

**War & Independence: Trauma, Memory, and Modernity in the Young Turkish Republic
(1908-1950)**

**Conference organized by The University of Utah and Turkish Historical Society
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**Thursday, 23 Jan. 2010
Reception (19:00-20:00) and Dinner (20:00-9:30)**

Friday, 24 Jan. 2020 (9:00-9:30)

Opening Speech: Professor Refik Turan, The President of Turkish Historical Society
M. Hakan Yavuz, The University of Utah (Professor of Political Science)

Panel 1: Ideas and Ideals of the Republic (9:30-12:00)

İřtar Gözaydın, (Istanbul, Turkey), “**Ziya Gökalp: On Religion.**”

This paper is on reforms and institution building by scrutinizing similarities and differences between pre-republican cadres and founders of the Republic of Turkey upon analyzing the ideas of the Turkish sociologist and political activist Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924). In order to re-evaluate the secularization politics of the Young Turks and the Founding Fathers of the Republic, Ziya Gökalp's legacy needs to be reviewed, whereas he has often been judged through a secularist-Islamist binary. This paper suggests that Ziya Gökalp's approach to the issue of religion, especially with a focus on his idea to construct a “*Diyanet*”, an institution to “regulate” Islam, was more complex than generally argued. Actually, Gökalp and his circle strove for a social and political order in which religious norms and modern institutions complemented each other harmoniously. The establishment of the *Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı* (Presidency of Religious Affairs) by the founders of the Republic in 1924, an institution yet to become one of the pillars of the new regime, is by itself a significant fact to focus on Ziya Gökalp's publications on religion. Moreover, to reread Gökalp serves an opportunity to reevaluate the view insisting that separation of religion and state is a Western phenomenon, foreign to Islamic culture. Ziya Gökalp, argues that the Islamic separation model is closer to Protestant separation models than to French *laïcité*; which allows religious citizens to translate their religious views into the public language accessible to all parties—either religious or secular—in public sphere. Thus, this paper is also a comparison of Ziya Gökalp's views on religion with the politics of the Founding Fathers of the Republic, yet to come in late 1920's with their repercussions all through the Republican times.

Levent Köker, (Professor Emeritus, Gazi University), “**Nationalist Ambiguities: Kemalism and Islamism in Republican Turkey.**”

Nationalism is a political ideology with an aim to forge and sustain the unity of a homogeneous culture (nationhood) and organized power (i.e., the state). Like all political ideologies in which a contradiction between the “imagined/normative” vision and “factual/descriptive” reality is

inevitable, nationalist imagination of a homogeneous culture involves also dialectical and interactive encounters with pluralism in the social sphere. On a more specific note, on the other hand, nationalist imaginations of cultural homogeneity have drawn heavily on ethnic and religious aspects of culture albeit with ambiguities resulting from an incongruence between the normative and the factual. Historical formation of “Turkish nationalism” in the late 19th and early 20th centuries within the turbulent disintegration process of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Ottoman imperial formation was no exception. Be that as it may, however, Turkish nationalism can be distinguished from many of its historical counterparts in the fact that, in almost all nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire, ethno-religious imaginations of nationhood preceded the formation of national states. Unlike Serbian, Bulgarian, Greek, and to some extent Arab nationalisms, “Turkish nationalism” emerged as a political ideology of a military-civilian bureaucratic elite who had been in positions of power within a declining imperial state and an emerging new “polity”. In other words, in the Turkish case, nationalism was a requirement for the legitimation of a military-civilian bureaucratic rule in the absence of monarchic rule and the most significant issue in this context has been the definition of nationhood. Various perspectives regarding the understanding of nationhood, on the other hand, had been determined albeit partially by some historical factors which can be summarized as follows: (1) Historical circumstances rendered virtually inevitable the formation of an overwhelmingly Muslim but multi-ethnic society within the borders of present-day Turkey. (2) Historically, both the territorial formation of republican Turkey and the decisive moments pertaining to the definition of cultural identity, Islam had been the dominant point of reference for the newly emerging nation-state. (3) The abolishment of the Caliphate in 1924, however, marked a turning point in history which led to the formation of a secularist state. (4) Hence, on a closer look, it can be said that the formation of Turkish nation-state has been a vividly interactive process in which Islamism [*İslâmcılık*] and Turkism [*Türkçülük*], two of the three (Ottomanism [*Osmanlıcılık*] was the other) influential ideologies of the late Ottoman period, have marked the various perspectives regarding the political definition of nationhood. Against this backdrop, this paper argues first, that contemporary political problems stemming from the tensions between ethnic and religious pluralism and the ambitions for homogeneity at the state level are determined by the ambiguities inherited from the formative years of the Republic. Kemalism, the founding ideology of the new state, took the lead to form an “assertively secular” polity, thus opted for a form of “Turkism”, or a form of Turkish “ethno-nationalism”, but left openings for the infiltration of religious (Islamic) elements. Islamism, on the other hand, as an ideology of a popularly supported oppositional force, did not close the doors for ethnic Turkish elements. One consequence of these “nationalist ambiguities”, this paper will proceed to show, has been a new ideological configuration known as “Atatürk nationalism”, a form of Turkish nationalism almost identical with what has been known otherwise as “Turko-Islamic synthesis” [*Türk-İslâm Sentezi*]. Finally, the paper dwells upon the question whether these various nationalisms, all with their own ambiguities could resolve the issues pertaining to the foundations of a pluralist and democratic polity in Turkey.

Umut Can Adisonmez (University of Kent) **“From Social Survival Mechanism to “Anatolian Nationalism”: Metamorphoses of Islamic Counter-Narratives in Turkey.”**

Aftermath the traumatic end of the Ottoman Empire, the process of modernisation and the corresponding civilisational shifts of Kemalist Revolution caused the Muslim communities of Anatolia to retreat into their conservative identities since the early Republican era. This trajectory not only provoked a decades-long identity crisis about defining Turkish state and society’s autobiographical narratives and behavioral codes with reference to *doing*, *acting*, and *being*. It also produced two major groups –Kemalist intelligentsia-bureaucracy versus provincial

elite comprising of the traditional-conservative and marginalised communities– dominating the sociopolitical life in Turkey. With contesting social origins and cultural-behavioural attitudes, both groups competed each other to (re)claim that they are hierarchically and normatively prime candidates to become the nation’s “storyteller”. Against this background, this work first explores the dominant ideas, emotions and fears of Anatolian population (xx-xx years) who were victims of the massive atrocities experienced during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. It secondly attempts to map out how their ideas directly contributed to the evolution of Islamic counter-narratives which later challenged Kemalist imagination of secular state and society. In doing so, it adopts historical periodization rationale which first explores the emerge of Islamic narratives among Anatolian communities as a sociopsychological defense mechanism for social survival. Then, it traces the transformations of and the links between the influential Islamic counter-narratives starting from Nurettin Topcu’s “Anatolian nationalism” thesis (1948) which advocated the nationalist-Islamist synthesis for the political and social organization as opposed to the secularist/modernists agenda. Building on this, it lastly links the discussion to the rise of neo-Ottomanism(s) and explore the ways in which these historical Islamic counter-narratives were instrumentalised by the Justice and Development Party (2002-present).

Hiroyuki Ogasawara, (Kyushu University, Japan), **“Development of the Turkish Historical Thesis During the Early Period of the Republic of Turkey.”**

History education has always played an essential role in nation building. It was no exception in the Republic of Turkey. Mustafa Kemal, the founder of the Republic of Turkey, had strongly recognized the importance of history and had been seeking “our history” for the ideal nation, as his words clearly show: “Writing history is as important as making history.” The purpose of this paper is to examine the rise, development, and decline of the Turkish historical thesis, enthusiastically promoted by Mustafa Kemal and his brains, during the early period of the Republic of Turkey. This study investigates relevant sources, such as published and unpublished works, textbooks, memories, periodicals, and documents, which would make it possible to reconstruct the process and contextualize its value in a more nuanced and detailed manner than ever. The most critical work based on Turkish history thesis was *The History (Tarih)*, a four-volume high school textbook composed in 1931. It is generally believed that the histories of Muslim dynasties and Ottoman Empire were suppressed during this period. However, reading this textbook without any prejudice shows that a considerable part of it was allotted to Muslim dynasties and the Ottoman Empire. It also does not unilaterally condemn Islam or the Muslim dynasty. Although *The History* is usually regarded as a revolution or coup d' état against former history textbooks, it should be considered a continuation of previous ones, except for ancient chapters that were significantly influenced by the Turkish historical thesis. *The History* should be characterized as an amalgam of the thesis, of traditional historiography, and of academic historical studies. Soon after the first congress of Turkish history in 1932, where the triumph of the thesis was highly declared, a comprehensive project was launched. Entitled “The Manuscripts of the General Turkish History (Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları Müsveddeleri),” this project aimed to make a complete Turkish history based on the thesis. Not only scholars but also non-academic persons, such as the rug-factory manager of Hereke, participated and submitted their manuscripts. Although this project continued until 1937, it faded out at last. The second congress of Turkish history held in 1937 had numerous non-ideological and academic presentations, and some participants recognized that the thesis was not dominant at this congress yet. The erosion of the thesis before Mustafa Kemal’s death in 1938 might demonstrate that Turkish historians had a kind of resilience to reasonable historiography.

LUNCH, 12-13:30.

Panel 2: Foreign Policy of the Early Republic (13:30-15:00)

Eldar Abbasov, History, Economics and Law Research Institute (HELRI), **“Russia-Ottoman Relations After Bolshevik Coup: From the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the Armistice of Mondros (November 1917-October 1918).”**

The Russian revolution in March 1917, the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II, and eight months later in November, the Bolshevik seizure of power in Petrograd changed not only the course of World War I, but also became a turning point in world history. Immediately after the Bolshevik coup on November 8 1917, the Second all-Russian Congress of Soviets adopted the "Decree on Peace" signed by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Vladimir Lenin, which called on all warring countries to stop the war and sign a peace without annexations and without indemnities. In fact, the Bolsheviks by this decree counted on the expansion and spread of the Communist revolution in Europe, primarily in Germany and Austria-Hungary. Germany as the leader of the Central powers accepted the call of Soviet Russia and on December 15, 1917, in Brest-Litovsk, controlled by the German armed forces and was signed between Soviet Russia on the one hand and the countries of the Central powers on the other hand a truce. The armistice extended to all land and air forces of the named States on the land front between the Baltic and Black seas. In the Russian-Turkish theater of operations in Asia, the truce was coming simultaneously. Following the Brest-Litovsk armistice, the Erzincan Armistice was signed on 18 December between Soviet Russia and the Ottoman Empire. The allies of tsarist Russia, the Entente rejected the call and refused to join the peace talks. After three months of difficult negotiations, a peace Treaty between Soviet Russia and the countries of the Central powers was signed in Brest-Litovsk on 3 March 1918. Turkey, as an ally of Germany, has benefited greatly from this deal. It regained not only all the occupied territories during the World War I, but also three districts (Ardahan, Kars and Batum – Elviye-i Selase) lost after the war with Russia in 1877–1878. The signing of the Brest-Litovsk peace Treaty and the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces from the Caucasian front turned Turkey into a leading power in the South Caucasus, which actually pushed Azerbaijanis, Armenians and Georgians to declare their independent States. On June 4, the Imperial Ottoman government signed peace treaties with Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia and thus took control of the entire South Caucasus. At the request of the Azerbaijani government, the Ottoman government agreed to provide him with military assistance to clear Baku of the Bolshevik-Dashnak clique. In order not to irritate and cause a protest of Germany Enver Paşa sent his half-brother Nuri Paşa to Azerbaijan to form a special army from among the Turkish military and local Azerbaijani volunteers. Created a new army of a total population of 20 thousand is called "Islamic army of the Caucasus". After three months of heavy fighting, the Caucasian Islamic Army entered Baku on September 20 and returned it to the Azerbaijani government. The capture of Baku shocked the Bolshevik government of Russia. In the note of the people's Commissariat for foreign Affairs to the Minister of foreign Affairs of the Imperial Ottoman government Nesimi Bey of September 20 expressed deep indignation of Soviet Russia on the fact of "capture of one of the most important cities of the Russian Republic" and noted that "the Ottoman Government showed that the Brest-Litovsk Treaty between Russia and Turkey no longer exists". It is no exaggeration to say that the capture of Baku by the Caucasian Islamic army in September 1918 was the last triumph of the Ottoman Empire in the World War I. By its significance, the capture of Baku can be put on a par with the victories of the Ottoman Empire in the Dardanelles operation (Çanakkale Savaşı) and Kut al-Amara. The move of the Azerbaijani government to Baku de facto confirmed the status of Baku as the capital of the Republic of Azerbaijan and became the practical implementation of its independence. If Baku had not been taken by Turkish troops, it would undoubtedly have become

an exclave of Russia, like the Kaliningrad region. However, the defeat in the World War I and the signing of the October 30 Armistice of Mudros with the United Kingdom crossed all the acquisitions of Turkey.

Sevtap Demirci, (Bogazici University), “**Turco-Soviet Revolutionists 1917-22: A Search for a New Political Model for Turks or a Temporal Cooperation?.**”

The WWI has been a global conflict that shaped the destinies of three grandiose empires, - namely Austria-Hungarian, Russian and the Ottoman-, and the people who lived within the vast territories of these political entities. As far as the six-century old Ottoman Empire was concerned, the Great War of 1914-1918 was but the culmination of a long process of dissolution which came to be known as the Eastern Question. When the war ended in 1918, there was practically no Ottoman Empire. Similarly, the First World War led to the downfall of the Russian Empire. Following October Revolution, the Bolsheviks seized power in Petrograd on the night of 7/8 November 1917 with a program of “bread, peace and land (to the peasant)” of which peace, at any rate, could be realized.¹ In light of the changing dynamics of the international relations the two empires -after having been an enemy power for centuries- experienced a rapprochement through which the Bolsheviks publicized the Allied secret agreements to the partitioning of the Empire and by doing so they assured the Ottoman government that the new government at Petrograd was willing to establish cordial relations. The paper will try to shed a light on the nature of the relations between the Turkish Nationalists who got engaged in a National Struggle (1919-22) against the foreign invaders, claiming power in the name of Turks and the Bolsheviks led by Leon Trotsky claiming power in the name of Soviets. Similarities and differences of these two movements will be elaborated. Besides, the question whether this regional/temporal cooperation stemmed from a search of a new political model for Turks or it were a necessity/preferred concurrence will be discussed.

Jamil Hasanli, (Baku, Azerbaijan), “Turkish-Soviet Relations: From Neutrality to Escalating Tensions.”

Turkey, which learned a bitter lesson in World War I, demonstrated wisdom and caution throughout World War II. During the period between the two world wars Soviet–Turkish relations passed through an interesting path of historical development. Both countries shared identical historical destinies in the 1920s; both states took their place within the system of international relations and both sought to maintain bilateral relations, collaborate on a wide range of issues, and consolidate their international positions. Until the mid-1930s, Soviet–Turkish relations were characterized as friendly, and in some cases as fraternal.

The Moscow Treaty on Friendship and Brotherhood signed on March 16, 1921 between Soviet Russia and Turkey, the Kars Treaty between Turkey and Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia signed on October 13, 1921, as well as Treaty between Turkey and Ukraine of January 21, 1922, laid down principles of friendship between Turkey and the Soviet Union. It eventually evolved into the Treaty on Friendship and Neutrality of December 17, 1925, stipulating non-aggression and non-participation in hostile groupings in the event of military clashes. The treaty, signed for a term of three years, was automatically prolonged each year, unless one of the parties was to declare its termination six months in advance.

¹ Norman Stone., Turkey: A Short History. (London: Thames and Hudson, 2010), p. 148

Late in life Kemal Atatürk warned his successors about the threat from the north; not much later his fears proved justified. During the first months of World War II the Soviet leaders laid their claims against Turkey on the table, which turned this country into an arena of confrontation between the West and the East. Starting in November 1944 the sides drafted several versions of their joint control of the Straits. In March 1945 the 20-year Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality was renounced; In June-August of 1945, the Soviet Union formulated and then put forward its claims to Turkey. On June 7, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov received Turkish Ambassador Selim Sarper in the Kremlin and laid down Soviet territorial claims to Eastern Turkey. On June 18 1945, Molotov and Sarper met for the second time. Molotov informed Sarper of Soviet intentions to build a military base in the Turkish Straits and establishment of joint Soviet-Turkish control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. On August 18, the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs determined an area to be annexed from Turkey and officially declared that these territories would form a part of the Armenian and Georgian Soviet Socialist Republics. Soviet territorial claims against Turkey followed suit; gradually this developed into a war of nerves typical of Stalin's Cold War period.

Panel 3: International Context of the Republic (1919-1938) (15:15-17:15)

Garabet K Moumdjian, (UCLA), “Armenian Involvement in the Kurdish Rebellions of the 1920s and 1930s in Republican Turkey: Trying to Map the Origins of “Hidden Armenians”

The history of Armenian-Kurdish relations extends over centuries. In the 1800’s, Armenians were involved in the Kurdish rebellions in Kurdistan proper. Needless to say, the rebellions were crushed by the Ottoman military. After the Armenian Genocide of 1915, a new phase of Armenian involvement in yet a new episode of Kurdish rebellions ensued this time in Republican Turkey. This new collusion lasted all the way to the late 1930s. The aim of the ARF (Armenian Revolutionary Federation, AKA Tashnagtsutyun) at the time was twofold: Dispersion into the Middle East was considered to be a temporary sojourn and the ARF was adamant in its thinking that Armenians should repatriate to their historic homeland. The ARF attempted such an adventurous plan due to its knowledge that many pockets of Armenians—ergo, what would later become known as “Hidden Armenians”—existed in the Eastern Provinces of the newly established Turkish Republic. Toward the end of World War II there was some optimism that the Soviet Union could reoccupy some of the historical Western Armenian lands and incorporate them into the Soviet Armenian Republic. The ARF, regardless of its ideological opposition to the Soviet Union at the time, agreed to a détente with its arch-enemy for such a nascent purpose. Having access to archival material from republican Turkey, the Soviet Union, Armenia, France, Britain, as well as the memoirs and letters of some prominent ARF leaders involved in the Kurdish rebellions of the time creates a unique opportunity to present a more detailed account about the period under. It was only after 1947 that this détente and the whole policy of returning to the homeland were totally abandoned by the ARF. By 1965, the 50th anniversaries of the Armenian Genocide, Armenians still living in Turkey were forgotten. The ARF announced that there were no Armenians left behind and that the only policy to follow was that of the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide. This study will not involve itself with the events pertinent to the Kurdish rebellions in the 1920s and 1930s. Rather, it will focus on Armenian and especially ARF participation in those uprisings. This has to be done in order to close a gap in the international historical discourse regarding the subject, since Armenian and ARF participation were not tackled by historians for several reasons most important of which was and still is the language barrier (knowledge of Armenian and Ottoman and the paucity of archival material. Moreover, and as an archival historian, it is my aim to present archival records almost in their entirety in order not to leave any room for individual interpretations and the misunderstandings they produce; in other words, I want to make the documents speak for themselves regardless of their length in some instances. Finally, it must be underlined that the aim of this narrative is to bring to light the issue of Armenians who were left behind after the genocide and deportations. The archival documents from Armenian and Turkish sources indicate that such a phenomenon existed since the early days of republican Turkey. It is important to shed light on such people and their participation in the Kurdish rebellions of the period, since, as shall be seen, it was this people that today represent what has become known as “Hidden Armenians” (AKA Islamized and/or Turkified/Kurdified Armenians).

Pam Sezgin, (University of North Georgia), “Jews in the Cumhuriyet: Model Citizens or Tolerated Others?”

When the first census was conducted in the Turkish Republic in 1927, some 81,872 Jews were citizens. By 1948, half of Turkish Jewry left for Israel after its independence was declared. What happened and how did the social memory of Jews in Turkey prompt their flight from a

land in which they lived for at least 500 years for the Sephardic Jews, and some 2000 years or more for those of Romaniote heritage? This paper explores the role of Jews in the creation of the Turkish Cumhuriyet, the contradictions inherent in imposing secularization on a society that had a historic Muslim social structure, Turkification as it applied to the Jews in the 1920s and 1930s, and how the long-term impacts of events and policies shaped both Jewish and non-Jewish rhetoric about belonging to the Turkish nation. Some Jews like Moiz Cohen, better known as Munis Tekinalp (1883-1961), were active in the formation of Kemalism as an ideology, as well as pioneering efforts to assimilate the Jews into the Turkish nation via linguistic change. The majority of Jews in Turkey were Judeo-Spanish speakers, and the elites in the community knew French from their formal schooling. The fact that even officials in the Jewish community often used translators and could not speak unaccented Turkish was a stumbling block to Turkification, a process that had a distinct and primarily linguistic meaning in the 1920s and 1930s for the Jews. Other leaders, like Haim Nahum Effendi who served from 1908 through 1919 as Chief Rabbi, represented Turkey at the Conference of Lausanne in 1922, elected by the newly created Grand National Assembly of Turkey. Historian and politician Abraham Galanté (1889-1950) served as a strong advocate of modern Turkish nationalism. Many Turkish Jews liked the ideology of early Kemalism with its emphasis on citizenship rights and secularism, key elements taken from the French version of nationalism that was familiar to Jewish graduates of the Alliance Israélite Universelle schools. The Jews were regarded as “model citizens” initially by the new Turkish state because they had not betrayed the Ottoman Empire with separatist aspirations for their own nation-state in the 19th century, but they were still held in suspicion and from time to time, treated as a foreign element. The 1930s and 1940s were particularly fraught decades for the Jews who were subjected to a pogrom in Thrace in 1934, and in the 1940s, to the *Varlık Vergisi* (1942, a wealth tax applied more harshly to non-Muslims) and the *Yirmi Sınıf* (*Yirmi Kur'a Nafia Askerleri*, 1941, “The 20 Classes” – additional military service with hard labor, for non-Muslims). The 1934 incident was motivated by military concerns. Thrace held a border with Bulgaria, a hostile power. The government proposed a voluntary relocation of the Jews from Thrace but the implementation turned violent and deadly. Despite “Turkification,” assimilation to the Republican ideology, Turkish language and cultural norms, the Jews were still viewed as outsiders, potentially a fifth column in such a sensitive military region. This attitude prevailed in laws that discouraged non-Muslims from taking government jobs and serving as career military officers. The attitude on the part of the Turkish state and by much of the Turkish public might be attributable to practical constructions of society shaped by centuries of Islamic law and practice. Jews were a *dhimmi* or protected class of people, not equal to Muslims in the religious view. Despite the Republic’s ideological emphasis on secularism and equality of all its citizens, old mental constructs die hard and the terms that are used for non-Muslims [e.g., *gavur*] carry with them negative associations and that of inferior status. Turkish social memory of the Balkan Wars and of World War I carried with it suspicion of non-Muslims, due to the uprisings in some places of Balkan Christian and Armenian nationalists, and their collusion with foreign powers. This powerful framework made the secular ideology of the new Turkish Republic difficult to apply in some contexts. The 1940s incidents were tied to economic concerns and an attempt by the single-party government to break the dominance of non-Muslims in the business sector. These incidents resulted in many of the remaining Greek, Armenian, and Jewish citizens losing their property and economic security. By 1946 and the implementation of the multi-party system in Turkey, Turkification was no longer part of the agenda. Turkey began to view itself as European, and a rhetoric of tolerance became important regarding the Jews. Both the Turkish government and Turkish Jewish Community leadership used the Jewish example in the Ottoman Empire and in the Turkish Republic as an indicator of Turkey’s humane treatment of minorities. The Jews were a minority welcomed by the Ottoman Empire, both in 1492 after their expulsion from Catholic Spain, and during World War II for the German Jewish intellectuals who found work and safety in Turkish universities. But Jewish social memory of the incidents of 1934 and the 1940s prompted half of the community to leave Turkey and resettle in Israel in 1948. The

half remaining in Turkey continued to support Atatürk's ideologies and Turkish secularism, but the community was never politically active in any great numbers. Primary sources for this paper include memoirs, ideological pamphlets, official statements by Jewish community leaders, and newspaper articles from the relevant decades.

Dimitris Stamatopoulos, (University of Macedonia), **“The Asia Minor Campaign: Interpretative Approaches and Political Conflicts in the Inter-War Greece.”**

The Asia Minor Catastrophe (*Katastrofi*) was perhaps the most important turning point in the history of Greater Hellenism during the 20th century; it was certainly what determined the domestic, economic, social, and political evolution of the Modern Greek state. Its basic consequence, the large-scale exchange of populations, dramatically altered ethno-linguistic and human geography landscapes on both sides of the Aegean. At the same time, it meant the creation of a new nation state, Turkey, atop the foundations of a large empire, and the regrouping of another, Greece, which became aware of its limitations with its “Asia Minor adventure.” The Asia Minor Catastrophe should definitely be considered a very significant episode in the destabilization of the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East brought about by World War One. Greece's entry into the war on the side of the Entente resulted in increased territorial gains in the Balkan Wars, and with the Treaty of Sèvres it managed through the annexation of the vilayet of Aidinio and the Smyrna region to extend its borders into Asia Minor for the first time. In actuality, the Greek forces took part in a broader-gauged division of Asia Minor among Allied forces, and the *Katastrofi* can only be understood in relation to France and Great Britain's open fronts in the Middle East. The presence of cohesive Greek Orthodox populations in Asia Minor made Greece the most significant threat to the failing Ottoman Empire and naturally, to the emerging nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. However, we should emphasize that Asia Minor was a region of great ethno-linguistic, religious, and cultural variety. During the initial decades of the 20th century, its population included “orthodox” Muslims (Turks, Kurds, Yuruks, Pomaks, Zeybeks, Circasians, Bosnians, Laz, Turko-Cretans, and Gypsies), “heretical” Muslims (Alevites, Bektashis, Kizilbashis), Orthodox Christians (Greeks, Syrians) and pre-Chalchedonian Christians (Armenians, Maronites), Jews, and even Catholics (Levantines, Greeks, Armenians, and others). Naturally there is a question concerning how many of these groups one could characterize as having been set up as “nationalist” or even “pre-nationalist.” A shared linguistic and religious identity did not necessarily entail the creation of a nationalist identity, though at the local level these population groups were united via the Ottoman administrative system of “communities” (vilayets). In this multicultural mosaic, the importance of the Greek Orthodox element was obviously considerable, and the importance of the *katastrofi* that ensued with the forceful expulsion of the Greek element from Asia Minor was comparably great. However, it should be stressed that its forceful demographic presence had not been a constant throughout all the centuries of Ottoman rule. On the contrary, increases in the Greek Orthodox population are observed from the early 19th century, and these tendencies were reinforced after the founding of the Greek state. Let us now consider the distribution of Greek Orthodox populations in Asia Minor in greater detail.

Serhun Al, (Izmir University of Economics, Turkey), **“Kurdish Independence, Turkish Anxiety: The Making of the Republican *Raison D'état*.”**

How did the First World War (1914-1918) and its aftermath shape and transform the Kurdish political activism and Kurdish nationalism in the Middle East? How did the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) and its clauses offering the Kurds an opportunity for self-determination influence the Turkish nationalism and the worldview of the founding fathers of the Republic? How did the

Treaty of Lausanne (1923) transform the Kurdish psyche and the Republican perception of national institutions, interests and ideas? What were the societal and ideational forces behind the formation of modern Turkish national identity vis-à-vis the emerging political Kurdish identity? In the light of the aforementioned questions, this article seeks to understand and explain the inter-dependent relationship between the Kurdish aspirations for self-determination and the making of the modern Turkish state and the Republican mindset in the first half of the twentieth century. In doing so, the global market of ideas and the transnational historical context (e.g. debates over Wilsonian self-determination and nationhood vs. Leninist self-determination; debates over assimilation, multiculturalism and nation-building, centralization and decentralization) will be taken into account as well as the ruptures and continuities in the Ottoman-Turkish state tradition against the state-seeking nationalisms. Understanding this historical context influenced by the transnational and local societal and political forces would shed light to unpacking the state-minority relations in Turkey in general and the modern Kurdish question in the Middle East in particular.

Panel 4: Ideology and the Military (17:20-18:35)

Tamer Balci (University of Taxes), “Title: Kemalism and Populism.”

Majority of studies on Kemalism disproportionately focuses on secularism, nationalism or statism principles of Kemalism; republicanism, revolutionism and populism principles are often either omitted or covered in the margins. This research examines one of the least studied principles of Kemalism, the populism, and its European roots. Unlike its contemporary meaning that often refers to irrational political promises of politicians to masses, the populism has been a manifestation of the concept of equality, the Enlightenment’s most celebrated idea. The populism concept of the Enlightenment aimed to bring equality to all people in a society, including equality in the courts of law. In pre-Enlightenment Europe, particularly in the majority-Catholic countries of France, Spain and Italy, the laws applied to people differently, depending on their social status. The Catholic Clergy, the first estate, was exempted from the laws of kings; they were subjected to the Canonical laws of church not to the laws of king. The nobility, the second estate, as well, enjoyed favorable status in the application of laws; they were the enforcers of the laws rather than the enforced. The third estate, or the subjects, were the ones held accountable for all the laws of king and the church. The French revolution turned the despised subjects into nation, abolished nobility privileges and initiated populism principle with a goal to create universal laws applicable to all population, regardless of their religion or social status. Implementation of populism in France was a painstaking process that took over a century but the ideals of Enlightenment and the concept of populism and its premise of equality in the courts of law attracted interests of reformers across the world, including the Young Turks of the Ottoman Empire. Similar to pre-modern Europe, the Ottoman Empire had a structure with different applications of laws. The Ottoman ruling elite were mainly divided into three different groups: the *ilmiyye*, sunni-religious establishment, the *askeriyye*, military class, and the *kalemiyye*, civilian bureaucracy. The Ottoman sultan and the royal family were above all these classes and rarely subjected to the same rules, if they were brought to court at all. The Ottoman *ulema*, scholar-administrators of the *ilmiyye* class, had a favorable application of laws compared to the military and the civilian bureaucracy. The subjects of the empire, the *reaya* or the herds, were sub-divided according to their religious affiliations in the *millet* system. The *millet* system handed the responsibility of each religious community to their religious head and included the same inequality dimension between clergy and non-clergy members of these groups. Overall, the Ottoman Empire had the same medieval inequality concept the European societies suffered. On its path to modernization, young Turkish republic embraced the populism concept with a goal

to embrace universally acceptable laws, regardless of religion, class, or social status. This study will primarily cover the inequality in the courts of law in Europe and the Ottoman Empire and the origins of populism in the Enlightenment thought. The secondarily, the work will cover the gradual implementation of populism in the late Ottoman Empire with a preliminary argument that the concept of populism was steadily implemented after the disintegration of *millet* system in the 1860s, and the Young Turk reforms between 1908 and 1918. Kemalist reforms in the 1920s and the 30s were the last steps to complete this process. The last section of the paper, as much as the space allows, will have a broad overview of the implementation or its violation of populism principle in modern Turkey, such as creation of military courts in 1963, which were again abolished in 2017.

Mehmet Arisan, (Istanbul University), **“Between ‘Revolution’ and ‘Counter-Revolution’: Contemporary Reflections of Turkish Republican Revolution.”**

Turkish Republican Revolution is generally accepted as the direct outcome of the Turkish Independence War. This was actually a war that was fought for saving the last remains of the Ottoman Empire. In this sense it can hardly be claimed as a republican war, nor can it be defined as a revolutionary war that aimed a republican transformation. Most of the Anatolian people fought against the Greeks in the independence war thought that it is a war against the Ottoman Empire and they just tried to save the last remaining territories of the Empire. Even though there was a certain anger against the Sultan for his cooperation with the occupation forces in Istanbul, it can be hardly claimed that there was any trace of the idea of Republic amongst the Anatolian people who were fighting against the enemy during the independence war. After the Republic was declared by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his associates, the idea of Republic began to be perceived as identical to the idea of “independence” and “victory” rather than being a “revolution”. Indeed it appeared as a “declaration” rather than “revolution”. However the developments that enabled people to perceive “revolution” in a particular way may well be defined as a revolution, even if it is emanated from above.

Moving from this point the paper basically questions the perception and understanding of the “Republican Revolution” and the current claims of “counter-revolution”. In doing this, it also intends to demonstrate the shortcomings of the wide spread understanding of modern Turkish politics based on a binary opposition between Kemalism (Kemalist secularism and republicanism) vs. Islamism (including all the traditionalists and Islamic-conservative nationalists). Indeed Turkish politics have long been perceived from a revolution vs. counter-revolution axis even though this approach has some variations in itself. The paper starts by questioning the notion of the “republican revolution” and discusses on what terms it can be accepted as a “revolution” or not. Moving from this point the paper will refer to some significant historical moments in modern Turkish history that have been defined or claimed as counter-revolutions such as the rise of the Democrat Party to power in the 1946-50 period and the military interventions which some of them have been defined as counter-revolutions while some others as attempts of “retrieval” of the ‘republican revolution’.

However, the paper is not an extensive re-reading of all these historical moments of an alleged “counter-revolution”, which supposedly culminated by the rise of AKP (Justice and Development Party) that finally led to the transformation to a presidential system from a parliamentary one. The paper rather tries to answer the question of whether we can talk about a “counter-revolution” by focusing on the conditions of possibility or impossibility of a “republican revolution”. It concludes that rather than a clearly defined “revolution” or a clearly defined unique regime of “Kemalism”, Turkish Republic mostly stands on a ground of a functional vagueness. It is capable of producing tutelary and authoritarian tendencies (which is intrinsic to all the competing political movements in Turkey) but always defies to be defined

within a clear-cut ideology and doctrine. This has always sustained the regime even though sometimes it becomes quite shaky.

Ugur Cenk Deniz Imamoglu, (Middle East Technical University), **“National Historiography in Europe and its Effects on Turkish National Historiography and Turkish Historical Society.”**

This work aimed at revealing the adventure of the nationalization of Turkish history writing and foundation of a national history institution in Turkish Republic while comparing the process to those in Europe. Firstly, the professionalization and institutionalization of Western historiography is mentioned through the cases of certain European countries. Then, the emergence of the incline in the West toward the national histories is signalized. At this point, societies and institutions to research national histories emerged and they functioned with the historians who saw “the study of history of the fatherland above anything else.” Accordingly, it is possible to see the traces of this inclination from Britain to France; from the Baltic to the Southern Europe countries; and from Central to Eastern Europe and the Balkans mostly in the 19th century. However, despite the similar intentions and interests, the journeys in different countries showed a diversity and variety regarding the different types of the nationalisms and the emphasis they made on the national identity. In following part, it is argued that both of these two processes (institutionalization and nationalization) continued in Turkey during the early Republican era through the case of Turkish Historical Society (founded in 1931): The foundation of a historical association in the new regime and efforts for regulating it in certain periods meant the continuity of institutionalization. Then, the activities through the Historical Society, defining a history thesis and arranging the books and meetings accordingly, marked the maintaining of nationalization process of history writing. Although a number of studies on Turkish Historical Society and Turkish History Thesis have been carried out, there is still need to understand it in various aspects. Moreover, in Turkish literature, there is hardly research on history institutions of the European countries. Therefore, a glance at them to try to see its possible effects on and similarities/differences with Turkish example would contribute to our understanding of the national historiography in Turkey.

Nihat Ali Ozcan, (TOBB University), **“Civil War and Victory.”**

Mondros Armistice ending the first World War implied new tensions, struggles, and conflicts for the Ottoman Empire. The war brought the country to a point of exhaustion, politically, economically, militarily and psychologically. While the state and government could not fulfill their functions, many parts of the country were under occupation by foreign forces. The weakening of central authority, depletion of resources turned the empire into a fragile and failed state. This environment of chaos and uncertainty turned the political, social, ethnic, religious and ethno-sectarian differences into political and military autonomous movements, and Istanbul government failed to establish its authority. It is possible to divide the conflicts and wars that turned the state into a failed one into four: Firstly, social banditry, which gained momentum with the deserters, and became an acute problem with the weakening of the state. Over time, many of them adopted political aims and consequently either transformed into guerilla or joined the regular army. Secondly, there was the symmetrical struggle of asymmetrical forces. Two or more irregular force took a political fight. The conflict between Greek gangs and armed irregular Muslim groups in the Black Sea or the operation carried out by the Cerkes Ethem group against Anzavur are examples to this type. Thirdly, there was the asymmetrical conflict, which is the struggle of the regular army against irregular armed groups. In this case, we see typical guerilla warfare, where the weaker side resorts to guerilla tactics against the stronger side. This was the case when there was guerilla war against the Greek Army in Eastern Anatolia or against the French Army in Antep, Urfa, Maraş or Tartus. Similarly, Ankara government’s use of the regular army to fight against the guerilla groups can be considered in the same category. Fourthly, there

was symmetrical conflict, where two regular armies confront each other. The attempt by the Istanbul government's use of Kuvvay-ı Inzibatiye to discharge the regular army under the command of the Grand National Assembly or the war between the Turkish and Greek armies are examples to this trend. In addition to the differences in the characteristics of the conflicts in Anatolia between 1918 and 1922, the motivations of the combatants were also different. The parties to the conflicts acted based on ethnic, religious, ethno-sectarian, tribal, social and political motivations. All these data suggest that between 1918 and 1922 a civil war took place in Anatolia, and one of the rebellious groups (Ankara government / Kuvai Milliye) managed to establish political and military supremacy, and subsequently gained a symmetrical victory against the invaders, thus shaping the new era.

Dogan Akyaz, (TEPAV, Ankara), **“The Role of Kemalist Military in the Formation of the Founding Philosophy of the Republic.”**

This article examines the role of the Military in the founding philosophy of the Republic. It will elaborate on the contribution of the military to the construction of a modern, western and secular nation-state and society during the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the republican era, based on new set of values. Here, the emphasis is on the “Kemalist military.” Because, one of the main drivers of the change, i.e., the modernization process of the military, which can be traced back to the Tanzimat era, reached its climax with the dominance of Kemalism during the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. Therefore, it is important to look at the methods and sensitivities of the “Kemalist military” to study the role of the military in the founding philosophy of the Republic. The transition from the Ottoman to Republican era happened as historical necessity in a period in which monarchies were replaced by republics, and religious-based multi-ethnic empires were replaced by secular nation-states. In line with the spirit of time, unitary, secular, and nation-state characteristics became the basic constituents of the founding philosophy of the new state. Despite playing a major role in the foundation of the Republic, the real power did not rest with the Military. From the very beginning, the National Struggle was led by people's congresses, and National Assembly respectively, and the Military was subjected to the national will already at the time of congresses. Mustafa Kemal managed to fill the vacuum created by the absence of a national bourgeoisie through military and civilian bureaucracy, intellectuals, and partly the local notables and people. He managed skillfully to channel this “historical bloc” to the cause of national salvation. Neither during the Ottoman nor early Republican era did the Military had a monolithic structure. The divided nature of the Ottoman Army was transposed to Anatolia despite all reform and purge initiatives, and consequently during the National Struggle era an internal conflict also broke out. It was not until 1923 that the Kemalists managed to bring the Military fully under control. With its transformation into the “Kemalist military”, the Military played critical roles during the extraordinary conditions of the time: the *supporting force* of the Kemalist revolutions between 1923 and 1938, and subsequently the active armed *protective force* of the regime. It is, therefore, illustrative to note how it stood behind the Kemalist regime much more firmly than other institutions during the counter moves to the unitary, secular and nation-state characteristics of the Republic, such as Sheikh Said rebellion or Menemen incident. Nonetheless, the role of the military after 1923 is not limited to “*defense and protection*”. Following its transformation into an instrument under the control of the government with the Republic, the Military also became an actor playing a critical role in the ideological struggle. While giving the Military such a role in addition to its main function of defending the country, several considerations were decisive: the military's ties with the people forged among others through such channels as the obligatory military service was instrumental in the young Republic's quest for constructing a new collective identity and cleansing the cultural environment from feudal, *umma*-based superstructure. Indeed, the military established close ties with the society in a wide area ranging from the legitimization of the Republican regime to the

creation of a republican culture and citizen, and as such became one of the most important institutions leaving its imprint on the Republic of Turkey.

25 January 2020

Panel 5: Foreign Policy (9:00-11:00)

Mesut Çaşın, (Yeditepe University), “Peaceful Foreign and Security Policy of Modern Turkey During Its Formation Era: Resurrected from its Ashes of Phoenix Stuck in the Sevres Vice.”

Ottoman Empire is the biggest empire after ‘Pax Romana’ that has ruled throughout three continents, Asia-Europe-Africa, and has shaped these lands’ political histories as the longest ruling empire. Turkish Sultan who lived in Topkapı Palace has gained the title as ‘Protector of Jewish people and Christians’ whilst being the Caliphate of Islam. Nationalist wars and the alliances of Empires has badly affected Ottoman Empire in the XX. Century. The alliance of England, France and Russia has chosen the way to divide and share the lands of Ottoman Empire as a way of treatment to Ottoman Empire which they named as ‘Sick Old Man of Europe’. Turkish Army has won the battles of Çanakkale and Kut-ül Amare in the First World War which is named as the ‘Great War’ yet the USA’s join to the war as the ally of England, Russian revolution in 1917 has changed the balance in the war and the result was the submission of Germany. Soon after Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of Sevres in a ship of English Navy named Agamemnon in October 30th 1918. After this signature accordingly to the principles of Skyes-Picot treaty, Little Asia and Mesopotamia were invaded in order to ‘*Save everyone who isn’t Turk from Turks*’ as Britain’s Prime Minister George Lloyd’s idea.

In September 17th 1934 Turkey joined Nations League as a semi-permanent member with 48 votes in favor out of 52, then in 1935 helped to prevent the invasion of Abyssinia by Italy. Turkey prioritized the relations with France and England after Germany invaded Austria as a signal of change in their political standing to an expansionist view. Turkish-French-English alliance was established in October 19th 1919, with the signing of a treaty. After Ataturk's death, ‘Inonu-Bayar-Saydam’ were the three decision makers to rise and take responsibility in shaping the state’s foreign policy. As a new established state, Turkey was able to manage to stay in a neutral status and avoid joining the bloody Second World War even though there were oppression.

Stalin pushing the communist ideology in Eastern Europe, the attraction of liberalism in economics and Truman Doctrine helps were the reasons why alliance between Ankara and Washington got stronger. Economical helps of USA which started in 1947, Turkey’s involvement to Korean War in 1950, becoming a member of NATO in 1952 took the Alliance of the West into another dimension. Young Republic of Turkey is like Ottoman Empire rising from its ashes like a phoenix when nowadays alliances are being reshaped. Turkey plays a crucial role at world peace and security, thanks to their realist foreign policy. Turkey’s international relations in the 20th century shows that in the 21st century Turkey will be a powerful partner...

Eric Hooglund, Editor, (Editor, *Middle East Critique*), “**Iran’s Views of the new Turkish Republic, 1908-1941.**”

The objective of this paper is to examine how Iranian officials and politically engaged intellectuals viewed political developments in Turkey from the 1908 Revolution until mid-1941. The 33-year period comprises three distinct phases in terms of Iran's early 20th century history, and political developments within Iran during each of these phases significantly influenced how Iranians interpreted/reacted to developments in Turkey. The initial phase, from 1908 to 1914, coincided with Iran's 1906 Constitutional Revolution and subsequent internal struggles between proponents of parliamentary supremacy and the supporters of a strong monarchy. The former faction viewed the 1908 Revolution in Turkey favorably. During World War I, Iran was a declared neutral country, but both Britain and Russia—which were allies against Germany and Turkey—occupied parts of Iran and neither imperial power had any diplomatic qualms about using Iranian territory to launch attacks into Turkey proper (Russia) and its Arab provinces (Britain). Turkey responded by attacking the entire western border area of Iran, which became a battle zone of foreign armies, with thousands of Iranian civilians becoming casualties. For Iran, the war did not end in 1918, but continued until 1921, as Britain used Iran to support White Russians during the civil war between them and the new revolutionary communist government (Red Russians). The third phase commenced with the 1921 coup d'état in Tehran that brought Reza Khan (later Reza Shah) to power. He was a modernizing ruler and became an admirer of Kemal Atatürk's cultural and economic policies, several of which he adapted for Iran. At the same time, Iran's politically important Armenian and Assyrian minorities campaigned against full normalization of relations with Turkey, demanding compensation from Ankara for destroying their villages in western Iran during World War I.

Panel 6: The Armenian-Turkish Debate: What happened in 1915 (11:15-13:15)

Christopher Gunn, (Coastal Carolina University), “**Navigating the End of Empire: U.S - French Collaboration in the Ottoman Levant, 1912-1923.**”

The history of U.S.-Ottoman relations during the late 19th and early 20th centuries is underdeveloped in the English-language literature. If mentioned in any detail at all, the narrative typically begins in 1915 with the creation of the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief and sustains the belief that the United States was a benevolent and altruistic actor in the region. Not commonly discussed, however, is the aggressive policy of gunboat diplomacy that the United States adopted as a means to influence the Ottoman government and protect its perceived interests. By the early 20th century the U.S. frequently threatened to “send the fleet” to Istanbul, Izmir and Beirut in response to alleged political, commercial and physical threats to Americans, American businesses or institutions. This paper will explore the role played by American Levantines, like George Washburn, Caleb Frank Gates, Henry Jessup, Daniel and Howard Bliss, and Bayard Dodge, and their French associates, in the development of this potentially violent form of diplomacy towards the Ottoman Empire during the last decade of its existence, and their support for the eventual French Mandate over the region. These former presidents of Robert College in Istanbul and the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut (later the American University of Beirut) and prominent faculty, some of whom were born in the Ottoman Empire and spent decades living there, were intimate with the political and business elites of New York and Washington. Additionally, these men were the foundation for American knowledge and public opinion on the Ottoman Empire and its inhabitants through their frequent publication of books, memoirs and articles in the *New York Times* and elsewhere. What remains uncertain, however, is whether U.S. foreign policy in the region between 1912 and 1923 was driven by the interests of the United States or the interests of this small, but influential group of

American Levantines. Through the use of multiple archives in the United States, Turkey and Lebanon, this paper hopes to provide a clearer picture of the motivations, interests and aims of these individuals.

Ömer Lütfi Taşcıoğlu, (Scientific Consultative Committee of ANKA Institute), **“The Political Causes of the Events of 1915: The Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation.”**

Contact between the Turks and Armenians began in the year 1026 with the arrival of Çağrı Bey into Anatolia. Until the Seljuks defeated the Byzantines and gained control of Anatolia, Armenians had been living in principalities as vassals of the Byzantine Empire. Once Turks started to rule over these lands, Armenians then became dependent on the Seljuks².

After the establishment of the Ottoman Empire, the Armenians became an integral part of the Ottoman Empire. The Armenian Patriarchate was established by Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror.

The Ottoman Empire, at all times, gave the Armenians freedom in dealing with their own internal affairs and religion, the right to be educated in their own schools, the right to solve any issues amongst themselves and exemption from military service and in this context adopted the Armenian Peoples Constitution³.

In the Ottoman Government there were 22 Armenian cabinet ministers, 33 members of parliament, 29 generals, 7 ambassadors, 11 consul generals, 11 academicians and 41 senior government officers. In this context, 10 Armenians served as members of parliament in the First Assembly and 11 served in the Second one⁴.

During the rise of the Ottoman Empire, Armenians were loyal subjects of the state. But during the downfall period, driven by provocations from imperialist countries, they started to dream of establishing an independent Armenia on territory that they could grab from the fragments of a disintegrated Ottoman Empire.

During WW-I, while the Ottoman Empire was fighting on 8 different fronts, some imperialist powers of the era planned to manipulate its Armenian citizens, to serve their expansionist aims. They had unfortunately misguided certain Armenians, preparing them through a provocative ideological training with the promise of “establishing an Armenian state reaching from sea to sea”⁵.

The Ottoman army on the one hand was fighting on 8 different fronts, and on the other hand had to leave army forces behind to secure public order at home. During this period most of the Armenians who were conscripted in the Ottoman army fled with their weapons and joined the Russian army, others set up armed gangs and began to commit massacres in Turkish villages⁶.

In spite of all, the Ottoman Government forgave the Armenian rebels. However, those who were forgiven rebelled again, and provided assistance to the enemy forces and continued to massacre civilians. Once the Armenian rebellion reached a point that it would affect the outcome of the war, and the number of civilian deaths was beginning to shape the structure of the local population, the Ottomans were forced to relocate those rebellious Armenians to lands away from the war zone but within its boundaries⁷.

² Ömer Lütfi Taşcıoğlu, Historical Facts in Turkish-Armenian Relations, Kayhan Matbaacılık, İstanbul, 2015, p. 5

³ Ibid, p.5

⁴ Aide –Mémoire on the rights of minorities in Turkey, Presented to the Representatives of the Members of the League of Nations, National Association for The Ottoman Society of Nations, İstanbul, 1922, p. 13-14

⁵ Ömer Lütfi Taşcıoğlu, The Open Letter Which Was Addressed to His Holiness Pope Francis to Reflect the Realities, Social Sciences Studies Journal, Vol 4, Issue 20, 2018, p.2672

⁶ Taşcıoğlu, Historical Facts..., p.7

⁷ Taşcıoğlu, Historical Facts ..., p. 31

However, as Armenians have distorted the truth, they have convinced some in the international community to believe the Turkish actions against Armenians constituted genocide. Armenians have also inflated the number of their deaths and are injecting anti-Turkish hatred into their new generations.

Foreign countries' parliamentarians have willingly accepted these lies, and while discussing the case of "genocide" they have ignored historical truth and that the Armenians in reality were in treason of their own government, during that time.

In order to ease the Turkish-Armenian relations, The Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Committee (TARC) was formed on July 9, 2001 as part of the reconciliation efforts of the US, Russia and the European Union⁸.

The committee was disbanded on November 11, 2001 after the Armenian representatives collectively withdrew from the committee⁹. Subsequently the committee was formed once again to continue its efforts. However, due to the lack of progress the committee ceased its work in 2003.

In the following period the Viennese Armenian-Turkish Platform was formed and in July of 2004, the Turkish and Armenian representatives began exchanging documents with the aim of conducting research. As part of this exchange, the Turkish representatives provided the Armenians with 99 documents which were obtained from the American, German, French and Austrian archives. Since the Armenian representatives had not attend the meeting, their documents had been presented to the Turkish representatives by Prof. Dr. Artem Ohandjanian the member from Vienna until Aug 3, 2004¹⁰.

By December 31, 2004, The Turkish representatives proposed the exchange of an additional 80 documents. A meeting was agreed to take place in the first half of 2005. In October of 2005, the Armenian representatives had requested additional time on the excuse that "the documents in Ottoman language had not been translated yet". After the Turkish representatives proposed for the translation of the documents¹¹ the Armenian representatives did not even respond to this proposal. Due to the negative attitude of the Armenians, these efforts also ended unsuccessfully.

Some countries place in their national curriculums baseless Armenian claims and passes legislation forbidding "the denial of genocide". This approach is largely unfair to the Turkish people, who, throughout history, have been known even by their enemies as brave, honest, and compassionate. The countries that have supported baseless Armenian accusations and have supported Armenian theories should not remain privy to the historical and political events which took place in Anatolia during 1912-1922, and their unfair stance should cease to a fair end.

Ramazan Gullu, (Istanbul University), **"Political Stance of Istanbul Armenian Patriarchate During Turkey's Transition to Republic and Afterwards."**

From the beginning of the Lausanne conference, the relations between the Armenian Patriarchate and the Ankara Government began to soften. Successful termination of the National Struggle had left aside the tensions experienced with the Patriarchate in the previous periods and enabled the establishment of more moderate relations. Patriarch Zaven Efendi, left Turkey after the acquisition of National Struggle. His substitute Kevork Arslanian, had begun to work with the government to regulate the relations between the patriarchate and the government. Arslanian was accepted by both the government and the Turkish public opinion as a positive figure that could improve the Turkish-Armenian relations. Arslanian has evaluated the signing of the Treaty of

⁸ Taşcıoğlu, Historical Facts ..., p. 19-20

⁹ Kamer Kasım, Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission: Missed Opportunity, Ermeni Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Dergisi, Vol. 4, December 2001, January-February 2002

¹⁰ İnanç Atılğan - Garabet Moumdjian, Archival Documents of the Viennese Armenian-Turkish Platform, Bentley University Academic Center, Los Angeles, California, 2009, p. 22-23

¹¹ Diplomatic Observer, 2011, Document 1-6082

Lausanne as a success for the Armenians, as for the Turks and had made efforts to adapt to Turkey's policies of post- Lausanne. As deputy patriarch until 1927 Arslanian continued its mission to ensure the patriarchate to follow policies consistent with Turkey. When in 1927 Mesro Naroian chosen as patriarch he also continued to apply the same policy. Overall, the Armenian Patriarchate, has a political stance supporting and contributing Turkey's national during Lausanne process and afterwards.

LUNCH 13:15-14:30

Panel 7: Literature and Ideas in the early Republic (14:30-16:30)

Habibe Yazici Ersoy, “Obligation Modality Markers in Ataturk’s The Great Speech and Its Effect on Political Science,”

Modal is a category of semantics which indicates the attitude, opinion, point of view and evaluation of the process and action in the sentence of the speaker in case of whether it is real. Modality can occur in different forms such as conjugation, prepositions, adverbs, emphasis, pronunciation, modality words, modal adverbs and modal particles. The research area in modal has been extended in recent years in the Turkish Turcology and it has been the subject of scientific fields of logic and philosophy before linguistics. Modal is also classified in many different ways. The obligatory modal which is one of the sub-types in modal classifications is based on the power and effective speech act and includes subfields such as permission, obligation and commissive. One of the most significant characteristics of obligatory modal is that it is subjective. In such modals, there is an authority and a world around this authority. Also, the forms of this modal may vary from speaker to speaker. Obligation is a sub-type of obligatory modal. Obligation is evaluated in two ways as strong obligation and weak obligation.

The Great Speech which is a historical speech by Ataturk at the 2nd congress of the Republican People’s Party in 1927 and that summarized the activities of Ataturk and his fellow soldiers on 15-20 October 1927, from 1919 to 1927, is an extremely important work. Also, this work which is a significant historical document, is a guide for Turkish people. Although The Great Speech by Ataturk is a political discourse, it has different characteristics from the other political discourses.

In this paper, the obligatory modal adverbs in the Great Speech by Ataturk in which Ataturk addressed the Turkish People, are identified and analysed, and the role and effects of the obligatory expressions of modal adverbs in political science is mentioned and emphasized.

Kemal Silay, (Indiana University) and Betül Tarhan, (University of Georgia), “Kemalist Revolution through Literature: Representations of Islam, Islamism, and Patriotism in Reşat Nuri Güntekin’s *Yeşil Gece*.”

This research analyzes the cultural and political climate of the early years of the Turkish Republic within the context of modern Turkish literature. *The Green Night* by Reşat Nuri Güntekin is a prime example of how the Kemalist project of enlightenment successfully reshaped the ideological nature of early Republican Turkish fiction. Framing a dichotomy between

Islamism and Kemalism, *The Green Night* offers salvation to the new nation not through religious dogmas but through scientific thinking and modern education.

Fatma Ahsen Turan, (Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University), “Analysis of Armenian Atrocities in Anatolia within the Context of Social and Traumatic Memory.”

From the last quarter of the 19th century, the great powers of the world began to use the Armenians against the Ottoman state as a part of their policies, provoking the Armenians and using them for their own purposes. In the Ottoman geography, an irrepressible Armenian issue emerged. The Armenian issue was moved from the historical platform to the political platform, and historical facts were ignored.

Armenian Dashnaktsutyun gangs has committed atrocities that are not appropriate for state and war ethics in Anatolia Kars, Erzurum, Van, Bitlis, Hakkari, Urfa, Adana, Maraş, Antep, Yozgat, Çorum and many places. We see that the Armenian attacks and atrocities are fed from the same source, the form, systematic of the atrocities made do not change despite the difference of geography.

Nations leave everything experienced to future generations through social memory. Transfers from generation to generation cause repetitions. Repeated events are reinforced in the memory and become ready to be transferred to future generations. The events told by those who experienced them, those transferred by eye-witnesses, legends, laments can be raw material for those dealing with the science of history and help fill the gaps in historical information. It is known that the public do not usually learn the history from the books but created history in their own imagination with narratives, legends and laments, mostly due to the influence of oral culture.

Traumatic memory includes all the negative memories and mass traumas such as wars, invasions, terrorist attacks, individual attacks on people, their honours, families, especially those who are exposed to atrocities by their trusted persons, and attacks on their lives, honours and possessions by their trusted persons. The incidents that have been experienced leave a lasting impression in the soul due to physically reasons and trauma. There are lasting impressions/traces of trauma in society and in the individual, so it is essential to confront the past in terms of natural justice and judgment. Different traumatic experiences as physical and psychological threats from traumatic attacks to genocide and individual violence are presented in poems, epics, laments, memories, stories and novels.

In historical studies, other than archive documents, oral history studies, where the feelings and thoughts shared by the witnesses or eye-witnesses with their circles are involved, can convey more impressive and lasting information. When the “The Armenian Genocide in Anatolia” is addressed in our paper, information found in the memories of people living at the places of events will be conveyed through the language of eye-witnesses and poets.

Panel 8: Political Culture and Leaders (16:45-17:45)

Mujeeb R. Khan, (UC-Berkeley), “The Past is Not Past: The Break-Up of the Ottoman State and the Continuing Crisis of the Middle East.”

This paper will examine how the break-up of the Ottoman State continues to reverberate in the ongoing crisis of the Middle East. The Sykes-Picot-Sazanov proposed division of the region in

1916 and the Misak-i Milli of 1920 are now on the verge of collapse. Drawing upon both realist and ideational variables from International Relations theory, this paper will underscore how the region became a cauldron of conflict over the last 100 years due to structural-systemic factors which explain persistent cycles of war and authoritarianism cutting across domestic, regional, and international levels of analysis.

Michael Gunter, (University Tennessee Tech), **"New Insights from Old Journeys: Clarence K. Streit's Visit to Ankara, January-March 1921."**

In 1921, Clarence K. Streit, a young journalist who had also served as an intelligence officer in WWI and later became a well known advocate of world government, overcame enormous hardships and arrived in Ankara to interview Mustafa Kemal and see for himself this nascent, but isolated independence movement. However, Streit was never able to publish his fascinating insights at the time because they were considered too pro-Kemalist. Thus, today they offer fresh, new insights into these important early days of what became the modern Republic of Turkey.

Ahmet Erdi Ozturk, (London Metropolitan University), **“Turkey’s Diyanet in the Twentieth Century: A Double Age Sword.”**

How does Turkey's Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) act as an instrument of foreign and domestic policy at the same time in a coordinated manner with the global political atmosphere in both multi-party and the Cold War eras? What are the factors that allow such an instrumentalization of Islamic values and institution in Turkish politics particularly after Mustafa Kemal period? In addressing these questions, this paper, uses qualitative methodology and focuses on the complex relations between the Diyanet and Turkish state structure between 1938-1980. This paper advances two main claims; first, since the beginning of 1940's the Diyanet has been in a transformation not only under the conditions of domestic political equilibrium, but also the global political turbulences. Therefore, secondly, it argues that particularly after 1970 the Diyanet serves as a primary foreign policy tool of Turkey in countries with a significant Turkish-Muslim minority and it was not only related with Turkish state's policy, it was also related with the conditions of the Cold War.

Hakan Erdagöz, (Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University), **“Republicanism between the Eastern Question and Revolution.”**

How did the new Turkish Republic reconcile its status as the heir to the Ottoman Empire in international politics and its revolutionary break with the past at domestic politics? How did the new Republic respond to the post-Eastern Question era as the successor state of the Ottoman Empire that assumed a secular and Westernizing identity in its cultural orientation? The aim of this paper is to examine how and under what conditions the founding fathers of the new state formulated the idea of republic to transform the society based on the inherited circumstances at international and domestic levels. By weaving together the legacy of the Eastern Question and the new Republic's self-presentation in the world and at home, I unpack what it meant to the founding fathers to ascend to the level of contemporary civilizations. Thus, the paper ties together domestic and international politics as well as the identity and realpolitik. I argue that the formulation of the new assertive republicanism (secularist and national) was a natural outcome of the elites' vision of progress and development, but more importantly the post-Eastern Question world that legitimated this mindset. The founding elites were impelled to act within such boundaries that were primarily defined by transnational trends and ideals. One major unintended consequence of such a formulation of republicanism has been the reinstatement of the feeling of backwardness and hence, problematic and shaky cultural identity of Turkey in relation to the West.

Fumiko Sawae, (Sophia University), **“The Place of “religion” in the Modern State in Turkey and Japan.”**

The categories of secular and religious have had different meanings according to times and places in which these categories were used. They were not necessarily binary nor mutually exclusive categories in some time and some place. It came to be conceived so, however, in the Western modern usage, which has been diffused globally, although not necessarily as something detectable in the everyday lifeworld of the common people in the non-Western world. And this situation resulted in differences among non-Western societies in terms not only of how the relation between the state and “religion”(s) were discussed but also of how it was arranged in reality. The Western conceptual distinction between the secular and the religious was introduced to Turkey in the process of the regime transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic in order to oppose both external and internal threats to the sovereignty of the secular Turkish nation. Secularity was thought as necessary both to show their civilizational

commonality toward the imperialist West on the one hand and to secure internally their upper hand in the political sphere and their entrenched lifeworld on the other. Secularity, however, has never been achieved in Turkey either as the substantial definition of the nation nor as the polity of the state. Secularized Sunni Muslim identity was ideal and functional for the sustainability of the unitary sovereign Turkey. Being secular has connoted the elite culture inspired by the Western secular culture and *habitus* and has functioned as an indicator of civilizational levels but/thus there has been always ambiguity about where to locate the non-Sunni Islamic segments and the anti-religious leftist underclass. Meanwhile Japan conceived the role of Christianity as a major source of the Western powers and thereby discussed to establish “religion” of their own because something corresponding to the concept of “religion,” the Japanese elite thought, was nonexistent in Japanese society. “Religion,” not secularity, mattered in their eyes for the purpose of establishing the strong and competent modern nation state, and absence not abandonment was the problem. This paper aims to discuss how “religion” mattered differently for the purpose of achieving sovereignty and nation state building and how such differences resulted in the religio-political relations in Turkey and Japan.

Alp Eren Topal, (Marie Curie Fellow, University of Oslo), **“Portrait of the Leader as a Savior: Messianic Expectations in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Republic.”**

The cult of leadership surrounding Mustafa Kemal Atatürk during the early years of Turkish Republic and his posthumous deification is obvious to scholars and students of Turkish history. While the conscious effort of the early republican regime to promote Mustafa Kemal as an exceptional human with supreme agency is well-documented, Messianic political projections and expectations among the elite as well as the people in the late Ottoman Empire that facilitated the rise of Atatürk’s image is less understood and almost ignored. Although such Messianic visions did not take center stage in press and publications, an attentive search through late Ottoman literature (memoirs, pamphlets, treatises, essays) reveals that such visions were frequently expressed. Couched either in explicitly Islamic apocalyptic traditions or in relatively secularized political theologies that upheld charismatic leadership, such Messianic visions that called for a savior figure ran across ideological divides. Accordingly, this paper addresses the prevalence of Messianic expectations in the late Ottoman Empire and attendant to the rise of the Republic. I will first demonstrate empirically the prevalence of such visions and expectations using both known and previously ignored sources. Starting with Mahmud II we encounter a Messianic image of the sultans promoted by the Ottoman sultans themselves drawing on Islamic traditions such as the trope of *müceddid*. By the early twentieth century, however, such expectations seem to have gained prevalence among the intelligentsia and the population with the successive crises of the Empire and the looming threat of imperial collapse. I have encountered several treatises from the final years of the Empire, which specifically address such expectations as well as admission of such expectations in the memoirs of prominent men of letters. My second contribution will be in addressing the temporalities of such expectations, that is, how a particular constellation of past, present and future imageries underscored these Messianic visions. Nostalgia for an idealized past, oppressive force of the present as a never-ending crisis and a bleak future all combined to foster such Messianic politics and seriously undermined more liberal and rational forms

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