ORRIN G. HATCH
FOUNDATION

HATCH CENTER SYMPOSIUM

GLOBAL PEACE *and* STABILITY

SYMPOSIUM REPORT

October 2020

Introduction

Over 42 years of public service, Senator Orrin G. Hatch was integral to shaping US foreign policy. During his tenure, he fought for policies to help Afghanis repel invading Soviets; supported Contra Rebels fighting a communist-backed regime in Nicaragua; championed legislation to found the National Endowment for Democracy; witnessed the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War; established concrete rules for international trade negotiations through the Trade Promotion Authority legislation; paved the way for approval of the EU-US Data Privacy Shield, and so much more. As President pro tempore, Senator Hatch traveled across the globe and fostered diplomatic ties with foreign dignitaries to strengthen US economic and military relations. Most recently, he was instrumental in securing the freedom of Utah resident Josh Holt, who had been detained with his wife on false charges as political prisoners in Venezuela for almost two years. Without fail, his public service centered on maintaining American influence abroad and facilitating the spread of our nation's greatest exports: the protection of basic human liberties, democratic institutions, rule of law, open elections, and free-market competition.

Both before and during Senator Hatch's tenure, global geopolitics underwent seismic shifts. The United States went from an isolationist and fairly inconsequential nation pre-WWI, to one of two superpowers post-WWII, to the only superpower following the fall of the Soviet Union. In recent decades, further tremors like the rise of China and Russia have led the United States to a world of competing great powers, hostile to longstanding democratic and free-market principles. Some claim we are witnessing the end of an era—the relegation of Pax Americana to fatefully joining the relics of Pax Britannica and Pax Romana in history books.[1] Others, rightly, are more hopeful.[2] Regardless of our current trajectory, how the United States chooses to respond to our ever-shifting geopolitical landscape will determine the vitality of democratic principles and free-market institutions throughout the world for decades to come.

Continuing Senator Hatch's longstanding influence and his inexhaustive focus on furthering Western values, the Hatch Center—the policy arm of the Orrin G. Hatch Foundation—centered its October 2020 symposium on the current issues and future challenges facing global peace and stability. Speakers included the Honorable Robert

C. O'Brien, former US National Security Advisor; the Honorable Jon M. Huntsman, Jr., former ambassador to Russia, China, and Singapore; David Stirling, co-founder and CEO of dōTERRA; Khosrow B. Semnani, CEO of S.K. Hart Management, LLC; Carine Clark, Tech CEO and Silicon Slopes Executive Board Member; and Josh Holt, former political prisoner in Venezuela.

This report briefly summarizes these symposium remarks and extends that dialogue, focusing on what has been done and what still must be done in two critical areas of foreign policy: adapting to the rise of China and Russia as great powers and combating anti-democratic and subversive influences at home and abroad. As Senator Hatch warned, "[t]he most important lesson of world history in the 20th Century is that if America does not rise to the task, no one else will."[3] Understanding these issues and potential paths forward will ensure America's ability to rise to its task and cement the vitality of liberal principles throughout the 21st Century.

The Honorable Robert C. O'Brien

US National Security Advisor

Robert C. O'Brien previously served as the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs at the US Department of State, where he held the personal rank of Ambassador. With the Secretary of State, O'Brien led the US government's diplomatic efforts on overseas hostage-related matters. He worked closely with the families of American hostages and advised the senior leadership of the US government on hostage issues.

Prior to joining the Trump administration, O'Brien was nominated by President George W. Bush and confirmed by the US Senate in 2005 to serve as a US Representative to the 60th session of the United Nations General Assembly. O'Brien also served as a Major in the Judge Advocate General's Corps in the US Army Reserve.

Before entering public service, O'Brien co-founded Larson O'Brien LLP in Los Angeles, a nationally recognized litigation firm. His law practice focused on complex litigation and international arbitration. In addition to his client work, O'Brien has served as an arbitrator in over 20 international and domestic proceedings and was appointed by the federal courts to serve as a special master in numerous complex cases.

O'Brien is a graduate of the UC Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall). He received his bachelor's degree in political science, cum laude, from UCLA.

Matt Sandgren
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ORRIN G. HATCH FOUNDATION

Matt Sandgren serves as the executive director of the Orrin G. Hatch Foundation, a nonprofit organization focused on promoting commonsense solutions to the nation's most pressing problems. Previously, Sandgren directed the legislative, communications, and political activities as Senator Orrin G. Hatch's chief of staff during his final and most effective years as a lawmaker.

A Capitol Hill Veteran with more than 15 years of experience, Sandgren also served as senior counsel on the Senate Judiciary Committee. Beyond intellectual property and technology policy issues, Sandgren's legislative portfolio spanned a significant portion of the Judiciary Committee's jurisdiction, including biotechnology, pharmaceutical (Hatch-Waxman), cybersecurity, immigration, internet governance, and privacy issues. He likewise served as Senator Hatch's staff director for the Senate Republican High-Tech Task Force and as lead counsel for the International Creativity and Theft Prevention Caucus.

Sandgren earned a BA from Brigham Young University, a JD from The University of Tulsa, and an LLM from The George Washington University. He is a member of the Utah, District of Columbia, and US Supreme Court bars.

Symposium Summary

As Matt Sandgren, Executive Director of the Hatch Foundation, noted in his prefatory remarks, the critical question of US foreign policy in years to come is whether American influence will continue to spread across the globe or give way to the East. Participants in the Hatch Center's October 2020 Symposium each offered their views on different aspects of this issue.[4]

David Stirling offered his worldview as CEO of an international business engaged in far more than simply producing and selling goods. dōTERRA has firmly enmeshed itself in the cultures and countries with which it works and serves, and the company's "Co-Impact Sourcing" model is at the heart of these efforts. dōTERRA sources its oils from over 45 countries, over half of which are considered developing countries. These sourcing efforts are paired with environmental stewardship and social impact initiatives designed to develop both long-lasting partnerships and sustainable jobs to farmers, harvesters, distillers, and their communities. As Stirling put it, this creates "game-changing" economic development in less fortunate areas around the globe. For example, in Kenya's Lunga Lunga province, dōTERRA provides over 800 farmers millions of melaleuca (or tea tree) seedlings free of charge and pays farmers several times more than they would make growing crops for local markets. Other countries like Bulgaria, Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Azerbaijan have similarly recognized the benefits of this model. As Stirling concluded, business relationships can transcend both trade disputes and international conflicts, leading to greater economic stability and prosperity. By actively engaging in the international communities with whom they partner, businesses can help champion peace, stability, and dignity in developing areas of the world that need it most.[5]

Ambassador Jon Huntsman Jr. drew on his experience as former ambassador to Singapore, China, and Russia, offering critical questions for future US foreign policy in

an era of competing great powers. There is no question, he said, that the United States remains the sole superpower by virtue of its economic throw-weight, innovation, free-market principles, and its commitment to civil society and military prowess. But with two great powers—Russia and China—continuing to grow in influence and strength, America must adapt and acclimate to the current great-power setting. We are now engaged in a struggle between democracy and autocracy to determine which governing model will most influence the world for the remainder of the 21st Century. Both China and Russia are carefully expanding their sphere of influence to challenge American hegemony.

To combat these influences, Ambassador Huntsman offered critical questions, the answers to which must serve as the foundation for US foreign policy over the next decade. Regarding China, how will we deal with its quiet rise to power? In what ways can we maintain our confidence and soft power? Can we depoliticize these policies, divorce them from election-cycle pendulums, and focus on long-term goals? Do we know what the future leadership of China looks like? Are we prepared should China choose to use its leverage vis-à-vis the United States by launching an economic torpedo and selling down its holding in US debt? Do we have a de-escalation strategy should hostilities increase in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait?

Regarding Russia, how do we respond to Moscow's provocations through election interference, disinformation campaigns, assassinations, and other destabilizing movements? If sanctions have thus far been ineffective

in changing Russian behavior, what other responses do we have? How can we resolve urgent arms control issues? Does America have a role in aiding the nearly 150 million Russians who are entrepreneurial and industrious but live in a country run by a corrupt oligarchy? To conclude, Ambassador Huntsman issued the clarion reminder that our American values are our most powerful weapon: in striving to practice and spread these values more perfectly, no one can beat the United States.

Ambassador Robert C. O'Brien provided the symposium's keynote address. He spoke of President Trump's foreign policy stances and how every decision was made in light of how it would affect the American people first and foremost. According to Ambassador O'Brien,



The Honorable Jon M. Huntsman Jr.

Former US ambassador to Russia, China, and Singapore

Ambassador Huntsman began his career in public service as a staff assistant to President Ronald Reagan. He has served each of the five US presidents since then in critical roles around the world, including as the Ambassador to Singapore, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Asia, US Trade Ambassador, US Ambassador to China, and most recently, US Ambassador to Russia. In all Senate confirmations, he received unanimous votes. Twice elected Governor of Utah, Huntsman brought about strong economic and tax reforms, tripled the state's rainy-day fund, and helped bring unemployment rates to historic lows.

Previously, Ambassador Huntsman was a candidate for the Presidency in 2012, in addition to serving as Chairman of the Atlantic Council and on the boards of Ford Motor Company, Caterpillar Corporation, Chevron Corporation, Hilton, the US Naval Academy Foundation, and the University of Pennsylvania. Ambassador Huntsman has also served as a visiting fellow at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, as well as a distinguished lecturer at Duke University's Sanford School of Public Policy. He is a seventh-generation Utahn and has been married for 36 years to Mary Kaye Huntsman.

we must deal with the world as it is, not as we hope it could be—peace can only be attained through strength. This means the United States cannot stay party to a treaty where the other side is not keeping the bargain, nor can it remain in organizations that work against US interests. Ambassador O'Brien also highlighted what he considered to be the national security victories of the last four years: defeating ISIS; bringing justice to Al-Baghdadi; removing al-Qaeda leaders in Yemen and Libya; rescuing over 50 American hostages and detainees in over 22 countries; replacing NAFTA with the USMCA; pressuring Iran and withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); taking a hardline stance with NATO allies and demanding they pay their share; rebuilding our military force; strengthening alliances with India, Brazil, Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand; brokering peace deals with the Taliban; and bringing American troops home from overseas conflicts. Most notably, the Trump administration spearheaded the peace agreement between Kosovo and Serbia and the historic Abraham Accords to normalize relations between the United Arab Emirates, Israel, and Bahrain.

Several participants also shared their thoughts on global issues and asked for Ambassador O'Brien's insights. Khosrow B. Semnani asked how foreign policy could counter Iran's fanatical regime without harming the many Iranian citizens at odds with their leaders. Ambassador O'Brien expressed his hopes that the Iranian people will soon be free of their despotic rulers to flourish as a country. Though sanctions impact the Iranian people, these measures prevent the country's government from helping radicals like Hezbollah, Hamas, or the Assad regime in Syria. Sanctions also hinder Iran in its nuclear development. That said, Ambassador O'Brien remains hopeful that Iran will soon come to the table to negotiate the sanctions and amend its practices to the benefit of the world and its people.

Semnani also asked whether the United States would continue to allow the budding relationship between Iran and China. In response, Ambassador O'Brien said Beijing will soon have a "rude awakening" when it realizes that its Saudi and Gulf Arab partners' interests do not align with Iranian interests. Instead, Beijing will need to navigate the divided region, balancing its interests in Iran with its dependence on oil.

Carine Clark asked what precautions were being taken to prevent interference on Election Day 2020. In response, Ambassador O'Brien expressed the federal government's keen awareness of Chinese, Russian, and Iranian efforts to influence the election's outcome. Awareness among Americans is also key, he said, since internal divisiveness will bring far more long-lasting harm to this country than a widespread cyberattack.

Lastly, Josh Holt asked how the United States can disrupt China's anti-democratic influence on Venezuela. Ambassador O'Brien responded by recounting the Trump administration's efforts to subvert China's influence and back Juan Guaido. These efforts included indicting Nicolas Maduro and seizing shipments of gasoline from Iran to Venezuela and diverting them to Guaido's benefit.

Concluding his keynote address, Ambassador O'Brien underscored that the era of leading from behind and strategic patience is over. Instead, we must build international consensus around our approach to China, Russia, and other national security threats. Importantly, we must stand up to their abuses of power. Good relations are our goal, of course, but these relationships must be built on the basis of reciprocity and fairness. With strong leadership, we have successfully met and will continue to meet those challenges.

Current Issues & Paths Forward

Extending this dialogue, the following sections discuss two critical areas in future US foreign policy: adapting to the rise of great powers and combating anti-democratic and subversive influences both at home and abroad.

Adapting to the Rise of Great Powers

In 1793, George Washington announced: "The duty and interest of the United States require that they should with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent powers."[6] For the next century, the equilibrium of global powers

David Stirling
Founder and CEO, dōTERRA International

David Stirling is a founding executive and the CEO and chairman of dōTERRA International. Under his visionary leadership, dōTERRA has grown from a fledgling startup to the world's largest essential oil company with more than $2 billion in annual sales. With nearly three decades of management and executive experience across a variety of industries, David finds his greatest satisfaction in helping companies and individuals succeed.

David oversees dōTERRA's exponential growth in Europe, Latin America, Korea, and Japan. In addition to setting the strategic direction for the company, and implementing and maintaining company culture, David also directs IT and technology processes, web development, distributor tools, and a workforce of more than 1,000 employees.

David holds both a bachelor's degree and an MBA in business and was recently honored as the first-ever recipient of the Distinguished Entrepreneur Award from the David Eccles School of Business.

allowed the US to keep to these principles of neutrality and isolationism. But after enmeshing itself in the Spanish-American War of 1898, the United States soon thereafter found itself in possession of territories like Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines—its place in the global order had begun to change.[7] Sensing this shift, President William McKinley wrote of this country: "[W]ithout any desire or design on our part," the Spanish-American War "has brought us new duties and responsibilities which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on whose growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization."[8] Over the course of the next century, the United States took on these duties of a "great nation," growing from an associate power in WWI to a global superpower at the end of WWII and throughout the Cold War.

The rest of the 20th Century would mark even more dramatic shifts in global geopolitics with Soviet containment strategies, the creation of NATO, the rise of Mao Zedong's communist party, the Korean, Vietnam, and Gulf Wars, and the fall of the Soviet Union. The turn of this century also brought the War on Terror, the birth of cyberwarfare, and, most recently, a global pandemic. With each new chapter of world history, the United States has managed to cement its place in the world order as the only superpower by economic, military, and political influence.[9] But ongoing geopolitical tremors threaten to change that. As Ambassador Huntsman aptly pointed out during the Hatch Center Symposium, we now live in a world with two rising great powers—China and Russia. To maintain global stability, he explained, we must shift our fixation from the Middle East and start thinking and adapting to the relatively unprecedented period of great power rivalries that we are entering.

China

Napoleon Bonaparte famously said, "When China awakes, it will shake the world"[10]—and so it has. Next year, we celebrate the 50th anniversary of Henry Kissinger's secret trip to China in 1971 that began multilateral relations between our two countries.[11] Since that year, China's economy has grown from just under $100 billion to over $14 trillion in 2019.[12] The vast majority of this growth has occured in just the last three decades.[13] That

Khosrow B. Semnani
CEO, S.K. Hart Management, LLC

Khosrow B. Semnani is an Iranian-American industrialist, community leader, and philanthropist based in Salt Lake City. He was born in Iran, studied English in the UK, and eventually emigrated to the US. In Utah, he founded Envirocare, the country's first privately owned low-level nuclear waste disposal facility. In 2004, after 16 years of growth and profitability, he sold the company, which later became Energy Solutions. Through his current company, S.K. Hart Management, he now manages a diversified global investment portfolio.

Semnani and his wife, Ghazaleh, founded the Semnani Family Foundation in 1993, which works with a wide variety of organizations to provide humanitarian relief across the globe. He also founded Omid for Iran in 2009 to encourage policies that protected the people of Iran and promoted their liberty. He wrote *The Ayatollah's Nuclear Gamble: The Human Cost of Military Strikes Against Iran's Nuclear Facilities,* published in 2012 in partnership with the Hinckley Institute of Politics at the University of Utah.

Semnani holds a master's degree in engineering and lives in Salt Lake City with his wife and three sons.

Carine Clark

Tech CEO & Silicon Slopes Executive Board Director

Carine Clark is a three-time president and CEO of high-growth tech companies, specializing in helping companies scale from $10 million to $100 million or more. Her reputation as a data-driven marketing executive at Novell, Altiris, and Symantec opened doors to lead Allegiance, MartizCX, and Banyan as president and CEO. She attributes her success to building an abundant team culture, demonstrating that companies accelerate their growth when they multiply their people.

As a cancer survivor, Clark channels her deep appreciation for life and relationships into advocating that tech professionals pay it forward by mentoring young people. In addition, Clark serves on the executive boards of The Utah Governor's Office of Economic Development, Silicon Slopes—a non-profit helping Utah's tech community thrive—and a few public company boards. She has received numerous awards including the EY Entrepreneur Of The Year® Award in the Utah Region and Utah Business Magazine's CEO of the Year.

Clark earned a bachelor's degree in organizational communications and an MBA from Brigham Young University. She enjoys traveling, exploring, and doing hard things with her family.

growth has continued at a fairly steady rate between 5 and 10 percent each year for the last decade.[14] Today, China's economy represents just over 16 percent of the world's GDP.[15] The United States still outpaces China with 24 percent of the world's GDP, but US annual growth has hovered around 2 percent for the last decade.[16]

China's military prowess has also increased, with military spending roughly doubling in the last decade alone (from $115 billion in 2010 to $261 billion in 2019), though China's military spending as a percentage of its GDP has hovered around 2 percent for the last two decades.[17] Chinese military personnel totals have also declined slightly.[18] Of course, the United States still dwarfs China in military expenditures with $732 billion in overall spending, sitting between roughly 3 to 5 percent of US GDP.[19] But in raw numbers, China has twice the overall number of military personnel.[20] China has also overhauled its approach to defense—dramatically upgrading its air, land, sea, and cyber technologies.[21]

China's global presence has also expanded. Since 2012, President Xi Jinping has consolidated power, expanding the presence of the communist party throughout the country.[22] Those efforts have also spread beyond China's borders as it attempts to inculcate developing and surrounding countries with its own illiberal principles.[23] Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative has largely paved the way for this expansion, involving a herculean effort to create a network of highways, railways, dams, pipelines, shipping ports, and other infrastructure projects throughout the globe.[24] Despite criticism of this initiative, over 60 countries (representing two-thirds of the world's population) have either engaged or expressed interest in Belt and Road Initiative projects.[25] This has given Chinese state-owned companies control of over 75 ports and terminals in 34 countries, expanding China's military prowess even further.[26]

Chinese business growth has also augmented the country's expansion. From 2008 to 2018, Chinese-owned Fortune Global 500 companies rose from 29 to 120, with US companies dropping from 197 to 126 and Japanese companies precipitously falling from 103 to 52.[27] China now leads with 124 to the United States' 121.[28] This jump in the rankings has come in large part because Chinese companies often are state supported through aid, tax exemptions, and logical assistance.[29] In fact, more than 73 percent of the 124 Chinese Fortune Global 500 companies are state owned.[30] China's vast labor force and state support also yields unmatched economies of scale that have allowed companies in technology, finance, energy, and materials sectors to penetrate global markets and begin to dominate them.[31] In many ways, the rise of Chinese business has become synonymous with Beijing's rise in global power.[32]

Foreign policy stances towards China have constantly been in flux over the last two decades. The Clinton administration paved the way for China to join the World Trade Organization, leading to a steep increase in US-China trade and Beijing's dramatic economic growth.[33] The Bush administration continued to experience this rise, with some increased tensions over events like the US-Sino Spy Plane Standoff.[34] The Bush administration also saw the sharp expansion of China's military spending and standing army size.[35] During President Obama's tenure, China became the United States' largest foreign creditor and the world's second-largest economy, driving Washington to "pivot" towards Asia and spearhead the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2011.[36] Though the administration decried China's growing presence in the South China Sea and other practices, President Obama's term was marked primarily by a spirit of cooperation interspersed with some competition.[37]

During President Trump's tenure, relations grew more tense.[38] In his last two years of office, President Trump imposed tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars of Chinese goods;[39] ran a global campaign against Chinese telecommunications equipment providers;[40] labeled China a currency manipulator and rescinded that label;[41] signed the Phase One deal attempting to deescalate trade relations;[42] denounced China's encroachment on Hong Kong autonomy and rescinded Hong Kong's special status;[43] escalated tensions over COVID-19 sources and solutions;[44] and blacklisted prominent Chinese-owned companies.[45] In contrast to prior US-Sino relations, Washington recently

Josh Holt

Former Political Prisoner in Venezuela

In 2016, Josh and Thamy Holt had just returned from their honeymoon in Venezuela when they were captured and held hostage as political prisoners in Caracas. For nearly two years, Josh and his wife suffered innumerable travesties as innocent people being held on false charges. For the duration of Josh's imprisonment, Senator Orrin Hatch worked alongside State Department officials and senior members of the Trump administration to secure Josh's freedom. In May 2018, they were able to broker a deal to bring Josh home.

During his incarceration, Josh had to find the mental resources to cope with countless indignities. Lessons learned from a Venezuelan prison are now invaluable tools Josh shares with audiences as he teaches others how to meet adversity with courage and resilience. He is now an inspirational speaker and lives in Utah.

has taken a harder stance on China, focusing more on competition than cooperation, and condemning unfair trade practices, intellectual property theft, human rights abuses, and aggressive military expansion.[46]

Though this report cannot be exhaustive on all strategies going forward, there are two points worth mentioning as it relates to China's rise and US efforts to maintain global stability. First, we must be careful not to blindly accept the narrative that China's global dominance is inevitable. The statistics above certainly show Beijing's exponential and continued growth. But the United States continues to be far wealthier per capita (over six times per capita wealth than China),[47] and there is some uncertainty as to the accuracy of China's macro-indicators generally.[48] But these are not the only indicators of success. National wealth measurements, for example, account for the accumulation of wealth (something GDP does not do). US household wealth was estimated at around $105 trillion in 2019, over 1.5 times larger than China's $64 trillion.[49] China's GDP increase, on the other hand, fails to capture whether it is actually getting wealthier or more prosperous.[50] COVID-19 has also highlighted global distrust towards China with 48 percent of international payments in April 2020 using the US dollar and only 1 percent using the renminbi.[51] Manufacturing costs are almost identical to those of China's when factoring overall worker productivity,[52] China shows no signs of catching up to the United States' unmatched technological advancements,[53] and US education outranks and is freer than Chinese education in readily apparent proportions.[54] We also cannot forget China's own efforts to convince us of this narrative.[55] Surely, the United States must continue its trajectory to maintain its place in the global order. But Chinese dominance is far from inevitable.

Second, maintaining a liberal global order cannot be done in isolation. Some have considered the Trump administration's foreign policy as retreating from global leadership in pursuit of domestic success.[56] Others have viewed these policies as necessary to defend and uphold US values and interests, and to help our allies and partners become more geopolitically self-reliant.[57] Regardless of who is right, the United States must leverage its relationships with other countries, strengthen security alliances, and expand partnerships across the globe, especially in the Indo-Pacific regions and developing countries.[58]

If nothing else, the relationship-fostering aspect of China's Belt and Road Initiative is one of its great successes. China's economic and ideological principles become more ubiquitous with each new project and partnership. This does not mean the United States should accept failures in current institutions and relations, however. The United States can and should continue to lead out in refining and reforming global institutions and relations to reach heightened levels of geopolitical efficiency. But abstaining from this kind of engagement because of an institution's or partnership's faults to go it alone will not lead to success. The Biden administration has already signaled its intentions of bringing back America's commitment to multilateralism and international organizations with an eye towards reform.[59] Combining a critical eye for reform with a willingness to engage within existing international institutions may be the best path forward to securing coalitions in furtherance of democracy and free markets. As one recent report put it, the ability to strengthen and mobilize our alliances and partnerships throughout the world "to confront the new realities of great power rivalry is *the* challenge for American statecraft in the period ahead."[60]

Russia

Russia's rise to its current place as a world power stands in stark contrast to China's. Though the USSR was by all accounts a global superpower during the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and perestroika left the successor state in shambles. Even during the Cold War, the Soviets' military might was built on an anemic economy and debilitated political system.[61] The transition from a command economy to one that was market-based only made things worse, especially given the difficulty of retooling a defense- and industrial-focused economy to one centered on consumer-based industries.[62] Many Russians also became disenchanted with free-market principles and privatization during the 1990s as market liberalization seemed to account for their drop in standards of living and social services, and the rise in corruption and crime.[63] Russia's revitalization began with President Vladimir Putin, who was able to suppress the more independent regions of the country and create a more unified Russia.[64] Internal reforms and growing oil prices also bolstered domestic economic stability.[65] This domestic stability dovetailed with Putin's efforts to strengthen international relations with world leaders and organizations.[66] With

Russia's increased abilities in cyberwarfare[67] and efforts to expand its sphere of influence in surrounding regions,[68] Russia has again risen to great-power status.[69]

Russia's power manifests itself quite differently from China's or the United States', however. In contrast to China's economic might, Russian GDP per capita sits just below $2 trillion—around 8 times smaller than China's GDP and 13 times smaller than the American GDP.[70] Russia's annual GDP growth has averaged 1.5 percent in the last four years, compared to the United States' 2.3 percent and China's 6.7 percent growth.[71] Russia also trails in military spending and military personnel, though it spent twice as much of its GDP on military expenditures than China in 2019.[72] Instead, Russia cements its seat at the global table through its full-scale nuclear arsenal (second only to the United States) and military might (also second only to the United States).[73] Russia also augments its power through cyberwarfare capabilities comparable to China's abilities,[74] and has used online mediums to engage in widespread disinformation tactics.[75]

Foreign relations with Russia have seen a recurring trend since the fall of the Soviet Union: a new administration comes in with high hopes of reforming US-Russia relations, only for relations to briefly improve before reverting to old tensions shortly thereafter. For example, the Clinton administration began with cordial notions of furthering Russian democracy, but relations sharply declined with Boris Yeltsin's suppression of protestors, NATO's enlargement, and Russia's military campaign against Chechen separatists. The Bush administration's stance toward Russia softened with Moscow's pledge to support post-9/11 efforts and Moscow's later pledge to partner with the United States in advancing democratic principles and human rights. But US support of Eastern European color revolutions strained relations.

The Obama administration similarly began optimistically given President Medvedev's election. But relations hit a new low when the United States supported the overthrow of Libya's Qaddafi and opposed Syria's Assad, and when Russia decided to annex Crimea and support insurgencies in Ukraine.[76] Relations during the Trump administration followed the same cycle, beginning cozy and degenerating into repeated sanctions for human rights violations, cyberattacks, and election interference; condemnation of Russia's practices domestically and internationally in countries like Syria and Venezuela; and withdrawal from the 1978 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty due to Russia's noncompliance.[77]

Going forward, three important strategies should be on policymakers' minds. First, nuclear disarmament agreements. The existing US-Russian New START treaty is set to expire on February 5, 2021.[78] On January 25, Presidents Biden and Putin agreed to extend New START for an additional five years[79]—something the leaders could do without congressional or Duma approval per the treaty's terms.[80] An immediate extension for the next five years gives both countries time to articulate competing interests and negotiate new terms while still remaining treaty bound.[81] That said, some disagreed with extending the agreement as letting it lapse could have provided Washington leverage thanks to Russia's interest in maintaining limits on US forces.[82] But America's long-term leverage will not wane by extending the treaty given the extension is only temporary. Ultimately, a new agreement must be negotiated within the next five years, and it should include changes that cover Russia's new types of strategic offensive arms not currently regulated by New START.[83] The Biden administration should also think carefully about trying to include China with its small, but not insignificant nuclear arsenal. An amended trilateral agreement may be the most efficient way to deal with the world's current nuclear powers.[84]

Second, NATO's presence in Eastern Europe. Russia has attributed much of its aggression in recent years to NATO's expansion.[85] Moscow's intrusion into Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea is by far the clearest example of this.[86] NATO-Russia relations have been ongoing since the Clinton administration,[87] but they remain a crucial aspect of US foreign policy today. President Biden has indicated his intent to strengthen ties with NATO allies, though he has not explained whether expansion of NATO is a priority.[88] Delineating the future of NATO is beyond the scope of this report, but policies going forward will

likely have to balance Russia's belief that it should enjoy a "privileged sphere of influence" with America's longstanding commitment to furthering rule of law and democracy in surrounding countries like Ukraine and Georgia.[89]

Third, Russia's growing cyber presence. Despite American dominance in traditional warfare, cyberwarfare is relatively nascent but quickly advancing. Russia has been among the frontrunners taking this form of asymmetric warfare to the United States and its allies. The December 2020 hack of at least six federal agencies—including the Departments of State and Homeland Security—is the most recent evidence of this.[90] And though the US government has repeatedly tasked experts with revamping our nation's cybersecurity plan, many of those recommendations, especially the importance of public-private partnerships, have not been fully implemented.[91] The Biden administration's cybersecurity policies will continue to mold this ever-important area of global engagement, especially given Congress's recent creation of the first national cyber director position.[92] As the SolarWinds hack demonstrated, though, America's ability to stave off Russia's repeated cyberattacks will depend on how well the federal government champions the public-private partnership.[93] And as Ambassador Huntsman noted in his symposium remarks, the United States must also prepare a strategy to respond if traditional sanction tactics fail to yield results.

Combating Subversive Influences at Home and Abroad

In acclimating to a global order with competing great powers, the United States must specifically combat Chinese, Russian, and other country influence designed to undermine democratic institutions and free-market

principles. China's Belt and Road Initiative is likely the biggest threat. This initiative has no doubt increased China's infrastructure and presence globally—but it goes well beyond infrastructure. These projects are built on low-interest loans that often give China greater leverage over participating countries.[94] For example, when the United States installed its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems in South Korea, China directed its citizens to boycott South Korean companies, tour groups, and more, forcing South Korea into negotiations, and eventual military concessions, with Beijing.[95]

This initiative also gives China greater access to influence the governments of developing countries around the globe. Chinese aid often comes with no values attached, meaning countries can accept aid without having to first alter their cultural and political norms to better accord with Western principles (as is often required with Western aid). After developing these "neutral" economic relationships, China can then offer its experience in helping governments in developing countries actively eschew democratic principles by suppressing rule of law, free speech, transparency, and accountability.[96] For example, China is now aiding Pakistan in developing a state surveillance system similar to Beijing's.[97] China's presence in Ethiopia and Sudan has also allowed it to train officials on how to censor media, internet, and other communication channels.[98]

China is not alone in its subversive tactics. Russian foreign policy seems evermore grounded in disinformation strategies to sow division within and skepticism of Western institutions. Combating this challenge is especially difficult given that messages rarely stem from the same source, coming instead through a mix of official, unofficial, and unidentified channels.[99] There is rarely uniformity across messages either since the goal is not to tell a lie, but to obscure truth.[100] To make matters worse, information consumers—particularly social media users—tend to have a multiplying effect on sensational news and viewpoints,

giving disinformation a multiplier effect at virtually no cost.[101] Many other countries, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, are joining the fray with disinformation tactics of their own.[102]

The task of combating both China's and Russia's efforts to expand their influences is daunting and multifaceted. To stem the negative effects of China's Belt and Road Initiative, the answer lies, again, in international relationships. Setting aside the merits of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, revitalizing trade relationships in that area of the world is vital.[103] Similarly, US policymakers should think seriously about offering a constructive alternative to China's initiatives. That is not to say the US should abandon its high standards for democratic reform, but expecting international favors without providing incentives will likely give way to China's ever-dangling carrots.[104] Japan in particular has adopted this approach, offering its own initiatives throughout Asia.[105] And as dōTERRA's David Sterling and Ambassador O'Brien mentioned during the Hatch Center symposium, international investment in and business with these regions can also have a similar impact in fostering economic independence and countering anti-Western principles.

Staving off Russian disinformation tactics begins with improving the digital literacy of everyday Americans. Russia's ability to sow doubt will decrease greatly when social media and internet users learn to think wisely about the media they consume and accept as true. The less false ideas are re-posted, the less likely Russia will benefit from the multiplier effect of digitally ignorant individuals. Sweden and Finland have been particularly successful in this regard and would serve as good starting points for policymakers in America.[106] France has similarly seen some success in taking a more hardline stance against Russian disinformation tactics.[107] Partnering with allied governments, NGOs, and private companies will also be necessary to triangulate disinformation tactics and increase collective resilience.[108] In a prior age, Thomas Jefferson may have been right: "Truth will do well enough if left to shift for herself" and "has no need of force to procure entrance into the minds of men."[109] But in today's age, a comprehensive policy must engage in a more aggressive information effort to spread truth, especially the truth of democratic principles.[110] Passively hoping democracy wins the day will not be enough.

Conclusion

US foreign policy will continue to shift and adapt as global events unfold. But we have long since left the era of American unipolarity. The United States still remains the sole superpower, but it must adapt in a new global order of competing great powers vying for the destabilization and overthrow of the liberal world. By 2049—the centennial of Mao's rise to power—China fully expects a shift in the geopolitical landscape: the dilution of Western-led institutions and the dominance of authoritarian and illiberal principles through countries becoming both enamored and ensnared by Chinese ideology and economic dominance.[111] Russia similarly has its eyes set on a multipolar world that will allow it to dominate Eurasia and impose its own anti-Western values therein.[112] And so, the question becomes: "[w]ill egalitarianism remain the dominant ideal in international politics, or will it cede leadership back to authoritarianism?"[113]

Whatever US policy stances are during the Biden administration and beyond, we cannot forget our greatest exports: the protection of basic human liberties, democratic institutions, rule of law, open elections, and free-market competition. Despotic and developing regimes may choose authoritarian models to maintain power, but the common refrain of modern political history is that a people will always come to demand liberty. By maintaining US influence abroad, these seekers of liberty will continue to reach for western principles. And with multi-generational grass-roots reform, democracy will win the day.

We also cannot forget that our efforts start at home. Recent events have strained the American spirit and projected examples of democracy at its worst. Only by piecing our pluralistic society together around shared principles can this nation then turn outward to share democracy at its finest. This will require actually uniting around shared American ideals despite differences—not merely giving lip service to this task to garner political approval. As George Washington observed in his First Inaugural Address: "[T]he preservation of the sacred fire of liberty and the destiny of the Republican model of Government, are justly considered as deeply, perhaps as finally staked, on the experiment entrusted to the hands of the American people."

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