



## Living Out of Camp

---

Alternative to camp-based assistance for Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia



NORWEGIAN  
REFUGEE COUNCIL





**Samuel Hall** is a research and consulting company with headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan and a regional office in Nairobi, Kenya. We specialise in socio-economic surveys, private and public sector studies, monitoring and evaluation and impact assessments for governmental, non-governmental and international organisations. Our teams of field practitioners, academic experts and local interviewers have years of experience leading research in several countries. We use our expertise to balance needs of beneficiaries with the requirements of development actors. This has enabled us to acquire a firm grasp of the political and socio-cultural context in the country; design data collection methods and statistical analyses for monitoring, evaluating, and planning sustainable programmes; and to apply cross-disciplinary knowledge in providing integrated solutions for efficient and effective interventions. To find out more, visit [samuelhall.org](http://samuelhall.org).



**Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)** is an independent, humanitarian, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, established in 1946. NRC works to protect the rights of displaced and vulnerable persons during crisis. Through our programmes we provide assistance to meet immediate humanitarian needs, prevent further displacement and contribute to durable solutions. Through our advocacy we strive for rights to be upheld and for lasting solutions to be achieved. Through our stand-by rosters we provide expertise as a strategic partner to the UN, as well as to national and international actors.

Visit: <http://www.nrc.no>

This report should be cited using the following reference: Samuel Hall Consulting (2014), *Living out of Camp: Alternatives to Camp-based Assistance for Eritrean Refugees in Ethiopia*, commissioned by the NRC. Samuel Hall Consulting encourages the dissemination of its reports. For permission to photocopy or reprint any part of this work, please send a request with complete information to: [development@samuelhall.org](mailto:development@samuelhall.org)

## Acronyms

---

ARRA	Administration of Refugees and Returnees Affairs
CS	Case Studies
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
IGA	Income Generating Activity
IRC	International Rescue Committee
KII	Key Informant Interview
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCP	Out of Camp Policy
PRS	Protracted Refugee Situation
UNHCR	United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees
SWOT	Strengths – Weaknesses – Opportunities – Threats
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
YEP	Youth Education Pack

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**ACRONYMS** **3**

---

**TABLE OF CONTENTS** **4**

---

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY** **5**

---

**I. INTRODUCTION** **9**

CONTEXT: ERITREAN REFUGEES, NRC & THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT..... 9

METHODOLOGY .....12

STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT .....15

---

**II. PARAMETERS OF THE OUT OF CAMP SCHEME** **16**

LEGAL FRAMEWORK.....16

MODALITIES OF THE OUT-OF-CAMP SCHEME .....16

OTHER OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFUGEES TO LIVE OUTSIDE OF CAMPS.....18

---

**III. LIVELIHOOD CHALLENGES & SELF-RELIANCE OF ERITREAN REFUGEES** **19**

SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS.....19

PROFILE OF ERITREAN YOUTHS LIVING IN THE CAMPS .....21

ASSESSING SELF-RELIANCE AND EXISTING LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES IN THE CAMPS.....25

CONNECTIONS, NETWORKS & SOCIAL CAPITAL.....35

LIVING OUTSIDE THE CAMP: A VIABLE OPTION FOR ERITREAN REFUGEES? .....39

---

**IV. LIVELIHOOD SOLUTIONS: PROGRAMMING IN THE CAMPS & OUTSIDE THE CAMPS** **44**

A. RATIONAL FOR LIVELIHOOD PROGRAMMING .....44

B. OPTIONS FOR PROGRAMMING.....46

ENHANCING ACCESS TO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CAMPS – WHAT IS NRC DOING ALREADY?.....46

EXPANDING THE PARAMETERS OF THE OCP AND URBAN PROGRAMMING .....50

---

**CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS** **54**

CONCLUSIONS.....54

RECOMMENDATIONS.....57

---

**REFERENCES** **66**

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## Living Out Of Camp:

Alternative to Camp-based assistance for  
Eritrean Refugees in Ethiopia



The present study was undertaken by Samuel Hall for NRC Ethiopia to examine the possible alternative to the encampment policy for Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia. Looking at the level of self-reliance reached by refugees living in the camps of Shire region and at the modalities and success of the recent Out-of-Camp scheme implemented by the government, the study highlights programming options and partnerships, as the way forward for stakeholders to address more effectively the challenges of migration, livelihoods, camp and out of camp programming in Ethiopia. Efforts to engage with out of camp programming are necessary in a migratory context like the Ethiopian one, where the prospects for durable solutions are severely limited, especially for Eritrean refugees, leading an increasing number of refugees to a situation of protracted displacement.

The study is based on primary data collected in Ethiopia according to a mixed methodology including:

- A 779-respondent quantitative survey in the camps of Mai Aini and Adi Harush,
- A 50-respondent small & micro-enterprise survey in Mai Tsebri & Addis Ababa
- 10 Focus Group Discussions, 10 Case Studies and 20 Key Informant Interviews

The findings of this study highlight 3 key conclusions:

### Limits of camp-based assistance

The survey of the Eritrean camps points at the limits of camp-based assistance for refugees. It confirms that encampment prevents the development of livelihood mechanisms amongst Eritrean refugees living in Ethiopia, leading to a very low level of self-reliance in the camps and to negative coping mechanisms.

### Low access to income-generating activities in the camps, especially for youth.

Activities available entail casual and irregular labour. The level of dependency on external assistance is very high demonstrating the very low level of self-reliance of refugees living in the camps.

- Eritrean refugees can rely on high levels of literacy (89%) but a very limited skill set and only a basic educational background, which reduces self-entrepreneurship and access to the labour market.
- Low access to work is one of the main obstacles for refugees living in the camp as 63% of them reported not having worked in the past 30 days and 59% of respondents work never or rarely throughout the year. Youth and women struggle particularly to access IGAs;
- The main types of jobs accessible are either casual labour in the construction sector or self-employment in the business sector. The main source of full-time employment available in the camp is with NGOs and ARRA, especially for women as 72% of the limited portion of women who had a full-time job worked in the NGO sector.
- A low connection to urban markets and a weak internal demand in the camp strongly limit the development of endogenous economic activities within or connected to the camps;
- Aid is the main source of income for 56% of respondents, along with charity (15%), community assistance (13%) and debt (17%) as part of their main sources of income.
- Low access to livelihoods is one factor further fuelling secondary movements out of the camps.

### Social and economic isolation limit self-reliance

Measuring access to network and social connections for refugees in the camps reveals the

high level of economic and social isolation, further limiting refugees' self-reliance.

- The family networks of refugees living in the camps are limited: only 22% refugees have relatives living outside the camps in Ethiopia and only 40% of them had Ethiopian relatives.
- The main type of interactions that refugees have with people outside the camp are for social or family purposes (45%), whilst business, financial and work relations are extremely weak (4%; 3% and 9%) confirming the poor economic integration of the two camps.
- 67% of respondents do not leave the camp nor have member of their household leaving the camp from time to time, confirming a high level of social isolation, fuelling frustration and secondary movements.
- Whilst the Eritrean diaspora is able to mobilize remittances to fund secondary migration, only a limited proportion of refugees in the camps (8%) reported relying on remittances. This resource should be better channelled to support livelihood activities in the camps rather than potential harmful migration strategies.

### Vulnerable Sub-groups: youth & women

- The population of the camp is composed mostly of young male: 75% of male respondents and 60% of female respondents were under 29.
- The youth showed the highest level of inactivity in the camps, with 72% of respondents aged 15 to 24 having not done any work over the past 30 days, against 56% of respondents aged 30 to 34.
- Women have a particularly poor access to employment and income-generating activities with only 17% of female respondents having worked in the past 30 days. 76% of female respondents never work throughout the year.
- Whilst single male youths are tempted by secondary migration, women and families are more likely to stay entrenched in the camps.

- NRC's YEP programme, which targets specifically young refugees with a strong vocational training, has yet to build up a strong livelihood component to its intervention in the camps.

**Overall, and as a consequence of economic dependence and social isolation, 2 main profiles of refugees co-exist in the camps:**

- a majority of young male refugees, ready to engage in further migration, despite the immense risks on the one hand;
- Refugees from vulnerable groups (including women, elderly, families) who are left behind, entering a situation of protracted displacement and highly dependent on aid.

**Both groups have low self-reliance levels and lack coping strategies, except for further movement, which increases their vulnerability.**

### A way forward? Out-of-Camp Scheme: opportunities & bottlenecks

The Out-of-Camp scheme established by the government is a welcome initiative that opens interesting opportunities for Eritrean refugees. Yet, it has not led to the expected results so far, as some gaps in the policy limit the protection and access to livelihood of refugees once out of the camp.

#### Low Self-reliance in the city

Assessing the living conditions of Eritrean refugees living in the city showed access to livelihood and self-reliance remains a challenge for some of the refugees in urban settings and that the OCP provides limited protection mechanisms for refugees in the city. Some connections are still lacking to increase the impact of the OCP on refugees' access to self-reliance.

**Key challenges of the OCP scheme for Eritrean refugees:**

**Uneasy adjustment to urban life due to:**

- An unreliable system of sponsorship
- Difficult to access employment and livelihood opportunities
- Poor conditions of employment, as refugees are restricted to informal jobs with no legal protection



## **Obstacles to local urban integration and to labour market entry:**

- The lack of work permit
- The necessity to have an Ethiopian guarantor to be hired
- Language can also be a barrier for business-related activities
- Lack of market information
- Lack of work experience.

## **Protection risks:**

- Food insecurity
- Negative coping strategies (food restrictions, prostitution...)

Because they are supposed to be self-reliant, OCP beneficiaries receive little assistance once in the city. Support and monitoring mechanisms on their living conditions are very loose. This tough adjustment to urban life explains why refugees living in the city still see resettlement as the main durable solution that they could access.

## **Livelihood Programming: towards self-reliance in and out of the camps**

### **Objective 1: Strengthening self-reliance in the camps**

The most vulnerable and the least self-reliant are left behind in the camps. Developing livelihood initiatives in the camps is needed and would help addressing the problem of secondary movements. NRC should build up the livelihood wing of its programming in the camps. In particular, a strong livelihood component should be developed from the inception of the YEP programme up to the follow-up with YEP graduates.

In particular, robust linkages to the markets should be built for YEP graduates by:

- Developing an apprenticeship programme with private employers in the surroundings
- Organising local and regional trade fairs
- Developing innovative credit mechanisms with the support of the diaspora
- Establishing self-help groups to support micro-entrepreneurship

### **Objective 2: Strengthening access to self-reliance through the OCP**

The OCP is an innovative mechanism but requires additional support to address the missing linkages and protection risks highlighted in this study. Much can be done to take advantage of the OCP legal framework developed by Ethiopian authorities to build refugees' self-reliance. Three main articulations can increase the impact of the OCP on refugees' self-reliance:

- a. A stronger link between refugees in the camp, who remain the most vulnerable and the least self-reliant, and the policy;
- b. A stronger link between refugees living out of the camp and urban livelihood.
- c. A stronger articulation between actors to optimize the impact of the OCP.

### **For all stakeholders, the research recommends simple measures to help bridging the gaps of the current mechanism:**

- **Reviewing communications campaign & tools** with refugees and potential beneficiaries in the camps to avoid creating an expectation gap.
- **Develop a reference document detailing the exact modalities of the OCP** for stakeholders.
- **Set up an Urban Resource Centre for OCP beneficiaries** where they can get information, counselling and be targeted for livelihood interventions.
- **Develop innovative solutions to address the issue of informal labour** in close coordination with ARRA.

**The research recommends a comprehensive “A to Z programme – from the camps to the City”** to address the 2 lacking connections exposed above: the low linkage between the camps' most vulnerable and the OCP on the one hand; the low connection to and integration in urban markets on the other hand.

### **NRC's Pilot Programme ‘From the Camp to the City – A Phase Approach to Building Self-Reliance’**

- **STEP 1 - Building urban skills and workforce preparedness in the camp**
- **STEP 2 - Transferring trainees to Addis Ababa, through the OCP**
- **STEP 3 - Temporary support mechanisms**

- **STEP 4 - Complementary training in urban settings**
- **STEP 5 - Small Business Grants /Urban Apprenticeship Programme**
- **STEP 6 - Strong Monitoring & Evaluation**
- **STEP 7 - Advocacy Component**

### Objective 3: Strengthening information sharing and Knowledge-Base Management amongst stakeholders

Given the fluidity of movements in and out of the camps of Shire, a tighter system of data collection, data analysis and information sharing is recommended to strengthen information and knowledge management amongst stakeholders and inform more directly programming. For livelihood interventions in particular, the impact of secondary movement needs to be assessed and that can only be done through a dynamic data collection system.

- ✓ **Collect data and update information from all stakeholders on existing migration and movement dynamics.** Mechanisms of Population Movement Tracking (PMT) have been established in other countries and migratory contexts to capture the migratory dynamics. PMT systems are based on consortiums of NGOs willing to align and share their data collection mechanisms. NRC is an active member of the PMT initiative in place in Somalia and could use this experience to replicate the initiative in the Ethiopian context.

### Conclusion

This study conducted on the Eritrean refugee caseload in Ethiopia and the increasing protracted nature of the camps in the North of the country should be seen as a case study and an opportunity to rethink refugee management in Ethiopia and similar contexts. It showed that, in the camps, a shift should take place to include development actors – more suited to tackle issues of livelihood – in the assistance framework for refugees. It confirmed the need to support non-camp based assistance to refugees and to use the opportunity of the OCP to see how this type of schemes could be replicated with other groups of refugees in the country as well as in other contexts where camp-

based assistance have led to intractable protracted refugee situations. The OCP also represents a great opportunity to open a dialogue on refugee management and innovative mechanisms to increase refugees’ self-reliance in Ethiopia, a dialogue that organisations like NRC should support.



**Samuel Hall.** is a research and consulting company with headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan and a regional office in Nairobi, Kenya. We specialise in socio-economic surveys, private and public sector studies, monitoring and evaluation and impact assessments for governmental, non-governmental and international organisations. Our teams of field practitioners, academic experts and local interviewers have years of experience leading research in several countries. To find out more, visit [samuelhall.org](http://samuelhall.org).



**Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)** is an independent, humanitarian, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, established in 1946. NRC works to protect the rights of displaced and vulnerable persons during crisis. Through our programmes we provide assistance to meet immediate humanitarian needs, prevent further displacement and contribute to durable solutions. Through our advocacy we strive for rights to be upheld and for lasting solutions to be achieved. Through our stand-by rosters we provide expertise as a strategic partner to the UN, as well as to national and international actors. **Visit:** <http://www.nrc.no>



# I. INTRODUCTION

---

This research is the first study of alternatives to camp-based assistance in Ethiopia for Eritrean refugees, and the first thorough review of Ethiopia's Out-of-Camp scheme (OCP)<sup>1</sup>. The situation of Eritrean refugees – as highlighted in the pages of this report – draws attention to two equally vulnerable groups: 1) young, single refugee males in situations of secondary movement and engaged in further irregular migration, and 2) protracted refugees with specific displacement-related vulnerabilities (women, children, elderly) who are highly – and almost exclusively – dependent on external aid. Both have low self-reliance levels and lack effective coping strategies – their only response is either to further migrate or to stay in the camps. In both situations, they are unable to secure livelihoods. They are victims of cycles of vulnerability and poverty caused by deportation, lack of networks and livelihoods, and lack of community-based support systems.

The Norwegian Refugee Council advocates for the needs of Eritrean refugees in a country now counting 18 refugee camps and 427,077 refugees<sup>2</sup>. It is time to take stock of current initiatives and lessons learned – as the OCP initiative has led to mixed results for reasons detailed in this report. As voluntary repatriation is not an option for Eritrean refugees, this study explores the OCP as a programming alternative while waiting for a durable solution. Whilst the OCP does not represent a durable solution in itself, it encourages access to more sustainable livelihoods for Eritrean refugees. What can be learned from this programme to analyse options beyond camp assistance in Ethiopia?

New avenues for programming and partnerships are highlighted in our conclusions. The study provides recommendations of pilot programmes that, if replicated more widely, could significantly enhance the assistance provided to refugees in Ethiopia.

## CONTEXT: ERITREAN REFUGEES, NRC & THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT

### ETHIOPIA'S REFUGEE POLICY

The Government of Ethiopia offers a relatively favourable environment to over 400,000 refugees living in Ethiopia<sup>3</sup>. Whilst camp-based assistance is still the cornerstone of Ethiopia's refugee policy, this research shows its limits: findings show that the encampment policy prevents the development of self-reliance mechanisms among Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia.

In a positive turn, the Government of Ethiopia shifted its refugee policy in 2010 – specifically towards Eritrean refugees – by establishing the 'out-of-camp' scheme through which Eritreans are allowed to live and study outside the camps if they are able to sustain themselves independently (usually through relatives or remittances). Eritrean refugees are even allowed to access higher education, through an agreement with the Ethiopian Administration for Refugees and Returnee Affairs (ARRA). About 3,000 Eritrean refugees have benefited from the scheme so far and the initiative has been

---

<sup>1</sup> The mechanism giving refugees the possibility to live outside the camp is a scheme and not a governmental policy. The acronym OCP will be used throughout the report for practical reasons and because it is used commonly by stakeholders in Ethiopia.

<sup>2</sup> UNHCR, (Oct-Dec 2013), *Ethiopia Refugee Update*

<sup>3</sup> There were 427,077 refugees in Ethiopia as of December 2013 according to UNHCR official figures. UNHCR, *Ethiopia Refugee Update* (Oct-Dec 2013). <http://www.unhcr.org/52ab069c9.html>

widely praised as a welcome step beyond a strict camp policy. Yet, refugees are still not allowed to work in the country limiting the opportunities for self-sufficiency.

The caseload of refugees is composed of Somalis (estimated at over 240,000 in December 2013) Eritrean (81,000) and South Sudanese refugees (above 70,000 individuals)<sup>4</sup>. Refugees in Ethiopia are scattered into 18 camps, supported by ARRA and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and provisions for 2014 expect an increasing influx of refugees<sup>5</sup>.

**Overall, whilst Ethiopia plays a strong role in welcoming and supporting refugees living on its soil, the favourable environment offered to refugees does not include in its framework durable solutions.**

### **Eritrean Refugees in Ethiopia**

Amongst the groups of refugees established in Ethiopia, Eritreans have a particular profile. The arrival of Eritreans in the country started with the brief Ethiopian-Eritrean war in 1998-2000. Eritreans continue to flee Eritrea to Ethiopia at an average pace of 800 to 1,000 per month, a pace that went up to 2,000 new refugees crossing the border every month over the past 9 months. Eritrean refugees usually establish in the Northern region of Tigray. The particular factors fuelling displacement – notably military conscription – explained that the group of Eritrean refugees living in Ethiopia is dominated by young men between 18 and 30 years old and often literate<sup>6</sup>. According to ARRA's statistics, this age category represents about 55% of the Eritrean group of refugees<sup>7</sup>. These specific characteristics of the Eritrean refugee population make their adjustment to the life in camps particularly uneasy. Eritrean refugees hardly have the option of returning to their country, where they face harsh punishment – including death penalty – for having left Eritrea in the first place. Possibilities to access resettlement to a third country are extremely limited, as about 1% of refugees get resettled<sup>8</sup>. One striking feature of the lives of Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia is the lack of perspective and horizons to strive for, explaining why majority of them continue their migration towards Europe or Israel through Sudan, Egypt and Libya. Eritrean refugees are stuck 'in limbo', as UNHCR coined it in 2011, unable to return, facing great difficulties and enormous risks to migrate further and not allowed to integrate locally<sup>9</sup>. **The prospects for durable solutions for Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia are severely limited.**

### **NRC's Programmes in Ethiopia since 2011**

In the light of the changing legal environment for Eritrean refugees, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) has a strategic role to play. Now in its fourth year of operation, NRC works closely with UNHCR and ARRA to provide relevant assistance to refugees in Ethiopia within its core competencies: a) Shelter; Education (vocational training and alternative basic education through the Youth Education Pack (YEP)); Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH); and Food Security.

**Building on the out-of-camp scheme, it is time to consider whether longer-term solutions are available to assist refugees in Ethiopia. This study analyses alternatives to camp-based assistance**

---

<sup>4</sup> Idem.

<sup>5</sup> UNHCR, 2014 *UNHCR Country Operation Profile – Ethiopia*.

<sup>6</sup> UNHCR (2012), *UNHCR Representation in Ethiopia – Briefing Note*

<sup>7</sup> IRIN News (2012),

<sup>8</sup> KII UNHCR

<sup>9</sup> UNHCR, 2011, 'Young Eritreans in Ethiopia face future in limbo'; <http://www.unhcr.org/4e27de636.html>

and avenues for urban livelihood programming to enhance the self-reliance of Eritrean refugees living in Ethiopia.

#### DEFINITIONS OF THE MAIN CONCEPTS

**PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATION (PRS):** Situations where refugees: *“have lived in exile for more than 5 years, and when they still have no immediate prospect of finding a durable solution to their plight by means of voluntary repatriation, local integration, or resettlement”*<sup>10</sup>.

**LIVELIHOOD:** *“The capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living. A sustainable livelihood allows to cope with and to recover from stress and shocks, to maintain and enhance its capabilities and assets to provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next generation.”*<sup>11</sup>

**SELF-RELIANCE:** *“The social and economic ability of an individual, a household or a community to meet essential needs (including protection, food, water, shelter, personal safety, health and education) in a sustainable manner and with dignity. Self-reliance, as a programme approach, refers to developing and strengthening livelihoods of persons of concern, and reducing their vulnerability and long-term reliance on humanitarian/external assistance”*<sup>12</sup>.

### OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

NRC commissioned Samuel Hall Consulting to lead this research to analyse the alternative to camp-based assistance and to provide a roadmap for NRC to work with stakeholders to address the challenges of migration, livelihoods, in and out-of-camp programming. This study is at the crossroads of key conceptual and operational issues related to assistance to refugees, from protracted displacement to irregular migration, and from livelihood interventions to self-reliance, and the challenges of urban programming.

The objectives of the present research are therefore three-fold, as illustrated in the table below:

- **Building knowledge** on the parameters of the out-of-camp scheme as well as on the profile and access to livelihood of Eritrean refugees living in and outside of the Ethiopian camps, to examine the articulations between the scheme and the situations of the refugees in practice.
- **Building stronger programming** by analysing opportunities for programming opened up by the out of camp scheme, in terms of relevance, modalities and potential impact;
- **Building support** as it analyses the extent to which out-of-camp programming may offer a better assistance framework for refugees in situations of protracted displacement in the Horn of Africa, based on this case study of Eritrean refugees living in Ethiopia.

<sup>10</sup> Crisp, J (2002), ‘No Solutions in Sight : the Problem of Protracted Refugee Situations in Africa’ in *CCIS Working Paper*, n°68, p.2.

<sup>11</sup> Chambers R. and Conway G. (1991), *Sustainable rural livelihoods – practical concepts for the 21st century*, IDS Discussion Paper 296, Brighton, 1991.

<sup>12</sup> UNHCR, (2005), *Handbook for Self-Reliance*, p.1

Table 0-1 Research Framework

OBJECTIVES	RESEARCH QUESTIONS	TOOL(S)
<b>Knowledge Building</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What are Eritrean refugees’ main sources of livelihoods?</li> <li>• Which networks link the camps with urban areas?</li> <li>• To what extent are they self-reliant in and outside the camps?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Quantitative Survey</li> <li>✓ FGDs</li> <li>✓ Case Studies</li> </ul>
<b>Programming</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What are the avenues for programming out of camp?</li> <li>• How can humanitarian assistance facilitate a higher degree of self-reliance for Eritrean refugees?</li> <li>• What are the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats of in camp vs. out of camp programming for Eritrean refugees?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Key Informant Interviews</li> <li>✓ FGDs</li> <li>✓ Case Studies</li> </ul>
<b>Building Support</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is programming out of the camps a relevant and effective option in Ethiopia?</li> <li>• How can the impact of the out-of-camp scheme be maximised?</li> <li>• How can national and international stakeholders support this type of intervention?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Key Informant Interviews</li> <li>✓ FGDs</li> <li>✓ Case Studies</li> </ul>

## METHODOLOGY

The fieldwork took place in January and February 2014, in Addis Ababa and in the camps of Adi Harush & Mai Aini in Shire region<sup>13</sup>. It was conducted under the direction of Samuel Hall’s researchers with the support of NRC local teams.

To grasp the dynamics of livelihoods and self-reliance among refugee communities and to assess the impact of the out-of-camp scheme, the methodology used a mixed methods approach combining both quantitative and qualitative methods to triangulate information.

The field research targeted 4 groups of respondents:

1. **Refugee populations living in the camps through a quantitative survey**
2. **Refugees living outside the camps through qualitative interviews**
3. **Host communities;**
4. **Employers and Business actors through a rapid labour market assessment**
5. **Governmental and non-governmental actors** involved in the assistance to Eritrean refugees.

<sup>13</sup> The camps of Adi Harush and Mai Aini were chosen based on their protracted dimension and because NRC’s YEP programme is implemented in both these camps.

## QUANTITATIVE DATA COLLECTION

### ▪ 779-Respondent Quantitative Survey in the camps

The research team carried out a 779-respondent quantitative survey of randomly selected refugees in the Eritrean camps of Adi Harush and Mai Aini (Shire region) with the support of NRC teams.

**Survey Questionnaire** - The survey was designed to analyse the level of self-reliance of refugees in the camps. It gathered data on a) the socio-economic profile of Eritrean refugees living in both camps; b) their main livelihood strategy and lack thereof; c) their social networks inside and outside the camp and d) their plans for the future. One specific section of the questionnaire focused on youths with specific data on their skills & job aspirations. Another section targeted YEP beneficiaries to get their opinions on the NRC programme and assess the impact of the programme on access to labour and income.

**Sampling** – The survey was based on the random selection of respectively 382 and 397 respondents in the camps of Adi Harush and Mai Aini for a total of 779 respondents. This sample size gives us a 95% confidence level and 5% margin of error. A random sampling strategy was followed in each of the camp, allowing for the collection of representative data for each of the camp. In order to ensure a representative sample of households, the division of the camp in zones served as a basis for the random sample. Within each zone, enumerators were asked to use a fixed-point and fixed-interval selection technique, selecting each house every 4 doors starting from a fixed point. The following table presents the breakdown of the survey population:

Table 1-0-2 – Quantitative Survey (Sampling)

Location	Men	Women	TOTAL
ADI HARUSH	245	137	382
MAI AINI	232	165	397
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>477</b>	<b>302</b>	<b>779</b>

### ▪ 50 micro & small Enterprises Survey

To assess the demand for labour and skills, a **rapid enterprise survey was implemented within the camps, in Mai Tsebri (closest small town) and in Addis Ababa** for a total of 50 micro- and small enterprises. The survey allowed us to collect data on a) the main economic sectors, profiles of SMEs and economic trends in the vicinity accessible to refugees; b) demand for labour (skilled labour and refugee labour) in these SMEs; c) perception of refugee skills, experience and professional aptitude.

The enterprise survey was purposive and prioritized market areas close to locations where Eritrean refugees live. Amongst SMEs located in these areas, the research team targeted the main sectors known to be accessible to refugees: car mechanics, garage, beauty salons, wood & metal workshops etc. based on prior discussions with key informants. This survey is therefore only indicative.

## QUALITATIVE DATA COLLECTION

The qualitative fieldwork consisted of:

- **Key Informant Interviews (KII):** A series of KIIs were conducted at the federal, provincial and local levels and aimed at clarifying the legal and humanitarian contexts; understanding the specific challenges pertaining to the situation of Eritrean refugees in the country and assessing the stakeholder landscape on the question of access to livelihood and assistance to refugees. A total of 20 stakeholders were interviewed through semi-structured in-depth interviews. Key informants included: governmental actors; Humanitarian actors at the Addis & local levels (UNHCR, IRC, DRC...); NRC staff at the regional, national and local levels; camp zonal leaders and RCC members.
- **Focus Group Discussions (10):** The field team conducted ten focus group discussions with respondents both within and outside the refugee camps. The discussion guidelines were designed to collect in-depth qualitative information on the migratory profiles and living conditions of refugees in and outside the camps; on their access to livelihood & employment; their business relations with non-refugees and with the cities and their plans for the future. For focus groups conducted in the camps, respondents were chosen based on a set of pre-defined criteria including a) participation in the YEP; 2) gender 3).

**Table 1-0-3 – Overview of Focus Groups by type of respondents**

TYPE OF RESPONDENTS	# of FGDs	# of Individuals
YEP Beneficiaries	4	25
Non-Beneficiaries	4	25
Host Community	1	7
Eritrean refugees living out of camp <sup>14</sup>	1	9
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>66</b>

- **Case Studies (10):** A series of ten case studies were collected to complement qualitative data through longitudinal profiles of Eritrean refugees living inside and outside the camps:
  - 5 case studies with beneficiaries of the Out of Camp Scheme (OCP) living in Addis Ababa for information on their living conditions, access to livelihood and employment and future plans when living in urban settings. Beneficiaries were selected through a snow-ball approach, as refugees from the camps provided contact information for refugees living in Addis Ababa, who in turn gave information on other refugees living in the city.
  - 5 case studies with youths living in the camps of Mai Aini and Adi Harush, also focusing on the question of migration, employment and aspirations. Based on a diverse case method, various profiles were looked after for the selection of respondents in the camps, (e.g. former students who had come back to the camps, graduates of the YEP etc.)

<sup>14</sup> It is difficult to trace beneficiaries of the OCP and the research team had to rely on ARRA to organise FGD in Addis Ababa. Findings on OCP beneficiaries are therefore indicative and not representative of the entire OCP population.



## CONSTRAINTS & LIMITATIONS

The research was constrained by two main limitations:

First, tracing down and getting access to beneficiaries of the out of camp scheme or illegal refugees living in urban centres like Addis was challenging. The research team had to rely on 2 main ways to identify OCP beneficiaries either through refugees still living in the camp who would provide us with contacts or through ARRA, reducing the sample size for this category of respondents.

Second, NRC local staff conducted the quantitative survey. This may have induced two limited biases: YEP beneficiaries may have under-played their dissatisfaction as they are interviewed by one of the YEP teachers; and the fact that respondents may have exaggerated their poverty, in order to get assistance from an NGO operating in the camp. Enumerators were asked to insist on the fact that the information was confidential and would not be used for any specific programme of assistance.

## STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

### **Chapter 2 – Setting the Context – Understanding Migration Challenges & Policies**

A context analysis of refugee situations in Ethiopia, with a dual focus on the legal framework regulating the rights and obligations of Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia, and on the key challenges of migration, livelihood and urban programming.

### **Chapter 3 – Key Findings of the Research**

Key findings from the quantitative and qualitative survey are presented with an in-depth analysis of the socio-economic profiles of respondents, their sources of livelihood and their self-reliance.

### **Chapter 4 – Livelihood and Programming Options**

Opportunities for livelihood programming and a SWOT analysis of the three programming options to be considered: programming in camps, transitioning out of camp and programming in urban settings.

### **Chapter 5 – Conclusions and Recommendations**

The report draws conclusions and recommendations on the most relevant options of programming for NRC in the short and medium term. To assist NRC in implementing the most relevant and appropriate programming, in light of this study's findings, the research team closes this report with a suggestion for a pilot programme to be tested by NRC to assist Eritrean refugees – with a focus on youth beneficiaries – in Ethiopia.

# II. PARAMETERS OF THE OUT OF CAMP SCHEME

## 1) LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The out-of-camp scheme (OCP) has to be understood in the larger legal framework on refugee rights in Ethiopia. Amongst the most important provisions impacting the lives of refugees in Ethiopia are:

- a) The largely implemented encampment practice: more than 427,000 refugees live in 18 camps scattered across Ethiopia.
- b) The reservations on the right for refugees to move around freely; right to work freely (art. 17 of the Geneva Convention) and access primary education (art. 22 of the Geneva Convention).


## 2) MODALITIES OF THE OUT-OF-CAMP SCHEME

Ethiopia has received recognition from international actors: its open borders policy for refugees from neighbouring countries and its establishment of the out-of-camp scheme allowing an increasing number of refugees to live outside the camps. The OCP’s implementation began in the summer 2010.

A striking feature of the OCP is that **its parameters remain largely unclear** for many stakeholders who work on refugee assistance in the country, from national and international NGOs to donors. **Stakeholders have different interpretations of the modalities, scope and potential use of the out-of-camp scheme.** No official document is easily available, detailing the scheme and its modalities. Whilst a reference document apparently exists, it has not been shared with the main stakeholders working on assistance to refugees in the country. The two main actors involved in the OCP are the Administration for Refugees and Returnees Affairs (ARRA) and its main partner UNHCR. Other actors involved in refugee assistance do not have a good knowledge of the parameters of the scheme nor any strategy to take it into account in their own programming - a gap that NRC is now aiming to bridge.

The absence of a reference document creates some discrepancies between each organisation’s interpretation of the parameters of the scheme. Interviews with ARRA officials allowed us to get a clearer picture of the parameters of the OCP, particularly in terms of criteria for eligibility. UNHCR had a different interpretation of some of these criteria, in particular regarding the nationality of the sponsor and the exclusivity of the mechanism for Eritrean refugees.

Figure 2-0-1 – Out of Camp Scheme: Main Characteristics (source: *KIIs with ARRA’s representatives*)



## Eligibility – Going out of the camp

- **The OCP is presently only applicable to Eritrean refugees.** Refugees from other nationalities, Somali or Sudanese in particular, are not eligible. Whilst authorities report that the OCP could soon be extended to other nationalities, no clear timeline has been defined for this extension yet. The main reasons put forward by Ethiopian officials for this exclusivity are:
  - a. The strong cultural links and homogeneity across the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia, making relationships with the host community easier;
  - b. The existing networks that Eritrean refugees could use to sustain themselves in the cities they move to;
  - c. The potential security risks that could come with opening the scheme to other caseloads, especially Somali, given current geopolitical and security contexts.
- **The main criterion regulating the access to the OCP is whether the refugee can benefit from the guarantee of a sponsor** - a high barrier for Eritrean refugees living in the camp.. According to ARRA, the sponsor, who takes on responsibility for his or her living expenses once outside the camp, has to be Ethiopian. The sponsor has to go through a vetting process, through which ARRA checks whether the relative will be able to support the refugee. There is a certain degree of latitude on that aspect, as some Eritrean refugees could be allowed to settle in the city if they prove that they have enough support from their family abroad to survive in the city.
- **Procedure** – Qualitative discussions with OCP beneficiaries suggest that the procedure to access the OCP could be long and tedious, between 6 months to 2 years<sup>15</sup>. Some refugees noted that the bureaucratic process was so difficult that refugees would prefer taking the risk to move to the city illegally.

## Once approved for the OCP: Key regulations

- **The out of camp scheme does not come with freedom of movement.** Refugees have to live in the city, which they registered as their place of residence with ARRA. Any movement out of the city requires a specific authorization from ARRA.
- **OCP beneficiaries are not included in urban assistance mechanisms for refugees.** The rationale of this scheme is based on the idea that those who settle outside the camps have their own direct access to sources of livelihood, that will allow them to be independent once in the city. This means that they do not have access to any subsistence allowance, nor have they access to free education or medical facilities. They can benefit from the reception and advice that UNHCR provides to refugees living in Addis during their open sessions on Fridays.
- **UNHCR and ARRA loosely keep track of the beneficiaries once they move out of the camp.** Discussions are planned every 3 months to check with refugees whether they face specific problems.

## Number and Proportion of beneficiaries

According to ARRA's official figures, there are 2,429 Eritrean refugees who have benefitted from the out-of-camp scheme and live in Addis Ababa, whilst 233 refugees live in the various cities of Shire region (Axum, Mekele or Shire in particular)<sup>16</sup> but this figure has been questioned.

---

<sup>15</sup> FGD OCP Beneficiaries, Addis Ababa.

<sup>16</sup> ARRA official data.

The official UNHCR statistics for the last semester of 2013 estimate the Eritrean caseload to be 81,000 individuals. Even if this number does not take into account secondary movement, it can be taken as a basis to calculate the Eritrean population size present in country. Based on these estimations, **it is possible to conclude that the OCP offers the opportunity to live outside the camp to approximately 3.7% of the Eritrean caseload living in Ethiopia.** As such, the OCP still represents a timid solution to the situation of protracted displacement of Eritrean refugees living in Ethiopia.

### 3) OTHER OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFUGEES TO LIVE OUTSIDE OF CAMPS

Apart from the OCP, **there is a growing ensemble of rules and schemes that open opportunities for certain refugees to live outside the camps.**

- *Higher education*  
One of these mechanisms is the agreement between UNHCR and ARRA to allow **young refugees to pursue their higher education in any university of the country.** To qualify for this scheme, refugees must pass the university entrance exam. 1,200 Eritrean refugees are currently enrolled in universities.
- *Work for graduates*  
An ambiguity lies in what graduates are expected to do, once they have completed their degree. ARRA officials expect graduates to go back to the camps and look for jobs there. On the other hand, past graduates mentioned being given the choice to stay in the city if they were able to sustain themselves. In this case, higher education can lead to a potential settlement, and local integration, outside the camps.
- *The Urban Programme - UNHCR*  
The final set of arrangements under which refugees can be allowed to live in the city is related to the **'urban programme' of UNHCR.** There are 2,500 refugees officially registered as urban refugees in Ethiopia. There are 3 main grounds upon which a refugee can be accepted in the urban programme: for security reasons, for medical reasons and for humanitarian reasons. Serious medical cases are referred to the urban programme when the person requires treatment that is beyond the capacities of the health centres run by ARRA in the camps. The refugees who come from countries which do not have an 'official' camp, such as Yemen for example, are automatically registered in the urban programme. There is a referral system in place between UNHCR field staff in the camps and the Urban Programme run from Addis. Unlike the OCP beneficiaries, urban refugees are supported by the UNHCR and receive a subsistence allowance.

## III. Livelihood Challenges & Self-reliance of Eritrean Refugees

---

This chapter presents the survey's findings on the livelihood and self-reliance of Eritrean refugees, both in and outside the camps. The indicators provided in this section – and summarised below - will inform the recommendations in chapters 4 and 5 of this report.

### SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS

#### A. MIGRATION & DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

**SECONDARY MOVEMENTS OF YOUNG MALES, VULNERABILITIES OF THOSE STAYING BEHIND: The camps of Adi Harush & Mai Aini host a majority of young male refugees, ready to engage in further and often irregular migration. Yet the most vulnerable portion of the camp population is staying behind in patterns of protracted displacement.**

- The camps of Adi Harush and Mai Aini are emptying due to secondary movement;
- The population of the camps is in majority male (61.2%), young (65.9% of respondents are below 29) and single (50.1%);
- The pace of secondary movements is high, especially amongst young male refugees but a segment of the Eritrean refugee population is entering protracted displacement, notably in Mai Aini where 44% of respondents have been living for more than 5 years. The ones who stay in the camps are the most vulnerable: women, elderly and families.

#### B. ECONOMIC PROFILE

##### LOW ACCESS TO INCOME GENERATING ACTIVITIES AND DEPENDENCY ON AID

**The survey found that access to income-generating activities (IGAs) in the camp was low, especially for young refugees. Activities available entail casual and irregular labour. The level of dependency on external assistance is very high demonstrating the very low level of self-reliance of refugees living in the camps.**

- Eritrean refugees can rely on high levels of literacy (89%) but a very limited skill set and only a basic educational background;
- Low access to work is one of the main issues for refugees living in the camp as 63% of them reported not having worked in the past 30 days and 59% of respondents work never or rarely throughout the year. Youth and women struggle particularly to access IGAs;
- The main types of jobs accessible are either casual labour in the construction sector or self-employment in the business sector. The main source of full-time employment available in the camp is with NGOs and ARRA, especially for women;
- A low connection to urban markets and a weak internal demand strongly limit the development of endogenous economic activities within or connected to the camps;
- Aid is the main source of livelihood for 56% of respondents, along with charity (15%), community assistance (13%) and debt (17%) as part of their main sources of income. Only a limited proportion of respondents (8%) could rely on remittances. Opportunities to self-supply are limited in the camps, due to difficult weather conditions and lack of financial means available.

### **C. SOCIAL PROFILE**

#### **AN ISOLATED REFUGEE POPULATION WITH FEW OUT-OF-CAMP CONNECTIONS**

**Measuring access to networks and social connections reveals the high level of economic and social isolation of refugees in the camps further limiting their self-reliance.**

- 22% refugees have relatives living outside the camps in Ethiopia. 45% of respondents had no family outside the camp. Of those who do, only 40% had Ethiopian relatives – representing 8.8% of the overall Eritrean refugee respondents.
- The survey found that interactions of refugees with people outside the camps are limited in scope and type as 49% of respondents said they had out-of-camp networks. The main type of interactions that refugees have with people outside the camp are for social or family purposes (45%), whilst business, financial and work relations are extremely weak (4%; 3% and 9%).
- 67% of respondents do not leave the camp nor have household members leaving the camp from time to time, confirming a high level of social isolation, fuelling frustration.
- Whilst the level of awareness about the existence of the OCP is relatively high (57% of respondents said they knew about it), precise knowledge about what it entails is low.
- Only 36% of those who knew about the OCP said they were interested in applying. Yet the main reason is not a genuine disinterest but either the fact that they don't have relatives to sponsor them (49%) or by fear of losing chances to resettle (40%).

### **D. URBAN REFUGEE PROFILES**

#### **LOW LEVELS OF SELF RELIANCE AND LIMITED IMPACT OF THE OUT OF CAMP SCHEME**

**Assessing the living conditions of Eritrean refugees living in the city showed that refugees' self-reliance is not achieved through the OCP per se. Access to livelihoods remains a challenge in urban settings and the OCP provides limited protection mechanisms for refugees in the city. Some connections are still lacking to maximise the impact of OCP on refugees' self-reliance.**

- In the frame of the OCP, refugees face several challenges that render their adjustment to urban life uneasy. These include the unreliable system of sponsorship and the difficulty to access employment and livelihood. The lack of work permit or the necessity to have an Ethiopian guarantor to be hired are huge barriers of entry to the labour market. So are language, the lack of experience and the lack of market information .
- The main sectors where Eritrean refugees may find jobs in the city are auto-mechanics, metal work & construction and personal services (hair dressing & domestic work).
- As they are restricted to informal jobs and have no legal protection, refugees living in urban areas suffer from poor conditions of employment.
- More generally, urban poverty and the lack of support mechanisms raise specific protection risks for refugees who move to the city, including harmful livelihood strategies, such as reduction of food intake or prostitution.
- Because they are supposed to be self-reliant, OCP beneficiaries receive little assistance once in the city. Support and monitoring mechanisms on their living conditions are very loose.
- This difficult adjustment to urban life explains why refugees living in the city still see resettlement as the main durable solution that they could access.



## PROFILE OF ERITREAN YOUTHS LIVING IN THE CAMPS

Populations in the camps of Adi Harush and Mai Aini are decreasing due to the high pace of secondary movement, which renders population estimations difficult. The majority of refugees living in the camps are male, young and single, although even more so in Adi Harush although the number of families and married couples is higher than commonly perceived. If all officially refugees, this population has a complex migratory profile as cases of forced migration, mixed migration and of deportation coexist. The Eritrean caseload is therefore characterised by 2 main profiles:

- Young male refugees, mobile and often looking to migrate up North;
- Women, elderly, families and refugees with no resources who stay behind, increasingly entrenched in the 2 camps.

### 1) SPECIFICITIES OF ADI HARUSH & MAI AINI CAMPS: A DECREASING BUT OVERWHELMINGLY YOUNG REFUGEE CASELOAD

#### Gender Imbalance in the camps: A majority of male refugees

The quantitative survey found a strong gender imbalance in the Eritrean refugee population in both camps and especially in Adi Harush, where the proportion of male refugees is significantly higher:

Table 3-0-1 – Gender Distribution/Camp


CAMP	MEN	WOMEN
ADI HARUSH	64%	36%
MAI AINI	58%	42%

The gender imbalance is starker in the most recent camp<sup>17</sup>. This suggests that gender imbalance reduces with time, explained by the fact that male refugees are more likely to enter in secondary movement, continuing their migration through Sudan and other countries. These gendered behaviours in respect to secondary movement would explain a levelling of the proportions of men and women as times goes by.

#### A caseload of youths

An important feature for organisations like NRC is to assess whether a focus on youth is relevant in the context of Eritrean migration. Figure 3.2 below confirms the high proportion of young Eritreans forced into migration to Ethiopia. For both men and women, a large majority of respondents were under the age of 29<sup>18</sup>, with respectively 75% and 60% of respondents aged less than 29.

Figure 3-1 – Proportion of refugees per age category (breakdown by gender)



On the other end of the spectrum, the proportion of respondents older than 50 is very low both for men and women (respectively 4 and 3% of respondents). The predominance of youths in Eritrean camps is due to the fact that most refugees start their migration when they are required to join the military.

<sup>18</sup> Ethiopia's official definition of youth comprises people between the age of 15 and 29.

## **Marital Status: A majority of single men and a majority of married women**

The survey found a majority of respondents (50.1%) being single. Yet, a closer look at the data shows a striking difference between men and women living in the camps:

Male refugees are significantly more likely to be single (64% of male respondents). On the other hand, the majority of female respondents were married (54%) as against only 33% for male refugees. An important difference also exists in the proportion of men and women being divorced, as 13% of female refugees reported being divorced against 2% of their male counterpart. These gender disparities confirm that men are more likely to leave alone to try their luck abroad. This generates situations of abandonment, domestic dispute and divorce/separation. The proportion of women divorced is higher in Mai Aini, an older camp, where female refugees may have been living longer separated from their partners.

52% of respondents live with at least another member of their households, nuancing the general picture of Eritrean refugees and suggests that the ones who stay in the camp are the ones who have members of their families with them or who have formed a family upon arrival in the camp. For them, further movement is either more complex or not desired. Families are more entrenched in the camp settings.

**Overall the simple demographic features of Eritrean refugees confirm some of the characteristics commonly perceived as key to analysing Eritrean refugees: over-representation of young people and of male refugees in particular and high proportion of refugees who live alone. On the other hand, for those who remain in the camp, the proportion of people living with family members is relatively high, reducing – although not necessarily preventing – secondary movement.**

## **2) A VULNERABLE AND COMPLEX MIGRATORY PROFILE: FORCED MIGRATION, MIXED MIGRATION AND DEPORTATIONS AMONG ERITREAN REFUGEES**

The camps of Adi Harush and Mai Aini host a homogenous population in terms of ethnic background and migratory profiles, as 93.7% of respondents belong to the Tigrinya ethnic group, followed by 6% to the Saho ethnic group, the second most important in the camps.

### **Country of Origin and Forced Return: The Question of Eritrean Deportees**

Unsurprisingly, 99.4% of respondents reported their country of origin to be Eritrea. A few respondents reported having come from Egypt or Sudan. When asked whether they were going out of the camp and to which destination, 5% of households where some members had left the camp reported having been to Sudan, Egypt or Libya. This confirms **the presence of deportees and refugees who come back to the camp after failed attempts to continue their migration up north.**

Qualitative data confirmed the presence of deportees in the camp and, very often, the hardship they had had to go through before being sent back to the Ethiopian camps. For example, a 15-year old girl told her difficult story during a FGD:

*I tried to leave Ethiopia through Sudan once. In Sudan I was captured and taken to Sinai, in Egypt. Life was horrible in Egypt. It was very difficult. Then I was brought back to Adi Harush, here in Ethiopia.*

FGD YEP Beneficiaries – Adi Harush.

This situation highlights the necessity to prevent secondary movements in dangerous conditions, especially for Eritrean unaccompanied minors, as these migratory routes are extremely risky at every step of the way.

### A case of mixed migration

The following figure details the main reason reported by refugees on why they left Eritrea in the first place:

Figure 3-0-2 – Reasons for Migration (Breakdown by gender)




Figure 3.0.2 confirms that, even though all Eritreans living in the camps have the refugee status, the migration of Eritreans is complex in its motivations. Indeed, fleeing to escape from a forced military conscription is a predominant motivation for Eritrean refugees, especially for male refugees, as 49% of them reported this as a reason for their migration. A lot of refugees noted how tough the living conditions were once they were forced into the military.

Yet, significant proportions of refugees left for economic reasons (respectively 15% and 19% of male and female respondents) and in hope of a better life (8% and 17% respectively). Interestingly, female refugees are more likely to have started their migration for economic reasons – both as a push factor and with the hope of getting a better life.

Qualitative data highlight factors including the absence of a job or higher education opportunities; of freedom of opinion and expression; and a “domino effect” as young Eritreans see others leaving massively. A final pattern is individual migration being triggered due to the harassment and retaliation of the regime against families of those who fled abroad.

*My brothers were in the military and fled to Ethiopia. The government imprisoned my father because of my brothers' departure. Once my father was released, he decided that we would all leave to Ethiopia.*


Mebeat, 20 year old.  
FGD Mai Aini

## Duration of Migration: transit or are some refugees bound to stay?

Analysing the duration spent by refugees in displacement in Ethiopia allows us to assess the extent to which the Eritrean camps are places of transit or destinations in and of themselves.

Figure 3.5 shows the proportion of refugees based on when they arrived in each of the camps. Naturally, what the graph does not show and what is particularly difficult to capture for stakeholders, is the proportion of people who leave the camp rapidly, within a day or a week. The survey gives us a snapshot of the situation in the camp and not a dynamic picture that would capture secondary movements.

Figure 3-3 – Duration of Migration (Per Camp)



On the other hand, the graph shows that **some of the refugees have been in the camps for significant periods of time:**

- 76% of respondents in Adi Harush have been in the camp for 2+ years and under 5 years.
- 49% of respondents in Mai Aini have been in the camp for 2+ years and under 5 years,
- **44% of respondents in Mai Aini have lived there for 5 years or more and can therefore be considered as 'protracted refugees'.**

The low proportion of refugees newly arrived in the camp is explained by the opening of Hitsats camp in 2013, to which most new refugees are sent. The question of the duration of stay in the camps is important as it partly defines the response of international agencies and other stakeholders. The relevance of non-emergency assistance programme is also dependent on whether part of the caseload of refugees is actually staying in the camps rather than engaging rapidly in secondary movement. The survey found that at least part of the population is more stable than what is usually perceived. As noted above, the sample is naturally skewed in favour of those who stayed but **it does show that a significant proportion of the camp population has been living and surviving in the camp for at least more than 2 years.**

### BOX – WHO STAYS LONG IN THE CAMP?

It is clear from qualitative discussions that staying in the camp is only rarely a positive choice. Generally, it is because of the financial impossibility of undertaking secondary movement either abroad or to other places in Ethiopia. Overall, **those who stayed in the camps appear to be the ones with the least social and financial resources available.** Several factors enter into play and prevent secondary movement:

- \* Absence of personal financial means to afford the costs of further migration. For the first leg of the migration through Sudan, several sources reported that the minimum to pay was between 3,000 and 4,000 USD.
- \* Lack of access to remittances to cover for the costs of the migration or to establish in the city
- \* Lack of Ethiopian relatives who could sponsor one's move to a city.
- \* Education level insufficient to reach the Ethiopian higher education system.
- \* Level of skills insufficient to take the risk to earn a livelihood in the city – either legally or illegally.
- \* Marriage or formation of a family in the camp, which render further migration more complex.

Are camps transient and fluid or do they represent a pocket of stability for certain refugees? The reality falls in-between as these dynamics coexist. Both Adi Harush and Mai Aini see important out-movements: a constant number of refugees leave across the border to Sudan, sometimes only a few days after arriving in the camp. Some have to stay a bit longer in the camps in order to gather the means to undertake the trip. Finally, some refugees have settled in the camp, formed a family there and are not ready to be displaced again, either to Sudan or to other cities of Ethiopia. Most are still waiting for an unlikely resettlement chance.


**ASSESSING SELF-RELIANCE AND EXISTING LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES IN THE CAMPS**

While Eritrean refugees have a high level of literacy, their skills and educational background remain limited and not adapted to the camp settings. This - amongst other factors – fuels a high level of inactivity in the camp, especially amongst younger female refugees, as access to income generating activities is rare. For those who access the labour market, work is irregular and informal. Access to work is heavily restricted by the impossibility to move freely and the lack of job opportunities within and outside the camp settings. Opportunities to self-supply are also very limited in the camps. As a result, refugees are heavily dependent on aid and assistance for their survival, making the camps areas of very low self-reliance. **Dependency on aid and lack of self-reliance in the camps explain why looking at alternatives to camp-based assistance is necessary.**

**1) SKILLS & EDUCATION BACKGROUND: A HIGHLY LITERATE BUT LOW SKILLED YOUNG GENERATION**

The survey confirmed a high level of literacy, as 89% of respondents reported being literate, a high figure given the 39% adult literacy rate in Ethiopia between 2007-2011<sup>19</sup> and compared to other refugee situations. There is a gender difference but literacy for women as well, the literacy rate remains high (81% as against 94% for men). The main determinant impacting levels of literacy is the age category of the respondent: respondents aged 40 and over show higher level of illiteracy than the younger refugees: 24% of respondents aged between 40 and 49 reported being illiterate, whilst the proportion increased to 48% for respondents aged 50 and over.

Figure 3-4: Highest Level of Education Completed in Eritrea



the younger refugees: 24% of respondents aged between 40 and 49 reported being illiterate, whilst the proportion increased to 48% for respondents aged 50 and over.

A high literacy rate, at least amongst the younger refugees, is explained by the fact that the majority of refugees were enrolled at school in Eritrea before leaving. Only 10.1% of refugees have never been enrolled at school, either in Eritrea or in Ethiopia. Education levels nuance the idea that Eritrean refugees start their migration with a solid education and skill set.

Figure 3.6 shows that **access to higher or technical education is minimal**. A vast majority could only access primary or

secondary education in their country.

<sup>19</sup> [http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/ethiopia\\_statistics.html](http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/ethiopia_statistics.html). The adult literacy rate represents the percentage of adults aged 15 and over who can read and write.

This is confirmed by the qualitative fieldwork, which found that most refugees fled between Grade 7 and Grade 10. Hence **only a few of the refugees have had a chance to develop skills and professional experience before leaving Eritrea. Whilst Eritrean refugees benefit from basic skills, they do not arrive in Ethiopia with a skill set robust enough to help them adjust to their new environment and develop economic activities.**

A common view on Eritrean refugees is that their urban background provides them with an urban skillset that could be of use to access livelihood in Ethiopia. As shown in the table below, the **skillset of refugees upon arrival in Ethiopia is limited to the most basic skills that can be learned at school.** Only marginal proportions of Eritrean youths possess technical and/or professional skills. Amongst the few who do, construction is the main skill. The proportion of refugees possessing skills in computer-IT (11%) is linked to the IT training provided in the camp by IRC. The background of Eritrean refugees does not provide them with professional or vocational skills other than the ones provided at primary and secondary school levels.

**Table 3-0-2: Skill set of Eritrean Young Refugees (Sample excludes YEP beneficiaries)<sup>20</sup>**

Numeracy Skills	22%	Manufacturing	1%
Foreign languages	10%	Accounting	1%
Computer, IT	11%	Communication	1%
Tailoring	3%	Marketing	1%
Construction	3%	Management	1%
Business skills	2%	Mechanic	1%
Electricity – Electronic system	2%	Plumbing	1%
Welding	1%	Agriculture, livestock	1%

The table also shows that very few Eritrean refugees arrive with developed skills related to either agriculture and livestock and only a small number of households relies on either agriculture or livestock to survive, showing that self-supply is not a strategy available to build self-reliance in the camps. The urban background of refugees does not prepare them to work in these sectors.

**2) ACCESS TO INCOME GENERATING ACTIVITIES (IGAs)**

**Who has access to work?**

Access to employment and income is undoubtedly a major challenge for Eritrean refugees living in the camps. Qualitative interviews repeatedly showed the stark feeling of hopelessness of refugees when it comes to employment and sources of income.

The quantitative survey allows us to refine the analysis of the problem of access to employment and IGAs and to measure which factors impact access to employment and IGAs for refugees:

*“There isn’t any kind of income generating activities in the camp. Sometimes we go to Mai Tsebri to try and find some daily labour. Casual labour pays very little. If you don’t receive any assistance from abroad, it is just very difficult.*

*Plus, even daily labour is not accessible to everyone. There are a lot of refugees trying to find work in Mai Tsebri. There are too many refugees for all of us to get work*


FGD Male, YEP Beneficiaries, Adi Harush

<sup>20</sup> Respondents also listed skills that they acquired during their school education, such as literacy (59%), Mathematics & algebra (22%), foreign language (10%) and natural sciences (12%). 13% of young respondents said they had no skills at all.



- **More than 63% of respondents have not worked in the past 30 days**
- A striking **gender imbalance** impacts the general figure of employment: 49% of male respondents reported having worked against only 17% of female respondents.
- **Access to work varies significantly across age categories.** The youths – aged between 15 and 24 – show the highest level of inactivity with 72% of youths not having worked over the past 30 days, compared to 56% for respondents aged between 30 and 34 and only 38% for those aged between 40 and 44. Targeting the youth for livelihood programming is a priority in the context of Adi Harush and Mai Aini.
- **Literacy only marginally impacts access to work for refugees:** 38% of literate respondents report having worked over the past month, compared to 29% amongst illiterate respondents. Given the overall high level of literacy in the two camps, literacy does not give a particular comparative advantage to get hired.
- **The level of education only plays a significant role for those who reach higher education.** All the lower levels of education (from primary to middle education in the Eritrean system), including vocational education, do not show differences in access to work. Amongst the few who attended university or technical institutes, 65% had exercised some work in the past 30 days, a proportion significantly higher than the average, but for a very small pool of people.
- **Finally, access to work increases with the time spent in the camps:** 28% of those who have stayed for a year had worked over the past 30 days, against 40% for those who have been living in the camp for 5 years. It can be assumed that refugees who stay longer have developed more experience and are more likely to access casual labour.

### Main Sectors of Activities: Construction, Business and NGOs



The two figures illustrate the main sectors of activities in which refugees who reported having worked in the past 30 days exerted their activity.

There are differences between the two camps, as construction is the main sector of work for 25% of respondents in Adi Harush as against only 15% in Mai Aini. Business & petty trade on the other hand is more prevalent in Mai Aini, where it was the sector of activity for 16% of respondents against only 8% in Adi Harush.

**NGOs are a major source of employment for both camps, as they represent about 15% of the jobs.** Field observations show that working as a ‘social worker’ for IRC or ARRA was one of the main options available to refugees, especially women. Whilst useful as a short-term solution to give refugees access to income and build their capacities, it raises issues of sustainability, as these sources

of employment are in no way endogenous to the camp or to the surrounding community. This is even more relevant as part of the ‘construction sector’ also depends directly on NGOs’ activities, which hire refugees for shelter programmes and other construction programme.

The difference between the two camps in terms of income-generating activities can be explained by their different locations. Adi Harush’s labour market is mainly dependent on the small town of Mai Tsebri for its sources of employment. There, some refugees can get daily labour, especially in the construction sector. Because there is relatively strong rural to urban migration in the region, the sector is dynamic, even though salary and opportunities for refugees remain limited. These opportunities do not exist in Mai Aini, which is much further from the city. Transportation costs to the city (20 EBR for a return) do not make it worth for refugees living in Mai Aini to try and get daily labour in Mai Tsebri,. On the other hand, businesses have more opportunity to develop as they do not suffer as much from the competition of Mai Tsebri. The range of products and services available in the camp of Mai Aini is wider than that of Adi Harush, explaining why the ‘business and trade’ sector is the first source of employment reported there.

Looking at sectors of activity to which women have access, it appears that **the NGO sector is particularly crucial for women employment** as 24% of women who worked in the past month worked for an NGO. The second main sector of activity for women is ‘personal services’ (beauty parlours, hair dressers etc.) followed by ‘business and trade’ as some of the shops in the camps are owned and run by women.

**Low Quality & frequency of work**

The survey allows us to measure the type, frequency and regularity of employment. Amongst those who worked in the past month, **33% worked as daily labourers, 22% as full-time employees (either in the public or in the private sector) and 9% reported being self-employed**. In the same group, another 26% reported being unemployed. This shows the low proportion of refugees able to access a stable job, whilst unemployment and daily labour remain the most common situation in the camps. The majority of full-time jobs is provided by NGOs and ARRA (60%), the source of employment for most of the refugees who reported having a full-time job, especially women (72% of women having a full-time job worked for an NGO). The survey also measured beyond the last 30 days how frequently refugees would work throughout a year:

Table 3-0-3 – Frequency of Work throughout the year (breakdown per gender)

Frequency	MEN	WOMEN
Constantly throughout the year	23%	12%
Seasonally/Part of the year	19%	4%
Irregularly, once in a while	13%	3%
Rarely	15%	4%
Never	30%	76%

Table 3.3 confirms that most refugees have either no access or rare and irregular access to work. For female refugees, the work situation is particularly difficult as they are either able to secure a full-time job with an NGO or have very limited opportunities to work: 76% of female refugees reported never working throughout the year. This is linked to the limited type of jobs available in the area – mostly in daily construction labour, less suited for women.

**Overall, both quantitative and qualitative data paint a rather bleak picture of the state of employment and IGAs accessible to Eritrean refugees living in the camps. Whilst the majority of them do not work, the rest have to rely on casual and irregular work on the one hand or NGO-**

**supported jobs on the other. The absence of job opportunities and IGAs in the camp fuel a real feeling of despair that directly contributes to secondary displacement.**

### **Obstacles to Income Generating Activities**

There are several obstacles that can explain the low access of Eritrean refugees to jobs or IGAs. This sub-section assesses the weight of these obstacles in preventing refugees' access to work and IGAs.

#### ▪ **Rules and Regulations**

The impossibility to work outside the camps is perceived by refugees as one of the main obstacles preventing them from securing jobs: 53.7% of respondents cite the impossibility to work outside the camp as an obstacle preventing them to access livelihood. According to the law, refugees are indeed not allowed to work anywhere outside the camps. Yet, Ethiopian authorities exert loose control over the implementation of this rule in Mai Tsebri and refugees who find jobs or daily labour there are not troubled. Further away from Mai Tsebri though, the road is guarded by checkpoints and refugees are required to get authorization to travel. This structural issue severely restricts access to labour markets.

Furthermore, the camp curfew – refugees have to be back by 6pm at the latest – also makes their situation less flexible to find jobs or daily labour as it imposes constraints on their potential employers.

Regulations regarding land ownership are also relevant. In the Ethiopian case, refugees are not allowed to own land. Access to land ownership is a sensitive question for the host community as well, especially in a dry and difficult region like Shire. Yet, skills related to agriculture and livestock are very limited in the camps, making land ownership less of an acute issue for refugees, even if 15.5% of them cited restricted access to land as an obstacle to secure IGAs.

#### ▪ **Stagnant economic sector: Absence of job opportunities**

Beyond the structural issues related to regulations, the characteristics of the local labour market make it difficult for refugees to access any jobs or activities. The absence of important local markets apart from Mai Tsebri means that the two camps provide labour workforce for a small and saturated labour market. Contrary to the situations observed in many camps in the world, where protracted refugee situations transform camps into integrated and often dynamic economic units<sup>21</sup>, **the camps of Mai Aini and Adi Harush remain significantly deprived of endogenous economic activities that could support a demand for labour.**

Whilst camps economy is usually constrained by several obstacles – from the lack of market information to the unpredictability of travel authorizations<sup>22</sup> – the Eritrean camps suffer from a more structural absence of internal economic life and limited economic linkages with their surroundings.

Beyond a few micro-businesses and shops, and some restaurants or cafés, very little economic activities have developed in the camps. **This is linked to constant secondary movements, which prevent the establishment of an entrepreneurial environment as people put their energy and limited financial capacities into preparing for a future migration or onward journey.** Furthermore, the uprooting of urban-raised young population to rural camps means that they first have to put a lot of efforts into adjusting to the hardship of the camp life and the multiple household tasks that it requires before thinking about developing an autonomous economic activity. Finally, and contrary to other protracted refugee situations, the Eritrean camps are not characterized by active and dynamic economic linkages with the rest of the country or with their country of origin. Somalis for example have become a famous example of resilience in migration and have proven their ability to re-

---

<sup>21</sup> Porter et alii (2008), 'Linkages between livelihood opportunities and Refugee-host relations: Learning from the experiences of Liberian camp-based refugees in Ghana', in *Journal of Refugee Studies*, vol. 21, n°2.

<sup>22</sup> See in particular Werker E. (2007), 'Refugee Camp Economies' in *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. 20, n° 3, 461-478.

establish large-scale business and trade relations even in situation of displacement, something that is absent from the Eritrean camps. These are only characterised by micro-scale business relations

This stagnant economic context explains why there are so few job opportunities available for refugees. A further problem lies in the fact that a decreasing population in each of the camp means a decreasing demand, hence pessimistic prospects for economic growth. Most shopkeepers and refugees looking into business opportunities have observed the downward trend and fear the consequences for their own activity or for their chances to get a job.

The main endogenous economic activities that exist in the camps are the following:

- **Petty trade:** micro- and small shops have been established. They vary in size and in the range of products that they are able to offer to their clients. A rapid assessment of the shops existing in Adi Harush showed that the smallest ones suffer from a lack of capital, which limits the products they can purchase. These shops reported very small monthly revenues: between 50 and 150 EBR per month. For the more established shops, the main issue is the decrease in the population of the camp and the impact it has on the demand. Bigger shops reported incomes of up to 550 EBR per month.
- **Construction-related services: Electricity, woodwork and metal work:** whilst some refugees have acquired the relevant skills to provide these services, and some of them manage to find labour. Shelter programmes have particularly supported the construction sector. Yet, the demand for wood or metal work remains very limited as a lot of refugees do not deem necessary to invest money in long-term objects or possessions, as they think they will leave soon. Most of the construction work accessible to refugees is located in the camps of the region but there are also some limited opportunities in Mai Tsebri, where refugees are allowed to go and look for work.
- **Personal services:** this activity is more developed in Mai Aini, as there is no town close enough for people to go to access these services. Beauty parlours, barbers and hairdresser salons have notably been established in the camp.

In this context, the establishment of the camp of Hitsats raises further challenges, especially as the camps of Adi Harush and Mai Aini are not at their full capacities. Adi Harush and Mai Aini see their population steadily declining, decreasing internal demand and further reducing the chances to see a healthy economic eco-system developing.

#### ▪ **Is the lack of a skill a significant obstacle to accessing IGAs?**

Another aspect to take into consideration when considering access to employment & IGAs is whether a skill gap is at the origin of the difficulties that the population faces when trying to get jobs. In the case of Mai Aini and Adi Harush, as highlighted above, refugees do arrive with a lack of professional and technical skills that makes it difficult for them to establish an activity or to be suited for any labour market. Furthermore, as established earlier, it makes them particularly unsuited for a rural context and limits their ability to develop activities related to the environment they live in.

The quantitative survey shows that bridging the skills gap does not lead easily to employment or IGAs, as refugees who have received vocational education and those who have not have exactly the same access to work: 63% of both groups did not work at all over the past month. When looking at the frequency of work throughout the year, those who have had a vocational education are less likely to work throughout the year (14% vs. 21%) but more likely to work 'rarely' and 'once in a while' (respectively 17% and 16% of them).

Once again, the main determinant to access stable employment in the camps is higher education as it gives access to NGO jobs. The demand is not high enough to support full-year activity to those who have technical skills.

### HOST COMMUNITY: Livelihood & Labour Interactions

The host community living in the surroundings of the 2 camps is also affected by a difficult economic environment. A rapid – and non-exhaustive – assessment of sources of employment showed similarities and disparities with the situation of refugees in the camps:

- Construction, metal work, woodwork and electricity are amongst the main economic sectors available to the host community. Mai Tsebri has several private and small workshops employing 2 to 10 employees in these sectors. These workshops have access to an important labour force, given the presence of the camps. An ongoing movement of rural to urban migration supports these sectors of activity.
- Services represent also a source of employment in the small town of Mai Tsebri, with cafés, restaurants, internet cafés and personal services being available in town.
- The town of Mai Tsebri represents a small market place and small businesses provide employment for part of the host community. A weekly market also drags people from the area to the town.
- Local government is also a sector of employment in Mai Tsebri, one that is naturally inaccessible to refugees.
- Small agriculture and livestock offer livelihoods to members of the host community, another difference with the refugees living in the camps. Whilst access to land and irrigation are two major challenges in the surroundings of the camps, local inhabitants can get farming contracts in the area. Those interviewed noted that they could only rely on rain-fed agriculture. Small livestock (donkeys, goats, poultry and cattle) is also a source of livelihood for the host community that is not accessible to the refugee population.

Overall, members of the host community confirmed the very good relationships they entertain with Eritrean refugees, with a high degree of acceptance and low resentment over the services provided to the refugee population. The refugee camps represent a market for the town, and some small businesses noted that the decrease of the camp population negatively impacted their businesses. Furthermore, the good relations with refugees mean that there is no particular reluctance in employing them, except for the fact that they may leave suddenly and are constrained by the camp curfew.


### 3) SOURCES OF LIVELIHOODS – HOW DO REFUGEES SURVIVE?

The last section established refugees' very poor access to work and income generating activities. Are there other sources of livelihood they can rely on to survive in the camps?

#### Main sources of Income: Aid & Assistance

As shown in figure 3.8, there is not much ambiguity as to where do refugees get their means for survival from: 56% of them answered that aid and assistance were their main sources of income. Women respondents reported higher levels of dependency on aid (63% of female respondents as against 51% of male respondents). Age was less of a determinant for livelihood strategies,

Figure 3-5 – Main Sources of Income



although the 25-29 age group was the one that reported the lowest level of dependency on aid as a main source of income (53%).

Furthermore, other forms of assistance, such as charity and community assistance, are additional sources of income for 28% of respondents, when combined.

Earning from casual labour is a source of income for 40% of respondents. The problem here being the irregularity of this form of income, as analysed earlier. Regular salaries are a source of income only for 13% of respondents. Here as well, there was an important difference between gender, as only 23% of female respondents reported earning from casual labour as a main source of income.

*Those who are here are the ones who have nothing. No money, no family, no opportunity. We have nothing to do. Just waiting and consuming food rations.*  
**FGD Male, Mai Aini**

The question of remittances is important. **Only 8% reported remittances as a main source of income for their household.** Reliance on remittances is likely to be under-reported. Still, the figure is relatively low given the fact that Eritrean refugees’ easy access to funding from the diaspora is a common trope of analyses on Eritrean refugees. Whilst this may be the case for Eritrean refugees on the move, or those settled in the city, those who remained behind, in the camps, have low access to this source of income. Focus group discussions confirm that those who remain in the camps are the ones who have very little outside resources to rely on. Those who reported receiving remittances said their main purpose was to cover daily food

and water expenses. Interestingly, the 15 to 19-year old age group reported the highest access to remittances (19%), showing that young refugees are supported in their movement by funding coming from abroad.

**A consequence of this low access to remittances is the low influx of cash money in the camp, hence the low level of financial means available for business-related investment and entrepreneurship.** Programmes cannot therefore expect to tap in the diaspora resources to implement livelihood-related programmes in the camps as these camps are poorly linked to remittance networks.

**Main Livelihood Strategies: Selling Aid Items**

Given the rare sources of income refugees have access to in the camp, it can be assumed that refugees rely on other livelihood strategies when living in the camps. Yet, the survey found that only a low proportion of refugees rely on alternative livelihood strategies.

**Table 3-0-4: Main livelihood Strategies reported by refugees**

Gathering & selling charcoal	7.8%	Weaving & spinning	1.9%
Making & selling firewood	4.2%	Selling livelihood products	5.8%
Gathering & selling gums and resins	4.2%	Handicrafts	2.4%
Basketry	1.8%	Petty business	7.7%
Making & selling of dung cakes	3%	Begging	1.2%
Selling aid items	<b>18.9%</b>	Child labor	4.9%

Amongst the main livelihood strategies, selling aid items is the most common: 20% of refugees admitted to it, but the phenomenon is likely to be largely underreported. Qualitative discussions showed that women in particular are in charge of selling aid items in order to buy other items, vegetables in particular. The main issue comes from the fact that, when selling aid items, refugees sell under poor transaction terms and lose a portion of the value of their aid. This is not the object of the present study but does advocate for cash-based assistance in camps like Mai Aini and Adi



Harush, connected to town markets and where food diversity is a need. The other main livelihood strategies available in the camp consist of gathering and selling various types of items, especially charcoal and firewood, which do not offer a reliable diversification of income.

### Inability to rely on self-production

Beyond income and employment, self-reliance may be supported by the production of food, for example through small backyard gardening, poultry raising or other livestock products. However, refugees living in these two camps only very rarely do self-supply. Interviews with camp leaders confirmed that **self-supply was extremely limited**. The main reason is the harsh weather and the lack of water that render any attempt at gardening and raising livestock very difficult. Lack of financial means and lack of willingness to stay reduce the possibility of self-supply and local investment.

#### 4) HOW SELF-RELIANT ARE REFUGEES LIVING IN THE CAMPS?

The assessment of access to employment, income-generating activities or other livelihood strategies for refugees living in the camp does not leave much room for hesitation as to whether warehoused refugees are self-reliant or not. Relying almost exclusively on aid and charity or assistance-related income and NGO-based employment, **Eritrean refugees living in the camps of Shire have a very low level of self-reliance**. A set of indicators can help us further refine this assessment.

#### Assessing self-reliance

Whilst their food needs are to a very large extent covered by the food rations distributed by UNHCR and WFP, refugees reported having difficulties covering their food needs. A majority faced a food shortage everyday (43.5%) to a few times a week (15.3%).

How often do you have difficulties covering your food needs?




Figure 3-6: Difficulties in covering basic needs

During qualitative discussions as well, refugees complained about the quantity of the food ration they receive and how it does not cover their needs. Out of the 28% of respondents who said that they were indebted, 92% borrowed money to pay for daily needs. The low level of self-reliance of refugees is further confirmed by the fact that the large majority of respondents (73%) would not be able to survive without borrowing money for more than a month if their main source of income - especially aid - was to be disrupted.

#### CONCLUSION – CONSEQUENCES OF THE LACK OF SELF-RELIANCE AND LIVELIHOOD

**The level of self-reliance of Eritrean refugees in the camps is extremely low.** They depend on aid to cover all their needs and have very little means of diversification of income. Perhaps even more worrying in the longer run is the fact that the only stable sources of employment are NGO-related. Contrary to other protracted refugee situations, the camps have not developed into self-sustaining economic units and very limited economic linkages have been developed through time.

The absence of job opportunities and livelihoods is a major factor in the feeling of hopelessness shared by many of the refugees living in the camp, especially the younger ones and it partly explains why so many of them see Ethiopia as a transit country, taking risks to further migrate to Europe, the US or Israel. These findings on the profiles of Eritrean refugees – and its youth – are key building blocs for our discussion of recommendations in the following sections.



**Pic.1** – Mai Aini Camp – YEP Beneficiaries preparing for the distribution of tool kits

## CONNECTIONS, NETWORKS & SOCIAL CAPITAL


This chapter measures access to social networks and the level of connections of the refugees as a) the out-of-camp scheme requires that refugees use their networks to live legally out of the camp; b) it is generally assumed that a protracted caseload has built up connections over time, especially with urban areas. Our data shows that these networks and connections are not dense and mostly limited to relatives and friends and not to economic actors. Travelling and movements outside the camps are limited, and have for main purposes casual labour and shopping in Mai Tsebri, health and family visits in the rest of the country. Whilst refugees have heard about the out-of-camp scheme, interest for the mechanism remains limited, as most refugees in camps do not have relatives to sponsor them.

### 1) CONNECTING WITH OUTSIDE THE CAMP: SOCIAL CAPITAL OF ERITREAN REFUGEES

#### Few refugees have relatives outside the Camps

As highlighted in section 2, living outside the camp requires refugees to have Ethiopian relatives able to sponsor them. More generally, measuring connections with relatives and non-relatives outside the camp is a way to assess the social capital that refugees can count on, were they to leave the camp.

Figure 3-7: Family Networks



Refugees were asked whether they had relatives living in Ethiopia and where their relatives live. As shown in figure 3.9, only a limited proportion of refugees living in the camp have relatives living outside refugee camps: 14% of respondents have relatives living in a rural area in Ethiopia whilst 18% have relatives in urban areas.

On the other hand, a large fraction of them simply have no one. This confirms earlier observations about the fact that the refugees remaining in the camps are the ones who have the least resources available.

The two camps presented a slightly different profile on this question, as refugees in Adi Harush seemed to have more consistently relatives outside the camps than those living in Mai Aini, as summarised in the following table:

Table 3-0-5 – Family Networks in Ethiopia per Camp

Do you have relatives living in Ethiopia? Where?	ADI HARUSH	MAI AINI
Relatives in another camp	16%	9%
Relatives outside the camp – Rural areas	18%	11%
Relatives outside the camp – Urban areas	20%	16%
None	39%	51%

Amongst those who have relatives outside the camps, **40% reported that these relatives were of Ethiopian nationality**. An additional 13% of respondents reported that they had both Ethiopian and

Eritrean relatives, whilst 31% only had Eritrean relatives living in the country. This is not a surprising finding given that many Eritreans stayed in Ethiopia after the division of the two countries. It is a common situation to have family members on both sides of the border.

Yet, as it is one of the requirements of the out-of-camp scheme, it is relevant for the present study. 45% of the refugees who reported having relatives outside the camps in rural areas said that these were Ethiopians and this figure goes up to 75% for those who have relatives living in urban areas. Having an Ethiopian relative is not enough in and of itself to leave outside the camp. Unsurprisingly, Ethiopian relatives are not all ready to sponsor Eritrean refugees and Eritrean refugees are not all ready to ask their relatives for a sponsorship. According to qualitative data, some of the obstacles are:


- **Financial burden** – Supporting a refugee – who theoretically does not have access to employment – represents a significant financial burden, some families cannot afford to guarantee for one of their relatives. As a result, some Eritrean refugees do not want to impose this financial burden on their relatives and prefer staying out of the scheme.
- **Administrative burden** – It represents an administrative burden for the sponsor, as their capacity to provide for the refugee’s needs has to be assessed by ARRA.

**Limited social Interactions outside the camp**

The survey allows us to assess the type of interactions that refugees have with people living outside the camps. Figure 3.10 shows very clearly that Eritrean refugees living in the camps either have no relations outside the camps or have in majority family and social interactions. FGDs showed that these interactions were mostly irregular phone calls and rare visits, rather than sustained relations.

This confirms the low level of integration of refugees in economic and business networks, as these represent very limited proportions of the interactions that refugees have outside the camps.

Figure 3-6: Interactions outside the camps



**Overall, a look at the connections that Eritrean refugees living in the camps have shown that those are limited in scope and type.** It confirms that the ones living in the camps have the least means, not only financially, but also in terms of social capital and potential support networks in the country.



## 2) GOING OUT OF THE CAMP

One aspect of the present study was to assess the intensity, frequency and nature of existing movements in and out of the camps in order to determine what change the out of camp scheme brings to the lives of Eritrean refugees.

Table 3-0-6: Do you sometimes leave the camp?

Going out of the camp	ADI HARUSH	MAI AINI
Yes, I do	26%	29%
A member of my household does	5%	5%
No one in my household ever leaves the camp	68%	66%

About a third of respondents reported either leaving the camp from time to time or having a member of their household leaving the camp. The proportions are the same in the two camps and do not vary across gender. **The survey confirms a high level of isolation of the refugees living in the camps as two third of them never leave the camp.** This has consequences in terms of access to labour markets, as the camps themselves offered very limited job opportunities or IGAs. It also has consequences in terms of personal development as young Eritreans repeatedly express their frustrations at the type of life they are living in the camp, where there is ‘nothing to do’ and no perspectives to look forward to.

Amongst those who report movements outside the camp, the main patterns of movement are:

- Daily and weekly movements out of the camp for those who try to access daily labour in Mai Tsebri. These are naturally easier for refugees living in Adi Harush as they do not have to cover any transportation costs to go to Mai Tsebri.
- Weekly to monthly visits to the nearest towns to go to the market and buy various types of goods, especially vegetables and clothes;
- Longer trips outside the camp to the city for health purposes or to visit family members outside the camps.
- Finally 7% reported leaving the camp to try and cross the border, a relatively small sample as a large part of them actually succeeds in passing the border.

Relations with the host community living in the direct surroundings of the camps are very good, as confirmed by qualitative interviews. Local people noted that no particular problems arose from the presence of the camps and that their interactions with refugees were good, usually limited to petty trade and exchange of goods. One respondent noted that some inter-marriages took place and did not raise any particular problem either.

It is difficult for refugees to go around illegally and without permission. It is not impossible though, as Eritrean refugees can blend in the local population. Some of them use the public transportation and make it to the city, sometimes up to Addis Ababa. Yet, FGDs showed that some of the young refugees had tried to reach Shire and other cities with no prior permission and had been caught at the checkpoint, detained for a few days in Mai Tsebri’s prison and then brought back to the camp.

Getting permission to go out of the camp is possible, as ARRA delivers short-term permission to go to various locations for health purposes or for family visits. Those permits stipulate the location and time that one can spend outside the camps. Some refugees complained about the difficulty to get authorisation but the overall majority of refugees indicated that short-term authorized movements outside the camps could be done with no real difficulty (77% of those who had reported leaving the camp sometimes).

### 3) OUT-OF-CAMP SCHEME: AWARENESS & INTEREST

There is a relatively high level of awareness in the camp about the various arrangements existing to leave the camp, including the out of camp scheme: 58% reported knowing about the out-of-camp scheme. Male refugees appeared to be slightly more aware than female refugees about the scheme: 61% against 52% of female respondents. Yet, this level of awareness should not be overestimated. As noted above, the practical details and requirements of the scheme are unclear to most stakeholders and respondents.

Still, FGDs showed that refugees had a relatively good understanding of the main principles of the scheme, especially the fact that they had to have someone accepting to sponsor them. UNHCR in Addis Ababa noted that the level of information of refugees who benefitted from the scheme and moved to the city about the details of the scheme remained limited and sometimes partly erroneous. In particular, **refugees are not clearly informed about the fact that they will not be able to benefit from UNHCR’s protection mechanisms and services – in particular the living allowance that urban refugees receive – once they move to the city.**

Refugees who knew about the scheme were further asked whether they would be interested in applying for it. The proportion of those interested in the scheme is relatively low: 36% of those who knew about it stated that they were interested. When asked to explain why they would not be interested, respondents gave the following answers:

Figure 3-7 – Interest in the OCP



Figure 3.12 shows that the lack of desire to apply to the scheme does not come from a genuine disinterest in living in the city but from practical considerations.

Figure 3-8: Reasons for not applying for admission to the OCP





## Reasons for not applying for admission to the Out-of-Camp Scheme:

**Lack of sponsor:** 49% do not want to and cannot apply for this scheme as they do not have a relative who could sponsor them to enter the scheme.

**Preference for resettlement:** refugees do not want to lose their chance to resettle (40%). In practice the OCP and resettlement options are not incompatible. The refugee case would be transferred to the city and handled by UNHCR sub-office there. Beneficiaries from the OCP can still apply for resettlement and would have their case handled similarly. This confirms the lack of information on how the out of camp mechanism works in practice and the fact that resettlement is a priority for most Eritrean refugees, not matter how slim the chances are.

**No guarantee of a livelihood – lack of success stories:** 21% have no interest in the OCP as it does not help one get a livelihood. This suggests that stories about the life in the city for OCP beneficiaries, a life that is sometimes difficult, reach the camps. There are more challenging stories reaching Eritrean refugees living in camps than success stories – a deterrent to leaving the camp for urban settings in Ethiopia, and an incentive to leave to go abroad.

## LIVING OUTSIDE THE CAMP: A VIABLE OPTION FOR ERITREAN REFUGEES?

The out-of-camp scheme, in its current format, and despite some of the benefits it brings to a small number of Eritreans, does not solve the question of durable solutions for Eritrean refugees living in Ethiopia. Experiences of OCP beneficiaries and other Eritrean refugees who have settled in the city confirm that living outside the camp is a challenge, as the city does not guarantee an easy environment. The OCP represents a great opportunity to connect Eritrean refugees with a labour market that is cruelly lacking in the camps and their surroundings. Yet, refugees' self-reliance is not guaranteed as the 'burden' is transferred to family members who often cannot or are not willing to support the scheme in the long run.

Two main articulations are missing to increase the impact of the OCP on refugees' self-reliance:

- A stronger link between refugees in the camp, who remain the most vulnerable and the least self-reliant, and the scheme;
- A stronger link between refugees living out of the camp and urban livelihood.

### 1) MAIN CHALLENGES OUTSIDE THE CAMP

*"It is like moving from a small prison to a big prison" - FGD – Addis Ababa*

Qualitative discussions with Eritrean refugees living in the city – under various circumstances<sup>23</sup> – show that most of them found it very difficult to adjust to life in the city.

### A fragile mechanism of sponsorship

A first aspect raised by OCP beneficiaries is the difficulties to have the sponsorship system work in practice. The sponsorship agreement puts a lot of pressure on family relations. Refugees reported several possible scenarios:

---

<sup>23</sup> Focus group discussions & case studies were conducted in Addis Ababa. The sample comprised OCP beneficiaries, refugees who had moved for health purposes and refugees who lived in Addis outside of the schemes.

## COMMON SITUATIONS CONFRONTING REFUGEES AND FAMILIES OUT OF THE CAMP

- A common situation: A relative accepts to sponsor a refugee to get him out of the camp to Addis Ababa but they do not agree on providing for the refugee's daily living expenses. Some OCP beneficiaries reported that their sponsor refused to see them or to be in contact with them once they arrived in the city.
- Another situation: the refugees are hosted by their family in Addis Ababa but have to find arrangements to cover their food and other basic needs. Each family finds its own balance and some OCP beneficiaries find great support within their families. But some note having to skip meals when necessary.
- Some refugees feel bad being a burden for their relatives and try to make their presence as light as possible for their family, sometimes compromising with their basic needs.
- In some instances, relatives expected to get financial help from the sponsored refugee. This may come from two misconceptions: a) that Eritrean refugees will benefit from additional assistance – especially financial – once in the city; b) that Eritrean refugees have an easy access to resources from the diaspora.
- Finally, the sponsorship system is vulnerable to external hazards, such as the decease or departure of the sponsor that can put the refugee in delicate situations, as they have to negotiate the trade-off between reporting their case to get potential protection and the risk of losing their OCP status.

Whilst innovative in its design, the mechanism is fragile in the longer-term and assumes strong familial ties that often do not exist. It therefore requires a more robust longitudinal monitoring to catch the evolutions in the sponsor-refugees relationship that may lead to protection issues.

### Limited Access to Livelihood for Out-of-Camp Refugees

**By far the greatest challenge is the difficulty to find a livelihood in the city.** The Ethiopian regulations greatly limit their ability to get a job. Eritreans cannot access a formal job because they are not allowed to work. They cannot present a proper work permit to their potential employers. Furthermore Ethiopian employers ask for guarantees to hire Eritreans in the informal sector. Some refugees pointed at the fact that employers are reluctant to hire refugees because of alleged links of refugees with Somali and Sudanese terrorist groups and ask for an Ethiopian guarantor. This was confirmed by the employer survey conducted in the capital. When asked what difficulties refugees face to find employment, a majority of employers pointed at **their absence of work permit and the difficulty to have a guarantor as the main barriers preventing them from entering the labour market easily.** Furthermore, because they are restrictions on their movement and because they cannot obtain business licences, it is difficult for refugees to establish their own activities.

*The main issue is that employers need a licence to hire people (...). I have machine operating skills. I looked for a job in that sector but I couldn't find any. I had to be Ethiopian.*

Daniel, 35 years old

**A second barrier to employment, according to the employer survey, is language,** as most refugees do not speak Amharic properly when they move to the city. For businesses, where handling client relations is necessary, language is clearly an issue.

Finally, the employer survey also found that **the lack of practical experience and the lack of market information** of refugees when they arrive in the city further reduced their chances of accessing jobs.

Here, the picture of Eritrean refugees living in Addis Ababa must be nuanced, as some of them are able to make their way and adjust relatively rapidly to their new environment, like in the two case studies detailed below. According to the employer survey and to qualitative data, the main sectors of employment of Eritrean refugees in the city are:

- **Auto mechanics:** a lot of the garages in the city used to be owned by Eritreans before the war between the two countries. Businesses have often been passed along to Ethiopian relatives and the Eritrean community keeps privileged ties with this economic sector;
- **Wood work, metal work and construction:** because these sectors are easier to enter with no proper work permits, they count more Eritrean refugees. It seems that Eritrean who move to the city have higher levels of technical skills and can use them in the construction sector.
- **Personal services** (hair dressing & domestic work): for women in particular these two main types of jobs are more accessible.

CASE STUDIES: FINDING A SOURCE OF LIVELIHOOD IN THE CITY		
	BIRHAN <sup>24</sup> , 39 years old, living in Addis with his wife and 4 children since 2012.	ESTIFANOS, 35 years old, living alone in Addis. Wife and children are in Sudan.
Livelihood in the city	<i>Almost a year ago, I had 500 EBR to start up a business. I had saved some money working in an internet café. I did a kind of assessment of the area I live in. I got an idea of the products that the farmers of my area produce. I bought a cart and started selling these products in the city. I mostly sell vegetables, tomatoes in particular. At the beginning it was difficult but now I have good relationships with the farmers and some good client relations. I work 24h a day to cover our expenses.</i>	<i>I found a job in the aluminium sector. It is daily labour. I had professional experience before coming to Ethiopia in 2008. In Eritrea, I worked as a driver there. I also had experience in the aluminium, electricity and construction sectors. One day, I passed by a workshop and I observed some workers working on aluminium. I saw that they were making mistakes and I showed them how to do it. I worked for free for one week to show them my skills before they hired me.</i>
Perception of life in the city	<i>Life in the city is better for the children but for me it is more a burden because I have to work all the time to afford life here. In the camp we have support. If it wasn't for my resettlement case, I would prefer being in the camp</i>	<i>When you live here, you can find a job and go to school. In the camp all you do is wait for food. But here we are asked for ID for everything: to rent a place, to work, everything.</i>

In these examples, Eritrean refugees were able to find informal activities. Both had previous skills and work experience that prepared them for the labour market, which younger refugees often lack.

**Protection in Employment: Problems of Informal Labour**

**Eritrean refugees can only find employment in the informal sector, as Ethiopian authorities are strict in applying the law for formal jobs.** The direct consequence is a lack of legal protection of Eritrean refugees. Examples abound of refugees being paid less than a third of what Ethiopian workers would receive for equivalent positions. In worst cases, also abundantly reported, Eritrean

<sup>24</sup> All the names have been changed to respect the confidentiality of the interviews.

refugees would get casual labour and never got paid at the end of their contract, with no chance of getting legal reparation because of their refugee status.

### CASE STUDY 3 – CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT OF REFUGEES

HABTOM, 28 years old, Male, Arrived in Ethiopia in 2008, University Graduate, back in Mai Aini

*I had completed a BA in management in Eritrea but I fled because in Eritrea you cannot work in the sector of your choice. When I first came to Ethiopia, I was sent to Mai Aini. I stayed there for 10 months. Then I had the opportunity to go and study out of the camp, in Addis Ababa. I went there in 2009 and studied for 3 years in a 'nursing' programme. Financially, life in Addis was very hard. I tried to work there but salaries are a lot lower when you are a refugee. I was paid 1,800 EBR when my Ethiopian colleague was paid 6,000 EBR for the same position. This was not enough for me to live in Addis, 1000 EBR is already the cost of rent in the city. I had to come back to the camp where I don't have to pay for anything myself.*

More generally, refugees note that their status does not offer them any legal protection, which put them in danger and made them incapable of defending themselves in case of incident or dispute.

The difficulties faced by Eritrean refugees to find jobs in the city have to be weighed against the overall economic context in a city like Addis Ababa to see if these differ from those faced by the host community. Secondary literature and the employer survey provide information on the main features of the urban labour market. In particular, the share of the informal sector in an important characteristics of Addis Ababa urban economy: Reviewing national data on employment, a 2010 Baseline Survey on Urban Poverty noted that '50.6% of urban employed are in the informal sector' and that 'the number of people engaged in urban informal sector activities has increased by approximately 37%'<sup>25</sup> The employer survey finds a high level of informality amongst the micro- and small enterprises surveyed in Addis Ababa, with 76% of employers confirming that they do not sign any written contract with their employees. Urban unemployment and urban poverty are also two important aspects, even though national statistics have recorded a significant decrease in urban unemployment in a city like Addis over the past two decades from 22.9% in 2004 to 18.9% in 2010<sup>26</sup>. Despite this official decrease, access to employment remains a key political issue in the country that could weaken host communities' acceptance for programmes targeting urban refugee livelihoods.

#### Harmful Coping Strategies

Anecdotal evidence suggests further protection issues coming with the life of refugees in the city, where protection mechanisms are very thin. Here, the situation of Eritrean refugees in the city likens that of other caseloads of 'urban refugees' in the cities of the region<sup>27</sup>. Because of the difficulty to access sources of livelihood in the city and the paucity of support mechanisms at their disposal, refugees resort to sometimes-harmful coping mechanisms. Amongst the protection risks raised by refugees are:

- **Reducing their daily food intake:** refugees mentioned that they would only eat once or twice a day to reduce the necessity to beg for money from relatives or friends;
- **Female prostitution** was also mentioned by refugees as one way female refugees were able to survive in the city.

#### Positive vs. Negative aspects of the life in the city

Refugees were asked to weigh the difficulties of life in the city against the positive aspects. None of the socio-cultural opportunities were considered, the calculation remains first and foremost an economic one. Amongst the positive aspects listed by refugees were: a) a better access to Internet

<sup>25</sup> CCRDA, (2010), *Baseline Survey Report on the Informal Sector in Addis Ababa*, p. 6

<sup>26</sup> Central Statistics Agency Urban Employment – Unemployment Survey

<sup>27</sup> See for example : Soucy, A (2011), *Mixed Migration from the Horn of Africa to Yemen*, for DRC.

and information; b) a better access to education for children and adults; c) access to better health services.

**2) SUPPORT MECHANISMS – OR LACK THEREOF**

Organisations and programmes targeting urban Eritrean refugees are scarce and so are the support mechanisms they can rely on, explaining why life in the city is sometimes very difficult.

**Assistance and Organisations**

The OCP was designed to get self-sustaining refugees to move to the city. As a result, ARRA and UNHCR do not provide additional assistance services to beneficiaries upon arrival. Refugees do not receive the living allowance that urban refugees are entitled to as part of UNHCR’s urban programme. UNHCR will receive OCP refugees, treat their resettlement cases and for the most critical cases – especially if there are health concerns – transfer some to its urban programme.

Some OCP beneficiaries have benefited from a recent vocational training programme funded by the UNHCR and implemented by its local partners. Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) also include OCP beneficiaries in their specific programme to address refugees’ recreational needs. JRS has a refugee community centre, where urban refugees can access workshops and skills training.

**Community Support**

Whilst urban refugees can count on their family networks, it appears that the Eritrean community in Addis does not have a strong cohesion and does not offer support mechanisms for the newcomers. Most urban refugees that were interviewed for the study noted barely knowing any other Eritrean refugee in Addis. They unanimously mentioned not being able to rely on the Eritrean refugee community for support. This contributes to the difficulty of a smooth adjustment to urban life, as out-of-camp refugees do not have strong networks to rely on. Whilst some Eritrean refugees have managed a relatively comfortable life through remittances and family support, those who lack either of these are left with little support in the city. In the city as well, a high level of social isolation prevents refugees – especially young and inexperienced ones – to adjust easily to a challenging environment.

**3) PLANS FOR THE FUTURE**


**Most Eritrean refugees see resettlement as their preferred option for the future, regardless of whether they live in the camps or in the city.**

Figure 3.13 shows the plans for the future of refugees living in the camps of Shire. It shows without ambiguity the ‘obsession of resettlement’<sup>28</sup> that Eritrean refugees share, with 77% saying that they want to relocate to a third country. Norway, Australia or the USA are the preferred destinations.

**These plans do not change drastically as refugees move to the city.** Resettlement

remains the priority for most of the Eritrean refugees living in Addis Ababa. A few refugees consider the option of going back to the camp if they could as their life in the city is too much of a struggle.

Figure 3-9: Plans for the future



<sup>28</sup> Citation from of a Key Informant Interview.


# IV. Livelihood Solutions: Programming in the camps & outside the camps

## A. RATIONAL FOR LIVELIHOOD PROGRAMMING

The survey of the camps of Adi Harush and Mai Aini confirms that the encampment policy prevents the development of self-reliance mechanisms amongst Eritrean refugees living in Ethiopia.

The lack of self-reliance comes first and foremost from the impossibility to secure jobs or establish dynamic income-generating activities – hence justifying livelihood interventions to bridge this gap.

Figure 4-1: Movements of Eritrean refugees & Connections to the market





***Within camps, refugees' lack of self-reliance is the result of:***

- a) **Limited market integration and lack of labour market connections:** the poor connections of the two camps to labour and business markets;
- b) **Unfavourable migration dynamics hampering community development:** the particular feature of the Eritrean migration and the high rate of secondary movement, decreasing the camps' internal demand to a level too low to support endogenous livelihood and income-generating activities;
- c) **Low skills and lack of professional know-how detrimental to economic growth:** the young profile of refugees, who cross the border with little practical & professional skills and experience or financial resources to start up income-generating activities.

Similarly, and on the urban end of the spectrum, refugees living in the city, OCP beneficiaries in particular, have yet to reach a level of self-reliance. Whilst living in a more favourable environment in terms of connection to markets and information, they face strict obstacles.

***Outside of camps, in cities, refugees' lack of self-reliance is the result of:***

- a) **Legal obstacles:** refugees face important regulatory obstacles that limit their access to the labour market to a few restricted sectors;
- b) **Low salaries and unstable wages:** when employed, out of camp beneficiaries can only get meagre and unreliable salaries because of their refugee status;
- c) **Lack of local market information:** urban refugees are limited by a lack of support-mechanisms and of general information about the city and the urban labour market.

Not only is self-reliance not achieved; a collateral damage is a process of burden sharing and cost transfer of their living expenses to their relatives through a fragile mechanism of sponsorship.

With the general goal of increasing refugees' self-reliance and access to livelihoods, NRC has to intervene simultaneously on both camp and out-of-camp settings, to adapt to the vulnerabilities highlighted in this research, it is recommended that NRC follows two strategic objectives:

- ✓ **OBJECTIVE 1: Strengthening self-reliance in the camps for the most vulnerable**
- ✓ **OBJECTIVE 2: Linking the OCP with livelihood interventions in urban settings**

The following sections will review these two avenues for programming for NRC and assess the opportunities NRC has to increase Eritrean refugees' self-reliance. The suggestions are to use existing NRC programming – and specifically its YEP activities – in two ways:

First, it is recommended to use YEP as a component of a larger effort to strengthen self-reliance in camps. In this holistic approach, YEP is one component of livelihood interventions that should be combined with a stand-alone livelihood programming for graduates, so as to address the high levels of vulnerability and low self-reliance of those staying in the camps.

Second, YEP is used a departure point to bridge the gap between the OCP and urban livelihood opportunities: how can YEP as a programme lead to successful and sustainable urban livelihoods for Eritrean refugees, in support of the Government of Ethiopia's Out-of-Camp Scheme?

## B. OPTIONS FOR PROGRAMMING

### ENHANCING ACCESS TO LIVELIHOODS IN THE CAMPS – WHAT IS NRC DOING ALREADY?

Strengthening access to livelihood is part of NRC's programmes in the camp, through the Youth Education Pack (YEP). NRC is implementing YEP in both camps of Adi Harush and Mai Aini. The YEP Programme aims at *'equipping refugee and host community youth with the necessary vocational skills, life skills, literacy and numeracy (...)* The YEP programme enhances youth's protection and improves their livelihoods, so as to become productive members of their communities.<sup>29</sup>

NRC's programme focuses specifically on youth by providing a 9-month vocational training in electronics and electricity, metal work, construction, food preparation, furniture making and tailoring/garment. In October 2013, the first group of 500 trainees, graduated.

Box 4.1 details the main characteristics of the YEP programme in the camp and gives a brief overview of its impact based on trainees' satisfaction and access to livelihood post-training.

An essential component for the success of YEP in enhancing livelihood is the follow-up post training: the programme plans for start-up kits to help graduates set up their own activities. Yet, at the time of the study, 3 months after the graduation ceremony, the trainees of both camps had yet to receive their tool kits. Trainees had been organised in groups to set up their activities together and YEP managers were planning on a setting up a collective structure – rather than individual tool-kits and shops – with a possible market place and tool kits that would remain the property of NRC and the community. The idea was to adjust to the strong secondary movements and its potential negative impact on the programme, in particular as the tool kit material could be sold and used to fund future individual migration.

The snapshot of the 2013 YEP programme implemented in the 2 camps exposes its strengths and weaknesses, even if the period of the survey limits the impact assessment, given that graduates were still waiting for their tool kits, which could improve their access to livelihood in the future.

The strengths of the programme are a **high level of satisfaction of graduates about the duration, quality of teaching and how in-depth the training was, according to its beneficiaries.**

The main weakness at this point of the project is two-fold: **a) the low proportion of trainees who secured a livelihood in the 3 months following graduation; b) the fact that the programme does not decrease the rate of secondary movements** as about 100 to 150 trainees have already left in both camps and 65% of graduates in Adi Harush still plan on leaving the country.

---

<sup>29</sup> NRC's Country Programme in Ethiopia, <http://www.nrc.no/?did=9601242>.

BOX 4.1 – SNAPSHOT - YOUTH EDUCATION PACK 2013

CRITERIA	CAMP	ADI HARUSH			MAI AINI		
		Male	Female	TOTAL	Male	Female	TOTAL
# of trainees registered		203	47	250	215	85	300
# of dropouts		20	--	20	41	11	52
# of graduates		185	45	230	167	75	232 <sup>30</sup>
Estimated # of graduates who will receive tool kits <sup>31</sup>		100 to 150			150 to 200		
Was the duration of the training adequate? <sup>32</sup>		Yes: 76% No: 24%			Yes: 80% No: 20%		
How do you judge the quality of the teaching you received?		Good to very good: 84% Average: 11% Bad to very bad: 5%			Good to very good: 85% Average: 12% Bad to very bad: 4%		
Was the allocation of time between theoretical and practical lessons adequate?		Yes: 43% No, too theoretical: 32% No, too practical: 20%			Yes: 78% No, too theoretical: 6% No, too practical: 8%		
Upon graduation, were you sufficiently trained to start working?		Yes: 61% No, I was given a superficial training on basic skills: 12% No, not enough to be professional: 14%			Yes: 82% No, I was given a superficial training on basic skills: 0% No, not enough to be professional: 6%		
After the YEP, did you try to look for a job or start a business?		Yes, I actively looked for a job: 41% Yes, I'm still looking for a job: 20% No, I did not: 15% No, I started planning on leaving Ethiopia: 15%			Yes, I actively looked for a job: 51% Yes, I'm still looking for a job: 18% No, I did not: 10% No, I started planning on leaving Ethiopia: 4%		
After the YEP, how long did it take you to find a job or start a business?		I'm still jobless/looking for a job: 82% I found a job/started a business straight away: 9% I found a job/started a business within 3 months: 5%			I'm still jobless/looking for a job: 67% I found a job/started a business straight away: 24% I found a job/started a business within 3 months: 6%		
What are your plans for the future?		Leaving Ethiopia to another country: 65% Keep on my current activity in the camp: 11% Finding a job in the camp/ outside the camp: 3%; 3% Setting up a business in the camp/outside the camp: 1%; 9%			Leaving Ethiopia to another country: 12% Keep on my current activity in the camp: 51% Finding a job in the camp/ outside the camp: 12%; 8% Setting up a business in the camp/outside the camp: 2%; 2%		

<sup>30</sup> Based on registration numbers collected at the YEP centres – discrepancies between total and broken down figures have not been corrected.

<sup>31</sup> Based on pre-distribution estimates from the YEP Centre Managers in both camps.

<sup>32</sup> Based on the quantitative survey – Sample : 125 YEP beneficiaries ; 74 in Adi Harush & 51 in Mai Aini. Only relevant answers were reported here, explaining why not all answers add up to 100%.

## OBJECTIVE 1

### Strengthening access to livelihood & self-reliance in the camps – Programme Modalities

Developing livelihood activities in the camp settings is challenging for any agency, given the structural barriers detailed above. Key actors like UNHCR and ARRA are keen on supporting the development of livelihood activities in the camps and see NRC as one of the most legitimate actors to do so. The study showed that the most vulnerable portion of refugees and families are getting entrenched in the camps: for them, access to livelihood and to higher self-reliance is a dire necessity.

In this context, strengthening access to livelihoods and self-reliance has to be built within a rights-based approach focusing on the link with refugees' rights and protection. NRC will need to strengthen its monitoring to see the extent of the relevance, effectiveness and sustainability of its efforts. Do these actually help build stronger protection standards and self-reliance for refugees?

**Strengthening implementation.** Amongst programme arrangements that should be integrated are:

- **Strengthen business and marketing skills in the training curriculum** – as detailed throughout the report, the camp environments are difficult and imperfect markets. Without proper business and marketing skills, trainees are likely to face great difficulties implementing their own activities. Whilst business skills are provided in the YEP, they are only a small component of the 'life skills' taught to trainees. They are not taught by specialised trainers but by NRC's teachers. This component of the training should form a stand-alone component of the curriculum and focus on how to design business plans; basics of financial planning & marketing.
- **Identify economic niches in the camps** – The camp has a weak internal demand but there are a few economic niches to be prioritized in the training. Mobile maintenance and repairing is one of them. Linking up with other actors, like WHO or WFP, for example, YEP can promote food diversification and backyard gardening, as very little vegetables are grown in the camps for example. Given the difficult conditions of the camp though, that would require partnering with specialised agencies.
- **Link up YEP graduates with livelihood programme to provide post-training marketing counselling and support** – NRC's livelihood experts should be available for trainees to provide tailored counselling for each of the trainees' groups and ensure a proper follow up to the YEP. A mechanism of 1-on-1 mentoring can be set up both for advice and to build up the confidence, trust and social capital of graduates.
- **Engage with ARRA and UNHCR** at the national and regional levels to explore opportunities to relax the restrictions of movements of refugees in the region, for refugees to access larger labour markets.
- **Foster linkages with markets:**
  - **Mai Tsebri** offers job and livelihood opportunities for trainees, as employers are keen on employing refugees in metal or wood workshops. NRC can develop an apprenticeship programme for refugees to develop their professional experience. NRC will need to a) develop awareness in the private sector about the YEP training and the quality of the skills it provides to refugees; b) consolidate the link between trainees and Mai Tsebri's market through a system of MoUs between existing workshops, trainees and NRC; c) guarantee employers that the trainee is committed to staying in the area.

- **Regional Market:** Opportunities in Mai Tsebri are too limited to absorb the number of refugees trained by NRC. NRC's livelihood programme managers will work on developing linkages beyond Mai Tsebri. Marketing and communications activities should include the main cities of the region (in particular Shire) to explore market linkages. NRC can discuss with ARRA to allow pre-selected refugee representatives to travel to Shire or other cities of the region with NRC's livelihood specialists to identify potential clients and negotiate terms of contracts for the cooperatives of refugees they represent.
- **Organise a trade fair in Mai Tsebri and in Shire:** In order to promote and sell the products and services of YEP graduates, increase the client base and visibility of the YEP label in the region, NRC will support the organisation of a local fair trade in Mai Tsebri and the participation of YEP graduates to existing trade fairs in Shire or Mekele. Both events will require prior discussions with ARRA, especially as graduates would need specific permissions to go to Shire or another city of the region. Prior discussions with the regional Chamber of Commerce (Mekele) would also help getting information on the existing trade fairs in the region and the modalities upon which YEP graduates could be allowed to participate.
- **Develop innovative credit mechanisms:**
  - **Establish self-help groups for vulnerable graduates:** micro-finance credit mechanisms require relatively stable environment to mitigate the risks, a condition that is not fulfilled in Adi Harush and Mai Aini, where the fluidity of movements would make the mechanism unsustainable. Self-help groups have the advantage of a) setting up collective structure supporting entrepreneurship; b) increasing ownership of beneficiaries over the process; c) developing modest projects, adapted to the difficulties of the economic environment of the camp.
  - **Map resources from the diaspora:** the Eritrean diaspora is widespread, well-organised and has financial capacities available. For the moment, most of these resources are used to fund secondary movement in very dangerous conditions (cf. above). Mapping the resources available (i.e. the willingness of the diaspora to fund collective small-scale projects in the camps instead of funding individual migration projects outside the camps) and raising awareness about the needs to divert funds from precarious secondary movement towards more sustainable projects of development in the camps would a) address the problem of livelihood in the camps; b) help curbing the issue of secondary movement and the protection risks they entail.

**Develop incentives for graduates to stay in business:** One issue faced by VT and livelihood programmes in the camp is the risk of graduates dropping out or leaving soon after graduation to continue their migration abroad. A system of incentives – independent from the graduation kit – can reward those who are still in business 3 months and/or 6 months after graduation through the distribution of vouchers or cash. That would also link the livelihood programme with efforts to limit secondary displacement.

**Strengthening monitoring.** Post-training mechanisms have to be strengthened to ensure that a protection-based approach to livelihood is ensured. Based on NRC's existing capacities to use electronic data collection, a regular monitoring mechanism should be developed to measure trainees' employment rate, participation in business and income. It should also capture rate of secondary movement amongst graduates, providing data on the sustainability of the programme. A short electronic survey should be conducted every month during the three months following the graduation, and continue every three months for a year. This monitoring system will help NRC refine its labour market assessment based on up-to-date data on access to livelihood for each of the skills taught during the training.

## EXPANDING THE PARAMETERS OF THE OCP AND URBAN PROGRAMMING

Another avenue is to link up YEP programming with the Out-of-Camp Scheme. At the moment, OCP mechanisms are mainly monitored by ARRA and UNHCR and only marginally integrated within the urban refugee programme.

There are three major gaps in the current out-of-camp mechanisms:

- **At the selection level to increase the number of potential beneficiaries:** One way to increase the impact of the OCP on self-reliance – especially for refugees in protracted displacement – is to advocate for an expansion the parameters of the scheme by offering other mechanisms to increase the number of potential beneficiaries coming from the camps.
- **At the implementation level:** Developing urban-based livelihood programming for NRC as a way to a) target the current OCP beneficiaries who struggle to adapt to consolidate their food security and access to self-reliance; b) include vulnerable refugees from the camps in the scheme by offering a sustainable livelihood mechanism and a guarantee, which would respond to ARRA’s main selection criteria.
- **At the monitoring and follow-up level:** the monitoring mechanisms for OCP beneficiaries are relatively light and no mechanism is planned for those who loose the guarantee of their sponsor, other than going back to the camps or staying ‘under the radar’ in the city. For protection purposes, and to measure the impact of the scheme, it is necessary to consolidate the follow-up on OCP beneficiaries.

→ **The OCP is an innovative mechanism set up by the Ethiopian government but requires additional support to address the missing linkages and protection risks highlighted in this study. It is well-worth looking into the programming avenues it opens, especially as it offers an alternative to camp-based assistance and a way towards urban programming for Eritrean refugees.**

### OBJECTIVE 2

#### Linking the OCP with livelihood interventions in urban settings – Programme Modalities

The objective of tackling self-reliance and livelihood for refugees is an ambitious one and one that is hardly compatible with an encampment policy. In line with its strategic objective to work on livelihood and self-reliance in the Ethiopian context, NRC will explore other avenues of programming.

Ethiopia offers an increasingly favourable political and legal environment to refugees. Not much has been done so far to take advantage of the legal framework developed by Ethiopian authorities through the OCP. There is room to work within that framework to build refugees’ self-reliance. It must be noted though that specific mechanisms developed to extend the impact of the OCP will have to be discussed with and approved by the Ethiopian government. The parameters of an innovative urban programme will have to be directly discussed with ARRA.

The following box suggests an “**A to Z programme – from the camps to the City**” to address the two lacking connections exposed above:

- The low linkage between the camps’ most vulnerable and the OCP
- The low connection to and integration in urban markets.



## PILOT PROGRAMME:

### From the Camp to the City – A Phase Approach to Building Self-reliance

1. **STEP 1 / Building urban skills and workforce preparedness in the camp:** As an addition to its YEP programme, and through a parallel short-term 3-month training, NRC should build up the urban and business skills of Eritrean refugees who have proven a long-term interest in moving to Addis Ababa. Training would focus on small-business management: from the establishment of a business plan to marketing and accounting. To build up workforce preparedness, language skills and communication skills should also be included in the training, as employers have noted these as barriers to employment for Eritrean refugees. Mock interviews and mock client meetings can be part of the training in an effort to build work skills and graduates' confidence.
2. **STEP 2 / Transferring trainees to Addis Ababa, through the OCP:** Working hand in hand with ARRA, NRC should then link up with the OCP mechanism to get 'urban trainees' accepted in the scheme. Existing family and community links should remain a priority but NRC could provide a guarantee for the refugees who lack these connections to enable them to leave the camp.
3. **STEP 3 / Temporary support mechanisms:** In order to facilitate the adjustment to an urban environment, a short-term cash transfer can be implemented for the OCP beneficiaries who are under NRC's guarantee system. It should be very clear from the beginning of the programme that any cash transfer would be limited to a period of maximum 3 months.
4. **STEP 4 / Complementary training in urban settings:** Focusing on the practical aspects of small-scale business establishment, trainees would finish their training upon arrival in the city through an additional 3-month training. At the end of the training, trainees should present robust business plans or have defined the sectors where they could work.
5. **STEP 5 / Small Business Grants / Urban Apprenticeship Programme:** Upon verification of the sustainability and coherence of the business plans elaborated by OCP beneficiaries and assessment of the initial capital needed to start the activity, business grants should then be allocated. Alternatively, trainees can be included in an apprenticeship programme by which NRC partners with small and medium-size businesses and companies to have them accepted as apprentices.
6. **STEP 6 / Strong Monitoring & Evaluation:** As noted above, the OCP scheme opens great opportunities but bears some protection risks for beneficiaries, in particular in terms of food security and negative coping strategies. The programme would therefore require a strong monitoring system. In particular, mobile data collection – through the Mobenzi data collection system that NRC already uses - can be used to monitor the state of income and the level of self-reliance of refugees living in the city.
7. **STEP 7 / Advocacy Component:** Building on the results of the M&E system, the pilot programme shall serve as a basis for a stronger advocacy strategy focusing on the development of alternative to camp-based assistance and urban livelihood for refugees. It should also be used to advocate for the amendment of Ethiopia's reservations on the Geneva Convention.

## SWOT ANALYSIS – OBJECTIVE 1 - STRENGTHENING ACCESS TO LIVELIHOOD & SELF-RELIANCE IN THE CAMPS

LIVELIHOOD PROGRAMMING IN CAMP	
STRENGTHS	WEAKNESSES
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Targets the most vulnerable amongst Eritrean refugees</li> <li>✓ Address one of the most blatant needs in the camp</li> <li>✓ Skill transfers useful in the camp settings or for future durable solutions</li> <li>✓ Positive impact on self-reliance of refugees</li> <li>✓ Positive impact on human dignity in the camps</li> <li>✓ Positive impact on the general camp settings through injection of cash &amp; increase of income</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ High mobilization of resources: requires the intervention of livelihood expert and intense post-training support for trainees.</li> <li>✓ Low sustainability</li> </ul>
OPPORTUNITIES	THREATS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Favourable institutional environment as ARRA and UNHCR are keen on supporting livelihood programmes in the camps</li> <li>✓ Availability of funding</li> <li>✓ Pre-existing YEP platform for NRC to build upon</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Weak economic environment: low connection of the camps to urban &amp; regional market; low internal demand.</li> <li>✓ Strong secondary movements may lead to high dropout rate and high post-training departure</li> </ul>

## SWOT ANALYSIS – OBJECTIVE 2 – LINKING THE OCP WITH LIVELIHOOD INTERVENTIONS IN URBAN SETTINGS

ARTICULATING CAMP & OCP	
STRENGTHS	WEAKNESSES
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Maximise the opportunities opened by the Ethiopian regulatory framework and the OCP</li> <li>✓ Move away from traditional skills towards bridging the gap in training for urban &amp; employment readiness skills</li> <li>✓ Working on workforce preparedness</li> <li>✓ Maximise livelihood opportunities through connections with urban markets</li> <li>✓ Testing alternative to encampment in the Ethiopian context in practice, as a basis for advocacy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Programme requires intensive and individual-based management and monitoring</li> <li>✓ Expensive programme</li> <li>✓ Urban implementation challenges: localised market assessments and difficult tracking of beneficiaries</li> <li>✓ No legal protection for refugees employed informally</li> </ul>
OPPORTUNITIES	THREATS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Increasing Interest for Urban Programming generally and within NRC in particular</li> <li>✓ ARRA's readiness to consider livelihood programming for refugees outside the camp</li> <li>✓ Dynamic Urban Markets</li> <li>✓ Good perception of Eritrean refugees amongst the general populations and by employers more specifically</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Grey regulatory area regarding access to work and labour by which ARRA allows informal work. The programme would bear the risk of a change in the government's policy</li> <li>✓ Reservations of Ethiopia on refugees' rights to work</li> <li>✓ Defiance towards refugees related to alleged links between refugees and regional terrorism</li> <li>✓ Overall level of unemployment in the country</li> </ul>

# Conclusions and Recommendations

## CONCLUSIONS

Is an alternative to camp-based assistance possible, feasible and desirable to increase self-reliance for Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia?

The present study draws key conclusions to inform NRC's programming both in camps and outside of camps:

### LOW SELF-RELIANCE IN THE CAMPS

- **The study confirms that the level of self-reliance reached by refugees living in the camps of Shire region is extremely low if not inexistent.** No sources of livelihoods and rare access to labour market make the economic environment very challenging for refugees to adjust and develop mechanisms of self-reliance independently. No linkages with the local and national markets and a decreasing internal demand mean that the camps are very weak economic units.
- **Whilst the camps' population has been decreasing, the most vulnerable are left behind.** Those who have their own savings, who have access to familial resources and remittances or who have social connections and networks are the first to leave the camps either to move to the city or to cross the border to Sudan. The refugees who have already benefitted from the OCP could rely on pre-existing family networks for example. Working on livelihood and reliance should therefore not be at the detriment of the most vulnerable groups, who are still in the camps.
- **Strong secondary movements highlight the need to focus on a youth-based approach:** Inactivity and lack of job opportunities are not the major factors causing secondary movement towards Europe and Israel, as an important fraction of refugees flee from Eritrea with the objective of crossing rapidly the border between Ethiopia and Sudan. Yet, the lack of economic activities contributes to these dynamics, as young Eritreans are faced with despair and a complete absence of durable solutions. The bleak socio-economic of the camps and the life of hardship and dependence that refugees have to endure push them towards further migration. This is particularly true of the population of single youth who compose a large portion of the camp's inhabitants. The needs and aspirations of the youth is an intrinsic requirement of any future programming.
- **NRC's YEP Programme is successful in teaching Eritrean refugee youths with useful skills but the linkage to market and livelihoods is still to be made.** Whilst the level of satisfaction of former trainees about the YEP is high, frustrations were mounting about the delay in delivering post-training kits, whilst NRC was struggling with procurement and revising its distribution strategy. The direct result is that 100 to 150 graduates have already left the camp, questioning sustainability and the programme's ability to slow down secondary movements as long as a clearer link with livelihoods has not been established.
- **Local authorities and UNHCR are keen on supporting any livelihood interventions in the camps,** as they have made of these interventions a priority. All stakeholders gave priority to basic needs in the first place but interest for livelihood programmes in the

camps is now gaining momentum, as all actors realise that the camps' population is suffering from the lack of economic activities.

### **THE OCP – AN OPPORTUNITY TO GRASP and KEY GAPS TO FILL**

- **The OCP is a positive opportunity offered by the Ethiopian government** for a part of the Eritrean caseload and a good mechanism to rely on to make progress towards non-camp based refugee management in the country. Yet, it does not give refugees the right to work or to move freely, nor does it provide a sufficient incentive for Eritrean refugees to consider it as a sustainable solution, as most prefer opting for resettlement and further migration.
- **The selection of the OCP beneficiaries leaves the most vulnerable behind with no alternative than staying indefinitely in the camps.** From a humanitarian perspective then, one weakness of the OCP lies in its selection criteria. There is space there for an organisation to bridge the gap between the OCP and the refugees left behind in the camps.
- **No monitoring mechanism exists in case sponsorships end:** Whilst the mechanisms designed for the OCP are ingenious and adapted to the Eritrean caseload, they are also fragile and vulnerable to hazards in the relationship between the OCP beneficiary and the sponsor. No mechanism exists in case the sponsorship falls apart, except for the refugee to go back to the camp.
- **The OCP transfers costs and burden from the camp to sponsors.** The OCP objective is not self-reliance per se; it is based on the assumption that family networks and relatives will be able to provide for the refugee's daily needs. Rather than building up refugees' self-reliance, it transfers the costs to another category of the population, with little assessment as to whether this is sustainable. Whilst it works for some of the refugees, others face challenges implementing the sponsorship system. Some have to turn to negative coping mechanisms to adjust. Supporting access to livelihood in the urban context is therefore a priority:
  - a) To increase refugees' self-reliance in urban context and guarantee the sustainability of the OCP scheme;
  - b) To reduce the protection risks and the reliance on harming survival strategies that refugees suffer whilst adjusting to the life in the city.
- **The OCP is implemented by ARRA and UNHCR; NRC should advocate for further avenues for partnership.** UNHCR has included OCP beneficiaries in some of the livelihood and recreational programmes implemented by its national partners. All interventions which include OCP beneficiaries target them once they are in the city. There are two gaps to fill: a) the link between the camps and the OCP is weak and the pool of refugees who can benefit from the scheme at this stage is limited; b) no specific programme has been developed to assist OCP beneficiaries, taking into account the specific vulnerabilities and protection risks they face upon arrival in the city. This reinforces the sense of isolation that many OCP beneficiaries feel once they arrive in the city.
- **Greater partnerships, programming linkages and advocacy can set a positive precedent for alternatives to camp-based assistance more widely in Ethiopia.** Whilst the OCP is limited to the Eritrean caseload for the moment, its successful implementation may lead the Ethiopian authorities to revise their position on

encampment more generally in the country and to agree on more durable solutions than the camps. Piloting interventions integrating the OCP will offer the opportunity:

- a) To open the dialogue with Ethiopian authorities on how to extend the parameters of the scheme (either to other caseloads or to negotiate refugees' legal authorisation to work);
  - b) To test this type of urban programming for refugees, providing useful lessons learned for future interventions;
  - c) To build knowledge on the 'invisible' caseload of refugees who live in urban settings, their specific vulnerabilities and protection risks. In the longer run, it is a good opportunity for NRC to start tackling urban poverty and the protection risks it causes both for Ethiopians and refugees.
- **A scheme like the OCP raises the question of replicability.** This issue plays at two levels: a) replicability to other caseloads of refugees present in Ethiopia; b) replicability to other countries of the region, such as Yemen or Kenya, where protracted refugee situations are sometimes an acute issue.
- When it comes to replicating the scheme for other refugee caseloads in the country, the current OCP scheme and its limited scale should be seen as an opportunity to develop and pilot mechanisms tackling as of now what may represent hurdles at a larger scale and may threaten the sustainability of the scheme. Central to this will be working with ARRA to define the appropriate regulatory framework on which to base refugees' access to labour in urban environments. Reducing potential grey areas and the uncertainties they bear will be key to guarantee the replicability of the scheme to other groups of refugees in Ethiopia.
  - Replicability outside of Ethiopia will depend heavily on national contexts and on the level of sensitivity of host societies to the presence of refugees in urban environments. One particularity of the OCP scheme is the high level of ownership of the government over of the scheme, which makes it more immune to rapid evolution than non-governmental attempts at establishing non-camp based assistance mechanisms. Replicability in other contexts will therefore have to take into account the willingness of governments to adopt similar mechanisms. That being said, a positive experience in Ethiopia would undoubtedly help convincing stakeholders in other countries that an alternative to camp-based assistance is possible.

**Overall, this study shows that NRC's desire to look into alternative to camp-based assistance in Ethiopia is timely and based on solid assumptions. The main needs are two-fold: reaching vulnerable refugees who are left without any durable solution to look at in the camps; bridging the gap of livelihood programming for refugees in urban settings. Both will require a strong support from Ethiopian authorities. Articulating these two parameters, taking the OCP as a basis, NRC is in a good position to develop innovative and needed interventions, and presenting itself as a credible partner of both ARRA and UNHCR in this process.**



## RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations section will first highlight key recommendations for all stakeholders working on assistance to refugees in the country and then focus on NRC-specific recommendations:

- **For all stakeholders** – Recommendations will focus on:
  - Addressing the gaps of the OCP identified in this study
  - Suggesting ways to improve data management and population monitoring in the camps.
- **For NRC, this section suggests:**
  - A strategic review of NRC’s positioning and operations in Ethiopia and of existing avenues for NRC to consolidate its presence at the national level;
  - A step-by-step Pilot Programme and the recommendations surrounding its implementation.

### GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

General recommendations for organisations working with refugees – especially with Eritrean refugees – are organised around two main axes:

#### 1) **Addressing the gaps of the OCP**

This review of the out-of-camp scheme highlighted a series of gaps that limit its impact and the sustainability. Simple measures can help bridging the gaps of the current mechanism:

- ✓ **Bridging the information gaps:** the study reveals that information about the modalities and parameters of the OCP are scarce and not easily accessible be it for refugees, beneficiaries or for stakeholders. This fuels expectation gaps between the assistance and services that refugees think they will get once out of the camps and what is actually planned by the scheme. The lack of information of humanitarian and development organisations means that opportunities are lost to optimize the scheme and develop programming based on it.
  - Organisations, in close cooperation with ARRA, should work on a robust communications campaign for Eritrean refugees starting in the transit centre up until the camps. Beyond a general campaign in the camps clearly – and repeatedly – stating the key modalities of the OCP, each potential beneficiary can be linked to the Urban Resource Centre (see below) set up in Addis Ababa for a phone meeting, where all the aspects of urban life are further discussed with potential beneficiaries.
  - Developing a reference document clarifying the parameters and modalities of the OCP for ARRA and UNHCR’s partners working with refugees in the country would greatly help organisations take the scheme into account in their programming. For the moment, the lack of clarity surrounding the scheme prevents donors and organisations to build on the opportunities that it offers. ARRA and UNHCR could hold a Q&A sessions with their main partners to give them the opportunity to raise their main questions and worries about the scheme. These discussions could serve as a basis to develop a handy reference document.
- ✓ **Setting up an Urban Resource Centre** for OCP beneficiaries. As explained above, social and economic isolation hinders the smooth adjustment of many Eritrean refugees to the life in the city. The lack of information – especially market information - and the lack of support and counselling mechanisms are particularly problematic for young and

inexperienced refugees. An urban resource centre would represent a good structure for refugees to be able to meet, discuss their experience and get some advice and information. A partnership may be established with organisations like the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS), which runs a refugee centre in Addis Ababa, to build on existing structures and to learn from their own initiatives. I

- In the short-term, the centre would provide information and counselling to help refugees settle in the city; serve as a learning centre for vocational training, language and urban skills; and potentially serve as a centre for the provision of additional services (health and education for example), in partnership with other organisations.
  - In the longer-run, the centre could be used as an incubator for small and micro-enterprises to tackle the question of livelihood for refugees living in the city. It could also be the basis to develop NRC's legal information and counselling services through the establishment of its ICLA programme.
- ✓ **Find innovative solutions to address the issue of informal labour** – In order to address the barriers to labour that refugees face when they live outside the camps, discussions should be engaged with ARRA to find innovative solutions. In particular, contract mechanisms can be developed specifically for these populations to help formalising their access to employment and reassure potential employers. Pilot initiatives can help define these mechanisms through a close monitoring of ARRA and a partner organisation like NRC.

## 2) Strengthening Information Sharing and Knowledge-Based Management

Given the fluidity of movements in and out of the camps of Shire, a tighter system of data collection, data analysis and information sharing is recommended to strengthen information and knowledge management amongst stakeholders and inform more directly programming. For livelihood interventions in particular, the impact of secondary movement needs to be assessed and that can only be done through a dynamic data collection system.

- ✓ **Collect data and update information from all stakeholders on existing migration and movement dynamics.** Mechanisms of Population Movement Tracking (PMT) have been established in other countries and migratory contexts to capture the migratory dynamics. PMT systems are based on consortiums of NGOs willing to align and share their data collection mechanisms. NRC is an active member of the PMT initiative in place in Somalia and could use this experience to replicate the initiative in the Ethiopian context.
- ✓ **Initiatives like the iris-based identification of refugees implemented by UNHCR in other contexts** could be piloted in a context like Northern Ethiopia to better keep track of movements in and out the camps. This would also help inform the development of non-camp based assistance as a precise knowledge of the movements of OCP beneficiaries is necessary, whilst keeping track is a lot more challenging in cities than in camp environments.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NRC

### STRATEGIC REVIEW & RECOMMENDATIONS

NRC's presence in Ethiopia is relatively new. Programmes started in 2011 and NRC has been able to quickly develop a range of activities. The organisation has even succeeding in already

positioning itself as a key actor on certain sectors, especially shelter. It has now reached a stage, where it can adopt a more ambitious strategy in the country.

The present study represents a good opportunity to review NRC’s current strategy in Ethiopia and to sketch the main strategic orientations that NRC could look into to strengthen its presence and legitimacy as a key actor for refugee assistance in the country and to go beyond emergency assistance and the implementation of UNHCR programmes. The following are areas where NRC could easily be more proactive for the benefit of a more coherent strategy and of a stronger voice on refugee-related issues in Ethiopia:

<b>Programming Strategy</b>	<b>Coordination &amp; Systems Strategy</b>
<b>1. Developing Urban Livelihood Programming</b>	4. Setting up <b>robust M&amp;E mechanisms</b>
<b>2. Becoming a key actor in the provision of youth-focused livelihood programmes for refugees in Ethiopia</b>	5. Developing a <b>strong communications and advocacy</b> component, notably with donors in favour of funds for urban programming
<b>3. Designing a four-way Partnership Strategy, bringing in the government, UN agencies, civil society and the private sector.</b>	6. Building up <b>coordination and information sharing</b> through a consortium dedicated to the dual challenge of livelihood in and out of camps.

**Programming Strategy:**

**1) Developing Urban Livelihood Programming**

Urban programming – especially in the sector of food security and livelihood – is receiving a growing attention globally. For NRC and in East Africa, these issues are particularly salient, as the challenge of ‘invisible urban refugees’<sup>33</sup> has become a significant issue in other countries of the region, Kenya in particular. Developing the urban component of NRC’s programming in Ethiopia would open interesting avenues given that:

- The needs for urban programming in Ethiopia is increasing rapidly given the strong rural to urban migration and the self-settlement of refugees in the cities, Addis Ababa in particular;
- Programming and donors operating in Ethiopia have heavily focused on rural programming, based on the conditions where the operations started in the country. Urban programming, on the other hand, remains a secondary focus.
- NRC at the global level is looking into food security and livelihood in urban environment and NRC’s regional office is active on that front. Developing this kind of programming would therefore be in line with the regional and global strategies of NRC.

To sum up, needs are growing, the number of actors focusing on these issues is low and urban programming would respond to a more global strategy. The development of Urban Livelihood Programming should be based on a strong dialog with Ethiopian authorities.

**2) Becoming a key actor in the provision of Youth focused Livelihood Programmes for Refugees in Ethiopia**

Through its YEP programme, NRC has a platform to work more directly on youth-focused livelihood-related programmes. Livelihood programming also represents a growing interest of

<sup>33</sup> See Hunnes, D (2012), ‘An analysis of Ethiopian Rural-to-Urban Migration Patterns from Primary Interviews’ in *Journal of Global Health Perspectives*. Or Morrissey, J (2008), ‘Rural-urban migration in Ethiopia’ in *Forced Migration Review*.

donors and agencies working with refugees, at least for caseloads where the basic needs are, to a large extent, covered. However, a specific youth focus is lacking. NRC benefits from its reputation and has already been chosen to be the focal organisation working on livelihood in several regions of Ethiopia. This means that livelihood will need to be integrated a lot early on in the projects so that the articulation with livelihood is made for any type of projects NRC develops, the YEP in particular. The recruitment of livelihood experts is a step in the right direction as this is an area where the needs for refugees are blatant and the interventions extraordinarily limited.

### **3) Designing a Four-Way Partnership Strategy**

The opportunity set by the development of the OCP scheme by ARRA and UNHCR provides a strong basis for NRC to build a complementary urban programming approach aimed at strengthening alternatives to camp based assistance. NRC should make the most of its specific status as a respected and neutral actor, who has a role to play beyond that of service provider and implementing partner. This study advocates for a three-pronged partnership strategy by NRC:

- ✓ **Partnering with the Government of Ethiopia**  
In Ethiopia, the government should be seen as a central and accountable partner, and NRC's efforts to support the government's OCP scheme will enhance national ownership and contribute to building the capacity of a scheme that is, at the moment, reduced to the Eritrean caseload. Partnership with the Government of Ethiopia and ARRA should be designed with two objectives in mind: 1) addressing missing links and building on lessons learned on the gaps of the OCP highlighted in this research and 2) offering governmental counterparts with capacity building efforts through training and capacity building programmes of civil servants to strengthen institutional processes. Such a dual approach will increase the effectiveness of OCP and enhance its sustainability. It will also naturally lead to a stronger advocacy position for NRC in country to argue for an expansion of the parameters of the OCP scheme.
- ✓ **Partnering with actors working on urban poverty and development actors**  
Beyond the scope of emergency assistance, livelihood interventions will require the support of donors and organisations specialising in development. Given the existing humanitarian and emergency needs for refugees in the country, some donors may be reluctant to divert funding from humanitarian assistance. On the other hand, given the lack of such interventions for refugees in the country, development donors could be interested in supporting this type of more sustainable interventions.
- ✓ **Partnering with civil society organisations**  
A mapping of existing services in urban contexts is a pre-requisite to developing a partnership framework to support out-of-camp programming and scheme. In the urban context, a lot of the work done to counter urban poverty goes through civil society organisation, in particular faith-based organisations, such as the Jesuite Refugee Service (JRS) in Addis Ababa for example. In order to channel and shape its urban programming, NRC should partner with pre-existing civil society organisations who have already built their acceptance and fine knowledge of the specific urban neighbourhoods and populations they work with. NRC would benefit from this experience, whilst on the other hand, civil society organisations could benefit from a partnership with NRC to access funding. Civil society organisations would also be useful to monitor the protection issues that urban refugees face, from poor labour conditions, to increased food insecurity and risks of harmful coping strategies.

✓ **Partnering with the private sector at the local and regional levels**

Private sector actors are needed to enhance market linkages at the local and regional levels. The enterprise survey of this study provides an initial mapping of companies participating in, or that have the potential to participate in, urban programming and local integration of refugees in urban settings. The third component of the partnership strategy offers guarantees in terms of efficiency while providing access to the local and regional labour markets. Starting in 2014, the proportion of partnerships with private sector (micro, small and medium enterprises) should be strongly increased to guarantee sustainability in programming. The suggestion to adopt a dual “local and regional” approach is a necessary step to diversify resources and partnerships and providing options for both vulnerable groups within camps and youth desiring to leave camps.

### **Coordination and Systems Strategy:**

#### **4) Setting up robust Monitoring and Evaluation mechanisms**

Setting up a robust M&E structure will be key for NRC to adjust its strategy in a country where its programming started recently. A robust M&E structure would have two major objectives: a) measuring the impact of programmes, recording progress, questioning relevance and revising objectives when necessary; b) monitoring the short-term and longer-term evolution of the various caseloads NRC is assisting in the country to feed into future programming. In order to develop independent programming, that is programmes that are not solely donor-led but are proactively designed based on the needs that NRC has identified, the adequate mechanisms of data collection and data analysis have to be put in place.

This will require relying on external / third party monitoring and evaluation actors that can support NRC’s work while not presenting any conflict of interest. M&E and follow-up will have to first start with the YEP programme currently being implemented, then branching out to pilot programmes and future programmes. A cycle of M&E projects will have to be funded through additional budget lines and will require additional donor support. Lessons learned from these M&E studies will be shared outside of NRC with partner stakeholders, and will be the basis for advocacy activities. These M&E mechanisms will ensure the credibility and relevance of NRC’s work.

#### **5) Build up influence on key refugee-related issues**

A particularity of NRC worldwide is its legitimacy as an independent actor working to address refugee protection and livelihood needs. This is based on strong communication and advocacy skills, a component that could be strengthened in the Ethiopian context. The development of non-camp based assistance in particular will require various discussions with ARRA to establish sustainable mechanisms all actors agree upon. Based on the results of its pilot programme and on a solid communication strategy, NRC should be at the forefront of these discussions with ARRA and UNHCR.

#### **6) Build up Coordination and Information Sharing: A Consortium dedicated to the dual challenge of livelihoods in and out of camps**

Information sharing is a challenge everywhere in East Africa, including Ethiopia. There are several gaps in the information-sharing process: from the field to the national level; from the national level to the regional level on the one hand; internally and externally on the other.

Regarding external coordination and in the frame of the present study, we could observe that coordination with other actors could be improved. This has to do with the way stakeholders

operate in Ethiopia, often in bilateral relations with UNHCR or ARRA. Yet, NRC should be a key actor in reinforcing refugee-related coordination mechanisms.

The best way to address such coordination and information sharing hurdles is to set up a consortium of actors – replicating the partnership strategy – to bring in government, civil society, United Nations agencies and private sector as a way to address the dual challenge of livelihoods in and out of camps.

From an internal point of view, a stronger information-sharing mechanism would allow NRC Ethiopia to feed more consistently into the regional advocacy and strategic initiatives. For example, mixed migration is a key regional issue, on which NRC is very active regionally through the Mixed Migration Task Force. This regional initiative would benefit from stronger communication and information-sharing from the national office.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROGRAMMING**

- **Engage in an early dialog with ARRA at the regional level and at the national level to develop both options of livelihood programming.**

The support of the administration will be critical for the implementation of any livelihood programme. Furthermore ARRA has full control over the OCP. Any pilot programme working within the camps or within the parameters of the OCP will therefore require engaging with governmental authorities early on in the process.

- **Engage in early dialog with donors and UNHCR: Advocate for urban programming**

Attention to livelihoods and urban programming is increasing amongst the international community working in Ethiopia. Yet, donors are still strongly emergency and rural-oriented, something that will need to be taken into account early on as well to secure funding for non-camp based forms of assistance. Advocate with donors to recognise the necessity of a shift towards programming in urban areas and to develop specific framework to start funding these initiatives. In particular, donors' support will be needed to facilitate refugees' access to financial capital and microenterprise development.

- **Phase the development of NRC's livelihood programming**

Both programme options examined above present complex sets of challenge and require careful planning. They also are complementary and address the issue of self-reliance from both ends of the spectrum. NRC should not be too ambitious as for the pace at which it can develop livelihood activities. It should be progressive in its approach and phase the development of its livelihood activities. The reinforcement of the livelihood component of the YEP can be implemented more rapidly and with lesser uncertainties than the OCP component. It should have the first priority for 2014. The preliminary steps for the implementation of an urban programme linked with the OCP should take place throughout 2014 for a start in 2015.

- **Design multi sector interventions linking education (YEP) and livelihood programme**

The rapid review of the YEP programme in 2013 showed that the programme suffered from the insufficient planning for and integration of the livelihood component and post-training mechanisms. The result of this is a decreased impact of the programme on livelihood and self-reliance and the secondary movement of many graduates. At the moment, the YEP programme focuses mainly on its skill component to the detriment of its livelihood component. This balance should be shifted through the establishment of a multi-sector intervention where livelihood and education are implemented hand-in-hand from the early stages of the project. This requires the recruitment of livelihood experts associated to the YEP programme from the early stages of the process.



- **Include the host community in urban livelihood interventions**

Given that unemployment is a general issue, that touches non-refugee populations as well, it is important to take the host community into account for programming in urban settings. Two modalities can be envisaged to include the host community in NRC's urban programme:

- A given percentage of beneficiaries of urban livelihood programme can be reserved for members of the host community, targeting in priority the urban poor.
- Sponsors of OCP beneficiaries could also be included in a livelihood programme in the city, as a way to consolidate the sponsorship system and including the host community in urban programming.

- **Engage in background and preliminary activities on the OCP Programme component as of 2014, for implementation in 2015.**

If an actual urban programme targeting OCP should start in 2015, several preliminary steps must be implemented in 2014 to prepare the ground for a robust programme. Amongst these:

- Preliminary discussions with ARRA
- Preliminary discussions with donors
- Preliminary discussions with UNHCR
- In-depth assessment of protection risks and livelihood strategies of urban refugees and OCP beneficiaries
- Identification of local organisations working in livelihood in urban contexts
- Implementation of a small-scale pilot project (see below)
- Assessment of impact & implementation challenges
- Adjustment of programme concepts and modalities.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A PILOT OUT-OF-CAMP YOUTH PROJECT**

### **Objective of the Pilot Project**

The objective of this pilot project is to test the feasibility, impact and sustainability of a NRC-led programme targeting Eritrean refugees in urban settings. The pilot project will aim at:

- a) Opening dialog with Ethiopian authorities, UNHCR and other stakeholders on the best way to approach livelihood programming for Eritrean refugee youths in and outside the camps;
- b) Testing the programme modalities developed to link Eritrean refugees in the camp to the OCP in Addis Ababa and NRC's capacities to implement this kind of programme;
- c) Assessing the feasibility and sustainability of a larger-scale project;
- d) Being a basis for advocacy towards non-camp based assistance in the country.

### **Project Description & Activities**

Access to livelihood and self-reliance in the Eritrean camps of Shire region is very limited. Whilst the Ethiopian government does not authorize work for refugees, it has recently developed a favourable scheme allowing some Eritrean refugees to live out of the camps. Yet, criteria to access the OCP limit the number of refugees who can access it and leave the most vulnerable behind in the camps. Building on that opportunity, the project will aim at extending access to the scheme to a larger group of Eritrean refugees living in the camps by offering

guarantees and developing an urban livelihood project in Addis Ababa for those who move to the city. The project would therefore have 5 main phases over a 9 months period:

- **Preliminary Phase**
  - Project discussions with ARRA – national level
  - Project discussions with ARRA – regional & camp levels
  - Coordination with UNHCR & other stakeholders working on refugees
  - Recruitment of an expert in urban livelihood programme
- **Phase 1 - In camp activities**
  - Identification of potential beneficiaries in Adi Harush and Mai Aini camps targeting youth and refugees with existing skills
  - First phase of short-term training (3 months): vocational training, preparation to urban work environment (including language and communication skills), business skills
- **Phase 2 – Transfer to Addis Ababa**
  - Guaranteeing for the refugees to get them the OCP status
  - Identification of residence opportunities in the city through existing refugee networks, local organisations & social networks.
  - Short-term limited cash transfer (maximum 3 months)
- **Phase 3 – Urban Vocational Training & Work preparedness**
  - Short term urban vocational training focusing on marketing, entrepreneurship and work preparedness
  - Identification of workshops & employers for apprenticeships
  - Small business grants based on solid business plans
- **Phase 4 – Monitoring & Evaluation/ Phasing out support**
  - Measuring access to livelihood & level of self-reliance in the city through
  - Impact & Feasibility assessment
  - Marketing & employment counselling
  - Regular follow up sessions with beneficiaries

### **Scope and Target Population of the Pilot Project**

The pilot should be conducted with a very limited number of refugees to limit the risks and the implementation challenges. The pilot should be limited to the city of Addis Ababa, where NRC already has an office and where possibilities for urban programming are the greatest.

Beneficiary selection should:

- Aim for a maximum of 25 refugees for the pilot phase
- Target refugees who are interested in moving to Addis & have demonstrated interest in vocational training and access to livelihood;
- Prioritize refugees with existing skills
- Target refugees who live alone in the camp for the pilot phase
- Adopt an AGDM approach – emphasizing in its selection the importance of a youth-focused and, as much as possible, a gender-balance in the activities and profiles of beneficiaries

### **M&E framework & Impact Assessment**

The pilot project should be based on a robust monitoring and evaluation framework. This will include a longitudinal assessment of beneficiaries' living conditions, professionalism and access to livelihood & self-reliance throughout the project. NRC already uses Mobenzi data collection system to conduct assessment. This technology could be used with benefit for M&E. The M&E framework should also allow NRC to identify quickly the challenges faced by the project,

record them and propose adjustment in the project framework. At the end of the pilot project, the data collected throughout the pilot will help NRC a) assess impact, relevance and feasibility of the OCP project; b) refine its approach to prepare for the full implementation. In urban context, longitudinal M&E is not as easy as in camp settings, given the dispersion of beneficiaries. In the mid-term, one option can be to develop a partnership with Ethio Telecom and Mobenzi. The idea would be to be able to send out e-questionnaires to beneficiaries every months to monitor their income, food security and livelihoods. This type of system requires an incentive – such as free credit – to be paid to the graduates. It is a robust system to track trends in the markets, compare which courses are the most effective and follow-up with former beneficiaries.

## References

---

- Black, R (1999), 'Putting refugees in camps' in *Forced Migration Review*, n°2, 4-8.
- Campbell, E. (2006), 'Urban refugees in Nairobi : Problems of Protection, Mechanisms of survival, and possibilities for Integration' in *Journal of Refugee Studies*, vol. 19, n°3, 396-413
- Cavaglieri, S. *Livelihood Strategies and Food Security in Refugee Camps*. Masters Thesis, Dept. Of Economics, University of Roma, Rome, Italy. To be published by the FAO.
- Chambers R. and Conway G. (1991), *Sustainable rural livelihoods – practical concepts for the 21st century*, IDS Discussion Paper 296, Brighton, 1991.
- Crisp, J (2002), 'No Solutions in Sight : the Problem of Protracted Refugee Situations in Africa' in *CCIS Working Paper*, n°68.
- Human Rights Watch, (2014), *I wanted to Lie Down and Die*.
- Jacobsen, K (2006), 'Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Urban Areas : a livelihoods perspective' in *Journal of Refugee Studies*, vol 19, n°3, 273-286.
- Lindley, A (2009), 'Crisis and Displacement in Somalia' in *Forced Migration Review*, issue 33
- Morrissey J (2008), 'Rural-urban migration in Ethiopia' in *Forced Migration Review*, issue 31, 28-29
- Omata N & Kaplan J (2013), 'Refugee livelihoods in Kampala, Nakivale and Kyangwali refugee settlements. Patterns of engagement with the private sector.' In *Working Paper Series*, n°95.
- Pavanello S, Elhawary S, Pantuliano S, (2010), 'Hidden and exposed: Urban refugees in Nairobi, Kenya' in *HPG Working Paper*.
- Pérouse de Montclos, MA (2011), 'Les camps de réfugiés et la guerre. Du sanctuaire à l'enterrement humanitaire?' in *IFRI – Focus Stratégique*, n°27, janvier 2011.
- Pérouse de Montclos, MA & Mwangi Kagwanja P (2000), 'Refugee camps or cities? The socio-economic dynamics of the Dadaab and Kakuma Camps in Northern Kenya. Vol 13, n°2, 205-222.
- Porter G. et alii (2008), 'Linkages between livelihood opportunities and refugee-host relations: learning from the experiences of Liberian camp-based refugees in Ghana. In *Journal of Refugee Studies*, vol. 21, n°2. 230-252
- RCK, (2005), *Self-settled Refugees in Nairobi, A close look at their Coping strategies*
- Soucy, A (2011), *Mixed Migration From the Horn of Africa to Yemen. Protection Risks and Challenges*. Published by the Danish Refugee Council, Nairobi, Kenya.
- UNHCR, (2005), *Handbook for Self-Reliance*
- UNHCR (2006), *Refugee Livelihoods : A review of the evidence*
- UNHCR, (2012), *Livelihood Programming in UNHCR : Operational Guidelines*
- Van Hear, 'Managing Mobility for Human Development : the Growing Salience of Mixed Migration' in *Human Development Research Paper*, 2009/20, for UNDP
- Werker E. (2007), 'Refugee Camp Economies' in *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. 20, n° 3, 461-478
- The World Bank, (2012), *Ethiopia Economic Update, Overcoming Inflation, Raising Competitiveness*.

## Samuel Hall. Contacts

For more information

[info@samuelhall.org](mailto:info@samuelhall.org)

[www.samuelhall.org](http://www.samuelhall.org)

