World Food Programme Afghanistan

Partnership Study

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Executive summary

The commitments made at the Tokyo conference have been symptomatic as they do not provide any operational agenda beyond commitments to aid quantity, and focus on aid effectiveness, fight against corruption, and accountability. As such, Tokyo has been perceived by many development actors, operating in the country, as “a political message sent to the Afghan government and the taxpayer” (Donor, Humanitarian Officer) on how money should be disbursed rather than a real roundtable on the assistance priorities for the next decade.

In these regards, WFP’s strategies, planning and decision-making need to be sensitive to a new field of analysis and operation: i) in a worsening political and security context, where formal counterparts tend to be less and less representative and credible; ii) in an economic environment marked by significant cutbacks from most international donors and serious risks of State bankruptcy; iii) in a rapidly changing humanitarian landscape, where old (conflict, droughts and floods) and new (IDPs and informal settlements) critical situations have now become chronic.

This advocates for a progressive phasing-out of most operational partnership with governmental counterparts, based on the realization that these counterparts do not generally offer sufficient operational and financial guarantees. This strategic shift does not mean a complete disengagement from the government – neither desired nor useful; but a specific shift from an assistance channeled through governmental partners to a direct support of governmental capacities (at both national and provincial level), from actual operational implementation to technical capacity development is the key modality for WFP’s strategy with the Government of Afghanistan in the short and medium term.

The specific modalities of this strategic shift with governmental counterparts include:

- Between 2012 and 2014, the share of WFP assistance (food and non-food items) distributed through ministries, local departments (including and especially governors’ offices) should be reduced to enhance WFP’s programme effectiveness: while leveraging the significant financial cutbacks (at least for 2013) the objective is to reduce the percentage of governmental partners to the few actors whose programmes can actually be monitored and provide guarantees in terms of transparency and accountability. The reasoning that applies to governmental authorities may apply, to some extent, to local CDCs: accountability is a key issue and thorough monitoring must be done to make sure that the assistance provided to communities, through the channel of the CDCs (or any other legitimate local council) does reach beneficiaries and people in need.

- International actors (from UN agencies to international stakeholders and international NGOs) theoretically offer better guarantees in terms of efficiency and accountability (compared with governmental actors) while providing good access to remote or unsafe areas thanks to their local anchorage, their acceptance strategies, and their apparent non-politicization. Through 2012 and 2014, the proportion of partnerships with international NGOs should be strongly increased (in both absolute and relative terms) to guarantee better accountability for WFP programmes. The suggestion of having 2 separate lists of INGOs is a necessary step to diversify resources and partnerships, create new and numerous links with other actors, to minimize over-reliance on
single partnerships, to maximize access and geographic coverage, and to strengthen emergency response through both national and localized partnerships.

- Local NGOs with a specific humanitarian and technician’s approach shall also be directly and indirectly prioritized. However, a main difficulty with national NGOs is that they are, for the most part, not bound by mandates to serve only humanitarian actors and, as a result, accept projects from development organizations, foreign governments and their subcontractors, and military actors. This is a concern to highlight for WFP in its effort to keep its independence and neutrality from parties involved in the conflict. WFP should therefore start assessing the actual capacity, needs, and profiles of potential partnering NNGOs to progressively build their capacity and set the technical and operational standards of future partnerships.

One might perceive in the necessary shift to a more accountable model some prejudice against governmental institutions or local actors; in fact, as evidence has clearly been made that governmental counterparts are not in a position of being accountable and transparent partners, it is urgent that WFP starts basing its partnerships on simple requirements of effectiveness, accountability, and transparency. It will also: 1) help the organisation clarify its neutral and impartial political positioning with regards to the parties in conflict; 2) contribute to build institutional and civil servants’ capacity (through training and capacity building programmes); 3) directly promote ownership through the progressive development of conditional partnerships with local NGOs.

There are thus some opportunities in today’s context for an actor like WFP: the key is to make sure that those responsible for drafting implementation plans on the Tokyo commitments on aid and the ‘mutual accountability framework’ understand WFP’s strategic perspective. In particular, many humanitarian agency representatives (both UN and non-UN) we interviewed considered that “there is currently an issue considering the recent Tokyo conference on donor money focusing on development while forgetting about the humanitarian funding for future disasters. There needs to be reserves for emergency responses if needs be” (UN humanitarian agency Deputy Country Director). While understanding the political agendas of international donors, WFP is probably one of the most credible interlocutors to raise humanitarian concerns and alert donors. In October 2011, for instance, WFP Afghanistan had appealed for $142m to feed 2.6 million people, as the country was facing the worst drought for a decade.

If the mandate of WFP in Afghanistan is mostly humanitarian (emergency response, general food distribution), while encompassing recovery and community resilience activities, we believe that through its new partnerships strategy, the organisation shall also play a more coordinating role to make sure that the actions undertaken by governmental counterparts, other UN agencies, INGOs, and local NGOs are conducive to efficient, pragmatic, and accountable humanitarian solutions. To provide its future partners with a clear roadmap of WFP’s priorities, to progressively understand each actor’s rationale, to define accountability and M&E systems that guarantee the transparency of the partnership, and finally to agree on a set of flexible measures to promote both timely emergency responses and/or long-term socio-economic impact in beneficiary communities, WFP will have to fully endorse a new role by actively piloting its partnerships and generating open dialogues with its new partners. We therefore think that the new Partnership Strategy shall be the cornerstone of a more pragmatic, flexible, and impact-driven era for WFP.

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1 The 2011 drought affected the 14 Northern and Western Provinces of Balkh, Samangan, Takhar, Saripul, Herat, Badghis,
**Objective of this study**

WFP is currently undergoing a number of processes to evaluate, refocus and revise its programme in Afghanistan. The PRRO budget revision will be developed by Fall 2012 and implemented from January 2013, a Country Strategy document will be prepared in early 2013 and a new PRRO will be operational from 2014. WFP is wholly dependent on Cooperating Partners (CPs) to ensure the successful implementation and monitoring of its programme in Afghanistan: in 2012, the Government of Afghanistan, with varying capacity and success, has implemented 65% of PRRO activities.

However, in an effort to maximize effectiveness, increase accountability and minimize risk, WFP aims to review its approach to partnership, and examine the options for increasing implementation in cooperation with non-governmental actors with technical and operational capacity. In order to identify potential I/NGO and NGO partners and gain a better understanding of an appropriate model for partnership in the short-medium term, this paper’s objective is to undertake a 3Ws mapping of NGOs implementing in Afghanistan, and propose a strategy for working with identified partners.

- **Objective 1:** Deliver a ‘3 Ws mapping’ of key humanitarian organizations working in key technical and geographical areas of WFP’s programme to provide recommendations to WFP management on possible partners for WFP programme implementation.

- **Objective 2:** Present a proposed ‘model of partnership’ for WFP’s programme implementation in the short to medium term, moving from the government to NGOs as implementing partnerships, and linking up with a partnership framework with key UN agencies.

The present study is based on a series of face-to-face interviews with 53 governmental and non-governmental actors between May and July 2012, in the cities of Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Jalalabad. As shown in the table below, interviews with governmental counterparts (MRRD, MAIL, MOLSAMID, MPH, MOE), UNWFP staff members, other UN agencies (UNHCR, OCHA, UNDP, ILO), international organisations (GIZ, JICA, NRC, ECHO, USAID, DFID, AFD, IOM, AKDN), international non-governmental organisations, as well as national non-governmental organisations were conducted to draw a representative landscape of the existing and potential partnerships between WFP and the other humanitarian and development actors. Last, it should be noted that the views and analysis contained in this publication do not necessarily represent WFP’s opinions.

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**Table 1: Key Informant Interviewees (breakdown per locations and organisations)**
**Context Overview**

**Political situation** – The on-going withdrawal of international military and development actors and the subsequent transition to a full Afghan political control, have raised serious concerns among both the national and international political, social, an economic stakeholders, as the political situation of the country is clearly worsening in almost all provinces. ISAF’s optimistic assessment of the local capacity to control and subdue armed opposition groups continues to be challenged by a series of attacks on Government installations, targeted assassinations, and high-profile attacks against prominent international facilities. Insurgent groups have clearly continued to expand their presence and demonstrate their reach across the country – including in areas previously considered stable. In these regards, even if a political agreement with the armed opposition is reached in the upcoming months, it is very much likely that there will be evolving regional contexts insofar as a coalition government will not have the means, at least immediately, to control the subnational periphery.

**Economic situation** – At the Tokyo conference, in July 2012, governments, including Australia, Denmark, France, and the UK, agreed on long-term commitment to development and state-building efforts; however, major donors to Afghanistan failed to provide clear commitments on levels of funding. In particular, and considering the Afghan government’s limited domestic revenues, there is still no indication on the financial mechanisms that will support the burdening funding of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) both in terms of equipment and salaries. It will necessarily depend on external assistance way beyond 2014, which cannot be guaranteed in today’s context; there is therefore a clear risk of State bankruptcy, on the medium-run, which would of course directly affect the level of the already endemic corruption as well as the provision of basic services to the population.

**Humanitarian context** – Key humanitarian indicators have steadily deteriorated in Afghanistan in recent years as a result of protracted conflict, recurrent environmental hazards and a combination of under-development and development failure. In 2011, the conflict continued to expand and intensify across the country, giving rise to increasing civilian casualties, population displacement, disruption of basic services and delays in humanitarian and development projects. As of July 2012, an estimated 500,000 people had been displaced from their homes, with over 100,000 new conflict-induced internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the first give months of 2012 alone. Finally, “Afghanistan is witnessing a change of humanitarian scope, opening interesting opportunities for IOs and NGOs should they be able and willing to (re)build their image as independent and neutral actors”\(^2\).

**Perspectives** – Following this logic, the acting Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) for Afghanistan, gave an inspiring overview of today’s context: “As foreign troops go, economic activity, revenues for the state and foreign aid budgets will drop. A virtue must be made of this necessity – to rationalize international support in a way that protects people [and] supports them to manage their own affairs”\(^3\). In these regards, and given the extremities of the context and reduced funding available, it may also be time for WFP Afghanistan to make strategic choices focusing on innovative context-specific and partnership models, and rethinking the operational positioning of the organisation by the yardstick of a more complex, uncertain, and volatile environment.

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\(^3\) Michael Keating, “Real security in Afghanistan depends on people’s basic needs being met”, The Guardian, Thursday 21 June 2012: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/jun/21/security-afghanistan-basic-needs.
Partnering with the government in 2012 and beyond

At the 2010 Kabul Conference, the Afghan government presented its priorities in the form of 22 broad National Priority Programs (NPPs) that were endorsed by donors. In the context of a continued decline in aid, maintaining even the appearance of progress in the Afghan government’s National Priority Programmes could be problematic. The commitment made by international partners to progressively channel 50% of development assistance through the Afghan budget and to align 80% of aid to Government priority programmes remains a key issue, as governmental agencies do not currently have the necessary financial and operational capacity to execute funding of this level.

WFP is closely aligned with the evolving general ‘architecture’ of government policy, either through its own strategy or through partnerships with other UN actors (and especially the FAO on food security). Currently, more than 65% of WFP’s implementation is conducted through the Government of Afghanistan, with varying capacity and success, and with disaggregated contacts at the national and local levels (including through Community Development Councils or CDCs). This over-reliance on the government for implementation requires assessing the main assumptions behind such a government-centred strategy.

1. *Does the government have the technical and operational capacity to deliver assistance effectively?*

   The chart below summarizes a key assumption of the partnerships strategy that has prevailed within WFP over the past 4 to 5 years. According to NGO representatives, there was a clear shift in 2006, when the organisation “turned its back to many international NGOs” (NGO coordinator, Brussels) to better channel its assistance through governmental formal and informal actors: Ministries and provincial Departments (65% in 2011, according to WFP; and 75% in volume of food delivered to beneficiaries – according to our own estimates) and CDCs or DDAs (9% in 2011, idem).
In today’s context, however, governmental counterparts do not generally offer enough operational and financial guarantee: 1) the lack of capacity, reporting, transparency, and accountability, as well as the endemic levels of corruption and food diversion have been almost systematically mentioned by all the stakeholders we interviewed (governmental counterparts themselves, community leaders, INGOs, NGOs, as well as WFP staff members); 2) the question of WFP’s political neutrality, in a worsening security situation has also been raised; 3) last, the absence of any accountability or transparency, on the government side also questions the legitimacy and the modalities of the existing partnership.

Moreover, on the longer-run, three other major obstacles may hamper the functioning of the implementing partnership between WFP and governmental institutions:

Significant capacity gap between the centre and the periphery: governmental decision-making processes are very centralized and principally – if not exclusively – rest in Kabul. At the provincial level, however, the capacity of governmental counterparts drops off significantly – with the exception of the MRRD (NSP), which generally succeeds in maintaining an acceptable capacity level as well as clearer action plans. This analysis is confirmed by an internal risk analysis drafted by the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), which raises serious concerns over the impact of the transition on subnational governance capacity.

Decreasing civil servant salaries and alarming corruption levels, likely to get even worse: “UNHCR never gives food or non-food items to government officials to watch or to hold, as we know they will disappear instantaneously” (UNHCR, Programme Officer). As mentioned in our context section, the probable state bankruptcy will also have a negative impact on civil servant salary payments – leading to increasing levels of corruption (e.g. “informal in-kind salaries, with WFP wheat bags”, as confirmed by governmental counterparts in Balkh, Nangarhar, and Herat).

Predictable shortage and brain drain of technical advisors: The services currently delivered by the central government are largely coordinated by a ‘second civil service’ comprising about 6,500 external consultants, national project staff and civil servants receiving higher salaries than those working in tashkīl positions. These salaries, topped up by donor funds, are unlikely to be maintained. The reduction of donor support for salary funding in line ministries and central agencies, such as the MoF or the MRRD, is predicted to lead to the resignation of highly qualified staff and consequent falls in performance.

2. What should be the strategic pillars of WFP’s partnership with governmental counterparts?

As strongly stated by the acting DRSG, it is now crucial to “clarify the respective roles and responsibilities of the Afghan government and international community and agree a mutual accountability mechanism. Stronger and more accountable governance must be at the heart of the deal. That is what local people want, entrepreneurs need, and what western politicians must have if they are to vote the funds⁴ out. In short, and in theory, the international community should be able to work with the government and the government should be able to deliver basic services; in practice, however, today’s context does not lead to a great deal of optimism. As strongly stated by one of our interviewees, one could argue that “after ten years in this country, realizing that you cannot work with and build the capacity of governmental actors is probably the most obvious sign of our the international failure here” (AAN Political Analyst,

Kabul); however, this paper clearly advocates for a progressive phasing-out of implementing partnerships with governmental counterparts, based on the realization that these counterparts do not generally offer – and are not likely to offer in a near future – sufficient operational and financial guarantees. This does not mean a complete disengagement from the government – neither desired nor useful; WFP will need to continue working through the government by setting into place a long-term capacity development strategy. Given that 65% of WFP’s operations have been implemented thus far through the government, this key recommendation requires an urgent need for a shift in strategy, by:

- Leveraging the reduction of donors’ funding by progressively phasing out of most WFP partnerships with governmental counterparts, even if some programmes, which form the largest portion of WFP’s activity portfolio (like nutrition and tuberculosis), will continue to work strategically with governmental counterparts;

- Realizing that the neutrality of the programme will be more and more questioned, as the political situation is likely to get worse and the representativeness of formal and informal actors increasingly unclear hence diminishing the possibility of accountability and transparency, hence re-directing WFP assistance to capacity building of national authorities instead of a handover of food and funds;

- Building on WFP’s existing commitment with regards to the cluster of NPPs under the Agriculture and Rural Development Cluster (ARD), the Skills Development NPP and the Health for All Afghans NPP, to strongly develop technical partnerships and capacity development programmes, so that national Ministries and provincial Departments progressively enhance their operational capacity as well as their accountability. This would involve minimal cash being disbursed and food being handed over, hence minimizing the threat of corruption and increasing the focus on technical support, through secondments of staff, trainings, strategic support for policy makers, among other areas to be further developed;

- Engaging on a case-by-case basis exclusively with governmental counterparts and programmes, and providing that “a mutual accounting and monitoring mechanism” is efficiently set in place, strengthening or initiating punctual agreements with reliable governmental counterparts. There should be no funding without monitoring – which has been the case for the past few years of activities in country – to ensure that food and money are not just given to national counterparts without proper check and balance systems to ensure that corruption is minimized and objectives more effectively achieved. Otherwise, WFP runs the risk of fuelling corruption and diminishing implementation.

3. **How could WFP practically engage with the government in a more effective ‘partnership’?**

A specific shift from an assistance channelled through governmental partners to a direct support of governmental capacities (at both national and provincial level), from actual operational implementation to technical capacity development is the key modality for WFP’s strategy with the Government of

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5 In early 2012 these were: National Water and Natural Resource Development, National Comprehensive Agriculture Production and Market Development, National Rural Access Program (NRAP), and Strengthening Local Institutions. However the final Cluster of NPPs was yet to be decided.
Afghanistan in the short and medium term. The specific modalities of this strategic shift with governmental counterparts include:

- Between 2012 and 2014, the share of WFP assistance (food and non-food items) distributed through ministries, local departments (including and especially governors’ offices) should be drastically reduced to enhance WFP political neutrality and programme effectiveness: while leveraging the significant financial cutbacks (at least for 2013) the objective is to reduce the percentage of governmental partners to the few actors which programmes can actually be monitored and provide guarantees in terms of transparency and accountability.

- WFP therefore needs to identify the partners that it can rely on, both for technical and operational efficiency, i.e. partners whose work it can realistically monitor. In this regard, this study finds that, aside from punctual agreements with local departments, only the MRRD, through its NSP programme offers sufficient guarantees, as the NSP has been designed to be sustainable and as local community councils (CDCs) play a pivot role in the implementation. Furthermore, NSP is a well-funded programme with strong external support, hence not risking any major shift in its programme’s quality or content. Its funding – from the World Bank, USAID and other donors – has been accompanied with an emphasis on Monitoring & Evaluation, with a strong M&E department in house, with clear expectations on accountability. This study therefore suggests the following immediate steps to be taken:
  - An umbrella Memorandum of Understanding to be signed between and MRRD-NSP at the national level for a three-year period (probation agreement).
  - A thorough assessment from WFP area offices at the field level (provinces, districts, and communities) on the actual implementation of WFP programmes and projects to ensure that:
    - 1) MRRD-NSP local partners provide enough guarantee in terms of capacity, accountability, transparency, and efficiency;
    - 2) Local CDCs can progressively take ownership of the initiative and build on WFP programmes to enhance the resilience of their food security net and socio-economic network;
    - 3) A thorough monitoring is implemented by CDCs (community-based monitoring, which has proven successful in many USAID programmes in western and central provinces), international and local NGOs, independent M&E teams as well as WFP M&E field officers.

- While partnering on implementation and on a case-by-case basis with the MRRD, WFP should emphasize its support to other ministries in the form of building the technical capacity of local governmental counterparts (either directly, or through INGOs and NGOs, or even through local private institutes) by developing long-term training programmes with national institutions and provincial departments.
  - These training sessions should only be provided after a comprehensive objective capacity needs assessment of the governmental institution. Between 2012 and 2014, those ministries with whom WFP will no longer directly partner on implementation will be instead selected for a sustained capacity building training phase that would cover a first period of 1 year, renewable based on achievements.
  - The Capacity Development Partnership Framework between WFP and ministries such as MoPH and MoE would cover national and provincial counterparts, with trainings held in
each region, from the national to the local levels. This framework would evolve around the following set of pre-conditions:

- WFP to develop the curriculum for the trainings,
- WFP to ensure a proper training and monitoring of Afghan NGOs who will be tasked with the 1-year agreement to properly training governmental counterparts. These I/NGOs will be selected based on their experience of food security in country, of cash transfers and cash-based assistance programmes, of emergency response.
- Afghan NGOs to provide the trainings to governmental counterparts, with specific deliverables and reporting mechanisms with WFP local offices and staff,
- Pre-selection of governmental counterparts and staff positions,
- Mid-term and final exams resulting in the provision of a training certificate,
- As for those who did not qualify the first year, can enroll in a second year.
Partnering with NGOs in 2012 and beyond

In 2005-2006, WFP’s strategy shifted towards channelling its support through governmental Ministries and Departments rather than international – and to a lesser extent – national non-governmental organisations. The reasons for such a drastic strategic change could be found in WFP’s decision to promote sustainability and national ownership as the cornerstones of its programmes. In today’s context, however, this strategy must be revised and its accuracy weighed against the risks of corruption and food diversion, to optimise the efficiency and outreach of WFP programmes and activities. In these regards, INGOs and NNGOs may have a significant role to play in the new WFP partnership strategy.

Out of the 25 INGO and 6 NNGO representatives interviewed for the purpose of this study, it should be noted that only two expressed a bad experience with and a negative prejudice against WFP; interestingly, however, the two cases were not related to any politicization, strategic positioning or structural deficiency of the programme, but rather to bureaucratic malfunctioning and miscommunications from WFP. As such and even if our sample is not representative, it is nonetheless indicative of the absence of any negative preconception – overall – with regards to WFP among most NGOs.

This section will distinguish the role played by international and national NGOs, as most national NGOs still lack the resources and capacity to engage ambitious and durable partnerships with WFP – in the meantime, as national NGOs are likely to be key implementing partners for WFP’s future activities, one of the main challenges of today’s partnership strategy is to develop the technical capacity of local players.

1. What is the perception of INGOs towards WFP?

If interviewed INGOs have generally expressed a clear satisfaction towards WFP, it also seems that they have specific expectations when it comes to partnering with the organisation. It is worth highlighting the main areas of opportunity that have been identified by at least one-third of our interviewees (8 out of 25), as they also provide the basis of any durable and effective partnership with INGOs in Afghanistan.

• Strategy and programming

Political neutrality: There is sometimes a reluctance by some INGOs to be associated with politicised actors such as UN agencies, and this is motivated by security concerns. The attacks against UN premises are a strong deterrent for INGOs to get associated with the UN “humanitarian” agencies, as they are being part of an integrated mission, and as their activities contribute to UNAMA’s mandate, which is to support a government challenged by an armed opposition.

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6 A study by CARE/World Bank drew a similar link, demonstrating that schools constructed by PRTs, or even visited by PRT representatives, are at increased risk of attack by anti-governmental forces (Glad, Marit (2009) Knowledge on Fire: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan, Risks and Measures for Successful Mitigation. CARE/World Bank, p. 42).
7 The attacks against the Herat UNAMA office in 2010, the Mazar-e-Sharif UNAMA office (April 2011) or the UNHCR compound in Kandahar (December 2011), as well as the attack against the UN guesthouse in Kabul in 2009 are strong elements pointing out toward a targeting of the UN by the armed opposition.
Operational transparency: As WFP strongly relies on governmental departments to channel its food delivery at the provincial and district level, there is clearly a risk of fuelling local corruption, favouritism, and food diversion, in a deteriorating environment where governmental counterparts do not report to anyone and are tightly linked with local communities. Overall, there is now more and more anecdotal evidence that channelling assistance through local departments and district governors is conducive to corruption: “So it is a good idea in theory but a big mistake in practice, especially in the provinces – where civil servants have sometimes not been paid for months and are not used to getting an informal salary from their position” (INGO Country Director, Kabul).

Flexible and bottom-up approaches: WFP is often described as an overly centralized organisation, where “nothing can be done without the prior agreement of Kabul” (INGO Country Director, Jalalabad). The organisation still suffers, in today’s context, from what a UN aid worker described as a “ready-made approach, [which] cannot prevalent in a country like Afghanistan” (UN Program Officer, Kabul): lack of contextualised perspectives and analyses, “siloed” programming, top-down and centralized approach to operational and strategic objectives.

Towards longer-term impact: A recurrent reproach is that WFP offices are generally too focused on quantitative and short-term results, rather than longer-term outcomes: “It’s not because you try to provide emergency responses to a crisis that you have to focus on food quantity, without any prior assessment. It sends wrong signals to local actors and does not meet the actual needs of the affected populations“ (INGO Country Director, Balkh).

Emphasis on nutrition and food diversity: All the INGOs working with WFP on food assistance or nutrition activities insisted on the organisation’s excessive emphasis on food quantity over diversity and quality. Nutrition is often regarded as a more complex but also more appropriate answer to most of the humanitarian crises and early recovery contexts: “There is this prejudice that food quantity is the most adequate answer to humanitarian crises. It is sometimes true but the situation is subtler here: very often, the question of malnutrition is not due to a lack of caloric intake but rather to nutritional deficiencies [=lack of food diversity]. WFP should rethink its assistance strategy drastically, if not exclusively, through this lens” (INGO Nutrition Officer, Kabul).

Longer-sighted funding cycles: Many INGOs (14 out of 25) expressed the need for more financial visibility and longer-term funding cycles: “It is difficult to produce anything that can lead to monitorable socio-economic outputs and outcomes. It then becomes challenging to examine how the outputs (and outcomes) contribute towards the development objectives of the project or to national priorities” (INGO Country Director, Badakhshan). In both strategic and financial terms, WFP’s funding cycle and short-term agenda often prevent INGOs from developing a real action and strategic plan (especially when they have a reduced donor portfolio).

• Operations and implementation

Lighter administrative procedures: despite significant efforts made by WFP, according to discussions with the Kabul Office, it seems that the perception of NGOs is still quite uneven at the provincial level, and some respondents considered this point as a significant obstacle to the activation of emergency responses (among the most frequent examples: “too many interlocutors”; “information gaps” between Kabul, regional and provincial offices, “theoretical and abstract approach”, “delayed answers”, “lack of institutional memory” between WFP and its partners or within WFP itself, etc.).
**Timeliness, trust, and sustainability:** Correlatively, if tools are not always adequate, it is also because the planning and implementation of humanitarian interventions or emergency responses are often undermined by logistical and organisational constraints – “it is almost never done in a timely manner and they are still distributing food for last year’s drought” (INGO Aid Worker, Samangan, May 2012). As often mentioned by our interlocutors (including the UNHCR and the ICRC), timeliness is not only the key factor of success for: i) humanitarian interventions, as timely interventions strongly prevent the affected households from relying on long-term coping mechanisms that increase their vulnerability; ii) but also for creating long-term relationship with local communities and improving the acceptance of international actors.

**More adequate use of assistance tools:** Almost all the INGO representatives we interviewed (23 out of 25) agreed that WFP was sometimes using irrelevant assistance tools: “Cash is an emergency response. The problem is that when WFP should give early recovery tools, they give cash, which is always useful but not timely” (INGO Deputy Country Director, Kabul). It should also be noted that our interlocutors unanimously said that WFP should request the support of field actors (humanitarian INGOs and NGOs with a direct access to local communities).

**Lower operational profile:** The US Congressional ruling requires WFP to put a USAID logo on all the wheat bags and other food items distributed by the WFP in USAID-funded WFP projects. Aside from the question of political neutrality that this “labels” raise, as already stated in the “WFP Portfolio Evaluation” and as reiterated by 10 of the 25 INGO representatives we interviewed, this policy not only puts implementing at risk but also endangers populations – as they are more likely to be associated with the Americans by insurgents.

**Grassroots and first-hand knowledge:** It is one thing to rely on implementing partners and INGOs, but many field actors wish the WFP could spend more time in the districts and communities where they operate. And from this point of view: “there are things you cannot delegate, like the first-hand understanding of the context, even if you use implementing partners” (INGO Provincial Officer, Badakhshan).

**Integration of monitoring and evaluation objectives within the strategy:** “We have seen a number of cases of biscuits or other WFP food in the bazaars for sale. Those items have a strong market value and governmental agents, community councils as well as partnering INGOs know it.” A quasi-systematic reproach to WFP, not only from INGOs but also from other UN agencies, is that WFP lacks a clear monitoring and evaluation strategy. It is still not seen as a potential asset but rather as a contract obligation, which explains why “interlocutors, procedures, demands, administrative requirements keep changing, every six month” (INGO, Provincial Officer). Some respondents have insisted on the lack of a systematic approach, with clear M&E methods and objectives – other than purely quantitative; others have highlighted the absence of follow-up, as if M&E were not a necessary and streamlined procedure but rather depending on WFP individuals and projects; last, a few interviewees suggested that WFP uses innovative M&E tools, which are probably more in line with its core missions, like “Community Based Monitoring” – sustainable, affordable, and relatively more trustworthy.
2. **What should be the strategic pillars of WFP’s partnership with INGOs?**

Most surveyed INGO representatives have highlighted that WFP tended to consider “partnership” as a one-way “subcontracting agreement”, which does not allow WFP to optimise the partnership with INGOs, as “[WFP] deprives itself from getting more grassroots approaches, tailored to the actual humanitarian needs of a community; they too often want to get rid of their wheat bags to achieve predefined quantitative objectives – regardless of what people need and also of what NGOs know”. In these regards, it does seem that WFP’s relationship with NGOs could be leveraged by relying on NGOs’ strengths: **1) community mobilisation**, as they are generally well anchored in the areas where they operate and mostly rely on long-term acceptance policies; **2) targeting of the communities and beneficiaries**, as they have a good understanding of the socio-economic reality of local communities; **3) identification of the most adequate tools** to develop emergency responses or longer-term development impact. To do so, this study advocates for transparent and shared dialogues with INGOs, by:

- Engaging exclusively with INGOs that are not involved in stabilisation or civil-military programmes, as it is important not to be perceived as partnering with civil-military players and their objectives (which may be in contradiction with humanitarian principles and objectives). This includes thoroughly inspecting the background and partnerships of potential partner NGOs, checking their sources of funding and local activity frameworks;

- Generalising long-term financial commitments (3 to 5 years) to build the necessary trust, network, and day-to-day understanding between WFP and its partners; however, such long-term commitments must be coupled with thorough, transparent and rigorous monitoring and evaluation procedures, to guarantee the transparency and accountability of both WFP and its partners;

- Developing flexible standardized MOUs (accelerated procedures) or include flexible contractual clauses in longer-term commitments for emergency purposes: for instance, “as soon as 100 Household are considered as vulnerable, WFP should immediately provide its partner with a certain quantity of food” (NGO Country Director, Kabul);

- Decentralising some aspects of the decision-making process, especially when it comes to emergency situations, to reduce the existing bureaucratic hassles and allow WFP provincial offices to immediately coordinate with local partners (INGOs or NGOs);

- Laying the emphasis on food diversity and quality, as evidence shows that when “policymakers focus exclusively on changes in caloric intake, they miss an important component of the big picture: while poorer households do not cut back on calories very much, it is likely that they reduce dietary quality”\(^8\).

- Developing prepositioned stocks to avoid predictable (seasonal) pipeline breaks, as there is a recurrent correlation between food insecurity and natural hazards, with seasonal peaks between: 1) December and March (= extreme cold according to OCHA’s hazards calendar), and

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2) March and June (= floods), indicating not only the importance of implementing short-term humanitarian relief, but also the necessity to anticipate predictable hazards through prepositioned stocks. In this regard, WFP critically needs to engage more directly with agricultural seasonality if it is to address this fundamental source of risk and vulnerability.

- Enhancing two-sided information and analysis sharing with partnering NGOs, as most NGOs agree that they do not have the capacity to conduct vulnerability analyses and that WFP should share its Vulnerability Analyses and Mappings;

- Defining strict accountability and transparency requirements, through procurement and M&E procedures and as mentioned in the Tokyo declaration.

3. How could WFP practically engage with INGOs in a more effective ‘partnership’?

International NGOs theoretically offer better guarantees in terms of efficiency and accountability (compared with governmental actors) while providing a good access to remote or unsafe areas thanks to their local anchorage, their acceptance strategies, and their apparent non-politicization. Recommendations for specific modalities to enhance WFP’s partnership with INGOs include the following:

- Through 2012 and 2014, the proportion of partnerships with international NGOs should be strongly increased to guarantee a better accountability of WFP programmes. Following up on the previous section addressing governmental partnerships, the reduced scope of technical and operational activities with governmental counterparts will have to be transferred to responsibilities undertaken by INGOs as a substitute. The suggestion of having 2 separate lists of INGOs – as detailed below, Lists A and B – is a necessary step to diversify resources and partnerships, create new and numerous links with other actors, to minimize over-reliance on single partnerships, to maximize access and geographic coverage, and to strengthen emergency response through both national and localized partnerships.

- A first list of INGOs (List A) would encompass all the INGOs that apply international and implementation standards and provide a relatively large provincial – if not regional – coverage, to allow WFP to develop approximately 10 to 12 long-term partnerships (3 to 5 years) that would cover a large percentage of the Afghan territory. This type of partnership would require a contractual agreement on duration (multi-year financial commitment, flexibility, M&E, and capacity building). Starting small – 5 partnerships – in 2012/2013 will undertake this modality as a pilot that could be further improved, fine-tuned, and eventually expanded in 2014, once the initial results from this first phase will have been analysed.

- A second list of INGOs (List B) would include all the INGOs that apply international accountability and implementation standards and provide a smaller provincial coverage (1 to 2 provinces), to allow WFP develop a great number of more specific partnerships (3 to 5 years) and fill the geographic or assistance gaps of the first list. It is recommended that WFP select a core group of up to 20 INGOs to provide a wide coverage of localized INGO presence. This would provide WFP with a more localized, context-specific approach to enhance the capacity to respond to emergency situations faster and more effectively. The type of partnerships would not differ
(multi-year, flexible, with strong M&E components and capacity building of local NGOs); only the importance of the geographic coverage would be different and the emphasis on local deliverables and local achievements. This type of partnership can be led with a greater number of INGOs since its monitoring will be more easily done – with a reduced scope of indicators and a more manageable scope of activities.

- The key guidelines of the partnership with both A and B International NGOs are based on standards of accountability and equality: INGOs shall not be considered as implementing partners or service providers at a time of insecurity and difficult access; by contrast, INGOs shall be fully integrated within WFP strategy as operational partners, through the following:
  
  o Transparent selection process (through Requests for Proposals and a set of simple and flexible standards of accountability);
  
  o Multi-year financial commitment to allow partnering INGOs and NGOs plan their operations and financial management on the long-run;
  
  o Reduction of bureaucratic barriers and administrative obstacles (once the agreement is signed with an NGO);
  
  o Improved information and analysis sharing with partnering NGOs (VAM, analysis of natural disasters, anticipatory strategies and contingency plans, etc.);
  
  o Flexible standardized MOUs (accelerated procedures) or inclusion of flexible contractual clauses for emergency purposes to allow responsive and timely answers to food crises;
  
  o Focus on nutrition – interventions should also focus – if not prioritize – food diversity (quality) over food quantity;
  
  o Focus on emergency assistance – To improve WFP’s responsiveness to emergency situations;
  
  o Focus on sustainability – Systematic development of prepositioned stocks to avoid pipeline breaks and mitigate the impact of seasonality;
  
  o Focus on monitoring – Thorough triangulated M&E procedures (not only internal, but also community-based, as well as through independent M&E teams; baseline, mid-term, and end-line evaluations; systematic M&E procedures shared with all the NGOs to explain the objectives and methods; random site visits (with mobile regional M&E teams);
  
  o Reciprocal accountability – For instance the French Commission Interministérielle de l’Aide Alimentaire (CIAA) request from its partners to provide a balance between activity (60%) and overhead (40%) costs. Similar models could be fine-tuned and adapted to the local context with specific criteria: NGO or INGO, Kabul or Ghor, food distribution or cash voucher, etc;
  
  o Capacity building of local NGOs through mandatory clauses in the multi-year partnerships agreements (MoUs) contracts with International NGOs, with clear result-oriented objectives. The transition or exit strategy of key INGOs include, and should be further required by WFP, to cover the transfer of knowledge and expertise to local NGOs more readily capable of accessing all areas, and more sustainable.
4. How could WFP practically engage with NNGOs in a more effective ‘partnership’?

At this stage and based on the external assessment commissioned by WFP Afghanistan⁹, national NGOs tend to be reliable and valuable implementing partners. However, they still suffer from a lack of: 1) accountability; 2) technical capacity; and 3) absorption capacity. As such, NNGOs cannot still not be considered as natural partners for an agency like WFP; symmetrically, it is also WFP’s responsibility to develop the capacity of those future partners, as they represent the most pragmatic way to: i) keep working in remote and unsafe areas; and ii) hand over key humanitarian and development responsibilities to Afghan actors. Recommendations for specific modalities to enhance WFP’s partnership with INGOs include the following:

• Through 2013 and 2014, partnerships with national NGOs should be limited to capacity building, needs assessments, and information sharing, so that both WFP and its partners (INGOs) can assess the potential of local organisations. Indirectly, WFP could also include a mandatory clause in its multi-year contracts with International NGOs with regards to the capacity building of NNGOs: on the longer-run, and providing that the newly trained NNGOs prove accountable and efficient, this approach could help both WFP and its partnering INGOs develop new partnerships with local organisations.

• Through 2015 and 2016, and based on capacity and needs assessments, a selection of accountable and reliable NNGOs should be defined. Long-term partnerships between WFP and NNGOs could then be progressively developed – on the same basis as those concluded between WFP and INGOs (accountability, transparency, sustainability, information-sharing, flexibility, and monitoring).

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Partnering with local communities (CDCs) in 2012 and beyond

In an increasingly volatile context where impartiality, neutrality and independence are more than ever at the centre of humanitarian work, WFP needs to ensure that it keeps these trademarks and ensures a proper visibility of its actions with the communities. This will allow for sustainability of WFP’s presence in country. The reasoning that applies to governmental authorities may apply, to some extent, to local CDCs: accountability is very often a key issue and a thorough monitoring must be done to make sure that the assistance provided to communities, through the channel of the CDCs (or any other legitimate local council) does reach beneficiaries and people in need.

At the same time, a similar reasoning as the one applied to NNGOs, regarding the risk of overwhelming small structures with new funding and partnership agreements, applies in this case as well. CDCs have been effective entities through which to deliver MRRD’s NSP programme and are now being used by other counterparts as well. In this case, it is believed that WFP should not fund these CDCs for implementation of activities (the partnership with NSP will naturally take care of that and give ownership to the government) but to instead focus on capacity building to make sure that these CDCs can actually and properly deliver on expectations.

The modalities suggested in this paper are therefore to:

• Shift to i) direct cooperation with communities and local CDCs, ii) for the specific purpose of technical capacity building on issues such as human resources, office management, project management, monitoring and evaluation, reporting, funding and spending.

• Provide a Monitoring & Evaluation framework that will address a dual purpose: ensuring M&E at the community and CDC level will also provide a check on the work of other partners present in communities, for example on NSP. This would allow WFP to have direct feedback from communities on the work of its institutional partners.

• This will first call for an:

  o Initial and continuous assessment of the representativeness of the CDC members;
  o Agreements on a set of core values and basic principles to promote trustworthy and sustainable relationships, while raising reasonable expectations among local communities.

• WFP will need to offer CDCs:

  o Longitudinal community assessments to identify development opportunities (through INGOs or local NGOs);
  o Systematic food needs assessments tailored to the actual needs of the community (through INGOs or local NGOs);
  o Project ownership through community-based monitoring procedures;
  o Low profile approach (through the debranding of WFP or donors’ logos, if need be).
Partnership strategy: strengths and weaknesses of a four-year agenda

**Strengths**
- Accountability, transparency, thorough monitoring & evaluation
- Improved effectiveness and value for money in a context of significant cutbacks
- Political neutrality and impartiality in line with the humanitarian UN mandate
- Contribution to the capacity building of Afghan institutional partners (Government)
- Progressive strengthening of Afghan NGOs (and CSOs).

**Weaknesses**
- WFP shall be extremely rigorous and systematically monitor the alleged cases of corruption (food diversion, procurement, etc.) by its own representatives
- Multiyear funding are important prerequisites that will obviously depend on donors’ commitment – which WFP can hardly control.
- The monitoring of both local and international NGOs will still be pending the security situation.

**Opportunities**
- WFP could play a coordinating role to better streamline the initiatives and programmes of the different actors (WFP, other UN, INGOs, NGOs, CSOs, local communities)
- Transformation of WFP’s image within the population (which may contribute to the sustainability) and among partners (NGOs)
- Potential and progressive extension of WFP’s outreach (remote and unsafe areas, through acceptance strategies – with INGOs, NGOs and local communities)
- Development of an ambitious advocacy campaign to explain donors (tax payers) how their money is spent and why it should be spent this way.

**Threats**
- Strong resistance from governmental actors (national and provincial)
- A worsening security context might lead some partnering NGOs to leave the country (unpredictable)
- Further financial cutbacks from donors
- Reduction of the humanitarian space (with increased problems of access)
- WFP’s alignment on governmental NPPs should be redefined in this new light
- Should WFP’s budget increase on the longer-run, would INGOs and NGOs have the technical, operational, and financial capacity to absorb more significant volumes of assistance (food, vouchers, etc.)?

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**Chart 1: Cooperating partners of WFP operations (2011-2015)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year 2011</th>
<th>Year 2013</th>
<th>Year 2015</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGOs</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNGOs</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDCs</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other UN</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*in percentage of food delivered*
3 Ws mapping in the key regions of operation

The table below provides a ‘3 Ws mapping’ of key humanitarian organizations working in key technical and geographical areas of WFP’s programme. These organisations are divided into 5 distinct categories: UN agencies, international organisations, INGOs (List A), INGOs (List B) and local NGOs. The objective is to provide recommendations to WFP management on possible partners for WFP programme implementation. It should also be noted that a more ‘3 Ws mapping’ at the provincial scale is also provided in the annex (indicative tables only).

The principles of the “Partnerships Framework” can be summarized as follows:

- First, key topics relevant to WFP programmes and strategies (education, health, nutrition, and food security) have been identified;

- Among the potential WFP partners and for each of the key topics, different types of actors have then been identified: i) other UN agencies; ii) international actors (like GIZ, JICA, AKF); iii) international NGOs from the A list (covering multiples provinces); iv) international NGOs from the B list (covering one single province); and v) local NGOs.

- While the objective with other UN agencies is of course, for WFP, to increase the collective level of coordination, international actors (like AKF in the North/North-East) can offer a strong anchorage and network at the regional level, which may allow WFP to develop longer-term agreements on multiple topics – rather than punctual and fragmented agreements.

- Likewise, with INGOs from the A list, the objective for WFP is to obtain a quasi-systematic geographic coverage of all the Afghan provinces, thanks to reliable and relevant international NGOs. Multi-year agreements could be developed to benefit from their expertise in one specific area (North-Eastern provinces) or topic (education, health, etc.) by using them as a priority multi-provincial or regional partner. On the longer-run, discussions could be held to convince A-list INGOs that are present in the North-East, for instance, but do not cover certain provinces (like Takhar) to further develop some activity in WFP’s targeted province; likewise, if an A-listed INGO covers a full area with different types of activities – which do not include health, for instance – one could imagine that WFP and this INGO agree on a way to ensure a proper health coverage of the targeted area through the existing network of that INGO.

- With INGOs from the B list, the logic is the same as for A listed INGOs and only their geographic coverage differs (provincial rather than fully regional).

- Finally, the objective of the partnership with local NGOs, would be to: 1) use them as implementers in specific areas or topics not covered by other INGOs or international actors; 2) build their capacity so that they can expand the geographic or topical scope of their activities and improve their accountability and quality standards.
### Table 2: Mapping of potential key WFP partners in the key areas of operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Highland</th>
<th>UN Agencies</th>
<th>International Actors</th>
<th>INGO - A</th>
<th>INGO – B</th>
<th>Local NGOs (Capacity Building)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>UNICEF, UNESCO</td>
<td>AKF</td>
<td>AAA, SAB</td>
<td>Oxfam, Helvetas, SCA</td>
<td>EAC, NDWO, ADA, AWSEO</td>
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<td><strong>Health</strong></td>
<td>UNICEF, WHO</td>
<td>AKF, ICRC, ARCS</td>
<td>AAA, IMC</td>
<td>KOR, AMI, NCA</td>
<td>AADA, DHA, BDN, GRSP, SHUHAAD</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>SCI</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td><strong>Food Security</strong></td>
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<td>AKF, ICRC, ARCS</td>
<td>AAA, IRD, ACF</td>
<td>Helvetas, Medair, Roots of Peace, SCA, Solidarités, Oxfam, SAB</td>
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<th>INGO – B</th>
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<td>CARE, SC</td>
<td>BRAC, MADERA, SCA, AL, AD, SAB, SERVE, CFA, WAW, MRCA, MOVE</td>
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<td>ARCS, AKF, AKHS</td>
<td>MC, ACTED, Afghan Aid</td>
<td>KINDER BERG, MERLIN, HELVETAS, MEDIAR, CONCERN</td>
<td>PRB, SHDP</td>
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<td>Food Security</td>
<td>FAO, UNHCR</td>
<td>ICRC, ARCS, AKF</td>
<td>MC, ACTED, Afghan Aid</td>
<td>HELVETAS, ICARDA, OXFAM, IRD, MISSION EAST, FOCUS</td>
<td>CRAA, PRB, SHDP</td>
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Acronyms

AAA ActionAid Afghanistan
AADA Agency for Assistance and Development of Afghanistan
ABR Afghan Bureau for Reconstruction
ACBAR Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief
ACDO Afghan Community Development Organization
ACF Action Contre la Faim (Action Against Hunger)
ACTD Afghanistan Center for Training and Development
ACTED Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development
AD Afghanistan Demain
ADA Afghanistan Development Association
ADEO Afghanistan Development and Educational Organization
ADRA Adventist Development and Relief Agency
AFGHAN AID Afghan Aid
Afghanistan Rural Development and Peace Organization
Afghanistan Women Council
AHDS Afghan Health and Development Services
AHTP Afghaneische Hilfe und Training Program (Afghan Aid and Training Program)
AIHRC Afghan Independent Human Rights Committee
AIL Afghan Institute of Learning
AKDN Aga Khan Development Network
AKES Aga Khan Education Services, Afghanistan
AKF Aga Khan Foundation Afghanistan
AKHS Aga Khan Health Service Afghanistan
AKTC Aga Khan Trust for Culture
AL Afghanistan Libre
AMI Aide Médicale Internationale (International Medical Aid)
AMRAN Afghan Mobile Reconstruction Association
ANDMA Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority
ARC Afghan Relief Committee
ARCS Afghan Red Crescent Society
ARD Agency for Rehabilitation and Development
ASCHIANA: Afghanistan's Children, A New Approach
AWC Afghanistan Women Council
AWEC Afghan Women's Educational Center
AWN Afghan Women’s Network
AWRC Afghan Women’s Resource Center
AWSDC Afghan Women Skills and Development Centre
AWSEO Afghan Women Services and Education Organization
BDN Bakhtar Development Network (Health)
CARE Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
Caritas Germany - International Conference of Catholic Churches - Germany
CDC Community Development Council
CFA Child Fund Afghanistan
CFI Childfund Afghanistan
CHA Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
CIC Children in Crisis
CONCERN Concern Worldwide
CORDAID Catholic Organisation for Relief and Development Aid
CRAA Committee for Rehabilitation Aid to Afghanistan
CW The Children of War
DACAAR Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees
DCA Dutch Committee for Afghanistan
DHSA Development and Humanitarian Services for Afghanistan
DRC Danish Refugee Council
DHSL Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e.V. (German Agro Action)
EMDH Enfants du Monde – Droits de l’Homme
EMOP Emergency Operation
FAO United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation
FOCUS Focus Humanitarian Aid
GFD General Food Distribution
GRSP Ghazni Rural Support Program
HASCO Help Afghan School Children Organization
HAWCA Humanitarian Assistance for Women and Children of Afghanistan
HDCAW Health and Development Center for Afghan Women
HELVETAS Helvetas Swiss Intercooperation
HI Handicap International
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IMC International Medical Corps
INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation
IO International Organisation
IRC International Rescue Committee
IRD International Relief and Development
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
JOHANNITER Johanniter Unfallhilfe e.V.
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MADERA Mission d'Aide au Développement des Economies Rurales en Afghanistan
MAIL Ministry of Agriculture Irrigation and Livestock
MC Mercy Corps
MDM Médecins du monde (Doctors of the World)
ME Mission East
MEDAIR

MERLIN Medical Emergency Relief International

MM Medica Mondiale

MoE Ministry of Education

MoLSAMD Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled

MoPH Ministry of Public Health

MoU Memorandum of Understanding

MOVE Welfare Organization

MRCA Medical Refresher Courses for Afghans

MRRD Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development

MSF Médecins sans frontières (Doctors Without Borders)

NAC Norwegian Afghanistan Committee

NCA Norwegian Church Aid

NECDNO Noor Educational Capacity Development Organisation

NPP National Priority Programs

NRC Norwegian Refugee Council

NRDOAW Nawayee Rehabilitation and Development Organization for Afghan Women

NRVA National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment

NSDP National Skills Development Programme

NSP National Solidarity Programme

OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

ORCD Organization for Research and Community Development

OXFAM Oxfam (GB and Novib)

P4P Purchase for Progress

PIN People in Need

PRB Partners in Revitalization and Building

PRRO Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation

RI Relief International

ROP Roots of Peace

SAB Solidarités Afghanistan Belgique

SC Save the Children

SCA Swedish Committee for Afghanistan

SERVE Serving Emergency Relief and Vocational Enterprises

SHA Swiss Humanitarian Aid

SHDP Social and Health Development Program

SHUHADA Shuhada

SI Solidarités International

SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary General

SWABAC Southern and Western Afghanistan and Balochistan Association for Coordination

TDH Terre des Hommes

TEARFUND Tearfund

UN United Nations
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHAS United Nations Common Humanitarian Air Service
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
WADAN Welfare Association for the Development of Afghanistan
WAW Women for Afghan Women
WFWI Women for Women International
YPCD Youth Capacity Development Program
Contacts

Samuel Hall Consulting
Qala-e-Fatullah, Street 5, #2
Kabul, AFGHANISTAN
14, rue Duvivier, 75007
Paris, FRANCE
Kabul: +93 796 60 60 28
Paris: +33 6 66 48 88 32
development@samuelhall.org

Visit our website at www.samuelhall.org