Cover Photo: At sunrise on Machu Picchu the contrasts between youthful tree, ancient ruins, and timeless Andes are thrown into sharp relief. Though the Incan city’s purpose is still unknown, the ruins are believed to have been constructed roughly five hundred years ago and are now UNESCO World Heritage Site. (Photo by Rebecca Chaisson, Sophomore Environmental Studies and Geography Major)

Disclaimer: Editors and faculty advisors are not connected to all published content. The Internationalist staff edited these articles but is operating under the assumption that the research is the original work of the author.
From the Editor

Since its inception in the Spring of 2015, The Internationalist team has been working towards the establishment of a research journal with the hopes of highlighting excellent undergraduate research and stimulating dialogue on international affairs. It is my great pleasure to present the inaugural issue of The Internationalist Undergraduate Journal of Foreign Affairs, a product of countless hours of effort and research by both our staff and our featured authors. The Internationalist is one of the most ambitious student-led academic efforts at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and I have high hopes for its future. As we become more established, I hope to see The Internationalist expand its capacity to publish excellent research and to reach out to communities of undergraduate students around the nation. I also hope to see it continue to work with the numerous academic departments and curriculums focusing on international affairs at Carolina.

I would like to extend a sincere thank you to our editors, especially those graduating who never stopped believing in the journal, and to our editorial board for their efforts. An additional thanks is given to the authors whose research highlighted pressing issues and provided new and fascinating perspectives to existing issues, and thank you to the many others who submitted papers that were not selected. We had far too many excellent pieces to choose from, and I hope to see even more in the coming years, both from those who have already submitted and from new researchers.

Finally, thank you to our supporters: our parent organization: the Carolina International Relations Association; the Office of Undergraduate Research, who provided excellent advice and oversight; and to the departments and curriculums that supported us including Anthropology, Religious Studies, Political Science, Economics, The Gillings School of Public Health, Global Studies, and Peace, War and Defense. It is because of your support that we have reached this far, and I look forward to working with you in the future.

Sincerely,

Christian Haig
Editor-in-Chief
The Internationalist would like to thank Ingrid Smith and the Carolina Global Photography Competition for providing us with access to their photo archives. Images entered into the contest provided us with our cover, in addition to various stunning snapshots featured throughout this periodical.

This photo, by Christopher Brown, Senior Communication Studies Major, Global Cinema Minor, showcases the now deserted Haydarpasa Terminal in Istanbul, once busiest train station in Turkey, it is finding new life as place for art and culture. The station’s waiting room housed an art exhibit during the summer of 2015 called “e-motions” by Dr. Rahşan Duren. Even with the repurposing of the station, on resident remarked “this station’s depressing, it used to be a place for dreams and now it’s empty.”
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Military Consolidation: A Qualified Success

By Brian Angelino
Senior Global Studies and Political Science Major, PPE Minor

Brian's passion for international relations and security has culminated in this paper on Bosnian military consolidation, which was written during a six week trip to the Balkans and the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna, Austria. Brian has his eyes set on joining the Air Force and becoming a JAG Corps Officer.

The process of military consolidation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is one of the few surprising success stories coming out of the war in the early 1990s. Though not a complete success, this process has made significant strides in opening avenues of negotiation and consolidation and has painted a bright future for the process of creating a unified Bosnian state. The reasons for this qualified success are twofold: adequate international pressure for reforms, and domestic incentives outside of international approval to catalyze the necessary reforms. Both before and after the war, there was never a time where both of these factors were sufficient enough to effect real change. In reality, there was just enough to start getting ideas down on paper, but when the time came for real reform, the political will was simply not there. What we are then left with is a system that, on paper, looks consolidated and unified, but on the ground is rife with disagreement and political tension.

As a subsidiary topic, this paper explores the importance of continued international attention to theaters of intervention. It is not enough to intervene, establish a governing structure, and then leave. Often times these theaters of intervention involve governments with little to no experience with self-rule, or that have experienced extremely corrupt regimes. As we see in BiH, this problem was rectified with adequate international pressure and assistance from about 2000 to 2008, but once international pressure waned, corrupt politics took over and progress diminished.

Military consolidation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), while extremely important in the path towards democratic consolidation, is one of the most difficult areas on which to find agreement due to its implications for physical security. This difficulty is especially salient given the situation in BiH during the early 1990s. The militaries were divided along ethnic lines, and to knowingly give up de facto power in an environment where power was the difference between life and death would be unthinkable. But this is exactly what happened. Starting in 1994 with the consolidation of Croat and Muslim forces, and culminating in the Defense Law on Service in the Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2005, the military atmosphere has successfully transitioned from one of uncertainty and insecurity to consolidation, security, and international approval, at least on paper. While structurally the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH) have consolidated, there are still disagreements as to which military doctrine should be used, and these prevent it from becoming a truly unified fighting force.

Through an examination of the consolidation process of both the HVO and ARBiH before the Dayton Agreement was concluded, as well as the post-Dayton consolidation of the two Entity armies, it becomes clear that two factors must be present in order for successful reform to take place. On the one hand, there must be adequate international pressure for such reforms. For both pre and post-Dayton, this pressure was present, though moreso after the signing of the Agreement than before. In addition, there must also be domestic incentives, aside from international approval, for the reforms to take place. Incentives were lacking in the pre-Dayton environment, which is why there was not concrete consolidation of Bosnian and Croat forces. Conversely, incentives were made very apparent in the “post-Dayton world.” As a result, when adequate international pressure was no longer present, incentives were not enough to push through the necessary reforms, and thus there was a lack of significant progress after about 2008 in the defense sector in BiH.

Historical Background

In 1989, Slobodan Milosevic revoked the considerable amount of autonomy the province of Kosovo had enjoyed within Serbia for the previous twenty-five years, which was the last time the Yugoslav Constitution had changed. This move
can be traced back as the tipping point for the war in the Balkans, a point of no return from which Milosevic embarked on his ruthless political experiment in Serbian nationalism. The ensuing six years saw genocide, forced removal, political upheaval, and independence movements from the various Yugoslav republics.

The first of the Yugoslav republics to declare independence was Slovenia, on 25 June 1991. This move was rejected by the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), which quickly intervened in the republic. But after a brief ten-day war, the European Community interceded, negotiated a ceasefire, and Slovenia became an independent country. This move created a domino effect in the region, with Croatia declaring its independence that same day, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) declaring in 1992. It is the war in BiH that would be in international headlines for the next three years.

Main Actors

The war in the Balkans was primarily fought between three factions: the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS), the Croatian Defense Council (HVO), and the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABiH). Out of these three, the VRS was the best equipped in heavy weaponry but suffered from a lack of manpower. With only about 60,000 troops, the VRS was thinly spread and relied on its ability to utilize its heavy artillery against the more guerilla-type Bosniak army, which boasted the largest ground force at about 90,000 troops with 200,000 in reserves. The Croat army was somewhere in the middle with about 100,000 total troops, but only an effective strength of about 55,000, and one or two guard brigades of about 10,000 capable of sophisticated operations. In this context the war began to wind down in 1994, influenced both by realities on the ground and international efforts spearheaded by American diplomacy.

The End of the War and Initial Consolidation

By 1994 war fatigue began to set in for the warring parties, but there were still several ambiguities and uncertainties; if not dealt with properly, these could have spelled disaster for the peace process in Bosnia. As James Gow outlined in his paper, Towards a Settlement in Bosnia: The Military Dimension, one of these ambiguities was the possibility of a consolidation of the Croat and Bosniak military structures. For the Croats, consolidation made sense for two reasons. First, they had suffered major territorial losses to the Bosniaks in the winter of ‘93-’94, and at the same time had to worry about Serb advances back in Croatia. For the Bosniaks, a consolidation with the HVO forces would help build their heavy weapon capacity and allow them to consolidate their gains against the Serbs during the winter months. Prior to this point, the Bosniak army went through cycles of gained and lost territory, gaining territory in the winter months when heavy weaponry like tanks were not as effective, and then losing that territory once the conditions were more favorable for the Serbs to regain the lost territory. An HVO-Bosniak merger would mean the Bosniaks could solidify these territorial gains made during the winter months, thereby achieving the upper hand against Bosnian Serb forces.

The consolidation process began in earnest after a 25 February 1994 ceasefire between the Croat and Bosniak forces. By early March, the Washington Agreement had been signed between Bosnian and Croatian government officials, effectively creating a "framework for a federation of Croatia and Bosniak majority areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina and a preliminary agreement for a confederation between the Federation and Croatia." Section VI of The Agreement cites that military arrangements are to accompany the newly formed Federation, including provisions on consolidation of the HVO and Bosnian military forces. The Agreement also stipulates that "current command structures will remain in place" during the transition period, which effectively allowed military officials to drag their feet in the reform process. Here, there already seemed to be a clear lack of adequate international pressure on the consolidation process. While there was a push for the idea of consolidation in principle, the United States was not willing to push for concrete steps in that direction.

The Washington Agreement negotiations were soon followed by negotiations that took place in Split, Croatia. They were negotiated by military leaders of the HVO and the Bosnian Army and mediated by John Galvin, former NATO Commander-in-chief and military adviser to Charles Redman, the U.S. special envoy to BiH. Though there was a general sense of optimism during the discussions, there was also a significant amount of apprehension, with one senior military official being quoted as saying, “I hope it works out. It will be extremely difficult to implement, but we'll see how it goes.” After two days of talks, agreements were made on the consolidation of command structures, intelligence gathering, and operations planning, but no concrete timetable for the transition was proposed at the time.

Later that year, Galvin led a team of fifteen U.S. officers to Sarajevo in November 1994 in an effort to catalyze what had been an otherwise dormant military transition since March. The delegation was primarily a result of the Clinton administration’s frustration with a lack of progress on the side of Croat and Bosnian military officials to integrate further per the Washington Agreement and earlier negotiations in Split. Additionally, the dominant camp at the time in Washington believed a Muslim-Croat coalition was the only way to ensure a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Initially, prospects for any kind of agreement looked slim. When U.S. officials arrived in Sarajevo in November 1994, both military and political officials cited mistrust about the other parties’ strategic long-term goals. General Ante Rosso of the HVO questioned the process, asking, "Why should we Croats engage ourselves when we do not know the strategic aim?" Izetbegovic talks of liberating Bosnia. But perhaps after freeing the country of Serbs, he will want to free it of Croats, too.” In the end, nominal cooperation occurred between the HVO and ABiH throughout the next year, largely with assistance from Croatian government forces (HV). The most high profile of these operations was Operation Storm, which took place on August 4-8, 1995, and was a campaign to push out Croatian Serbs back into the RS.
a lack of willingness on the part of the United States to expend the necessary resources to ensure this reform was successful. Aside from engaging in talks of consolidation, there was not a concerted effort to move in this direction. There was also no real incentive to merge. Aside from the marginal international pressure, the Washington Agreement allowed for separate command structures to stay in place. Furthermore, the Bosniak-Bosnian Croat partnership in its current form was successful in expelling Serbians living in Croatia in September 1995. Not only was each army allowed to keep their own command structure and still adhere to international agreement, but also the current set up was achieving both HVO and ARBiH strategic military goals. As a result, neither side had an incentive to reform, and the United States was not motivated enough to make this happen. Finally, after two ceasefire agreements in September and October 1995, the involved parties containing the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia came together on November 21, 1995 and signed the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, colloquially known as the Dayton Peace Accords. Annex 1-A outlined the procedures for the demobilization of military forces within the country and set out a framework for the future regarding military cooperation between the two Entities, the Federation and Republika Srpska. What this framework entailed was a complete demobilization of both Entity armies behind what was termed the “Zone of Separation,” which extended two kilometers from either side of the ceasefire line. Each Entity army was stripped of all operational capacity and was essentially told to shut down their operations and return to barracks.

Demobilization was one of the most important elements of Annex 1-A. In a time of war, the presence of previously warring militaries in the daily life of citizens posed serious problems for keeping the peace. The issue was especially salient in BiH, where the armies were primarily fueled by ethnic tensions. Indeed, immediately following the end of the Bosnian war, “The only conceivable enemy for a Bosnian soldier is another Bosnian soldier.” With this being the case, it was extremely important to ensure that the militaries were demobilized and stripped of any kind of ability to engage in atrocities similar to those of the past four years. To ensure the demobilization of the Entity armies, a multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) was created through Annex 1-A. IFOR was to have a one-year mandate with operational capabilities comprised of ground, air, and...
maritime units. IFOR had a complete executive mandate to ensure military security in BiH and was answerable only to their direct supervisors, not local military officials.\textsuperscript{23}

In conjunction with the establishment of IFOR, The Dayton Peace Accords established a Joint Military Commission. The JMC was meant to serve as a meeting point for all parties involved, including Entity army officials, to come together and air any complaints, questions, or problems they had. While the Entity armies had no real physical competencies on the ground in terms of mobility or the ability to enforce physical security, officials from each Entity army were still able to interact with IFOR and make their voices heard. Aside from airing grievances, the Entity army officials were also required to report on the location, type, and strength of personnel and weaponry of all forces within ten kilometers of the ceasefire line.\textsuperscript{24}

Beyond Dayton: Consolidating the Entity Armies

Due to the nature of the conflict in BiH, any kind of unified military structure was completely out of the question during the Dayton negotiations. The Dayton Peace Accords are often criticized as achieving almost nothing but a cessation of hostilities. In terms of creating sustainable democratic institutions in BiH, the Dayton Accords were far from adequate. This sentiment was echoed by Richard Holbrooke, one of the architects of Dayton, who has described the existence of three armies within BiH as, “the most serious flaw in the agreement.”\textsuperscript{25} As a result, the Constitution of BiH did not mention any kind of real competency in defense matters at the State level.\textsuperscript{26} Instead, defense competencies are given to the Entities, found in Section III Article I of the Federation constitution and Part VII Articles 104-107 in the RS constitution. As if this wouldn’t already create enough headaches for the BiH Presidency, BiH’s defense structure was further complicated by the creation of the Standing Committee on Military Matters, outlined in Article V(5)(a) of the BiH Constitution.\textsuperscript{27} The first line of this article stipulates “each member of the Presidency shall, by virtue of the office, have civilian command authority over armed forces.”\textsuperscript{28} In essence, this provision created two parallel command structures, one at the Entity level and another at the State level. Indeed, the Bosniak member of the BiH Presidency, Alija Izetbegovic, challenged this parallel structure in 1998. Izetbegovic’s argument was that the Entity constitutions violated the above article of the BiH Constitution, claiming that the Presidency should be able to assume civilian command through the Standing Committee on Military Matters, which was established in Dayton.\textsuperscript{29} But, on August 19, 2000, the BiH Constitutional Court ruled against Izetbegovic, and claimed that in fact BiH, “does not have unified armed forces at the state level.”\textsuperscript{30} This conflict of interest and parallel command structure would be part of the impetus for reform, with additional impetus coming from economic considerations. The Federation army was burdened by the combination of Croat and Bosniak forces, while the RS army had to deal with remnants of the JNA that were left behind.

Post-Dayton, both Entity armies combined employed about 46,000 full time professionals.\textsuperscript{31} The Entity armies were also in possession of enough heavy weapons to equip an even larger force. In an attempt to curb this unnecessary spending, and without any real power to enforce arms control measures, the OSCE initiated a public information campaign in BiH to inform the public on the inefficiencies of the two-army system.\textsuperscript{32} Utilizing radio, newspapers, TV, and the Internet, the campaign encouraged BiH citizens to remind BiH politicians that at the end of the day they (the politicians) are accountable to taxpayers and for citizens to, “demand transparency in the budgeting process.”\textsuperscript{33} At six percent of GDP, BiH spent almost six times as much on defense as other European countries, which on average spend about 1.5 percent. In more concrete terms, BiH at the time had a 1:21 active soldier to citizen ratio, while the UK had a ratio of 1:200,\textsuperscript{34} seemingly disproportionate for a country with no real global security interests.

The information campaign paid off for the OSCE, and by the end of 2001 the AFBiH had reduced their combined forces to 33,000.\textsuperscript{35} Moving forward, both Entity governments agreed on a goal of 20,000 full-time professionals to be achieved by 2005. But in reality this was the tail end of a process that had begun in February of that same year. As parties began to come to the realization that defense spending habits were not sustainable, the Parties agreed to an external audit of the 2000 defense budgets. The audit was conducted by three international auditors and was funded by the United States, United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Germany. As expected, the audit produced quite dismal results. According to the report, which applied the spending from 2000 to the 2002 budgets, the Federation would exhaust their 2002 defense budget by mid-May, while the RS would exhaust theirs by mid-August.\textsuperscript{36}

Unfortunately, this revelation did not translate into political discourse. According to a report on the October 2002 elections in BiH published by the European Parliament in November 2002, “There was a lack of meaningful debate on substantive issues, including reform.”\textsuperscript{37} While the report does not mention military matters directly, the observation that campaigns centered primarily on personal attacks and even appeals to nationalism is illustrative of a political atmosphere at the time in BiH that was not prepared to take on these reform issues, at least publicly. In early 2002, the Federation Parliament, after long debate, decided to reduce the AFBiH by 10,000 troops.\textsuperscript{38} This decision was especially important given the tradition of mistrust that had colored politics in BiH since the war. Especially in the realm of defense, traditionally a stalimated policy area, to have one Entity unilaterally reduce its capacity is extremely promising. The RS soon followed, and by the end of 2002 both Entity armies had been reduced collectively by 13,000, saving a total of 200 million-KM.\textsuperscript{39} It seems that, at least behind closed doors, military officials, and to a certain extent politicians, were able to agree on certain reforms when it came to military spending. This willingness came in no small part from guarantees by the International Community to assist in the transition, as well as their insistence that such reform was absolutely necessary.\textsuperscript{40}
Throughout this entire process there had been an increasing realization among the Parties that, “the purpose of armed forces is to restrain external aggression rather than protect groups inside a country from their fellow countrymen.” As with parliamentary discussion of defense reform, this realization was especially crucial and promising in a country where just seven years ago this was exactly what the armies were for.

Another important international development that spurred on military reform in BiH was the appointment of Paddy Ashdown as the High Representative in early 2002. Ashdown was only in office for just over a year before, using the Bonn Powers, he established the Defense Reform Commission. Just a quick glance over the pre-ambulatory clauses of the decision make it abundantly clear that HR Ashdown established this Commission to address the many structural deficiencies within the defense sector of BiH, such as the parallel chains of command and the ambiguities contained within them. The OHR decision was also influenced by events outside the country. Earlier in 2002 the Serbian manufacturer Yugioimport, operating out of Bijeljina in the Republika Srpska, was found to have been supplying jet engines and spare parts to Saddam Hussein in Iraq. It had been found that these deals had been occurring since Milosevic left power in 2000. While the political leadership was largely found to not have been involved, blame was placed on Bosnian Serb military officials, which only reinforced Ashdown’s convictions that reforms needed to be made. These revelations made it blatantly obvious that something needed to be done in increasing the efficiency and credibility of the Armed Forces in BiH. But this reform would not be easy, as the underlying structural issues weren’t necessarily physical.

A 2005 report published by the U.K.’s Conflict Studies Research Center in the highlighted an ideological roadblock to concrete reform in BiH. They claimed, “BiH is a weak state in which the chance for institution-based rule is very difficult to build and sustain, not least because the population has ‘little or no attachment to the idea of [BiH] as a legitimate state.” This way of thinking is easy to understand considering the conflict in the mid-1990s in surface level terms but also the nature of the conflict. No ethnic group had a clear majority in the country when war broke out. Coupled with a severe lack of trust, these factors created an extremely unstable environment. As a result, ethnic groups within the country could not establish one unified institution to which they could trust to effectively run the country. Instead, they were left with political parties that played off lingering ethnic tensions. A second aspect of this phenomenon leaked over into the armed forces, where a small degree of civilian attachment to the state translates into weak levels of loyalty to the armed forces by civilians as well.

In September 2003 the Defense Reform Commission submitted their report and recommendations for military reform in BiH. As the Report claimed in its executive summary, its creation was encouraged by not only defense pledges on the part of BiH, but also international efforts by the OHR, OSCE, and NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. The Commission was composed of representatives from all three parties as well as internationals, and met over ten times between the OHR’s announcement in May and their final proposal in September of that year. An important finding of this Commission got at the core of the problem with military reform. In conversations with BiH soldiers, many SFOR soldiers claimed that BiH soldiers were keenly interested in professionalization and enhancing their military skills. The gridlock in fact came from much higher up, as well as outside the military sphere. General Officers (GOs) and politicians, who developed in a system that rewarded party loyalty over actual ability, were proven to be roadblocks to reform. Additionally, voters responded to the protection of RS interests over the interests of BiH as a whole. As a result, RS politicians have had to tout these hardline policies in order to stay in office. Moreover, strong international pressure from organizations like the OHR was needed to ensure that the necessary defense sector reforms took place.

The main goal of the Defense Law of 2003 was transferring military competencies from the Entity level to the State level. Despite this law being an initiative of the international community, it was not extra-constitutional. The Report cited several articles from the Constitution of BiH, including Articles III.5, III.1, III.2, and IV.4, which all assigned military and foreign affairs competencies to the State level, as interpreted by the DRC. The result was the establishment of a State-level Ministry of Defense, but still with, “an appropriate and workable division of responsibilities between State and entity institutions.” As Valery Perry pointed out in her report on the same subject, “the Entities will retain their MODs for primarily administrative purposes (manning, training, and equipping).”
Within the new State-level institutions would be an Operational chain of command, composed of the Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff, and then a subordinate Operational Command, headed by a Commander. The Operational Command Commander oversaw the two Entity MoDs, and their respective chains of command. On a broader level, what the Defense Law did was give all “command” competencies to the State level, but still allowed the Entity level MoDs a hand in the implementation of these policies. The State was given the ability to decide on policy, while still allowing Entity MoDs to be involved in policy implementation. The Defense Law of 2003 also proposed parliamentary reforms that would bring the defense structure within BiH closer to NATO and PfP standards. In hindsight, allowing the Entity-level MoDs still take part in administering State-level policies was probably a mistake. It essentially allowed institutional gridlock to continue because while the State-level MoD was able to create the policy, there was no enforcement mechanism. As illustrated later, this is exactly what happened, and was one of the main drivers of the second Defense Law in 2005.

From 2003 on there were two main forces that explain defense reform in BiH: the establishment of the PSOTC in 2003 as well as membership in NATO’s PfP. Unlike the process for membership in the Council of Europe, which was predicated on promises of reform in the future, membership in PfP, as made clear by former SFOR Commander General John Sylvester, “is contingent upon real, not promised future changes.” Both of these processes were initiated more or less concurrently, with the Presidency of BiH announcing its interest in NATO’s PfP in 2001. Additionally, the first steps were taken in creating what would eventually become the Peace Support Operations Training Center that same year.

In Heinz Vetschera’s 2012 article, Vetschera examined the problems facing the current structure of the AFBiH, specifically a lack of a coherent and unified military doctrine and higher education curriculum. Before the war, each army had no real training or education system, and as a result most of this training was outsourced to countries like the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the case
of the RS and U.S.-backed “Train and Equip” programs in the Federation. In 2001 the U.K. Joint Services Command and Staff College commissioned a study that aimed to look at the feasibility of the establishment of a Joint Leadership College in BiH. At the time, there was a sense that the initiation of joint training, not necessarily joint military education curricula, would lead to further integration of the armies and the establishment of a unified military doctrine. By 2003 the Center, formally known as the Peace Support Operations Training Center (PSOTC), was established. All of PSOTC’s stated goals had an end game of a fully integrated and unified BiH defense system that would be in line with PfP requirements. The purpose of such a program, as outlined on NATO’s website, is, “...to increase stability, diminish threats to peace and build strengthened security relationships between individual Euro-Atlantic partners and NATO, as well as among partner countries.” Partnership for Peace would allow for the professionalization of the military that the soldiers desired, and would also provide a sense of legitimacy for the Presidency of BiH who hoped for Euro-Atlantic integration. Normally, just announcing a desire is not enough of an incentive to actually initiate reform, and as General Sylvester noted, Partnership for Peace required concrete reform, not just promises. Zoran Sajinovic pointed out in his 2007 report on the defense reform process in BiH that BiH must, “... have the capacity to act, be relied on to act, and conduct tasks in the area of their competencies.” These capacities were lacking in BiH, thus adding teeth to the incentive of membership into PfP.

It is important to note here that concurrently with military education, a second Defense Law was being developed, again mandated by Paddy Ashdown, that was submitted by the DRC in September 2005. The reform aimed to build off of the reforms enacted in the Defense Law of 2003, and cited specifically Article 80 of the previous law, which legally binds BiH to work towards NATO membership. The Defense Law of 2003 had assigned State level authority to create and set standards to which the Entity level MoDs were supposed to hold themselves, but “by the end of 2004 it had become clear that attempts to exercise even this limited authority were meeting considerable institutional inertia.” As a result, the 2005 Defense Law consolidated the two chains of command that were present from the 2003 law, effectively shutting down the Entity MoDs. Another important development contained within this bill was the elimination of conscript requirements.

From this point on, the AFBiH was composed entirely of volunteers. This is especially important, as a non-conscript army enhances the professionalization of an army. Instead of forcing citizens to serve, the armed forces are composed of citizens who willingly choose to serve and want to be there to learn and improve their skills as a soldier.

As further efforts were made to enhance the quality of military education in BiH, one thing became clear: instead of a concerted effort, every program that was developed was done so independently of one another. There was no coordination on the part of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, OSCE, or universities within BiH, all organizations that implemented programs, to implement programs that complemented each other. As a result, there was, “...a kind of emerging pattern of higher military education, [but] they could not be assessed as a system (emphasis in original).” Here again, like in the pre-Dayton consolidation of the Croat and Bosnian military forces, there was international pressure, but not quite enough, or in this case not coordinated enough, to push through meaningful reform. In October 2006, a window of opportunity opened up for military education reform to take another step forward. But this time, instead of coming from the OHR or NATO, it came from the newly appointed Minister of Defense, Selmo Cikotic, who had been appointed as a result of the October 2006 elections. Cikotic, along with continuing to pursue NATO membership, wanted to establish a coherent military training and education system that would entail expanding the PSOTC to include a defense college with full academic accreditation.

Measurable progress was made in this arena in the ensuing years. On March 24, 2008, after working in tandem with the NATO Advisory Team stationed in the BiH MoD, Cikotic released a decision that established the Commission on Military Training and Education.
This Commission was coupled with a concept paper, written by Heinz Vetschera, a member of the Defense Reform Commission and lecturer at the PSOTC at the time, that outlined, “...the requirements for courses, educational institutions, and how to integrate existing courses and institutions into one coherent system.” Unfortunately, this was where progress in terms of a unified doctrine ended, for two reasons. On December 14, 2005, Christian Schwartz-Schilling was selected to be Paddy Ashdown’s replacement as High Representative in BiH.  This was a crucial turning point in defense reform because it signified a large reduction in international pressure on reform measures within the country. Unlike Ashdown, who was extremely active in utilizing the Bonn Powers, Schwartz-Schilling declared upon coming into office that he would restrict his use of the Bonn Powers to ICTY matters and Dayton stability. With an involved High Representative no longer in the picture, adequate international pressure seemed to be waning away, leaving only the incentive of Partnership for Peace and NATO membership left to motivate reform within the country, but membership in PIP was satisfied in 2006. Secondly, the new PSOTC Commandant who came into power in 2006 had a drastically different vision than his predecessor. The first Commandant, a Danish Brigadier General, fully intended to have the PSOTC fulfill the role of AFBiH Command and Staff College, but the new Commandant had a much narrower view of the role of the PSOTC. He saw the PSOTC as a purely training center, and while training was a successful component of the PSOTC, the lack of attention given to education severely hindered military reform. Indeed, this reform could have spilled over into the education system at large. As the author notes (in footnote 36 of the report), “As of June 2008 I achieved a consensus among all eight public universities in BiH that they would accept the curriculum of the PSOTC’s staff course as part of regular management studies,” to which the Commandant replied, “We do not need academics but warriors.” This mindset completely eradicated the first necessary factor in defense reform in BiH: adequate international pressure for reform. For the first time, real resistance was made to further consolidation, not from domestic actors, but an international actor. With the pressure gone, and the incentive of PfP already achieved, reform started to severely decline. Despite the Commandant’s disagreements, there were continued efforts to create a curriculum for higher military education in the form of a series of workshops, but with no tangible results. Additionally, factions began to emerge that disagreed on how the process should proceed. Local politicians were quick to pick up on these disagreements and began to exploit them in the buildup to the October 2010 elections. Politicians began to fall back on familiar platforms: Serbian politicians opposed any kind of new institutions being developed at the State level, thereby opposing continued military education reform. Croat politicians exploited growing tensions within the MoD between the Minister and the Croat faction within the Ministry. What is interesting to note here is that, even despite NATO’s clear message that concrete reforms need to take place in order to move through the membership process, the message still was no longer enough of an incentive for BiH officials to make meaningful reform. In fact, the NATO Advisory Team did not even participate in workshops that were conducted in May of 2010. This should be attributed to a vacuum of international pressure on the reform process.

Conclusion
In the apt words of Heinz Vetschera, “the development of higher military education in BiH appears to have stopped in its tracks.” Though it is three years since this paper was published, BiH is still not a member of NATO, nor is there a unified military education structure, despite the fact that these were the two main strategic goals of BiH officials for the better part of the last fifteen years. As illustrated, the two main drivers of the military reform process were adequate international pressure as well as sufficient domestic incentives to reform, and both of these factors played off of each other. Post-Dayton, there was international pressure to reform from American diplomats and military officials pushing for consolidation of HVO and ARBiH forces, but no incentives on the part of the armies to do so. Additionally, international pressure was not strong enough to enact real change in the absence of these incentives, so reform did not occur. Post-Dayton, adequate international pressure was present in the form of a strong OHR, OSCE and the allure of membership in NATO, as well as incentives for BiH officials to act. In the case of the OHR, the incentives were less clear because of the OHR’s executive mandate to be able to act unilaterally, but still manifested themselves through Izetbegovic’s complaint about joint command structures as well as the Orao scandal of 2002. For the OSCE, the incentives they presented were very clearly economic in nature. Through demobilization of forces, BiH saved 200 million KM. With NATO, the incentives were present on both sides of the equation. For NATO, accession into PfP helped establish collective security in the region, and for BiH accession meant technical assistance and general military development. But when international pressure waned, the process stalled. While it is unclear what the future holds for BiH, it is clear that as long as the current domestic political situation persists, a strong international presence is necessary to push forward reform, as well as the emergence of domestic incentives to reform. This international presence will definitely be necessary in defense, and most likely in other sectors as well.

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Sarajevo is a striking city with a beautiful culture, stone architecture and people. The main square is full of people shopping for goods like pashmina scarves in the markets. (Tara Nattress, Senior Political Science Major, Classical Humanities and Social & Economic Justice Minor)
The Role of Kurds in Iranian Grand Strategy

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Sasha hopes to pursue a career in international human rights law. Research on the Kurds allows her to merge her interests in ethnic divisions and Middle Eastern politics.

The policy of supporting Kurdish militias as proxy groups would enable Iran to weaken regional rivals, support ideologically sympathetic groups, and centralize their state, helping them to reach their goal of regional hegemony. Iran's support of proxy groups in places like Yemen and Bahrain, as well as their consistent rivalry with Saudi Arabia, suggest that this is their ultimate goal. Their support of Iraqi Kurdish group the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) in the Iran-Iraq war severely weakened the Iraqi state, and their support of Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) members in Turkey has also helped the group to remain strong in spite of Turkish repression. In addition to weakening these states, Iran has successfully promoted the growth of Kurdish groups with ideological similarities; like Iran, groups like the KDP and the PKK are anti-imperialist and pro-Russian. Paradoxically, the stronger Kurdish militias become in Turkey and Iraq, the weaker they become in Iran, enabling the state to maintain its viability as a multi-ethnic empire by stifling Kurdish secession movements. Existing linguistic, economic, and social divisions have manifested as political divisions, preventing major Kurdish parties in Iran from unifying. Iran has exacerbated these fissures by supporting Iraqi and Turkish groups in exchange for their help in repressing Iranian groups, as evidenced primarily by the Iranian alliance with the Barzani family. If Iran recognizes the strategic significance of supporting Kurdish groups, the political landscape in the Middle East could change in a way with severely negative repercussions for the United States; for example, an Iranian alliance with the Kurds would likely damage American objectives in Syria, given the political significance the Syrian Kurds' People's Protection Units (YPG) will likely have in establishing the next Syrian government.

As the most powerful states in the world clamor for influence in the Middle East, one of the most prominent players is not a state at all. Rather, it is the Kurds, an ethnic group that is split between nations but united in pursuit of their own state. Indeed, the Kurdish nationalist movement has gained increasing strategic importance in the region (see Appendix II) as the United States has cooperated with Kurdish fighters both in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and in the Syrian Civil War.

In order to gain influence on this increasingly significant actor, Iran should seek to utilize Kurdish militias as proxy groups to achieve regional objectives. Doing so would help Iran to weaken other regional powers, promote the growth of sympathetic political powers, and consolidate the state domestically, thereby enabling them to achieve regional hegemony. To demonstrate why, I will examine literature on the role of Kurds in the Iran-Iraq War and the relationship between Iran and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). To show how supporting such militias can help Iran consolidate power domestically, I will examine how Iran's relations with other Kurds have affected their own, particularly during the Iran-Iraq War, as well as draw on statements by contemporary politicians.

A Kurdish-Iranian alliance would not only affect Iran's regional power, but would have substantial geo-political implications. Iran has a long history of supporting proxy groups such as Hezbollah to achieve regional objectives. Utilizing the Kurds in a similar manner, would significantly complicate politics in the Middle East. Moreover, supporting proxies allows Iran to achieve objectives while maintaining plausible deniability for controversial actions. It also enables them to maintain quasi-control over key strategic areas by exerting control through local actors with a solid understanding of the situation on the ground.

Furthermore, with the advent of the Iraqi and Syrian civil wars, the balance of power in the Middle East is in flux. How much aid the Kurds get from international powers, including Iran, will impact the development of governments in the region. If the Iran-backed Kurds fill the power vacuum left behind by the Iraqi and Syrian governments, Iranian power
will expand significantly. This would be particularly problematic for the United States, considering that the Iraqi Kurds currently sit on roughly 15% of Iraq’s oil supply. Furthermore, Iran is home to 9 million Kurds, which comprise roughly 15% of their population. Its policy toward its Kurds internationally will affect nationalist fervor in its own borders, thereby determining Iran’s ability to stay viable as a multi-ethnic nation.

**History**

**Iranian Kurdistan**

Under both Reza Shah and the Iranian Republic, Iran has consistently been threatened by Kurdish nationalists. Comprised of 30 million people split between Iraq, Iran, and Turkey (see Appendix I), the Kurds have been described as the “world’s largest stateless nation.” Kurdish nationalists complain that Iran does not adequately respect their civil, political, and economic rights. Though Iran’s constitution promises equal rights for ethnic minorities, these rights are often not granted in practice, and the Kurds are not explicitly granted equal rights. Neither are practitioners of Sunni Islam, which many Kurds are. While some Kurds serve in Iran’s Parliament, and can broadcast television and radio in their local language, their broader persecution manifests in many ways. Public schools, for example, do not teach Kurdish, Kurdish political parties are illegal, and Kurds are unlikely to rise to prominent political positions. Furthermore, Iranian Kurdistan suffers from higher rates of poverty than the rest of Iran.

Such problems have plagued Iranian Kurds for over a century, leading to the rise of Kurdish activists that threaten to dissolve the Iranian state. Following the abdication of the Shah and the occupation of Iran by British and Soviet forces, the Kurds took advantage of the chaos to form the independent Republic of Mahabad in 1946. The state dissolved within a year, however, and the Kurds gained little in the way of civil liberties. Kurdish activists were executed, teaching their language was outlawed, and the Kurdish Democratic Party in Iran (KDPI,) the most prominent Kurdish political party, was driven underground. It was not until 1951 that the Kurds reengaged with the political process in support of Mohammad Mossadegh. Inspired by his promise to appoint a Kurd to his cabinet, and the KDPI won many local elections in 1952. Though the Kurds supported a referendum to to limit the Shah’s powers, they did not support his successor and have been at odds with the Iranian Republic since it’s founding. Their opposition goes back to the uprising in 1979, when they refused to support Ayatollah Khomeini in the 1979 uprising due to his unwillingness to guarantee Kurdish civil rights in the Constitution. Khomeini responded by declaring holy war against the Kurds in the summer of 1979, before eventually surrendering and agreeing to give the Kurds limited cultural rights. The Kurds once again attempted an uprising during the Iran-Iraq War, when they succeeded in taking over large swathes of rural Iran. In 1983, however, Khomeini invaded Kurdistan with a quarter of a million troops and
successfully quelled the uprising. 50,000 Kurds were killed, including 45,000 civilians.

Since then, the relationship between Iran and its Kurds has been one of high tension and low-level violence. The KDPI remains active abroad, though Iran has continued to bomb its bases in Iraq. Iran was also accused of assassinating KDPI leaders Abdul Rahman Ghassemloou and Sadegh Sharafkandi in 1985 and 1992, respectively. In September 2015, the Kurdish Komala party accused the Iranian government of planning a terrorist attack on party headquarters.

The Kurds have expressed their resentment of this treatment. Politically, they were heavily supportive of President Khatami’s governmental reforms in the early 2000s, and many resigned from the government in 2001 in protest of attempts to thwart reform. In May 2015, the Kurdish city of Mahabad erupted in violent protests after an Iranian police officer was accused of trying to rape a young Kurdish woman, leading to her suicide.

The Kurds Outside Iran

Kurdish separatists have threatened both the Turkish and Iraqi governments for at least fifty years. Despite one in five Turkish citizens being Kurdish, the Turkish government has used violent measures to suppress the group since the early 1900s. The Turkish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) was founded in 1978, and entered war with the Turkish government in 1984. The Turkish government and PKK negotiated a ceasefire, after 28 years and 40,000 deaths, but scattered violence persists.

Iraq, meanwhile, is 20% Kurdish, and its first Kurdish nationalist party, the Kurdish Democratic Party, was founded in 1946. After two separate wars against the Turks in the 1960s and 1970s, the Iraqi central government began expelling Kurds from their hometowns and encouraging Arabs to take their place. The discrimination culminated in the horrific chemical attack on the town of Halabja in 1988.

The Kurds have improved their lot since the attack on Halabja. Today,
a Kurdish government rules three provinces through the Kurdistan Regional Government, the leadership of which is still undecided about whether to pursue complete autonomy or some sort of federal system within Iraq. The fact that Kurdish nationalism is a transnational phenomenon allows one nation in the Middle East to influence another indirectly, using the Kurds as a proxy; as such, Iraq and Turkey's problems with Kurdish nationalism are intimately relevant to Iranian strategy.

**Iranian Grand Strategy**

Iran’s grand strategy is to achieve regional hegemony. In order to achieve this, Iran must maintain a stable regime, making the management of internal ethnic conflicts critical. The Kurds have a place in this insofar as Iranian Kurds create division domestically, threatening state stability. Foreign Kurds can also be manipulated to foment division in enemy nations, thereby serving as a means of projecting Iranian power.

Nowhere are Iran’s regional goals more evident than in their ongoing competition with Saudi Arabia. Each state seeks to assert its regional dominance in the Arab Gulf, Iran’s actions in Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen underscore a willingness to act on this rhetoric. For example, Iran began supporting Shia coups in Bahrain in the 1980s and protests grew so prevalent that the Saudi’s were forced to suppress them militarily in 2011. The Iranians likewise support Hezbollah, a Shia military group in Lebanon, as well as the Shia Houthis rebels that overthrew Yemen’s Sunni government in the spring of 2015, and have been sending them arms since 2012. The Saudis responded by supporting anti-Houthi forces in Yemen, suppressing Iranian-backed rebellions in Bahrain, and generally banding with other Sunni nations through diplomatic organizations like the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Such regional expansion is, however, only possible if the Iranians are able to ensure stability in their own state. This is a particularly important for Iranian security, as it is home to so many ethnic and religious minorities. Iran is plagued by several domestic security threats, including the terror groups Mujahedin-e Khalq, Jundallah, and the Party for the Free Life of Kurdistan. The nation’s efforts to get the international community to cut ties with these organizations indicates that Iran considers them a strategic threat. As such, Iran will not be able to achieve larger strategic goals until it quells these threats.

**The Kurds as Military Proxies**

Iran may be able to use Kurdish militias to achieve regional influence. It has already achieved influence in Bahrain, Yemen, and Lebanon by strategically supporting various militias. Iran pursued a similar strategy in the Iran-Iraq War and through its continued support of the PKK. The ease with which different nations have also manipulated Kurdish militias suggests that Iran can do the same in the future.

Historically, the Kurds have been manipulated by Middle Eastern states to influence conflicts in their favor. This has been true since the initial decline of colonialism in the region, when Turkey supported Kurdish autonomy from Iraq in an effort to keep the Iraqi central government from consolidating oil reserves near Mosul. They later gave Iraqi Kurds a safe haven in exchange for help targeting the PKK. At no other time in recent history has this been more apparent than during the Iran-Iraq War. During this conflict, Syria and Libya supported the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).

Turkey, taking advantage of the regional chaos to undermine the Iranian government in the long-term, supported Iranian Kurds separatists. Iraq funded the Iranian branch of KDPI and Komala, a Marxist-Leninist Kurdish activist party. Iran, meanwhile, supported a coalition of groups opposed to Saddam, and also allowed them access to supply lines in Iraq. The Iraqi branch of the KDP was a member of this coalition. The Shah depended on the KDP both to undermine the Iraqi government (most notably in an infamous attack on a Kirkuk oil refinery) and to suppress Iranian Kurdish rebellions. KDPI is, incidentally, an offshoot of KDP; as such, Iran’s actions forced two branches of the same organization into war with each other because they were supported by separate powers. So dependent was the KDP on Iran that after the Shah cut off his support, the movement disintegrated within weeks. However, even after officially severing ties with the Iraqi Kurds, the Shah offered Mullah Mustafa Barzani refuge in Iran. Tehran lent this support to Iraq in spite of the substantial problems it was having with its own Kurds; indeed, after offering Barzani protection, his sons started the KDP/Provisional command in Iran.

Iran has also used Kurdish separatist groups to provoke its rival, Turkey. During the Iran-Iraq War, Iran offered military support to the PKK. Though it did not support the formation of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq, the appearance of such support allowed them to use their support of the Kurds to strengthen their bargaining position with Turkey. As such, Iran and Turkey began to engage in a sort of proxy war in Kurdish territory during this conflict.

Furthermore, starting in 1980, Iran began to harbor Kurdish activists fleeing from Turkey, allowing them to organize inside Iranian territory. They refused to allow the Turkish military access to Iranian Kurdistan, where they wanted to arrest prominent Kurds. Iran’s support also damaged Turkey indirectly; the support of Iraqi Kurds countered to Turkish interests, of opposing Kurdish nationalism all across the region.

In conclusion, numerous Middle Eastern states have used Kurdish militias to influence particular conflicts in their favor. This behavior goes back to the early days of colonialism, but came to a head in the Iran-Iraq War. Iran has also consistently used the PKK to gain leverage in its rivalry with Turkey. As such, Iran would benefit from continuing this behavior to undermine its rivals in the future.

**The Kurds as Ideological Allies**

A strong Kurdistan could benefit Iran not only by weakening its enemies, but by providing it with an ideologically similar ally and counter-balance to American influence. Indeed, one of the main pillars in KDPI’s platform involves resisting imperialism. Furthermore, Abdul Rahman Qassemlo, prominent Kurdish leader, resented the United States for not providing more support against the Iranian regime, arguing that they were trying to maintain quasi-imperial control in the region. General Dan Hickman,
who served on the Iran-Iraq border from 2003-2005, said many Kurds in the region asked whether the Americans would be more loyal to the Kurds in the future than they had been in the past. Therefore, a Kurdistan with a long memory of American betrayal may ally with Iran on the basis that their enemy’s enemy is their friend; this is especially likely considering the support the Iranian government has given Iraqi and Turkish Kurds.

The Kurds could also provide a counterbalance to other powers in the region. For example, Kurdish anger at the failure of Arab governments to stop ISIS may provide Iran with an anti-Arab ally. The Kurds’ historic antagonism toward Turkey could benefit Iran in a similar way.

This ideological convergence has increased in recent years, as both the Kurds and Iran get closer to Russia. Iran was not always so open, and was initially wary of the Kurds’ connections to Russia. For example, Marxist guerrillas fought with the KDPI, leading Khomeini to believe the Kurds were part of a Marxist plot to divide Iran. However, Iran no longer bears any antagonism to Russia. In fact, the Kurds would fit easily into Iran’s existing network of alliances due to their long history with Russia. Such an ally would make large-scale mobilization in the Middle East much simpler, thanks to shared interest.

Developing an alliance with the Kurds’ is in Russia’s strategic interest too, given their control of Northern Syria. In fact, Kurdish leaders have even begun to set up offices in Moscow. Russia has even declared an alliance with the Kurdish Democratic Union Party, and has consulted it on battling the Islamic State. Russia has also fostered commercial ties with the Iraqi Kurds, investing in oil in Iraqi Kurdistan.

It is not the first time this connection has been made, however. The Soviet Union was intimately involved in the foundation of the first Kurdish state, the Mahabad Republic. For example, in 1943, the Mahabad Kurds found a secret organization called the Committee of Kurdish Youth, (Komala). The Komala was ideologically inspired by the Soviet Union, and praised both Lenin and the USSR itself in its newspaper.

One potential counterargument is that Kurdish groups and Iran have fewer ideological commonalities than they first appear to. For example, many Kurdish groups are Marxist-Leninist, while the Iranian government is not. However, Iran has struck alliances based on fewer ideological similarities; Iran is closely allied with Russia, for example, even though they are a Shi’a anti-imperial power, and Russia is not Muslim and was a substantial imperial power (it, in fact, occupied even Iran).

Furthermore, one could argue that while the United States was an inconsistent ally, Iran has been too, due to its oppression of some Kurdish groups and support of others. Therefore, the Kurds are as likely to ally with the United States as with Iran. However, choosing between many potentially disloyal nations as an ally, the Kurds could be convinced to collaborate with any of several different powers; it is likely that they would choose to ally with the first nation that made an overture, meaning that if Iran moves fast in establishing an alliance, it is just as likely as other powers to gain influence.

Using Foreign Kurds to Control Domestic Kurds

Iran’s long history of struggles with Kurdish separatists, means it must be wary of allowing support of foreign Kurds to empower Kurds domestically; however, Iranian Kurds are divided by linguistic, economic, social, and political factors, making such empowerment unlikely.

**Linguistic Divisions:** Across the Middle East, there are three linguistic groups among the Kurds. Most Iranian Kurds speak Sorani, while Syrian and Turkish Kurds speak Komanji (see Appendix I). Some Turkish Kurds also speak Zara, a language so different that it cannot be understood at all by speakers of the other dialects. Politically, Sorani Kurds are frequently allied with Jalal Talabani rather than Masoud Barzani.

While Sorani’s have the majority, both of these two linguistic groups are present in Iran, leading to political tensions. Idris Barzani, the son of prominent leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani, was accused of taking advantage of the linguistic distinctions, linking Talabani to the Sorani’s to demonize him in Komanji regions. This demonstrates that the linguistic divisions between the Kurds may threaten their ability to unify behind a single political cause.

**Economic Divisions:** The Kurds in Iran are also divided economically. Komala argues that Kurdish society is plagued by a battle between the bourgeois and the proletariat. For example, in 1979, Kurdish landlords attempted to remove peasants from their land or impose heavy taxes upon them. Komala accused Kurdish leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani of supporting this, and supported the peasants in an armed uprising against their...
landlords. Perceived class differences have prevented Komala from allying with other Iranian Kurdish groups; for example, they refuse to cooperate with the KDPI on the basis that it is dominated by elites.68

Such economic divisions plagued the short-lived Mahabad Republic, and may have contributed to its demise. Support for the Republic was concentrated in the city of Mahabad itself and nearby towns including Bukan, Ushnaviah, and Naqadeh, but the general Kurdish public never supported it.69 This may be because the Mahabad government never achieved land redistribution reforms,60 likely because political leaders were often wealthy landowners.69 If such economic divisions plagued the first and only Kurdish Republic, it stands to reason that it may jeopardize future attempts to create a Kurdish state.

Social Divisions: Iranian Kurds are also divided socially, between educated urban classes and tribal leaders. Urban Kurds, such as those in Mahabad, often seek autonomy for nationalist reasons, inspired by Turkish and Arab nationalism. Tribal leaders, like those in Urumiya, similarly seek autonomy on the basis of wanting to maintain their sovereignty, and are therefore as likely to resist the leadership of political parties as the are to resist the Iranian government.62

Because most Kurdish separatist movements originated amongst the urban intelligentsia, they have often been unable to spread to the peasantry. For example, in 1967, a group of Kurds rebelled against economic problems and the Shah's increasing brutality. However, they were easily repressed due to their inability to mobilize rural Kurds.63

This urban-rural divide was particularly significant during the days of the Mahabad Republic. In the 1940s, the tribes were heavily involved in the sale of tobacco within Iran, and with the Mahabad Republic estranged from the rest of the nation, they were unable to do so. Therefore, many tribal leaders did not support the foundation of Mahabad. Mam Aziz, the chief of Mamesh, was particularly opposed to Mahabad, prompting the state's Soviet allies to threaten military action against him; eventually, the Barzani's attacked Mamesh, and Aziz was forced to flee to Iraq.64

When the Republic asked the tribes for stronger weapons and trained men, they refused.65 Absent such help, the Republic was forced to surrender, resulting in a brutal crackdown on Kurdish activists in Iran. The Shah burned Kurdish books, banned future printing in Kurdish, and outlawed teaching in Kurdish. Former President Qazi Mohammad was executed on March 31, 1947, along with eleven tribal leaders.66

These divisions were also significant during the Iranian Revolution. Whilst some urban Kurds allied with Khomeini, tribal chiefs did not. This was largely because of their alliance with the Shah. Prominent chiefs from the Jaf tribe worked in the Majlis and the Shah's palace, while an Aradal Khal Kurdish chief was a court minister and General Palizban, the governor of Kermanshah, was very prominent in the military.67

Political Divisions: Such linguistic, economic, and social distinctions manifested as political divisions. The Kurds have been political divided in Iran since the 1800s when the Persian government, inspired by the strong central governments developing in Europe, decided to expand their authority and fragment Kurdish territory into multiple administrative units.68

Iran’s two major Kurdish parties, the KDPI and Komala, are frequently at odds, with Komala accusing the KDPI of being overly elitist and too ready to accommodate the Iranian government.69 Both have difficulty coordinating with Tehran. For example, in the early days of the revolution, Khomeini offered the Kurds limited autonomy. However, they were unable to negotiate with all of the major players, because Komala wouldn't even come to the negotiating table. Pressured by this radical move, KDPI was forced to appear more radical than the actually were, and turned down Khomeini's deal on the basis that it was too limited and would partition the Kurds into multiple regions.70 During the Iran-Iraq War, they even fought on opposite sides.71 Similarly, the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan is frequently isolated from other groups in Iran due to its perceived ties with PKK.72

Not only are different parties opposed to each other, but many face internal opposition. For example, the KDPI allied with Muhammad Mahmood Abd ul-Rahman to invade the Turkey-Iraq border in 1976. The parties soon split.73 The KDPI split again 1980 when those that supported the Tudeh party wanted to accommodate Khomeini more and left the party.74 Komala has likewise split into two.75 Furthermore, the Marxist-Leninist Fadayan-e Khalq party is extremely divided. Most support Khomeini as a counterweight to the United States, but others believe he is elitist and an enemy to the proletariat.76

Further political fissures exist within the Iranian Kurdish community. During the Revolution, Kurds were divided over support for Khomeini. Sheikh Ezzedin Hussein advocated against walayat al-fiqh, the basis for Khomeini's legitimacy as a political leader, calling the revolutionary regime a “dictatorship under the name of Islam.” However, the Kermanshah Kurds are Shi'a and support Khomeini. Khomeini's first cabinet had two Kurds, Dr. Karim Sanjabi and Dariush Foruhar, and in the early days of the Republic, they were frequently sent to negotiate with the Kurds. Failure of negotiations sparked class-based violence within the Kurdish community.77 Divisions also existed during the Iran-Iraq War as some Kurds opted to fight for the Iranian army rather than a Kurdish one.

Divisions Between Iranian Kurds and Other Kurds
Historical and Political Divisions

Iranian Kurds have little sense of allegiance towards Kurds from other nations, because of political divisions and the historical affinity between Kurds and Persians. Sadeq Sharafkandi, the leader of the Iranian Kurds in the early 1990s, was quoted as saying that the Kurds in each country abide by the “principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of others,” adding that “Iran is [the Iranian Kurds’] problem.”78

Political factors also prevent the Kurds from unifying across national borders. Historically, the Iranian Kurds have been isolated from others as they were ruled by the Persian, rather than the Ottoman Empire.79 They have been unable to overcome those
divisions in recent years, largely due to political underdevelopment. Today, Kurdish organizations lack civil society components. Furthermore, rampant clientelism and over-dependence on foreign support weakens and divides Kurdish society.

Another factor contributing to the isolation of Iranian Kurds is their affinity for Persians. The Kurds and the Persians are both racially Aryan, while Turks and Arabs are Semites. This enables the Kurds in Iran to claim kinship with the local ethnic majorities in a way that Kurds in Turkey or Iraq cannot. Furthermore, Iran is a very ethnically diverse nation; Persians have only a thin majority, with one quarter of the population Azeri and one tenth Kurdish. Because of that, the Iranian government has learned how to balance the differing needs of different ethnic groups; for example, education in Iran emphasizes the achievements of the Persian Empire, which the Kurds had a strong role in building. By exacerbating these cultural connections, Iran makes it even less likely that Iranian Kurds will develop ties with Kurds in other nations, thereby minimizing the threat that supporting Kurds in other countries will spark nationalist impulses among their own Kurds.

Manufactured Divisions

These existing divisions, particularly between the Iranian and Iraqi Kurds, have been exacerbated by violent conflicts that make the future development of trust between the two parties extremely unlikely; paradoxically, the support of Kurds abroad has dampened nationalist movements within Iran by preventing the formation of transnational Kurdish alliances. Iranian Kurds are reluctant to cooperate with the PKK due to its Turkish origins, but the primary fissure lies between those in Iran and those in Iraq. In addition to the aforementioned violence between Iranian and Iraqi Kurds during the Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi Kurds have damaged their credibility with their Iranian contemporaries by striking various deals with Tehran. For example, following the 1967 uprising, Iranian Kurds sought refuge in Iraq, but their kinsmen rebuffed them in an effort to appeal to the Shah. In 1993, the KDP agreed to keep the KDPI from building bases in Iraq because Iran lent the KDP so much aid in the Iran-Iraq War.

Statements from contemporary politicians suggest that Iraqi Kurds will continue to seek the support of Tehran, even as it oppresses the Kurds living in its borders. Massoud Barzani, president of the semi-autonomous Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq, has pledged not to interfere in Iran’s internal relations, and even expressed support of the Iranian
government.  

Iran may also be able to reap public relations benefits domestically as it supports Kurds abroad, as Iran is able to frame itself as a champion of the Kurdish cause. For example, in July 2015, Iranian President Rouhani visited Iranian Kurdistan and gave a speech in which he highlighted Iranian support of Iraqi Kurds, and framed his government as a guardian of the Kurdish people. Similar statements have been made at other press conferences by the Iranian government. If Iran can paint itself as a friend to its own Kurds while simultaneously making an alliance with their Iraqi kinsmen less desirable, they can simultaneously draw Iranian Kurds further from Iraqi Kurds and closer to the Iranian state.

Conclusion

Iran has a long history of supporting Kurdish militias across the world in order to weaken their enemies, promote a sympathetic partner, and divide Kurds across borders. Given the division of their own Kurds, it is unlikely that this strategy would backfire and result in an independent Iranian Kurdistan, especially if Iranian politicians use their support of Iraqi Kurds to improve public relations with their own Kurds.

Western powers should be aware of the benefits Iran would receive from allying with the Kurds, and seek to make connections before Iran does. Human rights activists should also be aware that potential outreach to Kurdish militias may ultimately serve to divide the Kurds rather than help them, and urge the Kurds to be strategic about which alliances they enter into.

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Applying U.S. Geospatial Intelligence to Atrocity Crime Prevention in Weak States

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In order to effectively respond to imminent or ongoing atrocity crimes (genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity), the international community must have a clear understanding of when, where, by whom, and how these crimes are being committed. Peacekeepers and humanitarians are becoming increasingly interested in using geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) capabilities, such as UAVs and satellite imagery, to fill in these informational gaps. This paper engages with the emerging humanitarian GEOINT discourse by examining the possibilities and limitations of U.S. GEOINT capabilities as a corrective for atrocity crimes in states lacking strong military, police, and intelligence capacities. The article argues though U.S. GEOINT is subject to technical, practical, and political limitations that prevent it from serving as a silver bullet against mass violence, it can provide critical strategic and operational support to humanitarian actors. The paper begins by summarizing U.S. GEOINT capabilities and existing uses of geospatial imagery for humanitarian purposes, before exploring potential applications of U.S. GEOINT to atrocity crime prevention, such as providing indications and warning of imminent atrocity crimes, tracking atrocity criminals and verify their misdeeds, aiding operational planning against atrocity criminals, and enforcing peace settlements that prevent atrocities from recurring. The article then considers constraints on the use of United States geospatial capabilities for humanitarian purposes, and finally concludes that within these constraints, U.S. GEOINT can still play a critical role as part of comprehensive operations aimed at preempting and containing atrocity crimes in weak states.

Preventing war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity (called “atrocity crimes” or “atrocities” for convenience) is not merely a question of law enforcement; it is a task as complex as human society itself. Experts have identified many dimensions of conflict that humanitarians must engage with to preempt and roll back mass violence, ranging from the economic to the political to the psychological. But the literature on this subject has often overlooked one critical element of atrocity prevention: intelligence. The lack of adequate intelligence about planned and ongoing violence leaves states and multinational organizations powerless to understand it, let alone stop it.

The United Nations’ (UN) actions leading up to the 1994 Rwandan genocide illustrate the importance of effective intelligence collection and analysis to atrocity prevention. Weapons were being openly sold in the Rwandan capital in violation of a peace deal between the majority Hutus and minority Tutsis; a high-ranking Hutu militiaman testified about his superiors’ genocidal plans and led a disguised UN peacekeeper to his militia’s massive weapons caches. However, the UN lacked the capacity and will to verify, add to, and act on this intelligence, and was unable even to confirm that mass killings were deliberately planned and directed until they were well under way. Without a clear understanding of what was about to happen, the international community could neither engage in preventive diplomacy to preserve the fragile peace nor effectively plan to contain outbreaks of violence.1 This weak intelligence picture resulted in a massacre that could have been prevented with a
Better-informed response. This paper will argue that U.S. geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) in particular can effectively help prevent atrocity crimes in weak states. Though GEOINT is subject to technical, practical and political limitations that prevent it from serving as a silver bullet against mass violence, it can provide critical strategic and operational support to humanitarian actors before, during and after atrocity crimes. Though this paper deals with the prevention and mitigation of crimes, it is intended to answer practical questions rather than legal ones. This paper will begin by summarizing U.S. GEOINT capabilities, and then explain how those capabilities can help weak states (i.e., governments with poor law enforcement, military, and/ or intelligence capacity) prevent atrocities. The essay will continue by examining the limitations that might prevent U.S. GEOINT from being used as an effective humanitarian tool, before concluding with a judgment about GEOINT’s overall potential in the humanitarian space.

Background: U.S. Geospatial Capabilities and the Humanitarian GEOINT Movement

The technical details of the United States’ geospatial intelligence program define what it can do to reduce atrocity crimes. In the United States, GEOINT is controlled by the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA). The discipline involves using satellites, airplanes and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to collect imagery of objects on the Earth’s surface, including pictures taken with visible wavelengths of light as well as infrared light, radar and multiple spectra of light at once. Each of these collection platforms has advantages and disadvantages. Modern surveillance satellites can transmit digital pictures to NGA in near-real time. From their high vantage point satellites can monitor very wide areas. Surveillance satellites can also take pictures of smaller areas at a higher resolution; a viewer could clearly distinguish an object as small as ten inches in the most narrowly-focused satellite picture. However satellites take several days to orbit the Earth, and a satellite can only take pictures of areas that fall under its orbit. Therefore satellites cannot take pictures of any time and place, while airplanes and UAVs can if they have enough fuel to make a return trip and can avoid getting shot down. UAVs, or “drones”, have additional advantages: they can fulfill the function of airplane surveillance without risking a pilot’s life and they can continuously observe a single location from high altitudes for 20 hours or more. Furthermore UAVs can transmit real-time video while satellites cannot, and a continuous video feed provides a more complete record of change over time than a series of individual photographs taken over long intervals. Since the United States fields all of these technologies, each one can partially compensate for the weaknesses of the other, creating a combined capability with that can collect large amounts of potentially useful data.

In recent years humanitarians and GEOINT specialists alike have touted geospatial imagery as a corrective tool for atrocity crimes. The United Nations has analyzed commercially available imagery for evidence of wartime violations of humanitarian law in Gaza, Georgia and Sri Lanka. Dr. Cardillo has praised Amnesty International’s work using open source satellite images to document massacres by the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria and wants to use the agency’s unique capabilities for similar ends. However most extant humanitarian GEOINT (including UN programs) have been limited by their reliance on commercial imagery, which are less advanced than U.S. government GEOINT. For example, experts believe U.S. military satellites have higher resolutions than their private counterparts. Furthermore, the commercial satellites that the UN relies on do not collect imagery in near-real time. Finally, UAVs may remain too expensive for many humanitarian agencies for the foreseeable future. In short, American GEOINT could significantly improve on the imagery that humanitarians are now using to track atrocities.

U.S. GEOINT for Atrocity Crime Indications and Warning

U.S. GEOINT for Atrocity Crime Indications and Warning

Deliberately orchestrated and centrally directed atrocity crimes like the Rwandan genocide can be conceived of as functionally similar to any other military operation. A force planning to attack civilians must ready arms, train and mobilize troops and otherwise prepare for such attacks. These preparations leave traces that are, in principle and often in practice, detectable by intelligence organizations. By using communications intercepts, satellites and other technologies to continually monitor an armed group, understand its normal routines and find deviations in those routines that correspond to preparations for an offensive, intelligence agencies can infer what the observed group is planning. This art of detecting and analyzing an enemy force’s preparations to anticipate its plans dates from the Cold War and is known as indications and warning intelligence. Just as the United States combined GEOINT with other sources of intelligence to provide indications and warning for the actions of the Soviet military during the Cold War, so could it combine its GEOINT with other sources to predict and plan responses to atrocity crimes.

Since U.S. GEOINT has long been used to provide indications and warning for conventional military forces, it could easily be turned on large militias or state militaries with histories of violating human rights. In 2011, for example, a team of analysts at Harvard University successfully predicted a Sudanese invasion of a disputed territory using open source...
satellite imagery. The pictures showed Sudan “building large roads in areas where there was no economic reason for those roads to exist,” and the likeliest explanation of that costly investment was to facilitate troop movements. This is only a particularly dramatic example of an indication detectable by GEOINT. Any sufficiently large force will generate hard-to-conceal signs of mobilization for even slight moves towards an offensive. UAVs can seek out and follow troop movements and supply lines; satellites can observe the growth and development of military infrastructure like camps as troops gather. U.S. GEOINT trained on areas with a history of atrocity crimes could easily detect these signs of military preparation, and the United States could then pass on the imagery and analysis showing these preparations to the states that seem most likely to be attacked.

Geospatial intelligence can also provide indications and warning for smaller bands of would-be atrocity criminals as well. States must be able to anticipate the planned atrocities of even small groups, which are just as capable of massive human rights violations as larger ones. Both Charles Taylor of Liberia and Foday Sankoh of Sierra Leone initially controlled militias of about one hundred men, but these small forces displaced thousands using dramatic terror tactics. Admittedly, GEOINT is unlikely to discover such small groups on its own. From a drone’s-eye view, small insurgent meetings and civilian gatherings are indistinguishable without on-the-ground context. Therefore in these cases GEOINT would play a supporting role in an all-source indications and warning program. Instead of searching for the criminals themselves, GEOINT professionals could search collected imagery for more visible warnings, like arms shipments and weapons caches. Alternatively, drones could be sent out to verify other intelligence collected by weak states by scanning locations where atrocity criminals are supposedly meeting for further evidence. Either way, GEOINT would produce a clearer picture of which areas and persons in weak states are at risk for atrocities, and thereby help weak states to prepare for and possibly prevent them.

Using U.S. GEOINT to Track and Verify Atrocity Crimes

Even when geospatial indications and warning is not enough to stop the outbreak of violence, it can be critical to understanding its progress and containing it. Often the chaotic context in which atrocity crimes occur precludes government officials, NGOs or international observers from proving that they have occurred. Wars destroy records, force witnesses to flee and encourage biased reporting from partisans eager to pin atrocities on their opponents or to downplay their own misdeeds. In this

Street performers in Quito, Ecuador take a break from the music to enjoy the sun and a classic treat. (Photo by Dre Antonno, 2nd year Medical Student)
murky environment, geospatial imagery usually offers the most objective proof or disproof of reported atrocity crimes, or even the only evidence available to the wider world. Without knowing whether and where atrocity crimes are truly taking place, a state cannot determine where its troops and relief services can be most effectively deployed for humanitarian protection. Weak states in particular may need help prioritizing, because by definition their security capabilities are limited and could be stretched thin. Detailed geospatial imagery of atrocities gives them evidence about factors like location and severity that allow them to respond effectively.

GEOINT-based verification of atrocity crimes can be as useful politically as it is militarily. A single iconic satellite picture of an atrocity crime could completely change popular perceptions of an ongoing conflict, and thus reshape the political landscape around it. Photo or video evidence of atrocities can dramatize the suffering of distant civilians to a global audience and thereby create transnational coalitions in favor of humanitarian relief. Politicians can deliberately exploit this mobilizing power by publicly releasing geospatial imagery and thereby demonstrating the need for to stop an atrocity and help its victims. The United States, for example, declassified satellite photography of mass graves in Bosnia and Kosovo to build both domestic and international support for its humanitarian interventions there in the 1990s. The apparent objectivity, timeliness and detail of geospatial imagery could also serve as a rallying point for the international community when states dispute the presence and scale of atrocity crimes. The United States could send out drones or use satellites passing overhead to determine the extent of violence in a location, then – unilaterally or through an intelligence partner, such as the UN or the weak state plagued by atrocity crimes – release its findings to the international community in the hope of building a common understanding of the problem and how to solve it. In summary, geospatial imagery can be clear and compelling in a way that more abstract sources of intelligence, like written reports, rarely are. As such, it has a unique power.
to communicate ideas to politicians and publics, and can thereby build a consensus to offer aid to victims of an atrocity crime.

U.S. GEOINT for Counter-Atrocity Operational Planning

In addition to its role as a source of strategically and politically important information on atrocity crimes, GEOINT is critical to the success of humanitarian missions on the operational level. In particular GEOINT can be an important input into the military aspects of humanitarian operations. As a subsidiary of the U.S. Department of Defense, NGA already has experience supporting U.S. combat missions.\(^9\) Given its existing expertise, NGA could easily provide support to the militaries of weak states (or UN Peacekeepers) tasked with warding off or hunting down atrocity criminals. Commanders need to be thoroughly familiar with the geography of a region, including its climate, infrastructure and potential supply and transport routes in order to manage troops there effectively.\(^{29}\) The broad view of U.S. satellite surveillance could give a comprehensive picture of a weak state's geography to foreign peacekeepers, while aerial surveillance could be sent out to monitor changes in the landscape for foreign and native troops alike, from the destruction of villages and infrastructure to the construction of new militia camps. Thus GEOINT could help militaries to contain and roll back forces committing atrocity crimes, preventing them from inflicting further harm.

In more asymmetric conflicts where engagements with atrocity criminals would amount not to pitched battles but to raids, GEOINT would still be useful to military planners. GEOINT played an important role in preparations for the most famous recent raid of this type: the attack on Osama bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad. The NGA used geospatial imagery to create an exact scale model of the compound for military planners to work with, which became the basis for several life-size courses in which Navy SEALs troops practiced for the real raid. Analysis of GEOINT images even allowed planners to infer that there were no subterranean routes into or out of the compound because standing water nearby indicated that those tunnels would be inundated by a high water table.\(^{30}\) As the prelude to the bin Laden raid shows, good GEOINT can provide highly detailed information for asymmetric military operations, even informing analysts of features like tunnels that pictures cannot directly show. NGA support would be a huge boon to military forces planning to capture or kill atrocity criminals in their home bases, where the criminals would otherwise hold a tactical advantage due to their superior knowledge of the space. While militarily defeating atrocity criminals is not sufficient in itself to prevent future atrocity crimes, such raids can at least stop known human rights violators from continuing their attacks, and perhaps deter others from doing so.

U.S. GEOINT for Treaty Enforcement and Peace Preservation

GEOINT can not only help weak states and their allies foresee and counter atrocities; it can help preserve the peace that is the surest protection against atrocity crimes. Most atrocity crimes take place in the context of broader violent conflicts, international or domestic.\(^{31}\) As Hugo Slim has noted, a desire to avenge past wrongs is one of the strongest factors motivating groups to kill each other indiscriminately, and atrocity crimes can breed retaliatory atrocities in an escalating spiral.\(^{32}\) In these cases of reciprocal grievance and conflict, each group's lingering distrust and resentment of the other makes it hard to believe that peace will last after fighting ends, and producing a credible belief in each group that the other will not resort to violence is vital to convincing both sides to keep the peace.\(^{33}\) To ensure that neither side is mobilizing to violate a peace deal, peacekeepers must be able to monitor flows and concentrations of troops and weapons for each group.\(^{34}\) Critically, technical collection systems like drones and satellites are far more capable of tracking arms and militias across wide areas than ground forces are.\(^{35}\) Thus GEOINT can help enemies credibly commit to laying down their arms, as NGA could minimize the possibility of a surprise attack by collecting data on the opponents' militias and sharing it with the opponents and/or the UN. Faced with a prepared opponent and the scorn of the international community, neither side would have an incentive to go to war. By breaking the cycle of vengeance, mutual disarmament verified by GEOINT could greatly reduce the incidence of atrocity crimes.

Technical and Analytical Limitations of Humanitarian GEOINT

U.S. GEOINT technologies, while sophisticated, are not infallible. Satellites and UAV's cannot collect high-quality GEOINT in all circumstances. Drones can crash or be shot down; they can be grounded or blinded by bad weather, mechanical malfunctions, or mistakes by their remote pilots.\(^{36}\) Further, any UAV currently available eventually has to land, creating a potential gap in surveillance unless other UAVs are on hand to follow the target.\(^{37}\) All of these factors can prevent drones from getting a clear, continuous view of their targets, limiting the amount and quality of imagery they can provide. Satellites face even more restrictions. Satellites move in continuous orbits that limit their time over any one location.\(^{38}\) They also only collect images of particular regions that are considered economically, politically or socially important, which has hampered UN attempts to conduct imagery analysis of alleged atrocities in areas without existing satellite coverage.\(^{39}\) And environmental factors can impair satellite imagery as well as drone imagery, as satellites cannot take visible-spectrum photographs at night or through clouds and dense vegetation.\(^{40}\) Satellites, like drones, cannot always show intelligence agencies what they want to see, and unlike drones, cannot deploy on command to investigate unexpected threats. The technical limitations of these GEOINT collection platforms preclude the possibility of continuously tracking atrocity criminals or verifying their crimes. Even high-quality GEOINT is useless unless users can sort and interpret it, and technically perfect collection systems would encounter difficulties in processing and analyzing imagery. The U.S. intelligence community's collection capabilities have always evolved faster than its ability to sort through
collected data. Even with procedures and programs that partly automate the search for “important” images, photos and videos containing valuable information on priority issues can go unseen. The imbalance between data collection and processing could bury GEOINT critical to detecting and attributing blame for atrocity crimes, as well as finding perpetrators. Further, there may be no images that clearly prove whether atrocities were committed, or by whom. One problem is that the significance of an image may only be apparent to an expert. An unusual pattern of roads would seem like an odd coincidence to most, but an expert could infer the presence of a particular military from that pattern, as United States photo analysts inferred the presence of Soviet forces in Cuba in 1962 from satellite pictures showing their distinctive roads on the island. Analogously, U.S. GEOINT could contain subtle but unmistakable signs of atrocity crimes that would be missed without proper scrutiny, and a weak state's intelligence agency (or NGA itself) might lack the expertise to find them. Finally, expert analysts can still disagree about what detailed GEOINT shows. In the months before the Iraq War, for example, American image analysts could not reach a consensus about whether satellite photos showed evidence of biological and chemical weapons labs in Iraq. Limited satellite imagery of a location before an alleged atrocity crime can exacerbate this inherent ambiguity, making it impossible to determine precisely which events caused which changes to the site and how. Though UAVs collect data more precisely and continuously than satellites, their imagery is also inescapably ambiguous, especially when information about the context on the ground is limited. Uncertainty about who or what has changed a site between satellite overflights, or what the figures observed by a drone are doing or planning, will make it difficult in many cases to definitively assign blame for atrocity crimes.

Political Limitations of Humanitarian GEOINT

In addition to the technical and analytical imperfections of GEOINT as a discipline, political interests in the United States and abroad may prevent geospatial imagery from being effectively applied to humanitarian uses. A key element of the problem is that U.S. national security interests are not identical to those of weak states and international peacekeepers trying to prevent atrocity crimes. Most of the humanitarian applications for U.S. GEOINT mentioned previously would require the U.S. government to share classified imagery with foreign states, either directly or through the UN. But the national and international political complications of such sharing predispose states like the United States to keep their intelligence to themselves. Indeed, mainstream discourse on intelligence collection by both practitioners and academics frames it as part of a broader zero-sum competition for relative power between states. In practice, states limit their intelligence sharing with each other out of fear that the other state, a potential rival for power, will have greater relative gains from shared intelligence, and therefore a long-term strategic advantage. Unless preventing a particular atrocity crime seems to coincide with the U.S. government's self-perceived interests – that is, if preventing an atrocity meets other political goals – Washington is unlikely to share GEOINT with other governments who seek to combat that atrocity.

Conversely, if the U.S. is willing to agree to share GEOINT on atrocity crimes, it may do so at a cost which is politically unacceptable for weak states. Historically, when United States policymakers felt the need to share intelligence with countries that might use it in ways contrary to perceived U.S. interests, they have sometimes insisted on exercising hierarchical control over the foreign intelligence agencies receiving information. The people and government of a weak state may believe that U.S. supervision of their state's intelligence agencies limits their ability to pursue their independent national interest, as distinct from U.S. interests. Faced with the prospect of partial foreign control of a key national security function, weak states might find the political costs of receiving U.S. GEOINT too high to bear.

If the United States overcame the political barriers to sharing GEOINT for humanitarian purposes, a lack of political will to act on that intelligence might render sharing pointless. In many states with a history of authoritarianism, including many nominal democracies, new laws and purges of old personnel have failed to end routine human rights abuses in intelligence services. One of the most dramatic examples of disregard for human rights in national security services came in Rwanda in 1994, where the military chief of staff ignored UN intelligence about the coming genocide because he was one of the key conspirators behind the atrocity crime. Clearly, when the government of a weak state itself is planning to commit an atrocity, sharing intelligence will not convince that state to stop it. Moreover, there is no guarantee that GEOINT would persuade the international community to respond to an atrocity crime if the state where the atrocity is taking place is unwilling or unable to respond. On many occasions, states have not undertaken serious efforts to stop atrocities even when presented with clear and dramatic evidence that they are ongoing. While sharing GEOINT with a global public can facilitate calls for action against atrocities, it cannot ensure that action will be taken. U.S. intelligence sharing can only help prevent atrocities if intelligence recipients have the political will to prevent them.

Conclusion

As humanitarians increasingly utilize geospatial imagery to anticipate, verify and mobilize against atrocity crimes, the disciplines of humanitarian protection and GEOINT are converging. The United States government's GEOINT capabilities, which remain superior to commercial imagery, can make an important contribution to this convergence. NGA has the technical capacity to provide indications and warning for planned atrocity crimes; to show where atrocity operations to rout, capture or kill atrocity criminals; and to preserve the peace in which atrocity crimes are less likely to occur. Technical limitations of collection platforms, the inevitably ambiguous meanings of most geospatial imagery and political considerations that mitigate
against the sharing or use of intelligence for humanitarian purposes all ensure that American GEOINT cannot be a panacea for atrocity crimes. But the high quality of U.S. geospatial intelligence and its utility for both strategic and operational responses to atrocities show that it has a place as part of a comprehensive response to these crimes.

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Understanding and Optimizing Remittance Flows: The Example of US and Mexico

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The changing international economy is characterized by growth rates of worldwide remittances surpassing those of international aid, or net official development assistance (ODA). Over the last 15 years, ODA has increased by 66% in real terms to 135 billion (USD), while worldwide remittances have tripled to 542 billion (USD). Given vast wealth disparities between nations and continued international migration, this change in financial flows beckons a closer analysis: is the individual agency afforded by remittances eclipsing the need for direct, transnational government aid? Many studies–both on 21st century and early periods–suggest that remittances are more effective modes of financial development than other international capital flows. Other studies demonstrate the ineffectiveness of ODA compared to remittances on influencing human development indicators such as per capita income. This paper explores the potential benefits of and barriers to making remittances a more viable source of capital flows to lower-resourced countries, using the US and Mexico–the largest migration corridor in the world–as a case study.

The 21st century surge of human migration across borders is accompanied by changing international financial flows. Remittances are one striking example of this trend, amounting to a quantity nearly triple the amount of current annual international aid, or official development assistance (ODA), sent from developed to developing countries over the same year. While not often discussed, the difference between these two capital flows–both in definition and in quantity–is significant. Many recent studies show that remittances are more effective modes of financial development, poverty reduction and income growth than ODA. However, barriers to sending remittances through formal channels are large in both developing and developed countries and, as a result, remittances are largely sent through inefficient and risky informal channels.

The United States, the largest origin of international remittances, and US-Mexico, the largest corridor of migration, represent a key scenario for understanding how a financial reform focusing on remittances could have large impacts on policy, the economy and migration patterns. On these grounds, this paper explores the potential benefits of and barriers to making remittances a more viable source of capital flows, with particular focus on formalizing remittance channels from the US to Mexico. Two key areas for reform–mobile-phone money transfer systems and government fund matching programs–hold promise for harnessing the presently high volume of remittances to forge equitable economic growth in Mexico and the US, by lowering remittance transaction costs, optimizing government aid strategies, and supporting more accurate policy innovation.

Overview of Remittances and Official Development Assistance Worldwide

While remittances and ODA are both types of capital flows across international borders, they vary significantly in definition and pattern. ODA, often used synonymously with international aid, is an “official flow transacted by source and host governments … that is often earmarked for initiatives that, among other things, promote education, improve healthcare and develop infrastructure.” This type of capital flow is influenced directly by
Political decision-making: governments of developed countries send aid to foreign governments as part of political agreements, often on the premise that the money will further empower developing governments to provide necessary social resources to their populations.

Contrastingly, remittances are “private transfers received by households,” which, as a contrast to ODA and FDI, directly influence demand by increasing household income and access to finance instead of targeting institutions. Remittances refer to money sent across national borders by migrants, which, for the most part, mimic the flow of ODA: from developed to developing countries. If transferred formally, remittances flow from person-to-bank and bank-to-person; however, informal transactions, a currently popular option for undocumented or lower-income migrants, often involve carrying or sending cash from person to person without any institutional or bank involvement.

Figures 1 and 2 together demonstrate the destination, quantity and growth rates for both remittances and ODA over the last five years. With the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa, all world regions shown on Figure 1—from Asia to Latin America—had remittances in 2010 that made up a larger portion of GDP than did ODA. In these regions, remittances as a percentage were at least three times as large as ODA as a percentage, with South Asia showing the highest remittance as percentage of GDP of the regions listed. While Figure 1 provides a snapshot-view of remittance destination and size in 2010, Figure 2 illuminates equally important information: remittances have been rising at a faster rate than ODA over approximately the last 15 years. Figure 2 also demonstrates that remittances have been the second largest source of capital flows for over 20 years. In 2014, for example, remittances totaled to over $400 Billion, a quantity more than three times as large as the 2014 amount of ODA sent across the world. Figure 3, a graph of remittance flows to the main world regions, affirms a combination of the first two figures: remittance flows have steadily increased in the twentieth century, and the destinations of these remittances are dominantly in low and middle-income, or developing, countries.

Though the remittance volumes in Figures 1 and 2 are calculated using balance of payment figures, which would suggest that formal, legal and illegal international transactions are all included, there are specific data collection problems in contiguous countries with a high percentage of seasonal or illegal workers, like in the United States and Mexico. The World Bank, UN and IMF offer holistic analyses of remittance flows, but there are still many scholars who argue that even these analyses are underreporting total remittance flows because immigrants often send money through unrecorded channels using cash or other informal transfer systems. These facts suggest that remittance flows are even more prominent than the data in these figures displays.

Having established the relative dominance of remittances to ODA in the global financial system, it is next important to explore why remittances are growing more popular and what unique advantages this type of capital flow offers to inhabitants of both sending and destination countries.
Remittances: A More Effective Financial Flow than ODA

There are a few key reasons why remittances are a more appealing and sustainable mode of capital flow than ODA. One 2015 World Bank report notes that “remittances are large and more stable than many other types of capital flows”, which may partially be explained by the small relative size of each remittance sent. As opposed to potentially sudden, large shifts in funding at the national level based on congressional voting in liberal democracies who provide most of ODA, remittances fluctuations are dependent on the sheer amount of migrants present within a country. Migrants, many crossing the border illegally, to seek economic opportunity more quickly than the legal system allows, often only have small incomes and can thus only send small amounts of money home to their families or friends. As a result, remittances depend on the decisions of a whole variety of people to send money across borders, and no one actor can significantly impact the total volume with his/her sole actions.

Contrastingly, Figure 4 demonstrates how volatile ODA can be from one year to next, which may be partially explained by the relatively fewer, more powerful political actors who are in charge of funding in both recipient and sending countries from one year to the next. A study done by the IMF found that “in very poor, aid-dependent countries, [a] high volatility of inflows makes the macroeconomy hard to manage,” and that “aid has failed to act either as a stabilizing force or as an insurance mechanism.” The same study notes that brief periods of increase in ODA are often followed by declines due to “erratic policy implementation” in the receiving countries and “problems with the ways donor budgets are approved and administered” in the sending countries.

While the direction of current bilateral remittance flows does not necessarily match the direction of ODA flows and thus could not directly replace ODA in all instances, the individualized nature of remittances does suggest that this form of financial flow offers a macroeconomic stability that ODA currently does not. Another reason remittance flows are a sustainable source of capital flow is their direct link to migration, a thoroughly measured trend especially in developed countries which are the most common destinations for migrants. Dr. Lima explains how the flow of remittances increases in response to income shocks at home which cause people to migrate to earn a higher income abroad. Many other scholars, notably Dr. Barajas, acknowledge that the international business cycle can be very accurately understood through bilateral migration and remittance figures. Lima also acknowledges this interconnectivity, writing that “increased flow of remittances to developing countries is the result of increased migration,” and noting that “policy makers in developing countries can attempt to reduce impediments to international migration, specifically during periods of downturn in their nations’ economies.”

Figure 5 offers a concrete example of the direct link between remittance flows and international migration, using US data from the Migration Policy Institute. According to this figure, Mexico, the
largest origin of migrants to the US in 2013, also received the largest amount of remittances from the US in that year. The progressively decreasing size of the migrant population from each country in the US, with the exception of Nigeria, lines up nicely with the progressively decreasing total amount of remittance flowing from the US. Simply put, more migrants in a destination country equates to more remittance sent to the migrants’ respective home countries.

Perhaps the most striking advantage of remittance flows versus ODA is the evidence relating to its comparative effects on poverty reduction, income-per-capita, and broadly, on financial development. In a study analyzing low and middle-income countries, ODA was shown to have an overall negative, statistically significant impact on income-per-capita in receiving countries. In all countries except those in North Africa and the Middle East, a $1 increase in ODA per capita correlated with a 0.2% fall in income per capita. Contrastingly, a $1 increase in remittances per capita was consistent with a 0.4% increase in income per capita. Another study, using data from 71 developing countries, showed that “both international migration and remittances have a strong, statistically significant impact on reducing poverty in the developing world.” In this case, a 10% increase in per capita official remittances was shown to lead to a 3.5% decline in the share of people living in poverty within the receiving country.\(^ {19} \)

In a 2015 study, Esteves reaffirms the “more than proportional estimate of the impact of remittances on measures of the penetration of financial services… as compared with the (less-than-proportional) effect from other foreign financial flows.”\(^ {20} \) On multiple, significant grounds, remittance flows are shown to be an effective form of transferring money from one country to another in ways that ODA is not.

**Potential Economic Growth: Making Formal Remittance Channels More Accessible**

While previous sections highlight the potential of high volume remittance flows and advantages of this arguably more accessible financial flow, there are a number of current barriers to harnessing the full economic value of remittances. The most obvious issue, highlighted by Adams, is that “high transaction costs resulting from lack of competition, regulation, and/or low levels of financial sector performance in labor-exporting countries act as a type of regressive tax on international migrants, who often tend to be poor and to remit small amounts of money with each remittance transaction.”\(^ {21} \) This regressive tax on the lowest-income groups who send remittances home encourages informal transactions like sending money home with a friend, middle-man or in a letter.

As an example of barriers to sending money formally, transferring $20 through Western Union from the US to Mexico has a $5 fee, while transferring $100 has an $8 fee—transaction costs of 25% and 8%, respectively.\(^ {22} \) This 8% remittance cost is consistent with the average across all developing countries in 2014, but is far higher than the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development’s target of “reducing remittance costs to 3 percent by 2030, which would translate into a saving of over $20 billion annually for the migrants and their relatives.”\(^ {23} \) Because of high transaction costs the risky, inefficient and unrecorded remittance transfers remain popular among low-income, low-skilled migrants who would otherwise lose 25% of a small international money transfer to their household.

Other barriers to sending formal remittances include delays in processing remittance transfers—sometimes many days—and unfavorable exchange rates, which is an example of a high transaction cost.\(^ {24} \) While sending remittances through informal channels is no quicker, there is not necessarily a fee for informal sending, and so it remains, for many migrants, a superior transfer option. To receive lower transaction costs, one option is to open a bank account; however, many undocumented workers do not qualify for a bank account or simply associate banks with corrupt government and mismanagement (this latter sentiment is widely held in Latin America, see Figure 8). With the current barriers to formal remittance flows in mind, Barajas suggests that governments promote “measures of openness and integration into the global economy which allow for the role of remittance flows,” so policymakers better understand remittance fluctuations and their impacts. Understanding remittances through formally recording their sizes, volume, and destination “would allow policymakers to develop more efficient tools to manage external spillovers.”\(^ {25} \)

Increased accessibility of formal remittance flow options would also likely spawn the broadening of banks or bankers to reach previously untapped geographical areas, resulting in more competition and lower transaction costs for migrants.

A final issue with current remittance...
flows is that they often lack government accountability, even with formal transactions. Critics of formal remittances and supporters of ODA likely posit that international aid is a way to democratically provide financial assistance that will both develop foreign government and provide social and economic resources to low-income populations, whereas remittances do not guarantee the same safety net to low-income groups. However, as is explained later in the paper using US and Mexico as an example, there is a way to merge the flexibility of remittances with the development goals of ODA through government matching programs—a solution that would likely assuage the staunch supporters of ODA, a more government-led capital flow.

The Case of US and Mexico: Potential for Remittance-led Economic Growth

With previously mentioned barriers and inefficiencies of remittance flows in mind, consider the example of US and Mexico: a bilateral relationship bursting with migration, remittance flow and potential for financial reform. According to the World Bank, the 13 million migrants from Mexico to the US in 2013 represent the largest migration flow between any two countries in the world.\(^\text{26}\) Unsurprisingly, The United States is also the number one sender of international remittances, accounting for more than one quarter of them in 2014, with $24 billion of this sent to Mexico. Figure 6 and Figure 7, graphs of remittance-receiving countries, highlight that Mexico receive the largest amount of remittances in Latin America, and the third highest amount of remittances of any country in the world. Referring back to Figure 5, the US sends most remittances to Mexico, with the next closest in value being China who still receives $6 Billion less than Mexico.\(^\text{27}\)

Despite the uniquely high volume of remittance flow from US to Mexico, there are many ways the formal remittance system is currently inaccessible or unappealing to the sending migrants in the US and the receiving family or friends in Mexico. For example, only 27.4% of the population in Mexico has an account in a financial institution, which is lower than levels observed in Latin America and much lower than the global estimate of 50.5% of the population.\(^\text{28}\) The channels for access to the financial system most commonly used by the Mexican population are branch offices (40%) and ATMs (38%); given that only around a quarter of the population has a bank account, these statistics highlight an untapped market for recording financial transactions. Often not having the resources to carry a minimum balance for a bank account, Mexicans either opt for receiving money informally through mail or in-person carrier or picking up from a wire-transfer that has undergone a large fee. Even for some Mexicans who do have the resources to open an account, there is fear of “corruption and mismanagement” in banks as a result of many financial crises across the Latin American region over the last 50 years.\(^\text{29}\)

In the US, migrants hoping to send remittances to Mexico through the financial system also face barriers: high transaction costs at money-wiring companies and insufficient documentation or savings to open the bank account that would allow for potentially lower transaction costs. The situation represents a certain stagnancy: there are not enough incentives for migrants to use formal
remittance channels, meaning financial records aren’t as accurate, which means banks or entrepreneurs are not as likely to innovate and compete, which solidifies the high transaction costs and exclusion of migrants from the formal financial system. The next section outlines two solutions to overcome this stagnancy: the first, mobile payment systems, focuses on how to better include remittance senders to and receivers in Mexico in the formal financial system; the second, government fund-matching, aims to optimize the effects of remittances through encouraging specific types of spending by the recipient in Mexico.

Mobile Payment Systems and Government Matching Programs in the US and Mexico

Mobile payment systems, namely those that utilize basic, non-smartphones and do not require bank accounts, show potential to lower remittance costs and encourage recorded transactions from US to Mexico. For the low-income population living in remote towns of both Mexico and the US, mobile pay models enable fund transfers where access to banks or ATM’s is sparse. For the migrants living in urban areas of the US and the inhabitants of urban areas in Mexico, mobile banking would provide a bank account without having to present documentation or maintain a minimum balance. One World Bank report notes, “mobile technology can lower the cost of remittances, as it removes the need for physical points of presence and ensures a timely and secure method of transaction.”

One example of a successful mobile money transfer program is M-Pesa, which digitized domestic remittances and reduced the costs of sending remittances to rural areas in Kenya and a few other African countries. In Cameroon, for example, these costs have declined by 20 percent since implementation of M-Pesa. Like the low use of bank accounts in Mexico, more than half of Kenyan households still do not have bank accounts, but the mobile payment plan has showed success.

There is a variety of information suggesting that mobile banking holds strong market potential in both the US and in Mexico. A 2015 study found that “the total potential demand gap for mobile banking could stand near 40%, which corresponds to the difference between the number of current bank accounts and possession of mobile phones.” This same study found that “the mobile infrastructure for payment and ATM systems in Mexico is adequate.” Critics might argue that even if infrastructure and demand exists, there are plenty of smartphone apps for money transfer that have not convinced non-members of the banking system to join. However, this overlooks the important fact that, according to the International Advertising Bureau, 83% of phone users have traditional cellular phones, while only 17% have smartphones.

In the US, the environment is also conducive to implementing mobile payment plans that are compatible with basic cell phones. According to Pew Hispanic Center, In 2010, 76% of Hispanic adults in the US were using cell phones, and 90% of Latinos aged 18-29 used cell phones – both figures that grew multiple percentages points as compared to 2009. Cell-phone use among Hispanics is rising, but the same study showed something equally important: only 48% of foreign-born Hispanics (migrants) utilize data applications on a cell phone, as compared to 74% of Hispanics born in the US. Since migrants more directly correlate with remittance volume, and the migrant population would more likely use an SMS-based mobile payment system than one on a smartphone, there is tangible need for financial system reform. For the most basic account, no account holder information is needed which will likely provide unprecedented access to basic formal financial services that people without documentation previously did not have. Given the large undocumented population in the US—around 12 million people, 58% of which are from Mexico—there is huge market potential for mobile payment options on basic cell phones.

According to Figure 8’s information on reasons provided by Mexican adults for not having a bank account, the most significant barriers include: high costs, a mistrust of financial institutions, and lack of documentation. Mobile payment plans would provide a way to receive formal transactions in Mexico without worrying about these barriers, especially since users would not have to go to a well-known bank branch (which may elicit skepticism) to withdraw cash from their mobile account, but could instead see a trained representative at a more familiar local shop. The potential for mobile payment programs to formalize remittance channels is also evidenced through the small amount of international remittances sent through mobile phones in 2013—only 2%—contrasted with 4 countries that have more mobile money accounts than bank accounts and 10 countries in which mobile money transacted is greater than 2% of GDP.

The second recommendation for efficiently formalizing remittance flows
is a government matching program, aimed to incentivize migrants to send remittances for educational, health or other social development purposes. Drawing from successes in a recent study on Salvadoran migrants, the proposed program in Mexico would involve government offers to match remittances sent home from the US contingent upon specific uses of the remittance money. The past experiment offered Salvadoran migrants matching funds for educational remittances and lead to increased educational expenditures and lower labor supply of youths in El Salvador households connected to migrant study participants. The most substantial finding which could hopefully be mimicked in the new Mexican program was a “crowd-in” of investments: for each $1 received by beneficiaries, educational expenditures increase by $3.72, even though the government only matched $3 for every one dollar. This finding suggests that matching remittances can influence the migrants decision to send money home and also influence the recipient to spend a greater proportion of income on a certain, broad category. If applied to remittances sent from Mexico to the US, this same idea may “multiply” the effects of remittances through encouraging what is widely viewed as constructive development spending, on health, education, or financial development. In this sense, remittances could become a more flexible version of international aid: instead of allotting lump sums to developing countries for specific initiatives through congressional budgets, the government-matched remittances would harness the economic activity in the developed country through remittance flows sent by migrants to encourage a more individualized welfare program.

**Conclusion**

This paper opened with an overview of remittances in the twenty-first century and a highlight of the strong connection between this type of financial flow and international migration trends. Building on these premises, I explored the current hindrances to sending remittances through formal channels – i.e. high transaction costs, delays, and lack of documentation – to better understand the rationale of migrants who are sending remittances through informal channels. The example of US and Mexico—a zone of high remittances, high undocumented migrants, and high basic cellphone use—served to explore some possible ways both governmental and non-governmental reforms encouraging formal remittances from the US to Mexico could actually work.

A global economy where remittances are primarily sent through formal, recorded
channels would hold numerous policy implications, including new business innovation, local economic growth, more predictable migration trends and other unforeseen possibilities. That said, I do not suggest governments or individuals abandon other financial flows like FDI and ODA to replace with formalized remittance channels, as this would be counterproductive (and nearly impossible). There are many development projects in place worldwide that rely on both FDI and ODA to continue and thrive, despite previously noted concerns of volatility tied to these financial flows. In Mexico, for example, a planned $72 million in US aid will be received in 2016 for “democracy, human rights and governance sectors,” while the billions of USD sent from the US to Mexico in the same year through remittance channels will provide individuals directly with the flexibility to spend the money on unrestricted, personal development needs. Remittances received by many households in Mexico would more likely go towards filling needs that are directly related to survival—i.e. food, shelter, clothing, health—than towards meeting specific criteria for development laid out by national government and multilateral institutions like the UN, WB and IMF. Herein lies the controversy of comparing remittance flows to international aid: one’s own opinion of how to spend personal money may diverge from governmental or international notions of how and why people should spend or receive money only in ways that create sustainable and economically powerful societies.

However, my goal is not to dive into the weeds of this more philosophical discussion; instead, I aim to demonstrate that remittances are a powerful form of financial flow and deserve increased attention from scholars and policymakers. Instead of focusing on new projects funded through international aid, I argue that academic, political and economic discussions should expand to centrally include remittances: how can governments and businesses harness the billions of dollars in remittances to incorporate the goals of development efforts like the UN’s Millennium Development Goals in developing places like Latin America, South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and the Middle East? Since government programs that match remittances have been shown to encourage spending in specific sectors, could these programs expand and begin to overlap more fully with projects currently undertaken through ODA funding? Could the additional data acquired through formalizing remittance channels help illuminate more accurate financial flows that lead to more sustainable solutions to the problems that international aid attempts to solve, like wealth inequality, civil wars and poverty? The answers are far from clear, but above all, new equitable economic growth from formalized remittance channels may offer a greater quality of life for many individuals living in an economically more efficient world, and global discussion should reflect that.

Citations
Responses of Muslim-Majority Communities to the Shoah

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This paper is an analysis of the political and philosophical responses of Muslim-majority communities, primarily within the Middle East, to the Shoah of the 20th Century. It seeks to determine the role that political and religious forces play within the public understanding of the Shoah and the Palestinian Nakba. Additionally, it includes research into the political rhetoric used within Israel and the interacting narratives of the Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs, and Arab Palestinians within the region with regard to the respective experiences of these peoples. This paper examines the role of the State of Israel in the presentation and perception of the attempted genocide of the Jewish people.

In philosophical and theological scholarship regarding the Shoah, Jewish and Christian perspectives remain the primary frame of reference. Although reflecting the view of those primarily affected by the Shoah, this narrative leaves out the philosophical impact created by both the Shoah and the subsequent events for the Muslim world. This impact is most clearly seen through the relationship between Jews and Muslims, and the creation of Israel as a sovereign state in the Middle East. The lack of availability of non-ideological scholarship detailing Islamic reactions to the Shoah has allowed for new, politically-charged narratives to emerge that portray Muslims, and more specifically Arabs, as philosophically and ideologically complicit in the Nazi implementation of the Final Solution. However, the Shoah left lasting effects on Muslim thought, theology, and presentation of the history of Muslim-majority states that depicts the impact and attitudes towards the attempted Jewish genocide. This paper argues that the presentation of politically driven narratives, heavily influenced by the role of Israel, have had a profound influence on the perception and presentation of the Shoah in Muslim-majority states and communities.

For the purposes of this paper, the Hebrew term for disaster, “Shoah,” will primarily be used rather than the term “Holocaust,” derived from Greek for “a fully-burned sacrifice.” This is due in part to avoid presenting the attempted genocide of the Final Solution as a “sacrifice,” rather than a “disaster,” as well as to draw parallels to certain terminology used by Muslim figures in describing events post-Shoah. The term Muslim refers to anyone who adheres or claims to adhere to the tenets of Islam, though will primarily refer to religious and political leaders from Sunni- and Shia-majority states, as well as to the policies of the states themselves. This is not to refute or ignore the reactions of Muslims who do not fall within these categories, but rather is used due to the greater ideological, religious, and philosophical impact available to these figures due to their influential roles in the public sphere.

In the immediate aftermath of the Shoah, a form of indifference developed among many Arabs. This can be attributed to a belief that the issue was not inherently religious, but rather a European issue, and therefore not of any direct interest to Arabs. This mentality would be short-lived; however, after the formation of the State of Israel, Arab Palestinians were quick to notice the parallels between Jewish suffering during the Shoah and Arab oppression within the region. The rhetoric began to shift toward portrayal of the Palestinians as the “Holocaust’s true victims” due to the death and displacement caused by the creation of a Jewish state, as well as a projection of Nazi imagery onto Zionism and Israel, changing them from victims to perpetrators of crimes against humanity. In drawing this comparison between the Shoah of the European Jews and the displacement of the Palestinians, the issue of name emerges – the usage of the terms “Shoah” by Israelis and “Nakba” by Palestinian Arabs to describe the “Disaster” that had befallen them, as well as use of the general term “persecution” to describe the Nazi treatment of Jews. Nakba Day, the Palestinian name for the date of the formal creation of Israel and the loss of 78% of Palestine, along with forced displacement of some 600,000 Palestinians, led to the Arab-Israeli War of 1948. Through this war, the Arab discourse on the Shoah radically changed, morphing from one of solidarity through belief in an Abrahamic faith into one based on anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism and, in many cases, denial of the Shoah. This denial was not unique to Arab states, but became a common point of rhetoric among...
the governments of Middle Eastern states opposed to the existence of Israel: the Islamic Republic of Iran, notably, refused to recognize the attempted genocide of the Jews until 2013. This political usage of denial of the Shoah mirrors a perceived use of the Shoah by Israeli leaders to justify their role in persecution of Arab Muslims in Palestine. As such, much scholarship from Muslim-majority and especially from Arab nations is focused less on the philosophical and theological reflections found in much Christian and Jewish scholarship of the era, but instead focuses on the impact of the Shoah on Arab states. As a result, there is relatively little English-language scholarship on the perception and reaction to the Shoah in Muslim-majority states, with the majority of scholarship devoted to understanding the emergence of Holocaust denial and anti-Semitism in the region.

Influential upon the perception of the Shoah in the Middle East is the erroneous view of the role of Islam within the development of the Nazi Final Solution, notably brought forward by Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli Prime Minister. Prime Minister Netanyahu, in a speech delivered to the World Zionist Congress, shifted blame for the development of the idea of attempted extermination away from the Nazi leaders and instead upon the grand mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini. These comments drew criticism from many historians for the grossly inaccurate portrayal of the political involvement of the mufti – while he was certainly anti-Jewish and anti-Semitic, his contact with Hitler did not begin until months after the Nazi Final Solution had already begun the process of mass extermination. Further, there is much doubt over whether the mufti’s opinions were ever taken into account within the Nazi regime, as Hitler had generally decided upon deference to Mussolini regarding Arab lands. It is likely that the mufti was simply echoing sentiments that had already been seen in Ukraine and the Baltic States – ideological support for the atrocities of the Nazis would support their national independence after the war. This was also poorly received by Arab Muslims both within the region and around the world, many of whom were already opposed to Netanyahu and whose comments seem to support the somewhat prevalent idea of the Shoah as an Israeli political fabrication. These conflicting ideas about the Shoah were not new occurrences – rather, both are politically driven fabrications used to legitimize the states of the region.

This presentation of the Shoah is exhibited in certain pop-culture outlets...
as well, particularly in the 2009 Egyptian film Welad El-Am. The film describes an undercover Israeli intelligence agency kidnapping a family from Egypt and taking them to Israel, forcing Egyptians to work towards their rescue. Though this plot seems the standard action movie fare, the presentation of the Israeli state in the film makes it clear to the viewer that they are an enemy not unlike the Soviet Union in the American films of the Cold War. The film also both resorts to the standard anti-Semitic presentation of Jews as conniving and untrustworthy while at the same time drawing comparisons between the state of Israel and the German Third Reich. These presentations demonstrate the development of the new understanding of the Shoah in the light of the creation of Israel—literature from Egypt in 1945 presents a much more sympathetic position regarding the persecution and violence experienced by the Jews of Europe and even gave some support to their settlement in Palestine.9

In contrast to the reactions of Middle Eastern Muslims, the Muslim communities of Southeastern Europe and North Africa took a very different response to the attempted genocide. A frequently occurring line of thought for Sunni theologians during this period is the extension of the protection of People of the Book and understanding the guidance towards pluralism that is stated within the Quran, the hadith, and the Sunna.10 Within Shiite thought, there are certain parallels drawn between the Shoah and the massacre of Hussein and his followers at Karbala. Holocaust is the term most often used to describe the events of Ashura, which is often viewed as the most influential event in the history of the Shiite community.11 A great emphasis has also been placed upon the shared commandment “Thou shalt not kill,” which has, in many contexts, a greater extension towards saving lives and has become more closely tied to the concept that “He who saves a life saves the world entire,” a phrase found both within the Quran and the Talmud.12 This has also served to become a point of pride for many Muslims in the West, particularly in the Balkans. A wealth of examples of Muslims serving to protect Jews from the Nazis and the greater impact of fascism upon their own states have inspired a philosophical approach to the Shoah similar to the Central European tradition of analysis and understanding of Nazi evil and the nature of existence after genocide.13

However, Turkey, the largest Muslim-majority state of the region, has a far more complicated history of dealing with the Shoah, due in no small part to the genocide of the Armenians under the Ottomans, which the Turkish state still denies. “Holocaust” and “Shoah” are both terms that are not found within the secular public school curriculum in Turkey, and only Jews openly commemorate Yom HaShoah. Despite this, references to the Shoah (almost always as the “Holocaust”) have become more prominent in political speeches since the 1970s. In a great irony, many Jewish organizations, such as the American Jewish Committee, supported the Turkish denial of Armenian genocide prior to 2014, citing the uniqueness of the Shoah as a reason why this event should not be considered a genocide.14 In this way, the Shoah, referred to as simply soykirim (genocide), is taught as a unique example of genocide in Turkish secular schools.

Furthermore, Turkey takes great pride in its role in saving Jews from the Nazis during World War II, further cementing its national stance regarding the Shoah as a unique and devastating event that states must learn from. However, since reference to the Shoah became more prevalent in the early 1970s, the Palestinian question has emerged in greater prominence as well. This led to similar effects in Turkey as in other Muslim-majority states of the Middle East, including the outright denial of the Shoah and the first public mentions by politicians.15 Criticism began to emerge in the early 1990s for the perceived politicization of the Shoah by Israeli and Jewish organizations in the region.16 Ultimately, this is due in large part to a lack of emphasis placed upon comparative study of the Shoah by Turkish academics, which carries with it a trickle-down effect of lack of serious study by the average Turkish citizen into the Shoah; this, in turn, leads to misunderstandings, misrepresentations, and occasional outright rejection of the Shoah.

Western European Muslims are also heavily affected by these differing understandings of the memory of the Shoah. Within the UK and Italy especially, there has been pushback among the different Muslim community organizations as far as commemoration of the Shoah—a cycle of refusal, begrudging commemoration, and refusal again has emerged within the region.17 Again, much of the argument against commemoration seems not to be based on religious or philosophical disbelief in the Shoah, but rather upon its impact on Palestine and how commemoration of such an event would “hurt and exclude Muslims.”18 Perhaps influenced by these community leaders, the Muslim youth of Europe are, on average, a third more likely to have anti-Semitic beliefs and attitudes than their non-Muslim countrymen and be less informed about the exact events of the Shoah, including beliefs about Hitler encouraging the creation of Israel and himself being Jewish.19 Simultaneously, they also share in the Southeastern European idea of equating the Shoah with Muslim suffering historically—a means of understanding the events through an existing cultural framework.20 In this way, the oppression experienced by the Jews under the Nazi regime is seen as a parallel to the oppression and discrimination against Muslims in the west that has occurred historically and in the present.

Within a European Muslim context, representation has taken on the idea of pride for the righteous actions of Muslims in protecting the Jews of Europe. A 2011 film from France, Les Hommes Libres, details the way in which a mosque in Paris protected Jews by providing them clothing, shelter, and food, and attempting to pass them off as Muslims to avoid persecution by the German occupiers. The film also draws parallels to the common religious and historical backgrounds of Jews and Muslims through a character being given the opportunity by the mosque to ensure his protection by listing his grandfather’s name on a tombstone within the cemetery, effectively uniting the two groups through shared ancestry and religious devotion. It also draws parallels to early Muslim history—there is a theme of both reciprocal protection as was received by the Muslims in Medina by the Jewish community there, as well as the protection that some Muslims had
received in Ethiopia. Through this, the film demonstrates a moral of overcoming differences to protect one's fellow man and overcome hatred in the world.

The desire to overcome anti-Semitism to achieve peace and prosperity is also echoed in some scholarship. Dr. Joseph Massad describes the way in which conflict between Israel and Arab states, especially Palestine, can best be prevented through elimination of anti-Semitic thought in both the Middle East and in Europe. He claims that Israeli policies of projecting military strength in the region are due to a constant feeling of being under attack due to anti-Semitism, which forces them to put up an aggressive stance as a mode of defense, which further drives anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic sentiment in the nearby Arab states. This creates an endless feedback loop – as Israel maintains its aggressive position within the region, anti-Semitic and Shoah denialist ideas will continue to spread through the region, reinforcing the perceived Israeli need for projected aggression.

Muslims who were granted Israeli citizenship are among the most heavily affected by the Shoah and the subsequent influence it had on the creation of Israel and Israeli culture and politics. These citizens have taken on a space where they are neither Israeli nor Palestinian, both oppressed and oppressor within the collective psyche of the former British Mandate of Palestine. In a sense, these citizens have the most conflicted and divided feelings regarding the Shoah – it is at once the catalyst for the creation of their state and the force that led to the destruction of their way of life in its entirety; responsible for the displacement and loss of life of countrymen on all sides. Further, these citizens are conflicted in their use of these narratives as an understanding of their own place within the structure of nations, which continues to fragment their cultural understanding of the Shoah's impact. As such, different forms of legitimatization of these collected memories have emerged as Arab Israelis begin to enter the dialogue on the Shoah with their Jewish Israeli counterparts. For example, there is a program that places the Shoah and its effects within a decidedly Arab-Palestinian framework as a means of collective discovery of the different, occasionally conflicting, narratives of Shoah and Nakba. In effect, this is giving a different perspective to Massad's argument – as a means of overcoming anti-Semitism in the region, the two narratives of the Shoah and creation of Israel should be reconciled.

Ultimately, much of the scholarship regarding Muslim responses to the Shoah is tied heavily to the political and ideological impact on the understanding of the Shoah that came with the formation of the state of Israel and the subsequent Arab-Israeli wars and Palestinian Intifadas. Due to this, it is unfortunately difficult to understand the ways that Islamic thought has been influenced by the event on an ethical level – little work discussing issues such as the problem of evil in the post-Shoah world is readily available in English. However, there have been recent efforts to create a cultural and political framework for understanding its impact on a geopolitical level, as well as for a human rights perspective and when dealing with ethics of nation states. While the conflicting narratives of the Shoah in the Middle East seem to promote a divisive political angle, they are actually merely different means of legitimizing existence, political actions, and cultural suffering. Moreover, as these conversations become more linked, more progress towards unity is being achieved. As the political situation begins to resolve itself, new theological and philosophical works from the Islamic world will begin to circulate and a more complete understanding of the impact of the Shoah on Abrahamic faiths will become attainable.

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Barriers and Facilitators for Renewable Electricity Generation in Pacific Small Island Developing States

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This paper analyzes the challenges for governments of Pacific Small Island Developing States (SIDS) to implement renewable energy projects, and strategies to overcome them. SIDS suffer from extreme reliance on imported petroleum for electricity generation, and are looking to renewable energy as an alternative to improve their economies and balance of payments. Many Pacific SIDS are highly vulnerable to climate change, and as a consequence of this are also looking to lead world efforts with high targets for greenhouse gas emissions reductions. Although the effect of SIDS emissions reductions is negligible on their overall effect to mitigating climate change, these countries have a strong lobby in world forums such as the United Nations, and are using their work to send a powerful message. Foreign aid also plays a key role in the implementation of renewable energy projects, with New Zealand being a key regional player. But why have countries thus far been slow to transition to generating their electricity from renewable sources? This paper examines the socioeconomic, political, technological and physical barriers that have slowed down this process and, given these hurdles, discusses the possible future trends for renewable projects in the region.

Climate change is a serious problem facing countries worldwide, but is felt no more acutely than in Small Island Developing States (SIDS), which have geophysical and socioeconomic characteristics that make them extremely vulnerable. Atoll nations in the Pacific such as Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, and Tokelau are all at risk of being entirely submerged under the waves as global sea levels rise. Other nations such as Samoa and Fiji lie on “high islands,” not facing the risk of immediate inundation but nonetheless vulnerable to climate change. All SIDS face the risk of disruption to food and water security, health issues, damage to marine and terrestrial ecosystems and inundation of coastal settlements among other problems. The increased exposure to the consequences of climate change has caused many SIDS to call on greenhouse gas producing countries to reduce their emissions in order to mitigate climate change. At forums like the United Nations, SIDS have become extremely vocal, and many have now committed to reducing their own emissions and proving that this can be done while growing economies sustainably.

In attempts to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, many SIDS have raced each other to become the world’s first carbon neutral economies. From the early 2000’s onward, organizations such as Carbon War Room’s 10 Island Challenge emerged to help countries make this transition, and other organizations such as the Pacific Regional Environment Programme have shifted their focus to include renewable energy implementation, along with energy efficiency programs. The United Nations Environment Program defines climate change mitigation strategies as “efforts to reduce or prevent emission of greenhouse gases,” and many countries are now initiating their own projects. The motivations are both for the economic advantages of renewable generation in
SIDs, and to apply moral pressure to larger economies to commit to greenhouse gas emissions reductions.

Renewable energy has also moved from mitigation to a climate change adaptation strategy. The United Nations Development Program defines adaptation as the "process by which strategies to moderate, cope with and take advantage of the consequences of climatic events are enhanced, developed, and implemented." SIDs generally pay extremely high prices for fuel imports, due to their small market size and transportation costs and are thus highly vulnerable to price shocks or import disruption. This means renewable energy can be extremely cost effective and will quickly pay back for itself. There is also a growing body of literature arguing that renewable energy can be beneficial for reducing the risk to natural hazards, such as using solar panels after a disaster event, when infrastructure is damaged. 

This paper intends to outline the key trends in renewable implementation in Pacific SIDs. There is first a discussion of the current state of energy resources and the goals for renewable generation held by different countries, followed by a review of the literature. Then the paper analyzes the motivations for implementing renewable energy schemes in Pacific SIDs, and the barriers for adoption in countries where uptake is lower than would be expected. An example of particular success in implementing renewable energy schemes is discussed through the case study of Tokelau. Finally, there are some thoughts on possible future trends for energy in the region.

Background: Energy in the Pacific

The Pacific Islands countries and territories (PICTs) are a diverse set of nations spread over a vast amount of ocean. Pacific nations frequently have highly urbanized populations clustered on main islands with a single diesel power station supplying the community's electricity. Rural areas often have low penetration of electricity, particularly in countries with larger populations - such as Papua New Guinea (12%) and Vanuatu (28%) - tending to have a lower percentage of population with access to electricity. Electricity usage varies between countries, but is mainly for lighting, cooking, consumer electronics, and air-conditioning. Utilities in the Pacific are dominated by diesel generation, despite not one country having its own fossil fuel reserves. Tokelau, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Samoa, and Vanuatu are currently the only countries in the region with more than 10% of electricity generated by renewables, with all but Tokelau dominated by hydroelectric. Tokelau produces over 90% of its energy from solar, and wind is not a major source of electricity generation in the entire region. Biomass is a minor player in Fiji and some other countries with forestry and agricultural processing facilities, and coconut biofuel is being trialed in Vanuatu for vehicles, although its use for electricity generation has not been tested.

Electricity prices in the Pacific vary widely, with between US$0.15-1.50/ Kilowatt hour (kWh) paid by customers. However, in the vast majority of countries the true cost is not reflected in prices paid by the consumer, as domestic electricity sales tend to be subsidized. Almost all the PICTs have established aspirational voluntary targets to accelerate their adoption of renewable energy to generate electricity (Fig. 2). These goals show a clear commitment to renewable energy deployment in the region, although some critics argue they are overly ambitious and impractical due to the limited supply of cheap energy resources, insufficient storage capacity, and intermittent power supply. Solar resources are strong throughout the Pacific, whereas wind increases with distance from the equator. Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and, to a lesser extent, Samoa are the only countries rich in other renewable energy sources, such as geothermal, biomass and hydro. Overall, renewable energy currently contributes approximately 10% of the total electricity generated in the region, most of which is hydroelectricity in Fiji and Papua New Guinea.

In terms of expansion, solar offers the strongest option for most countries due to its widespread availability, easy installation, and minimal maintenance compared to other options. Solar is also relatively cost effective for a wide range of sizes, especially in the Pacific where imported fuel costs are high, and cost has fallen rapidly over the last decade. Furthermore, output from solar installations matches the load curve for most urban grids, where most of the demand comes from air conditioning.

However, on reaching ~15% of energy from solar photovoltaic (PV), it becomes difficult to increase further with significant investments in storage capacity to ensure grid stability. Tokelau achieved a high solar input only by installing a large-scale battery system, but unfortunately this technology remains prohibitively expensive for larger islands. This makes other technologies, particularly wind and biofuel, increasingly attractive for increasing renewable energy in many countries.
Literature Review

The past few years have given rise to increased attention to both the sustainable development of SIDS and the use of renewable energy in development. SIDS have strength in numbers, making up almost one third of the countries at the United Nations, and have been able to gather increased international attention on issues most pertinent to them.\(^16\) Thus, much of the literature on development in the Pacific focuses on climate adaptation strategies, and originates from large multilateral organizations such as the United Nations.\(^17\) Policy reports are also issued by regional organizations such as the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), and major donor countries including Australia and New Zealand.\(^18\)

Mitra argues that although individual islands may not represent large business opportunities, together islands represent a sizeable niche in the world energy market, and so should receive increased attention from business.\(^19\) The author outlines why renewable energy is an attractive option for islands, and the key issues and challenges present in its implementation, emphasizing the role of private enterprise in developing renewables in the context of islands. Dornan argues that for increased rural electrification in Pacific SIDS, a new approach is needed that is very different from undertaking in continental areas.\(^20\) The author makes comparisons between countries and access to power, noting that smaller countries' populations generally have higher energy access than larger ones. Utility reform and other institutional constraints are discussed as important barriers to expanding grids to rural areas, and methods for overcoming these problems are explored in detail.

This article is particularly useful as it is one of the few works to critically analyze the plan for implementation of ambitious renewable energy targets in Pacific SIDS, acknowledging that there are serious risks and limitations to these strategies. Dornan & Jotzo model the most cost-effective response for Pacific SIDS for investment in renewable technologies.\(^21\) This analysis accounts for the economics and future energy security of Pacific SIDS, with a particular analysis of the Republic of Fiji. The findings suggest that the government should focus on low-cost, low-risk renewable technologies such as biomass and geothermal, in order to increase energy security. It also argues that higher risk technologies such as wind and solar can be overall beneficial for SIDS, acknowledging that many countries are not amenable to biomass, geothermal or hydropower.

The academic literature on island renewable policy is still in its infancy. Couture’s lecture examines the unique conditions of energy markets on islands and how traditional policies frequently used on the mainland must be adapted to maximize their benefit to islands.\(^22\) Couture discusses the differences in these policies, and how each must be tailored to meet aspects unique to individual communities, using examples from the Pacific including Hawaii, the Cook Islands, Palau, and Vanuatu. The lecture concludes that by capitalizing on new forms of regulation, islands can maximize implementation of distributed renewable energy generation in a way that benefits both the utility and the customer. Couture also notes that traditional labels such as “feed-in tariff” or “net-metering” might actually have very different structures in the island context and should not be misread.

Individual countries are also publishing their own literature on the topic. The Government of Tokelau booklet shows how engagement with international organizations can be useful for countries to collaborate on renewable energy projects, and sharing knowledge of positive experiences can encourage other countries to adopt newer technology.\(^23\) It also shows how leading the way in the field can be a great source of pride for a smaller
nation, and how this can be a useful boost in promotion of renewables. Documents from the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs also help to illustrate current projects underway. This case study was commissioned in order to showcase the Tokelau Renewable Energy Project (TREP). It provides technical information to demonstrate how the atolls’ transition from using centralized diesel generators to a PV/diesel hybrid system could be replicated in similar locations in the Pacific. There is also a financial analysis, and a discussion of plans for system maintenance given the isolation and lack of indigenous knowledge in Tokelau. This example is useful to examine how the New Zealand government successfully partnered with the Government of Tokelau to undertake this project, and to see what barriers existed to its implementation and how they were overcome.

There are diverse perspectives on renewable energy use for Pacific SIDS, but the general consensus is that increasing its usage in the region will be beneficial, even if not all can agree what percentage of electricity should come from renewables at current technology levels. There are still significant gaps in the literature and much more work must be done to establish new policies and strategies that will be effective in aiding countries’ transitions away from fossil fuels. New research will also need to find ways of stabilizing grids runs on intermittent sources, such as battery storage or backup generators.

Driving Factors for Adopting Renewable Energy

Energy Independence

Most SIDS have high levels of dependence on imported fossil fuels for energy generation, on average importing 90% of their energy. According to Walker-Leigh, “fuel import bills now represent up to 20 per cent of annual imports of 34 of the 38 small island developing states (SIDS) - between 5 per cent to 20 per cent of their GDPs,” meaning that energy is a major drain on SIDS economies.

SIDS are highly vulnerable to the volatility of global oil prices, and the global energy crisis has been severely detrimental to the balance of payments of many of these states. Accordingly, UN DESA estimates that an “increase of US$10 in the world crude oil price translates to a 1.5 per cent decrease in GDP in Pacific SIDS,” again demonstrating economic vulnerability outside of SIDS governments’ own control. Many SIDS are now looking to renewable energy to increase their resilience and reduce vulnerability to the global economic system by reducing fuel imports and producing more indigenous renewable energy.

Political Leadership

The SIDS of the Pacific are putting growing pressure on the global community to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. National leaders of atoll nations have been particularly vocal about climate change, such as President Anote Tong of Kiribati, who has engaged with major polluting countries and lobbied for their ratification of the Kyoto Protocol as a mitigation strategy. As a country highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, Kiribati has used its status as a vulnerable country to its advantage in garnering support from the international community. Tokelau has reach almost 100% of its electricity generation from renewables, and is using this climate leadership as a way of persuading other countries to follow suit. Pacific SIDS have set themselves extremely high targets for renewables, with six aiming for 100% renewable generation by 2020, compared to Australia and the European Union, which aim for 20% by 2020. These political ambitions have become a key motivator for implementing renewable energy projects.

Greater collaboration between Pacific SIDS has also allowed advances to be made in climate change adaptation. Organizations such as the PIF and SPREP are pushing an adaptation-driven agenda and facilitating the sharing of knowledge between countries. This means that pilot projects carried out in one country can then be quickly adopted elsewhere, which could be greatly beneficial in accelerating adaptation. As Kiribati has limited implementation of renewable energy projects, it could learn from other countries and schemes such as the Tokelau Renewable Energy Project, whereby the country has adopted solar energy and been able to generate almost 100% of its electricity needs from renewable resources.

Aid Motives

Pacific SIDS have a high dependence on international aid for the development of energy and infrastructure projects. As a key donor in the region, New Zealand has pushed renewable energy categorizing the technology it requires as a key enabler of economic growth in its aid priorities. New Zealand was the main funder of the Tokelau Renewable Energy Program, and has since used the success of that project as a template for further projects in the Cook Islands and Tuvalu. New Zealand has commenced installation of PV systems on three sites in Rarotonga and the Cook Islands, and is now executing a NZ$10.5 million support package, which includes expansion of renewable energy projects in the former and on outer islands. In Kiribati, the biggest bilateral donors are Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the United States, and the largest multilateral donors are The European Community (EC) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and many of these funds are now going towards renewable energy projects. Kiribati is also dependent on technology from donor countries.
meaning international collaboration is key not just for investment but also implementation of renewable energy projects. Australia has also traditionally been a leader in aid and development in the Pacific, in 2000 launching the Pacific Renewable Energy Programme with the primary goal of increasing renewable penetration in the region. However, the election of Tony Abbott as Prime Minister has caused a change in foreign policy, with a drastic reduction in funds allocated for foreign aid and a reduction of Australia’s work in the Pacific. The Abbott government has also increasingly attacked renewable energy, attempting to cut the Australian Renewable Energy Agency and dismantling the domestic industry, meaning it is likely Australia will play a reduced role in the future of Pacific renewables.

Barriers to Implementation of Renewable Energy

Socioeconomic

In many cases, there is significant conservatism preventing the adoption of new technologies and the disruption of the status quo. In most cases, this is formed around a reluctance to adopt new, possibly unproven technologies due to the financial risk and large financial initial costs needed. However, with more and more success stories around the Pacific, there is a growing appreciation for renewable energy and more countries are willing to adopt the technology. With large multilateral organizations increasingly putting forward funding for renewable energy plants, countries are more likely to adopt at other’s expense.

Lack of Net-Metering Policies

Net-metering and feed-in tariffs (FITs) are both policy mechanisms that allow for individuals to generate their own electricity and return any excess back to the grid for a credit or payment. This allows for renewable energy generation to be spread through many small sources, over a wide geographical area, which decreases the overall risk and variation of generation and allows for more input from intermittent sources without the need for storage and complex controls. These policies often work well in large grid systems, but suffer problems when applied to SIDS. Most island utilities do not have net-metering or FIT policies, generally due to a concern over effects on utility incomes and grid stability. Palau is one of the few countries to implement these policies, enacting a net-metering law in 2012 laying out the approach to be used by the Palau Public Utilities Corporation. The lack of these policies reduces the incentives for small-scale renewable projects, as households are selling electricity to the grid when supply exceeds demand, and so find it more difficult to generate a return on the initial installation costs. In many cases, installing a domestic solar or wind plant necessitates taking the entire house off the grid, requiring expensive battery storage and making the project economically unviable. SIDS will need to find new policy alternatives that work for their unique environments and benefit both consumers and utilities if they are to continue to expand renewable energy.

Physical

The physical isolation of many PICTs mandates that manufactured parts must be brought in from great distances at considerable costs. In the case of Tokelau, this required bringing all parts by ship from New Zealand, a major logistical undertaking. None of the three atolls of Tokelau have ports, and so all equipment had to be unloaded onto small dinghies and transported through the reefs to shore. The installation team then had to stay in the country for 6 months until the project was complete and local staff had been trained. Similar problems are faced across the Pacific. The New Zealand Aid Program is working with the government of the Cook Islands to bring solar power to the six atolls in the Northern Group. These atolls are possibly even more isolated than Tokelau, but the communities’ hard work should eventually allow the projects to come to fruition.

Isolation also creates problems for upkeep of systems, with spare parts sometimes taking months to arrive. This is a particular problem due to the environment of many PICTs, where electrical and mechanical equipment is prone to damage from salt corrosion, high moisture levels, and high ambient temperatures. In the case of Tokelau, special panels were used that are particularly resistant to salt corrosion.

Institutional

Small governments in the Pacific may not have the institutional structures in place to help implement renewable energy projects, meaning it may be left to the responsibility of the utility company. This is a particular problem in Samoa, where there is weak institutional structure for energy within government, and there is no specific government agency designated as responsible for renewable energy.

Land Tenure

Land tenure in PICTs is a complex issue, varying extensively between nations. Customary land tenure systems have long been practiced, and are complicated by the overlay of colonial legal systems. These systems may often have communal ownership, and there may also be traditional spiritual associations with areas of land that prevent development. Customary land tenure and constitutional land laws are often applied simultaneously, leading to legal complications in the development of infrastructure projects where there is often no precedent to follow. This makes developers and investors nervous about starting projects that may get halted while the legal situation is examined, especially for those requiring large land areas. Accordingly, the traditional land tenure of Pacific Islands has been criticized for preventing economic development projects.

Technological

An important obstacle for the spread of renewable energy in PICTs has been the availability of capacity for the technical support to operate and maintain renewable technology. Outer islands suffer particularly from this dearth of expertise, and even when training is carried out during installation, the capacity is often lost over time. Methods need to be developed to ensure that staff knowledge is maintained, and to provide more effective training. In many cases, there is no training staff proficient in the local language, and manuals are only available in English. Training programs within the country need to be developed to
ensure sufficient knowledge is available for training and upkeep.

**Tokelau: Approaching 100% Solar**

The islands of Tokelau are one of the most remote inhabited places in the world. Without any facilities for aircraft, access to the islands requires a 30-hour ferry from Samoa, which makes the trip just once or twice per month. This territory of New Zealand is inhabited by just 1,500 people, split evenly between the three atolls of Nukunono, Atafu and Fakaofo. Tokelau has already been widely proclaimed the first country to reach 100% renewable energy, although in reality grid stability has required the occasional use of backup diesel generators.52

The remote location and small market size of Tokelau means that fuel imports for generators and outboard motors are extremely expensive, hindering economic development.53 The launch of Tokelau’s National Energy Policy and Strategic Action Plan was the initial step towards a 100% carbon neutral economy and eliminating the total dependence on imported fuels.54 This commitment is reaffirmed in the Tokelau National Strategic Plan 2010 to 2015, which highlights energy efficiency and renewable energy adoption. Following the proposal of this goal, pilot projects were carried out with microgrids in Fakaofo in order to assess the feasibility of a large renewable energy scheme.55 A major achievement was the 2013 completion of the solar PV electricity generation systems on each atoll, allowing almost all of the islands’ electricity needs to be met with renewable energy. This requires significant logistical organization, particularly the 1,344 batteries for use at nighttime and periods of low irradiance when solar energy production cannot meet the load.56 However, to reach a full 100% green electricity generation, the backup generators must be converted to run on coconut biofuel, as they still depend on imported fossil fuels.57

A ban on the use of air conditioning in government buildings has reduced electricity demand at peak times. In particular, 230-watt Sunrise panels were chosen for the installation, as they were

![This local fish market on Santa Cruz Island in the Galapagos. Fisherman often feed the sea lions, pelicans and other animals that approach them with scraps of their catches, creating a major ecological issue as the animals swarm the market for scraps instead of hunting on their own. Hopefully, information can be spread so locals can understand their impact on the environment. (Lauren Clance, Junior Biology Major, Marine Science Minor)
one of few on the market to be certified to the new IEC 61701 standard for resistance to salt mist corrosion.54

The installation of the solar PV systems was carried out as a joint undertaking between the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the government of Tokelau. Powersmart Solar, a New Zealand based company, was commissioned to design and install the systems. The NZ$8.45 million for the project was funded through aid and loans from the New Zealand government, Tokelau currently saves NZ$900,000 per year by avoiding the costs of importing diesel fuel.55 Tokelau’s economy is highly dependent on the annual NZ$10 million it receives in aid from New Zealand to maintain public services, which accounts for 80% of the government budget. Additional revenue comes from the Tokelau Trust Fund - in 2013 valued at NZ$70 million - which derives income from licenses given to foreign fishing fleets in Tokelauan waters.60

A major issue with the project is that few Tokelauans have training to operate and maintain complex solar PV systems and microgrids. The University of the South Pacific’s campus at Atafu offers limited distance-learning courses on the policy and implementation side of renewable energy, but is not currently equipped to offer practical training in electrical engineering. During the installation, a small number of Tokelauan technical staff with prior electrical experience were selected for a training program with Powersmart Solar staff, in order to reduce the dependency for upkeep on New Zealand workers.61 Tokelauan utility technicians were given practical training throughout the duration of the installation, as well as theoretical training on troubleshooting procedures and solutions one night per week. A training program with Auckland University of Technology has also been initiated to train younger students in electrical engineering and grid management.62 The government has also encouraged the use of mature but less complex technology. Many designers have a tendency to advocate high-tech automated control systems, which require significant expertise to operate. However, Tokelau would struggle to retain anyone with the skills to operate such systems, faced with wage competition from New Zealand and other countries, and so has encouraged the use of low-tech but efficient equipment.63

Tokelau was fortunate in its position as the only remaining New Zealand territory, in that the NZ government was looking for a location to implement a pilot project. Government of Tokelau documents emphasize that “Tokelau only allow the use of energy system components that have clearly been proven in other similar Pacific island countries conditions for an extended time,” being wary of investing in any system that could have a potential to fail.64 However, it seems that just a few years later, the government decided to lead the way with 100% solar implementation, perhaps showing a gradual reduction in skepticism of the technology. An issue in Tokelau’s unique relationship with New Zealand is that it limits any investment or aid received from other countries. Advocates for total independence in Tokelau argue that it would increase options for the nation in aid, and would allow bids for infrastructure projects to be tendered out to companies outside of New Zealand, potentially lowering costs. However, in the case of the tendering out of Tokelau’s new ferry to a Bangladeshi company, the New Zealand government faced significant backlash from the domestic shipbuilding industry.65

More recently, it seems that Tokelau has adopted a more independent approach to foreign policy, bypassing New Zealand. At the United Nations SIDS 2014 conference, Tokelau announced a partnership with the United Nations Development Program to develop a new energy policy, and to provide monitoring and demand-side management of the grid and solar PV system.66 Tokelau has approached the project as a branding exercise to raise the profile of its environmental vulnerability on the global stage, and by cofounding new organizations such as the Coalition of Atoll Nations on Climate Change (CANCC) has used its renewable energy policy to encourage other nations to follow suit. At the UN SIDS 2014 conference, Tokelau took the time slot allocated for New Zealand, and the Ulu o Tokelau joined other leaders of the SIDS Conference at the Renewable Energy Forum.67 Tokelau plans to continue leading the way by eliminating fossil fuels throughout its economy, with a new scheme to use coconut biofuel for the nation’s 1,000 outboard motors.68

**Future Trends**

Renewable energy will most likely be extremely important to future sustainable development in SIDS. Technology is constantly improving, and many of the barriers currently faced are likely to be surpassed with further research. Key to this will be improvement in storage capacity, as batteries currently stand as a particularly expensive cost when trying to reach high percentages of renewable, and particularly solar, penetration.
This allows for the grid stability necessary for fluctuations in electricity generation. Another alternative with serious potential is the use of coconut biofuel to power backup generators and level out power supply. The amount of processing necessary for this to happen means that it is currently out of reach to most communities, but the government of Vanuatu is testing this resource and so far has achieved positive results. Technology implementation is also likely to be tied to available aid, given the high investment costs necessary relative to the small economies of many PICTs. These donor priorities will be key for establishing which projects are developed, as was seen with New Zealand’s emphasis on solar power. New donor countries are now increasingly venturing into the region, including China, Taiwan, India, the United Arab Emirates and even Kazakhstan, which gives PICTs a great variety of sources from which to search for funds. With Australia continuing to back away from renewable energy projects, and friction occurring with PICTs over its climate policy, a geopolitical shift is likely to occur in the region. Many energy projects funded by donors have been inconsistent with one another, even within small geographic areas and individual islands. This means that different types of systems requiring different components and parts have been constructed, making it difficult to train staff to maintain them, and to have a ready supply of backup parts. The development of institutions will also play an important role in the future of renewable implementation. With many countries currently lacking specific government bodies to focus on renewable, utility companies or other bodies have dictated policy, despite the other interests that may come into play. Ensuring countries have the correct institutions to aid the spread of renewable energy will be vital, and these organizations can take on diverse roles including aiding of public-private partnership development and the understanding of the implications of local land tenure law.

Conclusion

The Pacific SIDS are at a historic junction where they must face the possibility of severe climate change putting in peril their very existence as nations. The deployment of renewable energy offers a cost-effective alternative for many countries to improve their economies and mitigate their effect on climate change. There do exist many barriers to the implementation of renewable energy projects, but these are likely to be rapidly overcome given the intense regional and national focus on environmental issues and renewable resources. New and old organizations are aiding SIDS to develop untapped potential, and increased aid money will also help streamline these projects. By increasing the focus on renewable technologies now, islands are leading the world in adoption and will push other countries to follow in their footsteps.

Citations

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Traditional authority and customary law have been important elements of South African society in both pre- and post-colonial contexts. Colonialism and apartheid drastically changed the system of customary law, as well as the role of traditional authority, in regards to African access to land. To right the wrongs of the past, both the right to land and recognition of traditional authority were incorporated into the new Constitution. Today, these two elements come in conflict with each other, creating an environment of confusion and ambiguity. This paper will explore how the unclear role of traditional authority in South Africa has led to an extension of colonial and apartheid land policies and has impeded rural communities’ ability to obtain the rights guaranteed to them under the Constitution.

**Constitutional Basis to the Right to Property and Recognition of Traditional Leadership**

The sections of the Constitution that address property and traditional leadership were both designed to redress the wrongs of past colonial and apartheid law. The sections of the Constitution that address property and traditional leadership were both designed to redress the wrongs of past colonial and apartheid law. The unclear role of traditional authority in South Africa has led to an extension of colonial and apartheid land policies that continued their negative effects on rural communities by impeding their ability to obtain the rights guaranteed to them under the Constitution.

**Historical Background on Colonial and Apartheid Land Acts**

In order to understand the current conflict of interests and the reason for the inclusion of property rights and traditional leadership in the Constitution, it is important to know the laws that have impacted land rights and customary law in South Africa. The four main laws that greatly contributed to the colonial and apartheid legacy today were the Native Land Act of 1913, the 1927 Native...
Administration Act, the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936, and the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951. The Native Land Act of 1913 created “native reserves” that comprised about eight percent of South African land area. The act started the process of territorial segregation of the races, and also helped white people exploit black labor from the reserves.4

The 1927 Native Administration Act codified customary law so that traditional leaders were given “powers over land they had not historically enjoyed.”5 By giving traditional leaders more power over land, the people living within the reserves lost some of the usage, occupation, and inheritance rights that they customarily held.6 The Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 increased the size of the native reserves from about eight percent to 13 percent and forbade land ownership outside of the reserve areas.7 The land was designated as “trust” land, and served as a native resettlement area. The occupation of “trust” land required yearly fees, and ownership rested with the South African Native Trust. Additionally, the act established the “six native rule.” According to the rule, any group of more than six black people who had cooperated to buy land had to constitute themselves as a tribe under a chief or they would lose their land.8

After the National Party won the election in 1948, a number of laws were passed in order to realize the Afrikaner’s apartheid agenda. The government passed the Bantu Authorities Act in 1951, which further segregated the races in South Africa and promoted systems of forced removal. The act established ten separate ethnic zones, called Bantustans, which were governed by chiefs and headmen who were designated by the apartheid government. The tribal leaders were responsible for the allocation of land and development within their respective areas.9 The act also “made it illegal for Africans to hold individual titles to property” in order to preserve the government’s idea of communal land tenure among tribes.10 In the late 1950s, and again in the early 1970s, the apartheid government created laws establishing self-governance and independence in the Bantustans, stripping its people from South African citizenship while retaining access to a pool of cheap laborers.

Customary Law and Authority in South Africa: Pre- and Post-colonialism

The land laws, in conjunction with other laws implemented by the government, codified customary law and established systems of customary authority that were products of colonialism and apartheid. Before addressing the ways that both the colonial and apartheid governments utilized customary law and authority for their own advantage, it is important to discuss the characteristics of pre-colonial customary law in relation to land tenure. A key characteristic of African land tenure regimes is that “land rights are embedded in a range of social relationships and units, including households and kinship networks, and various forms of ‘community’ membership.”11 Land rights are inclusive and generally secure, and there is a distinction between access to and control of land. “Control is concerned with guaranteeing access and enforcing rights…and is often located within a hierarchy of nested systems of authority.”12 The holders of land rights keep those in control accountable to varying degrees, and both land rights and authority systems are politically embedded. Balanced power relations are important, and the “inherent flexibility and negotiability of land rights in African property systems means that they are capable of dynamic adaptation to changing conditions.”13 The social and political embeddedness of land rights makes it true that “social relations are…more important than a relationship with the land itself,” and obligations to those of the past and the present are key to power and rights over land.14 The connection between land and social relationships created an obligation for a tribal leader to exercise his power in the interests of the public good, which held him accountable to the community.15

Colonial imposition changed the system of customary law that dictated land rights and control, and also changed the role of traditional authority in regards to land. As control over land became an economic advantage in the eyes of the colonial administration, land became a commodity that required an owner to have absolute control over the property.16 Through various laws, the colonial government used the concepts of tradition and customary law to restrict African land ownership. Colonists promoted the idea that “customary systems of land rights do not constitute property rights for their members, and that land rights inimical to tribal control do not exist, and insofar as they do, must be done away with.”17 The colonial government allowed chiefs to act as “trustees” for land. The chiefs were then responsible for the allocation of land to the people and were “co-opted into lower rungs of colonial administration.”18 Once land was perceived as a commodity and chiefs were co-opted by the colonial government, the social structures that were in place to manage land use and govern land rights were disrupted.

During apartheid, the same ownership structures remained. Tribal authorities were an extended arm of the government and claimed legitimacy through the “tradition” that was created for them under colonial rule.19 Within the Bantustans, chiefs continued to allocate land. The communities under traditional rule did not have rights in communal land; the chief remained a trustee and “communal land was registered as the property of the government.”20 The colonial and apartheid governments’ utilization of traditional authority altered systems of communal land tenure and traditional leadership. Land rights were stripped from the community, and the government held control over the communal land that the chiefs held in trust. The change in customary authority over land has left a legacy in the present practice of customary law, and traditional authority’s involvement in land issues, especially among rural populations.

Customary Law and Authority: Present

The development of the Constitution of the new South Africa sought to acknowledge the role of traditional leadership in the government and to maintain systems of customary law because of its importance in African culture. Section 211(1) of the Constitution states: “The institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to customary law, are recognized, subject to the Constitution.”21 Although the
intention to include traditional authority and customary law within the new South Africa was to redress past wrongs and to promote culture and diversity, the traditional systems had been completely transformed by the colonial and apartheid governments. The vagueness of Section 211 left room for interpretation of what customary law is and what the role of traditional leadership should be. In considering a definition of customary law in South Africa, Lungisile Ntsebeza asks: "Indeed, what counts as indigenous law and custom in a society that has been disrupted by land dispossession, Christianity, Western Education and the migrant labour system?"

The Constitutional Court ruled that the codified version of customary law defined by the colonial and apartheid governments was "politically motivated and fundamentally distorted." The court further stated that what exists is "living customary law," meaning that the law is flexible, dynamic, and a reflection of the people that it governs. However, the laws that were created to define clearer roles of traditional leadership also gave leaders more power to define customary law in their own context.

Two major laws that have shaped the role of traditional leadership are the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act of 2003 and the Municipal Structures Act of 2000. The Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act created a framework for provinces to design their own laws to provide for the powers and functions for traditional leaders. There are requirements for recognition, such as holding regular elections for 40 percent of membership and having one-third of the traditional councils be composed of women. In many cases, traditional councils that do not fulfill the requirements continue to be recognized. Each province, except for the Western Cape, has its own law for traditional governance.

The implementation of the Framework Act gave rise to many critiques. First, the Framework Act entrenched the "tribal boundaries created in terms of the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act as the jurisdictional areas of today's 'traditional councils'." These geographical boundaries have created the space for retention and recognition of traditional leaders "who
were appointed during the apartheid era.\textsuperscript{27} The borders also maintain “communities” that were created under the Bantu Authorities Act. People who were forced into those areas without connection to the land, their neighbors, or their chief are living the same historical narrative of apartheid each day that they remain in the former Bantustans.\textsuperscript{28} Furthermore, traditional leaders’ interpretation of the Framework Act and provincial laws allows them to believe they are protected from community oversight and accountability, effectively “closing down the democratic space for community members to participate in decisions about their land, resources and finances.”\textsuperscript{29} Some also believe that the requirements for recognition are not democratic enough, and that more members should be elected and women represented.\textsuperscript{30}

The Municipal Structures Act details the role and function of local government within municipalities. The act “gives powers to municipal officials to take decisions at the local spheres of government on matters pertaining to land use planning and development projects without stating how traditional leaders should be involved.”\textsuperscript{31} Traditional leaders are relegated to public participatory processes, such as the Integrated Development Planning process, to be involved in land use planning matters. Additionally, traditional leaders apportion land to residents without prior consultation to the government, which creates conflict between the democratically elected officials and traditional authority.\textsuperscript{32}

Within this conflict lies varying levels of accountability to rural communities, leaving the people with much less power over their land.

The Framework Act and the Municipal Structure Act each provide for a different role for traditional leaders. Although the purpose of the laws was to clarify the ambiguity within the Constitution, they only created more confusion over the role of traditional leaders in relation to their communities and land, and how customary law should be defined and carried out. There is clear tension between democratic and traditional methods of governance, which, ultimately, leaves people who are living in rural areas more vulnerable.

### Communal Land Tenure and Land Use Policy

In recent years, the government has developed new policies concerning communal land tenure and land use planning. These laws also play a role in shaping traditional authority’s role in governance and land matters, including the use of customary law to make decisions regarding property. The three main laws that will be discussed in this section are the Communal Land Rights Act, Communal Land Tenure Policy, and the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act.

The Communal Land Rights Act of 2004 aimed to provide legal security of tenure to communities living in the former Bantustans by transferring title of communal land to the communities themselves.\textsuperscript{33} Communal land is defined as land that is “occupied or used by members of a community subject to the rules or custom of that community.”\textsuperscript{34} One of the issues with the act is that, combined with the laws stemming from the Framework Act, the settlement patterns and boundaries of the former Bantustans are reinforced, leaving communities within apartheid tribal boundaries that they may not identify with. “Consequently, people who were put under a wrong tribal authority have little or no chance to re-establish themselves and to restore their land rights on communal land.”\textsuperscript{35} Furthermore, traditional leaders were given increased power over land administration and allocation in the tribal boundaries, subsuming land bought and owned by other people. The title deeds that were transferred to communities could be “endorsed to ‘traditional communities,’ rendering land reform beneficiaries perpetual minorities within encompassing tribal boundaries.”\textsuperscript{36}

In 2010, the Constitutional Court declared the Communal Land Rights Act unconstitutional because of a flawed legislative process. Critics of the law made it clear that powers given to traditional authorities would undermine land rights and security of tenure of communities living in the former Bantustans.\textsuperscript{37} It was also clear that the communities within rural areas were “against traditional leaders holding absolute power over the land on which they lived.”\textsuperscript{38} A law meant to give communities more power over land ended up vesting more power in traditional leaders, both creating confusion over the role of traditional leadership in matters related to communal land, and undermining the rights of the rural people to property.

To address the issue of communal land tenure, the government created a new policy in 2014 entitled the Communal Land Tenure Policy, also known as the “wagon wheel” policy. The policy “proposes to transfer the ‘outer boundaries’ of ‘tribal’ land in the former Bantustans to ‘traditional councils’”\textsuperscript{39} in areas where there are no traditional councils, Communal Property Associations and Communal Property Institutions will be allowed to hold title deeds. In the areas where traditional councils have title deeds, individuals and families will have institutional use rights to land within the traditional council’s jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{40} Traditional councils will also “own and control all development related to common property areas.”\textsuperscript{41}

Once again, the Communal Land Tenure Policy puts traditional leadership and rural communities at odds with one another. Traditional leaders claim that they are the rightful landowners within the former Bantustans, and believe that CPAs and CPIs undermine their authority. Individuals and families with institutional use rights supposedly have greater power to hold their traditional councils accountable, but if the traditional councils own the land and have control over development such as mining and tourism, how much power do community members actually have?\textsuperscript{42} The Communal Land Tenure Policy also undermines constitutional rights to property and democratic processes by undercutting the Restitution Act. Groups that are supposed to receive redress due to suffering from forced removals are forced to remain within traditional boundaries under traditional authorities that they do not identify with or find legitimate.\textsuperscript{43}

A third law describing land use planning and development in South Africa is the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act of 2013 (SPLUMA). The purpose of SPLUMA is to provide a framework for spatial planning and land use management that will
provide for inclusive, developmental, and equitable spatial planning in order to amend past spatial planning and land use laws that were based on racial inequality and unsustainable settlement patterns. In addition to the law, there are accompanying regulations that address various areas within South Africa, including areas under traditional leadership. Chapter three, section 19 of the SPLUMA regulations state that traditional councils may create a service level agreement with the municipality, "subject to the provisions of any relevant national or provincial legislation in terms of which the traditional council may perform land use management powers and duties on behalf of the municipality in the traditional area concerned." The traditional council must also provide proof of the allocation of land rights in terms of customary law if it does not create a service level agreement with the municipality.

A point of contention within SPLUMA is the establishment of Municipal Planning Tribunals, which is outlined in chapter six, part B. The Municipal Planning Tribunal is responsible for determining land use and development applications within its respective municipal area. In order to be a member of the Municipal Planning Tribunal, one must have knowledge and experience in the fields of spatial planning, land use management, land development, and/or related law. Members of the tribunal cannot also be members of Parliament, a provincial legislature, Municipal Council, or a House of Traditional Leaders. Traditional leaders do not support the implementation of SPLUMA because municipalities and Municipal Planning Tribunals have planning responsibility, which undermines their authority in communal areas. In response to the traditional leadership's complaint, Rural Development and Land Reform Minister Gugile Nkwinti stated that traditional leaders were “the de facto owners of the land,” to which the traditional leaders suggested that SPLUMA be amended to clearly state that traditional leaders were owners of communal land areas. To confuse matters more, the court has determined that it is “not constitutional for a chief to hold authority to make land use management and development decisions.”

The three acts discussed above demonstrate the tension between the democratic government, traditional leadership, and rural communities’ authority over land rights, management, and use. The powers that are extended to traditional councils prevent rural communities from achieving true land tenure security and undermine their power to manage communal land over which they should have the title to. The Church was actually built inside hollowed-out caves in Orheiul Vechi, Republic of Moldova. The Cave Monastery (Manastire in Pestera) was built in the 13th century by Orthodox monks. (Photo by Matt Richmond, MBA Candidate, Kenan-Flagler Business School)
powers that the municipal government is granted in SPLUMA seemingly undermine traditional leadership's authority over the land that they also may have title to. There is no guarantee that the government's decisions over land will positively or negatively affect rural communities and fulfill their right to property and tenure security.

Conclusion: The Role of Traditional Authority

The laws that were created to clarify the role of traditional leadership within the South African government have only added to the ambiguity and confusion left by Sections 211 and 212 of the Constitution. In relation to land, laws such as the Communal Land Tenure Policy and SPLUMA have contradicted each other by both extending and limiting the powers of traditional councils in regards to land use management and development within communal areas. Additionally, the right to property and recognition of traditional leadership were included in the Constitution to redress the wrongs left by the colonial and apartheid governments. Instead of achieving real change, the government has maintained the colonial and apartheid legacy. The boundaries of the former Bantustans have been retained, leaving many rural communities under the rule of traditional authority that they do not identify with. Rural communities are lacking security of tenure, just as they did during apartheid, because of the traditional authority's power over land use and allocation.

The Constitutional Court ruled that customary law is living, dynamic, and flexible, and that the law codified by the colonial and apartheid governments is invalid. However, elements of traditional African customary law, specifically in regards to land rights, have been so eroded by colonial and apartheid-era land law that it is nearly impossible to utilize and define pre-colonial African customary law in the new South African context. The government has not been successful in integrating customary and democratic law so that they both benefit the people of the nation, and so people are still left questioning what the role of traditional authority should be in South Africa.

This paper only begins to explain the historical and contemporary laws and processes that have shaped traditional authority and the use of customary law in South Africa today, although it is clear that the current role traditional leaders play is reinforcing apartheid legacy and preventing rural communities from achieving their constitutional rights. Traditional leadership and customary law should play a role within South African society, but with contradictory laws that grant too much power to leaders, their current role is not functional within a democratic context. The South African government must integrate customary law into its democratic law and principles, and utilize traditional leaders to create a system of law that will preserve traditional law and leadership without preventing people from benefiting from rights guaranteed to them in the Constitution.

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Addressing the UN Beijing Platform: 3 and Support for Independent Reproductive Health Clinics

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Justine Schnitzler is a junior double majoring in History and Women’s and Gender Studies with a minor in Social and Economic Justice. She has long been interested in the intersections of law, justice, reproductive health, and gender. In the fall of 2014, she was selected for a research fellowship through WomenNC, a UN-affiliate associated with the Commission on the Status of Women. In the spring of 2015, she presented her findings on the importance of funding reproductive health clinics in order to meet the Beijing +20 goals at the United Nations in New York City. She currently works as an intern with NARAL Pro-Choice North Carolina and plans to attend law school.

In this paper, I offer a detailed description of the United Nations’ Commission on the Status of Women Beijing Platform of Action, with emphasis on the CEDAW bill and the third goal of the Platform: “Women and Health”. The purpose of this paper is to address potential solutions to meet the goals set forth by the United Nations that are applicable and effective in both domestic and global spheres. Both domestically and abroad it is evident that conservative restrictions on funding to reproductive healthcare clinics have produced negative results. I examine the current status of global reproductive health, with emphasis on the country of El Salvador, where restricted access to reproductive services and the illegality of abortion have driven down overall health outcomes for women significantly. Thus, I offer two avenues through which healthcare objectives for women worldwide can be met: funding for reproductive healthcare clinics and support for advocacy work. The importance of a local-to-global organization working on the issues presented by the Commission is emphasized, with the non-profit Ipas utilized as an example.

Beijing Platform for Action and the Beijing +20

In September 1995, the United Nations (UN) Commission on the Status of Women formally adopted the Beijing Platform for Action1. This platform outlined goals to close the gap between gender inequality across the world, with the intention to revisit the progress of the goals at the fifteen and twenty year mark2.


The Beijing Platform for Action was revisited at the fifteen-year mark in 2010, with the goals of establishing what progress had been made toward the twelve points and highlighting areas to improve upon. In March 2015, the UN Commission on the Status of Women revisited the Beijing Platform for the last time as the theme of their annual conference, known as the Beijing +20.

Connection to CEDAW

The UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), as an “international human rights bill for women” in 19794. For the purposes of this paper, it is important to note what the Convention defines as discrimination against women, which according to the document, is, “…any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect
or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field."

States who have ratified this document are required to submit reports to the United Nations, every four years at minimum, to track the progress of provisions put in place by CEDAW.6

Of particular relevance to this paper is Article 12 of CEDAW, whose first subtopic reads: "1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, access to health care services, including those related to family planning." While CEDAW has not been ratified by all members of the United Nations, primarily due to the provision for reproductive healthcare as a human right of women, it has held considerable weight in the formation of new United Nations summits and legislation relating to women, including the Beijing +20.

Introduction

Within the subsection of "Women and Health," the tenth agenda point of the Beijing Platform, there exist two strategic objectives that specifically address women's reproductive health: "C.1 Increase women’s access throughout the life cycle to appropriate, affordable and quality health care, information and related services… C.3 Undertake gender-sensitive initiatives that address sexually transmitted diseases, HIV/AIDS, and sexual and reproductive health issues." Herein, the United Nations recognizes reproductive health as crucial to a safe, healthy life, specifically making note of the idea that a promotion of reproductive rights, freely exercises, should be the base from which government and community-based policies are developed.9

Two solutions that prove effective in addressing the needs of strategic objectives C.1 and C.3 are funding high-quality, affordable reproductive healthcare in the forms of independent and non-governmental non-profit clinics, while simultaneously supporting governmental organizations (NGOs) to put women’s unique reproductive needs on the forefront of policy and legislation.

Reproductive Health and Clinic Access Comparison

Global: From a global perspective, access to reproductive healthcare clinics dedicated to providing a range of life-saving services varies wildly across continents, countries, and cultures. For example, in most of Western Europe, laws regarding birth control and abortion are fairly "liberal," allowing for terminations up to 24 weeks in most cases, coupled with reproductive needs built into government-funded healthcare systems. Still, outliers exist, primarily due to religious influence. In countries like Ireland, a strong conservative Catholic presence has put a chokehold on the operations of reproductive health clinics, even for those that do not offer pregnancy termination.10 The European Court of Human Rights has ruled, on multiple occasions and most recently in 2010, that "the state violated women's rights by obstructing access to legal health services, including abortion."11

Outside the European sphere of influence, reproductive rights are fairly dismal. For example, in El Salvador, a country with a majority Catholic demographic located in Central America, pregnancy that ends under any circumstance, including natural termination through miscarriage—referred to by the medical community as “spontaneous abortion”—is grounds for jailing.12 In 2007, an eighteen-year-old woman was given a thirty-year sentence after seeking help for a miscarriage at the local clinic.13 On January 22, 2015, El Salvador’s Parliamentary Assembly voted to pardon the young woman, raising hopes for "the other 15 women jailed after suffering pregnancy-related complications…(who) are also seeking pardons."14

Yearly, over 21.6 million women undergo unsafe abortions, with 47,000 women dying because they do not have access to safe reproductive healthcare services. Over 18.5 million of these estimated unsafe abortions occur in the global south and developing world.15 Still, there has been some progress in the twenty years since the inception of Beijing Platform. The Guttmacher Institute notes that between 1995 and 2003, abortions worldwide fell from 45.5 million in 1995 to 41.6 million.16 While this drop in abortions is promising, the number of unsafe abortions dipped only slightly between 1995 and 2003, from 19.9 million 19.7 million.17 The findings of the report indicate that the reduction in total numbers of abortion is directly caused by an increase in contraceptive use, though 70,000 women still die every year from unsafe abortions.18 Without access to safe abortion, contraceptives to prevent unintended pregnancy, and other vital reproductive healthcare services, the goals of the Beijing Platform will not continue to progress forward on the whole.

United States: In the United States, access to reproductive health clinics varies on a state-by-state basis, with political discrepancies and population density heavily affecting the creation and maintenance of full-service reproductive health clinics. The Population Institute is a global nonprofit dedicated to educating policymakers and the public alike on population issues and the importance of timely family planning and reproductive health care access. It released its yearly report card for the United States regarding reproductive healthcare access on January 8, 2015. The report card is based on factors including number of clinics open per state, accuracy and presence of age-appropriate sexual education, and legislation regarding abortion and emergency contraceptive availability. On the whole, the report summarizes findings such as rate of unplanned pregnancy (half of all pregnancies in the U.S are unplanned), the impact of the newly sworn in socially conservative Congress, and a failure of the majority of the states to expand Medicaid. Based on these components, the United States received a “C” as an overall grade. In the report, the Institute noted, "the status of reproductive health and rights in the U.S. remains at a historic crossroads. Significant gains have been made in reducing the teen pregnancy rate, as the reported rate fell 15% between 2008 and 2010...more women are gaining access to health care, including reproductive health care, due to the Affordable Care Act. Several states, however, are restricting a woman’s
access to reproductive health services by passing burdensome restrictions that are forcing many clinics to close. In order to create a scale by which to assign these letter grades, the Population Institute narrowed down nine major components of a positive reproductive healthcare state including 1) a low rate of teen pregnancy, 2) a low rate of unintended pregnancy, 3) comprehensive sex education in schools, 4) access to emergency contraception in the emergency room, 5) Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act, 6) a Medicaid “waiver” expanding eligibility for family planning services, 7) state funding for family planning clinics serving low-income households, 8) lack of legislative abortion restrictions (Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, or TRAP laws), 9) county-level access to reproductive services, from family planning to abortion. Each component was assigned a point value, and the total points earned by each determined its letter grade.

Between the dismal grade for the United States overall and such great variation in access between states, it is clear that the U.S is in violation of the United Nations’ C.1 and C.3 goals. As stated by the Population Institute in the opening paragraphs of the 2015 report, “Reproductive health care shouldn’t depend on your zip code.”

Solutions: Two Effective Methods

There is much to be desired in terms of universal reproductive healthcare access, as outlined by the Beijing Platform, from both a global and domestic perspective. Both high-quality, affordable healthcare clinics (run independently and subsidized by through government means), and the financial support of independent NGOs have the ability to put women’s unique reproductive needs on the forefront of policy and legislation.

Funding and Supporting Affordable Reproductive Healthcare

There are many layers to understanding how reproductive healthcare is funded—federally, privately, domestically, and abroad. The most obvious example of the types of hurdles facing reproductive healthcare funding in the United States is the Hyde Amendment, which prevents
federal funding from being allotted for any purposes relating to abortion. The American Civil Liberties Union describes the impact this legislation: “the Hyde Amendment excludes abortion from the comprehensive health care services provided to low-income people by the federal government through Medicaid... in addition to poor women on Medicaid, those denied access to federally funded abortion include Native Americans, federal employees and their dependents, Peace Corps volunteers, low-income residents of Washington, DC, federal prisoners, military personnel and their dependents, and disabled women who rely on Medicare.” It is important to note that the right to terminate a pregnancy is but one facet of reproductive healthcare the United Nations deems intrinsic to every woman's quality of life. However, blatant legislation of this nature, intent on undercutting a woman's ability to make decisions about continuing a pregnancy, flies in the face of UN resolves.

Because 'abortion' is the buzzword most associated with reproductive healthcare, attempts to adopt the Beijing Platform into domestic legislation have been fraught with difficulty in many countries, not just the United States. Political and religious attitudes regarding sexuality, sexual health, and family planning hold enormous weight for the entities responsible for allotting government funds to projects and healthcare endeavors. Another UN conference, the International Conference on Population and Development in 1994, reaffirmed that reproductive rights were human rights. Over 180 countries pledged to work toward paying for services intended to improve the sexual and reproductive health of women, particularly those living in the world's poorest countries. However, because of these aforementioned political disagreements, progress has been extremely “uneven,” with much of the money needed to fund projects not forthcoming. As an example, of the estimated $6.7 billion needed per year for contraceptives, less than have of that money ($3.1 billion) has materialized. Additionally, some of the funding, comes with strings attached---for example, the United States, the single largest donor for international family planning, is prevented by the Hyde Amendment from addressing the issue of unsafe abortion. Clearly, the issue of a right to terminate a pregnancy has far reaching effects for all aspects of reproductive healthcare access.

Because of the stigmas attached to reproductive healthcare, much clinical funding relies on donations raised through a variety of avenues alternative to the government — primarily from private donations and political action committees. In order to successfully meet C.1 and C.3 of the Beijing Platform for Action, the United Nations must invest in NGOs committed to bringing reproductive healthcare to women all over the world, rather than solely relying on declarative resolutions.

While “supporting” can be read as an extremely vague crutch verb for advocacy work domestically and abroad, it can, in this context, be read as taking funding to the next level: giving full faith and backing through endorsements and integration organizations, which are dedicated to ensuring accessibility of reproductive healthcare to women across the world.
Case Example of a Successful Organization: Ipas

It is important to examine real-life examples of these aforementioned NGOs and corporate reproductive healthcare clinics in order to have a solid grasp of what UN goals in action look like in practice.

Ipas, an organization based out of Chapel Hill, North Carolina, is a global non-profit non-governmental organization dedicated to eliminating deaths from unsafe abortion, both domestically and abroad, through teaching about reproductive health, providing prevention tools, and fighting anti-choice legislation. 

Ipas started originally as a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funded project to finish and mass-produce a safe manual vacuum aspirator used in surgical first-trimester abortions. The organization now works to increase and improve access to both safe and legal abortion with a multi-faceted approach—including advocacy, community work, clinical training and research.

Today, Ipas's advocacy work focuses primarily on reaching its five stated mission goals: 1) advocating for policies that support a woman's right to choose, 2) supporting local partners to implement or improve laws that help women access safe abortion, 3) supporting work on behalf of groups of marginalized women, 4) developing and distributing literature on sexual health and reproductive policies, and finally 5) educating healthcare providers on the importance of safe abortion access, in the interest of human rights and public health.

In day-to-day practice, these goals are worked on and achieved primarily through partnerships with ministries, donors, commercial distributors, and providers and both the public and private sectors—enough to serve more than 20 million women.

A second example of a comprehensive project spearheaded by Ipas is its Ethiopia campaign, which began in 1999. Since 2001, Ipas has collaborated with over 148 local community-based organizations to educate women (and other community members) about preventing unintended pregnancy, Ethiopia's abortion law, and how to access safe, legal abortion and contraceptive services. In terms of qualifying success, Ipas reports "despite the persistent stigma surrounding abortion, projects documented more women asking community volunteers and health-care providers about safe abortion services when needed."

Conclusion

On the whole, the Beijing Platform for Action's inclusion of a "Women and Health" initiative and subsequent C.1 ("Increase women's access throughout the life cycle to appropriate, affordable and quality health care, information and related services") and C.3 ("Undertake gender-sensitive initiatives that address sexually transmitted diseases, HIV/AIDS, and sexual and reproductive health issues") addendums are far from achievable. However, it is independent reproductive healthcare clinics, funded and supported by NGOs, that are doing the bulk of heavy work all across the world to ensure women everywhere have universal access to reproductive healthcare. It is vital that the United Nations directs funds and time to organizations like Ipas to ensure that the women achieve full health equality in the coming decades.

Notes

1. Within the context of this paper, it is to be understood that a “full service reproductive clinic” offers the following services as standard: birth control options (pill, patch, ring, shot, etc), STD testing, preventative healthcare procedures (pap smears, etc.), and abortion (preferably both surgical and medication abortion).

2. It is important to note that the clinic itself may still receive funding; it just may not use the allocated funds for abortion services.

3. Title X is "the only federal grant program dedicated solely to providing individuals with comprehensive family planning and related preventive health services". The U.S Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Population Affairs (OPA) is the organization responsible for overseeing the program, and "OPA funds a network of 4,400 family planning centers which serve about five million clients a year. Services are provided through state, county, and local health departments; community health centers; Planned Parenthood centers; and hospital-based, school-based, faith-based, other private nonprofits." (HHS.gov).

Citations


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