Front cover photo: Shelby Casey studied abroad in Sweden; seeing the Northern Lights had always been somewhere at the top of her list of things she needed to do. As soon as she got the chance—she was ready, fur hat, snow onesie, camera in freezing hand. When she saw nature’s ballet, she almost couldn’t take a picture. She was wonderstruck and in awe, and needless to say, not disappointed.

Photo by Shelby Casey, Class of 2020, Biology and Neuroscience
This is Munchie, an infamous mascot of the Carolina International Relations Association. She’s pictured on a dock on St. Maarten, the southern Dutch half of an island shared with the French in the Caribbean.

Photo by Logan Anderson, Class of 2022, Global Studies major
THE INTERNATIONALIST

STAFF

Editor-in-Chief
Meghan Prabhu ’22

Executive Editor
Aida Al-Akhdar ’21

Managing Editors
Ash Huggins ’22

Hannah Rubenstein ’23

Head Design Editor
Mariana Herrera ’23

Design Editors
Tushar Varma ’22

Brianna Corrie ’23

Emma Fagerberg ’23

Social Media and Marketing
Director
Emma Dieterle ’23

Senior Editors
Jennings Dixon ’22

Joshua O’Brien ’22

Contributors
Maha Butt ’24

Anyi Li ’24

Rohan Rajesh ’24
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Internationalist Executive Team would like to give special thanks to:

Professor Brigitte Zimmerman
UNC Chapel Hill Department of Global Studies

Celine Mukamurenzi, MA
School for International Training Rwanda

Professor Gerd Valchars
University of Vienna

Professor Klaus Larres
UNC Chapel Hill Department of History

Professor Jonathan Weiler
UNC Chapel Hill Department of Global Studies

For their guidance throughout the earlier stages of the editing process. The Fall 2020 edition would not be possible without their invaluable expertise!
Despite the many challenges of this remote semester, the Internationalist has maintained its strong commitment to showcasing stellar pieces of student research and writing. Even a global pandemic could not stop us from continuing to carve out space in academia for talented undergraduates to be recognized. The accomplished authors whose articles you’re about to read – and surely enjoy – are incredibly worthy of that recognition.

Moreover, the enthusiastic effort, diligence, and perseverance of the entire Internationalist team this semester have catalyzed sweeping changes for the journal – we now have both a website and an international relations blog publishing student-written pieces weekly. This has enabled us to reach wider readership and start important conversations about issues that plague the modern day.

I’m incredibly excited to see where these new projects take us in the coming semesters.

Special thanks go out to Aida Al-Akhdar, my Executive Editor, whose honest leadership and untiring determination has been a great asset to this journal; our Head Design Editor Mariana Hererra, whose sheer talent and enthusiasm continues to blow me away; and our former Editor-in-Chief Patrick Clifford, who has been a wonderful mentor to me and an even better friend.

I give my biggest thanks of all to our incredibly talented staff – the Fall 2020 edition truly wouldn’t be possible without each and every one of you.

Sincerely,

Meghan Prabhu
Editor-in-Chief
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## AFRICA

**Justice as a Decolonial Process**  
By Phoebe Flaherty  
8

**Working for the Worker? A Study of the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT)**  
By Ava Erfani  
23

**An Analysis of Zimbabwean Health Crises Since Independence**  
By James McClure  
32

## EUROPE

**Ideology, Narrative, and Adaptation: A Case Study of Soviet War Monuments in Berlin**  
By Collins Alexander  
39

**Crescent Among the Stars: Islam and Islamophobia in the European Union**  
By Labeeb Ahmed  
50

## AMERICAS

**International Human Rights Trailblazer: The Case of American Foreign Policy in Argentina’s ‘Dirty War’ Under the Carter Administration**  
By Brittany Broome  
57

## TRANSNATIONAL

**Put Her In Coach: Female Sports Journalists’ Role in Women’s Athletic Coverage in the Media**  
By Jamie Cummings  
65
Justice as a Decolonial Process

By Phoebe Margaret Flaherty

Phoebe Flaherty is pursuing majors in public policy and colonial & decolonial studies within the interdisciplinary studies major. Phoebe is a member of the class of 2022, and spent the spring semester of 2020 studying post-genocide restoration and peacebuilding in Kigali, Rwanda prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. Her interests in the development and deconstruction of colonial ideologies stem from her passions for Indigenous sovereignty in Canada, and the many ways in which colonial ideologies are developed and deconstructed. This piece is inspired by the dualism of courts in post-colonial states to both bolster colonial projects and contribute to decolonization.

P

ower struggles make up the fabric of human history, with conflict and the desired dominance of one society over another staining much of the past. In many ways, the contemporary global setting is representative of centuries of power struggles at the societal, international, and ideological level. Pursuits of power in the global community have long been accompanied by the exploitation and manipulation of societies for the benefit of an imperial power. Long before the categories of first, second, and third world countries were introduced to the international community as an organizational model for global order, the West had been positioned at the apex of international power dynamics. Largely maintained by the legacies of European colonization, the modern power dynamics of the international community remain rooted in modern conceptions of Western superiority. Colonization, therefore, is an exercise in these power dynamics. The ideological inception, execution, and remaining legacies of European colonization have worked to transform the geography and people of a region to the benefit of the colonial power. Colonization is a form of domination, and the social transformation it catalyzes is profound. Beyond being a mere economic exercise in raw resource acquisition, the impacts of colonization have far exceeded the industrial revolution-based origin story of European colonialists in Africa and instead represents an exercise in international power dynamics. In many cases, colonizers intentionally manipulated the traditions, cultures, and social structures of a nation, transferring the people of the region to a colony-based way of life. Thus, the exploitation of one society for the benefit of another is intrinsically tied to human history, and has left a permanent stain on many post-colonial societies even after political independence from a colonizer is gained. One need only consider the African continent, and more specifically, the Rwandan state, to observe the capacity of colonization to force social transformation, and how colonial legacies continue to reveal themselves long after the colonizer’s retreat.

The structure of contemporary Rwandan society, like many other post-colonial states, remains heavily influenced by a long and painful history of Western exploitation and manipulation. Dominant religions, evolving national languages, and defined state borders in Rwanda serve as reminders of colonial rule, accompanied by a long history of colonial-derived legal practices on which the present-day legal system stands. Existing as a post-colonial state with political independence, Rwanda is faced with the challenge of building a secure state on a tumultuous past. Rising from the ashes of the 1994 Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi, conversations on Rwanda’s path forward are often prefaced by discussions of colonial legacies. In recognizing the structure of Rwandan society as an extension of the colonial histories that have influenced so much of the
country’s past, colonially-minded conversations draw attention to the fact that the dominant modes of thinking and production of knowledge across Africa are continually “defined and dominated by a Western world view.” Consequently, if decolonization is considered the final step of the colonial process – preceded by pre-colonial society, colonization, and post-colonial society – how can a country be considered “decolonized” if the face of the colonizer is tied to the ideological and infrastructural foundations of society? When is a country truly free from the shackles of colonization?

In the early 1960’s, the United Nations (UN) established the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People. Within the decade, “three dozen new states in Asia and Africa achieved autonomy or outright independence from their European colonial rulers.” The sub-Saharan African countries that became independent between the 1950s and 1960s officially entered an age of post-colonialism upon gaining this independence, however it is important to differentiate post-colonialism from decolonization. The term “post-colonial” has devolved from its original temporal meaning of colonies gaining independence, and is now commonly used to discuss the cultural, social, political, and economic effects of colonization on former colonies. Within Duncan Ivisan’s definition of the word, post-colonialism suggests that a country has the ability to overcome the wounds of colonization while being faced with the struggles of new forms of global empire building. In the interest of this paper, post-colonialism will refer to both the state of a colony gaining political independence from the colonizer, as well as to a former colony’s ability to grapple with colonial legacies. Recognizing that colonization itself may officially end with a nation’s independence, coloniality remains. Defined as “the long-standing patterns of power that [have] emerged as a result of colonialism,” it is critical to consider colonization as an ongoing process within international power dynamics. Within the UN’s Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People, previously colonized nations were welcomed “into freedom and independence…[under the belief that] all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory.” The independence of colonial nations was integrated into the UN agenda as part of a grand gesture that vowed to “bring[g] to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.” However, in equating decolonization to state political sovereignty, the coloniality of African exploitation by European colonizers remains unchallenged. Striving for the large-scale independence of previously colonized nations, the UN’s declaration expressed notions of state-independence reminiscent of Westphalian sovereignty. While equating decolonization to the establishment of an independent state may be enticing in its simplicity, ending colonization in all its forms and manifestations is necessary for decolonization—anything else is considered an injustice.

Colonization annihilates a people’s culture by imposing the colonial power’s cultural system over existing epistemics and traditional practices. In Rwanda, this includes the imposition of Christianity over traditional religious beliefs and an European-inspired justice system over community-led practices. In this context we continue to question whether a post-colonial country can shed the coloniality that has manifested within government structures when the legacies of the colonizer are compatible with the norms of the international community. Post-colonialism, in the eye of the colonizer, was never intended to remove the influence of the European nation over the post-colonial society. Instead, post-colonial eras have historically signified the efforts of colonialists to no longer keep colonies in the empire, but to keep the newly post-colonial states tied to a colonial way of life. There is a willingness of the colonizer to relinquish control, but only if colonial methods of business and administration continue to permeate the territory. With Western-inspired cultures of administration and justice enforced as international norms by the UN, how can a country pursue paths towards decolonization when colonial legacies are reinforced through Western-backed international insti-
tutions? Despite post-colonialism claiming to give nations the space to undergo decolonial processes of political, economic, and cultural reclamation, enforced international norms remain rooted in Western culture, and in many ways, reinforce the colonial systems imposed on countries like Rwanda. However, when fundamentally changing the justice system to address the compounding issues of colonial legacies, it goes to question whether or not the universal enforcement of international legislation makes adequate space for countries to pursue culturally relevant solutions towards decolonization.

So what is Rwanda? Post-colonial? Decolonized? Both? Upon the conclusion of the 1994 Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi, the Rwandan government was faced with a huge challenge in reconciling its population not only from the wounds of genocide, but also from the longstanding legacies of colonization. This paper will review the potential for justice systems to be a tool in decolonizing a post-colonial society. Centred on the attempts to decolonize post-colonial Rwanda, this paper will begin with a brief history of the country before reviewing the colonial legacies impacting Rwanda’s society and civil justice system. Next, this paper will explore the origins of gacaca – a community based justice system – and will review the potential for gacaca to counteract the colonial legacies of both German and Belgian colonial rule. Next, this paper will consider the debate between cultural relativism and universalism in the application of human rights, and whether or not departures from the international norms are acceptable in countries that have ratified the UN human rights convention. Lastly, this paper will consider the potential effectiveness of gacaca as a valuable tool in the process of decolonization.

Part I: A Brief History of Rwanda

Prior to European contact, Rwanda existed as a kingdom much larger than the borders of the contemporary Rwandan state. In its Pre-Colonial history, the social hierarchy of the Rwandan kingdom consisted of the King, the royal court, and the subsidiary communities under the control of the monarchy. Subsidiary communities were divided into three categories: Batutsi (Tutsi), referring to one’s role as a cattle and land owner; Bahutu (Hutu), referring to one’s role as an agriculturalist working leased land; and Batwa (Twa), referring to one’s role as a hunter-gatherer. The longstanding divides between the Hutus and Tutsis that culminated with the 1994 genocide do not, therefore, originate from pre-colonial society. The titles of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa indicated neither tribe nor ethnic group, and all groups were united by a common language, religion, and the occasional marriage. Thus, theories of “ancient hatred” as the origin of tensions between Hutu and Tutsi have no historical grounding.

When the African continent was fractured and distributed to different European nations in the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, the geography of the Rwandan kingdom was incorporated into what became known as German East Africa. Rwanda was dominated but not settled by European colonizers – becoming part of the rush for raw resources that fueled European economic expansion in the “scramble for Africa.” The strategic use of missionaries and the movement of administrative and legal institutions from the control of the monarchy to the colonial power solidified Rwanda’s position as a German colony. In 1919, after a League of Nations mandate redistributed German owned territories to other colonial powers post-World War II, Rwanda was put under Belgian control. Controlling the territories of Ruanda-Urundi and what was then known as the Belgian Congo, Belgium became a fierce colonizer of eastern Africa, leading what has since been referenced to as “the vilest scramble for loot that ever disfigured the history of human conscience.” With African deaths under Belgian rule estimated to be between ten to fifteen million between the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, physical violence was partnered with the manipulation of Rwanda’s existing socio-cultural categories of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa.
which “was brought to Rwanda by Belgian missionaries who described Tutsis as a foreign race [originating] beyond Rwanda.”\(^{18}\) the Belgians fabricated ethnic divides to bolster the colonial power structure. Attributing Tutsis to the concept of “Whiteness,” colonialists asserted that the taller height and lighter colouring of Tutsis in comparison to Hutus made the Tutsis most similar to the colonizer out of the social strata - empowering colonialists to promote Tutsis as “more intelligent and better equipped to govern.”\(^{19}\) Consequently, the Belgian colonial administration systematically imposed divides between Hutus and Tutsis (the Twa largely excluded from the process), oppressing Hutus and uplifting Tutsis through educational curriculum, socio-economic standings, and political power.\(^{20}\) The power imbalance between Tutsis and Hutus was further solidified in the 1930s, when the Belgian colonial administration issued the infamous ethnic identification cards that would be used later in the 1994 genocide to differentiate Hutus from Tutsis.\(^{21}\)

Later, in Belgian-controlled Rwanda, Hutus, as the largest ethnic group in Rwanda, appropriated the fabricated ethnic divides that were enforced by Belgian colonizers and “treated all Tutsis as untrustworthy foreign invaders who had no rights and deserved no consideration.”\(^{22}\) Upon gaining independence from Belgium in 1962, first Rwandan President Grégoire Kayibanda asserted Hutu majority power through his party’s politics. Later overthrown in a coup by Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana in 1973, neither president effectively addressed the growing ethnic tensions in Rwanda, nor reconciled the periodic mass killings of Rwanda’s Tutsi population.\(^{23}\) The hostility against the Tutsi minority grew into a government-supported campaign of anti-Tutsi propaganda bolstered by government-sponsored hate radio station Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines.\(^{24}\) When President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down on April 6th 1994, the Rwandan genocide against the Tutsis was triggered and one hundred days of calculated violence began.\(^{25}\) The genocide came to a close on July 15th, 1994 after over 800,000 Rwandans had died and “over two million refugees [from Rwanda had been displaced to] neighbouring countries.”\(^{26}\)

**Part II: Colonial Legacies in Rwanda’s Social Structure and Justice System**

The African continent and its contemporary socio-economic challenges are often referenced as prime examples of colonial legacies. Forced to succumb to the colonial ideals of European nations, “colonial hegemony and rationality is very much alive today in all parts of [Africa:] in the education sector, in the economy, in the ways knowledge is produced and validated, and indeed in the dominant modes of thinking… [such is the concept of] neo-colonialism.” Since the fracturing of the continent in 1885, the governing ideology of the “White Man’s Burden,” which was originally written in the context of American imperialism in the Philippines, has driven colonial projects in Africa – largely influenced by the need for raw materials and a strong belief in the duty of the Western world to “civilize” those born outside of Western society.\(^{27}\) Providing an ideological foundation to colonial practices, the imposition of European administrative practices radically restricted society, as did the cultural influence of the colonial power. Overwhelmingly, Christianity “was one justification that European powers used to colonize and exploit Africa,” as it synchronized the Rwandan people with the newly imposed cultural ideals of European colonialists.\(^{28}\) Having had a sustained influence over Rwanda since European contact, the power of European administrations and Christianity over Rwandan society are a testament to the colonial legacies steeped into post-colonial societies globally.

Colonial projects may vary in structure, but they are all bound by the manipulations of power dynamics par consequence of the colonial power. While some countries are the products of settler colonialism (i.e. the British Empire in Canada, Australia, South Africa, etc.), others experience colonialism as a form of
economic exploitation under an imperial project (i.e. the United States in the Philippines and Puerto Rico). While the role of German imperialism is often understated in favour of Belgium's role in building a post-colonial society capable of genocide, it is critical to consider the administrative processes established to govern Rwanda throughout its colonial era.

European involvement in “Rwanda-Urundi” shifted from the economic explorations of the German East Africa Country, which operated through contracts with local kings, to the development of a German colonial administration imposed upon a weakened Rwandan monarchy. The incorporation of Germany into the power of the Rwandan monarchy drastically altered the Rwandan state, as “the King was [no longer] managing or travelling throughout Rwanda as he wanted…[and] had to have a known place in which he could meet with White People.”

Pressured to abide with the wants of Europeans, judicial power was disseminated from the core of the Monarchy and alternatives to the royal court were constructed as new civic gathering places – marking the official establishment of a German civil administration. The manipulation of ethnic divides forged by European colonizers, the maintenance of colonial infrastructure such as a Western imposed judicial system and the entrenched ideals of White superiority were bolstered by the colonial power’s “concern to not compromise the image of the White man”, and the use of force and structural change to reinforce white supremacy. Across the transfer of colonial power between Germany and Belgium, “Belgium imported the civil and criminal codes of the then Belgian Congo to Rwanda and Burundi,” imposing on them a new system of civil administration established by the Germans. Continuing the colonial project of imposing Western-based laws on East African populations, Belgium “ignor[ed] the unique characteristics of Rwandan and Burundian society,” and continued to develop Western-inspired institutions in the region.

Western conceptions of land ownership and private property have been repeatedly used to the advantage of European colonizers. Land and resource acquisition is a driving force behind colonial projects, and the use of Christianity in achieving these feats persists as an intellectual tool to the colonizer. Missionaries are responsible for much of the early European contact with Rwanda, as “Christianity…[was used as] a guise [through] which Western governments justified the exploitation and conquest of African nations…to spread what they believed was a just and compassionate doctrine… [and] degrade the culture and society of the African people.” While the involvement of missionaries and Christian faith organizations persist in contemporary Rwanda, it is critical to analyze the use of Christianity as a key component of Belgian colonial projects. When Catholicism was introduced by Europeans to Rwanda in 1900, colonizers found power in the capacity of Christianity to alter the “belief, cults, behaviour and rites of many.” As the German presence in Rwanda grew, the influx of missionaries from Europe was put under the control of the German authorities along with the trade economy. Consequently, the involvement of Christianity in the growing Rwandan trade industry was streamlined to bolster the growth of Christian tradition in Rwanda and any negative act committed by a missionary, including “cattle raids by foreigners and the acts of violence they perpetrated,” were protected from prosecution.

The new religious culture in Rwanda opposed many traditional practices, a fact that the Republic of Rwanda outlines as the beginning of a state sponsored religion in Rwanda, and the oppression of non-“Western” religions by colonizers. Thus, colonial support for Christian missionaries established the economic foundations for colonial resource exploitation, and a degree of religious homogeneity between the colonizer and the colonized – making it easier to advance colonial projects across common religious ground.

When the Germans decentralized the civil justice process from the Rwandan royal court, the establishment of Catholicism was used to
create a society that differed from traditional societal norms and was compatible with the culture of the colonial power. Catholicism and Christian values at large have been deeply entrenched into Western systems of justice – a “connection… so intimate that it [is] usually taken for granted.”

Despite religious pluralism being protected in different Western societies, Western law is inherently Christian-centred, as many of the Western legal traditions were established nine centuries ago when the Roman Catholic Church first established its political and legal unity. The colonial foundations of Christianity in Rwanda are therefore, inextricable from the colonial power. In regards to the legal foundations of the colonizer, anti-discrimination and equality are entrenched in Belgian law, yet the “principle of [State religious neutrality] is not laid down explicitly in the Belgian Constitution.”

Although anti-discrimination policies and the lack of a state sponsored church provide the legal foundations for religious pluralism, Foblets and Velaers refute the assumed secularism of the Belgian state by highlighting the unquestioned participation of state officials in Catholic ceremonies, the hanging of crucifixes in public buildings – which are often maintained under arguments of aesthetics and historicity – and the Belgian head of state kneeling to kiss the Pope’s ring in 2009 to “honour[r] an outstanding compatriot.”

The pervasiveness of the Catholic faith in Belgian society showcases the inseparability of Christianity from the Belgian state – despite the constitutional support for diverse religious beliefs. The imposition of Christianity initiated by German colonizers and furthered by the Belgians has since culminated within 56.5 percent of the population being Roman Catholic and 93.6 percent falling under the umbrella of Christianity as of 2013. Thus, in considering the colonial project of the Rwandan state, the Christian foundations of Belgian society must be linked both to the dominant culture of Christianity in Rwanda and to the existence of a Western-inspired justice system influenced by Christian ideals. It is therefore, apparent that non-traditional understandings of justice and religion have been entrenched in Rwandan society by colonial powers, as the structural injustices within European infrastructure “were carried forward by the [Rwandan] post-independence regime to perpetuate a similar system of domination, but now with Rwandans in power.”

As previously discussed, the laws, civil justice system, and dominant religious values of Rwanda have been heavily influenced by the role of European colonizers. Interestingly, within the post-colonial and post-genocidal Rwandan context, the most discriminatory laws from the Colonial Era are said to have been abolished. However, some argue that colonial laws lie largely unaddressed until raised as a legal argument in a court of law. While Rwanda has the capacity to remedy colonial-era laws as well as the national legal structure, it has been acknowledged that international institutions such as the UN continually favour Western countries and their respective legal practices—posing a barrier to Rwanda if the country ever sought to dispose of the Western-rooted justice system. Considering the example of the sustained power of the United States within the UN, which Novosad and Werker account to institutional biases in the international system and a tendency for “political appointees [to be] frequently not loyal to the United Nations, but to their respective governments,” the term “international community” is often synonymous with “the West.”

The normativity of Western culture within the “international community” is bolstered by both the continued dominance of the West in international institutions and the colonial legacies that bind countries to Western social structures. Therefore, in an attempt to heal post-colonial societies of destructive colonial legacies and revive the traditional social structures that were superimposed by Western systems, the revival of traditional systems such as gacaca are designed not only to “deal with trials, [but to bring] people together based on culture.”
Part III: Gacaca

Inspired by traditional Rwandan community practices, gacaca was a gathering of respected community elders in pre-colonial Rwandan society who were responsible for “preserving peace and harmony in the community.”\textsuperscript{51} Subscribing to the belief that “any offense tarnishes the image not only of the individual who committed it, but also the family to which he/she belongs,” an individual’s offenses were considered to be a part of a community’s makeup, and were thus up to the community to solve.\textsuperscript{52} In framing individual offenses within the context of the community and under clan and family solidarity, the community-based style of “this traditional system of conflict resolution ensured cohesion of a pluralistic society.”\textsuperscript{53} The role of gacaca in maintaining the harmony of pre-colonial Rwandan society is profound, and reflects many Rwandan cultural ideals that have since been oppressed by colonialism. Thus, in the post-genocide context, returning to a pre-colonial inspired system of justice “constitute[d] a bridge between the ancient and the new Rwanda.”\textsuperscript{54} Intent on reviving the culture of a time when Rwanda was not necessarily more equal, but less divided, the imposition of the new gacaca attempted to transcend ethnicity and foster reconciliation after the genocide.\textsuperscript{55}

When one hundred days of genocide in Rwanda came to a close, over 800,000 Rwandans had died.\textsuperscript{56} Forced to recover from mass-social trauma, Rwanda opted for a “home-grown” system of justice to address the unprecedented judicial gridlock and necessary communal healing present in the wake of the genocide. Taking inspiration from traditional gacaca courts, “the ‘…new’ gacaca courts are in the truest sense an…invented tradition.”\textsuperscript{57} It is critical to acknowledge that the new gacaca did not mirror the pre-colonial structure exactly, but instead used the ideals of gacaca to create a legal system capable of promoting truth and reconciliation and addressing judicial gridlock. Under the amended Rwandan constitution of 2003, Article 152, Sub-section 2 states that the established gacaca courts are responsible for prosecuting and trying persons accused of the crime of genocide perpetrated against Tutsi and other crimes against humanity committed between October 1st, 1990 and December 31st, 1994. Gacaca’s imposition was also motivated in part by the Rwandan government’s refusal to have foreign jurists working within its judicial system, and the history of limitations faced by international tribunals. Through constitutional reforms implemented in 2003, gacaca was established to try thousands of cases under a decentralized justice system that attempted to heal society with a new Rwandan approach.

The cultural roots of gacaca are important, but so are the contemporary motivations for the court’s formation. While the gacaca courts were able to address a greater number of cases at a significantly lower cost than both the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Rwandan Civil courts,\textsuperscript{58} gacaca remains to be heavily criticized and praised by both African and Western academics. In an article by Alphonse Muleefu, Director of the University of Rwanda’s School of Law, and Dr. Felix Ndahinda, Director of Aegis Trust’s Research, Policy and Higher Education, the debate of reconciliation versus retributive justice considers gacaca optimistically simply off of “what the gacaca process alone may be able to achieve in reconciling the Rwandan society or eradicating the culture of impunity.”\textsuperscript{59} Gacaca did have a retributive component to its proceedings; however, the pre-colonial origins of gacaca tend to detract from Western judicial norms.\textsuperscript{60} Sentencing varied depending on the nature and relative severity of the crime, placing convicted individuals into four different categories:

The categories indicate the degree of individual responsibility and the respective penalties [for the crime]. The first category includes leaders and organizers of the genocide, persons who abused positions of authority, notorious killers who distinguished themselves by their ferocity or excessive cruelty and perpetrators of sexual torture. Category two includes the per-
petrators of or accomplices to intentional homicides or serious assaults against individuals that led to their death. Category three contains persons guilty of other serious assaults against individuals while category four covers persons who committed property crimes.\(^61\)

The retributive punishments for each of these categories varied, but conventional prison sentences were included. The nature of the crime was considered along with how the indicted individual came to face the court. Whether an individual turned themselves in to court authorities, withheld information, or failed to present themselves to the courts were all considered when determining the level of punishment individuals would be awarded.\(^62\) The subsequent maintenance of gacaca as a retributive justice technique is countered by the involvement of the community in the rendering of a truthful narrative and the community's involvement in communal healing. Although there was pushback from the international community in developing community-led justice practices in Rwanda, "the determination to move forward with the gacaca process in spite of dominant international objections was informed by the [country's knowledge] of the Rwandan conflict [and] the perceived need to reinvent Rwandan society as a whole."\(^63\) After persisting as a cultural fixture throughout the colonial era, gacaca was reimplemented in 2003, and allowed for many post-genocide legal issues to be addressed – but not without drawing criticism.

With the desire for Western cultural homogeneity at the forefront of many international institutions backed by the Western world, it is understandable to see why criticisms of gacaca courts are often labelled as Western regardless of whether an individual is "from the global West or from other continents including Africa."\(^64\) The "Western" label attributed to criticism refers less to its geographic origin, and more to how the criticism references the "norms, institutions or ideals rooted or embedded in Western legal and socio-political thought, even where some of them might have acquired a universal (human rights) stamp."\(^65\) An inability to escape Western ideologies in criticizing gacaca can inhibit the formation of a legitimate review of the courts – especially as gacaca is perceived as being contrary "to the established foundations of the globalised criminal justice mechanisms of Western inception."\(^66\) However, it is still critical to acknowledge the documented human rights violations within gacaca, while still contextualizing them within a universalist school of thought. Gacaca has been criticized for failing to bring members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) to justice for genocide crimes – a particularly fraught problem as current President of Rwanda Paul Kagame is an RPF affiliate, and "the government let it be known publicly and unambiguously that gacaca would not cover RPF crimes."\(^67\) The "new" gacaca ran from 2003-2012, and relied on local governments to collect information and run trials. Gacaca court judges were nominated by the community, and did not necessarily hold law degrees. Additionally the reported corruption of gacaca court judges and the coerced participation of some individuals in the trials have increased negative criticism, particularly as many gacaca participants lied or remained silent due to intimidation, corruption, personal ties, or fear of repercussions.\(^68\) In failing to exercise the minimum international standards of a fair trial, gacaca became the target of intense international scrutiny. However, the shortcomings of the gacaca judiciary can be partially attributed to how the genocide destroyed much of the existing judicial infrastructure – particularly through the killing of many judges and other judicial staff.

Although international standards were not universally upheld in post-genocide Rwanda, gacaca has combined a variety of justice theories within its structure. Stemming from Rwandan tradition, gacaca "combines different theories of justice: restorative or community justice, punitive or retributive justice, and rehabilitation or reintegration of the offender."\(^69\) Despite the intention of gacaca to unite Rwandans under a common cultural identity,
the cultural familiarity of the process did little to hide the revolutionary creation that was gacaca – providing solutions to a post-colonial and post-genocidal society that was far from the methods universally accepted by the international community.

Part IV: Cultural Relativism vs Universalism

The aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi continued to challenge the already fragile Rwandan state. With over 120,000 people detained in the wake of the genocide, the pace of proceedings inspired estimates that it would take "anywhere between two and four centuries to try all those in detention." As a country that had signed the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Rwandan government was faced with the administrative nightmare of being caught amidst the international regulations surrounding large-scale human atrocity, and the responsibility of the government to heal a severely fractured society. Article 11.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights instills in people the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a public trial at which they have had all the guarantees necessary for their defence. Further, Article 8 proclaims that everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating fundamental rights instilled in the constitution. The stipulations of the UN's UDHR and the Genocide Convention combined created a negatively-charged atmosphere for the post genocidal country, as the systems that were being prescribed to Rwanda were ineffective at alleviating pressure from the justice system, and came with high financial cost to the country. Therefore, the debate on the universality of justice processes comes into play within the Rwandan context. Do countries reserve the right to produce and practice justice processes that are relative to the culture? Or must countries abide by the standards set by international governing bodies?

Universalism is embodied by international institutions that strive to promote diplomacy and peaceful relations between the world's nations. In its most radical form, universalism gives "absolute priority to the demands of the cosmopolitan moral community over all other ("lower") moral communities [...in a] complete denial of national and subnational ethical autonomy and self-determination." In the context of universalism, every country that is a member of the UN has signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) – symbolizing a shared understanding of the human condition across different cultural contexts. As if to supersede the different traditions, values, and practices of different cultural contexts, universalism seeks to establish international norms that function above variances in global cultures. Universalism exists largely in the structure of the world today, and can be seen within any large process that binds the global community to a common medium. An inherent trait within international legislation, processes of homogenizing international communities are also visible within the growing global marketplace, expedited by the rise of international corporations. Consequently, radical universalism has been referred to as moral imperialism, as the inflexible nature of radical universalism ignores cultural context and prescribes strict notions of right and wrong to the global community.

It is critical to acknowledge that many of the points of the UDHR were held as universal values in most societies before being enforced by international legislation. Notably, "protection from arbitrary rule, protection of inhuman and degrading treatment, the guarantee of a place in the life of the community and access to an equitable share of the means of subsistence are central moral aspirations in nearly all cultures." Of course, the assumed universalism of these values without international enforcement has not been absolute, and one only need look at the course of human history to see how human suffering has gone unfettered by the international community. After the creation of the UDHR, communally understood notions of human rights were set into international law, as
were others rooted exclusively in the West. When enforcing human rights rooted in Western tradition (i.e. judicial proceedings), a universalist approach to human rights legislation runs the risk of being culturally imperialistic – perpetually favouring Western cultural norms.

Gacaca, however, is an exercise in cultural relativism, as notions of communal autonomy and self-determination are inherent in the process of justice. Cultural relativism can be demonstrated at different capacities – having a different level of influence depending on its severity. While radical cultural relativists hold that the “culture is the sole source of the validity of a moral right or rule,” cultural relativism at a weaker capacity “would recognize a comprehensive set of prima facie universal human rights and allow only relatively rare and strictly limited local variations and exceptions.” Cultural relativism contextualizes situations within their cultural context, and is critical of international norms and how they impact the affected society. However, extreme cultural relativism can be in direct opposition to universalism – asserting the dominance of culturally informed practices rooted in tradition over universally recognized systems. Within the African context, the argument of cultural relativism has been incited to apply modes of justice different from the ones prescribed by the international community. Examples on the African continent outside of the Rwandan context include:

Uganda; In an attempt to reconcile society from the conflicts in Northern Uganda’s Acholiland, an amnesty agreement was incited, where people were reintroduced to society with traditional ceremony and were not legally prosecuted. Malawi; President Hastings Kamuzu Banda used “traditional courts” to face political opponents outside of the regular legal system, with judges and chiefs appointed by Banda, no defense attorneys present, and all appeals being made to Banda personally. These courts did “not have the slightest connection with authentic traditional practices” but were marketed as such.

Malawi; President Hastings Kamuzu Banda used “traditional courts” to face political opponents outside of the regular legal system, with judges and chiefs appointed by Banda, no defense attorneys present, and all appeals being made to Banda personally. These courts did “not have the slightest connection with authentic traditional practices” but were marketed as such.77

Considering the Malawian case, justice methods exercised under the air of “traditional society” provide a culturally relative argument for employing justice methods outside of universally upheld standards. In doing so, the Malawian “traditional courts” blatantly violated Article 11 of the UDHR. In the Ugandan case, amnesty agreements were leveraged to stop the cycle of people joining northern Ugandan rebel groups, and to encourage people to reintegrate into society without the fear of facing criminal charges.79 However, it should be acknowledged that the highest-profile human rights violations within the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda were still held to the universalist standards of an international trial.

The debate surrounding human rights in the international community risks painting universalism and cultural relativism as mutually exclusive. Gacaca courts in Rwanda were founded both on a strong base of international criticism for culturally relative judicial practices and a lack of international attention to the country’s post-genocidal judicial issues. While gacaca did not guarantee the international standards of a fair trial, it offered a solution to judicial gridlock and communal healing. In lieu of gacaca’s benefits, a lack of political will from the international community to stop the 1994 genocide combined with international criticism against Rwanda’s “homegrown solution” speaks to the aforementioned “moral imperialism” of universalism. The international community did not seek-out any solutions to the judicial gridlock within Rwanda’s civil justice system nor the slow pace and high cost of the ICTR. Even within the ICTR, the court’s “prime function [was] widely perceived to be the reaffirmation of the international community’s own morality...it is about symbol politics [...] which were] necessary in light of the total inaction of that same community during the genocide.”81 Still, upon the creation of legislation for gacaca, the international resistance to the communal justice system was widespread. Justifying the application of justice methods outside of
universally upheld norms, the use of tradition as rhetoric for implementing justice systems alternative to the international standards demands an alertness to “manipulations of a dying, lost, or even mythical cultural past…[only] tenous[ly] connect[ed] to the Indigenous culture.” Such rhetoric, including the proclamations of corrupt regimes arguing that universally applied human rights laws are inappropriate, allows for the imposition of a less-regulated justice system that can act in favour of the political party in power. Despite the flaws in some culturally relative justice systems, gacaca played a huge role in reconciling Rwandan society – allowing for community-led truth and reconciliation through testimony. The success of gacaca can be attributed to its position within Rwandan society as a long-standing tradition. The inability for universally enforced standards of a “fair trial,” largely rooted in Western culture, to be met within Rwanda due to structural and fiscal restraints raises the question: does the moral imperialism of radical universalism exist as a form of neo-colonialism? Escaping the grip of the international community, the success of Rwanda’s gacaca courts suggests that culturally relative justice techniques have the potential to aid in a country’s decolonization. This is not to say that any rejection of universally upheld standards of justice helps aid a country, particularly as the UDHR’s standards of a fair trial aim to protect people involved in the justice process. Furthermore, this is not a question of “either or” when discussing cultural relativism and universalism, but more so about how much each school of thought will dictate the practices in that country. In the words of Audre Lorde, “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house,” but perhaps they can be used to inspire a sustainable solution to a long standing problem.

**Conclusion: Freedom from the Past, Moving Forward Through Gacaca and Indigenization**

In what is definitively a Post-Colonial Era in Rwanda, gacaca has set a precedent in the international approach to justice, and the ability for individual countries to take care of their own affairs. As reviewed in the beginnings of this paper, post-colonialism does not necessarily guarantee decolonization, but rather makes the space for new epistemes to be challenged and naturalized. Finding the balance between hegemony and Indigenous knowledge systems, indigenization “does not mean changing something Western into something Indigenous…Rather, indigenization can be understood as the weaving or braiding together [of] two distinct knowledge systems so that [both can be] appreciated.” As a post-genocidal method of justice, gacaca formed a bridge between pre-colonial and post-colonial society while still adhering to the Western judicial tradition of retribution. In its execution, gacaca does not represent an outright rejection of universal practices, as it also does not represent a full revival of the pre-colonial system that was smothered by colonization. Rather, gacaca is a blend of two ways of being – balancing somewhere between a reclaimed pre-colonial Rwandan culture and the Western-inspired international systems of justice that are typically installed after mass human suffering. In approaching the question of decolonization, the revival of gacaca represents a multifaceted process of decolonization for Rwanda. While criticized for having flaws and violating the very international human rights that Rwanda had ratified, the readoption of gacaca worked to deconstruct colonial ideologies that champion the assumed superiority and privilege of Western culture, and reinstate a “homegrown solution” that departs from the Western-influenced international norms.

The age of imperialism has defined the power dynamics that are continually visible in the contemporary global community. Interactions and violence between states in the pursuit for raw resources and greater international power are fixtures of society; particularly as the colonization of Rwanda aimed not only to exploit the land for raw resources, but to also exploit the people of the region to make the reaping of
raw resources easier for the colonial power. While colonial processes are still ongoing, the historical legacies of colonization are often referenced as social fixtures needing to be rectified and challenged once a country gains its independence. In escaping these legacies, countries are able to achieve a degree of self-determination in which colonial superiority complexes no longer govern the country’s activities. Freedom from economic exploitation, freedom from colonial violence, and increased autonomy through state sovereignty grants countries a type of “decolonial” reality. The social infrastructure of pre-colonial Rwanda was re-evaluated and re-established by German and Belgian colonizers, leaving behind Christianity, Western-European national languages, and a high level of paternalism from European nations. Having overwhelmed the social infrastructure, religious practices, and cultural beliefs of pre-colonial Rwanda, gacaca demonstrated a revival of Rwandan culture that rejected many colonial era cultural fixtures. Departing from the Western inspired court systems left over from the German and Belgian presence in Rwanda, gacaca legitimized pre-colonial social systems within the post-colonial era. Therefore, the ability of gacaca to “decolonize” post-colonial Rwanda lies in its ability to “indigenize” Rwandan society – blending pre-colonial systems into the contemporary approach to justice and reconciliation after the genocide.

Western colonialism is rooted in conceptions of European superiority that have persisted into the modern day. As reviewed in Part II of this paper, international institutions have been criticized for failing to equally represent the interests of all countries involved. The push for international homogeneity is rooted in Western cultural superiority – a shared characteristic between the Western power dynamics and Western-based understandings of human rights are at the forefront of the “international community” – asserted regardless of cultural context. Contrasting universalism to cultural relativism, gacaca considers both schools of thought while favouring the culturally relative ability of Rwanda to determine itself. To escape the moral imperialism of a universalist mentality, gacaca was used as a decolonial tool to move beyond the established international norms bolstered by the Western community. Universalists would condemn gacaca for its human rights violation and inability to adhere to the international standards of fair trails, rather the rejection of Western paternalism and Western-backed homogeneity, contributing to the decolonial process of post-colonial Rwanda. While contemporary international power dynamics no longer look like the brutal colonial histories of the past, the consistent superiority of the West that is bolstered by international organizations and the remnants of colonial projects is directly challenged through gacaca. Rectifying the power imbalances caused by Western superiority, gacaca demonstrates a way forward for many post-colonial societies. In achieving decolonization, countries can find a new way forward from the trauma of the past, in a way that meets the culturally relevant needs of the society. Does decolonization mean rejecting all social fixtures rooted in colonization? No. But it does represent a reclamation of the past in a way that benefits contemporary society, and can be braided together with the practices of the international community. Gacaca, while both heavily criticized and, in many ways, highly effective, represents a duality in what can be achieved in the international community. There are therefore, ways to find a meeting point between opposing facets of the international community: cultural relativism and universalism, history and future, and Western and non-Western culture. Gacaca toes the line between concepts that at first seem mutually exclusive, but can be brought together as a representation of what post-colonial societies can achieve in the wake of social trauma.
References

7. Chitonge, “Trials of Incomplete...”
8. Ibid
11. Ibid
19. Gaparayi, “Justice and Social Reconstruction...”
21. Rutikanga, Rwandan Historical Overview...
24. Ibid
25. Rutikanga, Rwandan Historical Overview...
27. (Mason, 2012)
29. Barrette, “German Rwanda: The Overlooked Role...”
31. Ibid
34. Ibid
35. Meert, “The Philosophy of Colonialism...”
36. Republic of Rwanda, “The Unity of Rwandans...”
37. Ibid
39. Republic of Rwanda, “The Unity of Rwandans ….”
41. Ibid
43. Ibid
46. Ibid
49. Ibid
50. Republic of Rwanda, “The Unity of Rwandans ….”
53. Ibid
54. Ibid
57. Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda & Alphonse Muleefu, Revisiting the Legal…
58. Rutikanga, Rwandan Historical Overview…
59. Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda & Alphonse Muleefu, Revisiting the Legal…
60. Megan Westberg, “Rwanda’s Use of Transitional….”
62. Rutikanga, Rwandan Historical Overview…
63. Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda & Alphonse Muleefu, Revisiting the Legal…
64. Ibid
65. Ibid
66. Ibid
68. Ibid
69. Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda & Alphonse Muleefu, Revisiting the Legal…
70. Gaparayi, “Justice and Social Reconstruction…”
73. Ibid
74. Ibid
75. Jack Donnelly, “Cultural Relativism…”
76. Ibid
77. Pete McCormack & Jesse James Miller, dir. Uganda Rising…
78. Jack Donnelly, “Cultural Relativism…”
79. Pete McCormack & Jesse James Miller, dir. Uganda Rising…
81. Ibid
82. Jack Donnelly, “Cultural Relativism…”
The traffic was unusually light on this Thursday afternoon in downtown Yangon. Built sometime in the 1920s, the building shown here is a vestige of Burma’s colonial past and remnant of British 20th-century imperialism. Staring at this structure made me realize how much the world has changed in only one lifetime, for it was only seven decades ago that the Republic of the Union of Myanmar became an independent nation.

Photo by Patrick Clifford, Class of 2020, Public Policy and Political Science
Working for the Worker? A Study of the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT)

By Ava Erfani

Ava Erfani will graduate from UNC Chapel Hill in 2021 with majors in Political Science and Interdisciplinary Studies as well as a minor in Asian Studies. She designed her Interdisciplinary Studies major to focus on colonial and neocolonial relations, leading her to study the continuities and transformations between colonial, postcolonial, and contemporary political conditions across regions. Her time abroad in Tunisia inspired her to write “Working for the Worker” based on her study of regime transitions in Tunisian politics and her conversations with local Tunisians.

What does the existence of a national trade union mean? As a form, the institution rose in popularity and necessity after the Industrial Revolution, and its multinational presence has also depended on the simultaneous proliferation of the industrial sector in each country. As labor was forced into modernity via the leveraging of wages, so too was the work force galvanized to stave off the most glaring parts of industrial working conditions by means of the formation of trade and labor unions. The existence of a national trade/labor union in a modern state is no new concept; many developed countries have significant proportions of their working populations involved in a trade union. However, the efficacy and impact of these unions remains a point of contention.

This friction is particularly relevant in respect to the Arab Spring uprisings, which can be linked to a broader public rejection of neoliberal economics. My interest in this issue led me to study the Tunisian national trade union, the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT). As evidenced by the widespread protests leading to the Tunisian revolution in 2011, the Tunisian worker was not sufficiently aided by the efforts of the UGTT. However, the union (along with three other major civil society organizations) was entrusted with the task of establishing order in 2014 during a political crisis which threatened the democracy won by the Tunisian revolution. In the context of Tunisian labor relations and government power, I chose to examine the UGTT as both a wielder of citizens’ and the state’s faith: two forces which are often diametrically opposed yet find an ostensible confluence via the union.

Background

Tunisia’s history with trade unionism can be traced back to the origins of the decades-long independence movement against French occupation—an important relationship between the social and the political sphere that the trade union presently works to maintain. Before the creation of the UGTT, there existed first the Confédération Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (CGTT), a trade union founded in 1924 by Mohammad Ali al Hammi which aligned itself with the Tunisian nationalist and anti-colonial Destour party. This was the first
break from the French trade union, the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), to gain real autonomy on behalf of the Tunisian worker. The CGTT was quelled by the colonial authorities. Years later in 1946, Farhat Hached formally established the UGTT. From the start, the union’s goal was to advocate for both workers’ rights and Tunisia’s independence from France. This duality is important to note here as I aim to trace the organization to the post-modern age in which there is no longer a direct colonial influence to point to, rather multiple forms of control (governmental, international, etc.) which the union ostensibly aims to subvert.

As was the case for other countries in the Maghreb with a history of colonialism, the end of the colonial power did not lead to an increase in citizens’ power in the post-colonial state. In the absence of the French authority’s disciplinary control, power was simply transferred to new authoritarian (yet now described as “nationalist”) actors. The Neo-Destour party led the anti-colonial and nationalist effort to remove the French authority from Tunisia. After independence, this party assumed power. However, there was a large conflict within Neo-Destour, primarily between its top leaders: Habib Bourguiba and Salah Ben Youssef. Due to his willingness to accept the softer “autonomy” over independence, Bourguiba chose to work with the leading French authorities in the process of independence, while Youssef took a more radical approach. Eventually, Bourguiba’s influence won over Youssef’s and the former went on to become the first and longest President of Tunisia. Bourguiba also played a strong role in setting the tone of UGTT operations post-independence.

In order to understand the shifts that occurred in the UGTT post-revolution in 2011, it is helpful to understand how the union changed after independence and how it operated in the authoritarian regimes of both Habib Borguiba and Zine el Abidine Ben Ali. Much of the existing literature on the UGTT—particularly works written in or translated into English—focuses on its role in Tunisia’s revolution and the broader context of Arab Spring uprisings. For the scope of this study, however, it has been helpful to outline the nature of the UGTT pre-revolution and the ways in which its influence was both strengthened and limited by the authoritarian regimes under which it operated. This is a theme that was also echoed in each interview I conducted.

Issue 56 of the Anarcho-Syndicalist Review discusses the ways in which the UGTT was suppressed by both Bourguiba and Ben Ali in the article: “Tunisia’s UGTT: Caught between struggle & betrayal.” The Bourguiba years held their fair share of conflict between the UGTT and the state, but in the ’60s and ’70s the former was allowed a relatively large level of autonomy. This autonomy subsequently led to planned retaliations by the state against the workers. One essential source to this discussion can be found in Issue 67 of the Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP) Journal, which included a report on a UGTT strike in late January of 1978: “A general strike called by the half-strong Union générale des travailleurs tunisiens (UGTT) was met with violence by the regime. Army, police and paramilitary units joined in a general offensive against the workers, leaving more than two hundred dead and hundreds more injured and arrested.” While this report contextualizes the importance and danger of protesting with the UGTT, it also reveals looming disparities between the former and current images of the institution. Where a general strike would garner the response of state violence in 1978, today the same action is part of the sanctioned list of responses allowed by the government apparatus in response to economic discontent. This sort of clashing was not allowed to continue, however, in the Ben Ali era:

In 1989, Ben Ali’s regime imposed direct submission on the UGTT leadership, headed by Ismail Sahbani, who collaborated in the implementation of neoliberal economic policies and fiercely fought the union left...
the UGTT is a story of betrayal and maneuvering. From its support for Ben Ali’s candidacy in the elections of 2004 and 2009 to social welfare reform, from the implementation of neoliberal economic measures to their abandoning of the Gafsa UGTT activists, jailed during the 2008 uprising, when they limited themselves to a simple request for the release of the prisoners.\textsuperscript{16} The union’s alignment with the regime marks a shift in the ideological posture of the UGTT; rather than advocate for its rank-and-file members, the leadership rallied behind the top-down neoliberalism of Ben Ali.

In many ways, the union seems far from the description of a monolith. It is comprised of twenty-four regional unions, nineteen sector federations, and twenty-one general unions with a total of around 750,000 members from all geographic areas of Tunisia.\textsuperscript{17} This regional component of diversity is a widely celebrated attribute of the union that is rare for many civil society organizations, which in turn fosters the public’s trust in the institution. Even so, in the Post-Democracy Era there remains the question of how much the UGTT can truly accomplish on behalf of the worker, especially when the country faces difficult economic conditions.\textsuperscript{18} It is often credited for “stabilization” post-revolution and the prevention of total state control by the Islamic party à la the 1979 Iranian revolution. In this way, it is viewed as a worthy representative of the Tunisian people based on its ability to uphold and protect the democracy that they were protesting for in 2011. However, the same economic symptoms which persisted before the 2011 revolution continue to exist today, so it remains to be seen whether authoritarianism is truly what was holding the UGTT back from affecting a stronger position for labor in Tunisia.

**Methodology Overview**

This research is based primarily on interviews as well as scholarly sources, some of which outline the history of Tunisia and the trade union movement, and others which discuss the politics in post-revolution Tunisia. I conducted a series of four interviews with Tunisians living in Northern Tunisia during the fall of 2019. These interviews were conducted with two members of the UGTT as well as two non-members. Interviews conducted with members were completed in French/Arabic with the aid of a translator, while the interviews with non-members of the union were conducted in English. I was able to interview the members of the UGTT thanks to the connections of my professor, Mounir Khelifa, and my advisor, Rached Khalifa. My advisor also connected me with one of the non-member interviewees, a female master’s student who was enrolled in his graduate seminar. The questioning for the interviews done with members of the UGTT differed from the questions asked of non-members. The purpose of interviewing non-members was largely to determine a sense of public perception rather than institutional or official knowledge about the inner structure/working of the organization.

Further, I was able to contextualize my findings based on a series of lectures attended in September and October 2019 via SIT’s academic program and the course “Politics, Civil Society, and Migration in Tunisia.” This course provided me with a broad historical background regarding the politics of Tunisia, especially regarding the forces that both pushed the revolution in 2011 and facilitated the formation of government and order following the revolution. A program visit to the Forum Tunisien pour les Droits Économique et Sociaux (FTDES), a Tunisian NGO formed after the revolution to organize social and political movements, also aided me in understanding how the civil society sector is related to the UGTT as well as the government. I utilized this visit in particular to inquire about the manner in which jobs are created and provided in Tunisia by the government and the role of UGTT influence. The representative of the FTDES whom we met with was extremely helpful in providing this information. From this conversa-
tion, it seemed that FTDES, though its organizational history is much shorter, faced a similar dilemma as the UGTT insofar as it created both an avenue for people to organize and a simultaneous entrenchment of the status quo which allowed—and perhaps encouraged—this sort of sanctioned form of protest.

Concerns

Of course, this study must not be taken as representative of the Tunisian public or be generalized to make assumptions beyond the scope of the paper. Rather, this study can be used to further general discussion on the efficacy of the UGTT and how it operates in the socio-political space of Tunisia’s democracy. Multiple factors served as ethical concerns in the process of this research. The existence of a short time-frame to complete the interviews, as well as an effective language barrier, made it difficult to recruit interviewees and/or set up times for interviews that would be convenient for the interviewee, myself, and possibly a translator if needed. Thus, I was largely reliant on existing contacts in the Tunis area to find possible interviewees, introducing bias in my sample in terms of region and, likely, social status. These same biases exist due to the fact that no Tunisians living in southern Tunisia were represented in this research, even though some interviewees were originally from the South.

Research Findings

I will present the interviews I conducted in two major parts. I will present the perspectives of those who were involved in the UGTT directly in order to give a deeper understanding of how the union operates. My goal during these interviews was to understand the more logistical aspects of membership and the structure of the union, and subsequently to inquire about the political reach and aims of the UGTT from the perspective of a current and former member. Secondly, I will present interviews with those who were not directly involved in the union so as to present a more general discussion of the influence and power of the UGTT, even to those who are not directly impacted by it via membership. My primary objective during these interviews was to openly question the interviewees about their experience or their thoughts regarding the UGTT from their respective positions.

Members

1. Involvement

The first two interviews were with Youssef Khelifa, a lecturer at the Higher Institute of Design of Tunis, and Tahar Labassi, a linguistics professor at the University of Tunis and also the former Chief of Staff of the Minister of the Department of Education in Tunisia. Khelifa had made a request to become a member of the UGTT in 2005; in order to join, he had to win favor in elections at the Higher Institute of Design. He was elected as a basic member in 2006. Khelifa was involved in the principal syndicalist sector of higher education and continues to work in this capacity as of the publication date of this paper. He describes his work with the union as generally low-maintenance, with the exception of election periods and more charged political climates—the zenith of these being the political climate during the 2011 revolution. Labassi had no official role in the UGTT at the time of the interview, but had been involved at the highest levels of the organization since 2002. He became Vice Secretary General of the trade union of teachers and a member of the national council of trade union university teachers during his time of involvement before stepping down in 2014. He continued to work with the UGTT following 2014 as a consultant.

2. Perception

Khelifa began by qualifying his view of his membership: that it was beneficial “psychologically” but not “financially” (though he said that he enjoys it because of this reason). He highlighted the importance and power of the union: when we talk about what strikes or movements can take place, the UGTT is quite important because it can decide the level of success due to its ties with influential people in the government. Under the old regimes, the organization was not “too free to
advocate for workers, but now, it is more free" to conduct its work. Before the revolution under Ben Ali and Bourguiba, there were acts of violence and armed, bloody conflicts between the UGTT and the state. Now that democracy has been achieved, there is no longer this sort of conflict. Khelifa lamented the fact that, though the UGTT has more power, the workers of Tunisia are suffering more than they were before the revolution due to a horde of economic reasons.

He discussed the ways in which there was “certainly a change [in the UGTT] especially with the new emergence of Islamist parties” post-revolution. Here, he pointed to what he called the real function and strength of the UGTT: to defend and secure modernity for the country. To Khelifa, the UGTT aims to protect and make a consensus between the Islamist and Modernist parties. This is why, he said, the UGTT worked against the Islamists after the revolution in order to stabilize the country. The UGTT supported many of the uprising movements at the time, so the government had to take it seriously due to the weight of the organization. The leadership works with both labor and the government, but from Khelifa’s point of view, the first objective is always to protect workers’ rights.

Labassi had a more critical perception of the UGTT, which he attributed to his former degree of involvement in and now relative freedom from the organization. He described the union as the only space where real politics was possible under the Ben Ali regime, though it was always committed to the upholding of the state. He admitted that today there is a question of whether or not the organization is actually a hindrance. He also described the nature of the UGTT’s negotiations with the government, which usually operates by dealing with ministers of various departments of government. These ministers would often sign agreements with the UGTT that would purportedly meet the demands of workers, but due to the high turnover rate of ministers they knew that the onus would fall on a successive minister and likely not be upheld. He did not place all the blame on this pattern, noting that the government is under great economic pressure due to a lack of means. However, the UGTT faces pressure itself from the working class as the economic situation worsens while the cost of living rises.

Labassi’s main qualm with the UGTT was in its failure (or as he called it, refusal) to change post-revolution. To him, changing means working as a trade union should work in a traditional democracy. He believed that the UGTT does not want to change because it is in a rather favorable position: it has an effective monopoly on unionism in the country. The government cannot give other trade unions many rights; the UGTT has made it so that only its own organization can win any favor in the eyes of the government. Labassi pointed to the UGTT’s failure to support the initial protests for the 2011 revolution, which began in the south of Tunisia. The union chose to side with the existing regime at the time. However, the UGTT is also not officially part of the government. It plays a quasi-governmental role, and this is likely where it prefers to stay, according to Labassi. He believed that the union should embrace a role in national politics and move towards the path of official institutionalization on the federal level.

Non-Members

1. Involvement

I interviewed Lassaad Bouattour, a civil servant working for the Ministry of Finance in Tunisia, and Rawe Khefi, a master’s student at the Université de Tunis el Manar within the Higher Institute of Human Sciences. Khefi had a background in unionism in her undergraduate years, though not through the UGTT. Neither had any direct relationship with the UGTT, meaning that they were not nor had ever been part of the union, and did not know anyone beyond the level of acquaintance who was involved with the union.

2. Perception

Bouattour outlined his major thoughts via a short history of the
UGTT’s activity since Tunisia’s colonial period. He acknowledged it had a strong effect in the turn of independence. The syndicalist movement was threatening to the colonial powers—this, according to Bouattour, is why Farhat Hached was assassinated, an act which immortalized the UGTT as a symbol for the national spirit. After independence, he noted, the Neo-Destour party and the UGTT viewed themselves as co-managers of the country—while this led to some clashes, the sharing of power was largely peaceful. Ben Ali was more authoritarian; Bouattour emphasized that the president was dealing with not one, but two major entities that often opposed him: the UGTT and the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI). Ben Ali would pick sides between UGTT and Islamists when it was convenient. Around 1991, however, Ben Ali became more hostile towards the UGTT, insisting that the union would need to operate on his terms and that he would choose the members of its leadership.

Bouattour became most critical of the union when discussing the education sector. As a father himself, he remarked that the UGTT’s education sector union is “an enemy of any mother/father in Tunisia,” especially after mass strikes by education workers last year. He also said that, today, the main way to get power is through the UGTT, while under Ben Ali similar benefits such as wage increases or job opportunities would come from membership in the party. Ultimately, he lauded the UGTT for its role in stabilizing the government post-revolution, but believed that they should not take their activities too far in the political or social realm in order for the country to be able to grow economically.

Khéfi held a significantly different view of the UGTT as compared to Bouattour. As someone who has been involved in leftist political movements for years in Tunisia, she hesitated to refer to the UGTT with total positivity. She did echo some of the major popular sentiments, like how the union was forced to conform to the state’s demands under Bourguiba and Ben Ali. She pointed out that they were able to gain some power during the Bread Riots in which they faced violence due to the protests that they were involved in. Khéfi felt that the union generally stood up for the people against the government, and that the people do not forget it.

However, she criticized the union for its failure to support the miners’ protests in Gafsa in 2008 and the initial seeds of revolutionary protests as well. She praised its ability to prevent the Islamist parties from gaining too much power after the revolution and said that it was clearly committed to upholding the “Tunisian way of life.” Fundamentally, Khéfi saw the UGTT as remaining more pro-government than pro-people following the revolution, and criticized its passivity regarding politics particularly after the Quartet period of 2014. For these reasons, she did not think the UGTT would become popular among her generation as an avenue for activism or as a movement.

Discussion and Analysis

A certain repetition took place during the course of each interview, wherein the interviewee would feel it necessary to outline the history of the UGTT/Tunisia before beginning to describe their own perception of the institution and/or how they were involved. Each gave a similar story of Tunisia’s history since the colonial period, though each differed in their explanations of why certain movements proceeded while others failed (e.g. Gafsa riots in 2008 vs. the Kasbah protests of 2011). This pattern made sense—it is difficult to say what exactly the UGTT is or does without discussing its history. The past of the UGTT is precisely why it is valued as an institution in the Tunisian collective consciousness today. Though all the interviewees had different political leanings, they followed some similarities in their beliefs, especially that the government must continue on a secular path and that the UGTT was helpful in this endeavor.

Each was concerned by the threat of major Islamic political and social forces, the most prominent being the Ennahda political party which won the highest percentage of votes.
in the last parliamentary elections.\textsuperscript{31}

The difficulty in assessing the UGTT is multifaceted. The organization has a long and diverse history which makes it difficult to tie to a coherent ethos over time, particularly due to the various treatment it has faced under multiple regimes and the various ways it chose to act under these regimes. The aim of this study is to attempt to accurately assess the union on both its own terms and on the terms to which the people of Tunisia hold it. To categorize it via a traditional left vs. right dichotomy or the basic movement of state actors as the abstraction of the citizenry would be a mistake, as some have done.\textsuperscript{32} This would ignore the entire basis of the union as well as a larger critique of power from perspectives outside of the bipolar political field.

As some interviewees mentioned, the ability of the union has depended on the environment around it. For Khelifa and Labassi, the UGTT is a strong if not the strongest Tunisian institution and should be strengthened in the democratic era in order to be even more effective. Labassi saw the union moving forward as a political party and taking on the responsibility that comes with governance rather than needing to negotiate as a civil society group. To Khefi, who identifies as a leftist, the UGTT did not do enough for the worker, and it was unclear at best whether the union is suited to take on the post-modern socioeconomic problems which the youth of Tunisia distinctly face.\textsuperscript{33} However, to Bouattour, the UGTT is too tyrannical in its measures to advocate for workers’ wages. It is these conflicting narratives that make it necessary to remove the lens of electoral politics in order to observe the kind of organization that the UGTT is, or appears to be. In this analysis, I valued the perception rather than some measure of “true” existence because of my interest in how the citizens of Tunisia view the strength of class movements. Further, it is unclear whether the UGTT can be objectively defined.\textsuperscript{34} My purpose was to explore the effect of power and proximity to the state in an effort to fight for workers via a union organization.

**Barriers**

In addition to the aforementioned difficulties, if this research was to be continued and expanded, it would be helpful to be able to speak to current members of the executive board of the UGTT. This allows for an additional level of perception which would contextualize the union more directly. Further, it would be useful to gather perceptions from those outside of the Tunis area, particularly in regions such as Gafsa, Sidi Bouzid, Gabes, etc. where the 2011 revolution began and where the socioeconomic conditions differ. An increase in interviews with the inclusion of more demographics would aid this research as well. Moreover, in all such interactions, the presence of a reliable translator (or the personal development of Tunisian Arabic/French fluency) would be extremely important to reduce as much of the language barrier as possible. A translator would also be advantageous for reading sources and texts relating to the UGTT.

**Conclusion**

Though my collection of interviews were limited in quantity, they provided me with a wide range of perspectives on the UGTT. These perspectives should not be used to reflect the actual and exact sentiments of all Tunisian people towards the union, but can be useful in a discourse regarding the UGTT and a broader discourse surrounding the ethics and efficacy of national unions. This allowed me to develop a more extensive comprehension of how the union is perceived. The UGTT is in quite a unique position, whether viewed as a national union, political institution, civil society group, etc. However, in the Post-Democratic era, the UGTT does not seem to use its advantages to change the material conditions for workers—purchasing power is low, and social unrest is high. This begs the question: is the union purposefully avoiding a more radical approach to maintain its power status à la Michels’ Iron Law of Oligarchy,\textsuperscript{35} or does it believe that its strategy is truly the most effective for its aims? These are vital questions that
are highly relevant to the exploration and imagination of the realm of possibilities that the UGTT can either create for Tunisia, or hinder.

References


4. For a broader discussion of what is meant here by the term “power” and how it is exercised, see: Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power.” Critical Inquiry 8, no. 4 (1982): 777–95, https://doi.org/10.1086/448181.

5. The effects of French colonialism can be expanded upon in multiple volumes, but for the purposes of this research, I am interested in the impacts of French colonialism on the political structure of Tunisia post-independence as well as how this structure impacted the creation and development of the UGTT.


8. Successor to the Destour party of the pre-1930s era.


17. Hèla Yousfi, Trade Unions and Arab Revolutions: the Tunisian Case of UGTT, 1.


20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Labassi saw the new political Islamists parties as trying to “take Tunisia backwards”


25. . As opposed to an established political party such as the Labour Party in the UK.

26. Former leader of the UGTT during the independence movement.

27. Though there has been no conclusive investigation, it is largely believed that the armed French organization La Main Rouge was responsible for the attack on Hached, whose death is commemorated every year in Tunisia.


34. Yousfi’s Trade Unions and Arab Revolutions: the Tunisian Case of UGTT would likely go the farthest in this endeavor, at least in English-language sources.

This picture shows the Great Mosque in the Medina of Sousse, a city on the coast of Central Tunis. Will Rowe traveled there during February 2020, while studying abroad in France.

Photo by Wilson Rowe, Class of 2021, Peace, War and Defense and Global Studies Major with a French Minor
An Analysis of Zimbabwean Health Crises Since Independence

By James McClure

James McClure is a student at UNC, double majoring in Global Studies and Public Policy, with a minor in French. Within these majors, his focus is on Global Health Policy and the region of sub-Saharan Africa. His submission analyzes the Zimbabwean government’s response to a variety of health crises since their independence.

In 2007, the lowest average female life expectancy in the world was Zimbabwe, at just thirty-four years of age. However, over the span of the last decade the estimated female life expectancy has risen to sixty-four years. From these measures, we can assume that the quality of life for Zimbabweans has significantly improved in the last decade, yet quantitative data does not paint the entire picture. Today Zimbabwe remains the eighth highest Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)-prevalent nation in the world, despite a drop from twenty-nine to fifteen percent in the infection rate since its peak in 1997. A full understanding of the seriousness of Zimbabwe’s health crisis requires examination of the history of Zimbabwe, changes in its political leadership, and governmental response to various disease outbreaks. While Zimbabwean life expectancy and health outcomes have improved since the 2007 lows, high rates of infectious disease and malnutrition remain due to gross incompetence by former president Robert Mugabe, as well as continuing economic hyperinflation and instability. Recurring authoritarian tendencies of current president Emmerson Mnangagwa suggest that he is likely to repeat the same mistakes as Mugabe.

Historically, the nation of Zimbabwe has experienced detrimental setbacks since the creation of a state with adequate health resources. First colonized by the British empire as the colony of Rhodesia, Zimbabwe became an independent nation after a 1965 revolution led by the whitesettler class and their prime minister, Ian Smith. Under Smith’s rule, Black Zimbabweans suffered from “nutritional deficiencies, communicable diseases and problems associated with pregnancy.” “Structures of racial domination”, which primarily consisted of government health spending inequality between Black-majority and White-majority areas of Zimbabwe, reinforced racially-stratified patterns of disease. Private medical services, used primarily by White Zimbabweans, received nearly five times as much funding than public medical services in urban areas and roughly thirty-six times more funding than public medical services in rural areas. White minority rule occurred in international isolation and continued until Robert Mugabe led the Black Zimbabwean majority in a civil war against the ruling government in 1975. In 1983, Mugabe was successful over Smith’s regime and declared official independence for Zimbabwe from the White Rhodesians.

In the 1980s, Mugabe and his government were able to construct a healthcare system in Zimbabwe that was considered a “model for Africa.” According to a 1990 report on health post-independence in Zimbabwe, the setting of a national...
minimum wage was the most important reform made under Mugabe to positively influence health. Other important policy changes included subsidies on basic food, expansion of public schools, free health care provided for those making below the minimum wage, the creation of more rural health facilities, increased commitment to the vaccination of major childhood diseases, and the formation of specified national departments to address malnutrition and diarrheal diseases. The report concluded that these health improvements “removed the worst nutritional and communicable disease effects of a settler colonial state,” and that this new health system showed “national commitment towards destroying the old order of racist and undemocratic health care institutions.” While trends of health funding disparities between rural and urban areas during the 1980s remain ingrained in government health policy, Mugabe’s reforms saw significant improvement to healthcare under former ruler Ian Smith. Proper maintenance of the national healthcare system continued into the 1990s, until political instability and economic failure in the late 1990s and early 2000s led to the system’s downturn.

In 2000, Mugabe began encouraging land invasions of White farms in order to scapegoat the remaining White population for economic problems in Zimbabwe and consolidate a majority within his party. The invasions created instability and rendered farming impossible, which in turn triggered “a humanitarian crisis in which more than half of the population needed food aid.” Government land redistribution programs under Mugabe failed to provide land invaders with the proper tools and materials needed to farm, resulting in a ninety percent decrease in the production of corn and wheat. The collapse of productivity in these farms, as well as gross corruption within the Mugabe regime, caused sustained hyperinflation, which plagues the Zimbabwean economy to this day.

As Zimbabwe’s economy contracted, Mugabe began to experience more feelings of political vulnerability and lashed out at any group he viewed as his opposition. Attacks by Mugabe’s “Youth Militias” against doctors providing treatment for political opposition members caused thousands of doctors to flee Zimbabwe. In 2008, only twenty-five percent of positions for doctors were filled in the state health system due to fear of political oppression. Inflation also made conditions for doctors who remained in Zimbabwe more dangerous, as most hospitals were no longer able to provide healthcare professionals with adequate amounts of gloves or sanitized equipment, putting them at higher risk of contracting blood-borne diseases such as HIV.

HIV remains one of the most pressing and harmful medical crises in Zimbabwe. As of 2017, HIV/AIDS is the leading cause of death and disability in Zimbabwe, with a prevalence rate of 12.7 percent among adults. While Zimbabwe has the ninth highest HIV death rate on the planet, significant improvements have been made in decreasing infection counts in the last decade. In 2008, Zimbabwe experienced the peak of its HIV/AIDS crisis, with a total national adult prevalence of 33 percent. Death rates were worsened by a lack of access to antiretroviral drugs, as the government was not able to consistently produce these medications. The limited drugs available were oftentimes distributed to Mugabe regime loyalists and army officers of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) Party, which forced hundreds of HIV-positive Zimbabweans to travel to Mozambique to receive antiretrovirals. Mugabe’s dictatorial governing style also reduced the amount of international aid received in Zimbabwe to combat the crisis.

While many Southern African countries received loans totaling upwards of $150 million from the World Bank in 2004 to finance HIV treatment, Zimbabwe received only $4 million. The Global Fund to fight AIDS also rejected the majority of Zimbabwe’s funding proposals of the same year.

Social stigma is another factor that worsens the burden of HIV in Zimbabwe, particularly for the LGBTQ+ population. Beginning in the late 1990s, during Mugabe's
period of political fragility, he continually condemned homosexuality as a “repugnant offense.” Mugabe’s statements contributed to the existing taboos surrounding homosexuality in Zimbabwean society, which created more barriers to HIV care for LGBTQ+ populations in Zimbabwe. A 2017 study by Jennifer Hunt found that LGBTQ+ Zimbabweans and sex workers in Zimbabwe are adversely impacted by doctors’ inaccurate perceptions of their sexual and gender identity, where “equal access to care” is “dependent on conforming to ‘sexual norms.” One lesbian woman even described that doctors were “afraid to touch” her when giving care. While HIV is a significant challenge for people of all walks of life in Zimbabwe, cultural prejudices against LGBTQ+ gender and sexual identities by healthcare providers remain a significant challenge to this marginalized population.

Reduction in HIV prevalence rates since 2007 is mainly unassociated with government intervention. Experts claim that community-based behavior change primarily accounts for the reduction of HIV infection, as many adults between the ages of twenty and twenty-five delay sexual activity in response to the high death and infection rates. One government policy success came from an initiative known as the “National Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission Program.” In 2004, the government expanded the production of antiretroviral drugs, specifically for HIV-positive mothers. This intervention proved to be successful, as infant mortality decreased from 102 deaths per 1000 births to 82 deaths per 1000 births by 2006. Recent estimates show a continued positive trend in infant mortality from lowering of mother-to-child HIV transmission rates, with a predicted infant mortality of 56 deaths per 1000 births in 2017.

Tuberculosis (TB) persists as another significant factor in the causation of negative health outcomes in Zimbabwe. TB is the third highest cause of death and the second highest cause of premature death in the nation. Compared to the rest of the world, Zimbabwe has the highest TB infection rate per capita. HIV infection is a risk factor in the contraction of TB, as nearly seventy-five percent of people with TB in Zimbabwe are also infected with HIV. The increase in the prevalence of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR TB) in Zimbabwe has made the persistence of this disease more difficult to combat. Government inattention to MDR TB surveillance is correlated with the decline of the national healthcare infrastructure, as oversight of MDR TB infection was last performed by the Zimbabwean government in 1995. In a 2012 study on TB cases in hospitals in the capital of Harare, nearly one-fourth of TB patients were infected with MDR TB. While the study only analyzed a small sample of eighty-four patients, the researchers stated the urgency of “a comprehensive response” to MDR TB by the Zimbabwean government, as the prevalence of MDR TB nationally could be even higher than in this sample.

In addition to ongoing tuberculosis outbreaks, the persistence of cholera reveals the ineptitude of Zimbabwean political leaders in addressing health crises. In 2008, an outbreak of cholera in Zimbabwe resulted in nearly 100,000 cases and more than 4,000 deaths over a period of ten months. The epidemic was worsened by the politicization of sanitation infrastructure by the ZANU-PF party. After the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party won numerous majorities in the 2005 parliamentary elections, ruling ZANU-PF politicians nationalized municipal water supply in areas of MDC support. Consequently, the price of accessing water rose and sanitation infrastructure was neglected in these areas, particularly in Harare. As sanitation systems deteriorated, cholera-inducing bacteria grew in the water supply. The neglect of water supply continued even after the onset of the 2008 epidemic, and Harare’s water supply was cut off in November 2008. Zimbabwe’s health system was also under strain during the outbreak, due to Mugabe’s failure to acknowledge the severity of the crisis. Rather than making a call for international donations to address cholera when cases were con-
firmed in Harare, Mugabe waited for four months, claiming publicly that there was “no cholera in Zimbabwe” even after his health minister had declared a crisis.\textsuperscript{28} Despite an official end to the epidemic in 2009, doctors in Harare report that the city still experiences regular outbreaks of cholera due to lack of maintenance of sewage and water infrastructure.\textsuperscript{29}

Since the 2008 epidemic, mass vaccination campaigns have been the Zimbabwean government’s primary policy solution to the recurring threat of cholera. Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Health declared another cholera outbreak in 2018 in Harare, totaling 8535 total cases and fifty deaths. While the severity of the crisis was significantly less than the 2008 epidemic, poor management of water infrastructure by the municipal government remained the primary causal factor. A vaccination campaign began in Harare and the surrounding region soon after the declaration of the outbreak, where over 2.7 million vaccines were produced for two rounds of the campaign. With support from the World Health Organization, the United Nations Children’s Fund, Oxfam, and other non-governmental organizations, the government was able to construct four cholera treatment centers in Harare and distribute sanitation and other non-food items to impacted areas.\textsuperscript{30} Government response was more rapid and efficient than during the 2008 epidemic. The mass vaccination campaign in 2018 occurred less than a month after the first cases were discovered, while in 2008, Mugabe did not even acknowledge there was an epidemic after his own health minister stated so. Timely acknowledgement of the crisis also allowed the government to quickly appeal for international aid, which likely mitigated the negative health consequences of the outbreak in comparison to 2008.

Environmental disasters have only worsened Zimbabwe’s public health crisis response. In March 2019, Cyclone Idai ravaged Southern Africa and displaced thousands of people in the region. A consequence of cyclone-induced flooding was the possibility of the return of cholera after the outbreak just a year earlier, as well as other infectious diseases prevalent in Zimbabwe such as typhoid fever and malaria.\textsuperscript{31} The government began another mass vaccination campaign for cholera in April 2019 primarily targeting the most severely affected districts of Chimanimani and Chipinge. International aid was utilized once again, as United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), Doctors Without Borders, and the Red Cross were instrumental in the creation of nearly one million doses of the oral vaccine, which were administered in two rounds to grant full immunity to recipients of the vaccine.\textsuperscript{32} One difficulty in vaccine administration was that rural road networks connected the districts of Chimanimani and Chipinge to the rest of Zimbabwe were decimated from flooding after the cyclone. In order to deliver the vaccines to the districts, public health officials had to use helicopters, and were limited to only thirty minutes on the ground for each of the target areas.\textsuperscript{33} These challenges highlight the continuing urban-rural disparity that exists regarding access to healthcare services.

At the onset of independence, the Mugabe regime prioritized maternal and child healthcare improvement. During Zimbabwe’s colonial era, maternal malnutrition was extremely prevalent, as it contributed to “low birth weight in ten to twenty percent of all births”, causing newborns to be more vulnerable to “more severe and often fatal infections.”\textsuperscript{34} After the creation of the national primary care program in 1980, the maternal mortality rate fell by twenty-eight percent by 1983.\textsuperscript{35} While post-independence maternal health gains were significant during the 1980s, they quickly eroded as economic hyperinflation and ruthless authoritarian leadership plagued Zimbabwe from the late 1990s onwards. According to a 2010 demographic survey in Zimbabwe, “maternal and child health has stagnated in recent years”, with stalling or downturn of the child mortality rate since the mid-2000s.\textsuperscript{36} High rates of malaria and HIV are significant burdens on the health of mothers in Zimbabwe. A 2003 report on maternal health
in Northern Zimbabwe implicated malaria and HIV in the high rates of “preterm delivery, low birth weight, stillbirth, or neonatal mortality.”

While the researchers recommended the use of antimalarial and antiretroviral treatments to address the possibility of mother-to-child transmission of these diseases, the Zimbabwean government has not been able to produce these medications on a consistent basis, mainly due to the costs of production in a state of economic hyperinflation.

Compared to the rest of sub-Saharan and northern Africa, Zimbabwe is an outlier in negative health outcomes due to its high HIV death and prevalence rates, as well as the continuing pervasiveness of vaccinatable diseases such as TB and cholera. Within Africa, only the nations of South Africa, Mozambique, Nigeria, Zambia, and Kenya surpass or compare to Zimbabwe in the infection count and death rate of HIV, according to 2018 estimates. Even in comparison with the handful of nations that are on par with Zimbabwe in HIV counts, Zimbabwe leads the world in TB deaths and TB-induced disability. While Zimbabwe was viewed as a progressive African state in the 1980s due to its healthcare model and improvements in disease and maternal health outcomes, rapid decline of medical infrastructure places Zimbabwe far above world averages in infection and death count for highly preventable and treatable diseases.

After close inspection of Zimbabwe’s major health problems mentioned in this paper, several trends emerge to cause these difficulties. The main explanation for Zimbabwe’s health woes is continued inattention and strain placed upon the once-advanced national health program, primarily by former president Robert Mugabe. During his peak of political fragility in the early to mid-2000s, inducing attacks on doctors by youth militias, the lack of doctors in Zimbabwe was so significant that there were “only 800 registered doctors in the country.” A lack of doctors impacts all areas of health, and legacies of this problem exist in all sectors of healthcare in Zimbabwe today. Mugabe’s pattern of politicizing and downplaying disease emergencies, such as the 2008 cholera epidemic and the 2007 HIV crisis, worsened the effects of these incidents and reduced the potential for receiving significant aid donations from international organizations. Economic mismanagement and corruption occurring under the watch of Mugabe also exacerbated the intense downturn of healthcare. Continuing hyperinflation has led to difficulties in government production of medications for HIV and malaria. Financial distress also contributes to the decline of the national education system, which has in turn limited the training of doctors in Zimbabwe to address shortages. Only time will tell if future leaders can overcome the disastrous health legacy that Mugabe created.

Moving forward, it will be up to the political leadership of recently elected president Emmerson Mnangagwa to determine if Zimbabwe will see improvements in health outcomes. Upon election, Mnangagwa’s promise to the Zimbabwean people was that he would take the country in “a new direction.” In his first three years of president, Mnangagwa has only accomplished this objective to a limited degree. Since promising to change the autocratic nature of the presidency in Zimbabwe, Mnangagwa “continues to prevent and violently suppress political protests” and keep the media “heavily biased in favor of the ruling party.” Many Zimbabweans even view Mnangagwa’s governing style as even more repressive than Mugabe, as more than twenty citizens have been killed and over 1,000 arrested since the beginning of Mnangagwa’s rule. These killings are especially concerning because Mnangagwa already resembles Mugabe at the end of his rule, despite being just barely three years into his first term. Economic reforms have also been few and far between, with “a brief government surplus” and “the introduction of a new currency aimed at curbing inflation” serving as the only significant changes made since Mnangagwa took power. Currently the Zimbabwean economy is close to entering a total state of disrepair, with shortages and basic resources that resemble the economic
crisis in the early 2000s, according to political scientist Andrew Noyes. The COVID-19 pandemic is also likely to place pressure on the continually strained healthcare system in Zimbabwe, especially with the high population of HIV-positive, immunosuppressed people in the country. Without any promise of commitment to improving the national healthcare infrastructure, it seems that president Mnagagwa will continue the same trend of complete disregard for healthcare as Mugabe, at the expense of the Zimbabwean people.

References

5. Ibid
6. Ibid
8. Andrew Meldrum, “Zimbabwe’s healthcare,” 1059-1060
10. Ibid
11. David Sanders, “Equity in Health,” 19
15. Andrew Meldrum, “Zimbabwe’s healthcare,” 1059-1060
17. Andrew Meldrum, “Zimbabwe’s healthcare,” 1059-1060
18. Ibid
21. Ibid, 6
22. Andrew Meldrum, “Zimbabwe’s healthcare,” 1059-1060
23. Andrew Meldrum, “Zimbabwe’s healthcare,” 1059-1060
28. Ibid
34. David Sanders, “Equity in Health,” 6
38. Andrew Meldrum, “Zimbabwe’s healthcare,” 1059-1060
40. Andrew Meldrum, “Zimbabwe’s healthcare,” 1059-1060
42. Alexander Noyes, “A New Zimbabwe?” xi
43. Alexander Noyes, “A New Zimbabwe?” xi
44. Ibid
This photo portrays the view from a café in Baščaršija—the oldest part of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. While living in Sarajevo during her gap year, Emma Holmes loved Baščaršija and the Ottoman-styled buildings with the specific roofing style as seen here. And Baščaršija Mosque, like many other religious buildings, is a defining feature in Sarajevo’s landscape.

Photo by Emma Holmes, Class of 2024, Global Studies and Asian Studies
Ideology, Narrative, and Adaptation: A Case Study of the Soviet War Memorials in Berlin

By Collins Alexander

Collins Alexander is a Peace, War & Defense and Global Studies double major who will be graduating in May 2021. His research interests include election security, information warfare, Central Asia, and counterterrorism. He wrote this piece for a history seminar about monuments and memory. He wrote about Soviet World War II memorials in Berlin because he visited them in person last December and thought it was bizarre that they were still standing.

Berlin has a tumultuous past, having been the capital of Prussia and the German empire before the democratic Weimar Republic, overtaken by Nazi Germany, followed by the Iron Curtain’s divide, and finally a unified modern Germany. Berlin’s public space reflects its volatile history.1 Street names, buildings, and monuments document the rise and fall of Germany over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

In the wake of the Second World War, the Soviet Union constructed three memorials honoring fallen Red Army soldiers in Berlin. The intention was to impose messages of victory, sacrifice, and ideological superiority onto the German population. They also celebrated the idealized “Great Patriotic War” – a Soviet collective memory meant to legitimize control and unify its people. Decades later, the collapse of communism challenged the monuments’ purpose by extinguishing the ideology they originally memorialized. In examining the post-communist and contemporary contexts of the memorials, this paper intends to answer how the Soviet Union is memorialized in Berlin.

Ideology, wartime experience, and symbolic location were significant factors contributing to the Soviet decision to erect war memorials in Berlin. The fierce rivalry between communism and fascism had a profound impact on twentieth century European affairs. From an outsider’s lens in the 1920s, fascism and communism seemed remarkably similar. Seizures of power in Italy, Germany, and the Soviet Union occurred within years of one another.2 They also appeared to share totalitarian ruling styles, manipulating the masses and violently suppressing dissent.3

However, substantial ideological differences drove communism and fascism against one another domestically. Each party’s extreme beliefs generated polarization and a “revolutionary rivalry.”4 To demonstrate their ideological superiority, states enacted measures to undermine their ideological rivals. Examples include Mussolini’s ban on the Italian Communist Party in 1926 and widespread use of propaganda.5 On the international stage, this rivalry was not immediate, as relations remained cordial for some time. Nonetheless, steps taken internally to quash rival ideologies laid the
framework for later external conflict.

Though government control quelled internal challenges to power, external security concerns exacerbated tensions in three instances. First, Adolph Hitler’s ascent to power in the 1930s frightened Soviet leaders. It showed the Soviets that fascism would not limit itself to developing states and pushed them to seek more collective security.6 The Soviet view of fascism’s expansionary desires reinforced their perception of Hitler as an existential threat. Second, the Spanish Civil War was the first example of direct struggle between communists and fascists. The Soviets displayed aversion to war by electing not to match German and Italian intervention for fear of further escalating violence.7 Finally, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 revealed different levels of understanding and trust. Hitler believed the Pact attained Soviet neutrality in German affairs, but Stalin interpreted it more deeply, as an opportunity to expand territory without provoking Germany.8 Nonetheless, Hitler regarded Soviet expansion into Southeastern Europe as a threat and this contributed to the German invasion of 1941.9 Despite the agreement to divide Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and Germany watched each other carefully, wary of the other gaining more power.

Fueled by security concerns, rampant propaganda exacerbated ideological tensions and heightened competition between Soviet communists and German and Italian fascists. The German invasion of the Soviet Union brought the rivalry to war. A long four years of savage fighting constituted the ultimate test to determine the superior ideology.

The German justification for invading the Soviet Union reveals the ideological intention to wage war against communist society. Wehrmacht Lieutenant-General Otto Lancelle explained to his soldiers in 1941 that they would be fighting the war of “National Socialism against Bolshevism,” to defeat Soviet “destruction of the world… and cultural assets.”10 German commanders described the “conflict of two Weltanschauungen” (roughly translated as “ideology”) as Germany’s “fight for survival” and “defense of European culture.”11 This language conveys the perception of an alarming communist threat. The incorporation of ideology emphasizes its notability in rationalizing war.

Emboldened by ideological rhetoric, the Eastern Front was marked by extreme brutality. German military doctrine called for decisive victory achieved by rapid mobilization and annihilation of enemy forces.12 Understanding the Soviet advantages of fighting on their own ground, greater manpower, and more resources, the Germans attacked full throttle and destroyed everything in their path.13 The Soviets matched the Wehrmacht’s cruelty through conventional and partisan resistance. Despite the quick German advance, Soviet soldiers were known to fight to the last man.14 In one particular instance of such “underhanded methods,” a unit pretended to be dead and attacked a German group from behind, inflicting 90 casualties.15 Underlying ideological implications translated into exceptional displays of determination.

The Germans proved no less harsh off the battlefield, seeking to destroy communist society. Wehrmacht soldiers willingly participated in atrocities against Soviet civilians, like “… the plundering of foodstuffs and the resulting starvation of Soviet civilians… and a ruthless anti-partisan policy that resulted in the deaths of large numbers of alleged “guerillas.”16 The Eastern Front was much more than two states fighting one another for material resources or control of land – it decided which ideology was superior.

The Soviets repulsed the invasion and defeated the Germans, though at an astronomical price. The war’s human cost amounted to 25-35 million Soviets, an estimated two-thirds of which were civilians.17 The war devastated infrastructure, destroying 70,000 towns, 6 million homes, 32,000 factories, and thousands of miles of roads and railroad tracks. The unimaginably destructive Battle of Stalingrad exemplified Soviet resistance through “street by street, house by house, sometimes room by room” defense. Years later,
the war would connote the battle to survivors, recalling it before other memories.

The Soviet victory over Germany brought several significant consequences. First, the Soviets perceived it as a demonstration of communist superiority to fascism, helping to consolidate fully and legitimize the Soviet regime in the eyes of the people it governed. Furthermore, it demonstrated the utility of propaganda, depicting the “other” as a “perpetual foil.” Using “the other” boosted morale during the war and would later prove crucial in uniting people around the Soviet victory in the so-called Great Patriotic War. The totality of victory – not only repelling invasion to pre-war borders but capturing the German capital – permitted the Soviet imposition of policy, ideology, and war narrative onto the German population. The war, as remembered by the Soviets, had a profound impact on the planning of memorials in Berlin.

Berlin’s symbolic status as a capital city compounded the meaning of Soviet memorialization. Capitals have historically gained significant status for their political, economic, and cultural prominence.18 This hierarchical status granted the capital a significant role in communicating “desired meanings” through displays of social, political, and cultural control.19 To outside states, capitals became symbolic of the whole state and a target for invasion.20 It was largely the cultural function which signified capitals.

The Nazi Party’s imposition of ideology was evident through its transformation of Berlin and ceremonies in the interwar period. Hitler communicated the “national identity” of the new German state in Berlin by combining architectural style and grandeur to denote modernization, authoritarianism, and intimidation.21 Rituals and parades added to the expression of Nazi identity.22 Berlin’s transformation heightened its representation of the Nazi ideology, implying its termination with the Soviet capture of Berlin in 1945. The dominance of Berlin added substantial meaning to Soviet monuments.

The Soviet memorials in Berlin serve a similar purpose in imposing Soviet sacrifice, victory, and superiority, though they do so in different ways. The quick construction, militaristic aspects, and central location in Tiergarten reflect the prominent role of Soviet sacrifice in Allied victory. The delicate artistic methodology of the Treptower and Pankow memorials create a shared educational theme through inscriptions, architecture, and location. The grandeur and active use of the Treptower monument add messages in celebrating liberation and heroism.

When visiting, observers first notice the Tiergarten memorial’s heavy weapons.26 Two T-34 tanks, among the first to arrive in Berlin in 1945 with the Red Army, are placed to the right and left.27 Behind them sit the two artillery pieces the Red Army used to proclaim the Battle of Berlin’s conclusion.28 Placing the weapons at a prevalent, forward position draws the viewer’s attention to the militaristic aspects, and reminds the observer of Soviet military dominance.

The Tiergarten memorial derives the most significance from its location. Positioned in the British sector after the war suggests an intention to communicate with Western audiences. To its Western wartime allies, the memorial emphasized the Soviet necessity to victory over Nazism. It also reminded West Berliners that

The New York Herald Tribune wrote that the Tiergarten memorial was the largest monument in Berlin during its building.24 Though unconfirmed, the statement expressed the widespread perception of a grandiose and impressive undertaking. About 2,000 Red Army soldiers are buried on the grounds, out of 80,000 who died in the Battle of Berlin.25 The monument’s spectacle, size, and detail is utterly disproportionate to the commemoration of approximately 2.5% of fallen Soviets during the Battle of Berlin. Doing so in a city still laying in ruins suggests Soviet postwar priorities in promoting its dominance.
they too had been defeated by the Red Army. The memorial stands on the busy Straße des 17. Juni, ensuring that it would serve as an everyday reminder to its Western passers-by.

Additionally, it was a symbolic spot in Nazi “Germania” plans of reconstructing the city according to the new ideology. Adolph Hitler and Albert Speer, the chief architect, intended to build the Nazi “victory avenue” in the same spot. Selecting this location as a “literal barrier” to Nazi triumph was a communist expression of ideological superiority to fascism.

The Tiergarten monument position in the middle of other Berlin landmarks exemplifies the Soviet imprint on history. The Brandenburg Gate, an eighteenth-century tribute to peace, and the Bundestag, where the iconic Reichstag stood, are within a few minutes’ walk. The Berlin Victory Column, a commemoration of Prussian unification, sits a mile west along Straße des 17. Juni. This sector, dense with monuments, memorialized significant periods of German and Berlin history. The Soviet memorial’s addition to the already defined space forces the inclusion of Soviet victory into the city and country’s commemoration.

The delicate methodology of the Treptower and Pankow memorials comprise an educative purpose through location, inscriptions, and architecture. Positioned in East Berlin, the audiences for these monuments differed from that of Tiergarten. They were built in 1949, giving Soviet planners time to carefully craft every aspect to communicate specific messages. Monumental inscriptions suggest a message of education. The entrances at Treptower and Pankow are marked with phrases in Russian on one side and German on the other, including a German translation invites the German populace to understand the Soviet message. By contrast, the Tiergarten memorial itself is only in Russian, save for an English inscription on the side. The effect of mirroring the German and Russian is symbolic in expressing the importance of reformation to the Soviets. The purpose of reeducating German visitors is key to the Soviet emphasis on maintaining East Germany as an ally.

Located in peripheral spots outside the center city, visitors must go out of their way to view these two memorials. Unlike the Tiergarten memorial, located on a busy street, East Germans would have to make an intended effort to visit. Planners emphasized this idea of a pilgrimage in the architectural layouts. Both memorials are narrow shaped with the only entrances on one extreme end. The unique arrangement forces the observer to view the memorials in a particular viewpoint. As one enters, they immediately see the main sculpture of each monument. As they walk toward the monument, successive features become pronounced and impact the perspective as they approach the main sculpture. Leaders manipulated the layouts to enhance the memorials’ educative features.

Non-militaristic features communicate messages through inscriptions and memorial layouts. The Pankow and Treptower memorials include a statue of Mother Homeland, a figure mourning the death of her son. They both include 16 tombs to commemorate the sacrifice of each Soviet republic. The exclusion of weapons and prominence of death emphasizes the sorrow of these sites. In conjunction with educating the German population, they highlight the war’s human toll.

To a greater degree than the Treptower memorial, however, Soviet leaders focused on the total wartime cost in the Pankow memorial. The site was an area where families would enjoy recreational activity in the nineteenth century before becoming a labor camp during World War II. Resembling a cemetery, the Pankow memorial carries on this theme of gloom. On its ground are the remains of over 13,000 Red Army soldiers, serving as the largest Soviet burial site in Berlin. The names of thousands who fell in the Battle of Berlin are chiseled into stone, producing a sense of guilt for German visitors.

The main feature of Pankow is Mother Homeland, shown crying about the loss of her son in combat with a flag of victory – again,
reminding the German audience of the great Soviet victory. She sits atop a pedestal with the words “Not in vain was the death and the flowing blood of the Soviet soldiers. Not in vain the sorrow and tears of the grieving mothers, widow and orphans. They call to fight for the eternal peace among all people.”

The imagery is another evocation of guilt for the Germans, attempting to convey the losses of the Soviet masses during the war to the German audience. As the main point of the monument Mother Homeland emits a somber tone for the memorial as a whole. These carefully planned features encourage remorse in the visitor.

The Treptower site concentrates on ideological superiority through symbols of liberation and triumph. The design’s background illustrates ideological themes. The Soviet administration held a competition open to Germans and Soviets for designs of the memorial in 1946. The inclusion of German planners encouraged the participation of the populace in re-education efforts. Competition criteria were commemorating fallen Soviets in the Battle of Berlin and expressing the reason for their sacrifice, defined as the “international liberation mission of the Soviet Army.” The message of liberation is twofold: it reminds Germans of its past oppressive system, while expressing Soviet victory in defeating this institution.

The artistic features tell the Soviet story of liberation. The sixteen sarcophagi lining the sides each have bas-relief works accompanied by text, which tell a story as an observer walks from one to the next. It shows Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union, explaining that the German intention was to destroy the Soviet people through enslavement or death. Emphasizing the German invasion, the monument depicts the Soviets as innocent, having been forced to fight for their own freedom. This depiction reflects a narrow interpretation of ideological battle based on moral superiority. It is important that the bas-reliefs have “no direct reference” to the German people because it avoid blaming the German audience and invites them to join the “anti-fascist resistance story.”

The towering Red Army soldier contrasts the subtle bas-reliefs by acting as the memorial’s clear centerpiece. He stands heroically with a long sword in one hand, small child in the other arm, and stomps on a swastika. The liberation message is clear as the child clings to him for protection. The popular Great Patriotic War narrative predicates on this message of liberation. The Treptower memorial, specifically the Red Army statue, came to embody the war cult.

The Soviets and East Germans employed the Treptower site for political purposes. Physically, the monument covers an expansive area of nearly a square kilometer. While the size exhibits grandeur in itself, communist ideologues used it for celebrations of Victory Day and Liberation Day. The functional use is consistent with the Great Patriotic War mindset that “no one is forgotten, nothing is forgotten,” deriving meaning from past suffering. Holding celebratory events there gave it an active role, continually imposing the idea of liberation. Although communicating different messages, the Soviet memorials in Tiergarten, Pankow, and Treptower advanced a common postwar Soviet agenda.

**Post-Communism**

The interpretations of the Soviet war memorials in Berlin have changed significantly over time. Originally, intentions were rooted in the events of the Second World War, aimed at educating the German population on the Soviet narrative, commemorating sacrifice, and reminding the Western Allies of the indispensable wartime role. As Europe settled into division in what would be called the Cold War, Berlin became a flashpoint and microcosm of greater struggle. The messages of these monuments shifted with regional and world developments. After the fall of communism many in Eastern Europe viewed Soviet memorials as symbols of domination and suppression, a sentiment many continue to harbor today. In recent years, Vladimir Putin’s leadership has revived Russia’s regional and
global position in part by adopting Soviet strategies. This trend has renewed disagreements about the meaning of Soviet symbols.

The complex politics of remembrance swept through Eastern Europe in the wake of communist collapse. Street names and monuments in Berlin were caught in the crosshairs of contentious debate as the population grappled with interpreting the GDR's legacy. The Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), previously in power as the Socialist Unity Party, fought to maintain communist-era names in city districts it controlled. The democratically elected PDS exhibited considerable support from the people. As the West German Parliament agreed to move the unified capital to Berlin in 1991, the city government formed a commission to evaluate street names, instructed to change any who “opposed one totalitarian dictatorship, that of the National Socialists, in order to replace it with another totalitarian dictatorship, that of the Communists.”

The overall trend left an “unspoken absence which somehow reinforces the memory of the Hitler period.” Berliners applied the memories and lessons from the Nazi period to decide on the fate of GDR monuments. This way of moving on from the Nazi period in such a way stuck in the memory of Berliners.

The Post-GDR Era differed from the post-Nazi period because East Germans were ambivalent about the communist past. These mixed feelings were a stark contrast to the general agreement of the German population against Nazism, rendering policy about monuments difficult to agree upon. Additionally, no country imposed beliefs onto the populace. The freedom granted to each citizen further complicated popular agreement on policy.

Students formed the Initiative on Public Monuments of the GDR to encourage informed public discussion about individual sites. The mature approach demonstrated an improved understanding of the implications associated with removing monuments.

Unlike the controversies surrounding communist monuments and street names, no one seriously considered taking down the Berlin Soviet war memorials. The East and West German governments agreed to protect the memorials in return for the removal of Red Army troops from Germany in the September 1990 “Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany.” The nature of the alliance between the Soviets and East Germans, including Soviet influence in the GDR state and ideology, made Soviet memorials more symbolic than street names and East German monuments. There is ample evidence that these monuments would have been targets of anti-communist acts. Signing strong protective measures in advance indicates the Soviet understanding of the regional political environment. The remembrance of other memorials’ degradation throughout Eastern Europe as Soviet soldiers pulled back was fresh in Soviet minds. Wanting to avoid further humiliation and disrespect, the Soviets used foresight and leverage to guarantee this would not occur in Berlin.

Contentious deliberation was not
unique to Germany. Former communist states across Eastern Europe struggle with the historical experience of the Soviet Union. Romanian politicians issued the Proclamation of Timişoara in 1990, proposing that former high-ranking communists be banned from public office for ten years. Subject to years of debate, the proposal represented popular disagreement about the former regime. Russia experienced widespread condemnation of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Veterans and monuments became frequent targets for their representation of the failed Soviet system. Attacks on the Soviet liberation narrative were rampant and drew comparisons to fascism, contradictory to fundamental communist beliefs. National humiliation encompassed Russia until the mid-1990s economic depression set in. At the 1993 Victory Day Demonstration, many of the common people joined the celebration in defense of Red Army veterans, relating their own struggle in the economic downturn to the vigorous criticisms against the veterans’ efforts. Equating the veterans to their achievements, this aligning gesture defended Soviet accomplishments and victory. The idea of the Great Patriotic War emphasizing martyrdom, suffering, and trauma, linked these two previously sparring groups.

Putin’s rise to power in the early 2000s ushered in an era of Russian reassertion of Great Power status. He has capitalized on the idea of the Great Patriotic War to heighten nationalism and unify the Russian people to support geopolitical objectives, such as aggression in Ukraine and Georgia. The politics of remembrance are especially prevalent in Russia’s resurgence as a regional power. A side effect has been the revitalization of historical interpretations consistent with the original intentions of Soviet monument planners.

The Communist Party’s reception of World War II victory illuminates why the Soviets invested so heavily in public works. The war legitimized the Soviet system, so building “public displays of loyalty” was a way to continually remind people of Soviet control. In erecting monuments, leaders could impose carefully selected messages onto audiences. Aleksandr Nekrich presents an interesting example of censorship, as he fought at the Battle of Stalingrad and later challenged the notion of the “suddenness” of the 1941 German invasion in a book. The KGB redacted this section, revoked his Communist Party membership, and no longer allowed him to write. This brutal restriction hindered the ability of the individual, and witness, to deviate from the official narrative. Like the “Nekrich Affair,” the active promotion of liberation at the Treptower memorial reminds individuals of the state’s power.

The renewed sense of historical pride has established the central political role of remembrance in Eastern and Central Europe. The Russian state under Putin has reinvigorated the memory and mission of the Soviet Union, synonymizing the past system with the present state. Soviet monuments have taken on renewed meaning in the modern Russian state. As the memorials continue to have an active life, their contention has complicated contemporary regional relations. Recent laws permitting the removal of Soviet monuments, accompanied with rampant vandalism, have soured relations between Russia and former Soviet bloc states. In 2006 someone stole 60 bronze pieces from the memorial in Pankow, Berlin to which the Russian embassy protested. Opposing interpretations of history are visible. The Russians, defending the commemoration of liberation and freedom, and many in Eastern Europe who perceive them as tributes to Soviet dominance. The fusion of Russian and Soviet identity means that threats of removal are taken as insulting to Russia. The resurgence of Russia as a significant European power has politicized the issue and strengthened justifications for their standing.

No instance better illustrates Russia’s assumption of the Soviet legacy than the 2007 relocation of a Red Army “liberator” statue in Tallinn. The move was celebrated by some, citing it as a symbol of Soviet dominance and repression. It was met with ardent condemnation by the
Russian government, proponents of the liberation view, and Estonia’s nearly one-fourth ethnic Russian population. The Russian outcry was considerable for a city in which it has a miniscule stake compared to Berlin. The symbolic value of Berlin as the capital of the Soviet rival ideology which it captured after a traumatizing war is extreme. Accounting for Russian protests to smaller instances of vandalism, like Pankow in 2006, one can assume a Tallinn-scale act would prompt a grave Russian response.

Preserving Soviet memorials is a way to perpetuate the memory of Soviet success. It creates a self-reinforcing cycle, justifying the contemporary rationalization serves to improve future prospects of its existence. Proponents of Soviet memorials concentrate on the act of the victory, resembling the 1945 Soviet liberator interpretation. Others view them as expressions of Soviet domination, instead focusing on the inability to interpret history individually during the Soviet period. These polarized understandings represent the collective past struggles of individuals.

**Conclusion**

The Soviet monuments located in Berlin exemplify the impact of shifting contexts on the meaning of public space. Initially imposing Soviet dominance and ideology, they still stand today, albeit with varying meanings according to different people. The Berlin memorials epitomize the Soviet paradox by suggesting that the Soviet spirit is alive. With contemporary Russia assuming the Soviet Union’s legacy, Russians retain the Soviet sentiments of ideology, war memory, and symbolism found in the details of the Tiergarten, Pankow, and Treptower memorials. Additionally, Soviet memorials have acquired new meaning as representative of the Soviet past and Russian present and future, adding an active political role.

Russia’s geopolitical reorientation means that Soviet memorials will be at the forefront of future controversy. Though people will remember Soviet repression, Russia will overtake the memorials’ symbolism. No end is in sight for the memorials in Berlin. Diplomacy between Russian and German delegations will be necessary, as the agreement states no expiration. It will require a concerted effort, as they are much too large and complex to simply move or take down. Whether Soviet planners purposely included seemingly endless life as an expression of domination is doubtful. However, the contemporary political environment created largely from the Soviet past seems to suggest eternal life for the Berlin memorials.

**References**

University Press, 2014), 94.
26. For this section, the writer visually interpreted the monuments using Google Earth.
43. Paul Stangl, “The Soviet War Memorial
This was taken on Mt. Trebević during Emma Holmes’ gap year living in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. She had taken the cable car up the mountain with her cohort on October 27, 2019 to see the bobsled track used in the 1984 Winter Olympics.

Photo by Emma Holmes, Class of 2024, Global Studies and Asian Studies
Crescent among the 25 stars: Islam and Islamophobia within the European Union

By Labeeb Ahmed

Labeeb Ahmed is a Political Science and Economics double major graduating in December 2021. His interests lie in international relations and he focuses on Europe-Middle East and Africa-Europe relations. After studying abroad in Vienna, Austria, and witnessing the Turkish and Slavic Muslim communities spread across Europe, he decided to write a piece that analyzes the current tense relationship between Islam and Christian Europe.

Inside the European Union, the rise in the number of Muslims and increased fear of Islam has increased tension and is stalling the integration of Europe, especially after the 2015 migrant crisis. Outside of the European Union (EU), Muslim-majority nations such as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Turkey attempt to be involved as members in a Union often cited as a “Christian Club” by critics for its lack of Muslim participation. This paper is an attempt to showcase Islam’s rise in the EU and explain how EU integration suffers due to Islamophobia, especially after the 2015 crisis. To do this, I will examine the history of Islam in Europe, then examine the 2015 crisis, and interpret poll data and opinions on Muslims by Europeans today – largely drawn from modern new sources and non-partisan polling organizations such as the Pew Research Center. The paper will end with an explanation of how EU integration is affected by touching on divisions between the EU member states, the departure of one in part due to Islamophobia, and the refusal of others in part because of their Muslim culture.

Despite the surge of an Islamic presence in Europe after 2015, Islam is nothing new in Europe and not every Muslim is a recent arrival, contrary to what many in Europe might believe. Drawing from centuries ago, one will learn of the Muslims who conquered vast swaths of the North Mediterranean and the Iberian Peninsula for over seven centuries. Meanwhile, in 1362, the Ottomans began their conquest of the Balkans and eventually captured Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine Empire. However, the most relevant illustration of the intertwined history of Europe and Islam occurs after World War II (WWII). With Europe devastated post conflict, infrastructure was in dire need of repair. Yet with so many young men dead from the fight, noticeable labor shortages began. To fill this labor gap, European powers turned to their colonies. Thus, hundreds of thousands of Indians, Pakistanis, and Bengalis went to the United Kingdom, Indonesians and Surinamese went to the Netherlands, and North Africans went to France. Germany needed workers too and turned to its former ally in World War I (WWI), Turkey (the then-Ottoman Empire). Germany accepted Turkish guest workers, who were expected to leave; however, most simply decided to stay, transforming German society as a result.¹ Knowing this information, we can conclude the following: Muslims in Europe are nothing new, so for Europeans to be wary of Muslims as a new presence is history un-
Before examining the effects of modern Islamophobia in Europe, its history must be explained. Islamophobia refers to the irrational hostility, fear, and hatred of Muslims, Islam, and Islamic culture, and the active discrimination against these groups. Islamophobia manifests itself in Europe in several attitudes, behaviors, and actions. Classic examples of Islamophobia in Europe include attacks on property and places of worship, threats, religious profiling, and abuse. Also included is discrimination in education, employment, housing, or access to goods and services. Legislation that disproportionately affects Muslims exists as well, such as with bans on wearing visible religious symbols or building mosques with minarets.

Islamophobia has caused many Europeans to fear Muslims, hate Muslims, stigmatize Muslims, treat them as the “Other,” and believe that Muslims cannot be integrated into the fabric of the European Union.

Despite the long history of Islam in Europe, the crisis in 2015 brought the presence of Islam back into question in the EU. More than one million migrants and refugees entered Europe in 2015. With countries struggling to cope with the massive influx and different views on how the influx should be handled, divisions brewed in the EU. Syria had the highest number of people applying for asylum in the EU, followed by Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Albania, and Pakistan — all Muslim-majority countries. Germany accepted the most asylum applications of any European state, followed by Sweden, Italy, France, and the Netherlands. This event is the foundation upon which the modern discourse of Islam and Islamophobia in Europe rests.

The Islamophobia that existed before the 2015 Refugee Crisis surged in intensity and spread throughout the population after the crisis. Since that influx of migrants, unfavorable opinions increased in most European countries, according to a National Observer 2016 survey of ten EU countries. Islamophobia surged by nine percent in the United Kingdom, by eight percent in Spain and Italy, and by twelve percent in Greece.

Analyzing the effects of the crisis and the sudden influx of Muslims in different countries will show us the change in sentiments over Islam. Similar reactions occur in states with a large Muslim population and states with a low Muslim population. Given France's history as a colonial power that once controlled Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia – three Muslim-majority countries – it becomes clear why there is a long history of francophone Muslims from these countries traveling to France for work and new opportunities. Thus, France has the largest Muslim population in the EU, with 8.8 percent of its population being Muslim. Despite the large and historic presence of Islam in France, France still has not become comfortable with it. In 2016, France drew controversy when French police confronted a woman wearing a burkini on a beach in Nice. The policemen demanded that she remove the burkini and issued her a ticket, citing that she was not wearing an outfit “respecting good morals and secularism.”

A year later, in 2017, French presidential elections were occurring and discussions on Islamophobia were present in nearly every campaign. That same year, 10 far-right militants were arrested by French anti-terrorist police because they planned attacks on Muslim places of worship.

For countries that are less-developed and took in much less in terms of Muslim refugees, Islamophobia has still increased. Hungary is a country that demonstrates the effects that the crisis had on Islamophobia. Despite having one of the lowest shares of a foreign-born population anywhere in the developed world, Hungary's current ruling party, Fidesz, managed to win by targeting their campaign against immigration. This is rather ironic; given Hungary's low fertility rate, immigration would massively help Hungary's declining labor force. Hungary is not necessarily anti-immigrant; until March 2017, it ran a residency bond program targeted mostly at upper-class Asians. For a €300,000 investment in Hungarian government bonds, permanent resi-
The tendency could be obtained, and 20,000 people took this offer. This money was then usurped by corrupt members of the government as well as used to fund the government propaganda against Muslims in Europe.\textsuperscript{9} Regarding immigrants, Orb.n’s government is specifically against Muslims in particular; a government spokesman said that the Hungarian government “knows that \[Islam] is not going to integrate.”\textsuperscript{10} Orb.n has been quoted saying that with mass migration, “[Europe’s] worst nightmares have come true.”\textsuperscript{11} He has called for an anti-migrant alliance to ban the continued arrival of new migrants at the European Union’s border. In part thanks to government propaganda, seventy-two percent of Hungarians have a negative view of Muslims in their country, whereas the EU average is only forty-three percent.\textsuperscript{12}

Poland is also guilty of Islamophobia. In a survey done by the Pew Research Center, Poles have the most favorable view of the European Union out of any member state. eighty-four percent of Poles have a favorable view of the European Union, compared to a mere fourteen percent who have an unfavorable view.\textsuperscript{13} Yet a paradox appears; the results from a survey conducted by the Polish Center for Public Opinion Research (or C.B.O.S) show that while Poles are the biggest believers in the European Union, a clear majority would rather lose EU funds than accept Muslim refugees as part of the EU’s relocation processes. thirty-one percent of respondents on this poll said that they believe refugees intend to “Islamize Europe” and twenty-three percent perceive refugees as potential terrorists.\textsuperscript{14}

Directly related to the presence of Islamophobia and the citizens’ views on Muslims is the public perception of just how many Muslims there are within the country. The average Polish citizen believes that Muslims constitute nearly seven percent of Polish society. In reality, the actual number of Muslims in Poland is a staggering seventy times less than that percentage, at only 0.1 percent of the population.\textsuperscript{15} A 2014 poll from the Social Research Institute found that French respondents believed that the percentage of Muslims in France at around thirty-one percent, whereas the real percentage did not exceed six percent at the time, and Germans believed that nineteen percent of the population was Muslim, instead of the actual four percent.\textsuperscript{16} A 2016 Ipsos Mori Survey measured the gap between public perception and reality of Muslim communities in forty countries. The survey’s results showed that the public estimates of the size of Muslim communities were more than four times the actual level in France and three times the actual level in the UK.\textsuperscript{17}

Now, there is a question of why Islamophobia is so persistent in Europe and why so many Europeans believe that the population of Muslims is larger than it truly is in their country. A major reason for this is government portrayal and propaganda. Throughout time, scapegoats existed as a powerful political tool for corrupt leaders and governments to divert the public eye from their own problematic practices and inadequacies. One of the most popular scapegoats that governments today use are minority groups such as Muslims. Muslims are major targets, especially now, because the refugees that arrived in 2015 came from war-torn countries that did not allow for the same level of education that a Frenchman or Englishman would have received. The media, too, propels government propaganda to influence how citizens should think. Titled “The Islamic Rape of Europe,” Polish magazine wSieci, a mass-market politically conservative magazine, helped to instill fear into the population through this depiction of a “proper” Polish lady being harmed by darker-skinned men.\textsuperscript{18}

Another reason for Islamophobia’s persistence in Europe is terrorist attacks conducted by extremist Muslims. The September 11th attacks in New York City arguably changed the West’s perspective on Muslims forever, and more recent events such as the terrorist acts committed by jihadists in London, Paris, Brussels, and Barcelona have caused even more fear and anxiety. Since 2001, it has been more com-
mon for media outlets in Europe to report based on stereotypes and use the actions of radicals to portray an entire community of Muslims.\

Islamophobia encourages Europeans to believe that Muslims cannot integrate properly and assimilate into European society, but that conclusion has been proven false. Europeans may think that Islam inherently goes against Western values, such as same-sex marriage. However, in a survey conducted by the Bertelsmann Stiftung, roughly sixty percent of Muslim respondents said that they support same-sex marriage. This is not limited to “casual” Muslims either; forty percent of Muslim respondents who consider themselves highly religious believe in same-sex marriage as well. Most of these Muslim respondents have their origins in Turkey, the Muslim-majority country with the most emigration to Germany. In contrast to these Turkish-German Muslims, only twelve percent of highly-religious Muslims in Turkey say that there are in favor of same-sex marriage. This disparity between Turkish-German and Turkish Muslim respondents illustrates the absorption of German values in the German Muslim communities. Essentially, Muslims in Germany feel at home there and are proven to have integrated into German society. Despite this evidence, sixty-one percent of Germans feel that Islam is not compatible with life in the Western world, but the vast majority of Germans – nearly eighty-five percent – say that they are tolerant of other religions. This is not the case with Islam. According to the Pew Research Center, half of the participating population believe that most Muslims want to be distinct from the larger society, with fifty-four percent in the UK, forty-five percent in Poland, sixty-eight percent in Spain, and a staggering seventy-six percent in Hungary holding this belief.

Muslims integrated well into Europe not solely in terms of values, but also in terms of adoption of the national language(s), education, and success in the labor market. A 2017 survey found that second and third-generation Muslims were better educated, had a better command of the national language, and found more success in the labor market than first-generation Muslims who likely grew up outside of Europe. In Germany and Switzerland, the rate of gainful employment among Muslims is not significantly different from that of the entire population. Seventy-five percent of Muslim respondents regularly spend their free time with non-Muslims, and, overall, nearly all respondents – ninety-four percent – feel connected to the country that they live in. This underlines a crucial fact claimed by Bertelsmann Stiftung expert Stephen Vogel; Islam is not an obstacle to successful integration into European society. Despite the integration, Muslims who actively practice their faith often encounter discrimination in the job market.

The rise of Islamophobia, especially after 2015, has contributed significantly to de-integrating the countries of the European Union. In 2017, the EU decided to sue the three members - Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic - for not respecting their quotas for refugee resettlement demanded by the EU. Hungary’s Orbán defended his defiance against the EU by telling the German daily newspaper Bild that the Hungarian government does not see these migrants as Muslim refugees, but rather as “Muslim invaders.”

Primary evidence of Islamophobia de-integrating Europe, however, can be found in the United Kingdom. Among the countless reasons that Brexiteers cite is the rise of Islamophobia contributed to British citizens voting to leave the European Union. According to anti-Muslim attack monitor TellMama, researchers at the monitor went from receiving roughly forty to fifty reports of Islamophobic incidences a day to thirty in merely three days after the passing of the EU referendum. Most of these incidents were directly related to Brexit. The founder of TellMama, Fiyaz Mughal, believes that the cluster of hate crimes since the vote has been because of certain British citizens with “deeply prejudicial and bigoted views” being empowered and believing “that they can air them and target them at
predominantly Muslim women and visibly different settled communities. Since the Brexit vote, such incidents of Muslims in Europe being affected by Brexit are substantiated by reported attacks. For example, Muslims are being shouted at and told to leave because of British citizens “voting ‘them’ out” with Brexit. Indeed, politicians who pushed for Brexit constantly used Islamic terror as a means to persuade voters that leaving the EU was absolutely necessary. Nigel Farage, a key politician in promoting Brexit, constantly pushed for leaving the EU to end the “terror threat,” and Boris Johnson has also seized the opportunity to comment that he believes Brexit will improve security in the UK. This rhetoric worked. The UK illustrates a prime example of how Islamophobia can tear apart the integration of the European Union.

The European Union’s overall approach to migration has created an obstacle to solidarity within the union. As it stands, the union does not have in place a system through which member states can share the responsibility of hosting migrants fairly. Member states continue to clash with one another over the question of who should host the asylum seekers and other migrants who manage to reach the shores of Europe. While member states in the southern border of Europe close to the Mediterranean Sea want to overhaul the current system to spread the responsibility and relocation quotas for migrant arrivals, countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia are refusing to support this sort of fair mechanism.

A preconceived idea of what Islam is and the reluctance of European member states to accept it is also reflected in the potential future integration of Europe, namely in the Muslim majority European states of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Turkey. At the European Union level, there is nothing that forbids the entry of a Muslim-majority country into the predominantly Christian EU because there is no reference to religion in the constitution. Thus, the question of whether or not Turkey, for example, should be admitted into the EU should be asked at the national level. The response is mostly negative; only thirty percent of Europeans are in favor of enlargement to include Turkey. This is not simply because of dissatisfaction with Erdogan’s current rule. The administrations from Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the first Turkish President, onwards transformed Turkey into a fiercely secular state that oriented towards the West. In the span of seventy-five years, it joined all the regional Western alliances such as NATO and the Council of Europe and played a vital role in the Western world during the Cold War. Yet being denied entry from the European Community, the EU’s predecessor, during a time when Turkey embraced Western values more dearly, signals an uneasiness with the Muslim culture of the country; this is why Turkish critics cite the EU as a “Christian Club.” Whether or not the EU truly wishes to remain exclusive is debatable, it is clear that Islamophobia has been used in the past and will certainly continue to be a tool to reject the European countries more “foreign” to the current EU members.

Despite its long presence on the continent, Islam continues to strike fear and repulsion into European society and legislation, especially post-2015. Member states of the EU still have large swaths of their populations with the following: unfavorable views of Muslims; not wanting more Muslims to immigrate; believing that there are more Muslims than there truly are in Europe; and believing that it is Muslims who choose to remain distinct rather than them being marginalized by the majority. All this has manifested into splintering in the union over opposing views on migration policy, with certain member states being sued and others leaving. Now, the problem of Islamophobia is intertwined with the EU’s future, and as the question of membership for three Muslim-majority European nations, the EU’s relationship with Islam will once again require more thought and analysis.
References


3. "Islamophobia in Europe.”


21. Wike, Stokes, and Simmons, “Negative Views of Minorities”


27. Ibid.


This photo, taken in Chengalpattu, Tamil Nadu, India, depicts an Indian teacher and her students celebrating Diwali with sparklers and a handmade rangoli. October 2017

Photo by Jennings Dixon, Class of 2022, English and Comparative literature and Political Science
International Human Rights Trailblazer:
The Case of American Foreign Policy in Argentina’s ‘Dirty War’ Under the Carter Administration

By Brittany Broome

Brittany Broome is a December 2020 graduate of UNC-Chapel Hill who double majored in Public Policy and Global Studies with a minor in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE). This course of study has allowed her to investigate US foreign policy and its intersection with social movements on the world stage. Through this, Brittany Broome became interested in investigating the role that human rights considerations play in international agenda-setting. Her Internationalist piece is the culmination of her research into the Carter administration’s human rights-focused foreign policy strategy which is understood to be the first time an American President made human rights a top priority in conducting foreign affairs.

Today, the United States’ hegemonic position in international affairs is undeniable. In this role, the United States government has claimed to be a champion of human rights in the world, though, the integrity of this assertion is subject to much debate. President Jimmy Carter played an instrumental role in shaping how the government considers international human rights in its formulation of a foreign policy agenda. A key example of this phenomenon is the Carter administration’s handling of relations with Latin America, specifically Argentina, during the late 1970s and into the early 1980s—a time when the governing military junta was committing gross human rights atrocities.

This paper will discuss the dynamics of Argentina’s so-called Guerra Sucia or “Dirty War.” It will then move to explain how Washington, D.C. handled the junta’s rise to power before the Carter administration, primarily focusing on Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s actions, as well as how the government’s position evolved once Jimmy Carter took office. The paper will analyze the policy decisions Carter made as president and his administration’s actions. Under Carter, the US government’s strong stance against the Argentine government’s abuse of its citizens led to the improvement of conditions in the country and the recognition of soft power diplomacy’s necessity.1

President Jimmy Carter was the first contemporary American president to place human rights at the forefront of his foreign policy agenda, both rhetorically and in action.2 Understandably, his policies, on a grand scale, were not always regarded as successful in achieving human rights-related ends in every corner of the globe.3 Nonetheless, his administration served as a trailblazer for the government-mandated inclusion of human rights in foreign policy.4 Though Carter-style relations with abusive regimes did not continue into the Reagan administration, the sentiment and intention of his team’s human rights-focused policies were undeniably formative.
Current and future American governments can still find these policies useful in considering how the United States government should move forward in international affairs today. As highlighted through his efforts in Argentina, President Jimmy Carter placed soft power, centered around human rights protections, at the heart of American international policy—an action that changed the fabric and character of the United States’ diplomatic practice as it was known. This paper argues that, while the Carter administration cannot be cited as the direct source for the fall of the junta in 1983, its aggressive policies against Argentina’s human rights abuses inserted the issue of human rights saliently into US foreign policy grand strategy.

**Background and Context**

**Argentina’s Dirty War**

Argentina’s “Dirty War” marks a time in the country’s history that is colored by gross human rights abuses by the military junta government. Officially, the war began with a coup d’etat in 1976 and ended when the junta fell from power in 1983. Moreover, Argentines were already familiar with social unrest and terrorist violence in the years leading up to the coup that removed President Isabel Perón from office. Before the coup, Argentina experienced years of politically-motivated left-wing guerrilla violence, including bombings, kidnappings, theft, and murders. Right-wing Argentine Army Commander-in-Chief Jorge Rafael Videla took control of the country after the military coup. His new government vowed to crack down on the radical left. Videla and the military considered leftist terror threats and attacks from groups like the Montoneros as acts of war. The junta proceeded to combat perceived subversives using techniques similar to the terrorists themselves (i.e. murder and kidnapping). The tactics in which the junta engaged were compounded by the agreement known as “Operation Condor,” in which the security services of Southern Cone states (Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Brazil) joined together to counter terrorism and political subversion through “coordinated psychological warfare operations directed against leftist and radical groups.” Because of this international cooperation against leftist groups in the fight against communism, the indiscriminate tactics against those labeled as left-wing terrorists throughout the region made the human rights situation of many Latin American countries dire. By the end of the ‘Dirty War’, it is estimated that roughly 30,000 Argentines were killed, nearly 500 children were taken from their parents or born to detained mothers and then given to families sympathetic to the military with new identities, and more than 9,000 are classified as desaparecidos, “disappeared persons.” The disappeared are those who were kidnapped by the government and they were never to be seen again, many are thought to be victims of “death flights” that dumped hundreds of drugged prisoners into the Atlantic Ocean. As for the children, Argentine citizens are still trying to uncover their identities and reunite them with their families.

Since the 1800s and the passage of the Monroe Doctrine and its subsequent Roosevelt Corollary, the security and stability of Latin American nations have been of great importance to the United States’ regional interests. This was heightened during the 1970s and 1980s, when Latin America was viewed as a hotbed for human rights violations. The violent actions of the Argentine junta during this time only further exacerbated these issues. President Carter’s interest in improving human rights globally made Argentina a clear target for his efforts. Nevertheless, the attitudes of the United States government were not always consistent with how to address the Argentine problem between administrations.

**Kissinger and the Years Before Carter**

President Gerald Ford, along with his active and influential Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, was a strong proponent of implementing realist American foreign policies. During the Ford administration, human rights took “secondary priority” and
Kissinger was known to respond obstinately to any initiatives aimed at improving human rights around the world. He has said that human rights “are not appropriate” as a foundational basis of American foreign policy. Kissinger’s balance-of-power approach in his Realpolitik was the norm of the bipolar Cold War era. It was instead Carter and his administration that took advantage of the increasingly multipolar world order in the 1970s to advance the United States’ position in fighting to promote human rights around the globe.

President Carter’s Foreign Policy Platform

On the first day of his presidency, January 20, 1977, Jimmy Carter asserted that human rights should be upheld in American policy, not only domestically, but also worldwide. In his inaugural address, Carter explained that the United States was the “first society openly to define itself in terms of both spirituality and human liberty” and that because of this, it is part of the country’s responsibility to “take on those moral duties” and “help shape a just and peaceful world that is truly humane.” A few months later, in an address at Notre Dame University, President Carter famously remarked that America is “now free of that inordinate fear of Communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in our fear.” This sentiment was the driving force...
that led Carter to believe that the United States no longer needed to cooperate with dictators and leaders who operated contrary to American values. Carter made it clear that his campaign promise to elevate human rights to the frontlines of American policy were not just talking points. It became his objective to oversee a comprehensive agenda of international issues that would place the United States as an international hegemon politically, economically, and morally.

The Carter Administration’s Stance towards Argentina
Reduction in Military Aid and Assistance

The Carter administration took a special interest in the Argentine issue and sought to combat it not solely through diplomatic means, but also through withholding military assistance to the junta. In only his second month in office, President Carter made the move to cut U.S. military aid to Argentina nearly in half— reducing it from forty-eight million dollars to just twenty-five million dollars. This move by the new President was shocking and unsettling to a large number of high-ranking officials in the Argentine government. It was a stark break from the “quiet diplomacy” of the Kissinger era and relatively unencumbering policies the Argentines had become accustomed to with the previous administration. Carter had the goal of sending a message to Argentina and other regimes committing human rights atrocities that they could not benefit militarily from the United States as long as they continued their abuses. Nonetheless, because of the complex nature of the military arrangement already established between the Argentine and American governments, there were still cases where training, spare parts, and equipment, were given to Argentina in gestures of good faith that certain American officials wanted to maintain. Others in government, like Senator Edward “Ted” Kennedy, protested any concessions of military aid and assistance to the regime, even if in “good faith.” Their opposition was born in the belief that there could be no leniency until the Argentine government demonstrated “substantial progress.” According to a 1984 study of the relationship between foreign aid and human rights violations, the Carter administration policies of foreign assistance had no statistical pattern of influence over human rights violations in the world holistically. However, for the Argentine case specifically, there was, in fact, a substantial decrease in military aid and assistance to Argentina during the Carter administration as opposed to his predecessor.

Diplomatic and Economic Policies

The intense diplomatic maneuvering of Carter administration officials and their Argentine counterparts highlights a striking difference in the priorities of each country. Both leaders were convinced in the necessity of their actions so negotiations were not expected to be easy. Videla’s government truly seemed to believe that what it was doing— detaining people suspected of being subversives and then subjecting them to torture, rape, and even murder—was necessary and just action for protecting Argentine national security interests. Nonetheless, Videla’s government, like others in Latin America at the time, did not want to be diplomatically or economically isolated and discredited by the global system. For this reason, President Carter utilized diplomatic engagements, such as the September 1977 Panama Canal Treaty, to raise his concerns to Videla and others over the atrocities he saw occurring in their countries. On such occasions, he even made specific requests for the release of prisoners in Argentina as well as the publication of comprehensive lists of detained and disappeared persons in the country.

In conjunction with diplomatic attempts to reason with Videla, the Carter administration also refused to support twenty-eight loans to Argentina from International Financial Institutions (IFIs). The administration believed its defiance in not supporting IFI loans to Argentina and countries in similar situations served as a strong signal of its disapproval of totalitarian and
abusive policies. This sentiment, while successful in theory, was also only as effective as the entire international community’s resolve to impose economic punishment on these countries. Unfortunately, many of these loans passed through and were given to Argentina despite abstention from the United States. It is not, however, that the diplomatic and economic attempts to push Argentina to end its abusive tirade were failures; in turn, these actions indicated that the Carter administration moved on its own in this regard before human rights agendas took hold in the foreign policy platforms of the international community at-large.

Effects of the Administration’s Policies

Not every attempt by the Carter administration to promote human rights in Argentina was a definitive success. Private industry, as well as alternative sources of military aid and economic support to Argentina by other countries, hampered the administration’s objective of pressuring the junta into submission. Carter could not merely force Argentina’s hand and induce them to implement policies favored by the United States. Nevertheless, the economic and military pressures placed upon Argentina by the Carter administration did make clear that the junta’s human rights abuses would no longer be tolerated by the United States. Through this, the administration made substantial improvements in the American institutional system for international human rights promotion. Carter and his team in the State Department attempted to provide teeth to the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, previously handicapped under Kissinger, by bringing in civil rights experts and putting their objectives into the light for the American public.

Unfortunately, the Carter administration’s successes in some other parts of the world were bleaker than they proved to be in Argentina—the Iran Hostage Crisis is a primary example. These shortcomings drew much criticism and influenced Carter’s successor, Ronald Reagan, to revert to similar policies of the Kissinger era. Relatively early in his time in office, President Reagan denegated human rights policies and relegated them to a lower priority than Carter had done. The new administration viewed Carter’s concerns for human rights at the expense of American national security interests as weak and began to show support for the Argentine government. Reagan thought that the country needed a more “realistic” approach to human rights and foreign affairs, but by his second term moved back toward a more Carter-esque, positive stance on the importance of human rights.

Carter’s successors each took a different approach to resolve the complex nature of institutionalizing human rights policies in diverse countries around the globe. Ronald Reagan attempted a neocconservative approach similar to that of Ford before slightly softening his policies; George H. W. Bush tried to be more pragmatic in his handling of human rights and, in many ways, still did not succeed; Bill Clinton did not seem to have a specific foreign policy orientation in any sense; George W. Bush’s foreign policy was dominated by the War on Terror, in which human rights took a back seat; and Barack Obama moved closer to Carter’s vision of globally connected societies that strived to promote human rights. Today, President Donald Trump’s administration seems to be backing away from an international human rights-centered foreign policy agenda as it turns to a more nationalist focus.

Conclusion

Many historians and politicians alike assess President Jimmy Carter’s emphasis on human rights as the preeminent focus in his foreign policy agenda to be idealist at best. He indeed placed the moral virtue of what he saw to be at the core of the American people at the center of his policymaking. However, it was Carter’s conception of the United States’ role in the world as one in which “idealism was a practical and realistic approach to foreign affairs” and a vehicle to exert American influence. When looked at holistically, his global affairs policies were not
always able to meet the high standards set out by his “absolute” commitment to human rights promotion. However, it is not accurate to say that President Jimmy Carter and those in his administration were unsuccessful in promoting human rights in the region. Their policies changed US.-Latin American relations in a way that demonstrated the US government would not always be bedfellows with abusive regimes. Furthermore, President Carter showed the world that his policies were making headway in combating the gross human rights violations in the hemisphere through the creation of the Interamerican Commission on Human Rights and Interamerican Court on Human Rights.39

No presidential administration after Carter has made any greater improvements in balancing the implementation problems faced by human rights-oriented policies with the vast array of American national security and political interests.40 Nevertheless, in the words of former Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs William Hodding Carter, “the most extraordinary departure from American foreign policy in the history of this republic was the institution of a formal program of human rights dedicated to the proposition that those things we thought were important about people and for people should be a part of our international policy.”41 Both present and future American governments must continue to examine how Carter and his vision of the world broke new ground and spearheaded institutionalizing human rights through soft power diplomatic means at the core of American foreign policy.

References

9. Stephen Rabe, Lars Scholtuz, and Klaus Larres. “Torture, Murder and Genocide: Cold War Memories in Latin America & The USA.” Krasno Seminar Series. The US in World Affairs: The Cold War and Beyond Lecture Series, 29 Mar. 2015, Chapel Hill, NC, [00:09:00; 00:15:30-00:16:40; 00:18:10-00:19:16; 00:25:00-00:28:30], https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tt05Z3XX-Ow&list=PLZeU44btCwxs8I6-XMzhjDZAu-eCwWUVK&index=19&start=0s.
14. Ibid, 10
15. United States Department of State. "Henry Kissinger’s Meeting with Admiral Guzzetti; Date on Document is 00:19:16, 00:25:00-00:28:30; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FpHj0ue717U."


29. Ibid, 2

30. Schmidli, "Institutionalizing Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy," 372

31. Borshoff, "What is a Human Rights Policy?" 718

32. United States Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research Office of Research and Analysis for American Republics. Evolution of U.S. Human Rights Policy in Argentina, 6-8


35. Shestack, "Human Rights, the National Interest, and U.S. Foreign Policy," 17


37. Borshoff, "What is a Human Rights Foreign Policy," 731-732

38. Schmidli, "Institutionalizing Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy," 365


40. Borshoff, "What is a Human Rights Foreign Policy?" 732

A traveler admires the expertly-woven tapestries in Morocco.

Photo by Shelby Casey, Class of 2020, Biology and Neuroscience
Put Her In, Coach: Female Sports Journalists’ Role in Women’s Athletic Coverage in the Media

By Jamie Cummings

Jamie Cummings is a junior at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where she studies International Politics and Public Policy with a minor in Spanish. She is a current intern for the International Trade Administration within the US Department of Commerce where she focuses on European Policy. Jamie Cummings is a former Burch Field Research Scholar, through which she studied gender discrimination in post-war International Criminal Tribunals in the Western Balkans.

The Chicago newspaper’s infamous Twitter headline read “Wife of Bears’ lineman wins a bronze medal today in Rio Olympics.” Corey Cogdell-Unrein had just won her second Olympic medal in trap shooting only to have her name and success attributed to her spouse’s athletic career. Unfortunately, microaggressions such as this one are not uncommon in the media’s coverage of women’s sports. Moreover, the coverage itself is problematic, as it is nearly non-existent compared to the attention men’s sports receive. Society has arbitrarily placed sport within the domain of men. The debate is often framed by the claim that insufficient interest in female athletics makes them unprofitable. The real question is whether or not the reason behind the lack of interest is the lack of coverage. Evidence suggests the market of female audiences is growing all the time. The solution to the disparities faced in coverage and microaggressions may rest with female journalists who are more likely to quote and report on women than men. In a vicious cycle, gender hiring practices in sports journalism are unequal, perpetuating the media’s problematic limited attention to female sport. Media organizations must support women in editorial and leadership roles if they wish to avoid sexist culture and the estrangement of female fanatics.

Coverage (or Lack Thereof)

Women’s sports across the board receive far less than equal media coverage around the world. In the United States, women make up approximately two to four percent of all coverage. Televised sporting displays a particular disparity for females where just 1.5 percent of all programming is dedicated to women’s athletics. The lack of coverage reinforces the societal belief that sports are the realm of men, because that is the only gender displayed time and again across the screen. Cheryl Cooky, an associate professor of women’s gender and sexuality studies at Purdue University, has been studying televised sports news for more than twenty years and claims she has witnessed a decline in the coverage of women during her research. Others have gathered evidence to suggest coverage has increased to some capacity.

Increased coverage in recent years may appear to have occurred, however, the content and sports
categories are more isolated than statistics suggest. In the 2016 Rio Olympics, women's sports surpassed men's receiving 58.5 percent of the competition broadcast time on NBC's telecasts. Digging deeper, mid-way through the Olympics the network was revealed to have registered over two hours dedicated to women's beach volleyball and nearly three hours to women's gymnastics. It would be remiss to ignore the fact that these two sports require particularly revealing uniforms. Additionally, it is common that Olympic coverage is dedicated to traditionally feminine sports such as figure skating and gymnastics indicating the tendency to support women in high-level sporting only if they fit into the “feminine mold.” Furthermore, Olympic reporting of female athletes in the media often includes in-depth backstories with more about their familial relationships, spouses, and life outside of sports. While these stories are interesting, they are not an equal statistic to be compared with the time men's pure on-court, athletically competent action receives. By covering select feminine sports and female athletes' non-athletic life, the increased content is essentially just more of the same. Other defenders of increased—though still nowhere near equal—coverage point to websites specifically devoted to women's sports like ESPN-W. Platforms such as these are “a double-edged sword” as they do generate more content about women's sports but simultaneously “compartmentalize it away from the mainstream of sports coverage.” Exacerbating the problematic unequal coverage of female sports are the microaggressions that often appear in the media when content is devoted to women.

Microaggressions in “Girls” Sports

Microaggressions in women's sports media are a manifestation of socialized sexist biases in which our culture is entrenched. It should not be discounted that biological differences between male and female athletes exist relevantly in the context of sport. However, gender norms have been constructed as attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors about how men and women should conduct themselves. These conventions are social concepts with no biological backing that are further fortified in the microaggressions presented by the media. Microaggressions are usually not intentional, rather automatic statements or actions occurring often enough that they may even be overlooked or informed as harmless jokes. The repetition is part of the socialization cycle which must be addressed to stop problematic comments, headlines, and articles. A 2010 study created a taxonomy for the types of microaggressions female athletes face most frequently including the “assumption of inferiority, sexual objectification, and restrictive gender roles.”

Assuming women are inferior revolves around the notion that they are less capable mentally or physically compared to men. The lack of media coverage indirectly is evidence of the conviction that men's sports garner more interest due to their strength, speed, and excitement. Referring to females as “girls” or “ladies” while rarely terming males “boys” or “gentlemen” in sports broadcasting also assumes a woman is meant to view the male in authority or behave within a certain polite confines while men are allowed to be more aggressive and rowdy. One study analyzed the entire ESPN Sport Science series, a collection of videos that assesses performance in terms of biomechanics, to find differences between how women and men were portrayed. Researchers found female athletes were often compared to their male counterparts while the males were never compared to females. This approach was seen as a way to “legitimize female sports accomplishments as athletic.” Here male athletes are the standard to which all athletes are compared, which further entrenches the notion of male athletic superiority. One-way physical comparisons are another familiar example of inferiority microaggressions.

Female athletes are sexualized in the way the media portrays their personhood as reminiscent of the catch-phrase “sex sells.” Objectification involves minimizing the value
or whole being of a woman to her body or body parts. Female athletes are frequently posed in sexual ways with revealing clothing, or none at all, in sporting magazines. These star athletes have the right to pose in whatever way and outfit they please if it makes them feel empowered. Their motivation should be driven by internal desires though, not the societal or industry pressure to appear sexy and feminine despite being an athlete. Serena Williams, Jennie Finch, Danica Patrick, and Lindsay Vonn were all granted Sports Illustrated covers only after they posed for the (SI) swimsuit issue of their respective years. This pattern of receiving rewarded recognition for the professional’s sport after their bodies were revealed, also reveals the objectifying expectations of mainstream media companies. Being a powerhouse athlete and being a woman do not have to be mutually exclusive characteristics.

More broadly than sexual objectification, gender roles are overly emphasized in sporting media restricting women to narrowly defined acceptable behaviors and images. For example, commentators have remarked about elite athletes’ tennis grunts or arguments with the officials referring to them as “ritualized yelling.” The aggression and strength behind these actions are deemed too masculine for women who are expected to always embody the delicate and soft nature that has been arbitrarily attributed to females. In addition to the Sports Illustrated swimsuit sexual objectification editions, Brittney Griner, who is arguably one of the greatest female basketball players ever, remains without a cover likely because she does not fit the feminine mold. Griner has been unapologetically herself, embracing her sexuality, height, and strength since entering the WNBA but those characteristics do not fit the framework society shaped and the media upholds.

Globalized from Washington to Sydney

Similarly horrendous discrepancies in coverage and instances of microaggressions are common throughout the world. In the United Kingdom and Australia, less than ten percent of televised reporting and newspaper stories are focused on women’s athletics. According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) on women and the media, the sporting situation could be argued as even worse-off in other non-English-speaking, smaller nations across the globe. Throughout the report, it is constantly cited that women’s sports and female sporting journalists are underrepresented. UNESCO has created a search-engine extension called “Her Headline” which searches and highlights online media for gender stereotypes that many have become desensitized to as the norm. As Schmidt concludes, “the hegemonic masculinity of sports, and sports media, is not associated with any particular national identity or bounded by any geographic border” meaning the issue of sexist sports exists globally.

The Chicken or the Egg

The golden question around the discrepancy in the attention given to men and women’s competitive sport is whether it is the lack of interest leading to the lack of coverage or the lack of coverage leading to the lack of interest. Valid arguments from both market and normative frameworks can be made, but this paper is focused primarily on the media’s role as gate-keepers. Greater exposure could be the key to changing norms. Data collected across the UK, US, and Australia demonstrated that female journalists were significantly less likely to perceive the current level of women’s sports coverage appropriate and adequate than male journalists. Further, scholars have evidence that interest in female sports increases when women are presented with images of fierce and competent athletes. In other words, perhaps the truer story is that society requires a mindset shift that could result from an increased publicizing of impressive women in sport. After all, the 2015 Women’s World Cup final game is the most-watched soccer match of any gender in United States history and that is due in part to the intensive coverage. A potential market of untapped interest lies beneath the surface.
Female Fandom

The number of female sports fans across large English-speaking countries is increasing each year. Specifically in the United States, as of 2018, women comprised forty-six percent of the entire NFL fanbase. During the last summer Olympic games, women made up more than half of the NBC prime-time viewers. This proof of interest does not automatically mean that the same populations would show-up to watch more women's athletics, but it does provide a market opportunity for capitalizing organizations. If media companies continue to televise or publish microaggressions, maintain strict gender barriers, and refuse to increase the streaming of women's competitions, they could be alienating a growing audience. Alongside expanded female interest in engaging with athletic media, women's desire to directly participate in sports journalism has evolved as well.

Women Want to Take the Lede

Women are increasingly interested in becoming professional sports journalists. Females make up nearly sixty-five percent of journalism and communications majors across America today. The reality these women face in sports broadcasting and writing, however, is bleak. In the UK, only three percent of sports journalists are women, yet in the United States, less than ten percent of newspaper sports articles from the last 30 years in total were written by women. Hiring practices that have created a significant lack of diversity amongst professionals in the field are due for serious re-evaluation.

Failing Grades in Gender Hires

For the fifth consecutive year in 2018, jobs including sports editors, columnists, reporters, and copy editors received an F for gender hires in the sports journalism industry. Overall, hiring practices were not much better according to Central Florida's Institute for Diversity and Ethics in Sports study, which gave more than seventy-five news outlets a D-plus final grade. In fact, ninety percent of all sports editors and 88.5 percent of television sports reporters are men in the US. The lack of women in powerful positions in sports journalism is striking and better explains why the disparity in coverage has persisted for decades. Furthermore, newsroom culture for women is notoriously difficult since athletics have been gendered as a male domain by society. Surveys demonstrate male journalists find women as less credible and assume they instinctively know more about sports than women. When women are given sports reporting assignments, the types of stories awarded are statistically more often 'human interest' pieces. This procedure is likely linked to the belief that females are sensitive and interested in the emotional side of sports making them better candidates for a fluffier story. The failing hiring practices and difficult work culture are reinforcing factors in the discrimination in coverage and microaggressions women's sports face writ large in the media.

Women’s Greatest Advocates: Women

Women are more likely to quote other women, give other women more reporting attention, and cover other women more respectfully than men. According to recent survey data, 74.8 percent of women believed that female sporting should be given greater media coverage. Women are rarely quoted in articles unless the story is about an all-female sport. In comparison, men are featured in articles about women’s sports as cited experts across newspapers in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia. If women are referenced in a male-dominated sport piece or even in women's sports articles, it is most frequently for their familial or domestic role in the life of an athlete. The inequality in quoting demonstrates, yet again, the perception that the female's role is in the home while the male's is in the game.

Terry McDonnell was Managing Editor and then Editor-in-Chief for Sports Illustrated from 2002-2012 where he was named one of Sport’s Business Journal’s 50 Most Influenc-
tial People. Before his time with SI, McDonnell worked as an editor for the US Weekly tabloid and Men’s Journal. His time in these posts “would noticeably influence SI’s direction” as more male-driven. It was under McDonnell’s leadership that the aforementioned disturbing female magazine cover practices for Williams, Finch, Patrick, Vonn, and Griner took place. Yet, McDonnell is just one editor out of all the ninety percent of positions dominated by men in sports journalism. If women are to be covered more often in more respectful ways, there must be positions for them in management and editorial boardrooms. The cycle is continued as women are stuck with human interest stories while promotions are reserved for high-profile reporting. Without the opportunity to excel in serious sporting stories, the promotions remain out of reach. The answer to women’s sports equity in the media may rely on hiring women and hiring them to influential positions.

Hear Women, Hire Women

A desire amongst women to see more females represented in sports journalism is exhibited, as sixty-eight percent have reported they feel women deserve a more prominent role. Not only are women more likely to cover and quote women, but also their image or names on substantive athletic reporting could change the gender culture around sporting altogether as a powerful example to the rest of society. Sexual objectification, restrictive gender roles, and assumptions of inferiority—which can appear without malicious intent—may emerge simply as a result of inexperience in covering women’s sports. Perhaps placing women who have had this experience due to a tendency to quote and advocate for female athletics would mitigate the microaggression culture. Oftentimes, sports broadcasters are retired athletes who have dealt first-hand with their own media portrayal that could give meaningful recommendations from a reporter or managerial perspective. Additionally, hiring former athletes who defy the feminine standard of televised sports would not only offer a more representative portrayal of the female sporting community but also would break through society’s conception of gender confines. The problem and solution are best bound together when it is explained that if “the voices of female sportswriters are muted, women's sports and female athletes lose their best advocate.” The lack of female sports journalists mutually reinforces the disparities in coverage and sexist language around women’s athletics. Media organizations should fix the failing diversity and inclusion hiring grades by placing more women in professional roles of authority to end the cycle of offensive commentary and increase the coverage of women’s sports while also growing the emerging female market.

References

3. Ibid
8. Ibid
11. Carlton, M., Cuevas, M., Ghiasvand, F, Murphy, D., & Shifflett, B. 2016. “Gender
13. Ibid
15. Ibid
17. Ibid
24. Ibid
33. Ibid
34. Ibid
36. Ibid
37. Ibid
39. Ibid
40. Ibid
41. Ibid
42. Ibid
43. Ibid
47. Ibid