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Cover Photo:
Tangier, Morocco- During my time studying abroad in Spain, I went on many excursions discovering new people, places, and cultures. One of these excursions led me to the country of Morocco. While on a guided tour in Morocco, we made a pit stop at this beautiful location where both the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean meet the heavens. The paths converge in such a seamless way. Their beauty is captivating. (Photo by Natalie Scott, ’17)
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On April 14, 2014, the terrorist organization Boko Haram sparked international uproar when it kidnapped almost three hundred schoolgirls from Chibok, Nigeria and forced them into marriages with the insurgents. Although the incident garnered a great deal of attention from the international community, this was not the first time that Boko Haram had engaged in unspeakable acts against civilians. Since its resurgence in 2010, it has killed at least 20,000 people and displaced an additional 2.3 million.¹ Unsurprisingly, the Global Terrorism Index classified it as the deadliest terrorist organization in the world in 2015.² This paper presents a critical analysis of Boko Haram and its rise to power in order to answer the question: What are Boko Haram’s political objectives and to what extent has the group been successful in achieving its goals? This question can be answered through a review of the organization’s background, through discussion of its desires to form an Islamic caliphate in the Sahel region to replace the current state system, and through an analysis of the types of violence it uses against civilians. It is also important to examine how Boko Haram has achieved collective action. This investigation finds collective action achieved through the conscription of villagers, through imposing strict barriers of entry, and through exploiting the indiscriminate violence carried out by the Nigerian military. This paper finds that the terrorist group has not been successful in its ultimate political objective and argues that a settlement with Boko Haram will not be possible due to the group’s dynamics. It also hypothesizes that this terrorist organization will not return to its former level of strength in the future because of the growing effectiveness of the Nigerian military under newly elected president Muhammadu Buhari.

The Dispute, Background, and Strategic Violence of Boko Haram

Boko Haram was founded by Mohammed Yusuf as a Sunni fundamentalist group in 2002 on the view that the current state systems in Nigeria were illegitimate and therefore did not deserve to retain monopolies on political and military power.³ As a result, the primary goals of this terrorist group are quite clear: to eliminate these states and institute a caliphate to replace them. The precise structure of this caliphate remains unclear given that Boko Haram is more of a loose, divided network of cells as opposed to a strong hierarchical organization with clear policy goals.⁴ Despite these extreme⁵ objectives, Boko Haram did not engage in violence for the first seven years of its existence. However, the growing radicalization of the group eventually prompted a Nigerian police investigation on July 26, 2009. This resulted in a minor confrontation between the two groups which eventually sparked a massive military retaliation.⁶ Hundreds of Boko Haram members were killed and Yusuf was allegedly executed while in police custody.⁷

Despite this setback, the group quickly experienced a resurgence under its current leader, Abubakar Shekau, after a massive prison break in Bauchi. In 2011, the still relatively weak group resorted to targeting attacks against vulnerable civilians with improvised explosive devices. These initial attacks can be explained in two ways. First, Boko Haram needed to signal that it had the necessary resolve to achieve its political demands. The group did not have the capability to directly engage with the powerful Nigerian army so it was forced to use violence against civilians to send a series of costly signals, a process that Kydd and Walter refer to as attrition.⁸ Second, Boko Haram needed to demonstrate to civilians that its threats could be carried out, which set the foundation for the group to eventually use coercion as a means of achieving collective action.⁹

As its capabilities increased, the organi
zation grew bolder. Following the inaug-
uration of Nigerian President Goodluck
Jonathan on May 29, 2011, Boko Haram
bombed the capital of Abuja in an act of
indiscriminate violence against the new
administration. In northern cities, the ter-
rorist organization relied more heavily on
assassinations and the specific targeting of
police officers in an effort to minimize the
casualties of potential supporters. Suicide
bombings and other types of indiscrimi-
nate violence would be far more likely to
alienate the local population against Boko
Haram.

In total, Boko Haram engaged in 115
attacks in 2011 that killed 550 people,10
prompting Jonathan to declare a state of
emergency at the end of the year. How-
ever, this action only produced increased
violence. Just three weeks into 2012, Boko
Haram launched a vicious attack on police
buildings in Kano that killed 190 people.11
Meanwhile, the Nigerian military was
accused of numerous human rights abuses
in their attempts to combat the terrorist
group which didn't help the military gain
popular support against Boko Haram.12
President Jonathan failed to rescue the kid-
napped girls from Chibok and to prevent
skilled militants from taking control of
huge portions of territory in the north-
ern territory of Nigeria. In January 2015
a “Multinational Joint Task Force” which
consisted of soldiers from Nigeria, Chad,
Cameroon, Niger and Benin came together
in an organized effort to weaken Boko Ha-
ram.13 By the end of the year, the terrorist
organization had been beaten back and
driven from most of its territory. Contrary
to the claims of current Nigerian President
Muhammadu Buhari, however, the group
has not been defeated.14 In fact, there is ev-
idence that it has recently begun to escalate
its attacks in a desperate attempt to deter
civilians from siding with the government.
Boko Haram was behind a devastating
attack near Maiduguri, Nigeria that killed
eighty-six people this past December.15 It
is clear that even the success of the Task
Force's military efforts have not completely
destroyed Boko Haram.

This past winter, I was given the opportunity to explore one of Iceland’s natural wonders, a cave formed naturally out of
ice. This particular ice cave is located inside of Vatnajökull, Iceland’s largest Ice cap. Each year the ice cave will melt and
entirely new one will form. I chose to photograph the caves only source of light, a spiraling ice tunnel that was carved
solely by flowing water.

Joseph Taylor, ‘18
How Boko Haram Has Produced Collective Action

A recent report by the Council on Foreign Relations declared that the origins of Boko Haram “appear rooted in grievances over poor governance and sharp inequality in Nigerian society.”16 African analyst Chris Ngwodo goes even further, arguing that the terrorist group “is a symptom of decades of failed government and elite delinquency finally ripening into social chaos.”17 However, in reviewing the existing literature on grievances and civil war—which commonly espouse ties between the two—it seems clear that even the presence of severe grievances in Nigeria are not enough to compel collective groups of individuals to commit violence. Collier and Hoefller note that “grievance-assuagement is predominantly a public good,”18 which is more difficult to overcome when recruiting because of the collective action problem. It is also important to note that a comprehensive study performed by Fearon and Laitin on the causes of civil war found no evidence that “civil war will break out where broad political grievances are strongest.”19 Boko Haram instead has relied on threatening villagers, instituting steep barriers to entry and exploiting the indiscriminate military response of the Nigerian army.

Coercion

One of the most common methods terrorist organizations use to recruit is coercing members through violent threats. Boko Haram has employed this strategy with great effectiveness. When the terrorist group held a significant amount of territory, it would resort to lining up people in the villages that it controlled and ordering them to join or be killed.20 Boko Haram has also relied heavily on the forcible recruitment of both women and children. According to an estimate by Amnesty International, it has likely kidnapped at least two thousand women, many of whom were forced to take part in the group’s violent activities.21 Not only has Boko Haram utilized female suicide bombers to an alarming degree, it has even trained some of its abducted women to become fighters. In fact, a group of women known as the Chibok girls have committed some of the worst atrocities of the conflict.22

Abducted children have also played an important role in Boko Haram. Given that children tend to question authority far less than adults, they are more easily manipulated into committing devastating attacks. Shockingly, in the past two years, approximately 20% of the suicide attacks undertaken by Boko Haram were carried out by children.23 Without a doubt, Boko Haram has been able to leverage its brutal reputation to effectively threaten much of northern Nigeria to comply with its demands.

Steep Barriers to Entry

Boko Haram is an extremely religious organization that adheres to a very fundamentalist brand of Islam. There are two significant barriers that must be surpassed before joining Boko Haram. Like other militant religious organizations, prospective members must make a series of religious sacrifices to ensure that their devotion is sufficient.24 Perhaps more importantly, many individuals are given tests of loyalty before they are permitted to become members. For example, the attacks following Jonathan’s presidential inauguration in 2011 were perpetrated by Nigerian soldiers who needed to prove they were serious about defecting.25 These sorts of violent tests of loyalty are not limited to willing members. In order to combat the possibility of conscripted members turning on their captors, Boko Haram has forced kidnapped individuals to commit murder or other acts of violence so as to make them feel isolated from normal society, binding them closer to the organization.26 These barriers to entry help to ensure that those members who do manage to join can be trusted to carry out Boko Haram’s orders.

The Indiscriminate Violence of the Nigerian Military

Through its use of indiscriminate violence against civilians, the Nigerian military has contributed to the growth of Boko Haram. The corruption in the Nigerian military has made it nearly impossible to gather sound intelligence on Boko Haram, forcing the army to “take vengeance on the whole civilian population.”27 In its Annual Report in 2012, Amnesty International accused Nigeria of killing hundreds of innocent civilians in counterattacks against Boko Haram. Just a year later, Human Rights Watch made similar claims.28 As a result, the terrorist organization has managed to increase its numbers despite the fact that the vast majority of Nigerians abhor its actions.29 In some respects, the Nigerian military has been its own worst enemy as it is has allowed Boko Haram to leverage the army’s deficiencies and gain support for the terrorist group.

The Failure of Boko Haram and the Unlikely Nature of Negotiation

At this point, neither its brutal slaughter of civilians nor its temporary seizure of territory have allowed Boko Haram to achieve its ultimate political objective of overthrowing the states in the region. There have also been no attempts at negotiating a settlement between Boko Haram and the governments in the region. There are two possible explanations for this: issue indivisibility and the dynamics of Boko Haram itself.

An indivisible good is one that cannot be divided without causing a reduction in its worth. In some respects, it seems as though the control of the Nigerian government is indivisible; it cannot simultaneously exist as an Islamic state as envisioned by Boko Haram and retain its current status as a democratic republic. However, Fearon and many other political scientists do not accept the validity of this principle.30 The issue of governmental control is far more complex than the simple picture painted above: Boko Haram could be given political representation in the current government;31 part of the country could be classified as an Islamic state; or leadership could alternate between members of Boko Haram and the current policymakers. The existence of these scenarios suggests that negotiations are hindered not by issue indivisibility, but by a different phenomenon.

Boko Haram is best viewed as a cell network rather than a formal hierarchy which has led to some divisions within the organization, particularly between nationalists and those more focused on regional ties with other terrorist groups.32 Although Shekau has been able to maintain his relatively uncontested status as the leader of Boko Haram, he does not possess complete dominance.33 A game theory model laid out by Best and Bapat explains why this situation will be unlikely.
to lead to negotiations. If Shekau did attempt to negotiate, he would potentially spark infighting by rival cells, which would ultimately lead to a weakened Boko Haram that would be far more vulnerable to defeat. Seeking to avoid this, Shekau has no incentive to enter into a settlement. This theory is supported by two important pieces of empirical evidence. First, Shekau deviated away from the domestic focus of Boko Haram by pledging allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria just about a year ago. Not only does this suggest that the terrorist organization is losing strength, it may mean that Shekau is attempting to appease certain factions within Boko Haram. Second, Shekau has taken steps to “silence pro-dialogue individuals,” indicating that he is taking action against the pursuit of negotiations. In summary, it is not indivisibility, but the internal politics of Boko Haram that are likely to make negotiations difficult to achieve.

The Future of Boko Haram
Although this situation will likely not be resolved through negotiations, it is possible to predict what the future of this terrorist organization will be. It is very unlikely that Boko Haram will be completely defeated in the near future. Unlike in a hierarchical structure—where eliminating top leaders could quickly lead to the collapse of the organization—killing Shekau or other leaders in Boko Haram will not destroy the organization. Just as the death of Yusuf only temporarily weakened Boko Haram in 2009, the system of relatively loose connections between different cells will ensure the durability of the group. However, it will likely not return to its former level of strength. Although certain characteristics of Nigeria—such as poverty, rough terrain, and a large population—do make it vulnerable for a return of a Boko Haram insurgency, this terrorist organization would have to once again overcome the immense problem of collective action. Given the recent election of President Buhari, however, this looks unlikely. It has been widely believed that Buhari will likely be more effective than his predecessor in maintaining the security of the country. Buhari’s inauguration ceremony coincided at a time when there was greater cooperation between Nigeria and its neighbors and the Multinational Joint Task Force had achieved some success. Even more recently, Buhari secured a deal in which the United States would resume a training program for the Nigerian army that had previously been terminated under President Jonathan. This should increase the combat effectiveness of Nigerian soldiers, which should allow them to more effectively protect civilians who are vulnerable to coercion by Boko Haram. Perhaps more importantly, the United States has agreed to coordinate information sharing, which will allow the Nigerian army to launch counterterrorist strikes with more precision and
minimize the collateral damage of terrorist strikes. With a decreased ability to capitalize on the flaws of the Nigerian army, Boko Haram will be less likely to achieve its political objectives.

**Conclusion**

Although it has even briefly held significant swathes of territory, Boko Haram has not achieved its main objective of overthrowing the state systems in the Sahel region and replacing them with a caliphate. This is due to the fact that Boko Haram is a relatively flat network in which negotiations could lead to infighting which makes a settlement unlikely. However, Boko Haram has been able to achieve collective action through coercion, steep barriers to entry, and through exploiting the violence carried out by the Nigerian army. This has allowed the group to launch a variety of both targeted and indiscriminate attacks that have killed thousands of people in the hopes of achieving its political objective. Despite recent setbacks to its power, Boko Haram is unlikely to overcome the collective action problem to the same extent that it previously has. Unfortunately, the terrorist organization is also unlikely to be destroyed for many years to come.

**Citations**

4. Ibid., 3.
5. The use of the word ‘extreme’ here does not aim to make any moral judgment; rather, it uses a classification of extremism defined by Lake in which the political preferences are not widely shared and those individuals who do possess them lack the means of power to obtain them. Lake, “Rational Extremism - Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century”, 17-19.
7. Ibid., 98.
9. Ibid., 66.
10. Kimemia, Africa’s Social Cleavages and Democratization, 146
17. Ibid., para. 13.
24. Berman, Radical, Religious, and Violent - The New Economics of Terrorism, 16
25. Berman, Radical, Religious, and Violent - The New Economics of Terrorism, 16
30. According to a recent poll by the Pew Research Center, “eighty-two percent of Nigerians have an unfavorable view of Boko Haram, with seventy-nine percent holding a very unfavorable view.” Poushter, “6 Facts about Public Opinion in Nigeria before Election Day”, para. 4.
32. Forty-three percent of terrorist groups end by reengaging in normal politics; thus, it would not be unusual for Boko Haram to be given this privilege. Jones and Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End - Lessons for Countering Al Qa’ida, 19.
34. Ibid., 13.
35. Ibid., 5-11.
36. Ibid., 14.
37. Ibid., 14.38.
38. Olorunyomi, “US Resumes Training of Nigerian Troops for Anti-Terror War”, para. 1
40. Ibid., para. 6.
Orban’s Illiberal Democracy and its Restrictions on Liberty

By Madeline Hatcher
Senior Political Science, Global Studies Major, Philosophy, Politics, Economics Minor

As a country that emerged from the throes of Soviet control primed to accept and integrate liberal democracy, the Hungary we see now exhibits few of these characteristics and indeed seems to be moving in a regressive manner. Prime Minister Viktor Orban and his supporters have amassed an incredible amount of political power and leverage, leading to restrictions on free speech and unbiased media sources, as well as almost unrestrained corruption at all levels of government. Hungary’s accession to the European Union in 2004 has done little to actually combat this illiberal form of modern democracy with its lack of enforcement mechanisms, suggesting that the Orban administration, and those that follow, will be unlikely to change course anytime soon. The Orban regime’s political clientelism, destructive reforms to Hungarian legislature, and unwillingness to adapt to democratic standards have severely hindered the country’s ability to fully transition from a former Soviet satellite state to a functioning European nation. These challenges will likely continue to impede Hungary’s progress for the foreseeable future, highlighting the difficulties of a democratic transformation in a country plagued by its history of corrupt politics and unfree citizens.

Since Fidesz’s landslide victory in 2010, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and his party have been able to consolidate a large degree of power in a particularly undemocratic way. This systematic demolition of a liberal democracy has come as a bit of surprise for the international community. During and immediately following the EU accession process, Hungary “was consistently ranked among the most advanced post-communist transformation countries,” supporting the general expectation that “countries far along in the transformation process [would be] most likely to comply with EU rules”. Its “goulash communism” had allowed Hungary to be the most liberal of the Soviet bloc states and transition peacefully into democratic rule. In addition, “the media, judiciary, and business sector appeared to be sufficiently independent” to ensure Orban’s cooperation with the rules.

However, it soon became apparent that the positive outlook echoed by both the Hungarian government and the EU had been too optimistic. Less than twenty years after gaining EU membership, Hungary seems to be in the midst of a democratic backslide, largely due to Orban’s restrictive policies, particularly in relation to the media and legal institutions. This paper will take a closer look at the implications of such legislation, analyzing the extent to which the EU is able to enforce the rules of the democratic playbook once accession has occurred. However, in order to understand the implications of Orban’s regime for the future of Hungarian democracy, it is imperative to first take into account the conditions that were perfectly primed for Orban’s political takeover in 2010.

How was Orban Able to Secure Power?

What factors can be used to explain such a sharp decrease in the legitimacy of Hungarian democracy, so soon after its establishment? One possible explanation is that the EU is simply not “equipped to address the massive socioeconomic disruptions of the transformation process, such as rising income inequality and unemployment”. The EU’s status as a supranational entity means that it lacks a strong enforcement mechanism; in addition, it prevents the EU from intervening in certain affairs of its member states, such as individual economic issues. Hungary’s economy, which was already weak, was extremely crippled by the 2008 financial crisis and its international implications. This was largely due to the fact that in 2007, most countries in the midst of EU accession were either burdened with high external debt from international banks or high government debt. Hungary was the only country to have both of these financial problems.

In conjunction with the fractured economy, the main explanation for Orban’s 2010 success can be attributed to the breakdown of the Socialist Party, which had been the ruling party for eight years; it fell prey to scandal and debt, and has been unable thus far to recover enough to topple the Orban regime. This political windfall provided a major boost to Orban’s campaign, as the other left-leaning parties splintered and, consequently, lacked the cohesion necessary to sustain any serious opposition to Orban. This political windfall provided a major boost to Orban’s campaign, as the other left-leaning parties splintered and, consequently, lacked the cohesion necessary to sustain any serious opposition to Orban. The combination of a fragile economy, equally unstable political climate and EU accession stress acted as the driving force behind Orban’s massive sweeping of the votes in the election. However, it has been his manipulation of the legislative
process and defiance of democratic regulations that have enabled him to effectively block any form of opposition before it even arises.

The Current Hungarian Situation

Since Hungary's EU accession, the international view of the country has only continued to sink further and further. One political commentator has portrayed Hungary's political reality as a "Frankenstate," the pieces of which "might have operated perfectly well in their original contexts, but combined in a new constitutional system, these once-normal rules produce abnormal results." This so-called "Frankenstate" has tried to maintain norms that were acceptable in pre-1989 Hungary, but are not compatible with modern democratic values. Why haven't Orban and the Fidesz leaders been under greater scrutiny for their mistreatment of democracy? Orban openly disavows the importance of maintaining a democratic rule of law in Hungary in his assertion that "liberal democratic societies cannot remain globally competitive". This controversial comment acts as a justification for Orban's political actions thus far during his term, and highlight the lacking transition to EU membership with only partial implementation of democratic values.

As this paper will discuss, Orban's regime has primarily inhibited Hungarian citizens from exercising their right to free speech and has undermined the upholding of constitutional values of the legal system. While the EU has attempted to force Orban to change his ways, it seems that Hungary's political climate has changed little, highlighting the inconsistencies of the EU's enforcement abilities and the depth of Hungary's issues. Is it reasonable to agree with the many "political scientists, pundits, and journalists in Hungary and abroad" who claim that, in light of Orban's policies, Hungarian democracy has died after only twenty years. Though Hungary has made significant improvements since joining the EU, Orban's regime is part of a larger problem of institutionalized corruption and disregard for ethical conduct.

Limitations on Free Speech in the Media

Orban's administration has been subjected to much critique since its rise to power, in particular for its restrictive control of the media and the negative social effects created as a result. One of the first major policy actions taken by Orban in the early stages of his term, without consulting either the opposition parties or relevant organizations has drawn wide criticism from multiple leaders and institutions within the international community. In January 2011, a new media law was passed, a precedent that "handed Viktor Orban the Sword of Damocles to hold over the head of Hungary's free media". This legislation granted the government the ability to impose heavy fines and potentially cause media outlets to become bankrupt if they did not choose to comply with the government's idea of acceptable material. The law certainly seemed to be a revival of the strict censorship of the Communist regime with its restrictions on personal liberty and expression. Orban's law also established a Media Council tasked with overseeing regulation...
of publication outlets; unsurprisingly, all members of this Council were appointed by the Fidesz- controlled Parliament. As a means of further extending the party’s influence within the public media sphere, the law also established a term length of nine years for the Council Chair and its members, exceeding two parliamentary cycles. This symbolizes the pervasive nature of Orban’s policies; even if the Fidesz-controlled parliament was somehow ousted from power, Orban has ensured that his authoritarian legacy will live on. While the law may have appeared to be more of a guiding force than anything else, Orban’s intentions soon became clear, as many people in related fields began to lose their jobs for speaking out under the flimsy guise of protecting the people. Attila Mong is just one example; she had been a popular radio host of a government-owned station, but after conducting a minute of silence in protest of the media law she was suspended and never got her job back.

The implications of this media law, as well as the serious nature of the situation, cannot be overstated. Here is an overt attack on personal liberty and the right to freedom of speech, and yet there has not been a substantial public outcry in response. Kounalakis wonders, “How could a law be enacted without public debate or even giving the opposition a chance to evaluate the law?”, and this has indeed been the central question of the controversy surrounding the legislature. While the law still remains intact, keeping these restrictions firmly in place, observers have begun to draw attention to the situation. For instance, it has received “harsh assessments from the European Parliament, the European Commission, the United Nations special rapporteur on freedom of expression, the media representative of the OSCE, [and] the Council of Europe”. Seeing that some institutions were beginning to raise alarms concerning the law, Orban then made some smaller agreements aimed at convincing them that the system was ethical, and should not be viewed as a major issue. Neelie Kroes, who was
the EU Commissioner at the time, felt that concerns over the media law had been sufficiently addressed through an exchange of email correspondence with the Hungarian government, "which promised to ease rules for foreign media and soften the rules against 'unbalanced' coverage and 'offensive' Internet content.

Though his statements have mollified some of the negative reactions, Orbán's explicit limitations on free speech have stirred discontent among international institutions in response. Sedelmeier notes that once the main independent radio station was withdrawn from the air, the case was taken up at a Budapest court, which granted the station temporary freedom to stay on air. However, according to the Council of Europe, this ruling still does not fully comply with the EU's human rights standards, since the station was only granted temporary freedom. While these institutions clearly disagree with Orbán's policies, their abilities to enforce change seem to be limited to chastising him without offering a real solution to the problems at hand.

**Reforms to the Legal System**

Exercising strict control over the media is not the only way in which Orbán's government has been able to diminish the rights of the Hungarian citizens. The Fidesz party has fully entrenched itself within the judicial system, giving Orbán even more leverage over the legal decisions reached in Hungarian courts. According to research compiled by Freedom House, the democratic progress of Hungary's judicial framework and governance has worsened as well (Kovacs 2013, 241). From the beginning of the Orbán regime, it has been able to pass through any legislation that it chooses, without the threat of a strong opposition party to act as a constraint. In 2010, when the Fidesz-KDNP (Christian Democratic People's Party) coalition government came to power, it had won more than two-thirds of the parliamentary seats, a victory that "empowered the government to execute its economic, social, and foreign policy without any significant control from the parliament". In addition, "from a legislative point of view, it meant that the government had the power to change any laws or the constitution almost on a daily basis according to political interests", a situation that clearly does not portray the ideals of democracy upon which the EU was founded.

The Orban government has made use of its control of Parliament, primarily by aggressively passing legislation that concentrates power in the hands of Fidesz. During Orbán's initial stint as Prime Minister, from 1998-2004, a total of 224 bills were adopted, compared with 168 and 167 total bills in the following Medgyessy and Gyurcsany governments. This trend has accelerated since his second victory in 2010, and it's evident that governmental restrictions placed on the legislative process have increasingly crippled the country. In the Freedom House's assessment of Hungary's legislature, the authors remark that "Orban tends to appoint weak figures to key positions, favoring personal loyalty and a lack of serious political ambitions over professional expertise and ability". Backed by parliamentary support, Orbán has exploited his privileges as PM and pushed through a variety of reforms and laws aimed at nothing other than substantiating his seemingly limitless power.

One of the most striking, and perhaps disheartening, examples of such reforms instituted by Orban is his complete disregard for the basic tenets of rule of law and the preservation of constitutional ideals, two elements found in modern democracies. For instance, in 2011, the wife of a prominent Fidesz politician was appointed as head of the judiciary for a new extended nine-year period, which "cleared the way for more direct political manipulation of the courts, which had represented one of the last state institutions outside the government's control". Additionally, the President of the Supreme Court, Andras Baka, was forced into early retirement ostensibly because he didn’t have five years of Hungarian judicial experience, even though he had previously served as a judge on the European Court of Human Rights for seventeen years. In reality, his dismissal has been linked to his public disapproval of the legal reforms generated by Orban and Fidesz.

The legal changes instituted by the Orban administration have not stopped at the strategic positioning of key legislative actors, however. Further eroding the system of checks and balances in the legal system, the government removed a watchdog institution which had been monitoring human rights and the rights of minorities, replacing it with the Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, an institution whose head executive is a Fidesz party member.

**Corruption**

The prevalence of corruption in Hungarian government has continued to plague the promotion of democracy as well. Freedom House's analysis of the democratic progress of Hungary's government found that corruption has steadily worsened in the years following EU accession. The report also notes that, in Hungarian society, "small-scale corruption...is a widespread and blatant phenomenon, and many people see it as a necessary part of life." The fact that Hungary’s corruption score has increasingly declined under Orban should not come as a surprise, given the tactics he and his party members utilize to ensure their political protection. A handful of journalists, under the protection of watchdog NGOs, have been able to achieve some degree of publication independence. However, they are far outnumbered, in both quantity of supporters and resources, by Orban and his allies, who will stop at nothing to defend their concentration of power.

Within the existing government, there has also been a large degree of bribery and questionable transactions occurring between political officials, leading to scandals which have caused Orban's former adviser Jozsef Debreczeni to lament, "In the West a similar scandal would have led to the fall of a head of government. He would have to resign. Not in Hungary". That isn't the only monetary infraction committed by the Orban government, though. After EU accession, Hungary had been under the Excessive Deficit Procedure as a means of monitoring its fiscal responsibility. In recent years, however, the government began applying its own methods for avoiding the EU’s regulations, by “introducing sectoral taxes, eradicating private pension funds, and redirecting accumulated assets into the budget or used to reduce government debt”. This further illustrates the lack of constraints placed on Orban's control of the state, and demonstrates the alarming slide towards authoritarianism taking place right under the nose of the EU.
The EU’s Response
Since the beginning of Orban’s campaign to accumulate power, particularly by threatening the rights of Hungarian citizens, it has seemed that the EU has largely stood by, reprimanding Orban but not taking punitive action against his government. Why has the EU not taken a more proactive stance in addressing the problems associated with the Orban regime? Zeff and Pirro, in their analysis of the EU’s relationship with its member states, argue that, “the possibility for intervention is extremely unlikely given the lack of legal political instruments”. The EU is best-known for undertaking methods of passive leverage in terms of enforcement policies, generally preferring to abstain from direct intervention. Furthermore, it’s possible that Orban wasn’t as harsh in his policies during his first term as Prime Minister in the late 1990’s, because Hungary was in the midst of the EU accession process. But once Hungary had attained EU member status and Orban had regained his position as PM, he wasn’t as concerned with following EU rules, resulting in the democratic breakdown observed in Hungary today.

The EU has had varying degrees of success in its negotiations with Hungary pertaining to the demonstration of democratic ideals. As predicted by the liberal institutionalist perspective, it seems as though Orban would be most inclined to comply with EU standards if threatened financially. Some academics argue that “the need for external financing from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund may force the leadership to backtrack on some of the most prominent laws that undermine democracy”. On the other hand, a survey conducted by the Corruption Research Center found that EU funding considerably increases the risk of corruption in Central and Eastern Europe. This offers a partial explanation for the EU’s lacking response to Hungary’s problems; its leaders may be unsure if providing financial assistance will incentivize Orban to respect the fundamentals of democracy, or if it will cause a misuse of funding and dependency on EU institutions that could lead to the creation of a severely weak and incapable state.

Though the EU has encountered some
difficulty addressing specific legislation drafted under Orban, it seems to have had no problem bringing its complaints to the legal branches of the organization, mostly in the form of detailed infringement proceedings. Since May 2010, the European Commission has initiated over 98 infringement proceedings against Hungary. In 2012, the Commission’s main accusations against the Orban government concerned the independence of its central bank and judiciary measures, in particular. These laws were found by the Commission to be out of line with EU rules, meaning they had to be revised or Orban be taken to the Court of Justice. While official in nature, the infringement proceedings seem to be more formal than effective in dealing with the Hungarian situation.

Why has Orban been able to avoid legal prosecution for his actions? According to Kelemen, Orban’s authoritarian actions are protected by the center-right faction of the European Parliament, the European People’s Party, or EPP. For example, the Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs published a report in 2013 that criticized the destruction of basic human rights in Hungary; this was soon dismissed by the EPP vice chair Manfred Weber for being an attack by the leftist parties. This instance highlights the ways in which authoritarian regimes like Orban’s are able to undermine democracy within the framework of institutions such as the EU, and suggests that other leaders with similar agendas might also guard themselves with allies in order to avoid repercussions for their illiberal actions. In particular, Poland has also been experiencing a slide towards authoritarianism; Kauffmann remarks that both nations, “once the poster children of post-Communist tradition,” now display aspects of Communist-era rule, such as an unwillingness to share power, the production of conspiracy theories, and “exclusionary discourse toward opponents”. If Orban continues to openly pursue a path of illiberal democracy and the EU does not actively intervene, what’s to stop Poland from following the same course toward authoritarianism?

**Conclusion**

Immediately following the collapse of Communism in 1989, Hungary seemed to be one of the most promising success stories of the former regime. A quarter of a century later, it is apparent that Hungary’s liberal democracy has become substantially disintegrated, and the possibility of a quick remedy is not likely. Viktor Orban has utilized the declining economy and occurrence of scandal in the opposing party to consolidate his power and guard it from any form of contention. He has accomplished this through many ways, including imposing a restrictive media law, as well as pushing through legislative reforms that further cement his party’s power.

Though the EU has condemned Orban’s transition to a more authoritarian form of rule, it has, for the most part, not been able to sanction or persuade him into reversing his strict policies. Moreover, even if an opposition party is able to come to power in the following elections, the powers of the new government will still be “constrained by Fidesz’s takeover of independent institutions and installation of clients into key positions” (Kovacs 2013, 240). The possibility of a new government does not seem very likely, however, due to recent gerrymandering and electoral changes that undeniably tipped the scales in Orban’s favor in the 2014 elections, indicating that his party’s systematic unraveling of democracy is far from finished. In addition, Fidesz’s only real challenger in the election was the far-right Jobbik party, whose leaders have been dubbed “Europe’s new fascists”; this lack of a strong opposition, coupled with an extensive billboard advertising campaign, secured Orban’s position as the unbeatable political machine for another term. Clearly, Orban and his controversial ideas are not going anywhere anytime soon, allowing him to continue to enact strict legislation and inhibit the Hungarians from truly experiencing liberal democracy. If the EU doesn’t adopt a more aggressive approach to punishing Orban and his corrupt government, other countries may follow suit, leading to a resurgence of illiberal democracies in Europe and worldwide.

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Malta has offered new ways in which wealthy individuals can obtain Maltese citizenship. In addition to becoming a Maltese citizen and accessing the resources and perks that follow, it is important to point out that obtaining Maltese citizenship includes access to the EU and its additional benefits. Jansen et al (2015) describe that “for some – those who hold the right passport and have financial means – borders hardly seem to exist, or rather, the borders that exist are supposed to enable and encourage their mobility. Others are limited in their freedom of movement, or may even face detention, deportation or death.” This statement highlights the various degrees in which borders can affect groups of people. In the context of migration and borders, a multitude of dynamics contributes to the flows and restrictions of people. In particular, wealth is an indicator of how easy the border is to navigate for some individuals. Anderson and Keith (2014) assert that “while for some travelers [borders] are impassable, patrolled with guns, detectors and un navigable bureaucracies, for others these same borders are barely noticeable, requiring nothing more than a nod to a security guard. More particularly, travel for the wealthy has usually been easier than travel for the poor.” The border, either justified or fueled by nationalist ideals, subjectifies certain groups to differential treatment. Balibar (2010) discusses how “borders, the drawing and the enforcing of borders, their interpretations and negotiations that ‘make’ or ‘create’ peoples, languages, races and genealogies” interconnect with each other in a way that allows for the subjectification or the preferential treatment of certain groups.

The Individual Investor Program (IIP) plays a meaningful role in discussing the relationship between wealth and mobility. This case focuses less on the restriction of low income populations and instead explores the additional travel rights that large amounts of money can buy.

**Background of Individual Investor Program**

Joseph Cardona, who is heavily involved in the execution of the IIP through his roles such as chief of Identity Malta (an agency responsible for issuing and updating Maltese forms of identification) and minister of the IIP itself, demonstrates the power that citizenship-by-investment has on a national economy by claiming that “applications are pouring in, and the program aims to raise €2 billion (Euros), more than a quarter of Malta’s gross domestic product.” The Malta Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Research Group conducts yearly studies to assess the fiscal impact of the IIP. This research is led by Dr. Kenneth Camilleri, who is a tax partner at a leading Maltese law firm Chetucci Cauchi Advocates, and he estimates that the program “netted the country over €1 billion in contributions and direct investments” since its inception. The national rewards in terms of capital gain incentivize this type of program. Despite these positives, there are as many negatives attributed to citizenship-by-investment. Most notably, the EU discourages this type of program by saying that “the rights conferred by EU citizenship, such as the right to move and reside freely within the EU, should not be treated as a tradable commodity.” In response, Malta adjusted the requirements to gain citizenship through the IIP to make the process more expensive and ensure that the investor spends more time in Malta than previously necessary.
Cost and Number of Applicants

The IIP met new regulations imposed by the EU in 2014 and set out on its goal to attract wealthy individuals by exchanging Maltese citizenship rights for a combination of a donation, investment in housing property, and investment in government bonds. The IIP brochure details the figures as a €650,000 contribution to the National and Development and Social Fund, a €350,000 investment in real estate to be held for at least five years, and lastly a €150,000 investment in government bonds, which must also be held for a minimum of five years. Figure 1 details the supplementary fees that are required for the IIP. These fees are nominally hefty, but are irrelevant as they pose relatively few barriers to the individuals who can afford this program. This program demonstrates that the applicant is seriously invested in the country economically and residentially. As will later be discussed, however, residency is not necessary.

According to the Chetcuti Cauchi Advocates law firm based in Malta, the IIP received around 578 applications, which remains significantly short of the 1,800 application cap that was imposed by the government. This figure does, however, build upon the 400 or so individuals who applied in 2014. Figure 2 shows that the total applications since 2014 totaled near 1,000 families. There were 54 individuals naturalized of the 147 individuals who had their citizenship applications approved in 2015. Assuming that most of the initial 578 applicants were financially capable of providing the three investment components, this program proves to be selective whether intentionally or not. Before other economic impacts are even considered, the fees that the Maltese government have gained from the 54 applicants awarded citizenship totals €62.1 million.

These numbers are relatively low, but if the maximum amount of applicants (1,800) was approved for citizenship then roughly 0.4% of Malta’s population of 434,403 would be citizens-by-investment. Using 2016 figures, if these numbers translated to the United States or the EU then 1.3 million of the United States’ population of approximately 325 million or 2 million of the EU’s population of roughly 510 million people would be citizens-by-invest-ment. While Malta is not on the same scale of population as the United States and the EU, the visualization of the amount of people that are purchasing citizenship without engaging in a community within Malta is critical.

Criticisms and Similar Schemes

Initially, the Labor Party, who hold a majority seats in the House of Representatives, had proposed to sell passports “for €650,000, with few other requirements for citizenship.” Opposing party members and the EU quickly refuted this proposition. Marco de Mario, a member of the Nationalist Party, stated that “[the Nationalist Party] does not wish to form part of a law which prostitutes Malta’s identity and citizenship.” More concretely, the Nationalist Party stated their disapproval of potentially selling citizenship to individuals who have never set foot in Malta and that a minimum of five years residency should at least be considered. The European Parliament presented its concerns in a plenary session, in which the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) come together from all 27 Member States and participate in decision making. A resolution was passed by a resounding 560 votes to 22. This resolution addressed the following concerns: EU citizenship should not have a “price tag”, the rights and benefits of EU citizenship should not be treated as a “tradable commodity”, it is unclear if current Maltese nationals will benefit from the revenue produced by the IIP, citizenship involves both rights and responsibilities, whether or not the schemes do violate fundamental EU values, and lastly Malta and other member states with similar schemes must bring their schemes into line with EU values.

The EU is worried about the moral implications that arise from ‘price tagging’ EU citizenship. The institution believes that the values and principles associated with its member states are possibly violat-
accessibility to internet users. It states that "the main goal of the European Union is to defend these values in Europe and promote peace and the wellbeing of the citizens" and, accordingly, "the European Parliament seeks to ensure that these values are realized in the EU legislation." Lastly, the consequence follows that "no country that does not recognize these values can belong to the Union." While Malta has not been subjected to the consequences of this final decree, it is a warning sign that has caused Malta to question and reform its IIP. This structure of values is officially supported in the Treaty of Lisbon, which also clarifies the process of decision making in the EU. These values highlight the importance of the European Parliament’s decision to question Malta’s intentions with the IIP and why the MEPs voted resoundingly in favor for a solution.

Other schemes currently exist in the EU such as Great Britain and Spain that focus on offering visas to the business elite to promote travel in that nation. Anderson and Keith discuss the ease of travel for the wealthy with support from the ‘GREAT club’ and the “Spanish golden visa”. The ‘GREAT club’ is an invitation only "fast track premium visa service for elite business executives coming to Britain." It was created in 2013 by UK Home Secretary Theresa May to create "UK Visas and Immigration in March to provide a focus on delivering excellent customer service. These changes will allow us to maintain a world class, competitive visa system that can innovate in order to serve the ever-changing needs of business and ensure Britain succeeds in the global race." The “Spanish golden visa” focuses on specific investment in exchange for a visa. The requirement for the visa is a €500,000 or larger investment in "residential real estate or a portfolio of properties." These visas have similar attributes of Malta’s IIP by providing transnational mobility in exchange for long term, substantial investments. The ‘GREAT club’, however, seeks its own clientele and neither visa provides citizenship outside of the traditional processes of each nation. As of March 2017, Great Britain remains a part of the EU, but the British government is undergoing negotiations to officially leave the EU due to the 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum vote.

Outside the context of the EU, many payment for passports and visas schemes have existed and some even still remain today. Some are detrimental to the credibility of a nation and its institutions. Some Pacific Islands, for example, are known for selling passports. Alongside legal practices, however, are illegal practices that take advantage of the absence of the population purchasing passports legally. In reference to some Pacific Islands where these practices take place, Van Fossen (2007) states that "exposure of hidden details by the media and by democratic interests demanding transparency led to invalidation of many passports because (i) sales were illegal, (ii) some purchasers were notorious undesirables and (iii) secrecy concealed corruption" and as a result the credibility of the passport in these nations became uncertain. There is no recent evidence to suggest that illegal practices are taking place in Malta at the same magnitude as in Tonga, Samoa, and other Pacific Islands, but the possibility for exploitation is certainly there, in particularly with Malta’s decision to allow a private firm to take control of the application process.

Applications Processed by Private Firm

Granting a private firm to handle the direct applications for citizenship creates moral and national issues. Citizenship is a governmental construct, so it would seem fit for the government to manage these applications. Instead, the Maltese government allows Henley and Partners to lead the program with some supervision from Identity Malta. The firm attempts to catch the potential applicants attention with the following selling points:

- The right to live, work and study in any of the 28 EU countries and Switzerland
- Travel visa-free to 166 countries, including the EU and Canada
- World’s strictest due diligence standards and vetting of applicants, thus ensuring only highly respectable applicants will be admitted
- Citizenship of a well-respected EU country
- Reasonable contribution and efficient application process
- Malta is an attractive place to live or own a second home and is strategically located with excellent air links

These benefits certainly have validity, but have the essence of a business proposition that does not entail adopting an entirely new nationality. The fact that the Henley and Partners list the application process speed as one of the reasons to apply demonstrates the purely economic, and potentially harmful, nature of this program. The legitimacy of the process is questioned by the EU and Maltese sceptics because of this delegation.

Who is Applying?

A comparison of the previous nationalities of regular immigrants and individuals purchasing citizenship is interesting. In reference to wealthy individuals purchasing passports, Houlder explains that "accurate statistics are in short supply, but the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has suggested that demand for citizenship-by-investment programs is led..."
by clients from China, followed by Russia, and to a lesser extent from the Middle East. It says the surge in demand 'may reflect a combination of growing wealth in emerging markets and an increase in global uncertainties and security issues.'

These particular individuals are attracted to benefits of Maltese and EU citizenship. Regular immigrants, on the other hand, are detailed in Figure 3.

The immigrants on this map are predominantly from the UK, Australia, Canada, and the USA. These are all wealthy English speaking nations, which is fitting that Malta’s two official languages are Maltese and English. Malta is a relatively expensive country, so although these immigrants have not bought citizenship per se, they have accessed the country through wealth. To put the wealth of the nation into perspective, Malta ranks in the middle of EU countries for GDP per capita in 2015.

There does not appear to be any issues regarding safety in the context of the applicants who are applying for the citizenship—by-investment. Instead, the morality of the application process and the role of civil responsibility are the concerning aspects of the IIP.

Conclusion

"At one time, second passports were — like suitcases of cash — the preserve of spy novels. Now they are becoming increas-ingly common, according to the International Monetary Fund." The passport and carrying multiple passports to travel freely around the world were staples to the James Bond movie industry. Nowadays, individuals with significant wealth are able to purchase citizenship to seek economic advantages. The purpose for multiple passports is not quite the same as using passports to navigate countries as a spy, but it does show the evolving use and nature of the passport.

The European Union has many problems with Malta's IIP. Malta redeveloped the program so that it was more expensive and required the investors to spend time in Malta to ease tensions, but is it the existence of the program that is concerning or just the money associated purchasing the citizenship? It would appear that both contribute to the discussion. Most importantly, pricing Malta citizenship creates a beginning price for EU citizenship, which could lead to a series of programs in other small and possibly economically poor countries in Europe that would incite a bidding war and create new perception of the role of citizenship. This is dangerous because citizenship is treated as a commodity that has a monetary value, which leads to exclusion (primarily impoverished groups of people) and the devaluation of the culture associated with citizenship. By no means does this last statement mean that citizenship should be isolated and only given to those born in the geographical boundaries of a country, but instead that they should live in that area and contribute to the country in their own unique way, rather than simply purchasing the citizenship.

Interestingly, Guy Verhofstadt, a leading Brexit negotiator, proposed the idea of offering UK citizens the opportunity to pay for EU citizenship to keep hold of the benefits of the institution. Does this have the same implications of Malta selling citizenship? Not directly, but it plays with the same ideas of 'price tagging' citizenship. Malta is not the first country to offer citizenship or residency perks in exchange for money, but their program is one of the first to become a legitimate program, which has led to many discussions in Europe and the rest of the world about the future of citizenship.

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Leaderless Jihad: Changing Patterns in a New Era of Modern Terrorism

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Academic scholarship surrounding terrorism studies is a disjointed array of contrasting viewpoints. However, at its center lay a recurring reliance on David Rapoport’s ‘Four Waves of Modern Terrorism’ theory. This thesis attempts to examine Rapoport’s theory by analyzing the shifts in radical Islamist groups, in a multi-layered study of both al Qaeda and The Islamic State (IS). By examining this period of time, this paper contends that between the years of 2004-2005 we entered into a period of transition, and as such hypothesize that the Fourth Wave has already entered a state of contraction. The paper provides a historical context to forms of contemporary religious terrorism before examining and contrasting the timelines of both al Qaeda and IS in relation to technological and societal developments. In turn, culminating in the shifting modus operandi to one of a framework which is not only set upon the concept of ‘leaderless jihad’ but has also endowed a heightened level of nationalistic politicization within contemporary terrorism.

On 20th September 2001, nine days after the catastrophic events in Manhattan, then-President George W. Bush addressed the nation declaring that the “war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there.” His pledge that the United States will not lay dormant “until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated,” invigorated and preluded what would be a decade of war, conflict and fear. Just under twelve years after Bush’s statement, President Barack Obama announced that the “Global War on Terror” was over. However, since then, terror groups across the world have gone rampant. Most notably the Islamic State (IS), which has taken vast swaths of land and control over a destabilized Syria and a recovering Iraq, has used a cohesive technological campaign to recruit and indoctrinate supporters. Despite Obama’s claims that Bush’s ‘War on Terror’ may be over, it should not be assumed that the notion of terrorism is not only far from that, but that it also did not begin with the falling of the two towers in Manhattan. David Rapoport’s attempt to conceptualize the changing patterns of modern terrorism offers a wave theory of 19th century terrorist trends. According to him, we are currently in the Fourth Wave of terrorism, a wave that he regards as the “Religious Wave.” Rapoport contests that this religious wave, with Islam at its “heart,” began in 1979 and will end in 2025, upon which a new wave of terrorism will arise. This thesis will analyze Rapoport’s theory, contending that the Fourth Wave is firmly within the contraction phase. In addition, this paper aims to approximately predict the point from which this transitionary period began.

To do this requires examination of the change in ‘energy’ and strategy, the two components that make up the wave periods. In analysis, it will be important to look beyond the face-value of modern terrorist organizations as we see them today and instead explore the contextual data to which these groups have formed, grown, and changed. Two main contemporary terrorist groups, Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, will be referenced in the analysis.

Rapoport’s Wave Theory

To understand whether we are in a period of transition out of the ‘Fourth Wave’ requires a brief examination of Rapoport’s overall theory on terrorism. This assessment will give an insight into not only the key features of each wave, but also more importantly, what aspects are visible in a transition. Rapoport defines a ‘wave’ as a “cycle of activity in a given time period with expansion and contraction phases.” He goes on to explain that those activities “occur in many countries driven by a common predominant energy shaping the relationship of participating groups.” It is in his opinion that a different “energy” drives each wave.

The ‘First Wave’ is in which, according to Rapoport, the doctrine of modern terror was created. Beginning in 1880 and lasting approximately forty years, tapering off in the 1920s, its energy centered around anarchistic tendencies, holding the rationale...
that social conventions were immoral, of which methods of terror were required to destroy them. The ‘Second Wave’ began in the 1920s and lasted, once again, for approximately forty years. Brought on by the consequences of the Versailles Peace Treaty, this wave was aptly named the ‘Anti-Colonial Wave’ as its primary motivator was the contentious discontinuation of European influence in numerous overseas territories. The ‘Third Wave’ rotated around Marxist theory and the revolutionary rhetoric that accompanied it.

Under Rapoport’s theory, ‘Revolution’ is the overriding aim in every wave. However, the term may be understood differently within each different wave. In the First and Third waves the theme of revolution was understood to be one which meant a "radical reconstruction of authority to eliminate all forms of inequality." However, Rapoport claims that it can also refer to the acquisition of a new source of legitimacy. For example, sacred texts have presented themselves as a recurring theme throughout the Fourth Wave.

The ‘Fourth Wave’, also regarded as the ‘Religious Wave’, began in 1979 and, much to the apprehension of this essay, is predicted to last until 2025. Like the preceding waves, the Fourth Wave had two defining points: the Iranian revolution and the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet forces. The revolution in Tehran showed a number of groups for which “religion had more political appeal than neo-Marxism”. It is this ‘political appeal’ that must be examined with respect to how it can, and arguably has, changed the underlying motivations for terror.

Rapoport has regarded the Fourth Wave as one that “reshaped the international system profoundly”. He would not be incorrect. In this wave, we see the transition from secular aims to ones centered upon the pursuit of religious dominance. While Anarchists held that social conventions were immoral, and as such it was their duty to destroy them, the justifications behind the Fourth Wave lay in religious interpretations that “the world must become impossibly bad before it could become unimaginably good.”

While different ‘energy’ drives the waves, the other component remains to be strategy and technique. Rapoport contends that each wave produces major techni
In the 1990s, with multiple failures in acquiring struggling organizations throughout the region, AQ's success began. Farrall argues that AQ's structure only became united after OBL's return to Afghanistan in 1996. In contrast, many analysts hold that AQ's structure was devolved over the years.

When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan nearly a decade after the conflict began, OBL, and the jihadists he stood by, left the battleground with one overarching goal: to defeat the U.S. sphere of influence. This was not just because of the loss of a desolate country, allowing AQ to build the foundations for a coherent organization. While there is academic contention as to when AQ's rise occurred, the vast majority of scholars agree that following the events on September 11th the nature of the organization changed dramatically.

Moving from an organization that had used a pyramidal structure to "facilitate strategic and tactical direction," AQ developed into one of a "decentralized and radicalized" network. This was after being under-ground and into the mountains following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001. Constant bombardment and drone strikes have seen AQ's higher ranks disintegrate. The most damning being the raid on Abbottabad in May 2011, which saw the killing of Osama Bin Laden. Following this, while AQ managed to stay intact, it has been criticized for its failure in relevance. This has not been aided by the rise of the Islamic State and its corresponding global terror campaign. But why did AQ focus its efforts on the United States?

Iraq's invasion into Kuwait in 1990 garnered the attention of AQ. Arguably, to an extent, this was less about religious contention than it was about ego. As historians have documented, OBL offered to send AQ assistance to Saudi Arabia. However, the Saudis rejected his offer and took the opportunity instead to seek help from the United States, angering a shamed Osama Bin Laden and prompting his further skepticism of the U.S. sphere of influence throughout the region. Some historians, such as Farrall, present the theory that the attack on 9/11 was less about religion than it was about inciting an "armed retaliation," resulting in American troops laying forth over the supposed sacred lands and thereby opening up "a new front for jihad." In addition, assuming that the leadership of AQ maintained a political standpoint which cared less about religious ideology than about becoming a powerful entity, they would be able to evaluate that U.S. retaliation would present AQ as the "strong horse" among Islamist militants, leading them to fall under Al Qaeda's leadership in the fight against the "invading Americans." This is something they arguably predicted well.

Over fifteen years on from the attacks on September 11th, AQ may be a shadow of their former self, their central organization's capability having been degraded. But, they should not be completely disregarded. Their demise, which resulted in a change of strategy, was not just because of America's reduction of the group's sphere of influence and the targeted killing of high-ranking AQ leaders such as OBL, but also because of competition from other Islamist groups. Up until 2015, one particular group was happy to enact their 'holy war' in the Middle East without overtly antagonizing the West. In fact, the leaders of this group, which has been recognized under the banner of many different names, the most common being The Islamic State, have openly criticized AQ for the 9/11 attacks because, in their belief, it led to the "crushing of the movement in Afghanistan and the defeat of its host, the Taliban regime." As such, these remarks, in hindsight, are now difficult to comprehend given the acceleration of IS-sponsored attacks outside the Middle East.

Islamic State (IS)
The Islamic State (IS/ISIS) has long coordinated and enacted their attacks on the enemy that is "near," primarily being the Arab countries (Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria). A brief examination into the history of ISIS presents the group's leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a religious scholar who rose through the ranks of AQI (Al Qaeda in Iraq) to become the eventual leader of the self-proclaimed Islamic State in a period between 2011-2013. A report by Europol in November 2016 noted that the group's primary goals were originally the seizure of territory and local resources, of which they were arguably successful in, with vast swaths of Iraq and
Syria being under the control of the group by 2014-2015. Their involvement within Western countries, at that stage, was limited at most. The group’s higher echelons have long stated that directly sanctioned major attacks in the West are to be avoided due to the possibility of massive retaliation and subsequent loss of territory that would occur in a conventional ground war with US and/or NATO forces. Despite this, on 31st October 2015 an incendiary device blew up an Airbus traveling from Egypt to Russia, killing 224 on board and signaling the change toward, what Europol called, a “broader international strategy.” Since then, ISIS has directly coordinated and trained terrorists involved in some of the most brutal attacks the West has seen, operating throughout all of Europe. It is clear that there is an increase in the frequency, scale and impact of ISIS’s attacks within the EU’s member states, something which, in turn, must be analyzed. 

While ISIS’s strategy may appear to fit within the old AQ mantra, and as such be firmly within the confines of the Fourth Wave, there is evidence to the contrary. While like many of the organizations within the Fourth Wave, ISIS is committing these attacks to garner fear, destruction and terror. They are, however, more heavily reliant upon them as a means to galvanize and recruit supporters for their ‘State’. Where we can also see a possible transformation since 2004 is a lack of direct connection between the terror organization and the would-be attackers. Al Qaeda exhibited similar tendencies, with the Madrid train bombings in 2004, not being plotted by the organization, but instead being done ‘in the name of’ the organization. In fact, they now rely on accept recruits through their training camps. In fact, they now rely on accept voters after they have committed an act of terrorism. As Sageman supports, bombings are now the “de facto official initiation ceremony” into Al Qaeda. The group itself has recognized the developments within the organization, stating, in 2003, that it will take Americans a “long time to understand the new form of Al Qaeda.” 

As mentioned before, ISIS also relies on this recruitment strategy. While rarely coordinating attacks in the West, the few that are conceived by the group’s leadership seek to motivate a plethora of foreign fighters to join them in Syria and Iraq - areas in which they hold higher value towards. Arguments to the contrary have to answer the question as to why ISIS has taken little action against the state of Israel despite overt religious animosity, with the group stopping abruptly along the Golan Heights. It could be naive to assume that ISIS, as a pseudo-state, is exclusively full of vitriolic religious extremism. As Cronin documents, the upper ranks of ISIS consist of, not only anti-US insurgents, but also secular former Iraqi military officers who are motivated through regaining “the power and security they enjoyed during the Saddam Hussein era.” It is therefore arguable that they are a contingent who uses religion as a tool to gain geopolitical influence and control in the areas that the ‘State’ apparatus deems as attainable. As shown by the declaration of the Caliphate and an ‘Islamic’ State, there is the combination of both religious and nationalist tendencies. As such, ISIS is the underpinning organization of the transitional period, utilizing the preceding wave’s key tenet, religion, to mislead and take advantage of its membership.

The ‘Leaderless Jihad’ Phenomenon

The term ‘Leaderless Jihad’, a phrase coined by terrorism scholar Marc Sageman, is used to describe the “scattered, decentralized structure” of extremists who no longer need to rely on direct orders from the central command of terrorist organizations. Sageman, supporting this thesis, states that there is a new generation of extremists:

> It consists mostly of would-be terrorists, who, angered by the invasion of Iraq, aspire to join the movement and the men they hail as heroes. But it is nearly impossible for them to link up with Al Qaeda Central, which was forced underground after 9/11. Instead, they form fluid, informal networks that are self-financed and self-trained. They have no physical headquarters or sanctuary, but the tolerant, virtual environment of the internet offers them a semblance of unity and purpose. 

According to Sageman, ‘leaderless jihad’ is the natural outcome of a “bottom-up mechanism of group formation in a specific environment shaped by top-down counterterrorist strategy.” The process of radicalization stemming from small, local, self-organized groups in a “hostile environment” linked through the internet. However, Sageman notes a key limitation. For the survival of this “leaderless social movement”, the terrorist organizations are required to provide a “constant stream” of new and provoking attacks that, in turn, will invigorate potential future lone-wolf (used in the ‘leaderless jihad’ sense) into taking action themselves in attacks, all in all creating the “impression of visible progress toward a goal.” It can be argued that this “goal” is one of a religious nature, and as such indicates we are still firmly within the Fourth Wave. However, it may also be contended that, using the Islamic State as an example, the outreach of the caliphate is, not as a religious movement, but a pseudo-state attempting to consolidate power and territory. As such, the ‘energy’, as Rapoport would say, is possibly transitioning to become less about a larger religiously-inspired movement as it is about nationalistic dogma. 

AQ pre-2004 is a wildly dissimilar group than we are faced with today. Post-2004 Al Qaeda Central Command no longer knows who its followers are. They no longer accept recruits through their training camps. In fact, they now rely on accepting members after they have committed an act of terrorism. As Sageman supports, bombings are now the “de facto official initiation ceremony” into Al Qaeda. The group itself has recognized the developments within the organization, stating, in 2003, that it will take Americans a “long time to understand the new form of Al Qaeda.”

The Internet as a Transitional Tool

The internet to the Fourth Wave is what dynamite was to the First Wave and, in the words of Sageman, “makes the existence of a leaderless jihad possible.” The techno
logical advancement of communications, coupled with the development and propagation of the internet, is the driving force behind the furthering of global terror. It can be argued that, following the development of the internet, terrorist groups have used this tool wisely with virtually every major terrorist group maintaining some form of website or social media presence. The internet, including the dark web, in the mid-2000s boasted over 4,000 websites for Islamist extremists. According to Simon, the internet is in fact the “energy” behind the Fifth Wave, having revolutionized the way in which single individuals can “become significant players” through their newfound ability to garner information regarding weapons, targets, and bomb-making manuals.

While this thesis does not agree with Simon’s sentiment concerning the internet as the predominant “energy”; he does, however, highlight a key characteristic that is apparent in the transition between the waves, and may, to an extent, play a substantial role in the eventual Fifth Wave. For now, however, it can be ascertained that the development of the internet has bought about a changing tool for terrorism. Just as dynamite was the influential tool of the First Wave, the internet appears to arguably be playing a very key role in this transitional period, and may end up eventually as a defining feature in the next wave.

However, where parallel can be drawn is through Simon’s statement regarding the internet’s revolutionary effect. This effect has arguably been documented by the change in power dynamics of global terrorism, with Sageman contending that the “true leader” of Islamist terror is no longer a group of authoritative figures at the head of an organization but is instead the “half-dozen influential jihadi forums.” Once again, raising discussion as to a clear and demonstrable change in strategy for the Fourth Wave.

Sageman’s aforementioned point highlights how the internet, a global system conceived in the late 1990s, is only now becoming a catalyst for the transitional period. It is no longer about static websites containing propaganda. The true result of those static pages was not so much as to inspire, but to instead act as reinforcement for previously held
beliefs. Where the internet and the new forms of easily accessible communication have become apparent in the wave's transition is through a new age of interactivity. It is this interactivity that is revolutionizing global terrorism through the “rapidly changing human relationships,” concerning anonymity, the little cost involved with cutting their interactions when needed, and the overarching ability to garner the feeling of belonging to a greater community, which they cannot do openly in society.

For this transitional period, we are also seeing the transformation of terror itself, being fear which now arises from the terrorist who no longer requires training or guidance from an overarching command structure, and as such is considerably harder to stop before participating in their attack. There is now the trepidation that we cannot prevent the next coming attack because our detection methods are redundant. In the years prior to 2003, terrorists for AQ would attend training camps before being sent back to the West. There were considerable countermeasures, whether at borders or through monitoring chatter involved in the logistics of physical training, of which Western intelligence agencies were considerably successful at.

In contrast, the 'terrorists' in this post-2003 transitional period do not need to travel, they do not need to receive bomb-making training from specialist camps thousands of miles away; in fact they may not even need to communicate with others in formulating their attack. Instead, any necessary bomb-making training is now acquired through the internet with accessible step–by–step guides to create improvised explosive devices, which while dangerous, does not require the specialist expertise it previously did.

It is difficult to specify the exact moment a transition will fully occur from the Fourth Wave to the Fifth Wave. As Rapoport contends, this takes place when another 'energy' becomes more dominant. This would imply that there is a slow, yet gradual, 'wave-like' manner to the stages, in which as the 'energy' of one slowly decreases, the other increases. This creates an effectual passing where, at a specific point, both energies are in equilibrium. This thesis does not attempt to pinpoint an exact moment this occurred or will occur. However, it could be estimated that, around 2003–2004, this process of decline/incline for the different 'energies' began. As highlighted earlier, prominent organizations such as AQ have had their frameworks altered. But, it is not just the organizations that have become affected; so too, in conjunction, have the attacks. The Madrid bombings in 2004, an argued starting point for this transition, saw the internet, for one of the first times, play a critical role in instructing the attackers. Numerous later attacks also employed the internet, including the 2005 Cairo Khan al-Khalili attack, the 2006 failed bomb plot in Germany, and the 2007 plot to bomb Glasgow and London’s West End.

Analysis of cases from the 2004 period presents a clear example of the "inversion of power" for which the internet has provided. As Schwartz argues, AQ has made “exceptional use” of the internet with regard to recruitment. However, the case of Younis Tsouli, known by his screen name ‘Ihabi007’, presents an instance in which power had switched from the command of AQ to the leaderless online jihadis. The "exceptional use", which Schwartz refers to, was only able to occur due to the facilitation of people like Tsouli. A young Tsouli, a Moroccan-born resident of the United Kingdom, became renowned for being the “internet jack-of-all-trades” for aspiring jihadis, allowing dissemination of propaganda, beheadings and bomb-making manuals. This attracted the attention of AQ leadership, prompting them to seek Tsouli’s assistance in setting up web forums, chat rooms and means of distribution for their social presence. Aspiring extremists flocked to them, all with the hope of receiving approval from the countless Islamist recruiters within. It was these forums, set up by Tsouli, which may have become the breeding ground for the start of the transitional period, beginning the evolution of contemporary religious terrorism and the 'leaderless jihad' movement.

Transition and the Political Appeal

Finally, it is key to examine possible counterpoints to this thesis. Critics of this transitional theory argue that the aforementioned points are merely just a new tactic used by Islamist organizations, and that we are in fact still firmly within the Fourth Wave. It would be naive of this thesis to assume that terrorist organizations cannot adapt. However, these critics are only partially correct. Rapoport’s Wave theory works around a steady decline and then a steady incline, in a ‘wave-like’ motion. He contends that the waves possess “expansion and contraction phases.” Therefore, it can be argued that the events this thesis has documented place the Fourth Wave in this ‘contraction’ phase, in which political appeal has played a large influence.

This would not be the first time that such an influence has presented itself. As Rapoport himself contends, when assessing the transition between the Third and Fourth Wave, religion had more political appeal than neo-Marxism. Could it not be advocated that nationalism is now in possession of more political appeal than religion? This is arguably the same transition witnessed in previous waves, and, in this case, is exhibited through the pseudo-state aims of the Islamic State, the dominant organization of terror within contemporary religious terrorism.

In addition, it must be highlighted that critique based on the argument that the 2003 Iraq War was purely of a religious nature does not hold true. While it is clear that there was much religious divide within the Iraq War, not all militants in, and following, the conflict were fighting for religion. Rather, in display of a possible emerging energy, there was also a substantial nationalistic dimension to be found.

As such, while events may well have been within the Fourth Wave, this does not rule out a steady contraction in the wave’s energy.

Twelve years on, we can see how the ‘leaderless jihad’ effect has shown steady increases and propagation within society. A new energy has emerged. One which has seen religiously motivated groups set their sites on the establishments of states and governance. Attacks are now not only being inspired by these pseudo-states, as with Orlando in 2016, but there is also the emergence of a new type of terrorist. One which commits attacks as a “soldier” in the name of the pseudo-state, despite having no guidance or communication from such an entity, operating in mere blind nationalistic rationale. It is this rhetoric which
vastly differs from that of the Fourth Wave energy.

Evidence of a transition has been shown through the evolution of strategy and the development of technology. The aforementioned attacks have only been possible due to the advancements in communication that makes the concept of decentralized leaderless attacks, and the network in which they are conceived, a characteristic that is unlike anything the Fourth Wave has been able to demonstrate until this point. These extremist networks, hidden in the depths of the internet and the dark web, have become the hand which guides global terrorism. This is something which was not apparent in the years prior to 2004.

Conclusion

It is arguably apparent that we are currently witnessing, within the confines of Rapoport’s theory, a transformation of both ‘energy’ and strategy within modern terrorism. A pattern is clearly developing upon which political appeal is becoming the catalyst for which these transitions can occur. This itself puts the somewhat philosophical question into the forefront as to whether there is an underlying motive upon which all of these waves stand. As with Rapoport’s own admittance, the political appeal was clearly acknowledged in the transition between the Third and Fourth Waves, which begs the question as to whether this is a recurring theme. As the Fourth Wave clearly demonstrated the ability for religion to be used as a tool for political gain, we may now possibly be seeing an adaptation of this in which nationalism is the apparatus once again upon which terror organizations can divide and torment the population.

This thesis would therefore contend that, while Rapoport’s Wave theory is a succinct way to measure trends and patterns of terrorism, he does not lay enough focus onto the contraction phase. While an energy may be dominant, there is a peak within the wave from which this energy must, at some point, enter a state of decline. This, however, does not mean it is no longer the dominant energy. Assuming that Rapoport is correct, the Fourth Wave’s energy entered into dominance in 1979 and will be superseded by the energy of the Fifth Wave in 2025. This would imply that the half-way point of the wave would be 2002. After this point, as supported by this thesis, the Fourth Wave began its contraction and entered into its period of transition.

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The Black Panthers of Israel

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Beginning in 1971, an activist group of Sephardic and Mizrahi Jews known as “the Black Panthers of Israel” emerged in Jerusalem. Modeled after the American Black Panthers, the Black Panthers of Israel movement was created by Sephardic and Mizrahi Jews as a social justice mission to better the living and social conditions of the communities it represented. That sentiment, of marginalization compared to the Ashkenazi, left them on the outside of the Israeli social circle and manifested in different means of protest and resistance in pursuit of equality in Israel. They played a significant role in the history of Arab Jewish culture, as a political manifestation of the sentiments of three generations of Mizrahi, the Jews of Arab or Central Asian descent that made up their constituency. While the Black Panthers of Israel effectively dissolved in 1973, they served to draw focus to the widespread feelings of unrest and marginalization that Mizrahi and Sephardi Jews experienced in the 1960s and 1970s Israeli state.

The Black Panthers of Israel emerged in early 1971 as a grassroots social movement that was a manifestation of Mizrahi and Sephardi discontent surrounding a number of issues prevalent in Israeli society at the time. The Mizrahi Jews were Jews colloquially recognized as Jews of “oriental descent”, referring to their ethnic heritage from Arab or Central Asian cultures, while the Sephardi Jews were Jews of Spanish descent or with ethnic heritage from the larger Iberian Peninsula. These groups stood in sharp contrast to the majority of Israel who were descended from European Jews and centered around the Jewish diaspora. Created in the ethnically-diverse Jerusalem neighborhood of Musrara, a small core of young Jews began one of the most unique protest groups in Israeli history driven by social inequalities across issues including housing, wage discrimination, police violence, and the discriminatory attitudes of the Ashkenazi (European Jewry) towards them. Such significant class and ethnic inequalities set the context for the birth and growth of the Israeli Black Panther movement.

When the Black Panthers of Israel emerged in early 1971, twenty-three years after the creation of the Israeli state, non-Ashkenazi Jews had proportionally lower standards of living than their Ashkenazi counterparts. As of 1971, the average non-Ashkenazi had an income averaging about 54% of comparable Ashkenazi, and a relative 59.3% primary school attendance rate. Their relative existence on the socioeconomic periphery of Israeli society ultimately contributed to the emergence of the group and were compounded by the idea that the Ashkenazi-majority government did not want to act to solve them. Black Panther representative Kohkvi Shemesh articulated this popular sentiment well with his statement that “the government can solve the poverty problem, it just doesn't want to; the government is supported by and represents the wealthier (Ashkenazi) classes.”

Shemesh’s articulation of the belief that the government was inactive in attempting to rectify non-Ashkenazi social and economic problems exemplifies the intersectionality of class and ethnic discrimination that served as a driving force in the emergence of the Black Panthers in 1970s Israel.

Mizrahi and Sephardi Social Climate of the 1970s

As discussed above, there existed a strong resentment of the social stratification in Israel at the beginning of the 1970s, and this ultimately contributed to the climate that caused the Black Panthers to emerge. Much of the negative feeling around the issue was directed towards the government and their policies that exacerbated income disparity. In the 1950s and 1960s, state sponsored labor made up a large sector of the Israeli economy; however, the amount of newly created low-paid, unskilled jobs that went to Mizrahi and Sephardi Jews was greater than Ashkenazi both proportionally and in absolute terms. As a 1971 New York Times report put the new economic growth, “an ethnic split (in the economy) was appearing… the Ashkenazim were the managers and Sephardim the managed.” Although this sentiment was widely recognized, the lack of political clout by the Mizrahi meant that no political change could be implemented.

One aspiring Mizrahi politician protested that “today the Oriental (Mizrahi) Jews, who make up 52% of the population, hold less than 10% of the seats in Parliament, 9% of the top jobs in government and the
economy". It was not that the Mizrahi did not have the desire to implement change in economy policy, but that they lacked the capacity to do so given that the ethnic majority that controlled Congress benefited disproportionately from their policies and thus were less inclined to change the system. With this proportionally low representation and proportionally high poverty rates, conditions were ripe among the non-Ashkenazi community for a political uprising.

Beyond their economic rights, many Mizrahi and Sephardi believed that the Ashkenazi controlled government were also violating the Zionist promise at the core of Israel's formation. In the early days of the Israeli state, Zionist doctrine was complete with rhetoric discussing how the Jews were “one people” that were to be united in an egalitarian Israel. Indeed, it was seen to be so significant that it was codified in the "Law of Return", which gave all Jews the right to return to Israel and gain Israeli citizenship. The Mizrahi and Sephardi Jews, however, didn't feel as though the state was fulfilling its promise of an egalitarian society. The expansion of low-paying private sector jobs coupled with lack of action in resolving these groups’ economic policies exacerbated poor living conditions and was a factor in the betrayal that these Jews felt. One parliamentarian articulated this sentiment of betrayal of the Zionist vision, stating that “Zionist ideology says that we are one people, all equal, and it doesn't matter where you come from, but suddenly we are not equal”. Other Mizrahi and Sephardi often wondered why they came to Israel when they would face unequal treatment at the hands of the state, claiming that "what happens to the Jews abroad is the same as what happens to Sephardim here". This political and economic betrayal by the state ultimately factored into the division of the Jewish people and the rise of the Black Panthers in 1971.

Responses to Formation of the Black Panthers

The first major emergence of the Israeli Black Panthers into the public sphere

Namtso, the largest lake in Tibet, is regarded as holy. We drove ten hours across rural Tibet to reach it, arriving late at night. The elevation was intense, and the night was cold, but in the morning we were greeted by the most beautiful place I have ever seen. The water was a brilliant blue, and the sky felt close enough to touch. Despite harsh conditions, life, and culture thrived.
occurred on the 3rd of March, 1971, spawning from this protest and continuing throughout the spring and summer as a large array of responses to the Black Panthers emerged. In the Mizrahi and Sephardi communities, the responses often differed across generations. Although there were many first generation Mizrahi involved, second generation were the most enthusiastic and formed most of the leadership of the organization. Young men such as Saadia Marciano and Charlie Biton, who averaged a fourth grade education and were only around age twenty at the time of the party's formation, were extremely enthusiastic about the movement. The popularity among young Mizrahi was reflected in the core's periphery, which had "twenty to thirty committed younger boys and a core of committed helpers." According to one young Mizrahi man, "there are two kinds of people in this country: a superior one and an inferior one. If our parents are quiet all the time we are not going to keep quiet." His statement mirrors the cross-generational differences of reaction regarding social conditions and highlights the heavy youth involvement in the movement, while at the same time implicating much of the older generation as being less active than the Mizrahi youth. Reactions among the different members of the Israeli Black Panther constituency were also contingent upon location, with the highest levels of support for the Panthers in urban areas, specifically Jerusalem, but with tinges of support in Haifa and Tel Aviv. This can be attributed both to the ability of urbanites to mobilize as well as the dense populations, which allowed for stronger networks of support. Mizrahi responses to the movement, well varied, showed that there were deeply rooted social issues that unsettled large sections of the community.

Ashkenazi responses were largely negative, with some exceptions. Because many of the issues they raised were intersectional and also applied to lower class Ashkenazi, they had some support from people across ethnic lines. Additionally, Ashkenazi members of Knesset, the Israeli Parliament, thought it would be politically expedient to court the Mizrahi and Sephardi constituencies that made up the Black Panther support base which led to both the Communist Party and right-wing Likud Party seeking political coalitions (although both ultimately failed in this objective). Most of the wealthy and politically powerful Ashkenazi, however, had tumultuous relationships with the Black Panthers. According to Golda Meir, the Black Panthers were a “threat to Jewish unity”, a sentiment echoed by many in the upper tiers of Israeli society. With militarized opponents surrounding them and having recently fought the Six Day War, the Prime Minister was hesitant to become engulfed in domestic social unrest. Overall, the response from Ashkenazi towards the Black Panthers was mixed, standing in stark contrast with general support coming from Mizrahi as a whole.

Protest Practices and Symbolism

The practices of the Black Panthers served as symbols of Mizrahi and Sephardi sentiment and agenda as a whole. First of all, the name Black Panthers was, in and of itself, a symbol purposefully chosen to show that the marginalized groups of Israeli society were, like their unrelated American namesake, empowering themselves and working for social and economic justice. In choosing this name, they highlighted that Israel, like 1970s America, had severe class disparities that disproportionately affected the groups that were taken advantage of and used as the source of another ethnic group’s wealth. Additionally, the purposeful selection of extremely public settings to showcase their platform and draw disproportionate responses from police allowed them to weaponize government resistance and project their message. Perhaps the most notable case of this was when leader Charlie Biton handcuffed himself to the podium in Knesset, proclaiming “these social issues deserve more than five minutes” before having to eventually be cut away from the podium. Additionally, the brutal retaliation by police served as free negative advertising against the government. The Black Panthers claimed that the government used these protests as “a pretense to attack” the Mizrahi and Sephardi people. Such examples are indicative of both the tension between the Mizrahi and the government, as well as the framing of the Black Panther argument in a proletariat, marginalized light.

Despite emerging from secular, leftist ideals, the Black Panthers also utilized religious ideology in their messaging. They emphasized the departure of Israel from its “vision of egalitarian redemption for the Jews” to one of economic inequality for the Mizrahi and Sephardi and used religious texts and rituals to emphasize the significance of the shift. Religious grounding also served to add a level of legitimacy and authority to their message. In one incident, they took the Haggadah, or the liturgy of Jerusalem and the struggle for Mizrahi rights. Mirroring this religious text that recounts the story of Moses and his struggle to liberate slaves in Egypt, the writers of this 1971 Haggadah discussed issues such as socioeconomic poverty in urban ghettos of Jerusalem and used allegory to compare them to Prime Minister Golda Meir to the slaveholding Pharaoh and the Black Panthers to the liberating Moses. In using religious symbols such as these, the Black Panthers made a striking commentary on the treatment of the non-Ashkenazi Jews at the hands of the state, which claimed to be fulfilling a religious vision of egalitarianism.

Conclusion

The Black Panther movement lost its momentum when the 1973 Yom Kippur War forced economic issues to the back of Israeli political priorities, though remains one of the most impactful social movements in Israeli history. With continually limited success at the ballot box, they eventually dissolved and were coopted into the framework of other existing political entities, and as generations of Mizrahi Jews assimilated into Israeli society the socioeconomic disparities became less prevalent of a focus for these groups. The movement did, however, leave a lasting mark on Israeli social society as a whole. The Black Panther movement was a significant manifestation of the feeling that Mizrahi and Sephardi Jews had been relegated, both socially and economically, by the Ashkenazi Jews who controlled the government and means of production in mid-20th century Israel. Though they did not last for an extended period of time, they served to show the frustration and feelings of marginalization of Mizrahi and Sephardi Jews and the ethnic divides that
began to emerge in the decades following the birth of the Zionist state. Through this protest movement, attention was drawn to this marginalization and in turn drew widespread focus onto the Sephardi and Mizrahi feelings of resentment towards the Israeli government.

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In order to understand what it means to have a weak state, one must first define exactly what we mean by "state." In this paper, "The modern state may be defined as an institution that successfully claims a monopoly of the means of violence, control over a territory and a population and the responsibility to provide services, and is recognized by other states." Even a concise definition reveals major problems with the DRC. I will first work through the above definition's application to the DRC before then providing other pertinent information on the state.

The easiest measurement to draw from Eriksen's definition of statehood is the qualification that the DRC must be "recognized by other states." For ease of analysis, I will use the United Nations as the putative authority on states. The DRC is a member state of the United Nations and is universally recognized by its other member states. Measuring other qualifiers in Eriksen's definition is more complex and ambiguous. Because the DRC is universally recognized as a state, its failure to clearly reach other qualifiers indicates it is a weak state rather than not a state at all.

The most catastrophic failure for our measurement of statehood is controlling a monopoly on violence. By this measure the DRC is substantially weak and suffers the associated consequences. For example, "Weak states lack a monopoly on violence, and must face the insurrection of armed groups." Almost nowhere is this statement more accurate than in the DRC, where armed rebel groups are abundant and responsible for enormous devastation. In the Kivu regions alone, there are almost 70 known armed groups and more than one million people have been forcibly displaced (ACAPS). Additionally, these rebel groups compound the issues of a weak state by further undermining its power and institutions. One group, the armed movement called "Mai-Mai" (also written Mayi-Mayi), is of particular relevance.

Anti-Allochthon Sentiment in Militias

The Mai-Mai are not a singular group; rather they are a collective name given to multiple nationalist resistance militias in the DRC. Though their alliances shift frequently, the Mai-Mai always have one objective: to persecute and terrorize Rwandophones in the DRC, especially in the eastern Kivu regions. Nationalist goals to reclaim the DRC and expel foreigners motivate this anti-allochthon activity to terrorize many of its inhabitants. One particularly vulnerable people are denizens of the DRC who speak Kirundi or Kinyarwanda. There are many names for this group this paper and its sources will use interchangeably throughout this paper including Rwandophones, Banyarwanda and Munyamulenge (singular) or Banyamulenge (plural). These are all names encompassing both Hutus and Tutsis, which are each distinct ethnic subgroups.
their communities as victims of Rwandan-Rwandophone conspiracy that leads true Congolese to be “on the point of being exterminated.”

Like other armed rebel groups, the Mai-Mai gained footing in the absence of an adequate government presence. Though their exact origin is unknown, the deterioration of East Congo at the beginning of the 1990s left conditions favorable for the rise of the Mai-Mai. The East Congo’s decline occurred after unpopular state land seizures and financial strain on the patronage system left the region with low economic prospects and inter-generational conflict. In Masisi, a region north of Goma, “traditional chiefs of the indigenous population, particularly Hunde, began to mobilise young people against Banyarwanda” due to said conflict. Shortly thereafter self-declared “autochthonous militias” began to massacre the Banyarwanda community, motivated by longstanding arguments over land, socioeconomics and nationality, which also means political access in this context. This means political access here because Rwandophone control over disproportionate amounts of land in the Kivu regions has historically led to discontent in other populations – discontent expressed often through attempts to restrict Rwandophone voting rights. It is crucial to note that this division has existed for decades and cannot be labeled as responsible for the spawning of the Mai-Mai; the lack of established politically regulatory power combined with the militarization of society is what allowed the Mai-Mai to rise. Now in power, the Mai-Mai cause widespread violence through pillaging, rape and murder while simultaneously utilizing the subsequent insecurity as part of their recruitment strategy.

The Mai-Mai’s activity continues to provide evidence of a weak Congolese state through their occupation of territory and control over populations. Furthermore, the Mai-Mai capitalize upon the weaknesses of the Congolese state to increase their influence in these areas. “In East Congo, enrollment in rural militias is a response to a
complete lack of alternatives such as social and economic integration and security." Lack of viable alternatives in combination with social and economic marginalization is a growing problem in the eastern DRC and is of particular concern to young males. 20, 21 “Young” here includes, but is not limited to, those who would be child soldiers. 22 Vulnerability of the young is important because “in Africa there is a strong correlation between the social and economic marginalisation of young people and war. In East Congo, as well as in other war-torn areas, young combatants often emerge as new and leading actors.” 23 To the marginalized, the Mai-Mai provide social mobility and an escape from critical conditions economically. Although not directly mentioned in the above definition of a state, it certainly does not help that the DRC does not provide economic opportunity to many of its inhabitants. Even today, after modest recovery from the turmoil of the 1990s, the GDP per capita is US$800. 24 Compared to the dysfunctional DRC state, the Mai-Mai proclaim they strive for a DRC free of dictatorships, Western imperialism and classes. 25 It is easy to see why this promise finds success in the context of the DRC’s socioeconomic climate. The lack of economic stability can be further aggravated by chaos in the wake of violent group activity. Chaos is not a problem for the Mai-Mai because, “Sometimes, the choice to enroll is justified simply by the will to pillage and take profit from the situation of disorder.” 26 Membership in an armed group provides safety both in numbers and power. Occasionally, the Mai-Mai provide bodyguards as well. 27 The Mai-Mai perpetuate terror and insecurity, use this as a recruitment strategy, and further compound the problems the DRC faces while simultaneously claiming to offer solution. If the state had complete control over its territory and its inhabitants, as well as a monopoly on violence, such disorder would likely not exist to motivate the people attracted to chaotic situations.

One source that makes the state’s culpability for popularity of armed groups abundantly clear is a survey conducted by UNICEF in 1997 Bukavu. This survey questioned members of the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo/Zaïre (AFDL), a disbanded militant group Kabila used to overthrow President Mobutu and former ally of the Mai-Mai, though the Mai-Mai later changed their allegiance. 28 According to Van Acker and Vlassenroot, this survey showed 25% joined the AFDL due to promises of generous compensation, 28% because they lacked other opportunities, 15% were convinced by other members, 15% wanted revenge against Kabila’s army and only 7% joined for patriotic reasons such as to liberate the country. 29 If one extrapolates this information to analyze the Mai-Mai and other rebel groups, the role a weak state plays in the propagation of rebel groups—and therefore anti-allochthon activity—becomes clear. The above discussion of economic disenfranchisement creating an environment ripe for recruitment to armed groups relates to our definition of a state under “responsibility to provide services.” While it is difficult to determine which services are a responsibility of the state to provide, one can observe how the absences of certain services have become problematic. One example that provides us an opportunity to see such a vacuum is arms. The saturation of arms in the DRC shows the need for a service—in this case, security—is not met by the state. “The proliferation and flows of small arms have facilitated the continuation of conflict, the militarization of society, and illegal cross-border trade.” 30 Activity surrounding weapons not only reflects a widespread attitude of violently seizing what the state cannot provide, it also creates and perpetuates “illegal” systems, or those done without the involvement and against the wishes of the state. For example, “...most of the factions [of the Mai-Mai] have turned into private militias and are paid by big dealers who needed protection for their gold and coltan trade.” 31 Predictably, “The lucrative trade in coltan, gold, diamonds, tin and other resources extracted through violence has unleashed a permanent reign of terror in the region...” 32 Here, it is easy to see how the various weaknesses of the DRC state reinforce each other. For this reason it is difficult to determine whether resorting to hire factions of the Mai-Mai to protect trafficking of resources is a failure to provide a service or a failure to maintain a monopoly on the subsequent violence. Regardless, the fact that illegal seizure and sale of the DRC’s resources occurs shows a fundamental lack of adequate state infrastructure; the DRC does not seem to be able to provide its inhabitants the service to safely participate in international and intranational resource trade.

Anti-Allochthon Sentiment in Local, Provincial and National Government

Unfortunately, armed militias and rebel groups are not unique as a means by which the state’s weakness can weaponize anti-allochthon sentiment. Politics fans the flames of autochthony discussions at the local, provincial and national levels. Though introduced and utilized by European colonizers, autochthonic rhetoric has seen widespread use in Congolese politics and activity. 33 This discourse finds political and motivational success for a number of reasons: it draws anger and energy from both contemporary and long-term conflicts, its ambiguity allows usage to be flexible, and because it maintains power systems that disenfranchise those who would argue against its use. I will provide some examples of the above rhetorical advantages after first analyzing how the rhetoric affects its targets.

Local Congolese politics is a complex endeavor where loopholes and murkiness allow autochthonic and anti-allochthonous rhetoric to thrive. One such loophole is the state’s use of traditional chiefs to control allocation of land. These chiefs have the power to replace or evict landowners with limited oversight, and use this power to subjugate Rwandophones. 34 In this situation, Congolese inhabitants who speak Kirundi or Kinyarwanda are commanded to “submit themselves to the autochthons” and either vacate their property or become a subject to an autochthon. 35 These traditional chiefs have incentives to do this because many of their constituents believe Rwandophones unjustly possess their ancestral land. 36 This rhetoric is not restricted to conflicts with Rwandophones; ongoing tensions between the Hunde and Nyanga exemplify allochthony vocabulary utilized among two ethnic groups seen as autochthonous at a national level. The Hunde and Nyanga are two groups in the North Kivu province of the DRC, where most of the anti-Rwandophone conflict is located. Interestingly, the Hunde and Nyanga...
both mythologize their origin in migration and more accurately exist on a linguistic and cultural continuum than as distinctly separate groups. This means the Hunde and Nyanga are not only less separate, they could also both be considered allochthons depending on the motivations of the speakers because, “All central Africa’s self-styled autochthons, in fact, seem to accept that the true ‘first people’ of the region are the now dwindling pygmy populations: the Twa in Rwanda, Burundi and the Kivus…” The near complete eradication and disenfranchisement of the Twa makes their recognition as true autochthons highly unlikely. Compounding the murkiness of autochthony in this area are the Bashi and Baidjwi people who originate from the Idjwi island in Lake Kivu—part of the border between the DRC and Rwanda. Denizens of the same province as the above conflicts, the Bashi and Baidjwi find themselves stuck between autochthon and allochthon, though disdain for their “Rwandan-ness” is rising. What interaction between these groups at the local level shows us is that anti-allochthony activity is not a rigid moral conundrum empowering the original owners of the land but rather a weapon used ambiguously and with little consistency in an attempt to justify exclusion. I will explore this more when discussing rhetorical advantages.

The importance of belonging occupies the provincial political sphere as well. A frustrating historical example is President Mobutu’s influence on the Conférence Nationale Souveraine (CNS) in 1991. Constructed in response to international and domestic pressure to democratize, the CNS was to function as a discussion on a multiparty Zaire between provincial representatives. After suggestions that the conference reflect “demographic weight” in each area, President Mobutu promulgated “delegates only represent provinces from which they could be considered autochthon.” Unsurprisingly, Rwandophones were excluded throughout the CNS conference after being labeled as foreigners; Jackson notes, “not one so-called Rwandan appeared on the final party delegates list.” The barring of Rwandophones from the political process also upset the Nyanga and Hunde in North Kivu, two groups who wanted to form a winning coalition there to defeat the Nande.

President Mobutu’s actions here were part of a bigger political strategy of his called géopolitique or “geopolitics.” Since then, geopolitics has infiltrated provincial political thought in the DRC. Geopolitics applies in political races where “Candidates for provincial political office in, say, North Kivu, are often opposed on the basis of their origin in South Kivu and thus their “allochthon’ status.” Furthermore, NGO aid can be seen as favoritism by the locals depending on the number of autochthons and allochthons they employ. It is also not uncommon for employers to withhold jobs based on perceived origin. Though similar to anti-allochthony rhetoric persecuting Rwandophones, an important distinction is that, in the above examples, the victims of this rhetoric are not being challenged on their Congolese-ness. The most virulent sphere for autochthony rhetoric is the national. It is common to label the unpopular or adversary as Rwandan or foreign by some other nationality. Even heads of state are not immune; President Mobutu was accused of both having foreign parents and a foreign wife. Ironically, even Joseph Kabila—head of a government endorsing blatant and vitriolic anti-Rwandan rhetoric—suffers rumors of being a half-Rwandan lovechild. Rhetoric is not the only consequence of anti-allochthony sentiments; hostility towards those perceived as foreign at a national level frequently manifests in official legislation, restrictions of rights and violence. Sadiki Koko, a researcher at Institute for Dispute Resolution in Africa, provides a possible reason for why Congolese officials nonchalantly restrict citizenship of Rwandophones: “…due to its dominant ethnic dimension (a clear legacy of colonialism), citizenship in most African countries is perceived as a community right, the African individual deriving his/her citizenship status through his/her membership to the ethnic group.” Later in Congolese citizenship battles, this concept significantly complicates interpretations of law because different members of the same ethnic groups can have citizenship rights when others simultaneously lack them. Rationale aside, Rwandophone citizenship has always been contentious in the DRC. This is important because citizenship is the closest equivalent to autochthony institutionalized at a state level. Article 6 of the 1964 Congolese constitution reads, “there exists only one Congolese nationality. It is granted, beginning from the date of 30 June 1960 [i.e. independence] to all persons having now, or at some point in the past, as one of their ancestors a member of a tribe or a part of a tribe established on the territory of the Congo before the 18th October 1908.” Though some Rwandophones can trace their Congolese-inhabitant lineage to as early as the 18th century, many more long-time DRC residents trace their family’s arrival to the 1930s, when Belgian colonialists imported workers from Rwanda to alleviate famine there and circumvent the perceived laziness of local labor. Even more Kirundi- and Kinyarwanda-speaking persons found themselves in the DRC as refugees fleeing the Rwandan genocide. It is estimated over one million Hutu refugees entered the Kivu regions in 1994. By this time, however, the legislation had changed. The first person who tried to change this clause in the constitution was Barthélemy Bisengimana as director of Bureau de la Présidence from 1969 to 1977. Bisengimana is a Congolese Tutsi and was appointed by President Mobutu, though not for pro-Rwandophone reasons. One of President Mobutu’s strategies for holding onto power was to appoint “representatives of ethnic groups that could not threaten him because they were numerically weak and had ambiguous political and social status.” In the early 1970s, Bisengimana made multiple attempts to repeal rulings and proffered legislation that changed the cutoff date to January 1, 1950. Nothing succeeded in changing the constitution, however, and his legislation faced serious opposition. This opposition made the implementation of Bisengimana’s efforts difficult. In fact, even laws restricting Rwandophone citizenship were enforced inconsistently and contradicted each other. Falling short of effecting constitutional reform, one of Bisengimana’s other objectives was securing Banyarwanda claims to citizenship that already existed. Koko writes, “…rather than granting Congolese citizenship to the Banyarwanda (since they were already citizens), the Ordinance-Law simply sought to put an end to contestations, exactions and other ill-treatments inflicted on the Banyarwanda by other Congolese ethnic communities in the east.
In addition to opposition on ethical grounds, many disagreed with Bisengimana’s law because it altered citizenship ambiguity by means of creating an exception for the Banyarwanda rather than changing Congolese citizenship as a whole. After Bisengimana fell from power, backlash took his efforts in the opposite direction. In 1981, President Mobutu’s congress not only annulled Bisengimana’s law, but moved the cutoff date to August 1st, 1885, by virtue of Law No 81-002. This meant the law retroactively took citizenship rights away, “thus effectively excluding most if not all Rwandophones even more decisively.” Additionally, Law No 81-002 directly attached legal acquisition of citizenship to ethnicity, muddying the waters even further for the Banyamulenge. While the vast majority of Rwandophones were excluded, a small percentage could trace their Congolese lineage back to before 1885 and claimed as early as the 16th century. This created the question of whether excluded Rwandophones drew their citizenship from the few with long ties to the DRC or if these few were excluded because the majority of their ethnic group largely lacking legal claims to citizenship. Law No 81-002 was also unique in allowing the acquisition of citizenship to “Rwandan and Burundian immigrants,” though this came at the cost of relinquishing the ability to hold elected office.

Though Law No 81-002 was never fully implemented, “...it still provided the institutional basis for increased discrimination against the Banyarwanda.” After the official legislation and restriction of rights came the violence. The aforementioned CNS in 1991 served to ramp up ethnic tensions and created a legislative body called the “Haut Conseil de la République-Parlement de Transition.” In 1995, this body promulgated the “Resolution on Nationality” which declared all Rwandophones became Congolese by fraud and withdrew all citizenship rights for the group. “The 'Nationality Question' was, without doubt, a trigger for the two subsequent wars in which the Congolese Tutsi [a subset of Rwandophones], particularly, have played a central role,” with the 'Nationality Question' referring to the above “Resolution on Nationality.” These two wars were catastrophically violent and had intense ethnic alignments. In the aforementioned Second Congo War, an estimated four million people died. Though many Rwandophones died fighting or as civilian collateral damage, the violence did not end when the wars finished. The Second Congo

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I took this picture while serving as a Peace Corps volunteer in the Republic of Moldova, one of the poorest countries in Europe. Peace Corps volunteers have been active in the country for more than 20 years, working on multiple projects to help further economic and social development. To date, more than 1,350 volunteers have served in about 100 towns and villages across the country. I worked with NGOs and government organizations on human rights advocacy. In the face of harsh economic and political times, I often found my job encouraged hope and optimism—something all too often lacking in Moldova. On my way home from work one day, I stopped in front of a vacant lot to closer inspect the lone-standing building in the midst of rubble and trash. The lot was for sale, and it struck me that here was a sign of optimism: a call to build something new to replace something broken and in disrepair.
War, waged between the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) rebels and Kabila’s government, is particularly at fault for this. Because the RCD had the support of the Rwandan government, “the RCD rebellion... was considered a Tutsi attempt to regain Kivu”. This is critical because the Mai-Mai claim Rwandan conspiracies are endangering the Congolese to justify violence against Rwandophones. Not only does this seem plausible to many Congolese people, especially in the Kivu regions, it was actually true to some degree in the past.

Another example of a conflict used to energize anti-allochthon rhetoric is the ongoing disagreement over land in the Kivu regions. “[The Kivu regions are] a meeting place and melting pot, but also an area that has repeatedly tasted the bitter fruit of conflict, most often between groups claiming the status of autochthony and those defined as ‘strangers’: migrants supposedly without the same level of attachment to a mythological native land”. Rwandophones in the Kivu regions fall victim to accusations they unjustly own ancestral land or attempt to control, sell or force Kivu to secede. What is important to note is the issues surrounding the CNS conference and subsequent violence were never resolved. As discussed earlier in this paper, groups like the Mai-Mai harness this fear of Banyarwanda control over land in the Kivus to violently mobilize against allochthons, convincing an insecure and unsafe population this is their best option.

Why Autochthony Rhetoric is Successful at the Governmental Level

Another reason autochthony rhetoric finds political success is because it is vague and flexible. Even in the Kivu regions, the site of arguably the most pointed rhetoric in the DRC, the words autochthony and allochthony are ambiguous. In the DRC, it is widely accepted that the decimated Twa pygmyoid population truly arrived first. Therefore, “Claims to autochthony are thus claims to have arrived first, but also second”. Additionally, some Rwandophones can claim autochthon status regionally, which I will expand upon later. Of course, this ambiguity lends itself to excellent political application. To explore this, I will first provide more context about Rwandophone ethnic demographics.

The two largest ethnic groups labeled as Rwandophones or allochthons in the DRC are the Hutu and the Tutsi. Both Hutu and Tutsi found themselves in the eastern DRC via migration. This migration happened over centuries, but mostly after the arrival of European colonization and specifically in response to crises in Rwanda. The differences between Hutus and Tutsis mainly stem from events and power systems in Rwanda where the Tutsis were of substantially higher political power and even considered by European colonizers to be Caucasian. This preference stems from...
Restricting the number of people who are scarce in many parts of the DRC. Here, Bantu refers to a “megaethnicity” that encapsulates the Hutu as well as the Hunde, Nyanga and other ethnic groups in the eastern DRC. The Tutsi belong to the megaethnicity called Nilotes. The Bantu-Nilotic rivalry fuels conflicts in the DRC’s Kivu regions and Ituri region (just north of the Kivus) as well as those in Rwanda and Burundi among other locations across the great lakes region. In the DRC, Tutsis are successful pastoralists and often the antagonists of conspiracy theories. In fact, President Mobutu used them as “intermediary elites,” drawing again upon his tactic of thrusting to power those with ambiguous political status to minimize their threat to his power. Those hungry for power in the Kivu regions and elsewhere can therefore use anti-allochthon rhetoric in different ways and to different means. The easiest way to see this is through the shifting alliances of the Hutu people. Because of their Bantu megaethnicity, the Hutu have claim to regional autochthon status in spite of their national allochthon status. When it is politically beneficial, like during the 1996-1997 post-Rwandan Genocide violence in the DRC, pan-Bantu alliances form including the Hutu and excluding the Tutsi. Other times, like the Second Congo War, Rwandophones band together against a common enemy. This flexibility commands the power to include or exclude a huge number of people with very little change to the rhetoric itself. Thinking back to the complexity of autochthonous rhetoric at the local level (e.g. Hunde vs. Nyanga), it is easy to see how this supercharged discourse is valuable to achieving short-term political gain because of its flexibility. Huge portions of the population are inflamed by this rhetoric and many different groups can be made its victims.

Finally, anti-allochthon rhetoric finds political success because it maintains power systems that disenfranchise those who would argue against its use. The most obvious example is the previously mentioned campaign to restrict Rwandophone citizenship rights. Resources, such as land, are scarce in many parts of the DRC. Restricting the number of people who have access to these resources increases the opportunities for those whose citizenship is not questioned. This is because even having citizenship in the DRC does not guarantee you access to land; losing or not having citizenship means almost certain exclusion. The citizenship restriction method has an additional advantage of restricting the power Rwandophones have to resist their disenfranchisement. This is not only because they lack access to the political process, one could argue the economic instability caused by losing citizenship would cause systemic power inequality. Furthermore, “...endemic state failure, compounded by repeated inconsistencies... has contributed to turning the question of the citizenship of the Banyarwanda into a stumbling block to peaceful co-existence and human and state security in the country, especially in the Kivu region.” This means the rhetoric motivates violence, which subjugates the Banyarwanda—and the Congolese as a whole—economically, physically and geographically. According to the UNHCR’s 2015 Global Trends Report on Forced Displacement, “The total number of refugees originating from the Democratic Republic of the Congo stood at 541,500 at the end of 2015.” On top of this, millions have died in the conflict and countless more have suffered either economically or otherwise.

Finally, it is important to understand the role Congolese elites play. To them, the insecurity in the DRC and the subjugation of Rwandophones work in their favor. Erik-sen, in discussing why international actors have failed to amend the situation in the DRC claims, “state-building has not served the interests of key actors.” One such actor is the state itself, or rather the regime that controls the state. There are a couple reasons why the Kabila regime’s interests run seemingly in contrary to the masses. One is due to the DRC’s economy based on exporting raw materials. The consequences of perpetuating this model are “...the development of an oligarchy bent on using state power as a means of self-enrichment, the deeper underdevelopment of the country, and the further impoverishment of the masses.” The other is because the DRC is a neo-patrimonial state. This is deleterious because, in neo-patrimonial systems, “...the state’s very weakness is a resource, both because it makes it possible for elite politicians to get access to economic resources, and because it enables them to maintain their own armed groups... This has clearly been the case in the DRC.” Not only have politicians like President Mobutu taken advantage of the weak DRC state, they likely also directly benefit from it through patronage and clientelism. The patrimonial system in the DRC is a relic of colonial times and does not change with new regimes. Likewise, strong political institutions breed competition, so “...a weak state is forced to pursue policies that weaken it even further, in order to prevent the emergence of alternative power centres within the state apparatus.” Other key actors are non-political elites. As discussed earlier, the Mai–Mai and other armed groups are able to exist because the DRC is a weak state without a monopoly on violence. Just as a weak state benefits these elites, so too does a scapegoat for the DRC’s problems. “That Rwandophone nationality has remained a matter of doubt has been a potent tool for postindependence Congolese elites.”

Conclusion

Anti-allochthon rhetoric finds significant political and motivational success because energy it draws from conflicts is intense and inspires action, it allows groups to shift allegiances and suggest multiple interpretations without being contradictory, and it creates a feedback loop where its success compounds itself and eliminates its resistance. What President Mobutu and the Mai–Mai in particular show us is that these strategies work because of the insecurity resulting from a weak DRC state. President Mobutu knew his power was under constant threat, so institutionalizing the inferiority and ambiguity of the Banyarwanda was necessary to remain afloat. For both politicians and armed groups, it is successful to tell your constituency Rwandophones in their communities are conspiring to take power and ruin their way of life when violence constantly looms on the horizon, and some Rwandophones indeed did attempt to seize power well within living memory. Likewise, it is successful to tell your neighbor joining the Mai–Mai and attacking Rwandophones is a good financial option when he has few others. Furthermore, it is not in the interests of the Congolese elite to strengthen the state nor to reduce discrimination
against the Banyarwanda. Although it is unclear if a strengthening the DRC state would do anything to amend the virulent anti-allochthon rhetoric and activity suffered by Rwandophones, it is undeniable state weakness contributed to its potency and proliferation.

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was particularly interested in studying media treatment of the Calais crisis during the summer of 2015, when Calais was reaching peak media popularity and the possibility of Brexit had not been announced by David Cameron.

My research was centrally guided by the question “How was the Calais migrant crisis depicted in The Guardian and The Times in June and July of 2015?” More specifically, I was interested in whether each newspaper portrayed the crisis as an economic issue, a social issue, a security issue, or a diplomatic issue. Was there a difference between The Guardian and the more conservative Times? How did their perspectives on the migrants themselves differ?

This research is significant because media bias — a systemic bias in the way that the media presents and discusses issues — can influence the way citizens perceive an issue, in turn affecting political outcomes. For example, scholars have found evidence for media bias affecting public opinion on enlargement of the EU, public support for an EU-wide foreign and security policy, and the outcome of the 2000 Danish referendum on the Euro. An experiment by Gerber et al. found in 2009 that, in a randomized trial, households which received a free subscription to the Washington Post were more likely to vote for a Democratic candidate in the Virginia gubernatorial election than those which received the more conservative Washington Times — who were more likely to vote for a Republican candidate. If an observer applies the logic of the effects of media bias to the situation in Calais, they could assume that Britons’ perspectives on migrants would have been affected by the newspapers’ representations of the Calais crisis.

As immigration-based issues become more prominent in European politics, the treatment of immigrants — and sometimes migrants’ very lives — depends on the way citizens perceive their situation. More sympathetic media portrayals may, based on the logic of media bias, create a more sympathetic populace. On the other hand, more hostile or more negative media portrayals may foster hostility towards migrants among the citizenry. The election of anti-immigrant, populist leaders in liberal democracies exemplifies the recent shift towards more negative views on immigrants. As Brexit demonstrates, these views can have drastic consequences, not just for migrants, but also for native citizens. Thus, examining the way the media frames and portrays issues like the Calais crisis is crucial in understanding grander political themes.
My analysis itself was based on 18 articles each from The Guardian and The Times, comprising a total set of 36 articles. I examined eight weeks’ worth of news, which roughly averages to 4.5 articles per week. I chose The Guardian and The Times for two major reasons. First, both The Guardian and The Times are mainstream British broadsheets: they are newspapers most Britons know of and trust as legitimate news sources. Combined, the news papers have a print and online monthly readership of 7,762 thousand adults. Since the underlying motivations of my study are rooted in the consequences of mainstream media’s effects on voter attitudes, the choice of popular, well-established newspapers was necessary.

Second, The Guardian and The Times span the mainstream political spectrum: The Guardian lies slightly left of center and The Times lies slightly right of center. I specifically chose newspapers with differing political biases, because I wanted to know: Do their biases in general affect their representations of the Calais crisis in particular? Do their depictions of the Calais crisis reflect general beliefs of the left and the right on migration?

Furthermore, on a practical level, The Guardian and The Times were the two newspapers with the highest number of articles that matched my search terms for June - July 2015 on LexusNexis. While quantity is by no means an assurance of quality, I assumed that a larger amount of articles in the beginning would mean I could find a more even time distribution of articles after narrowing them down. Also, I assumed that having similar initial numbers of articles would simplify the process of choosing comparable numbers of articles across newspapers.

As for the search itself, I used LexisNexis to search for articles one newspaper at a time. Restricting my search to 1 June - 31 July 2015, I found 96 newspaper articles in The Times containing both “migrants” and “Calais” and 67 in The Guardian under the same search terms. These search terms were deliberately vague: using a more specific term like “refugees” would shift the articles toward more sympathetic, pro-migrant pieces, as “refugees” is a more connotatively positive term than “migrants” in mainstream culture. Similarly, I avoided a search term like “Calais crisis” because this would shift my results in the other direction by only including articles that explicitly referred to the situation in Calais as a crisis.

After instructing LexisNexis to remove duplicate articles with moderate similarity, I was left with 110 total articles. From these, my goal was to choose moderate-length articles that related the Calais crisis to Britain. While ideally I would have randomly selected the articles, with such a small sample size (36 total articles), I had to prioritize relevancy over randomness.

Thus, I purposefully excluded exceptionally short articles. Some articles that appeared within the search results were barely a paragraph, which I felt was too short to adequately code. Fortunately, in most cases an expanded article covering the same topic directly preceded the too-short article, so its information was still included in my results. Furthermore, the exclusion of exceptionally short articles allowed a more medium article length in general. Having articles of roughly the same length was ideal for making cross-article comparisons of the number of references to a certain hypothesis. For example, if I did not take article length into consideration, a heavily economy-centric short article would appear to have the same bias as a well-rounded long article if they contained the same number of references to Calais as an economic crisis. This situation is unideal, hence my exclusion of especially short articles.

I also decided to avoid opinion pieces, as the goal of my research was to examine the characterizations of migrants within news articles, not in op-eds or
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My strategy to address this unsolvable problem of subjectivity at the center of my data collection is addressed in the below Hypotheses section. Second, many articles had absurdly short paragraphs, which interfered with my original paragraph-by-paragraph coding plans. To get around this issue, I grouped every three to five sentences that discussed the same idea into a paragraph of my own making and coded this paragraph as a unit. While by no means a perfect system, this allowed me to avoid over-counting characterizations (by not counting each sentence individually) and under-coding articles (by coding the entire article at once).

Hypotheses

I chose my four hypotheses based on the ways I hypothesized newspaper articles would characterize the Calais crisis. First, I drew from existing research on the two major types of integration problems immigrants face — economic integration and social integration — and assumed that these general tropes would apply not only to characterizations of the migrants themselves, but also to the broader issue underlying their migration. Essentially, I applied my pre-existing knowledge on the worries people — natives and migrants alike — have concerning immigration to the Calais crisis. I assumed that since people are often concerned about the economic and social aspects of immigration, they would also be concerned about the economic and social aspects of the Calais crisis.

Then, knowing the Calais crisis was a fundamentally international situation rooted in questions of border control and security, I added two other hypotheses — that the issue could be portrayed as a diplomatic issue or security issue. While I saw the potential for overlap between diplomatic portrayals and security-based portrayals, as border controls themselves lie at the intersection of both, I decided that the two hit on equally important yet different aspects of the crisis: characterizing something as a diplomatic issue implies the issue is one of failed or mismanaged interactions between states, while characterizing something as a security issue implies that the major problem is the situation itself, its lack of security. Thus, I determined that my four hypotheses would be that newspapers would portray the Calais crisis as an economic issue, a social issue, a diplomatic issue, or a security issue.

The actual mechanics of coding articles was relatively straightforward. After mentally grouping 3-5 related lines into self-made paragraphs, I decided which of the four hypotheses the characterization best fit. Sometimes the decision was remarkably straightforward: a line clearly stated that the crisis was an economic issue. Other times I needed to assign more than one characterization to a paragraph which implied the crisis was rooted in both diplomacy and security. Occasionally, paragraphs were incredibly vague about their perspectives on the crisis.

Thus, I created the “indeterminate issue” category to cover cases when a paragraph's characterization was not straightforward; for example, given a paragraph in which the author implied that the situation in Calais was a significant problem yet did not offer a clear perspective on what type of problem it was. While it is true that the “indeterminate issue” category says little about the newspapers' actual characterizations of the crisis, it does provide a helpful metric for how heavily the general negativity of the situation was implied.

Furthermore, because I needed to make a conscious decision about how to code each statement, I was wary of assuming too much. The “indeterminate issues” category allowed me to avoid over-assuming the characterization of the crisis. Thus, it allowed me to note that the articles were discussing the crisis as an issue to be solved and avoid guessing at the author’s unexpressed, internal motivations.
I also kept track of two characterizations of the Calais Crisis beyond my central hypotheses. First, while I was coding articles, I realized that articles frequently mentioned Britain's inherent greatness as an instrumental cause for the crisis, so I decided to note all instances of this rhetoric. Second, I decided to track the number of positive characterizations of migrants. Thus, I kept track of every time I saw a purely positive, sympathetic representation of a migrant. While these two metrics stray beyond the central aims of my study, they nevertheless provide an interesting, useful gauge for factors related to the characterization of the crisis itself.

Results

Overall, the crisis was characterized mostly as a security issue, with economic concerns and diplomatic concerns roughly tied for the second most frequent characterization. Broadly, the results do show that the left-right lean of these two newspapers aligns with their characterization of the Calais crisis. Thus, while both newspapers mentioned all four hypotheses, the right-leaning Times characterized the situation as mostly as security and economic issue, while the more liberal Guardian was more likely to discuss social and diplomatic issues.

The prevalence of the discussion of security-based characterizations in both newspapers is rooted in the events of June and July 2015 themselves. In week 3, there was a surge in conflict in Calais — migrants began breaking into lorries during heavy traffic in order to attempt to smuggle themselves into Britain. This "lorry crisis," as it began to be called, scared many Brits. There were occasional reports of lorry drivers being threatened. Lorry drivers, faced with their lorries being broken into whenever they stopped, tried to change their routes to avoid Calais. Unfortunately, the proximity of the Eurotunnel to Calais meant traffic could not be removed from the city. Thus, lorry drivers focused on calling for increased security in Calais.

In week 8, the major headlines concerned the thousands of migrants who had attempted to storm the Eurotunnel. Several migrants died, and traffic through the tunnel had to be shut down. Understandably, this was also a very security-centric topic, both concerning security to protect the Eurotunnel — and the British-French border — and to protect the migrants from getting hurt.

The frequent characterization of the crisis as a diplomatic issue also makes sense, given the nature of the Calais crisis as a problem shared by Britain and France. Several times, the British government implored the French government to take action to curtail unauthorized migration through Calais — and the French government asked Britain to further discourage migration, as below:

"In response to a request by the French authorities, there is now direct communication between our officials and migrants to explain to them that there is no El Dorado there [in the UK]," said the British Ambassador to France.

Often, officials stressed diplomatic partnership as a key factor in solving the crisis. Thus, it is logical that newspapers would present the crisis as a failure of diplomatic cooperation.

The Times characterized the issue most often as a security issue, then as a diplomatic issue, as an economic issue, and lastly as a social issue. Beyond frequently discussing the security and diplomatic aspects of the crisis, The Times emphasized the economic motivations of migrants more frequently than The Guardian did and depicted migrants themselves in a more negative light. The "Times cited migrants' desire to work in the illegal economy or the black economy in Britain as a key cause of the crisis. Also, The Times more closely followed the lorry crisis, especially stressing its economic consequences. One of the articles during the first week solely discussed the lost revenue from food-carrying lorries being broken into, saying, "Food worth almost £2 million is being written off each month because stowaways have broken into lorries heading for Britain."

The Times's economic focus is logical given its center-right slant and the strong conservative interest in protecting the domestic economy.

While The Guardian also discussed the economic motivations of migrants, it traced their motivations back to broader social causes. For example, The Guardian framed migrants' desire to find work in Britain as a consequence of the horrible conditions in Calais. Therefore, The Guardian implied that the Calais crisis was less about the economy and more...
about people's statuses in society.

The Guardian also discussed migrants themselves more positively, both through framing their often-tragic stories as quests for fair, good lives and through generally emphasizing the sympathetic aspects of migrants in Calais: their squalid living conditions, limited access to healthcare or education, and desire to work hard.

On the following page, I have included graphs of the frequency of the newspapers' characterizations over time. This reveals some further distinctions. For example, the lorry crisis in week 3 was deemed by The Times to be most evident of a security issue, while The Guardian framed the lorry crisis overwhelmingly as a diplomatic issue. However, this graph shows us that the newspapers can also present crises similarly: in week 8, at the time of the Eurotunnel storming, both newspapers agreed that it was both a diplomatic and security issue.

Overall, I found two general types of articles: event-centric and human-centric. Event-centric articles tended to stress the facts, focusing on reporting what happened. Event-centric articles in general stressed the economic, security, and diplomatic facets of the Calais crisis. Human-centric articles, on the other hand, highlighted the stories of migrants and the conditions of the camps in Calais. These — more often found in The Guardian — were the most likely to portray migrants in a positive light and paint the crisis itself as a social issue.

As I mentioned earlier, I also kept track of two other metrics: the “Britain is great” rhetoric and the positive characterizations of migrants. There were 42 instances of blaming British greatness as a major cause of the crisis overall, with 23 in The Guardian and 19 in The Times. For an example of this rhetoric, see below:

"Who is to blame? Local officials say that Britain is causing the problem. They claim that people from poorer countries are lured by the prospect of better benefits and housing."

While this rhetoric is broadly logical — "the migrants want to leave France because Britain is better" — it oversimplifies the issue, which might have hindered deeper thought or analysis of other motivational factors.

In all 36 articles, there were only seven positive characterizations of migrants, one in The Times and the other six in The Guardian. The characterization I found most revealing was in a Guardian article about a musician's music video, which used footage from a documentary about Calais to tell a story inspired by Cormac McCarthy’s The Road, or, as the musician calls it, an "extraordinary story of the human spirit trying to survive insurmountable odds." The article ends on this quote by the creator of the music video:

"As the product of British multiculturalism, when I see migrants I see hope and hard work. But most of all, I see humans, like you and me."

Though this is quote from a person that does not necessarily reflect the opinions of The Guardian's editorial board, the lack of additional author commentary implies the author agrees, at least partially, with the musician's assertion. Furthermore, of all the music videos one would highlight, to call specific attention to “Nerina Pallot’s” … far more poignant approach to the music video" implies at the very least a sympathetic eye...

As with any data, there are potential alternate explanations. For example, one could argue that these articles represented only the opinions of a few authors. However, to refute this idea, it is important to remember that an article must be approved by an editorial team, the people responsible for maintaining a consistent tone and direction across all articles. Thus, the articles' depictions of the crisis in Calais were at least deemed cohesive with the papers' tone at the time of publication, meaning my analysis was still significant, if maybe temporally bound.

However, that is not to say my data was perfect. It would have been impossible with my level of expertise and limited resources to impartially choose...
articles or assess their characterizations of the crisis. Thus, my results are subject to some level of human error, whether that be from mis-categorizing authors’ points or unknowingly favoring certain articles over others. Nevertheless, I designed this project keeping these potential flaws in mind, and tried to set out precautionary measures to protect against having my own bias — or mistakes — influence my results.

Other potentially interesting future studies in the same vein could ask: how did British newspapers portray all international migration-related news in the summer of 2015? Did Brexit change the way newspapers discussed immigration? Are Syrians depicted more favorably than other migrant groups in mainstream British media?

In relation to my study in particular, my conclusions could benefit from analyzing more newspapers — or at least more articles. Also, a parallel study of readers’ opinions could be revealing: do readers’ characterizations of the calais crisis reflect the left/right slant of the newspaper they prefer to read? Does exposure to an article slanted in a certain way encourage readers to change their views?

I would recommend that future studies use a computer program to code articles to decrease the potential for the human error inherent in subjective decision-making.

Conclusion

My research examined how The Guardian and The Times (London) depicted the Calais crisis in June - July 2015. Specifically, I looked at whether articles depicted the crisis as an economic issue, a social issue, a diplomatic issue, or an issue of security. While the security-based characterization prevailed overall due to the nature of the events in Calais over the summer of 2015, differences between articles of the center-left Guardian and the center-right Times revealed a systemic bias in accordance with general left-right characterizations of migration. Thus, The Times tended to depict the crisis as an economic issue, while in contrast The Guardian tended to portray the crisis as a social issue. Furthermore, The Guardian fostered a more positive, sympathetic picture of the migrants themselves.

Bias in media depictions of current events is significant far beyond Calais. If the news citizens read systematically presents an issue in one light, citizens are likely to start accepting that perspective as the most correct, whether or not they are aware of alternatives. Seeing the troubling rise of fake news and its demonstrated effects on elections in liberal democracies, it is important now more than ever to hold mainstream media accountable to their biases — and this begins with research.

Citations

8. https://www.google.com/trends/explore?date=2010-01-01%202016-12-05&geo=GB&q=Calais


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