “We have to have the strongest military by far.”45 During his 2016 presidential campaign, Trump claimed in an interview with the *New York Times* that China had no respect for the United States or President Obama and, that in disregard of the United States, the Chinese “go in the South China Sea and build a military fortress the likes of which perhaps the world has not seen.”46 As evidenced by his earlier writings, Donald Trump considered China a significant military threat over a decade prior to the Xi administration’s military reform and modernization efforts. Trump discussed his views regarding China in *The America We Deserve*, published in early 2000 just before canceling his exploration of a presidential run.47 Trump claimed in 2000: “The idea was that with the demise of the Soviet Union and the victory of capitalism we were entering a trouble-free era of peace and guaranteed prosperity. These guys [experts] apparently hadn’t heard of Islamic fundamentalism, miniaturized weapons, terrorism, or the People’s Republic of China.”48 While raising multiple concerns, Trump maintained, “Our biggest long-term challenge will be China,”49 calling China a “very real, and almost totally undiscussed, military threat.”50

Trump, in 2000, concluded that China viewed the United States as “a rival in its ambition to dominate Asia.”51 In the unclassified summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) unveiled in January 2018 by Secretary of Defense James Mattis, it is very clear that China is a “strategic competitor,” viewed by the administration as a revisionist, competitive power.52 Trump’s previous stance is also echoed in the 2018 NDS:

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49 Ibid., 117.
50 Ibid., 121.
51 Ibid., 122.
“China…will continue to pursue a military modernization program that seeks…regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future.”53 These developments are significant given that, for nearly two decades, the U.S. has primarily focused on threats from non-state actors in the years following the September 11, 2001 attacks. This return to strategic competition with other states is a departure from recent U.S. foreign policy.

Upon returning from Asia in November 2017, Trump faced criticism for his rhetorical pivot regarding China, turning from a message of opprobrium to one of admiration and cooperation. When questioned on the trade deficit, President Trump asserted that he gave China “great credit” for its economic success, calling Xi a “very special man” for whom he possessed an “incredibly warm” feeling.54 Despite previous public pleasantries, the United States’ relationship with China remains tenuous, particularly in the realm of military power projection. John Haines sought to assess Trump’s national security and foreign policies, writing that Trump favors a “unilateralist (but not the pejorative isolationist of which some charge him) approach to defining American interests” and “strategic ambiguity.”55 Dean Chen also discusses Trump’s strategic ambiguity in his analysis of the United States’ relationship with China regarding Taiwan. Chen writes that Trump has criticized China and called for strengthening U.S. naval power to “counter Beijing’s behaviors in the South China Sea;” implied “a potential military confrontation” given that China is “unlikely to renounce its claims and island control;” and defended his telephone conversation with Taiwan’s president that China viewed as a slight to its sovereignty over the island.56 Chen contrasts this with Trump’s frequent consultation of Henry Kissinger (who was largely responsible for the U.S. acceptance of the One-China policy) and Trump’s selection of Terry Branstad—a “long-time friend of Chinese President Xi Jinping”—as ambassador to China to demonstrate the U.S. administration’s mixed messages.57 While assessing Trump’s “unconventional policymaking style” and displays of both “pro-China and anti-China behaviors and rhetoric.”58 Chen also notes that strategic

58 Ibid.
ambiguity is not unique to Trump, but is “Washington’s long-standing...policy” regarding Taiwan.59

In his 2017 speech to the United Nations, Trump referenced Russia and China, asserting, “we must reject threats to sovereignty, from the Ukraine to the South China Sea,” but also thanked both states for voting in favor of UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea.60 Director of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Niskanen Center Michael Fay wrote in response to Trump’s speech that while “some have suggested that it marked a significant departure in American foreign policy” to a “new unilateral turn in U.S. foreign policy,” Trump’s rhetoric at the UN was “not much of a departure from America’s foreign policy traditions.”61 Rather, Fay concluded that the more significant question should be about “what larger principle the Trump administration’s unilateralism is moored to.”62 One of the first points Trump made in his UN speech was regarding U.S. military strength. Trump stated: “…It has just been announced that we will be spending almost $700 billion on our military and defense. Our military will soon be the strongest it has ever been.”63 Similarly, Trump has called for the “massive rebuilding of the United States military” and “peace through strength,” a priority echoed in the White House’s 2017 National Security Strategy.64 One means of assessing these statements in effect is to examine Trump’s administration’s budget proposal and the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2018.

In the Trump administration’s budget proposal, the first area listed as a new priority is defense, specifically reversing defense sequestration, building warfighting readiness, and implementing defense reform.65 The proposal called for $639 billion in discretionary spending for the Department of Defense, with increases “fully offset by targeted reductions elsewhere.”66 Trump’s budget blueprint called for significant decreases in funding from 2017 Continuing Appropriations Act levels, particularly for the Environmental Protection

59 Ibid., 183.
62 Ibid.
63 Donald Trump, “Remarks by President Trump to the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly.”
66 Ibid.
Agency and for international aid spending. Office of Management and Budget Director Mick Mulvaney asserted: “There's no question this is a hard-power budget. It is not a soft-power budget…And that was done intentionally… We wrote it using the president's own words.” While presidential budget proposals are not necessarily realistic forecasts of ultimate government spending, the White House’s “A New Foundation for American Greatness” indicates the administration’s high and low priorities. The mercurial nature of the U.S. defense budget has meant instability for the Defense Department, further complicated by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA), which imposed constraints on discretionary spending. Defense spending levels authorized by Congress for 2018 exceeded the limits of the BCA. Congress authorized nearly $700 billion in defense spending—more than either the DOD requested, or the White House proposed. The chart below (Figure 3) displays the U.S. defense budget along with China’s steadily increasing estimated military expenditures from 2000 to 2016.

President Trump has claimed that his administration’s budget proposal would result in one of the greatest “military buildups in American history,” emphasizing his message of military strength through proposed military-centered spending with cuts elsewhere.68

Figure 3. China’s estimated military expenditures and the United States’ military expenditures in billions of constant (2015) U.S. dollars from 2000-2016.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (NDAA) includes noteworthy directives and expectations, including that “continuing efforts by the Department of Defense to realign forces, commit additional assets, and increase investments to the Indo-Asia-Pacific region are necessary to maintain a robust United States commitment to the region.” The NDAA stipulates: “The Secretary of Defense should…enhance regional force readiness through joint training and exercises, considering contingencies ranging from grey zone to high-end near-peer conflict,” and that the U.S. military must remain committed to freedom of navigation (FON) operations as a core security interest. These operations have occurred regularly during Trump’s first year in office. China was the claimant of the highest number of excessive maritime claims globally to which the DOD chose to respond in 2017. The NDAA also calls for “strengthening the defense partnership between the United States and Taiwan” and, perhaps most significantly, “normalizing the transfer of defense articles and defense services to Taiwan.” Such provisions are viewed by China as flagrant violations of its One-China policy, which Trump—like his predecessors—claims to uphold.

In his signing statement for the 2018 NDAA issued December 12, 2017, Trump asserted:

> History teaches us that when you weaken your defenses, you invite aggression. The best way to prevent conflict…is to be prepared…Only when the good are strong will peace prevail. Today, with the signing of this defense bill, we accelerate the process of fully restoring America’s military might.

CONCLUSION

While Trump declared strong positions against China prior to and during his candidacy for president, he was criticized for failing to maintain a consistent posture toward China during his first year in office. Near the end of Trump’s first year, the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy both marked China as a competitor, a label denounced by Beijing as reminiscent of Cold War-era competition. The conditions of

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70 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
the 2018 NDAA signed into law by Trump as well as the administration’s budget proposal both mark a focus on American military might. The U.S. military maintains numerous bases with thousands of personnel stationed throughout the Asia-Pacific region, holds standing military exchanges and exercises with Asian allies and partners, and continues to reinforce its strategic partnerships and agreements in the region. These examples and those covered within this discussion reinforce both the continuity that exists into the Trump administration, but also the pivots this administration has made.

Meanwhile, Xi has, to date, maintained momentum for reforming the PLA and increasing the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) strength within the military. Xi has been dubbed “chairman of everything;” his “thought,” like that of Mao Zedong, is enshrined in the CCP Constitution; his rivals have largely been cast aside through his campaign against corruption; and, Xi does not have a clear successor on the CCP’s Politburo Standing Committee, signaling that Xi may not intend to step aside at the end of his second term. The next years of the Trump administration will prove critical in establishing the United States’ relationship with an increasingly powerful China and Chinese military, capable of projecting strength close to home but potentially much further in the near future. Recent actions by the Trump administration to impose tariffs on Chinese goods, met with Chinese retaliation, indicate potential for increased confrontation between these powers. Ultimately, both countries will either view one another primarily through the lens of competition or cooperation. That choice will yield global ramifications.

75 Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, “Chinese Military Reforms in the Age of Xi Jinping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implications.”
This paper broadens our understanding of violent extremism and suggests a policy change that will improve results in combatting terrorism. The first section explores the current U.S. military approach to terrorism and demonstrates that its shortcomings are rooted in a fundamental misunderstanding of the logic that drives violent extremism. The second section explores terrorism as a social rather than merely political and military phenomenon by looking at the provision of social welfare by terrorist organizations. Lastly, the third section looks at how the U.S. government should further support and expand USAID programs aimed at tackling the root causes of violent terrorism.

Military engagement and development assistance are two of the principal avenues to conduct foreign policy. The ultimate goals of both practices are protecting national interests and promoting domestic and international security. Yet, in recent years, public debate in the United States has centred on military solutions, often overlooking the benefits of non-violent forms of engagement, including foreign development assistance.¹ This is especially true in the case of the U.S. response to violent extremism abroad. In the course of this paper, I argue that the U.S. response to terrorism to date has been ineffective because of a fundamentally misguided understanding of the logic and incentives that drive violent extremism. A reconceptualization of terrorism as a social rather than merely political and military phenomenon is necessary. As such, I explore the role of terrorist organizations as providers of social welfare services in developing countries and how terrorist groups use this overlooked function to enlarge their recruitment pool and exert influence over the civilian population. It is important to note that the function of social service provider is one of many aspects of terrorism that have been overlooked. The analysis of this limited phenomenon specifically cannot – and it is not meant to – be construed as the sole

¹ Bryant Harris, Robbie Gramer, and Emily Tamkin, “The End of Foreign Aid as We Know It,” Foreign Policy, April 27, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/24/u-s-agency-for-international-development-foreign-aid-state-department-trump-slash-foreign-funding/.
reason why individuals decide to join terrorist organizations. However, it is an aspect that is often disregarded, both among policy-makers and in mainstream media, and it needs to receive greater attention in order to form sensible and well-rounded solutions to the global challenge of terrorism. The last section of this paper focuses on the pre-existing Unites States Agency for International Development (USAID) programs that focus on tackling the root causes of support for terrorist organizations. In that section, I argue that these programs should be expanded and should receive more attention from the American public and the media so as to change the popular idea that terrorism should only be tackled through military engagement.

In line with the official definition adopted by the United States government, the operating definition of terrorism utilized in this paper is “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” International terrorism is “terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.” This paper only focuses on terrorist organizations operating in foreign countries. This paper does not focus on specific terrorist organizations, though I will use Hamas as a case study in section II. Additionally, this paper focuses specifically on the provision of social welfare, understood as the direct delivery of programs that promote well-being and social security, rather than on public goods provision which, on the other hand, includes services as law enforcement, roads and infrastructure, and telecommunication networks.

SECTION I: TERRORISM AND MILITARY RESPONSE

This section is dedicated to outlining some key factors shaping the U.S. response to terrorism. A growing body of literature is focusing its attention on critically assessing the effectiveness of the American strategies to conduct the War on Terror. The American military effort has been substantial and sustained, with an estimated 4.4 trillion dollars spent and 2.5 million Americans sent to fight. On top of the cost necessary to run sustained military operations, the War on Terror resulted in the deaths of over 6,800 service members as of 2015,

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3 Ibid.
and the number is steadily growing. From al-Qaeda to the Islamic State, U.S. efforts to fight terrorism since 9/11 have been immense and have come at great human and economic cost. The United States has invaded two Muslim-majority states and conducted military operations in an additional five, namely Syria, Pakistan, Libya, Yemen, and Somalia. Despite these efforts, the data indicates primary objectives have gone unmet and some areas have worsened – this is especially the case for the number and strength of Islamist-inspired terror groups. The sheer number of terrorist attacks has increased overtime. In 2001, some 1,882 terror attacks occurred. By 2016, the number had risen to 14,488, reaching a peak in 2014 with 16,860 incidents. Over the past four decades, the fewest number of terror attacks worldwide occurred in 1998 and that trend continued into the early years of the War on Terror. However, 2005 signaled a break out, as terror attacks nearly doubled from the previous year and then continued climbing rapidly. Globally, fatalities caused by terror attacks have increased to unprecedented levels. The average number of deaths rose 72% for the 13-year period after 9/11 as compared to the 13 years prior. These numbers provide an overview of the incidences of terrorist attacks worldwide and, while they do not discriminate based on the type of terrorist organization involved, for example Islamic versus non-Islamic terrorism, it gives us a sense of how ineffective the U.S. response to global terrorism has been to date. In light of the onerous cost and unsatisfactory outcomes of the war on terror, this paper proposes preventative measures, through specifically targeted USAID programs as a more effective way to combat violent extremism.

The Logic of Violent Extremism: Theoretical Explanations

Before delving into how USAID programs, which in part are already in operation, should be further leveraged to combat and eradicate terrorism, this section will identify some theoretical explanations to understand the ineffectiveness of the U.S. military response to date. What can

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explain this surge in terrorist attacks despite extensive American military efforts to eradicate violent extremist groups? Prior to answering this question, it is also important to note that terrorism is an extremely complex and variegated phenomenon, and no single explanation can provide a conclusive theoretical basis to answer this question. Having said that, in the case of Islamic terrorism and the American post-9/11 response to terrorist threats, a copious amount of scholarly research has been written to unravel this puzzle. Kydd and Walter argue that the United States’ counterstrategies to tackle terrorism proved to be ineffective because they were based on faulty assumptions of what drives terrorist violence.8 According to this theory, al-Qaeda targeted the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11 in the hopes of discouraging the United States from continuing to support Israel and Saudi Arabia, as well as to provoke a military response to instill anti-American sentiments in Muslims around the world and enlarge the pool from which they could recruit.9 De Mesquita and Dickson further add that, in provoking a military response, terrorist groups aim at inducing the enemy to reveal information about itself that helps the organization recruit additional members.10 Specifically, this theory is applied when governments have the ability to carry discriminating or targeted responses to terrorism but decide to choose an indiscriminate approach, thus revealing to be unconcerned with the wellbeing of the foreign country’s citizens.11 Sharp argues that force as an option of first resort is not only ineffective but oftentimes unlawful as well. He writes that “acts of international terrorism committed by non-state actors do not constitute a use of force within the meaning of the law of conflict management” and thus do not warrant a military response.12 The theories presented in this paragraph provide some explanations as per way the United States’ response has been ineffective to date. The fundamental flaw of the U.S. approach to terrorism has been a misguided understanding of the logic that drives violent extremism which, instead of weakening terrorist groups has facilitated their radicalization. Because of this, this paper argues that U.S. strategy should shift its emphasis from responding to terrorism to preventing terrorism through the provision of social services to marginalized and disenfranchised communities. Once again, this

9 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
solution is meant to broaden our understanding of terrorism, rather than providing a conclusive and infallible fix to all forms of violent extremism around the globe.

SECTION II: RECONCEPTUALIZING TERRORISM

This section broadens and reconceptualizes the role of terrorist groups. In particular, this section explores how terrorist organizations can play the role of non-state providers of social welfare, and how this little-known function can positively impact their capacity to recruit new members and acquire legitimacy in the eyes of local communities. This function is one of the many facets of terrorism that receives little attention. As such, focusing on this aspect of terrorist groups alone will not eradicate all forms of terrorism everywhere. Nonetheless, it is essential to understand terrorism in its entirety, as a social rather than a purely political phenomenon to craft effective policy solutions to tackle it.13 It is, thus, paramount to explore all avenues through which terrorist groups can expand their recruitment pool and polarize larger and larger segments of the population. Analyzing the provision of social services – or the lack thereof – is the focus of this paper and it also is an important component of broadening understanding of terrorism as a social phenomenon.14 The following sub-section will provide context as to why developing countries have not evolved the same standards of welfare provision that developed countries enjoy.

The Problem of State Capacity

In order to understand the role that terrorist groups can play in delivering social services, it is necessary to understand why this function would appeal to them – or be required of them – in the first place. The welfare state – or the lack thereof – is the first step in understanding the pervasiveness of non-state service providers in the developing world.15 Most citizens in Western democracies can rely on the government for the provision of social welfare, specifically understood as the “direct delivery or indirect facilitation of services and programs that promote

14 Ibid.
15 This statement refers to the increasingly pervasive presence of non-state providers as a whole, including non-governmental organizations, faith-based organizations, and multinational corporations.
well-being and social security.”  

However, the development of the welfare state as we know it is the result of a lengthy process that can be traced to Bismarck’s Germany. 

State capacity, the ability of the state to provide services to citizens, while taken for granted in many Western democracies and developed nations is by no means the norm in developing countries. 

Gough et al. developed a framework to understand these variations in the ability of states to provide their citizens with social welfare. In doing so, they distinguished three macro-categories, namely 1) welfare state regimes, 2) informal security regimes and 3) insecurity regimes, to understand the framework they call welfare regimes. The first category represents what we have previously described as Western models of welfare states and it is mostly present in OECD countries. Informal security regimes, on the other hand, describe “institutional arrangements where people rely heavily on non-state institutions to meet their security needs.” Lastly, insecurity regimes describe “institutional arrangements that block the emergence of even stable informal security mechanisms and thus generate gross levels of insecurity and poor welfare outcomes.” Figure 1.1 provides further details regarding the specific characteristics of each category. Since these macro categories group together states at rather different developmental stages, Gough published another study specific to the sub-classifications present within the category of informal security regimes. For the purpose of this paper, the examples will be drawn from countries categorized as insecurity regimes or belonging to the lower end of the spectrum in informal security regimes, what Gough groups under E to H.

Thus, the literature on welfare provision provides us with a useful framework to understand the complex relations between the state, its citizens, and terrorist organizations operating within the territorial borders of the state. Countries such as Syria, Somalia, Lebanon, Mali, Pakistan, and Palestine, where the United States has focused its military counterterrorism

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18 In this sense, it is interesting to note that non-state service providers are present in developed countries as well, including the United States. For further readings, please refer to Scott W. Allard’s chapter titled ‘State Dollars, Non-state Provision: Local Nonprofit Welfare Provision in the United States in The Politics of Non-state Social Welfare.  
20 Ibid.  
efforts, are among the many nations listed by Gough under the category of informal security and insecurity regimes. In these states, governments to varying degrees lack the ability to reach the entirety of their population for the purpose of social service provision, and the role of service provider falls upon or is taken on by non-state actors.²⁴ It is important to note that terrorist organizations are neither the sole nor the major form of non-state providers in non-OECD countries, as non-governmental organizations, faith-based organizations and multi-national corporations often fill in that role.²⁵ However, the focus on terrorist organizations as non-state providers has been purposefully selected for this research. As explained hereafter, providing social services gives terrorist groups a set of incentives and advantages that should not be discounted if the purpose is eradicating the group itself, and it ties directly into how USAID and foreign aid could be leveraged to weaken terrorist organizations. Hereafter in the paper, a case study of a terrorist organization providing social welfare services will be discussed, together with some strategic implications that this function entails.

Case Study: Hamas

According to the United States and the European Union, Hamas, an Arabic acronym for Islamic Resistance Movement, is a terrorist organization operating from the Occupied Palestinian Territory. It originated in 1987 after the beginning of the first intifada, or Palestinian uprising, against Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and had the dual purpose of carrying out an armed struggle against Israel and delivering social welfare programs.²⁶ In 2005, it became the first Islamist group in the Arab world to win an election through a ballot vote.²⁷ Fifty years after the end of the six-day war, over 4.8 million Palestinians are living in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and Gaza under debilitating conditions. Oxfam reports that “50 percent of the population rely on aid, [and] almost 2 million people are trapped inside Gaza with little access to the most basic services.”²⁸ Hamas’ rise is deeply connected to the socio-economic circumstances in which the Palestinian people find themselves. It is essential to note that Hamas

²⁴ Ibid.
²⁵ Ibid.
²⁷ Ibid.
was born as a Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and that it inherited several commitments relating to social responsibility. Article 21 of the Hamas Covenant states that “mutual social responsibility means extending assistance, financial or moral, to all those who are in need and joining in the execution of some of the work. Members of the Islamic Resistance Movement [Hamas] should consider the interests of the masses as their own personal interests.” Moreover, the Palestinian Authority (PA) as led by Fatah (Hamas’ political rival), has failed to effectively deliver social services to the Palestinian people in Gaza. In this sense, it is estimated the Hamas’ extensive social welfare programs have an annual operating budget of 50 to 70 million dollars, thus, making it one of the major social service providers operating in the Gaza area. Built by Gaza’s citizens, the same tunnels that were used to smuggle weapons to attack Israel were originally used to transport life-saving medicine, clothing, food, fuel, and other basic supplies. When the Israeli blockade was imposed in 2007, many of these basic items were unavailable through normal trade. The blockade has since been relaxed, but the tunnels are still used, at least in part, for the transportation of civilian goods.

In its thirty years of operation, Hamas has simultaneously delegitimized the existing government and gained favour among the civilian population by delivering social services. Analysts believe that preventing Hamas from proving welfare services now would not be an immediate solution to the problem of violent extremism by the organization because they have created for themselves a reputation of having the people’s best interest at heart in the many years spent providing social services. Hamas’ influence, built upon years and years of welfare provision, cannot be dismantled overnight; however, the case of Hamas serves as an important lesson in preventing the spread of violent extremism elsewhere. By helping fill the gaps left by government with low state capacity – regardless of whether they are unable or unwilling to provide the services – the U.S. government through USAID could prevent other violent groups from turning citizens’ poor living conditions to their advantage.

31 Ibid.
SECTION III: USAID AND THE PROVISION OF SOCIAL WELFARE SERVICES

As outlined in this paper, the U.S. response to violent extremism has been ineffective because of a fundamental misunderstanding of the logic that drives attacks by terrorist organizations. Better practices and policies require a fundamental restructuring of how we conceptualize terrorism not only as a political phenomenon but also as a social one. In this sense, I argue that preventative measures rather than ex post reactions would prove to be more effective. When considering the role of terrorist organizations as non-state welfare providers, a possible response would be filling the gaps in the delivery of social welfare that the relevant state has failed to provide. One can achieve this either by aiding the government in increasing state capacity or by having development organizations filling in the gaps themselves. USAID has long been a proponent of development assistance as a measure to counter violent terrorism. The 2011 report on the Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency declared that “[USAID] has long recognized the critical role of development in addressing social, economic, governance, and other grievances that can fuel violent extremism or radicalization of individuals and communities.”32 Thus, the fact that marginalization, disenfranchisement and low socio-economic prospects can fuel the violent extremism is not news to either USAID or the U.S. government. However, most of the programs spearheaded by USAID are based on youth empowerment, media and messaging, improved local governance, reconciliation, and conflict mitigation, and scarce attention is given (explicitly) to the delivery of social welfare programs as a means of preventing the spread of extremist violence.33 In this sense, I believe the U.S. government should expand these programs and more effectively explain their value and purposes to the public. For obvious reasons, namely the fact that preventative measure prevent the radicalisation of individuals, such measures have a relatively weaker appeal to the public. However, seeing the ineffective response to the threat of global terrorism to date, it is necessary for states to explore new avenues and for citizens to accept and embrace non-violent forms of foreign policy. This is especially important seeing that the new Administration seems to privilege

33 To be clear, USAID provides social welfare services; however, the provision of social welfare services is not directly spelled out as a measure to prevent the spread of violent terrorism. Similarly, I did not find direct acknowledgements of the fact that terrorist organization can provide social services.
military actions over cooperation and provision of development aid as means of dealing with threats. USAID programs aimed at countering violent terrorism are currently operational in African countries, such as Somalia, Mali, Nigeria, as well as Pakistan and Central Asia.

CONCLUSION

As presented in this paper, giving primacy to military actions rather than non-violent engagement signals a profound misunderstanding of the logic that drives violent extremism. In its pursuit of security, the United States should incorporate a broader understanding of terrorism into its definition of terrorism, moving away from conceptualizing it as a merely political and military phenomenon and adding to it a social component. In particular, this paper analysed the function of non-state provider of social welfare carried out by terrorist groups. As shown in the case of Hamas, delivering social welfare programs in countries where the state’s ability to reach its population is limited can contribute to the solidification of loyalty towards the group and radicalization of the population. Additionally, this paper acknowledges that USAID is currently delivering some programs meant to counter violent terrorism. However, given the limited scope of the programs, this paper recommends to directly spell out social welfare provision as a way to tackle violent terrorism.
### Appendix

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Figure 1.1
ON THE FORMULATION OF PUBLIC OPINION:
SHIFTING DYNAMICS OF THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

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Recent polls reveal a disconnect between the American and Japanese public regarding the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. What are the factors which determine a country’s public perception towards another? To answer this question, I examine the Yomiuri-Gallup survey and analyze whether an overall trend exists in how public opinion is formed. In this paper, I first outline the major events in U.S.-Japanese relations post-World War II, and discuss how public has evolved. Second, I survey economic and political events that have influenced formulation of public opinion in the United States and Japan. Last, I examine the current U.S.-Japan relationship in light of my findings.

INTRODUCTION

As the cornerstones of Asian-Pacific security, the United States and Japan have maintained a strong alliance since the end of World War II. However, the relationship has not been without hardships. The partnership has overcome a number of obstacles over the years, from trade frictions to political discoordination. As renowned U.S.-Japan scholar Steven K. Vogel puts it, “The United States and Japan have so often combined high levels of cooperation, in the sense of working out agreements that benefit both sides, with high levels of tension, in the sense of elite-level hostility, public distrust, and the politicization of disputes.”1 One indicator of the ups and downs of the U.S.-Japan alliance is public opinion polling. The Yomiuri-Gallup poll, taken annually in the both United States and Japan since 1978, provides insight into how the relationship has been perceived publically, rather than just at a diplomatic level.

This essay will examine the high and low points in the U.S.-Japan relationship through the lens of the Yomiuri-Gallup poll and attempt to identify a trend that influences one country’s public opinion towards another, particularly that of the United States to Japan. I will first summarize the major events in U.S.-Japan relations post-World War II. Second, I will survey the

extent to which economic factors, particularly trade friction, has influenced public opinion in the United States and Japan. Through linear regression analysis, I find that while correlation between trade balance and public perception of the other country is stronger in Japan than in the United States, the association is rather weak. To see the extent to which non-economic factors may have influenced public opinion, I will then examine political factors that may have influenced formulation of public opinion, highlighting certain years in the 1978-2016 timeline which experienced a significant rise or fall in public trust towards the other nation. I find that the U.S. perception of Japan is linked significantly to Japan’s performance as a security partner. Last, I will examine the current U.S.-Japan relationship in light of my findings.

**HISTORICAL REVIEW**

To understand the current U.S.-Japan relationship and the public perception of the other country, it is necessary to study the foundations of the alliance which can be traced back to the end of World War II. In this section, I will identify key points in U.S.-Japan bilateral relations from 1945 to 1980.

Military hostilities ended between the United States and Japan on August 15, 1945, when Japan surrendered to the United States, terminating the long and brutal Pacific War. Close working relations between the United States and Japan soon followed. In September 1945, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur, arrived, starting the five-year United States military occupation of Japan. In November 1946, MacArthur led the radical revision of the prewar Japanese Meiji Constitution to create an open and democratic Japan and a strong ally to the United States. His team wrote in the infamous Article 9 of the Japanese Peace Constitution:

> Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and threat of use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.2

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Ironically, this U.S.-made Constitution has been the cause of U.S.-Japan conflicts over the last half century. Starting with the Korean War in 1950, Article 9 gave Japan an excuse to decline participation in the United States’ wars, allowing it to focus primarily on rebuilding and growing the war-trodden Japanese economy. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida called it an unfortunate yet welcome opportunity, “a gift of the gods,” and utilized it to create an autonomous Japan; “Japan’s security might remain dependent on U.S. forces, but this same dependence was to be used to free up resources Japan needed to become economically autonomous.” In 1951, the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed, along with the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which laid the groundwork of the security relationship today.

The first pivotal crisis in the U.S.-Japan relationship occurred in 1959, on the topic of renewal of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. After being politically cornered, Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, signed a revised U.S.-Japan Security Treaty which conceded to much of the United States demands:

The draft did explicitly promise the U.S. defense of Japan (which few thinking persons doubted would occur in any event). In return, Americans were to be able to use bases in Japan to defend the Pacific region. At no time did polls indicate that a majority of Japanese wanted U.S. military bases in the home islands, and in 1958 only 7 percent wanted the all-important bases in Okinawa to remain.

President Dwight Eisenhower took advantage of the weak Japanese economy and shrewdly pressed Kishi to sign the security treaty on the grounds of continuing an advantageous trade relationship. The deal resulted in an uproar among the Japanese public. Around six million people went on strike, leading to violent protestor-police clashes in which one student was trampled to death, and 482 students and 536 police were injured. Still in effect after sixty years, the signed treaty is one of the most discussed issues in U.S.-Japan relations. Kishi’s successor, Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda, changed the mindset of Japanese politics by taking it off the Cold War and focusing on economic growth.

From the 1960s to the 1970s, trade relations became a burgeoning issue in U.S.-Japan relations as Japan grew to become an economic threat to the United States. Under the wing of American military protection, Japan’s economic growth rate averaged nearly 10 percent over a

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3 Ibid., 287.
4 Ibid., 289.
5 Ibid., 318.
6 Ibid., 321.
fifteen-year period. In 1968, it became the world’s second largest economy, only surpassed by the United States.

Japan won full membership in such crucial international groups as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in 1964…The auto industry, producing a half-million vehicles in 1960, quadrupled in 2.2 million in 1966, then increased 50 percent again to replace Germany as the world’s number-two maker by the 1970s. The globe’s largest shipbuilding industry had order books double the size of its three closest rivals. By 1966, the United States had sold Japan $2.4 billion worth of goods during the year and bought $2.9 billion. An unfavorable trade balance had set in for Americans.7

Meanwhile, the United States suffered setbacks. President Lyndon B. Johnson, upon entering office in 1968, escalated the war in Vietnam. The triumph and failure of the two nations were apparent as Japan succeeded with its economic development and the United States fell deeper into the pitfalls of war. By providing weaponry and other products to the war, it is estimated that Japanese firms benefited at least an extra one billion dollars per year between 1966 and 1976.8 This, coupled with Japanese protests slandering the brutality and cultural insensitivity of the American effort in Vietnam, led to dissatisfaction from the United States. Ambassador Alexis Johnson recalled,

The biggest threat to Japanese-U.S. relations was feeling on part of [the United States] that after sacrificing thousands of lives and billions of dollars in defense of areas of East Asia, an area which is at least of equal interest to Japan, we not only did not get any understanding from Japan but receive criticism and harassment on essentially minor matters.9

To make matters worse, under the leadership of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, Japan expanded its trade with communist China, the America’s ideological adversary.

In 1971, the United States’ counterattacked Japanese economic expansion under the direction of President Richard Nixon. When Sato failed to deliver the promise to cut back textile imports to the United States in return for Okinawa’s reversion, Nixon started to consider Japan an “enemy.”10 Infamously known as the “Nixon Shocks” in Japan, Nixon launched a series of policies meant to weaken Japanese trade. First, in the summer of 1971, Nixon unilaterally devalued the dollar and ended the postwar fixed exchange rate regime. This action raised the value of the yen, thus making U.S. exports cheaper and Japan’s more expensive. Second, he

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7 Ibid., 327.
8 Ibid., 344.
9 Ibid., 347.
10 Ibid., 351.
imposed temporary controls on prices and then a 10 percent surcharge on imports. Again, this was a blow to Japanese exports.

To conclude, U.S.-Japan relations between 1945 and 1980 were largely defined by the security debate and trade friction. From 1945 to the 1960s, as the memories of war were still fresh in people’s minds, the points of struggle were about security and American military protection. The public discontent on security issues were mainly concentrated in Japan, for the treaty was advantageous for American interests in the Cold War. From the 1960s to the 1970s, the debate shifted from security-oriented to economically-oriented, initiated by the success of Prime Minister Ikeda’s policy to harness American protection to concentrate time and resources on economic growth. As trade friction became rampant and Japanese military contributions remained low, Americans became more hostile to Japan and Japanese products. Simultaneously, Japanese people came to doubt America and its reliability as a protector and trading partner. In light of this discussion, in the next section, I will explore the correlation between public opinion and trade friction through statistical analysis. In the following section, I will explore non-quantifiable factors which have caused positive and negative spikes in polls.

**ECONOMIC FACTORS (QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS)**

As I have explored in the previous section, trade friction has been a major source of conflict in U.S.-Japanese relations. To test the extent to which public opinion has been influenced by economic trade, I conducted a statistical analysis of trade balance and public perceptions of the other nation.

**Methodology**

I used linear regression analysis to survey whether there was correlation between U.S.-Japanese economic relations and public perception of the other country. I conducted two separate analyses: one on the correlation between Japanese perceptions of the United States and the Japanese trade balance to the United States, and the second on the correlation between American perceptions of Japan and the American trade balance to Japan.
As a quantifiable variable of public perception towards the other country, I used the data from the Yomiuri-Gallup Survey from 1979 to 2016, polled in the last quarter of every year.\textsuperscript{11} Since the survey was not done in the years 1996 and 2012 due to the American presidential elections, I substituted the two with polling data from March in the following year. Also note that the survey method from 1978 to 1999 was face-to-face interview, while from 1999 onwards, the method was phone interview. The specific polling data cited in this analysis was the answer to the question, “Do you think U.S.-Japan relations are good or poor?” While the answers were divided between “very good,” “good,” “poor,” “very poor,” and “not sure,” I used the sum of “very good” and “good” as the variable indicating positive public perception on the other country.

For the data of the United States trade balance to Japan, I used the official numbers from the United States Bureau of Consensus’s \textit{Statistical Abstract of the United States} from the years 1979 to 2016. For that of Japanese trade balance to the United States, I used official numbers from Index’s \textit{Financial and Economic Statistics JAPAN (1960-2000)} for years 1979 to 2000 and Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO)’s statistics from 2001 to 2016. I set the range from 1979 to 2016 because the data of Japanese trade balance to the United States was only recorded from 1979.

In conducting the linear regression analysis, I set the standard deviation of the U.S. trade balance to Japan’s (Japanese trade balance to the United States) as the dependent variable, and the standard variation of the percentage of those who answered, “very good” and “good” in the Yomiuri-Gallup Survey as the independent variable.

\textit{Results}

The results show a relatively low statistical correlation between trade balance and public opinion. The linear regression of the Japan to the United States was 0.212105 and United States to Japan was 0.037901 (see Figures 1 and 2 in the Appendix).

Figure 3 and 4 chart the relationship between trade balance and public opinion. Figure 3 shows the U.S. trade balance to Japan (USD Million) and American public opinion, while Figure

\textsuperscript{11} I would like to thank the Polling Section of Yomiuri Shimbun for providing this data from the Yomiuri-Gallup Poll.
4 shows Japanese trade balance to the United States (JPN 100 Million) and Japanese public opinion. It is noticeable that the Figure 4 (Japan) shows a higher correlation between the two factors while Figure 3 (United States) reveals a wide gap between economic trade balance and public perception especially from 1996 onwards. It can be predicted that the two nations may have moved onto a different stage in their relationship during this time.

Indeed, the U.S.-Japan trade friction that defined the relationship in the 1980s and 1990s temporarily cooled down in 1996, with the culmination of a contentious semiconductor trade conflict and a relatively well-performing American economy. The new agreement replaced the Semiconductor Agreement of 1986, which had set a 20 percent target for the foreign share of Japan’s market. The treaty had angered the Japanese industry for being overly intrusive while satisfying the United States as an effective trade agreement. The new Joint Statement released in August 1996 mentioned nothing on trade access and simply specified the roles of the two governments to review market trends, cooperative activities, and government policies related to the semiconductor industry. Leaders of each nation had expressed their satisfaction with the new policy; Ira Shapiro, senior counsel for the U.S. Trade Representative said, “We see the progress of recent years as somewhat fragile and we wanted to keep some counterweight…This gives us access to the data and it keeps the spotlight on the issue. If we see a pattern, we can address it,” while Japan’s Minister of International Trade and Industry remarked, “We have put an end to the system of managed trade…We have created a multilateral framework of cooperation that is appropriate for the new era.”

If 1996 was a turning point for U.S.-Japan relations, post-1996 public perceptions of the other country reveal a gradual improvement from pre-1996 perceptions. In Japan, the average of those who answered U.S.-Japan relations as “very good” or “good” were 39.4 in 1979 to 1995, while it increased to 43.4 from 1996 to 2017. The same pattern goes for the United States, in which the average of those who answered U.S.-Japan relations as “very good” or “good” were 48.2 in 1979 to 1995, while it increased to 52.8 from 1996 to 2017.

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12 Yomiuri Shimbun (03-17-1997).
15 Ibid.
I draw two conclusions from this statistical analysis. One is that Japanese perception of the United States is more related to economic factors than so that of the United States. Second is that while economics and trade do have a loose effect on the public perception of U.S.-Japan relations, they are not sufficient in explaining how the opinions are created. Since these analyses indicate how economy is not a primary determinant for public opinion formulation, I will explore non-quantifiable factors in the following section.

**POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FACTORS (QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS)**

To identify an overhauling trend in the formulation of public opinion on U.S.-Japan relations, I conducted a qualitative analysis using survey data from past Yomiuri-Gallup polls.

**Methodology**

I conducted research on the online databases for Yomiuri Shimbun, Yomidasu Reishikan, concentrating on the 1979 to 2016, the same period as the statistical analysis. For the purpose of this paper, I translated my findings into English. To research, I used the keyword “日米共同世論調査” [“Japan-U.S. Joint Public Survey”] to find 28 articles published annually on the contents of the Yomiuri-Gallup survey. Upon identifying trends, I looked through academic writings and historical accounts to find evidence to support my case.

**Results**

I found three primary trends which explain the formulation of public opinion in Japan and the United States toward the other country: first, the more amicable the personal relationship of between the United States President and the Japanese Prime Minister are, the better the polls; second, the more powerful the third party the stronger the public perceives the U.S.-Japan alliance; third, political incidents and scandals only have a transient effect on polls.

First, the chemistry between American and Japanese leaders and their policies seems to have an impact on how people of one country perceives the other. When President Ronald Reagan came into office, he had campaigned for a “Strong America” that does not yield to
Japanese economic strength and fights for equal footing in security initiatives. His stance and words incited the American public’s demands for Japan to take a greater role in security affairs. That year, only 47 percent of the American respondents said that U.S.-Japan relations were “very good” or “good,” the lowest in five years. The Japanese respondents scored even lower at 37 percent, feeling threatened by Reagan’s strong rhetoric to restructure U.S.-Japan security relations. For example, Reagan’s urges for Japan to increase its military expense rate to over 1 percent of the GNP was only supported by 10 percent of respondents according to the same poll. However, in 1983, the numbers strike back up again (the U.S. to 64 percent and Japan to 48 percent) due to the budding friendship between Ronald Reagan and new Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, or what was cordially-called the “Ron-Yasu” relationship.

Nakasone’s speeches during his trip to the United States described the two nations as bound together in a “common destiny” or unmei-kyōdōtai, and this boosted both American and Japanese optimism for a close partnership. The second drop in polls occurred when Nakasone stepped down from the seat of Prime Minister in 1987, possibly indicating the public’s concern with the next leader.

Another example is the close relationship between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi from 2001 to 2006. Throughout this period, the U.S. respondents who said U.S.-Japan relations were “very good” or “good” averaged at around 60 percent and Japanese respondents at 50 percent, with consistent high scores. Similar to the “Ron-Yasu” relationship, Bush-Koizumi connected on a personal level, discussing Western movies on the side of diplomatic negotiations. In one case, Koizumi described the United States and Japan’s relationship with Elvis song “I Want You, I Need You, I Love You,” which he reportedly sang in front of President Bush.

Meanwhile, President Barack Obama had a negative relationship with the three prime ministers of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), Yukio Hatoyama, Kan Naoto, and Yoshihiko Noda between the years 2009 and 2011. Contrasting with the Bush-Koizumi years, the positive perceptions are down by 10 points for both countries; U.S. respondents who said U.S.-Japan

16 Yomiuri Shimbun (11-22-1982).
17 Ibid.
18 Yomiuri Shimbun (11-08-1983).
19 Yomiuri Shimbun (12-14-2007).
relations were “very good” or “good” averaged at around 50 percent and Japanese respondents at 40 percent. President Barack Obama first had sour relations with Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama regarding the controversial United States Marine Corps Air Station Futenma relocation issue.\(^{21}\) It was even hinted by some media outlets that President Barack Obama contributed to Hatoyama’s quick resignation.\(^{22}\) The rest of the DPJ leaders failed to connect with Obama on a personal level, and this period was overshadowed by the Futenma debacle. Even when the strength of the U.S.-Japan relationship was reaffirmed with the United States military’s assistance during the disaster relief efforts of the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, the “very good” and “good” evaluation of the alliance still hovered at 52 points in the United States and 35 in Japan.\(^{23}\) In Japan, the percentage of people thinking the alliance was “poor” or “very poor” was at 41 points, surpassing “very good” and “good” by 6 points. However, when the Liberal Democratic Party with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe came back to power in 2012, upholding the mission to rebuild and strengthen U.S.-Japan relations, the public perception of the relationship experienced an uptick. These three case studies show how the closer the personal relationship between the leaders, the better outlook people have on the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Second, the presence of a third party strengthens the perceptions of the bilateral relationship between the United States and Japan. The public tends to view bilateral relations more importantly under the threat of a third power. Until the collapse of the Cold War, threat from the Soviet Union connected the two nations. From the early-to mid-1990s, the United States and Japan searched for a common goal and new purpose for the alliance. A 1995 article from Yomiuri Shimbun suggests, for example, that the stagnation of people’s perception towards the U.S.-Japan relationship can be attributed to the loss of a common target (the Soviet Union) which instilled the sense of crisis due to the end of the Cold War structure, while trade friction worsened, undermining both states’ institutional foundations.\(^{24}\) In the mid-1990s, as the economic and military rise of China became more evident, and the alliance consolidated once more:

During the Cold War, the primary purpose of the U.S.-Japan alliance was to contain the Soviet Union and, if necessary, to defend Japan. The collapse of the Soviet


\(^{22}\) Ibid.

\(^{23}\) Yomiuri Shimbun (12-18-2011).

\(^{24}\) Yomiuri Shimbun (12-07-1995).
Union shifted American concerns in Asia to broader issues affecting regional stability and security...At the April 1996 bilateral summit in Tokyo, President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto reaffirmed the continuing relevance of the alliance in the 21st century. The two leaders issued a Joint Declaration on the alliance, and the prime minister also committed his government to review Japan’s Defense Policy Guidelines. China reacted strongly to what it perceived to be a broadening of the scope of the alliance in the Joint Declaration’s reference to shared U.S.-Japan interests in a ‘peaceful resolution of problems in the region.’

The polls affirm this pattern, as a dip in the percentage of American and Japanese respondents who said U.S.-Japan relations were “very good” or “good” is seen between 1990, when the Cold War structure was crumbling to extinction, and 1996, the year in which the leaders of the United States and Japan redefined the alliance with the purpose of keeping East Asian security. This is the same year in which China first held military demonstrations in response to the Taiwanese presidential elections and nuclear weapon experiments. The evaluation towards the relationship continues with an upwards trend passing 1999, when the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation were renewed in May. Meanwhile, distrust towards Chinese militarization increased in both nations, however more so in the United States.

While the looming power of China shows a gradual trend over years, third party threats felt directly by the public have caused an obvious spike in the public perception of the necessity of the U.S.-Japan alliance. From the American polls, the two high points of the perception of U.S.-Japan relations is 1983 at 64 points and 2001 at 72 points. Common in these two years are that Americans experienced domestic threats from a hostile power and saw the Japanese self-defense forces cooperate with the United States. First in 1983, the United States was threatened by the Soviet Union, when civilian aircraft Korean Air Lines Flight 007, en route from Anchorage, Alaska to Seoul, South Korea, was shot down by a Soviet Su-15 interceptor, killing all 269 passengers and crew on board. The USSR claimed that the airliner had penetrated restricted Soviet airspace over a sensitive military area located in Sakhalin Island.

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26 Yomiuri Shimbun (03-17-1997).
29 Ibid.
to this devastation, the Japanese provided confidential information to the United States on the issue, and they united in an anti-Soviet Union campaign, contributing to the favorable polls.30

A clearer example is 2001, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Although the United States perception towards the U.S.-Japan alliance had been experiencing an upwards trend before 2001 due to the increasing threat perception from China, after 9/11, the polls reach an unprecedented high at 72 percent of respondents answering that the current U.S-Japan relationship is “very good” or “good.” With the United States being under such a grave threat for the first time in decades, Prime Minister Koizumi’s swift response to 9/11 in passing the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law boosted the United States’ image of Japan as a reliable ally.31 The law allowed for the dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces to the Indian Ocean, for the purposes of “cooperation and support,” “search and rescue,” and “relief activities” to back the United States’ effort to counter terrorism.32

Third, political incidents that undermine trust in the other nation have only a temporary effect on the public perception of the alliance. One example is 1982, when the polls experienced its first dip. Combined with Ronald Reagan’s strong campaign rhetoric against Japanese trade policy previously mentioned, this year had the “IBM Industrial Spy Incident,” in which IBM and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) cooperated in a sting operation and caught Japanese companies Hitachi Ltd., and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation attempting to steal IBM technology.33 Under lingering trade tensions, this event strengthened the “unfair Japan” narrative in the United States, while eliciting anger and shame in Japan, some publications accusing IBM and the FBI of entrapment.34 However, by the next year, the people’s prospect on the relations had recovered.

Another example is in 1987, when the polls dip once more along with Nakasone’s end of term. A cause was the Toshiba-Kongsberg scandal, in which it was revealed that Japan’s Toshiba and Norway’s Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik had been selling advanced technology equipment to the Soviet Union in violation of the regulations of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral

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30 Yomiuri Shimbun (11-08-1983).
31 Yomiuri Shimbun (11-30-2001).
Export Controls (Cocom), an agreement led by the United States to prohibit exports of sophisticated technology to Communist nations. The event provoked outrage once more in the United States, as exemplified by an incident in which three politicians sledgehammered a Toshiba radio outside the Capitol. The Japanese public responded with “a strong, defensive condemnation of American scapegoating of Toshiba, seen as arising from trade friction and the loss of U.S. competitiveness in high technology…the punishment was seen as unfair and motivated by anti-Japan sentiment.” As seen with the IBM spy incident, however, polls recover to 1986 standards by 1988, indicating how scandalous incidents have only an ephemeral effect on public perception. It can be concluded that while these civil-level incidents do sway public opinion of the other country to a certain degree, the relationship of the heads of state may have a stronger influence in creating an image of the wellbeing of an alliance.

A third example is from 1995, when the infamous Okinawan rape incident led to widespread anti-American protests in Japan. Three American servicemen raped a fifteen-year old Okinawan girl in September 1995. This incident had an impact exclusively on the Japanese poll, as in 1995, it became the first time that “poor” and “very poor” surpassed “very good” and “good” in the Japanese perception of U.S.-Japan relations. American polls also showed a low evaluation of U.S.-Japan relations, but most cited economic friction and not the rape case, which many were not aware of. Following the incident, the Japanese opinion towards the United States military plummeted. With the backdrop of questionable necessity of the U.S.-Japan alliance after the end of the Cold War, the Japanese public erupted with anger and started to ask whether United States military bases in Japan were still necessary. However, the polls rose once more in 1996, from 23 points to 46 in Japan and 29 to 46 in the United States. As previously mentioned, 1996 was the year in which China started to show its military power, as well as when trade relations became better with the signing of the 1996 trade pact. The overarching trends previously mentioned and the presence of a third power and resolution of trade friction, overrode the anti-American sentiment from the incident.

CONCLUSION

In this essay, I have identified three trends in the formulation of American and Japanese perceptions toward the U.S.-Japan alliance: the existence of economic friction, the personal relationships of the heads of state, and the presence of a third power threat. Economic friction subsided in 1996, leading to an overall improvement of the perception of U.S.-Japan relations. The strong personal relationships between Reagan and Nakasone and Bush and Koizumi improved the polls while Obama’s rocky relationship with the three DPJ leaders lowered them. Third power threats from the Soviet Union, China and terrorist organizations, which called for a stronger military alliance between the United States and Japan, contributed to a good impression of the other country.

Considering these three factors, the U.S.-Japan alliance will most likely continue to have good reviews with the new Abe-Trump relationship, set in the increasingly unstable situation of East Asia with China and North Korea. A point of apprehension is President Trump’s protectionist trade policies, which may cause rifts in the economic relationship. To maintain an amicable U.S.-Japan relationship that is supported by the public, both President Trump and Prime Minister Abe need to craft a common ground on trade, strengthen the security alliance, and continue their display of personal friendship.
APPENDIX

Figure 1. Japanese Perception of the U.S. and Japanese Trade Balance to the United States

Figure 2. American Perception of Japan and American Trade Balance to Japan
Figure 3. U.S. Trade Balance to Japan vs. Americans' Feelings toward Japan

Figure 4: Japanese Trade Balance to the U.S. vs. Japanese's Feelings Towards the U.S.
COLD WAR AND POST-COLD WAR ROGUES: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY RESPONSES TO CHINA’S AND NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS

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Through analysis of once classified documents, this paper assesses U.S. foreign policy responses to rogue nuclear states in both the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. It argues that the U.S. response to the development of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program in the 1990s and early 2000s reflects both a Cold War response—as defined by the U.S. approach to China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons in the 1960s—and a post-Cold War response—one more fitting of a nonpolar world order. In short, the paper asserts that the Clinton and Bush administrations vacillated between a Cold War and post-Cold War approach in responding to North Korea’s nascent nuclear capabilities, providing an important historical analysis that can inform contemporary policymakers as they respond to a now nuclearized North Korea. The paper begins by providing context on the development of nuclear programs in both China and North Korea. Utilizing declassified, U.S. government documents, it then provides an overview and analysis of America’s Cold War response to a nuclear rogue as a gauge in demonstrating its mixed response to a post-Cold War nuclear rogue. The paper ends by recommending a future path for America’s approach to the North Korean nuclear crisis, one entirely distinct from its Cold War strategy.

INTRODUCTION

The United States became the world’s first nuclear weapons state on July 16, 1945. Today, eight other states possess nuclear weapons stockpiles, with only five of the nine—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States—recognized as Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The other four states—India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea—maintain nuclear weapons programs as non-member states to the NPT.1 The international system, however, de facto considers only North Korea to be a “nuclear rogue,” a country that attempts to challenge the global order by developing nuclear weapons capabilities.2 It is not the first, however, to be considered a rogue state—even among the five recognized NWS. Just as North Korea has been viewed as a nuclear

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1 North Korea acceded to the NPT in 1985 only to withdraw its membership in 2003.
2 While the concept “rogue state” has shifted meaning since the end of the Cold War, this paper will utilize the term consistently across the Chinese and North Korean case studies. See Litwak (2000).
rogue in the post-Cold War period for its development of a nuclear weapons program, so too was China considered a rogue state during the Cold War for acquiring its nuclear weapons capabilities.

Through analysis of once classified documents, this paper assesses U.S. foreign policy responses to rogue nuclear states in both the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. It argues that the U.S. response to the development of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program in the 1990s and early 2000s reflects both a Cold War response—as defined by the U.S. approach to China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons in the 1960s—and a post-Cold War response—one more fitting of a non-bipolar world order. In short, the paper asserts that the Clinton and Bush administrations vacillated between a Cold War and post-Cold War approach in responding to North Korea’s nascent nuclear capabilities, providing an important historical analysis that can inform contemporary policymakers as they respond to a now nuclearized North Korea.

America’s Cold War approach fundamentally rested in the bipolarity of the international system, where the United States and Soviet Union played central roles in all international issues, regardless of apparent geographic interest and often as a result of rigid alliance patterns. Issues between the two states took precedence above all else, and deterrence—a policy by which nuclear states do not strike one another for fear of an in kind response—undergirded U.S. nuclear strategies. Its post-Cold War response is characterized by a willingness to work outside of great power politics—utilizing multilateral settings, in particular—and rigid alliance structures, shifting away from these two dominating forces that ultimately lead to a continued strategy of deterrence.

The paper begins by providing context on the development of nuclear programs in both China and North Korea, paying particular attention to the rogue status of each and the structural realities of developing nuclear capabilities in Cold War and post-Cold War environments. Utilizing declassified U.S. government documents, it then provides an overview and analysis of America’s Cold War response to a nuclear rogue as a gauge in demonstrating its mixed response to a post-Cold War nuclear rogue. The paper ends by recommending a future path for America’s approach to the North Korean nuclear crisis: the United States should adopt a policy entirely distinct from its Cold War strategy, one better fit for the post-Cold War period.

3 This paper utilized collections from the Wilson Center’s Nuclear Proliferation International History Project and the National Security Archive.
THE NUCLEAR PROGRAMS

A Cold War Nuclear Rogue

Before the People’s Republic of China (PRC) became a recognized nuclear state in 1968, the United States—and the international system as a whole—saw it as a rogue actor, a communist nation seeking to disrupt the bipolar balance of power central to the Cold War.\(^4\) The Kennedy administration and later the Johnson administration took great interest in China’s development of the bomb. Both presidents had to decide whether or not—and how—to respond to the East Asian nuclear weapons program, taking into consideration the geopolitical context of the early 1960s.

This decade marked a period of high tension between the United States and Soviet Union as the two continued to face off in the ideological struggle that defined the Cold War. The bipolarity that defined the Cold War had hardened, with the United States and Soviets each working to advance their weapons and technological capabilities vis-à-vis the other while simultaneously solidifying their spheres of influence. The United States became the champion of democracy and capitalism while the Soviets declared themselves the leaders of the communist world. While both faced resistance from states seeking to remove themselves from a potential proxy crossfire between the two superpowers, nearly all states came to fall in one of the two superpower camps. But China stood uniquely in its resistance of both the United States and Soviet Union, on the one hand rejecting an oppressive West and on the other pushing back against the Soviet Union’s dominance of communism.\(^5\) In rejecting both superpowers while seeking to advance its own position in the international system, China became a rogue state by challenging the fundamental bipolarity of the Cold War system. And due to its efforts to acquire the bomb—a clear interest since the late 1950s—it became a nuclear rogue.

\(^4\) While the NPT recognized China as a NWS since it acquired nuclear weapons capabilities prior to July 1, 1976, China did not sign or ratify the treaty until 1992. Beijing refused to sign the treaty when it first opened for signatures in 1968, arguing that it was “discriminatory” (Kimball and Reif 2017).

\(^5\) Throughout the Cold War, China and the Soviet Union appeared to be natural allies and partners. Both increasingly powerful, communist nations, the two stood to benefit from working together in the ideological battle against the capitalist United States and its western allies. But in reality, the two faced an ideological battle amongst themselves, at odds in their views of the future of communism. This made for an uneasy relationship, with China not truly a part of the Soviet’s sphere of influence but an ostensible partner nonetheless.
Before the Sino-Soviet split hardened, though, China turned to the Soviet Union for assistance when it decided to pursue a nuclear weapons program. This appeared at odds with China’s motivation for developing the bomb—to avoid being “bullied” in “today’s world,” recognition of the dominance of the two superpowers and China’s increasing intention to alter that reality. This dynamic demonstrates the difficulty of breaking out of the powerful, dominating structure of the international system. Even while attempting to change the global nuclear balance, China tried to work within the Cold War framework. While at first the Soviets appeared committed to helping the Chinese develop the capabilities to produce fissionable material, other geopolitical considerations took precedence, causing the Soviets to renege.

Without dedicated support from the Soviets, and, more importantly, victim to what Nie Rongzhen, a prominent Chinese military leader, called a “stranglehold” on technical development, the Chinese sought an independent path towards nuclear weapons. In fact, the Soviets’ lack of support became an “impetus” for the Chinese to “strive even more resolutely for independence and autonomy and self-reliance in science and technology.” Premier Zhou Enlai explained that the Chinese objective was “to bring about the total prohibition and complete elimination of nuclear weapons and to break the nuclear monopoly of the big nuclear powers.” According to this perspective, since the destructive force of nuclear weapons could affect all states, “[s]mall and large countries both have the right to express their views” in international

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7 In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Soviets were in the midst of trilateral discussions on a nuclear test ban with the United States and United Kingdom. The Soviet Central Committee explained to their Chinese counterparts that “… if the Western countries should learn that the Soviet Union is giving a sample nuclear weapon and design technical data to China, they may seriously wreck all the efforts undertaken by the socialist countries to strive for peace and to relax the tense international situation” (Central Committee of the Communist Part of the Soviet Union [CCCPUS] 1959). That said, the Soviets did offer a nuclear umbrella to China and “all countries in the entire socialist camp,” including North Korea (CCCPUS 1959). This was no small gesture, but one that did not satisfy the Chinese.


9 Ibid.

The Chinese government thus saw its weapons program as a check on nuclear powers, emphasizing its rejection of the bipolar world order.

It did recognize, however, that its arsenal could not match that of any other nuclear-capable state, especially that of the United States, which had 29,463 active nuclear weapons in 1964. Recognizing the great likelihood of a perpetual asymmetric relationship to the U.S. arsenal, Mao nonetheless pursued a weapons program to increase the PRC’s “international prestige… and… leadership.” This too became an important motivating factor in the development of China’s nuclear capabilities, an opportunity to advance its position in the international system, not just as a state standing up against the nuclear monopoly of great powers, but as an increasingly important, great player itself.

Driven by these factors, China successfully tested its first nuclear weapon on October 16, 1964. The official PRC statement declaring the successful test reiterated China’s intentions for developing the bomb, specifically citing the “increasing nuclear threat posed by the United States” as the reason why China was “forced” to develop a nuclear weapons program. Despite its procurement of the bomb, the statement also affirmed China’s commitment to a no first use policy and reiterated its two-fold goal of breaking the nuclear monopoly and eliminating nuclear weapons altogether:

The atom bomb is a paper tiger… This was our view in the past and this is still our view at present. China is developing nuclear weapons not because we believe in the omnipotence of nuclear weapons and that China plans to use nuclear weapons. The truth is exactly to the contrary. In developing nuclear weapons, China's aim is to break the nuclear monopoly of the nuclear powers and to eliminate nuclear weapons.

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11 Ibid.
15 “The Chinese Government hereby solemnly declares that China will never at any time and under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons” (Government of the People’s Republic of China 1964); “Statement of the Government of the People’s Republic of China.”
Since the Korean War ended only in an armistice in 1953, merely a temporary—rather than permanent—peace has held.\(^{16}\) As a result, North Korea remains prepared for the resurgence of war, and, as early as the 1970s, prepared for a resurgence to be nuclear. In 1976, for example, the Hungarian ambassador to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) reported that the North Koreans believe that “[i]f war occurs… it will be waged with nuclear weapons, rather than conventional ones.”\(^{17}\) The North Koreans prepared for such an outcome by building up fortifications, moving factories underground and ensuring key infrastructure had branches of “subterranean cave networks.”\(^{18}\) But because they lived under the Soviet’s nuclear umbrella, the DPRK did not pursue the advancement of its own nuclear force—that is, until after 1991.

The North Korean nuclear program is a product of the post-Cold War period. Without a nuclear umbrella—and with increasingly dire domestic realities—the North Korean regime viewed itself as intolerably insecure in the international system.\(^{19}\) In the early 1990s immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States became the unipolar power, the “winner” of the Cold War and thus an assumed fundamental threat to the remnants of the communist world. But in order to live up to its proclaimed ideology, the United States took on the role of benevolent hegemon, one working to create a liberal international order that would advance the collective interests of all states. By the early 2000s, the United States no longer ruled over a unipolar system, instead becoming a player—albeit, a critically important player—in a nonpolar world, one in which many actors possess and exercise “various kinds of power.”\(^{20}\) This “newer world order” is characterized by multiple centers of power where no single or small group of states exercises total control—a direct contrast to the bipolar Cold War world order.\(^{21}\)

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\(^{16}\) Because of the on-going and extremely isolated nature of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program, some of the information regarding North Korea’s motivations, methods and postures has been collected from statements outside of the specific period in question (i.e. before 1991 or after 2008). This is avoided where possible.


\(^{18}\) Ibid.

\(^{19}\) With the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea no longer fell within the Soviet’s “socialist camp.” And because China continued to maintain a small arsenal, it did not extend a nuclear umbrella to its increasingly problematic neighbor.


\(^{21}\) Ibid.
North Korea remained a small, isolated state, increasingly vulnerable to domestic unrest and external threats, especially in regards to U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea. By the end of the Cold War, North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung started taking more explicit steps towards developing a nuclear arsenal, only solidifying the DPRK’s status as a rogue state for its now attempted nuclear resistance to the global order. Negotiations with the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations in the early 1990s—which aimed to convince the North Koreans that they had more security and economic support to gain should they stop developing nuclear weapons—did delay these efforts. But as evidenced by the six nuclear tests the DPRK has conducted since 2003, those delays ultimately proved futile in preventing a nuclear North Korea.

As leader of the DPRK from 1997-2011, Kim Jong-Il oversaw the early technical development of the North Korean nuclear program. A key motivating factor in the development of the program was his military-first policy of sŏn'gun, in which a military-centered economy became the foundation of North Korean society. The nuclear program played a central role in the advancement of this policy. By committing himself to the development of the program, Kim Jong-Il demonstrated a clear “dedication to providing national security against external threats” and providing the army with “priority access to the state’s scarce resources.” Thus the policy of sŏn'gun—and the nuclear program by extension—became a fundamental factor in the maintenance and consolidation of Kim Jong-Il’s power.

Identifying further motivation for the development of the North Korean nuclear weapons program requires looking at more recent statements coming from the isolated nation. In a speech to the Worker’s Party in 2016, Kim Jong-Un stated, “We will comply sincerely with our international commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and strive to achieve the denuclearization

22 The death of Kim Il-Sung, who had ruled North Korea from 1948 to 1994, devastated the nation built around a cult of personality. He had appointed his son successor years before, but it took nearly three years for Kim Jong-Il to consolidate his power and officially take on the position of General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea.

23 Benjamin Habib, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Programme and the Maintenance of the Sŏn'gun System, The Pacific Review Volume 24 (2011): 43-64, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09512748.2011.554992; While Kim Jong-Il’s relationship with the North Korean military elite remains a contested topic, it was in the autocratic leader’s interest to maintain good relations with the military, the only body in the state that could undermine his power; the military, while necessary to maintain his power, posed the greatest domestic threat to Kim Jong-Il.

24 Under his son and successor, Kim Jong-Un, the sŏn'gun policy has developed into the policy of byungjin, by which the state pursues a two-pronged goal of economic development and nuclear advancement.
of the world.”

This rhetoric accompanied a declaration that the DPRK’s weapons program is meant to be a “strong nuclear deterrent” against the United States, supporting earlier statements, like one released by the Korean Central News Agency on September 30, 2009, arguing that “[the] dismantlement [of the North Korean nuclear program] is unthinkable even in a dream as long as there exist the sources that compelled it to have access to nukes.”

Thus resistance to the status quo of nuclear world order—in which only the recognized NWS possess nuclear arsenals—undergirds North Korea’s motivations to acquire nuclear capabilities, solidifying its status as a nuclear rogue.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY RESPONSES

China: A Resurgence of Deterrence

The United States considered the PRC an aggressive and expansionist state in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It attacked India in 1962, continuously threatened Taiwan, and supported North Vietnam and North Korea. Even more, Kennedy and Johnson viewed China’s leadership as “extremist and irrational,” where fundamental “U.S. Cold War strategies of containment and deterrence would not apply.” Both administrations viewed China as a rogue state, one whose development of a nuclear weapons program proved extremely threatening to the security of the United States and its Cold War allies. But by the end of the Johnson administration, China was recognized as a NWS by the NPT, with deterrence underpinning its increasingly normalized relations with the United States and growing presence on the world stage.

Burr and Richelson provide a robust analysis of declassified documents that disclose the Kennedy administration’s assessment of and response to the Chinese nuclear threat.

27 This despite the three other non-recognized states that possess nuclear weapons.
29 Ibid.
30 Burr and Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle.’
initiated massive intelligence efforts to learn more about China’s progress in developing the bomb. While aerial images provided some knowledge, human and communications intelligence provided little insight into the secretive program. The Kennedy administration struggled to collect useful intelligence on China’s development, with one report claiming that United States intelligence on the program “is fragmentary[,] as is our information about the nature and extent of Soviet aid.” That did not stop the administration, though, from drawing wide and pressing conclusions about the development of the Chinese program. One adviser saw a potential Chinese nuclear test as “as likely to be historically the most significant and worst event of the 1960s.”

Goldstein too provides insight on the US response to the Chinese threat, revealing that Kennedy pursued joint action with the Soviets, but to no avail. The attempt to secure Soviet assistance at a time of heightened tensions between the two superpowers demonstrated how seriously Kennedy viewed the threat of a nuclear China, and his recognition of the realities of a bipolar system: the most effective outcomes could only come from collective action by the two superpowers. He “believed that Chinese nuclear weapons would alter the balance of power in Asia” and that “all of Southeast Asia would fall to the Chinese Communists.” With that fear driving him and the Soviet’s refusal to engage in a joint response, Kennedy began to seriously consider military options, even “absent of complete information on the Chinese nuclear plan and without a thorough analysis of the likely impact of China’s nuclear progress.”

There were, however, dissenting voices within the executive branch that called for a less drastic, dangerous, and politically risky response to China’s nuclear development. Robert Johnson, a Policy Planning Council staffer, composed numerous research papers on the topic. While he wrote the first of his studies while Kennedy was still president, his insights did not take hold until Lyndon B. Johnson assumed the presidency. These reports became the foundation of a “non-alarmist” position in which policymakers questioned if a Chinese nuclear program posed a significant enough threat to the United States to merit a firm response. In one study, Robert Johnson asserts that because of the asymmetric nature of U.S. and Chinese nuclear capabilities,
the United States need not expend significant political, military and economic costs in order to prevent the final development of the Chinese weapons program.\textsuperscript{36} He argues in another paper that, “the significance of [a Chinese nuclear] capability is not such as to justify the undertaking of actions which would involve great political costs or high military risks.”\textsuperscript{37}

Johnson’s studies instead focused on the psychological effects the development of the Chinese program would have on a global audience:

The ChiComs will value their nuclear capability… for its psychological effects in weakening the will of countries resisting insurgency, in inhibiting their requests for U.S. assistance and in stimulating and exploiting divisions within Asia and between Asian countries and the West. It will be used to put political pressure on the U.S. military presence and to obtain support for Chinese acknowledgement of claims to preeminence in Asia and status as a world power.\textsuperscript{38}

The biggest challenge Johnson thus identified was maintaining the morale of allied states in Asia and elsewhere.

Importantly, Johnson also identified the likely Soviet reaction to a nuclearized China. He claimed that “[t]he USSR will be concerned that a nuclear capability will increase [Beijing’s] prestige and influence in the Communist world,” making it in the Soviets’ interest to ensure that the Chinese nuclear threat does not escalate.\textsuperscript{39} That assessment only strengthened Johnson’s argument for limiting the United States’ response—and in particular, his argument against preemptive action—as he claimed that the United States “distinguish[es] the problem of nuclear deterrence of Communist China from that of [the] USSR.”\textsuperscript{40} Thus Johnson relied on a Cold War narrative in arguing for a non-alarmist approach to China’s development of weapons program: the Chinese threat pales in comparison to the overarching Soviet threat, so greater attention and resources must be devoted to the latter.


\textsuperscript{39} Robert H. Johnson, "A Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation and Nuclear Capability\textquotedblright; 3.

\textsuperscript{40} Robert H. Johnson, “Thursday Planning Group Discussion,” 2.
In response—with the Vietnam War looming and an election approaching—President Johnson adopted a markedly different approach from Kennedy’s, moving away from military options. When China tested its first weapon in October 1964, Johnson issued a “reassuring statement” in which he reaffirmed “defense commitments to Asia.” He fulfilled those commitments by commencing deterrent submarine missions in the Pacific to patrol “new threat targets,” but overall maintained a “relatively restrained” response to China’s nuclear progress. So despite former claims by Kennedy and Johnson officials that the traditional, Cold War strategy would not work against this rogue state, deterrence ultimately became the U.S. policy towards China’s nuclear weapons program.

And it worked despite America’s preoccupation with the Vietnam War and China’s potential role as a North Vietnamese ally. By 1966, the Johnson administration took solace in three realities:

[F]irst, China’s bomb had not been accompanied by more aggressive behavior by Beijing, as had been feared; second, Sino–Soviet relations continued to worsen; and third, intelligence estimates claimed that the Chinese would not have either ICBMs or thermonuclear warheads until the early 1970s at the earliest.

North Korea: A Mixed Response

Throughout the Cold War, the United States had made its position on the Korean peninsula clear: it supported the non-violent reunification of the two Koreas under the rule of the Republic of Korea (ROK). By 1991, though, the United States recognized that the end of the Cold War presented an opportunity for it to update its policy in order to decrease the likelihood of a violent, final resolution to the Korean War. While the first Bush administration initiated this effort, it received extreme pushback from the North Koreans who took great issue with the close relationship between the United States and South Korea, especially in military terms. By 1993, when Clinton assumed the presidency, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) suspected that North Korea was storing nuclear waste, evidence that it was not complying with

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41 Burr and Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle,’” 92.
42 Lyle J. Goldstein, “When China was a ‘Rogue State,” 747; Ibid.
43 Lyle J. Goldstein, “When China was a ‘Rogue State,” 750-751; Johnson remained concerned, however, about the potential proliferating effects of the Chinese weapons program and the threat of proliferation overall in the international system. As a result, Johnson helped negotiate the most important advancement in global nuclear security—the NPT.
the NPT or the Joint Declaration it had signed with the South. The Clinton and second Bush administrations tried to address this issue and more as North Korea continued to pursue the development of weapons capabilities in the late 1990s and early 2000s, but both presidents were challenged to find responses fit for the post-Cold War period, struggling to break out of a Cold War approach to the nuclear crisis.

By 1994, the Clinton Administration had selected a diplomatic path in working to prevent North Korea from developing the bomb. Secretary of Defense William Perry, however, reassured the South Koreans of America’s commitment to their alliance. In April 1994, he stated that while diplomacy remained most “desirabl[e]... sanctions would be necessary” if that path failed. And because sanctions would raise risks, “force readiness must be maintained and deterrent ability improved for the combined [U.S.-ROK] forces.” This reassurance was reiterated during the U.S.-North Korean bilateral meeting in Geneva—and recognized as a critical factor in the dynamics of that meeting—as Ambassador Robert Gallucci delivered an opening speech that addressed final issues that had to be resolved before the United States and DPRK could come to a final agreement:

[The U.S.] and [DPRK] have agreed to address the nuclear issue in a broad and thorough manner, placing it in the broader context of political and economic relations between our two countries... In light of this, and in view of the strong ties and alliance that binds the U.S. and ROK, you should understand that we expect that progress between the U.S. and DPRK in implementing a broad and thorough settlement will be accompanied by progress in improved North-South relations.47

44 After the United States removed its nuclear weapons from South Korea in September 1991, the two Koreas signed the South-North Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Through this agreement, they pledged not to develop, test, deploy or use nuclear weapons (“Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” 1991).
46 Ibid.
47 The Secretary’s Morning Intelligence Report from July 23, 1994 stated that “Pyongyang understands that there is a link between a deterioration in North-South relations and US-DPRK talks and that a downturn in inter-Korean relations risks slowing progress in Geneva (“DPRK: Not Much Movement” 1994, 10). Even more, it recognized that “… the best way to ensure progress in US-DPRK talks was to engage the South” (“DPRK: Not Much Movement” 1994, 10); Amb. Galluci’s opening statement as September 21 U.S.-DPRK Talks,” September 24, 1994, National Security Archive, accessed December 12, 2017,https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB474/docs/19940924.pdf. From Cable US Mission Geneva 008198 to Secretary of State.
So even while the United States pursued bilateral negotiations with the North Koreans—a post-Cold War approach—the United States maintained a Cold War posture by continuing to emphasize and even prioritize deterrence reassurance for its regional ally.  

The result was the 1994 Agreed Framework, which stated that North Korea would freeze and eventually eliminate its nuclear facilities and allow the IAEA to verify its compliance. In return, the United States agreed to provide the north with heavy fuel oil and to help facilitate the construction of two light-water reactors that would equip the DPRK with nuclear energy capabilities. With progress on the implementation of the Agreed Framework well underway by 1996, the United States even expanded its goals, stating an express desire to “build on this foundation to address a wider range of issues with North Korea.” Part of this expanded initiative included implementing Four Party Talks between China, the DPRK, ROK and United States to come to the “adoption of tension-reduction measures… and confidence-building measure” between the states. While this approach appeared more fitting of the post-Cold War period for its development of a regional, multilateral body to address the nuclear issue, the fact that the United States played an integral role in its formulation points to vestiges of the Cold War. The United States continued to exercise power beyond its apparent regional interests in simultaneously exercising its—by then waning—hegemonic influence and reassuring its regional ally.

Perry recognized this tension between a Cold War and post-Cold War approach while conducting a review of U.S. policy towards North Korea in 1999. In talking points for his visit with North Korean officials in May 1999, Perry acknowledged the need to adapt to the post-Cold War world, even while maintaining—and perhaps repurposing—U.S. Cold War-era alliances:

After World War II, a key part of our Asian policy was to defend ourselves and our allies from the threat of attack by the Soviet Union or its allies… Since the fall of the Soviet Union… [t]hese alliance relationships are no longer fundamentally pointed at a single threat or any specific country. They are intended to enhance our

48 For nearly 60 years, the United States has extended its nuclear umbrella to South Korea as part of its “extended strategy of deterrence” (Roehrig 2017).
51 At that time, Perry no longer served as Secretary of Defense but as head of an outside North Korean policy review as requested by Congress and established by Clinton (Perry 2015, 161).
own security, the security of our treaty partners, and the overall security of Asia. These alliances are important to us, and we will preserve them.

Nevertheless, we realize that there have been great changes in the world, especially in Asia. The structures and patterns of diplomacy that emerged in the aftermath of World War II and evolved in the Cold War are no longer completely suited to the current situation, and will become increasingly less suitable as the years pass.\textsuperscript{52}

To better fit the post-Cold War era, Perry recommended pursuing a “two-path strategy,” by which the U.S. should first pursue a “new, comprehensive and integrated approach” to negotiations with the DPRK in assuring its “complete and verifiable… cessation… of destabilizing nuclear weapons and long-range missile programs.”\textsuperscript{53} In return, the U.S. and its allies would reduce pressures on the North Korean regime. However, this first path “depends on a willingness of the DPRK” to cooperate, and if North Korea chose not to, the U.S. would have to proceed down a second path “to contain the threat that [it had] been unable to eliminate through negotiation.”\textsuperscript{54}

Perry, however, completed his policy review as the Clinton administration began transitioning out of the White House and the George W. Bush administration transitioned in. Even though Secretary of State Madeleine Albright travelled to North Korea on a historic visit in October 2000, the United States failed to progress towards Perry’s recommendation of adopting a more appropriate, post-Cold War response to the North Korean nuclear issue. Even worse, by 2001, the Agreed Framework talks broke down and soon thereafter, President Bush identified North Korea as part of an “axis of evil;” together with Iraq and Iran. That designation, compounded by the fact that neither the United States nor the North Koreans were living up to their commitments under the framework, led to the dissolution of the agreement.

In 2003, the Bush administration recognized the need to engage with the North Koreans as they withdrew from the NPT and declared intentions to continue developing their nuclear weapons program. However, Bush refused to continue direct negotiations and instead “opted for a policy of military-political pressure vis-à-vis North Korea,” reminiscent of the U.S. Cold War


\textsuperscript{54} Ibid, 9.
strategy. With the help of China, the United States initiated the Six Party Talks, a multilateral, largely regionally-based forum through which China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Russia and the United States worked to try to resolve the nuclear issue. Bush maintained a hardline, demanding a “complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of the nuclear program first” before the United States or its allies would give humanitarian or economic aid to North Korea. This proved problematic as the North Koreans adamantly resisted the U.S. approach and the other powers all vied for their individual interests.

The Six Party Talks resulted in various near-agreements, one of the most far-reaching being the September 2005 Statement of Six. However, tensions continued to boil between the six states—namely the United States and DPRK—as interests clashed. By 2006, the North Koreans tested their first nuclear device, and while they continued to participate in the Six Party Talks until 2009, they reached no permanent agreements with the other states. As a result, North Korea moved forward with the development of its nuclear weapons program. While this forum was ultimately unsuccessful, by supporting this regional negotiation space, the Bush administration tried to reclaim a post-Cold War approach. But through its attempts at strong-arming the North Koreans throughout the process and its difficulty in balancing the voices of the other states at the table, the United States ultimately failed in this regard and reverted back to a Cold War response: remaining unengaged with nuclear rogues.

56 Ilsu Kim, “A Comparative Analysis,” 70.
58 This statement served as a starting point for continued step-by-step progress towards the resolution of the Korean nuclear crisis. It outlined five common understandings, including first and foremost that the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will be carried out solely by peaceful means” (Denisov 2007, 37).
59 As of October 2017, the DPRK had tested six nuclear weapons of various magnitudes.
60 Importantly, though, unlike its Cold War response to the Chinese nuclear weapons program, the United States has still maintained that North Korea is a nuclear rogue and has repeatedly called for the total denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and at minimum, a complete freeze of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs. It has, however, maintained a policy of deterrence by not engaging militarily with the North Koreans, instead relying on the threat of its nuclear arsenal in preventing a North Korean nuclear attack.
FUTURE OUTLOOKS

If the United States wants to prevent North Korea from becoming a tolerated—non-rogue—nuclear weapons state, then it needs to adopt a new policy distinct from its Cold War strategy. While the Kennedy administration contemplated military options in responding to a Cold War nuclear rogue, the Johnson administration eventually pursued a path of deterrence, recognizing the extreme costs of engaging with China in military, political, and economic terms and the greater attention and resources needed to combat the Soviet threat. The U.S. response to North Korea should be markedly different since the DPRK nuclear threat exists in a post-Cold War era, one now characterized by a nonpolar—rather than distinctly bipolar—world order. The Clinton administration attempted to respond appropriately through diplomatic engagement and the establishment of the 1994 Agreed Framework, but its continued emphasis on Cold War alliances and failure to live up to U.S. commitments undermined its efforts. The Bush administration outright rejected the Agreed Framework, taking a hardline stance even as it engaged in a multilateral forum with the DPRK. But while engaging in this forum did appear to be a post-Cold War approach, U.S. dominance in the regional group as well as its unwillingness to compromise with North Korea or the other states resulted in a reversion to a Cold War strategy. Since 2009, the United States has largely remained disengaged with the North Koreans, effectively relying on a policy of deterrence as the North Korean weapons program advances.

Disengagement is untenable. North Korea still maintains its rogue nuclear state status and the rhetoric exchanged between the United States and DPRK has increased the threat of a conflict. The United States must engage with North Korea. To do so effectively, it must pursue a strategy that offers incentives to North Korea for working towards U.S. strategic priorities: freezing and phasing out its nuclear program and allowing IAEA verification inspections to confirm. If the DPRK fails to do so, the United States must be prepared with strong disincentives in order to pressure North Korea into compliance.

61 Such incentives could include economic relief, aid packages, agreements to scale back joint U.S.-ROK military operations and negative assurances.
62 Such disincentives could include harsher economic policies, expanded joint U.S.-ROK military operations and increased U.S. military presence on the peninsula.
Critical to the success of this strategy will also be the roles of Japan, South Korea, and China. All must have substantial voices in the implementation of the strategy, and China in particular must play an active role in its execution. The United States must engage bilaterally with Japan and South Korea in order to reach security agreements and develop robust aid packages to incentivize North Korea. It then must work with China to reach an agreement on economic policies that both must implement in order to effectively pressure North Korea and engage in trilateral talks with China and North Korea in order to build confidence between the nations. This will facilitate bilateral negotiations with the DPRK in working towards the fulfillment of U.S. strategic priorities, dialogue that will require the United States to come to the negotiation table without the precondition of a denuclearized North Korea and even more importantly, a willingness to operate entirely through post-Cold War approaches. The United States must adapt to the era, leaving behind vestiges of the Cold War, in order to find an effective resolution to the North Korean nuclear crisis.
A GRAND STRATEGY FOR THE AGE OF INTERCONNECTED NETWORK POWER: SECURING AMERICA IN A DIGITAL WORLD

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America’s key position as gatekeeper of the international system provides Washington with an outsized mechanism for wielding power over geopolitics: those who seek access to American currency, markets, financial institutions, education systems, military power, and intelligence sharing will have to conform to American standards of behavior and governance. Whereas pontificators of international affairs have long lamented America’s decline, the construction of a gatekept cyber-world that integrates and harmonizes each and every tool and facet of American power will necessarily extend American hegemony for the long term. More importantly, it will keep America secure, prosperous, free, and sovereign.

INTRODUCTION

A “Grand Strategy” reveals how a nation plans to muster all of its economic, political, military, diplomatic, ideological, cultural, and technological prowess to achieve lasting security and prosperity. Like a pendulum, America’s approach to engagement with the world has swung back and forth among liberal, realist, and nationalist perspectives over time and across administrations. President George W. Bush opted to support “the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.” President Barack Obama adopted a strategy of national retreat that limited democracy promotion and withdrew American forces from Iraq. His was a strategy that “initially chose engagement… [and] connection, but without a clear theory of what specific connections to make or how to manage them to advance U.S. national interests.” President Donald Trump has articulated a supposedly “America First” policy aimed squarely at defeating Jihadist insurgencies, renegotiating bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, and increasing defense spending. Trump has deemphasized diplomacy as the cornerstone feature of America’s international relations, electing for a more militaristic approach to engagement.

The challenges of today’s world call for a new national grand strategy rooted in the principles of realism that simultaneously recognizes the array of complex threats facing the United States, but which also embraces the unprecedented opportunities to advance America’s strategic position at home and abroad offered by this new context. In this, the age of interconnected network power, nothing is safe from technological disruption—not governments or businesses, and certainly not the news media. The essential feature of the 21st Century and beyond is the unquenchable human desire to connect people to one another. In other words, connection is now the coin of the realm.

Power in today’s newly ordered system is expressed through various in-or-out borders: gates. Gates are languages, block-chains, protocols, code, encryption, trade agreements, laws, norms, monetary policy, financial regulations, judicial verdicts—all those things that connect, contour, and constrain a topology.3 Any time an individual enters a system—uses the TCP/IP Protocol, goes on Facebook—they are (inadvertently or not) walking through a gate. Applied to the internet, gates are the technical protocols through which individuals pass upon entrance into whichever system they are using. This new wired world will be ordered by those who control the in-and-out access points of network spaces. Power, thus, resides in the hands of those who construct and control gated spaces. Indeed,

No position is more important, formidable, influential or profitable than that of the gatekeeper. Defining who is in or out of any network is among the most essential moves of design… Flows of bits, of migrants, of gold and patents and medicines—all of these forces can be controlled, bent for good or stopped for ill, as they pass through or collide with gates.4

A grand strategy for the age of interconnected network power begins with a new “Marshall Plan” of sorts, not for the rebuilding of war-ravaged Europe, but for the construction of a gatekept cyber-world for America, its allies, and other nations that seek friendship, peace, and prosperity for their citizens. The United States should take the lead in forging a consensus among nations of similar orientations that, together, would establish a set of clear and universal laws, rules, and norms to govern their conduct in cyberspace. Similar to NATO, this cyber alliance should integrate and share offensive and defensive strategies which can be used in the case of an attack against one member individually, or the group as a whole. A credibly

4 Ibid, 236.
committed alliance structure has, thus far, deterred Russian aggression against member states in conventional war fighting contexts. A cyber alliance would presumably do the same.

The time-tested strategy of gate construction draws inspiration from history’s longest lasting political orders:

The ‘defense in depth’ of the Roman Empire, for instance, or the protective isolation of Tokugawa Japan, or the walls of Han China. The aim of these systems was to survive through defense. Strategists of those empires learned they should avoid attack except when absolutely necessary; a defensive posture was safer.5

Hard Gatekeeping flows from an identical logic. It is merely the “development and control of the physical and topological spaces that will define any nation’s future security.”6 The objectives of this strategy are simple: “protect those inside the gated order, to make security and innovation more efficient, to accelerate certain kinds of connection and dampen others, to manage links to the non-gatekept world, and to use that ‘in or out’ leverage to affect the interests and plans of others.”7

This key understanding of network power grafts neatly onto America’s domestic and foreign policy for this century and beyond. Metcalfe’s Law explains that “the power of a network grows exponentially with each additional user.”8 But by taking Metcalfe’s Law and flipping the logic on its head, new, highly useful, realities become astonishingly clear. As networks grow, expand, and become more powerful, the benefits of being on the inside are so high that the costs derived from being on the outside necessarily grow higher and higher. This is what Tongia and Wilson describe as the “Flip Side of Metcalfe’s Law.”9 That “Flip Side” provides the functionalist logic that forms the basis of a Gatekept grand strategy: America should erect a new cyber network architecture. American ingenuity, economic vitality, political and military power is the lynchpin of the global order. Thus, those on the inside of America’s gatekept cyber-world will be able to harness those benefits to their advantage. While at the same time, those on the outside will suffer outsized consequences that inflate each and every second they remain there.10

5 Ibid, 265.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid, 244. See also, Bob Metcalfe, “Metcalfé’s Law After 40 Years of Ethernet,” Computer, Vol. 45, No. 12. (December 2013): 26-31
9 Tongia and Wilson posit, “For all the network ‘Laws’ the cost of exclusion rises ~exponentially, and becomes worse than exponential as only a few people are left out of the network.” Rahul Tongia and Ernest Wilson, “Turning Metcalfe On His Head: The Multiple Costs of Network Exclusion,” Research Gate, (August 2007): 14.
10 Ibid.
America’s key position as gatekeeper of the international system provides Washington with an outsized mechanism for wielding power over the geopolitics: those who seek access to American currency, markets, financial institutions, education systems, military power, and intelligence sharing will have to conform to American standards of behavior and governance in cyberspace. Whereas pontificators of international affairs have long lamented America’s decline, the construction of a gatekept cyber-world that integrates and harmonizes each and every tool and facet of American power will extend American hegemony for the long term. More importantly, it will keep America secure, prosperous, free, and sovereign.

This paper will proceed by identifying the Internet’s basic structural deficits that make it wholly unconducive to security. Next, it will recognize and address specific threats to the United States that make it all-the-more necessary to get to work operationalizing this strategy immediately. Time is limited. It could be one day soon when other nations grow strong enough to hold America at proverbial gunpoint, able to bully and coerce the country’s leaders with the threat of imminent cut-off. Finally, I will outline the principles of an American-constructed gatekept cyberworld. Establishing a firm set of clear, resolute principles will be essential for persuading other states to join the U.S. network. Those who seek to join should know the United States will keep their data and information secure, their access free and uninterrupted, so long as they abide by a shared set of rules and norms. Some empires only last a matter of years. Others last centuries. For America’s longstanding hegemony to endure, policymakers must adopt a strategy for mastering the topological combat spaces of the future. This strategy of Hard Gatekeeping aspires to do just that.

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11 For just a few examples see, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/topic/american-decline
12 “The likelihood that an attack carried out by a determined and capable adversary would be thwarted by security measures is low. While some U.S. utilities might block attempts by an adversary to gain initial access or might be able to detect an adversary in their systems, many might not have the necessary tools in place to detect and respond. Efforts to improve data sharing that could enable detection by one company to block access across the entire industry are in their infancy. In the Lloyd’s scenario, only 10 percent of targeted generators needed to be taken down to cause a widespread blackout.” Robert K. Knake, “A Cyberattack on the U.S. Powergrid,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 3, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/report/cyberattack-us-power-grid
THE PLAGUE OF INSECURITY: WHY CONSTANT CONNECTION CREATES INHERENT VULNERABILITIES

The internet was originally conceived and designed by engineers and academics for easily accessing, sharing, and disseminating research and opinions. As time passed, it evolved to a more interactive and multifunctional system of networks as it expanded to include businesses, consumers, bloggers, Tweeters, and so many others that make the internet the wonderful, whacky, incredible, bizarre, and utterly insecure place that it is today.

Former Chief Scientist for the NSA’s National Computer Center, Robert Morris Sr., outlined the three golden rules for individual cybersecurity: (1) Do not own a computer; (2) Do not power it on; (3) Do not use it. He might also have also added this corollary: Do not connect it to the internet.13 To live and operate in today’s modern world requires individuals violate all four rules and with innovations in mobile and cellular technologies, they’re not merely broken every day, but more likely, every second. “We want to own the best device, we want it always on, and we want to use it all the time. ‘Utility’ and ‘connection’ are almost synonyms now.”14 In this race to connect every fiber of human existence to networks, downsides have been almost entirely overlooked. Both the individuals connected to them, and the networks themselves can be dangerously twisted and manipulated without anyone even knowing. Ramo presciently outlines the threat:

Constant connection means… constant vulnerability…. Systems we faithfully rely on today… are simply not built for this frightening demand. They are too easy to manipulate, which means we are too easy to manipulate. These network meshes offer the possibility of history and unsupervised control. Of you, me, the markets we connect to, the data we need… We are exposed through all of our links, for the first time, to a possibility of surreptitious and total surveillance and control—not simply by governments, but by anyone who can worm inside.15

In their paper, “Back to Basics: Beyond Network Hygiene,” Lindner and Gaycken argue that the reason for the inherent insecurity of cyberspace lies in its topological conduciveness to offense-dominant strategies.16 They write:

It is increasingly obvious that the state of the art in Computer Network Defense is over a decade behind its counterpart in Computer Network Offense. Even

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13 Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Seventh Sense, 153.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid, 151.
intelligence and military organizations, considered to be the best positioned to
defend their own infrastructures, struggle to keep the constant onslaught of
attackers with varying motives, skills, and resources at bay. Many NATO member
states leave the impression that they have all but given up when it comes to
recommending effective defense strategies to the entities operating their critical
national infrastructure and to the business sector. At the core of the problem lies a
simple but hard historic truth: currently, nobody can purchase secure computer
hardware or software. Since the early days of commercial computer use, computer
products, including the less obvious elements of the network infrastructure that
enable modern use of interconnected machines, have come with absolutely no
warranty. They do not even promise any enforceable fitness for a particular
purpose. Computer users have become used to the status quo and many do not even
question this crucial situation anymore.17

The ever-growing number of failures to detect or respond to attacks on critical
infrastructure, private businesses, government officials, governmental institutions, and American
citizens demonstrates the quintessential paradox of the status quo: The capacity to keep secrets
has actually diminished over time, such that “the more essential it is that an organization keep a
secret, the less it seems able to do.”18 This strange duality is expressed with frighteningly
rising frequency as the government asks it asks citizens for more and more of their personal data,
at a time when it cannot effectively guard its own.19 Ramo laments, “A decade behind? That is
the gap between a flip phone and an iPhone… We can ask: Are we plugging more machines with
more layers, software, and applications than we can protect? Are we making more bugs than
we’re patching? (Yes and yes.)”20 Summarizing these intrinsic weaknesses of the network
architecture, Lindner and Gaycken write, “Attackers are not like natural catastrophes, they can
analyze their targets for vulnerable elements. Isolating single, selected vectors only shifts them
onto a different, less observed, and less protected vector.”21 Unfortunately, the existing
architectural composition of U.S. networks contains more of those “vulnerable elements” than it
can afford.

18 Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Seventh Sense, 154. See also, Henry Farrell and Martha Finnemore, “The End of
Hypocrisy,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2013, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-
states/2013-10-15/end-hypocrisy
19 Scott Shane, Nicole Perlroth, and David Sanger, “Security Breach and Spilled Secrets Have Shaken the NSA to Its
brokers.html?_r=0
20 Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Seventh Sense, 155.
POWER ABHORS A VACUUM: THE THREAT CONTEXT

America’s failure to articulate a well-conceived vision for the future has presented opportunities for revisionist powers like Russia and China to pursue their own versions of world order that are antithetical to America’s interests and values. The U.S. is confronted by the threat of a rising and radical regime in Tehran that seeks to displace American hegemony in the Middle East. North Korea threatens peace and stability as its dictator races closer and closer to achieving a nuclear capacity that places millions of Americans’ lives at risk. These movements should be seen as nothing less than serious and fundamental challenges to the Western-led international order.

America’s adversaries are emboldened not only in the physical space, but in the new domain of cyberspace as well. Where the nation’s mastery of conventional means of warfare once secured the homeland from attack, America is in the midst of a pitched battle for dominance over the fighting surface of the future: cyberspace. The social compact that once defined a nation’s priorities and identities—the balance between liberty and tyranny, big government and little—is being actively reshaped by the invisible forces of networked connection. Countries like China and Saudi Arabia are striking that balance by providing their citizens the capacity to connect while limiting their freedoms to dissent from their governments’ actions. That tension between connection and control will be the defining feature of future social compacts, both in national and international contexts.

Rather than build the architecture outlined herein that would have secured the Internet for American and international users, policymakers have, instead, opted to advocate for a free and open, global and interoperable network. Such inaction on the security front has had unfortunate consequences: As more and more of Americans’ daily lives and activities have moved online,

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they’ve become less and less secure. According to the Department of Defense, Americans’ “reliance on the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of data stands in stark contrast to the inadequacy of [their] cybersecurity.”25 Without the kind of investment necessary to reconstruct the internet’s basic architecture, Americans have been, and continue to be, highly vulnerable to malicious state and nonstate actors.26

Such incapacity to defend against attacks is America’s most significant vulnerability in cyberspace. Recognizing this weakness, Russia and China have forcefully integrated cyber aggression into their own strategic doctrines.27 They seek to make their societies and economies less free and fair. For autocrats like Putin and Xi, the free-flow of information represents the most significant threat to their stranglehold on power.28 They instrumentalize would-be technologies of liberation to repress and control their societies.29 Policymakers should understand that strategies of the past have failed: Russia’s brazen interference in America’s presidential election, its meddling in Europe and across the Middle East provides the clearest illustrations yet. Russia, and other actors, are exploiting social networks and information tools to erode the appeal and legitimacy of the United States in particular, and democracy in general. By targeting politicians, media and journalism, financial markets, and Americans’ personal data, Russia’s influence operations are actively undermining America’s shared commitment to common values and ideals, as well as its national unity.30

Iran and North Korea’s increasingly hostile behavior in the cyber terrain also represent a critical threat to U.S. National Security.31 North Korea’s November 2014 cyberattack against Sony Pictures was one of the most damaging and consequential attacks against any U.S. entity—public or private—to date. The multipronged incursion included elements of coercion,

25 Ibid, 1.
26 Ibid, 9-10.
intimidation, and even the threat of terrorism. It left thousands of Sony-owned computers inoperable, and even provided North Korea access to Sony’s confidential internal business information, in addition to the company’s extensive databases on celebrities and employees. North Korea’s increasingly audacious movements in cyberspace reveals the failure of current US strategy, and demonstrates the need for a new one.

THE WAY FORWARD: A GATED CYBER ORDER

Despite the significant vulnerabilities inherent to the structure of U.S. networks, they remain the most dominant and decisively powerful in the world. The U.S has largely been self-deterred from publicly expounding upon its offensive capabilities. Sanger describes Obama’s approach as “chronically under-responsive.”

For America to lose this critical edge over its competitors would represent a potentially deadly national security threat. “It’s less that the United States will be ‘buried’ but that the country certainly will be enmeshed.” Ramo asks, “Are you the gatekeeper or the gatekept? This is the fundamental question of self-determination and power that emerges from the nature of our age.”

Hard Gatekeeping will involve building and developing “secure, carefully designed communities to manage everything from trade to cyber-information to scientific research… Each will be developed fresh, tuned for principles that reflect how network power operates.” In today’s world of few gates and walls, globalization and constant connection are linking powerful and sometimes dangerous forces together in unique ways. The spread of the internet and of network technologies has produced seismic and destabilizing effects. Openness and universal access has created a context in which “forces that are inimical to the interests of the whole

33 Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Seventh Sense, 257.
34 Joseph S. Nye, “Deterrence & Dissuasion in Cyberspace: Russia, China & the U.S.” YouTube, April 10, 2017, www.youtube.com/watch?v=xBPurt3Zs74
36 This is in reference to the threat from former Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, “We will bury you.” For more see, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP73B00296R000200040087-1.pdf
37 Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Seventh Sense, 257.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid, 258.
system are jacked into and using the technologies of the system against itself. It’s not just terrorists or hackers who are gaming the system; nations are also pushing at the roots of the global order.”

A successfully implemented Hard Gatekeeping strategy should make systems of interconnection run in fast, secure, and harmonious ways. “Gated network orders are powerful. They run faster than purely open ones. And they offer not merely security, but influence: The cost of being excluded from gatelands of finance or information will be nearly total.” Ramo elaborates,

Just as the Marshall Plan after World War II guided America’s work in building a new global order, the country now perhaps needs a plan to build (or redesign) all of the systems that will determine future power – and to do so as gatelands…. Our world…. Will be defined by newly constructed gatelands, each essential in some way to national or economic security. Trade, finance, education, cybersafety, artificial intelligence, and military affairs will move from unconnected to connected… To hold the pen that designs these systems is a position of historic importance.

Hard Gatekeeping is based on five core principles: (1) As with any grand strategy, the central premise of Hard Gatekeeping is to keep Americans inside the nation’s gates safe. In a world of constant and unending interconnection, America cannot merely create its own gated cyber infrastructure and hope for peace and prosperity. Contrary to Slaughter’s contentions, Hard Gatekeeping does not involve walling America off, and disconnecting it from the rest of the world. Rather, it attempts to create a new system through which America’s relationships with other nations can be mediated. As such, new gatelands should be constructed in a way that covers and connects America, allies, and those other nations that seek peace, prosperity and security. Practically, this will involve the building of a new Internet designed for security in a time of escalating digital and cyber threats.

The world should expect that the opening attack of future wars… will come invisibly and silently through networks or from space… Well-built gates will offer more than protection. They will be a source of time and leverage. Alliances and gatelands and infrastructure that can be defended for long periods will deliver the honestly earned confidence of the truly secure.

40 Ibid, 258.
41 Ibid, 259.
42 Ibid, 265.
44 Ibid, 266.
(2) Jon Postel, an engineer and programmer who designed and created some of the internet’s original protocols, surmised that the internet’s architecture should be conducive to the “Robustness Principle:” “Be conservative in what you do, be liberal in what you accept.”45 For Postel, this meant that the basic switches, nobs, and nodes on the net should be able to successfully manage all sorts of communication – they should be “robust,” able to understand and converse with a wide variety of computers – but also meticulous about not disseminating nonstandard junk onto the networks.46 The second principle of Hard Gatekeeping modifies Postel’s “Robustness Principle,” to “Be generous and cautious in what you accept. Be secure.”47 America should open its gates to those states that seek admission, but with an appropriate level of caution and at a cost. “Today, America permits nearly any nation to plug into the country’s markets or technologies or education systems.”48 As a consequence, spoilers that seek to disrupt and destabilize the entire system are granted admission and gain those riches that flow from their access in turn. Postel’s Principle made sense for a time when connection yielded only benefits. As this paper has shown, that time is over. America’s gated order should be structured keeping that spirit of openness in mind, but moderated by a clear understanding of both the costs and benefits derived from connection. It makes absolutely no sense to “hand the advantages of the system to groups intent on undermining it… Completely open technology standards can be hijacked too easily. Wide-open artificial-intelligence systems may be manipulated against their users.” Hard Gatekeeping provides that all nations enmeshed in a single gated order are committed to a similar vision of the international system and are dedicated to ensuring its continued existence.49

(3) Hard Gatekeeping is inspired by history’s most successful defensive strategies. It will not, thereby, insist America force other nations into its gated systems. “The aim should simply be to build the best-performing network order.”50 If done successfully, the dominating “winner take all, losers take none” effect of network construction and evolution makes it highly likely that middle and smaller powers would be left without much of a choice but to join America’s gated

46 Joshua Cooper Ramo, *The Seventh Sense*, 147.
47 Ibid, 266.
48 Ibid, 267.
49 Ibid, 267.
50 Ibid.
order. That said, America’s core values–democracy, rule of law, freedom of expression, privacy, transparency, and accountability–will undergird the very design features of American-owned gatelands. “Personal security and freedom should be a principle that everyone inside such systems can be assured of.” These guarantees should induce those less-powerful nations who are likely more than other nations–who will infuse the designs of their own gated systems with different values and principles that reflect national considerations–to join. Chinese or Russian designs, for instance, will probably place a greater degree of emphasis on surveillance, monitoring and control. Those nations who wish to live under the yoke of such tyranny should be allowed to do so: “The desire for self-determination, to be the gatekeeper and not the gatekept, reflects sensible, understandable urges.” Forcing other countries into American “enmeshment is unnecessary. It would painfully complicate their domestic politics.”

(4) Just as America will respect the right of each and every nation to pick and choose their own path–to be the gatekeeper or the gatekept–all other states would be required to abide by those same principles. Sovereignty is at the core of America’s historic foreign policy traditions. America aims not for imperial empire, but rather, for “a world of decentralized democracies – ‘sister republics’ living side by side” in peace and prosperity. “Cuius region, eius reticulum, we might say: ‘Whose realm, his network.’ And on that basis some degree of interconnection can be discussed.” In this gatekept world, America would oppose and repel the attempts of any one country to forcibly integrate another into its gated system.

(5) Though Hard Gatekeeping primarily establishes a defensive strategy to protect America, its allies and interests, it is not a passive one. America should actively monitor, engage, and eliminate any attempts to weaken or destroy its gatekept order. “Networks are not invulnerable. In fact, their very design includes certain weaknesses. They can be collapsed by

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51 Ibid.
53 Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Seventh Sense, 267.
54 Ibid.
55 Henry R Nau, Conservative Internationalism, 85.
56 Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Seventh Sense, 268.
57 Ibid.
contagion or strikes against crucial nodes.”\textsuperscript{58} Deterring attacks requires America minimize risks by continually improving and upgrading its defensive systems: “better gates deter attack.”\textsuperscript{59}

Those who target America’s gates should be excised or excluded from entering in the first place. As demonstrated, exclusion carries a set of extraordinarily high costs. This is not to suggest, however, that defensive mechanisms will be enough. America must confront its enemies and opponents “when truly existential dangers emerge—nuclear weapons, certain types of artificial intelligence, terrorism.”\textsuperscript{60} America must immediately move to halt ongoing nuclear proliferation, and prevent it in the future. It must also avert the emergence and development of new and dangerous technologies like malevolent artificial intelligence and space weapons.\textsuperscript{61} Hard Gatekeeping provides America with a high degree of leverage over those countries that seek admission or use of its gatekept systems. But that is not enough. A complete strategy incorporates elements of both offense and defense, married with the capacity and willingness to attack opponents when necessary. “This means developing military and diplomatic stratagems aimed at destroying the topological and real-world anchor of American enemies. Those forces will be hammering every American interest; the country should feel unembarrassed about moving quickly to disarm dangers.”\textsuperscript{62}

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

The old trope that America has entered a state of imminent decline is inaccurate, overplayed, and hyperbolic. Sure, in terms of sheer GDP, America no longer holds a decisive edge, but its unfettered control over most of the world’s most important and essential operative networks provides its hegemony can be maintained for the long-term. “American gatelands for trade or finance or security will, if they work, have an alluring power.”\textsuperscript{63} Thus, America must work to construct a gated architecture for itself and those other nations that share a vision of

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid, 269.
\textsuperscript{62} Joshua Cooper Ramo, \textit{The Seventh Sense}, 269.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid, 273.
world order that embraces the principles of democracy, freedom, liberty, rule of law, and yes, security. History suggests that the longest lasting empires were ones that “ran with great efficiency. They possessed tools of power that permitted the assembly of an empire at an unusually low cost… New territories brought in more than they cost. The great powers of history fused easy expansion and high returns.”64 As this paper has demonstrated, this too, is the story of networks: they expand and grow with historically unprecedented ease, at low cost, and evolve towards greater efficiency.

This paper has attempted to reckon with the power and threat of instant, constant interconnection. It has identified existing and emerging physical and cyber threats to America, and proceeded to outline the principles of a Hard Gatekeeping foreign policy strategy that aims to provide security and prosperity to the American people. America should embrace the wonder and triumphant power of networks through a strategy of Hard Gatekeeping. In so doing, it would fashion a new political order ripe for the age of interconnected network power.

64 Ibid, 275.
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