


# WHAT'S RACE GOT TO DO WITH IT?



 UNION  
OF  
JUSTICE

CLIMATE INJUSTICE IN EUROPE UNCOVERED

# Intro

# **This research project assesses the intersection of climate policy, social policy and race, to understand the ways in which: a) racism in Europe operates to expose racialised populations to environmental harms, and b) a lack of social resources hinders attempts by those populations to shape climate policy within their respective countries of residence.**

**Environmental injustice is not defined merely by exposure to environmental harms but is also intimately related to the uneven distributions of resources to ameliorate and address these harms.**

It is therefore unsurprising that these environmental issues are compounded by and mediated through other social factors which index inequality in Europe namely poverty, housing, geography - and race.

While discussions of 'climate racism' have long been dominated by the example of the United States, a growing body of research has sought to develop a picture of the nature of climate racism and climate injustice in the European context.

Studies have documented that climate injustices and environmental harms in Europe are disproportionately stacked

against its marginalised - including racialised, and largely working class, communities<sup>2</sup>. This includes increased proximity to waste incinerators<sup>3,4</sup>, waste facilities<sup>5</sup> and polluting industrial facilities<sup>6</sup> as well as greater concentrations of air pollutants<sup>7,8</sup>.

Moreover, studies have emphasised the structural conditions that render these populations inordinately vulnerable to environmental harms, including the lack of political and social resources to push back against policy decisions that impact their local environs<sup>9</sup>, and the de facto marginalisation of particular racialised communities from the democratic process,<sup>10</sup> the comparative lack of information to democratically challenge such decisions compared to more well-off communities<sup>11</sup>. Among these factors was also the role that

housing played as a key mediating factor in vulnerability to environmental harms, with poor housing quality playing in increasing populations' susceptibility to the health impacts of such harms.<sup>12,13</sup>

**This research project therefore places a large emphasis on the politics of environmental injustice and climate racism in Europe**, by analysing the recognition, or lack thereof, of racialised environmental harms, efforts to challenge the racialised dimensions of such harms, as well as the role of racialised communities themselves in combating them, and the barriers they face both at a national level and within the climate movement in doing so.

It analyses this through the use of a public survey alongside a series of expert roundtable discussions with racialised

activists and policy experts from across 10 western European countries with large racialised populations, forming our area of concern: **Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Republic of Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.**

## Roundtables

Between November and December 2023, a series of roundtable discussions and/or interviews were conducted with individuals from each country of concern in order to ground the research in the context of each country and to inform the subsequent research survey.

The roundtables took the form of structured discussions, with a series of questions framed around three areas:

- i) Outlining the context for racialised populations in the specified country in terms of access to state services and exposure to environmental harms;
- ii) Understanding how climate-related policy has been approached in the specified country, and whether these policies have been 'race blind' or sought to tackle existing racialised disparities;
- iii) Determining how much space there is within the policymaking space in the specified country for racialised communities to shape policy.

Following the roundtables, each recording was reviewed for thematic analysis.

There were clear differences between national contexts, but based on the discussions no country gives much reason for celebration.

**Few participants reported feeling positive about climate action and policies being undertaken by their governments, and none believed that climate policies were attentive to the specific issues affecting racialised communities.**

Certain themes were shared or repeated between national examples which warranted further attention.

### **Habitation, segregation, and environmental harms**

**The question of housing emerged as integral to the question of climate justice in Europe**, as a frontline in daily exposure and battles against environmental harms, while also being bound up with larger social and political questions that cannot be neatly siloed off from climate.

**In nearly every country, participants pointed to the spatial concentration and/or segregation of racialised communities into areas disproportionately exposed to environmental harms and hazards**, from

heat islands to industrial zones and their related pollutants, waste incinerators and/or lack of green space, and often living in substandard housing conditions that offered little protection from these hazards.

### **Exclusion**

**These communities also often found themselves excluded from the political process** either by active disenfranchisement - as in the case of Austria's onerous citizenship process - by the penalties imposed by their social precarity, or by the social force of racism itself turning politics into a minefield for racialised communities.

These communities were often 'overlooked' by the local government when it came to the enforcement of housing and environmental policy, while avenues for accountability were limited.

This was illustrated most starkly by the example of Traveller reception areas in places like France, the housing of Roma and Sinti communities in almost-condemned buildings near toxic land in Germany, or the immigration reception areas in Spain - where the physical separation of those communities physically demarcates their social exclusion.

### **Political polarisation**

This was reinforced by the fact that a **number of countries in discussion had seen recent electoral breakthroughs of far-right parties or growing momentum among them, which had a discernible impact on the political climate and on prospects for climate justice and anti-racism.**

This includes hard or far-right parties agitating for a cessation or reversal of climate policies, whether national or directed by the European Union, as well as sharpening racism in the public political debate, especially directed against migrants and asylum seekers.

### **Gap between climate and social justice**

Moreover, it was clear that the political space available for certain elements of the European far-right to claim 'pro-climate' credentials exists due to the narrow mainstream conception of climate and climate action that is evicted of social concerns like racism.

The cynicism of mainstream climate politics, such as government greenwashing tactics and corporate hijack<sup>14</sup>, has offered Green politics little defence from a surging far-right offering perverse

solutions to real, material social plights. This has led to the political quagmire currently facing the European Green Deal, with decreasing political legitimacy in the face of a popular backlash.

**The future of a progressive, robust climate movement in Europe depends on their ability to learn, draw from, and build durable solidarity with communities in struggle** against social, economic, and political injustice - including racialised and migrant communities.

More specifically, it is vital that these movements build with those communities on equal terms, **support greater self-organisation of racialised communities to enable them to develop a collective voice and build power, and to accept some direction from their leadership where fitting.**

**Building a political system and climate movement inclusive of racialised and excluded communities would also entail mobilising around a 'climate justice' framework** that defies a compartmentalisation between 'climate' and 'social' issues.

It would also mean emphasising the international dimensions of climate change and climate action, particularly placing an emphasis on the impact on the Global South, and ensuring that calls

and demands for climate justice locally do not succumb to parochialism or to merely offset or offload climate action and its impacts on the Global South.

## Survey

The survey was developed to address 3 themes:

- 1) Subjective perceptions of the importance and priority of climate change as an issue**
- 2) Satisfaction with their government's communication around climate action plans**
- 3) Perceptions of barriers to engaging with and shaping climate policy**

The majority of respondents were recruited through a targeted social media campaign.

**Collectively our social media adverts reached over 1,435,532 accounts online.**

This generated over 7943 click-throughs which led to the completion of 3,510 surveys with unique IDs.

After filtering out responses from those registering themselves as being of



a White ethnicity, as well as obvious examples of spam or abusive respondents, **3,131 valid responses remained.**

**Summary of findings:**

**QS1: Importance of climate change as a national issue**

In order to gauge perceptions of the importance ascribed to climate change as a socio-political issue, respondents were asked to rate their response to the question **'How important do you consider climate change to be as a national issue?'**

Responses were given on a rating via Likert scale (1: Very Unimportant, 7: Very Important; 4: Neither/Unsure).

Ratings 1-3 were aggregated as 'Unimportant', and ratings 5-7 were aggregated as 'Important'.

Respondents **overwhelmingly rated climate change as an 'Important' national issue**, with proportions of 'Important' responses exceeding 75% in all but two of the countries - **Italy (61%)** and **Spain (70.54%)**.

Other than **Italy (29%)** and **Spain (25.45%)**, no country registered more than 1 in 5 respondents rating this as an 'Unimportant' national issue.

**From this question it is evident that racialised people surveyed in this survey found climate change to be a pertinent issue, in line with the general trend reported by polls across Europe on the climate.**

**QS2: Importance of climate change as an issue for respondents and their communities**

As the roundtable discussions sometimes noted a disconnect between climate

change as an objectively important issue, and how much importance was ascribed to them by racialised communities given other immediate material concerns, respondents were then asked to rate their response to the question ***How important do you consider climate change to be for you and your community in particular?***


As with question QS1, responses were given through a rating via Likert scale (1: Very Unimportant, 7: Very Important; 4: Neither/Unsure).

Ratings 1-3 were aggregated as 'Unimportant', and ratings 5-7 were aggregated as 'Important'.

Respondents again **overwhelmingly rated climate change as an 'Important' issue for themselves and their communities**, albeit in slightly different proportions to their response to the question regarding its importance as a national issue.

**In all but 3 countries, 75% or more of respondents rated it as an**

**Graph 1:** Aggregated responses to QS1 'How important do you consider climate change to be as a national issue?', by country



**'Important' issue for themselves and their communities; the exceptions being Italy (63%), Netherlands (71.38%), and Portugal (71.95%).**

Only **Italy (24.50%)** and the **Netherlands (21.23%)** saw more than 1 in 5 respondents report climate change as 'Unimportant' for themselves and their communities.

A side-by-side comparison between responses for the previous question and this question provided mixed outcomes.

**Six of the ten countries** (Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Spain) saw a greater proportion of responses for **'Important' for themselves and their communities (QS2) in comparison to national importance (QS1)**, though these were usually slight differences.

**Four of the ten** (Germany, Netherlands, Portugal and UK), however, saw the opposite, with a greater proportion of responses reporting climate change as an **'important' national issue (QS1) as compared to its importance for themselves and their communities (QS2)**.

The differences in the proportion of 'Important'/'Unimportant' responses between QS1 and QS2 were analysed for statistical significance, with a confidence level of 95%.

**There was a statistically significant difference between reported Importance of climate change as a national issue compared to its Importance for respondents themselves and their communities** for three countries: **France, Spain and the UK.**

**In each case this statistical significance was seen in both directions: for both 'Important' rankings and 'Unimportant' rankings.**

**QS3: Satisfaction with government communication about climate action plans**


We wanted to probe into the point raised above about the 'democratic deficit' in relation to climate change, in order to assess whether respondents felt well-informed about their governments' strategies for addressing climate change - something that had implications both for democratic involvement in climate action,

and for developing climate preparedness among their populations.

Question QS3 was therefore formulated to gauge how satisfied and engaged regular, lay, racialised individuals were with their respective governments' communications regarding national climate action plans and policies.

Participants were asked to score how much they agreed with the statement:

**Graph 2:** Aggregated responses to QS2 'How important do you consider climate change to be for you and your community in particular?', by country.



**'I feel that my government keeps me well informed about their plans and policies for tackling climate change'.**

Responses were given through a rating via Likert scale (1: Completely Disagree, 7: Completely Agree; 4: Neither Agree nor Disagree/Unsure). Ratings 1-3 were aggregated as 'Disagree', and ratings 5-7 were aggregated as 'Agree'.

Respondents **were mixed on this question.**

There was a clear **general tendency to Disagree with the statement posed**, with **every country except Ireland (49.18%)** recording a **majority of over 50% of respondents Disagreeing with it.**

Only four countries recorded **more than one in five respondents registering Agreement** with the statement: **Ireland (32.79%), Netherlands (27.08%), France (25.53%) and Italy (20.50%)**, with a mean value of 17.76% between countries.

The **proportions of Disagreement varied vastly** between countries, however, with a **range of 26.02%.**

The **highest proportions of Disagreement** came from **Portugal (75.20%), Germany (75.07%) and Spain (73.66%)**, with a mean value of 65.28%.

The lowest proportion of **Disagreement** came from **Ireland (49.18%), Netherlands (58.46%), Italy (58.50%) and France (58.44%).**

Also noticeable was the high **proportion of respondents answering 'Neither Agree or Disagree/Unsure'** (score '4' on the scale).

In order to try and gain an insight into the motivations for respondents choosing the answer **'Neither Agree or Disagree/Unsure'**


**'Disagree/Unsure'**, we reviewed those respondents' answers to an optional follow-up question, asking of respondents: **'Please could you explain your ranking for the previous question [QS3]?'.**

While the number of respondents choosing the answer 'Neither Agree or Disagree/Unsure' which opted to explain their responses in the follow-up was very small, the responses did suggest that their response was informed by **Mistrust**

**of their governments' and the claims regarding climate policies** - including concerns of greenwashing - or their beliefs on the **Disconnect between the rhetoric of their government and the reality of implementation of climate policies.**

These both feed into the wider issue of a disillusionment with mainstream politics that is expressed through the idea of a democratic deficit in Europe and European policymaking.

**Graph 3:** Aggregated responses to QS3 'I feel that my government keeps me well informed about their plans and policies for tackling climate change', by country.





### QS4: Opportunity for shaping climate policy

In order to more directly assess the factors impacting political engagement, the survey asked respondents to report on their feelings on the level of opportunity available to them, as a racialised person, to shape climate policy in their country when compared with a white person.

Question QS4 asked to score how much they agreed with the statement: ***'I feel that people of a 'non-white' background in my country have just as much opportunity to influence its climate policies as people of a white background'***\*

Responses were given through a rating via Likert scale (1: Completely Disagree, 7: Completely Agree; 4: Neither Agree nor Disagree/Unsure). Ratings 1-3 were aggregated as 'Disagree', and ratings 5-7 were aggregated as 'Agree'.

There was a **clear general tendency to Disagree with the statement posed**, with a majority scoring between 1 and 3 on the question. Responses varied between countries over the extent of Disagreement, however, with a range of 27.94%.

The highest proportion of respondents Disagreeing with the statement could be found in **Germany (82.04%)**, and

the lowest proportion in **Ireland (54.10%)**, with an overall mean value of 67.84% between countries.

Five of the countries recorded over 70% of respondents registering Disagreement with the statement: **Germany (82.04%), Spain (79.02%), Austria (75.96%), Belgium (72.88%)** and **Portugal (70.85%)**.


Only two countries recorded **more than one in five respondents registering Agreement** with the statement: **Ireland (33.33%)** and **Netherlands (25.46%)**. **The UK (19.97%)** came close.

As with QS3, there was a notably **high proportion of respondents answering 'Neither Agree or Disagree /Unsure'** (score '4' on the scale).

There were 5 countries where we **found a statistically significant difference in the proportion of 'Agree' or 'Disagree' responses in terms of gender: France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and the UK.**

However, these **instances of statistically significant differences did not follow a consistent gendered trend in this particular sample set, and so no clear conclusions can be drawn from it.**

**Graph 4:** Aggregated responses to QS4 'I feel that people of a 'non-white' background in my country have just as much opportunity to influence its climate policies as people of a white background', by country.



### QS5: Barriers in shaping climate policy

Having established through responses to QS4 that respondents largely felt there to be less opportunity for racialised people to shape climate policy in their country than their white counterparts, QS5 sought to gain a greater insight into the type of barriers faced by racialised communities.

A set of possible barriers was formulated based on themes that emerged during the roundtable discussions.

These included four choices that were centred around the theme of **social and political exclusion**.

A further three choices focuses on limitations within the sphere of climate action.

And two choices focused on **personal or individual constraints**.

This question asked respondents *What would you consider the main barriers for 'non-white' communities in influencing climate policy in your country?*


Responses were given through multiple choice selection, where respondents were asked to indicate as many options as had a bearing on the difficulty for racialised communities in their country to shape climate policy.

There was no ranking for their selection

Six options were selected by at least 1 in 3 respondents, on average 15:

- **Racial discrimination preventing engagement** (average: 57.65%)
- **Feeling excluded from the process** (average: 46.85%)
- **Feeling that they won't be heard** (average: 38.42%)
- **Lack of time to participate** (average: 34.53%)
- **No opportunities to engage** (average: 33.79%)
- **Language barriers to engagement** (33.66%)

**Graph 5:** Average selection rates for QS5 'What would you consider the main barriers for 'non-white' communities in influencing climate policy in your country?', across all countries)



# Conclusion

The picture we have found is that racialised communities in western Europe, in line with wider populations in Europe, are overwhelmingly concerned about the climate crisis, but negative about their governments' communication regarding climate action plans and, more importantly, about their ability to shape the climate agenda in their countries.

There are certainly limitations to the present study, including sample size.

We would encourage future research to build upon the insights we have offered, including through larger and more representative sample sets.

Yet these findings reveal a disturbing level of disenfranchisement and exclusion among racialised communities in Europe, which has ramifications not just for climate action, but for democracy more broadly.

The picture we have gotten from our research is therefore that racialised communities are:

- Stigmatised and excluded in European society,
- Bearing the brunt of racial and

class injustices which confine them to settlement in zones of squalor and environmental harms,

- Excluded and marginalised from spaces to shape and influence climate policy, and therefore
- Drawing little benefit from mainstream climate initiatives.

## Recommendations

Healthy environments: Monitoring and tackling exposure to climate harms

### European Union

- 1) Provide comprehensive reports on the cumulative environmental impacts on marginalised communities, on a bi-yearly basis.**
- 2) Mandate member states to ensure that the siting and implementation of known pollution sources - such as industrial zones and factories, waste incinerators and waste sites - are subject to proper democratic consultation with impacted local communities prior to**

**implementation, and that information on the pollution and harms from such sources are communicated openly in multiple languages.**

- 3) Mandate member states to report progress made on environmental justice every two years. All surveys and research must be co-produced with marginalised communities.**

### National Governments

- 1) Implement legislation enshrining a national obligation to ensure that air quality is within World Health Organisation limits, with clear mechanisms of accountability and repair for authorities where this is not met.**
- 2) Implement legislation to ensure that the siting and implementation of known pollution sources - such as industrial zones and factories, waste incinerators and waste sites - are subject to proper democratic consultation with impacted local communities prior to implementation, and that information on the pollution and harms from such sources are communicated widely, including in alternative locally-spoken languages were necessary.**
- 3) Ensure that access to well-maintained, public green space is available and**

accessible to all according to World Health Organization recommendations that all people reside within 300 metres of green space.

- 4) To collect data on environmental quality, pollution, and public health outcomes disaggregated by race to identify disproportionately affected communities. Work with institutions led by marginalised and racialised communities to ensure that this information is disseminated widely, and translated into alternative languages were necessary.**
- 5) Endeavour to make public transportation accessible and affordable for all.**
- 6) Ensure that racialised communities receive significant public education, technical assistance, as well as generating public-facing data and platforms to help communities learn about the impacts of the climate emergency.**
- 7) Integrate mitigations of the adverse impacts of climate change on racialised populations within the EU Buildings Directive.**

## Climate movements

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- 1) To campaign for the implementation of legislation enshrining a national obligation to ensure that air quality is within World Health Organisation limits, with clear mechanisms of accountability and repair for authorities where this is not met, akin to 'Ella's Law' proposed in Britain.
- 2) Campaign for the establishment and proper implementation of housing regulation, rather than allowing them to become 'checkbox exercises'.

## No climate justice without social justice

### European Union

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- 1) Establish an office of Climate Justice Accountability within the European Commission, which will identify and eliminate barriers to inclusion, investigate dubious practices, monitor the progress of the green transition and require all environmental legislation or regulation introduced by the European Union to receive an equity score created by climate experts and community organisers. It will also make sure that all facets of the EU commission are being held accountable for climate equity.

- 2) To ensure the integration of the impact of climate related racism into EU-mandated National Action Plans Against Racism (NAPAR) to address systemic injustices faced by racialised communities in member states.

### National Governments

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- 1) Ensure that relevant 'just transition' processes are inclusive of informalised workforces and racialised communities, so that they are not left out of such transition initiatives.
- 2) Push the European Parliament to ensure the integration of the impact of climate related racism into EU-mandated National Action Plans Against Racism (NAPAR) to address systemic injustices faced by racialised communities in member states.
- 3) Push the European Parliament for the establishment of an office of Climate Justice Accountability within the European Commission.

### Climate movements

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- 1) Adopt a climate justice framework and ethos, and seek to build a climate movement that has antiracism, migrant justice and internationalism as its cornerstones, by integrating climate campaigns with struggles

against poor and unregulated housing, anti-migrant policing, racism, Islamophobia and fascism.

- 2) Campaign actively for the exclusion of far-right parties and groups from participating in climate campaigns and rallies, to preclude them 'greenwashing' their image.
- 3) Pledge to adopt a racial lens to all forms of research and advocacy undertaken by organisations within the movement.

## Battle Europe's democratic deficit

### European Union

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- 1) Establish a European-level interagency process to ensure that marginalised communities are consulted and actively involved in carrying out the implementation of the European Green Deal.
- 2) Scale the European Climate Pact into a mass citizen consultation where voices from marginalised communities are supported and amplified.
- 3) Endeavour to actively carry out democratic forums and processes such as consultations and assemblies, are carried out in districts and areas known to be populated by racialised and migrant populations
- 4) Make available ringfenced, unconditional grant funding for civil society organisations led by racialised groups working on climate to support their work.

### National Governments

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- 1) Foster and support the participation of those self-organised and/or informalised institutions of racialised

communities, such as faith institutions, to engage in policymaking discussions and processes around climate.

- 2) Foster and support the participation of racialised communities in democratic forums and processes relating to climate policy including, as and where applicable and lawful, through positive action, positive discrimination and/or guaranteed representation. Ensure that amnesty is provided for any undocumented migrants that are encouraged to engage in such processes also, so that they are not deterred by fear of repercussion.
- 5) Include voluntary ethnicity monitoring in census and other population-mapping exercises to better map the distribution of racialised communities, and to enable more informed national discussions on the impact of

environmental harms upon them.  
France: Amend the 1978 law of  
information and freedom to make  
lawful the collection of ethnicity data.

### Climate movements

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- 1) Seek to develop networks of mutual solidarity with other movements, campaigns and civil society organisations in your countries that tackle issues relating to race/ism, migrants' rights and climate justice in the Global South, particularly those self-organised by racialised groups. Recognise where a division of organising labour may need to be negotiated with such groups to enable racialised individuals to participate in climate action without exposing them to undue risk of repression.



## Endnotes

- 1 Including migrant and asylum seekers
- 2 Schutter, Liesbeth & Wieland, Hanspeter & Gözet, Burcu & Giljum, Stefan. (2017). "Environmental Inequality in Europe." Wien: Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien.
- 3 Laurian, L., & Funderburg, R. (2013). "Environmental justice in France? A spatio-temporal analysis of incinerator location". *Journal of Environmental Planning and Management*, 57(3), 424–446. doi:10.1080/09640568.2012.749395
- 4 Schwarz, L., Benmarhnia, T., & Laurian, L. (2015). "Social Inequalities Related to Hazardous Incinerator Emissions: An Additional Level of Environmental Injustice". *Environmental Justice*, 8(6), 213–219. doi:10.1089/env.2015.0022
- 5 Kapoor, Alba & Hood, Simon & Youssef, Nannette (2022). *Confronting Injustice: Racism and the environmental emergency*. Runnymede Trust/Greenpeace. Available at: <https://www.runnymedetrust.org/publications/confronting-injustice-racism-and-the-environmental-emergency>
- 6 Glatter-Götz, Helene et al. (2019). "Environmental Inequality in Austria: Do inhabitants' socioeconomic characteristics differ depending on their proximity to industrial polluters?". *Environmental Pollution*, 198, 201–210. doi:10.1016/j.envpol.2014.12.014
- 7 Fecht, D., Fischer, P., Fortunato, L., Hoek, G., de Hoogh, K., Marra, M., Hanneke K., Vienneau, D., Beelen, R. & Hansell, A. (2015). "Associations between air pollution and socioeconomic characteristics, ethnicity and age profile of neighbourhoods in England and the Netherlands". *Environmental Pollution*, 198, 201–210. doi:10.1016/j.envpol.2014.12.014
- 8 Mitchell, Gordon & Norman, Paul & Mullin, Karen. (2015). "Who benefits from environmental policy? An environmental justice analysis of air quality change in Britain, 2001–2011". *Environmental Research Letters*. 10. 105009. 10.1088/1748-9326/10/10/105009.
- 9 Schutter, Liesbeth et al. (2017). "Environmental Inequality in Europe." Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent (2021). *Environmental Justice, the Climate Crisis and people of African descent A/HRC/48/78*. Available at: [https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session48/Documents/A\\_HRC\\_48\\_78.docx](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session48/Documents/A_HRC_48_78.docx)
- 10 Schwarz, L., Benmarhnia, T., & Laurian, L. (2015). "Social Inequalities Related to Hazardous Incinerator Emissions: An Additional Level of Environmental Injustice". *Environmental Justice*, 8(6), 213–219. doi:10.1089/env.2015.0022
- 11 Schutter, Liesbeth et al. (2017). "Environmental Inequality in Europe." Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey - Being Black in the EU (2018). European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. [https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra\\_uploads/fra-2018-being-black-in-the-eu\\_en.pdf](https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-being-black-in-the-eu_en.pdf)
- 12 Smyth, Jamie & Wilson, Tom (2023). *Big oil welcomes COP28 call to move away from fossil fuels in 'orderly' way*. FT. Available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/6034f475-e1d5-47e1-9456-afb540bd9702>
- 15 The selection rates for these varied between countries. In certain cases these variations were quite stark - this is in part due to respondents from Ireland, who consistently selected options at a rate below the mean average. For example, while almost two thirds of respondents in Spain (65.18%) selected 'Racial discrimination', just under one third of respondents in Ireland (32.24%) selected this option - giving a range of 32.94% between selection rates in Spain and in Ireland. Excluding Ireland, this range becomes a much narrower 15.33% between Spain and Netherlands (49.85%). Similarly, 40.68% of respondents in Belgium selected 'No opportunities to engage', which was over double the selection rate in Ireland (19.13%), giving a range of 21.55%. Excluding Ireland, this range becomes a 13.60% difference between Belgium and Netherlands (27.08%).

**Union of Justice is a European, independent, people of colour (POC) led organisation dedicated to racial justice and climate justice. We empower those most affected by equipping them with the skills and knowledge needed to make a difference. Additionally, we conduct and promote research as well as campaign to create a Europe and a world that is equitable, just and sustainable.**

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without us!"**