3. The quest for authenticity and the replication of environmental meaning

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Two intriguing phenomena pervade the creation and experience of the modern environment. On the one hand, there is a growing preponderance of places, buildings and things that are commonly called *fake* or *inauthentic* – for example, plastic flowers, false shutters, staged touristic environments, pseudo-vernacular buildings, and mock woodwork. On the other hand, there is a strong cultural trend involving a search for an authenticity which seems to be missing in these examples, a desire to have the “real” thing and to deride any synthesized substitute. It is not easy to say why such themes are so current, yet I take it as a social fact that a heartfelt quest for authenticity proceeds. To accuse someone, their possessions or home of being inauthentic implies a strong moral judgement and arouses righteous indignation. The purpose of this essay is to explore this dual phenomenon of the production of fakes and their systematic elimination.

To accomplish this aim, the essay first examines the phenomenon of fakery, which is interpreted as the replication of environmental meaning through the manipulation of appearances – a situation which frequently breeds doubt and deception in person–environment interaction. Yet the quest for authenticity and the search for “real” meaning through “honesty” of form often leads to the destruction of that which it seeks by inducing fakery. The argument is that both fakery and the quest for authenticity are symptoms of a deep crisis in modern person–environment relationships and of a mistaken belief that authenticity can be achieved through the manipulation of form. However nebulous and ambiguous this notion may remain, authenticity is a property not of environmental form, but of process and relationship. As process, it is characterized by appropriation and an indigenous quality. As relationship, it speaks of a depth of connectedness between people and their world. Authentic meaning cannot be created through
the manipulation or purification of form, since authenticity is the very source from which form gains meaning.

Transformations of form and meaning

To clarify the nature of authentic meaning, I begin by examining the transformations of form and meaning through a seemingly trivial example: the case of false window shutters (Figure 1a–1d). In the past, window shutters served as a boundary control device for the regulation of temperature, ventilation, light, sound, views, and social interaction. In this original context, shutters were integrated with the everyday life of the places they enclosed by virtue of the dialectic between opening and shutting. Their form evolved from this context of boundary control (Figure 1a). As other kinds of boundary control became popular, however, shutters were cut off from these functional roots. In the first stage of this disjuncture, the shutters are built to shut but not actually to be used. Their connection with life inside the building is severed and their role becomes purely visual and static (Figure 1b). In the third stage, this static visual role is concretized as the shutters become fixed to the wall, the possibility of “shutting” now entirely denied (Figure 1c). A last stage is achieved when the correlation in size between shutters and windows is lost such that they would not cover the windows if they did shut (Figure 1d). At this point, the shutters have become blatantly unshuttatable and purely decorative. But have these shutters become inauthentic and if so at what point?

If one asks this question of authenticity in terms of a formal analysis, then the critical transformation would appear to occur at Figure 1c, when the shutters become unshuttatable. Yet the fixing of the shutters is only a concretization of a deeper transformation already occurring in Figure 1b. Here, although the shutters are formally indistinguishable from the original, they are no longer shut and are entirely decorative. The shift between Figures 1a and 1b is a transformation of the relationship between the dweller and the form, involving a loss of integration between the shutters and the everyday life of the place. At the same time, there is a transformation of the formative process: whereas the original shutter form derives from action in everyday life, the latter forms derive from the visual image of “shutters.”

There are, then, two kinds of transformation: one which occurs with the loss of use and integration with everyday life; another which occurs with the loss of shuttability. Caught between these transformations is the ambiguous case of the shutters in Figure 1b which are either authentic or inauthentic, depending on whether one views them as formal or usable objects. This ambiguity is not a trivial matter because it leads to a clearer understanding of authenticity. As the replicated shutters become less and less like the original, they lose meaning. This is why derision tends to fall on the blatant and unambiguous examples like Figure 1d. If the shutters do not connote “shutting,” they lose some of their original meaning. Yet if they do connote “shutting,” they achieve this meaning through deception.

This transformation of the shutters is not an isolated example, as one can see by considering the household fireplace. Originally an important center of domestic heat and social contact, the fireplace was also a symbolic and
spiritual center of family life. When the heating function is usurped by modern technology, the intangible need for a center to replace the hearth persists and often leads to representations—fireplaces that are mere show, or, indeed, cannot be used at all. As with the shutters, the crucial transformation occurs when the form loses its integration with the everyday life of the place—in this case, its use in heating and gathering. Once again, the replication stems from the attempt to preserve or create a shared meaning, using a prop that has lost its role in everyday life. My argument, then, is that the phenomenon of fakery is essentially a replication of meaning. For the shutters, this meaning is inextricably bound up with “shutting;” for the fireplace, with “heating and gathering.” Meaning is thus the foundation of fakery, and replications are forms that attempt to carry authentic meanings. Replications succeed by virtue of their very ambiguity and sophistication—i.e., by their success at masking their own transformation. It is important to understand, then, that inauthenticity emerges out of the very attempt to retain or regain authenticity.

There is, however, a problem with this argument in as much as “shutting” and “decorating” can both be valid functions of environmental form. Within a context of “style,” shutters can in time become part of a culturally shared image of “window,” as fireplaces become part of the image of “living room.” The meaning of these environmental elements cannot be recreated easily when they have their functional roots severed technologically. The paradox is that while our attempts to retain the meaning of “shutting” with fixed shutters may be inauthentic, our attempt to retain the meaning of “window” by the very same means may be authentic to the degree that the shared meaning is evoked.

Involvement and appropriation

A resolution of this paradox requires a deeper understanding of the kinds of meaning which emerge in person—environment interaction, and a fundamental distinction between the use-based meaning of “shutting” and the image-based meaning of “decorating.” Useful in this regard is Heidegger’s distinction between Zuhandenheit (readiness-to-hand) and Vorhandenheit (presence-at-hand), which he argues are ontological categories or modes of Being in terms of which aspects of our world appear to us. Zuhandenheit is the mode of Being of implements (Zeug) which we use and with which we actively engage. The meaning of the implement emerges from what it is “for.” Vorhandenheit, on the other hand, is the condition of an object that stands in a theoretical visualized relationship to the subject; it is not used but rather stands available for our consideration. Thus, the meaning of a hammer is found in its use for “hammering,” just as a pen is for “writing,” a bridge for “bridging” or a house for “dwellings.” The locating of the meaning in the “for” makes it highly dependent on the context, thus meaning is inextricably bound up in connections with other implements and the world at large. In the case of the hammer, for example, the meaning is connected to the shape of the hand, the strength of the arm, the structure of the nail and the wood, and all of the events leading up to and flowing from the act of hammering. Returning to the shutters example, we find the meaning emerging from the activity of shutting, which in turn has links with that which is shut out and in, with the cycles of day and night, with seasons and weather, with the uses and views of rooms, and so forth. Only in the context of everyday use does the shutter gain its meaning. False shutters are an attempt to retain or regain this meaning through the replication of appearance. In this attempt, however, the meaning relationship is shifted from Zuhandenheit to Vorhandenheit, and the shutters become objects for contemplation. Heidegger clearly gives ontological priority to the action-based over the contemplative, since we are involved in the world first by virtue of our concern for that world. Further, it is through this concerned involvement that our world is disclosed and appropriated:

The hammering does not simply have knowledge about the hammer’s character as equipment, but it has appropriated this equipment . . . ; the less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become . . .

Appropriation is a difficult yet vital notion here, since it embodies the dual qualities of both caring for the world and taking from it. As caring, appropriation speaks of our primary involvement in the world, our concern. This caring or concern is not a moral attitude for Heidegger; rather, it is ontological—i.e., a fundamental aspect of existence. Further, appropriation is more than just a utilitarian concern; it involves a respect and preserving of the world in its own right. It is through this care that the world is disclosed. A second part of appropriation is the notion of taking, which is close to the etymological root as seen in the Latin appropriare—“to make one’s own.” Taking, in this sense, is a kind of incorporation of the world into ourselves. As our world discloses itself through our concern, we take this disclosure into our Being. Appropriation is closely related to the process of identification. As we open ourselves to the world of things and places, we
bring them meaning through our care and concern, and at the same time these things and places lend meaning to our sense of identity. Appropriation is rooted, therefore, in a concerned action through which we appropriate aspects of our world as anchors for our self-identity.

The importance of the concept of appropriation for the understanding of authenticity lies in this emergence of meaning through action. Our successive appropriations and identifications from past experience form a kind of ontological ground of meaning. In as much as experience is culturally shared, so are these meanings. This ground of shared meanings constitutes the very experience that the fake tries to replicate. Insofar as the fakey succeeds, it conceals an attendant doubt and deception. At the same time, this doubt and deception breeds unreliability into our acts of appropriation – the very acts that generate meaning in the first place.

Deception

One way to understand the problem of deception is to explore the effects of deceit in human relationships. Honest interaction is the foundation of social life because effective communication requires some integrity between the surfaces and depths of people’s behavior. Lies spread uncertainty and alienation through a social system, since each lie sows seeds of doubt into all future statements by the liar. When we feel that we cannot rely upon surface appearance, we have two options: either we separate ourselves from the source of deceit, or we adopt an attitude of mistrust and engage in an investigative operation directed towards the discovery of a deeper reality. Both consequences of deceit contaminate the social system, since separateness leads to social fragmentation and alienation, while the investigative approach engenders a web of new lies in the cover-up operation.

Although deceit is by no means so clear in relationships between people and their environment, the consequences are similar. On the one hand, criticisms of fake things and places are a means of separating oneself from his or her world. On the other hand, the insistence on having the “real” thing requires an investigative operation, a search for the clues indicating authenticity. This investigative attitude is itself a kind of separation from the phenomenon, a stance of Vorhandenheit that reduces the thing or place to an object. It involves not our openness to the disclosure of the thing or place, but rather a kind of empirical testing. Just as fabrications are invented to cover up previous deceit in human relationships, so environmental replica-

tion becomes more and more sophisticated in order to thwart investigations and capture “real” meaning. A further consequence is that this objective attitude colors our experience of the authentic originals since they, too, must be tested first and experienced second. The result is that specific doubts about fakey lead easily to a more general doubt about the authenticity of our world.

From another perspective, however, one could argue that if the deceit really works then the consequences are not significant. Jenck writes that “when synthetic wood and stone can be manufactured which outperform and are visually indistinguishable from their natural counterparts, then it becomes pedantic and effete to insist on having the ‘real’ material.”

This possibility is indeed a problem and the insistence on a kind of technical authenticity is often full of pedantry. There are, however, reasons for rejecting Jenck’s argument. First, it assumes a purely visual Vorhandenheit relationship of people to their world – a view that is prominent in the enclaves of architectural criticism. Second, Jenck’s argument is elitist in that it ignores the preferences of lay people, assuming they do not care to know whether they are inhabiting a stage set. Yet people do care. No one wants to be deceived – not by people, places, things or materials. Despite their isolation from the design process, most individuals desire to know about their world at depth. They can accept all kinds of faked things and perhaps even learn to love them so long as they are not deceived by those things. For example, the use of synthetic stone can be an authentic means of decorating a house, yet one would not want to buy or become attached to the house in the mistaken belief that the stone was “real.” While it may be pedantic to insist on having the “real” stone, it is not pedantic to insist upon knowing the difference. This awareness is fundamental to the way in which people experience their world.

Experiential depth and environmental purity

Although deception is the source of the moral problem of inauthenticity, the issue is more complex. The differences between the original and its replication are more than just categorical. They involve differences of experiential depth – differences in the richness of possible environmental appropriations. To understand this point, consider the case of an artificial surf beach in Phoenix, Arizona (Figure 2). Here, identical waves roll in at identical intervals to wash upon imported sand. There are no crabs to nibble one’s toes, no sharks, undertows, tide lines or driftwood. There are no shells to be found in the sand, no rock pools to be explored, no sea breezes and no salt air.
3: Quest for authenticity

There is nothing inherently "bad" about the artificial beach, but it is useful for a discussion of authenticity because its designers have gone to such lengths of replication without the remotest possibility of deception in the desert context. The difference between an original beach and the replica is largely that of depth — this includes spatial depth, historical depth, depth of diversity and of learning opportunity. The original meaning, although anchored in the forms of sand and waves (which have been replicated), is also bound up with salt, breezes, crabs, undertows and intangible forces of the ocean (which have not been replicated). Any original beach is a learning environment par excellence, offering a significant opportunity for a sense of connectedness with the natural world and an enhanced understanding of one's place in nature. In short, the original beach embodies a depth of process, a depth of learning opportunities, and it engenders a depth of emotional commitment and appropriation.

There is no moral problem with the artificial beach, since there is no deception. Rather, it is the comparative poverty of the beach in terms of experiential depth and its attempt to claim so much meaning that gives rise to our judgements of inauthenticity. Only because it begs to be compared to the original do we bother to criticize. Yet I do not mean to argue that the artificial beach cannot be cared for and appropriated. When we grow up in such places or spend a lot of time in them, they become part of our everyday world, our "home." Their forms become anchors for our self-identity. No doubt the artificial beach is popular and well-loved, and may one day be preserved as an authentic part of Phoenix history. So long as we are not deceived, we can genuinely appropriate the technically inauthentic.

An important question remains, however: To what extent does the replica come to serve as a surrogate for the original? This is an important issue because synthesized substitutes are designed from a stereotyped and purified image of the original. The original always embodies far more chaos, "defects" and diversity than its duplicate. From a myriad of original forms, a selection is made which purifies and petrifies the meaning — a selection which meets socio-culturally defined expectations and reflects ethnocentric views. This is a particular problem for children who may well come to regard the original as a defective version of the surrogate. If they are to form their conceptual categories (such as "beach") from purified replicas of those very categories, then an incestuous cycle may begin that inhibits the ability to encounter the prototypical world in its originality.

The environmental purity and lack of diversity stemming from the replication of meaning can also be taken a step further, resulting in the purification of everyday life itself. This pattern occurs through another, more subtle confusion of categories. Consider the case of pseudo-vernacular landscapes — the design of housing or commercial developments to simulate a bygone era. Pointe Benicia is such a housing development in the "historic" town of Benicia, California. Although the architectural forms of this development appear to be traditional and diverse, they are actually generated from a few basic designs laid out in village-style around an artificial lake with mechanically bubbling brooks and wooden footbridges (Figure 3). Such places are increasingly common and popular today, based upon a widely shared nostalgia for a more stable, picturesque and authentic past. Such environments, however, do not represent a real past that consumers have ever experienced but, rather, a mythical image of "harmonious village life." This image is a stereotype, stripped of its oppressions and hardship. Yet as shallow as it is, this stereotype is generally perceived as involving a public environment — i.e., the houses and shops as well as the streets, squares, and other public spaces. When the meaning which is anchored in these forms is replicated today, however, the place in a legal sense generally becomes private. This transformation gives rise to the realm of the "pseudo-public" — i.e., places with public meanings yet private control. In the original square, street or marketplace, freedom of access and use was at least public-
ly negotiable. Yet in the pseudo-public realm, all kinds of political and deviant behavior can be proscribed and access denied at the whim of the owner. At Pointe Benecia, signs have appeared to keep out non-residents who are lured by the “village” (Figure 4). Clearly, the pseudo-public realm can appear without the pseudo-vernacular, but in association with such styles it becomes particularly confusing because it draws its meaning and success from its role as a surrogate public place. In this way, the shallowness of experience and purity of form occurring with the replication of meaning can also extend to the creation of a political and behavioral purity of everyday life. The result is a subtle and unself-consciously deceitful erosion of public life.

**Authenticity as Indigenous Process**

I have described several distinctions between the original and the replica which I believe are important to the problem of authenticity — distinctions of relationship, category and experiential depth. I now want to consider a distinction of process. In all of the examples outlined above, the original and the replica embody fundamentally different kinds of formative processes which converge upon the same formal result. For instance, the original beach emerges organically from its geographical context, while the artificial beach is a technological product based on a purified stereotype. Both processes have their own kind of order: the former, growing in place, is intrinsic; the latter, derived from an external image and imposed, is extrinsic. The intrinsic forming process I will call *indigenous*. Although we commonly associate “indigenous” with the traditional and primitive, the etymological root means “produced or born within,” thus indicating a somewhat wider meaning. Indigenous processes, therefore, are those where form is “inborn” and are opposed to processes which are derived and imposed from without to fit some wider order. A formative process is indigenous when the form emerges out of the everyday life and context of the place. Thus, the shutters evolved from the dynamics of boundary control; the fireplace from the nature of fire, heat and gathering; the beach from the interaction of land and sea; the medieval village from the dwelling traditions of that society.

Our association of the indigenous with the traditional and the past, although narrow, is not unfounded, since the issue of authenticity is a peculiarly modern one. To a traditional society, where the processes of environmental change are integrated with everyday life, there can be no dispute about origins — no doubt about depth. Only as modern industrialization separates us from the process of production and we encounter the environ-
ment as a finished commodity, does the problem of authenticity emerge. As Relph claims, the problem of authenticity and the replication of meaning is strongly linked to the modern spread of technology, rationalism, mass production and mass values. At the same time, the quest for authenticity is also a modern phenomenon; as MacCannell argues: "the final victory of modernity ... is not the disappearance of the nonmodern world, but its artificial preservation and reconstruction ..." At home, this quest takes the form of the eradication of fakery, but increasingly the quest is conducted away from home in the form of tourism. "For moderns," says MacCannell, "reality and authenticity are thought to be elsewhere: in other historical periods and other cultures, in purer, simpler lifestyles." This search for authenticity in the past and the exotic is lamentable, both because it purifies and commoditizes that which it seeks, and because the seeds of authenticity are always available at home. In as much as authenticity is rooted in indigenous process, it is only found and generated in the dwelling practices of everyday life.

**Ambiguities of authenticity**

It is important to understand that when I speak of indigenous process, I am not speaking of a kind of place, but rather a kind of process. This distinction raises some important ambiguities, since the same place can often exhibit a range of processes and, therefore, aspects of both authenticity and inauthenticity — for example, an owner-built house of mock stone. My last example illustrates some of these ambiguities as well as the impact of the modern search for authenticity on the traditional world.

The Dogon are a tribal group in Mali who have long been famous for their highly developed cultural systems and the aesthetic appeal of their artifacts and habitat. The Togu Na ("House of Men, House of Words"), a place of communal decision-making, is a characteristic building type with a thick straw roof set on open columns. Images of tribal significance such as masks, animals and fertility symbols often appear on the columns and surrounding rock faces. The changes wrought by modernism in recent years have been many, including an influx of Western tourists eager for snapshots of primitive life. Many of the young men have deserted the villages for the cities and some have returned disillusioned. A Togu Na in Banani, one of the more accessible villages, was rebuilt in 1975 by these young men. It is adorned with clay figures in great profusion which, according to Spini and Spini, represents "an attempt to give the tourists a superficial account, by means of the most striking images, of the masks and animals, but no longer as a coded message, just simple notional lists." The images are not only multiplied but "introduced with expressive violence typical of other African civilization." On a nearby Togu Na, there is a sign requesting money for photographs and in yet another the space once reserved for the ritual dressing of the masks is now given over to non-traditional dance displays. Finally, some of the "men's houses" have been de-gendered as Western women are permitted to enter.

The transformation here has much in common with the examples presented earlier: from a process which is integrated, intrinsic and indigenous; to one which emphasizes display and other-directedness. This display comes as a direct response to the tourists — indeed, it is an attempt to mirror and embellish their very expectations. At the same time, the Togu Na is transformed from a "men's house" to a "commercial enterprise" while pretending to remain a "men's house." In its outside influence, commodification, and misrepresentation, this process has become inauthentic. Yet there are two important ambiguities to confuse the issue. First, the Dogon themselves decided to rebuild in this way, so in a sense it is an inborn process. Although there was outside influence in the forms that they chose, this influence was not imposed from without. In this light, the rebuilding may be considered an authentic commercial enterprise grounded in an indigenous response to economic need and the opportunity of tourism. Second, the production of the display may actually be playing a very important role in protecting the authenticity of the Dogon culture and habitat. If the tourists' search truly destroys the authenticity which they seek, then the belief that they have found the real thing ends both the search and the destruction. To deceive outsiders with a fake display may then be an authentic form of defence against the ravages of tourism. This protective function of fakery is a crucial ambiguity which has also been noted in relation to urban conservation, the pseudo-vernacular and the natural environment.

Modernism has also brought its pressures on the Dogon in other ways. In the plains villages, the pillars of the Togu Na are generally wooden and carved with the forms of breasts as fertility symbols. These carved pillars are now quite valuable commodities on the world art market, and they are frequently stolen by tourists and art dealers. One of the responses of the Dogon to this threat is to disfigure their own sculptures by cutting off part of the breasts. With their commodity valued destroyed, these sculptures are safe from Western museums and living rooms. But what of their authenticity? To us, with our fetish for form, this disfiguration appears to empty the pillars of meaning and value. We would never disfigure the things we love to prevent
theft. Yet clearly for the Dogon, the pillars have intrinsic value that goes
deep into appearance and is not entirely annulled by the disfigurement. If
authenticity is not to be located in form but in process, as I have argued, then
perhaps even the disfigurement is an authentic preservation of meaning. And
here, perhaps, is another distinction: while inauthenticity is an attempt to
regain lost meanings through the replication of form, authenticity involves
the power to retain the meanings without the form because it is the very well-
spring that brings meaning to form.

Authenticity as connectedness

The concept of authenticity is a truly ambiguous one, yielding to varying in-
terpretations when viewed in different ways. These ambiguities are only a
problem, however, when one insists upon locating authenticity as a condi-
tion to be found in the physical world. With this point in mind, I want to offer
some tentative ideas of how one might conceive of authenticity in the
modern world — not as a condition of things or places, but rather as a con-
tion of connectedness in the relationship between people and their world.
Consider one dictionary definition of “authentic”: “reliable, trustworthy, of
undisputed origin, genuine.”24 Here, we find three aspects of meaning.
“Undisputed origin” implies a connection between the form of the
phenomenon and the processes that produce it. Thus, wood cannot be
authentically except as the product of the processes of growth in a tree. This
relationship is a temporal connection between past and present, process
and product. “Genuine” similarly implies that the phenomenon which looks
like wood is not a plastic replication — that there is a connection between
the surface and the depth of the material world. This link implies a kind of
spatial integrity where if one were to penetrate the surface appearance, then
a richer version of reality is not different from what would be disclosed.
The third aspect of authenticity, the “reliable, trustworthy” component, is
once again a temporal connection, this time between present and future,
perception and action. In as much as we must act in everyday life on the
basis of the perceptual surface of the lived-world, authenticity renders this
world both reliable and trustworthy. It is, therefore, a part of the meaning of
wood that it can be cut, nailed, carved, painted and burnt — that it will carry
certain loads and gain a certain patina with time.

These three aspects of authenticity are never separate and together iden-
tify different kinds of connectedness between the everyday world and those
deeper realities and processes that created it and those consequences

which flow from one’s engagement with it. In this sense, authenticity is a
property of connectedness between the perceived world and the believed
world. It connects us spatially with the places in which we dwell and tempor-
ally with the past and the future (Figure 5). Authenticity is a condition of integrity
in person–environment relationships. This connectedness is not a percep-
tual phenomenon; its deeper significance lies not in its connection of ap-
pearance to reality, but in its connection of people to their world. Authenticity
is, then, a kind of being-in-the-world, a connectedness born of our acts of ap-
propriation. It is a spatio-temporal rootedness which enriches our world with
experiential depth.

Just as authenticity is not to be found in the world of things, neither is in-
authenticity. The tendency to speak of inauthentic things or places, to locate
the problem of authenticity in the physical environment, is very much
misplaced. Inauthenticity is rather a disconnection of the larger system of
person–environment interactions, a disease of this system. The
fundamental paradox and the source of the greatest ambiguity is that inauthen-
ticity emerges out of our very attempts to find and recreate a lost authenticity,
a lost world of meaning. Inauthenticity is an attempt to resurrect meanings,
but it results in their very destruction. The problem lies not in the search,
which is genuine; but in the misplaced belief that authenticity can be
generated through the manipulation of appearance. Authenticity has the in-
digenous quality of being inborn. So long as the search is conducted “out
there,” in the exotic and the past, beyond the world of everyday life, it seems
bound to be frustrating and perhaps destructive. Authentic places and things
are born from authentic dwelling practices in everyday life. Their order flows
“bottom up” rather than “top down.”
The search for authenticity stems from a serious disconnectness in the ecology of person–environment relationships that one might call homelessness. This comes not only from the absence of a place to dwell, but also from having the dwelling experiences that constitute home cut from beneath one’s feet by rapid advances in industrialization and technology. Much of what passes for inauthenticity is evidence of our attempts to regain a sense of home through synthetic surface effect. This manifestation of inauthenticity in the form of fakery is a replication of meaning. It is a lure for our false hopes and an attempt to capture our hearts by deceit. It is a cosmetic solution for a deeper schism in the system. Our attempts to eradicate fakery from the environment are not only superficial but also often misplaced and dangerous. Misplaced, because the “fakes” often have quite authentic aspects about them, most notably their role in protecting the truly authentic. Dangerous, because if we eradicate the most blatant and least deceitful places, then we encourage their replacement by more sophisticated and more deceitful versions of the same thing. It is well to remember that our scorn never falls upon that which truly deceives us. Our decrying of the inauthenticity of places and things is all too often a pedantic effort to lend our lives a surface effect of authenticity while a deeper disconnectness from the places which we inhabit remains unchallenged.

Notes
1. The author would like to thank Sandra Gifford, David Seamon, Robert Mugerauer, Lars Lerup, Johanna Drucker, and Dean MacCannell for commentary on various drafts of this essay.
2. Two provocative critiques of the authenticity of places to which this paper owes a good deal are Edward Relp, Place and Placelessness (London: Pion, 1976); and Dean MacCannell, The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class (New York: Schocken, 1976).
4. See, in particular, Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 97–102; Steiner, Martin Heidegger, pp. 89–90; and Vycinas, Earth and Gods, pp. 34–37.
6. Ibid., p. 98.
11. This relationship is evident in the predominant style of discourse conducted in the major architectural journals. Buildings are evaluated and reputations made and lost largely on the basis of published photographs, which reduce buildings and places to a ‘Vorhandenheit’ relationship.
15. Relp, Place and Placelessness.
17. Ibid., p. 3.
20. Ibid., p. 76.