REREADING NIETZSCHE IN THEORY: AESTHETICS AND THE MOVEMENT OF GENEALOGY IN THE EARLY WORK

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The following is intended to restore certain difficulties to The Birth of Tragedy that two of the text's most influential readers—Paul de Man and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe—have either passed over or found uninteresting. For even if we concede with Lacoue-Labarthe that BT is Nietzsche's only proper "book," it is undoubtedly a vexed, fragmentary, and disconnected one. And de Man's claim that BT "seems to defend a well-rounded thesis, supported by relevant argument and illustration" is—precisely because it comes from de Man, the self-professed critic of nuance and rigor—slightly puzzling.

The impetus behind the endeavor here is neither corrective nor simply critical. The spirit of the reading attempts to emulate the example of a recent collection of essays, titled Intersections, which seeks to forge a very specific kind of conversation between nineteenth-century philosophy and contemporary theory. The conversation envisioned there is modeled not on a history-of-ideas or genetic logic but is conceived as a genuine, symmetrical dialogue that inspires reciprocal reflection. Through it, "theory" does not simply come to uncover embryonic pre-texts in post-Enlightenment thought but rather finds occasion in reflecting on its past to reconsider its own contours, to reexamine the place at which it has arrived, and to reevaluate the static, often exclusive investments of its various "schools." The dialogue can thus become more estranging than "hermeneutically satisfying." The following will thus be more interested...
in what de Man and Lacoue-Labarthe are doing as they read Nietzsche or how they read Nietzsche than in who has Nietzsche right.

Specifically, the analysis takes its cue from the thesis of Tilottama Rajan’s contribution to that collection: “For Nietzsche, what we now call phenomenology and deconstruction are curiously allied.” “They are curiously and unpredictably allied, so that the language with which we can most productively speak of and tease out that alliance is difficult to find. For that reason, the questions posed here about Nietzsche’s BT and the alleged beginnings of a critique of representation undertaken in that text will be fairly nontechnical: How does the “outside” of the text turn up in Nietzsche’s account of language, theater, and art? What is the status of concepts like “illusion” and “reference” in the picture of language and aesthetics that the early Nietzsche sketches? When the world and the body turn up in this “early” account, are they really so straightforwardly present (“metaphysics plain and simple,” writes Lacoue-Labarthe’)? How does the early Nietzsche figure and theorize the relationship between being and appearance generally?

In the background of the analysis, another set of questions will lurk. Both de Man and Lacoue-Labarthe understand BT to be an immature text in which Nietzsche is not yet attuned to the implications of some of his own insights, one that unlike most of the later work allies Nietzsche with the metaphysical tradition. De Man writes openly: “The later evolution of Nietzsche’s work could then be understood as the gradual ‘deconstruction’ of a logocentrism that receives its fullest expression in The Birth of Tragedy.”6 Lacoue-Labarthe is slightly more sympathetic: If there is a break, it occurs “as of” BT, so that we must learn to read two separate and very different languages within it, the language of metaphysics and another “in which ‘deconstruction’ is already under way.”9

Both readings converge and come to this conclusion excluding any serious engagement with Nietzsche’s account of Attic tragedy, only the categories in themselves of the Dionysian and the Apollonian. De Man makes the decision to exclude explicit: “Within the reading of The Birth of Tragedy as a logocentric (melocentric) text, the relative weakness of the main thematic articulations is of little importance, since the pattern is rooted in a deep-seated generative conception of language that is bound to control all the movements of the work.”10 He thus accounts for the omission methodologically: Allegorics are not interpreted in thematic terms. In fact, the very question of the “aboutness” of the text, the essential secondariness of its thematic articulations, is what appears to be at stake in the project.11 The movement of de Manian allegory, in other words, like the struggle between philosophy and literature for Lacoue-Labarthe, transpires at a nonthetic level in the text. Allegories of reading—or of the “impossibility” of reading, of the necessary, repetitive, constitutive confusion between figural and referential statement, or between sign and substance, reference and phenomenalism, linguistic and natural reality—come into view through a certain kind of excavation, revealing a deep-structural pattern of valorizations that is said to drive the text’s movements at the core.

Thus for both readers the early Nietzsche’s speculations about tragedy and the movement of aesthetics become secondary, and the readings focus, almost exclusively, on Apollo and Dionysus as symptomatic constructs. How is this forgetting (not the forgetting of tragedy, but of Nietzsche’s account of tragedy) essential to the arguments made? Or to the kind of genealogy that is alongside being written? The thrust of de Man’s reading, for example, pivots on an understanding of Dionysus as the literal voice of logoscentrism. Again, de Man makes the indictment openly: In Dionysus’ association with ritual, music, voice, gesture, and so on, “Truth, Presence, and Being” are all on his side.12 Both de Man and Lacoue-Labarthe in this way understand the Dionysian as a pseudo-theological, metaphysical category. The connection they draw, however, between Dionysus and “metaphysics” seems too easy, precisely too literal, basically thematic—the kind of statement one could make about BT having a vague idea of its story and the associations that organize it. And if, as they claim, Truth for the early Nietzsche really is measured by proximity to the Dionysian, why doesn’t Nietzsche valorize the pre-Hellenic “barbaric” festivals of Dionysus, with their piercing shrieks and rhythmic dances and symbolisms of the body (BT, §2)?13 Why does Nietzsche valorize tragedy, the fleeting, precarious Hellenic balancing-act of the Dionysian with the Apollonian?

A qualifying note regarding this last set of questions is in order, however: At the same time that Nietzsche’s reception in “France” might be seen as the instance of theory’s self-grounding genealogy, writing (Lacoue-Labarthe: “it is quite possible that Nietzsche was ahead of his time and began to undo . . . ”), so that one could say
without exaggeration, for instance, that a text like “On Truth and Lies in an Extramoral Sense” is not really part of Nietzsche’s corpus in the same way that it is part of something like a deconstructive canon, it is important to remember that the Nietzsche of the 1970s is as much an event in publishing history as it is in the evolution of theory. If both de Man and Lacoue-Labarthe read BT with a real excitement through the lens of the unpublished notebooks and lecture notes on rhetoric, it is because that material had just come to be made available, a fully proper critical edition of the primary text of BT and its preparatory notes appearing in German ninety-six years after its original publication.15

I

We might start approaching Nietzsche’s thoughts on language and aesthetics by briefly revisiting that text written for Cosima Wagner the year after the appearance of BT in which Nietzsche famously renounces all claims to truth and expounds a precociously radical theory of language and metaphor. I won’t recall Nietzsche’s text “On Truth and Lies in an Extramoral Sense” in detail here, as its exposition of metaphor is well known, perhaps most eloquently outlined by Sarah Kofman.16 “Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions.” And what is truth? It is synonymous with dissimulation, “a movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms” (TL, 84).17 The story is by now second nature.

For de Man, “On Truth and Lies” is “openly Socratic in its deconstructive function.”18 Nietzsche simply tells it how it is. Likewise, for Lacoue-Labarthe the essay makes clear “that transposition is the essence of art and that language furnishes its very model.”19 For both critics, the argument in the essay revolves around the potential confusion between what are in actuality effects of reference and what we take to be objects of consciousness or experience. The concern is with the epistemological force of rhetoric, with the power of language “to make something which is unreal appear to be real” (TL, 81). De Man’s conception of deconstruction or allegory and Lacoue-Labarthe’s of literature follow from this reasoning. De Man calls deconstruction “the recognition of the systematic character of a certain kind of error,” it is a repetitive staging of demystification, a protraction of the moment of waking, a remembering of the forgetting of metaphor. And at no point is Nietzsche said to be more explicit and eloquent about his participation in such a project than in “On Truth and Lies.”

There is no doubt that Nietzsche struggles with questions similar to these in the text. The very basic similarity or affinity lies in the clearly negative valuation of logos. But it does not follow from the account Nietzsche presents in the essay, as it does for Lacoue-Labarthe, that “the world is what is said about it.”20 This, I think, is exactly what Nietzsche does not want to say. I think he leaves open the possibility that the world both is something other than and that it can be productively conceptualized as something other than which can be said about it. It is simply untrue that for Nietzsche here “there remains nothing outside of saying—and nothing, to begin with, from which saying would have begun.”21 Nietzsche’s concept of “life” is a much richer concept than is sometimes thought. Language in the text is indeed set up as the paradigm of the impossibility of a certain kind of knowing, but it is paradigmatic of deception, delusion, and masking generally, that is, paradigmatic of an ethico-existential rather than epistemological predicament. Nietzsche is concerned in the essay with the creation of metaphor from the point of view of production that takes metaphor to be an “inventive” (TL, 86) (the adjective throughout is aesthetic) rather than a constitutively vexed gesture. What we “confuse” for Nietzsche are not objects of reference with object of consciousness; the question of reference or coincidence does not occur to him.

The problem for Nietzsche in this essay is not one of reference but of perspective. The identity between truth and dissimulation that Nietzsche establishes already points to the fact that certain conditions must be met in order for truth to effectively disseminate.22 Here are—significantly—the first few lines of the text:

Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe which is dispersed into numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. . . . After nature had drawn a few breaths, the star cooled and congealed, and the clever beasts had to die. —One might invent such a fable, and yet he still would not have adequately illustrated how miserable, how shadowy and transient, how aimless and arbitrary the human intellect looks within nature. . . . For this intellect has no additional mission which would lead it beyond human life.
Nietzsche begins the exposition with a vivid picture of the world, literally “looking down” on it—some corner of the universe, sometime. The text commences with a dramatization of the smallness of knowing through the exaggeration of the vastness of the space to which it belongs. The world figures as a place, as the vast *wherein* of knowing and speaking. The biting play with point-of-view in the passage makes clear that knowledge cannot have the world as its object because it is “of” it or “on” it, a point or a moment within it.

This dramatization of the problem of representation as Nietzsche explicates it in “On Truth and Lies” has consequences for all three “types” in *BT*— Dionysus, Apollo, and Socrates. Nietzsche’s critique of Socratism, and subsequently “aesthetic Socratism” or realism, does not turn on the question of reference. His critique does not, as de Man and Lacoue-Labarthe claim, center on the realist confusion between reference and phenomenalism but on the kind of impossible perspective an answer to Socrates’ inquiry would demand. The problem with Socrates is not that he remains naive and deluded or is not in-the-know, so to speak. This is less important for Nietzsche than the fact that his inquiry doesn’t get anywhere; it is nihilism. Socrates asks the wrong questions. In the picture of the world Nietzsche sketches, Socrates’ question “True or false?” can have no answer. For this reason he is instructed in his last hours in a dream vision, “Socrates, make music!” (*BT*, §14).

In his characterization of the relation between subject and object in “On Truth and Lies” as an aesthetic relation, Nietzsche appears to employ the term “aesthetic” as a synonym for something like epistemology. In the early works, however, the category of the aesthetic for Nietzsche becomes the means through which he approaches the question of knowledge specifically in relation to the question of value. In *BT*, Nietzsche writes in a central and somewhat cryptic formulation that the aesthetic is that through which existence is justified (*gerechtfertigt*) (§5), and in “On the Utility and Liability of History for Life” Nietzsche attributes the historical sickness of his age to a lack of a particular sensibility, what he directly calls the aesthetic drive. In both *BT* and “Utility and Liability” Nietzsche’s conception of the aesthetic arises specifically in the context of his critique of modern culture. It gains importance as a concept here because it serves as a contrast or an antidote to the infirmities of the age. There are three primary ones: historical *Bildung*, science, and “scholarship.”

They have in common is a blind dedication to thoroughness. The maxim that informs these enterprises might read: I know because I can (boredom, vanity, curiosity, momentum). Most importantly, then, the aesthetic in these early texts is *unwissenschaftlich*. An aesthetic understanding or an aesthetic truth is imprecise, incomprehensive. It evades. It could be conceptualized as a kind of immunity rather than receptivity (the pathos of distance echoes here). The link with the concept of Übertragung in “On Truth and Lies” now becomes explicit: the aesthetic relation between subject and object entails an enormous constitutive forgetting, a dissolving of particularity. One might think here too of an image from *BT*: Euphues sitting in the theater, with the masterworks of his predecessors—Sophocles and Aeschylus—in hand, reading so closely and carefully, perplexed at the contradictions and incongruities in every line, puzzled by the asymmetries and exaggerations of every thing—in some sense seeing everything, and therefore nothing (§ 11). His demand for absolute clarity (the give-away prologue, for instance) will of course kill tragedy; Nietzsche calls the moment aesthetic Socratism. The general metaphor of undirectedness or indiscriminacy that runs through these texts is Nietzsche’s early picture of nihilism. The central passage (“The Madman”) from the third book the *Gay Science* on the death of god will parallel such imagery: a world whose horizon (being a limit, a bound) has been erased, a particle continually falling. In all the cases, the directionless spilling out of the will to knowledge is accounted for by a lack of something characterized as aesthetic, something capable of guiding or giving direction to the will to know. Thus the question of value appears. It is in this sense that Nietzsche’s emphasis in “On Truth and Lies” falls on metaphor as an *inventive* (aesthetic) gesture.

Most important, then, what Nietzsche leaves open in “On Truth and Lies” is the possibility that our redemptive truths are metaphors just like the others. Perhaps this is the point at which Nietzsche most significantly parts ways with deconstruction. There is no indication that the kind of awakening he imagines, that the kind of second-degree truth at which he arrives mandates the upkeep of a self-consciousness and self-surveillance in writing that recoils from positive articulations about material objects or other people or the world. There is no indication that writing for him is henceforth confined to a logic of self-demystification. If there is a form of hyper- or heightened consciousness that Nietzsche considers, the deconstructive logic...
logical reasoning, that art derives its continuous development from the duality of the Apolline and Dionysiac; just as the reproduction of species depends on the duality of the sexes, with its constant conflicts and only periodically intervening reconciliations. These terms are borrowed from the Greeks, who revealed the profound mysteries of their artistic doctrines to the discerning mind, not in concepts but in the vividly clear forms of their deities. To the two gods of art, Apollo and Dionysus, we owe our recognition that in the Greek world there is a tremendous opposition, as regards both origins and aims, between the Apolline art of the sculptor and the non-visual, Dionysiac art of music. (§1)

Nietzsche's polemic with the Socratism of academic scholarship appears in the very first sentence. (Nietzsche attempted an escape from the department of philology at Basel and applied unsuccessfully for the chair of philosophy the year after BT's publication.) He employs a perplexing phrase, however, to characterize the alternative to "logical reasoning"; "perceiving directly [zur unmittelbare Sicherheit der Aanchauung]." As a kind of historian or historiographer, Nietzsche would have been appropriately aware that the term unmittelbar seems a strange one to characterize his relation to Athens of the late-sixth, early-fifth century B.C. Furthermore, one would be hard-pressed to prove with Sicherheit the thesis that Apollo and Dionysus drive the history of aesthetics in a kind of generative battle. That he has "borrowed" the terms from the Greeks seems fair enough. What he means, presumably, is that the "vividly clear forms" of the deities serve as apposite embodiments of the two underlying forces he identifies. The fact that philological consensus ascribes the origins of Attic tragedy to the worship of Dionysus is beside the point; he says he derives the typology from mythology and not history. He appropriates the figures as myths, "borrows" them: Apollo is the god of soothsaying, light, law, medicine, etc., and Dionysus of intoxication, fertility, nature, and so forth. Thus Apollo presides over the arts of plastic form and symbolism, and Dionysus over music. There is, however, an inconsistency here: Apollo is the Greek patron god of music. The only connection between Dionysus and music is precisely historical. Perhaps the introductory passage is best read keeping in mind against whose ears such liberties would most severely grate— the philologists. Apollo and Dionysus are thus importantly Nietzsche's myths.

II

The interweave between myth, history, allegory, and fiction in BT is condensed and messy. It is difficult to decide whether the workings of Apollo and Dionysus in the text's story are better characterized as allegorical or archetypal, whether the permutations in the two forces as they come forward in actual aesthetic forms (dithyramb, lyric, tragedy, dialogue, opera, novel, Gesamtkunstwerk) are structural or typological. Nietzsche never makes clear why he invests Apollo and Dionysus with their significance, and although there are connections between the two deities in mythology, there appears to be no philological precedent for this kind of pairing. In fact, Nietzsche greatly complicates any attempt at clarification from the beginning. The text commences thus:

We shall have gained much for the science of aesthetics when we have succeeded in perceiving directly, and not only through
Nietzsche introduces the Socratic archetype much later in the text. He does not invest Socrates with the same generative power that he does Apollo and Dionysus; unlike the latter two, Socrates seems to represent a Weltanschauung rather than a Trieb. What Nietzsche calls aesthetic Socratism (§12), the critical method embodied in artistic form at the hands of which tragedy is killed, materializes in the drama of Euripides. The severe condemnation of Euripides in relation to Aeschylus and Sophocles also seems to have no precedent in philosophy. Aristotle liked Euripides very much, and insofar as BT as an uncommon genre study is said to shed some kind of unique light on Greek tragedy in general, its treatment of Euripides by large is considered to be rather poor, or certainly not very topical. The anachronistic adjective gives the caricature away immediately:

The bourgeois mediocrity on which Euripides staked all his political hopes now had its chance to speak, where previously its dramatic language had been defined in tragedy by the demigod, and in comedy by the drunken satyr, the half-human. And Aristophanes’ Euripides was able to pride himself on having portrayed mundane, commonplace, everyday life, which anyone was in a position to judge. If the populace was now philosophizing, conducting its business and pleading its legal cases with a hitherto unknown shrewdness, this was his doing, the product of the wisdom he had inculcated in the people. (§11)

That Euripides as a type, as the expression of a cultural mood, stands in for bürgerliches Trauerspiel, the novel of nineteenth-century realism in general, and perhaps mass culture on the whole is barely concealed (the first two are eventually discussed explicitly in §14, and Nietzsche’s thorough disdain for the latter is clear).

For both de Man and Lacoue-Labarthe, Nietzsche gets something importantly right about Euripides here. Nietzsche appears intuitively (“hermeneutic instinct,” de Man calls it) to have found his way to the right “others”—narrative, expository prose, realism, portrayals of everyday life, everyday man, and so on. Nietzsche’s politics of form (that is, his compression of all the right forms into the same politics) is right on. “The novel is the genre of Platonism and might well be the genre of metaphysics in general,” writes Lacoue-Labarthe. He maintains further that Nietzsche links the novel and all such naked exposition that has not abandoned the desire for self-coincidence to the will to truth. What the novel and its various relatives thus have in common is that they constitute as much as they will the forgetting of “literature.” Likewise for de Man, Nietzsche’s condemnation of Euripides pivots on the tragedian’s attempt to guarantee “the reliability of the action in terms of truth and falsehood.” Both critics understand Nietzsche’s condemnation of Euripides to pivot on the tragedian’s suppression of something like text. They understand Euripides to be in the grips of a certain naive understanding of language. Euripides, according to the account, imagines language can do something it can’t.

Nietzsche no doubt does hold to a very specific politics of form. He expounds his critique of “Euripides” lucidly. In particular, he cites two of Euripides’ technical innovations: the prologue and the deus ex machina (§12). Both are the products of Euripides’ “insistent critical process” (§12) and serve to give tragedy an openness and an “audacious intelligibility” (§12), which results in the exorcism of Dionysus and which subsequently forces Apollo to abandon Euripides as well (§10). The exemplarity of Euripides for Nietzsche indeed comes out of a consideration of these formal techniques. He writes explicitly (§11) that through them Euripidean drama forsakes both “uncertainty” and “incommensurability.” The grounds on which Euripides stands as a “type,” the grounds on which this particular structure of drama becomes an archetype into which so many disparate genres and all mass culture in general can be condensed, stems from the fact that through these formal innovations Euripides “brought the spectator on to the stage” and “taught the people to speak for themselves” (§11). The formulations make clear that in expounding the formal novelty of “Euripides,” Nietzsche is concerned with who is speaking and for whom the play is staged.

That the people would speak for themselves, that they would be the subjects of the speaking, suggests that they cannot be spoken through or spoken to—that they are not receptive in some sense. That the spectator would be brought onto the stage, that the stage would accommodate “everyday man,” suggests that it becomes bound by a pathos of “communication” rather than one of force. It means that the theater is hampered by an obligation to retain fidelity to, to mirror or to address the subject as a “subject of consciousness,” as a “spectator.” Nothing happens at the theater anymore; Euripides, in his bourgeois mediocrity, represents things for his “spectators.” What this means for the theater generally is that it can no longer be the means through which the people take seriously, say experience
seriously, the proposition that the forces out of which their culture and lives are woven are larger than they are, more precisely different than they each are. They no longer experience anything at the theater. They watch, observe, think, assess. They begin the burning of interiority that will be so important in the later Nietzsche’s account of modern subjectivity. The people “speak for themselves” and thus no one else can speak; it is in this sense that Dionysus and Apollo “abandon” (§ 10) Euripides. And it is in this sense that Euripides becomes fascinated with “character drama,” psychology, “acting”—various fables of knowing, agency, personality, individuality. Everyday man goes to the theater to know; reason is the source of enjoyment. The kind of incommensurability or uncertainty (again, Nietzsche’s terms) that Euripides forsakes is not of his text but of his spectator.

Understanding in tragedy for Nietzsche begins when the spectator is most engaged and consumed by the drama. He describes the process as a kind of giving over:

Dionysiac excitement is capable of communicating to a whole crowd of people the artistic gift of seeing itself surrounded by a host of spirits with which it knows itself to be profoundly united. This process is the primal dramatic performance in the tragic chorus: seeing oneself transformed and acting as though one has truly entered another body, another character... Now the dihyrambic chorus is given the task of stimulating the mood of the audience in such a Dionysiac way that when the tragic hero appears on the stage they do not see, for example, the awkwardly masked man, but rather a visionary form born, so to speak, out of their own rapt vision... He involuntarily translated the entire image of the god that was trembling before his soul to that masked figure, and dissolved its reality into a ghostly unreality. This is the Apolline dream state, in which the daylight world is veiled and a new world, more distinct, comprehensible and affecting than the other and yet more shadowy, is constantly reborn before our eyes.

In the witnessing of tragedy, the self, the center for the gathering and hardening of metaphors dissolves (Dionysus), and the spectator sees (Apollo: vision in the form of a sustainable dream) a “new world,” paradoxically and importantly for Nietzsche a “more distinct” and “comprehensible” one. The individual is identified, identifies so unreservedly with the satyr chorus that it is as if he had entered another body. Compelled by the horror of a glimpse into the heart of being, the chorus, and thus by extension the spectator in the theater, wills its own illusion, projects the healing consolation of the actor on the stage, desires and understands the necessity of the anthropomorphic transformation of true metaphysical insight. Tragedy affirms forgetting, and the self thus becomes malleable, a medium for the Urkünstler. Zarathustra will say that the self is a dance floor for divine chance. We are reminded here of the perplexing phrase Nietzsche employs in the commencing sentence of the text with which he contrasts the process of logical reasoning: “perceiving directly.”

III

In The Birth of Tragedy’s 1887 preface, “Attempt at a Self-Criticism,” Nietzsche himself calls the book strange and disagreeable (§ 2). But what Nietzsche calls “youthfulness” in that preface, that is, the sense in which he himself understands the text to be an “early” work, lies for him not in a still un consummated vision of the problem of representation but in the naïve vision of history that drives its indeed strange narrative of the birth and heralded rebirth of the spirit of tragedy. This is an “early” vision of history that Nietzsche just a few years later would term “monumental” and the hazards of which he himself would underline. He points out in the second Untimely Meditation that insofar as this kind of history takes up the past as something capable of happening a second time, insofar as it proceeds according to analogy or likeness, it not only turns that past into a pure fiction but it also washes away the sites of difference in the present. This model of historical understanding will be replaced by the critical project Nietzsche will term genealogy. Foucault in his reflections on the project has characterized it as “meticulous” and “gray.”28 By the former, “meticulous,” I take Foucault to mean that a certain materialism and a certain revaluation of detail will inform the genealogical project. By the latter, “gray,” I take Foucault to mean that genealogy is always conditional, unresolved in some sense. It is aware of the narratives it weaves about its own present as it looks to the past, and the story that unfolds insistently does not move along the axis of recognition.
NOTES


5 De Man, Allegories, 101.


7 Lacoue-Labarthe, Subject of Philosophy, 10.

8 De Man, Allegories, 88.

9 Lacoue-Labarthe, Subject of Philosophy, 10.

10 De Man, Allegories, 89.

11 De Man writes, “The question is precisely whether a literary text is about that which it describes, represents, or states” (ibid., 57); or “I am not primarily interested in its specific ‘thesis’ . . .” (ibid., 107).

12 Ibid., 83.


14 Lacoue-Labarthe, Subject of Philosophy, 15.

15 The publication of Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari’s Kritische Studienausgabe of Nietzsche’s works in German (Walter de Gruyter, Berlin/
LETTING PHILOSOPHY GO:
THE ROLE OF REASONING IN KAGYÜ TIBETAN BUDDHISM

Linda E. Patrik

ARE MEDITATION AND REASONING COMPATIBLE?

Known as the Practice Lineage, Kagyü Tibetan Buddhism draws from the spring of yogic realization won during meditation. The Kagyü commitment to intensive meditation practice traces back to the 11th Century yogi Milarepa, who meditated for many years in the caves of Tibet. By making intensive meditation practice into the foundation for its dharma teachings, the Kagyü lineage treats the doha (meditation songs) of Milarepa and other meditation masters as equivalent in philosophical importance to the Buddhist Sutras, to the classical Indian philosophical treatises of Dignaga, Dharmakirti, Nagarjuna and Chandrakirti, and to the many commentaries by Kagyü philosophers from the 12th to 20th century. The Kagyü doha (or meditation songs) bear little resemblance to technical philosophy in style. Yet they are more than celebratory songs of yogic realization. They are metaphysical and epistemological in content, expressing the central points in the theory of reality held by the Kagyü, and offering corrections to the kind of knowledge used to attain enlightenment. They lay out critiques for philosophical minds as well as guiding instructions for meditators.

What is difficult to understand about Kagyü Tibetan Buddhism is the relation of philosophical reasoning to the insights won in meditation. Kagyü histories portray Milarepa countering the objections of scholarly philosophers by referring to the purity and non-conceptu-