The North American revolutionary Left during the 1970s can generally be split into two camps: those who emphasized questions of class and devoted themselves to workplace organizing, and those who prioritized anti-imperialist struggles both within the United States and around the world. But this division was not necessarily hard and fast, since a range of radicals attempted at different points to map the intersection between these areas. One such outfit, notable both for its theoretical contributions and its practical work, was the Sojourner Truth Organization (STO). STO was a small group—rarely exceeding even fifty members—that emphasized participation in mass struggles, opposed Stalinism as both politic and method, and helped develop the theory of white-skin privilege, which it identified as the central impediment to successful movements for revolution within the United States. This set of commitments ensured that STO’s take on both workplace and anti-imperialist struggles was unorthodox for its time, and as a result its efforts looked rather different from the dominant expressions of the two camps.

The organization was founded in late 1969 and carried on until the mid-1980s, paralleling the historical trajectory of many larger and better-known radical groups that developed in the aftermath of the New Left. Its origins lay in a small coterie in Chicago—veterans of Students for a Democratic Society, the Black Panthers, the women’s movement, labor struggles, and Old Left parties—who began intervening in popular struggles in both community and workplace contexts as the 1960s ended, just as various Trotskyist and new communist movement organizations were doing in other parts of the country.

Two theoretical innovations marked STO’s contribution to the revolutionary Left. First, the group rearticulated the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony as an analysis of “dual consciousness,” arguing that the working class displayed both a broad acceptance of the status quo and an embryonic awareness of its own revolutionary potential as a class. An early pamphlet produced by STO suggested that “what is in the worker’s head is a source of...
power insofar as it reflects the worldview of the working class—and a source of weakness—insofar as it reflects the world view of the capitalist class.”

The task of revolutionaries was to help expand the level of proletarian consciousness through participation in mass struggle, while challenging the acquiescence to bourgeois consciousness. STO believed that this process required the creation of a revolutionary party, but it rejected what it called the “Stalin model” of party-building in favor of an eclectic mix of organizational ideas drawn from Lenin and, as the 1970s progressed, from the Trinidadian Marxist C.L.R. James.

This conception of consciousness, the potential of the working class, and the role of revolutionaries was unusual, to say the least, within the developing new communist movement of the early 1970s. Most other groups organizing at the “point of production” maintained the traditional position associated with Lenin’s well-known tract *What Is to Be Done*: workers themselves can only obtain the sort of “trade union consciousness” that leads them to accept partial concessions from management in a permanently reformist cycle. Thus, the class will remain divided and ineffectual until the guiding leadership of organized, conscious revolutionaries transforms the perspective of the workers from the outside, creating the “revolutionary consciousness” that is necessary for the overthrow of capitalism. This line of thinking led to the creation of multiple self-appointed vanguard parties throughout the 1970s, such as the Revolutionary Communist Party (previously the Revolutionary Union, or RU) and the Communist Party Marxist-Leninist (initially the October League, or OL). Both of these organizations at their respective heights were far larger than STO, each including hundreds of members spread across the country. Depending upon one’s perspective, they could also be viewed as having been more “successful” in their workplace interventions. Despite the group’s smaller size, however, the ingenuity of STO’s unusual approach makes the organization worth careful study. STO was largely uninterested in its own organizational growth, preferring instead to advance its politics directly within broader movements. This strategy allowed a relatively small number of committed revolutionaries to make a significant impact on a wide range of industrial workplaces. Similarly, STO’s theoretical contributions emerged from within a context of continued engagement with working class struggles. The group’s major thinkers were not professional academics, and despite some university background they fell largely into the category of organic intellectuals. Partly as a result, STO’s intellectual and strategic contributions were always disproportionate to the group’s small size. In a context where a new generation of radicals is considering historical models for political action, STO’s unique experiences offer important lessons on topics such as dealing with union bureaucracies, engaging in labor struggles outside of unions, and combining antiracism with working-class militancy.

The second quintessential aspect of STO’s revolutionary theory was its analysis of white-skin privilege as a bulwark of white supremacy. A founding member of the group, Noel Ignatin (now Ignatiev), helped pioneer the concept by reframing ideas initially advanced by W.E.B. Du Bois, especially in his classic work *Black...*
According to the theory, people identified as “white” benefit from material and psychological advantages that people of color are denied. STO argued that white workers must “actively and militantly reject their partial, selfish and counterfeit interests as part of a group which is favored in relation to blacks, on behalf of their total, broad and true interests as part of a class which is coming alive.” As a largely white group, STO saw its role as spurring the white working class in this direction and supporting organizing efforts emerging from black, Puerto Rican, and other nonwhite communities.

The white-skin privilege theory was in many ways the theoretical pivot that allowed STO to shift from its early workplace organizing orientation to its later emphasis on anti-imperialist solidarity efforts. As with the question of dual consciousness, the white-skin privilege analysis sharply differentiated STO’s politics from those of many other leftists during the 1970s. Most Trotskyists and the bulk of the new communist movement rejected the theory altogether as a counterproductive manifestation of white guilt in the service of reactionary forms of nationalism among blacks and other oppressed communities. On the other hand, the white anti-imperialist Left, including the Weather Underground (WUO) and its supporters, embraced a variation on the theory, and former members of STO remember being criticized for having a supposedly naïve attachment to the possibility of class-based organizing among white workers. Even as STO’s self-understanding changed during the mid-1970s, away from the new communist movement and toward the anti-imperialist milieu, it retained its own distinctive analysis of white-skin privilege. Partly as a result, its subsequent relations with other groups active in the anti-imperialist Left, such as the Prairie Fire Organizing Committee (PFOC), were somewhat strained.

Within this intellectual framework, STO spent the decade of the 1970s engaged in a striking array of practical work. These efforts can be categorized roughly into two periods: a workplace organizing period lasting approximately from 1970 through 1975, and an anti-imperialist solidarity period running more or less from 1976 through the end of the decade. These demarcations are not exact, as both sorts of organizing continued at some level during both periods. They also neglect a range of other essential components of STO’s work, including a continuing commitment to autonomous organizing by working-class women and an intense focus on theoretical development and internal education. Nonetheless, an assessment of these two periods can shed significant light on STO’s unique place within the movements of the 1970s.

Workplace Organizing

STO’s early emphasis was on organizing at the point of production, especially in large factories in the steel, auto, and manufacturing sectors. In contrast to many groups of the period also engaged in workplace organizing, STO rejected mainstream labor unions as a venue for struggle, calling instead for “independent mass
workers’ organizations.”10 Group members participated in the creation of many such organizations, in both unionized and non-union factories, always agitating for demands that challenged what STO, following Antonio Gramsci, described as the compromise of “industrial legality.”11 This compromise doomed traditional labor unions, which necessarily negotiated workable relationships between workers and management. STO’s activities within several dozen factories in and around Chicago resulted in hundreds of job actions during the early 1970s, ranging from short-term work stoppages to longer wildcat strikes and sabotage at the workplace.

STO’s approach to workplace struggles was heavily influenced by radical workers’ movements in Italy and the United States. In 1969, the Italian industrial working class rose up in a widespread rebellion known as the Autunno Caldo (Hot Autumn).12 When a number of major union contracts came up for renewal simultaneously, the collaboration between the company bosses and the union bureaucrats was plain to see. At the same time, the Italian government was in the beginning stages of a lengthy campaign to foment fascist paramilitary violence against leftists and working-class militants. Major Italian factories like Fiat and Pirelli were staffed, in large part, by internal migrants from southern Italy, whose agrarian backgrounds included extensive experience with direct action and sometimes violent confrontation but only limited previous interaction with trade unions. As a result, maneuvering by union officials failed to impress the rank and file, while incidents of fascist terror largely reinforced the militancy of the working class.

The Hot Autumn featured a number of factory occupations and, in the end, resulted in enormous concessions from management, including an average wage increase of almost 25 percent. More importantly, however, the Italian events highlighted the potential for a type of permanent organization of workers outside the trade-union model, which generated new theories of revolution grouped under the general heading of operaismo, or “workerism.”13 The key theoretical innovation to come out of the Italian context was “autonomy,” meaning the independence of the working class not only from capital, but also from its “official” representatives in the unions and from its would-be vanguards in the Leninist Left. In the North American context, most of the new communist movement took inspiration from the Hot Autumn’s factory occupations while ignoring or rejecting its organizational and theoretical innovations.14 For STO, however, these elements were to prove decisive in the creation of a novel approach to workplace organizing.

Closer to home, the trajectory of the League of Revolutionary Black Workers (LRBW) in Detroit was perhaps more inspiring than the Italian events, even though it was much smaller in its impact and more fragile in its outcomes. The inspiring aspect of the Detroit experience was precisely in its location. Detroit was a largely black city in a country where all recent radical movements had emerged either from, or in response to movements within, the black community. It was also closer to Chicago than was Turin. The league had in fact established direct contact
with many of the Italian radicals in the winter before the Hot Autumn, when LRBW member John Watson traveled to Rome for a conference on anti-imperialism.\textsuperscript{15} Detroit was hardly unique in producing militant rank-and-file labor struggles, but the sophistication of the LRBW gave the city enough national prominence on the Left that, decades later, Noel Ignatiev could still speak metaphorically of the “Petrograd-Detroit industrial proletariat” as the context for STO’s initial forays into workplace organizing.\textsuperscript{16}

The guiding principle of STO’s attempts at workplace organizing was the rejection of trade unions as the vehicle for their efforts. Following the strategy outlined in \textit{What Is to Be Done?}, most other Left groups of the era (including both the RU and the OL, as well as several Trotskyist organizations) emphasized the creation of opposition caucuses that could eventually take over the unions and turn them into fighting organizations of the working class. But for STO the very concept of “trade union consciousness,” combined with the experiences of the LRBW, as well as the overall arc of organized labor’s increasingly corrupt history in the twentieth century, implied profound limits to the unions’ radical potential.\textsuperscript{17} In this context, the experiences of the original Industrial Workers of the World (IWW, or the Wobblies), from its inception in 1905 to its decline in the mid-1920s, provided an example of an alternative to the AFL-CIO. STO referred to this alternative as “independent mass workers’ organizations,” which largely paralleled the Wobbly concept of “one big union.” In its prime, the IWW had organized thousands of workplaces, led hundreds of strike actions, and throughout had shown complete disregard for bourgeois niceties like legality, reasonableness, and respectability.\textsuperscript{18} The Wobblies reflected and crystallized the revolutionary aspirations of a vast cross-section of semi-skilled and unskilled industrial workers all across the United States. Beginning from Chicago more than half a century later, STO optimistically hoped to accomplish something similar.

For the most part, STO’s strategy took one of two approaches: either the group provided support to independent organizations as they developed in a range of workplaces, or members of STO took jobs in specifically targeted factories and attempted to organize independent groupings directly, with and alongside other militant coworkers. The flagship factory for this sort of industrial concentration was the Stewart-Warner facility on the North Side of Chicago, although similar efforts were made at Motorola, at the International Harvester Plant in Melrose Park, and in the steel mills of South Chicago and northwestern Indiana. In the early years, the organization was structured into multiple branches, and for a time each branch was associated with a major factory concentration, although in no case did every member of a branch work in the target plant.\textsuperscript{19} In each instance, however, several STO members obtained work in each factory and set about organizing rank-and-file groups that always included nonmembers as well. Many of these workplaces featured female majorities among the workers, and women in STO were just as likely to take factory jobs as the men. In fact, the first periodical published by STO, a single issue of a tabloid named \textit{Bread and Roses}, was aimed
directly at working-class women, especially those employed in factories and hospitals.

The first part of building an industrial concentration was obtaining employment in the chosen factories. This was not always easy, especially for middle-class radicals with years of university experience in their recent past. Lies had to be told, job applications had to be fudged, and eyebrow-raising aspects of personal histories had to be rewritten for the benefit of hiring agents. When John Strucker, for example, applied for work at the Stewart-Warner factory, he needed to explain away the seven years he had spent pursuing his undergraduate and graduate degrees full-time. He concocted an elaborate tale, wherein he had completed high school but then had been obligated to take over the family hardware store in New Jersey when his father became ill. Being good with his hands but not much of a manager, the store struggled for several years and eventually went under, after which he had headed to Chicago in search of a factory job. This story was good enough to get him work as a lathe operator, a position he held for more than a decade. Early on, however, he was identified as a troublemaker, and the company eventually researched his back-story. Once they determined that no such hardware store had ever existed, management attempted to fire him. With help from STO’s contingent of lawyers, Strucker appealed his case to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Upon consideration, the NLRB ruled in his favor, noting that although he had in fact lied on his job application, he had lied “down,” underplaying his credentials rather than overstating them.20

In the early 1970s, the Stewart-Warner factory employed several thousand people, more or less evenly split among black, white, and Latino (largely Puerto Rican) workers, of whom perhaps one-half were women.21 The plant manufactured a variety of electrical components for use in cars, boats, and other vehicles. It had a range of military contracts that were lost in the aftermath of the Vietnam War.22 As many as a dozen STO members had jobs in a variety of departments and were thus able to slowly build a factory-wide presence for the group’s politics. The first step in this regard was the initiation of a shop newsletter called *Talk Back*, which was published irregularly for close to a decade. Initially, *Talk Back* was published and distributed anonymously to prevent the company from punishing those responsible. As time went on, however, the members began to distribute the newsletter publicly as a way to build solidarity within the factory. In addition, STO members also produced and distributed a range of stickers in and around the factory, which were used as propaganda and as morale-boosters.

The distribution of shop sheets and agitational newspapers was a common tactic for leftists involved in workplace organizing in the 1970s, and there is no evidence that STO was any more successful than competing groups like the RU or OL at integrating workers into their preparation or at tying their production to specific struggles. The distinctiveness of STO’s approach to the workplace became clearer when, building upon the initial work of producing shop sheets, in-plant efforts graduated to supporting and even initiating organizing efforts within the
Three campaigns ran the gamut from small-scale attempts to remove particularly mean-spirited or racist foremen to plant-wide struggles around improving working conditions and health and safety precautions.

Three elements helped clarify the differences between STO’s efforts and those of other groups involved in factory work. First, unlike other Left groups organizing in factories, STO did not attempt to change the union leadership. Rather than develop oppositional caucuses that could challenge corrupt union bureaucrats, STO argued that the institution of the trade union was itself the problem, and that changing the names on the leadership slate would, at best, have no effect, or, at worst, make workers even more complacent than they had previously been. At Stewart-Warner, for example, *Talk Back* mocked union caucus efforts by promoting a garbage can, “Filthy Billy” Trash, as a “CANdidate” for president of the local. Criticized by skeptics both inside and outside STO, this abstention from fights over union leadership extended even to the level of departmental steward, which represented to many leftists both a winnable and a meaningful position in the union hierarchy. Stewards have responsibility for pursuing worker grievances, and the choice between a responsive steward and a corrupt one can make the difference between success and failure in, for example, a worker’s compensation claim. Nonetheless, STO’s critical perspective on trade unions led the group to decide that no STO member could run for steward, although members did sometimes support, and shop sheets periodically reported on, the candidacies of militant coworkers.

Of course, not all workplaces were unionized. In non-union plants, a different set of problems presented themselves, but the contrast between STO and other Left groups attempting to organize workers remained. At the Motorola factory on the West Side of Chicago, for example, STO members were involved in creating the Motorola Organizing Committee and publishing the newsletter *Breakout!* But this was not a campaign to win union recognition and a first contract. Even after several years of organizing at the plant, the editors of *Breakout!* could write: “We do not work for any union. We are not against unions, but mostly we are for people fighting the company.” Just as in unionized factories, the STO members at Motorola thought unions were not a productive way to fight the company, so they never attempted to bring one in.

Another major difference between STO’s approach and that of other Left groups committed to industrial concentration related to the kinds of demands that were put forward in organizing projects. Many Left groups pushed campaigns that promised to improve working conditions for all workers in a supposedly equal fashion, such as across-the-board pay raises. STO members, by contrast, involved themselves first and foremost in struggles to improve the situations of those they saw as the most oppressed workers, typically people of color and women. For example, the *Talk Back* group helped coordinate an eventually successful campaign at Stewart-Warner to eliminate a particular pay grade that was being used by the management as an excuse to pay black and Puerto Rican women significantly less
than white women for similar work. Organizing workers around this issue meant persuading the majority of the workers—men and white women—to back a demand that had no immediate effect on their personal working conditions. The arguments advanced by STO members and their allies in campaigns like this were both moral and strategic, and, win or lose, they helped define the approach taken by STO to workplace organizing.

The third key difference between STO’s work in factories and that of other Left groups concerned recruitment. All Leninist organizations agreed on the need to create a new and truly revolutionary party that could serve as the vanguard of all struggles against capitalism, and STO had made party-building a part of its self-conception from its 1969 founding. Further, all these groups recognized that any such party needed to be demographically representative of the working class it claimed to represent. For the OL, the RU, and most other new communist groups, this implied a significant emphasis on recruiting workers, and especially non-white workers, to their organizations. For STO, however, defending workers’ autonomy (implied in the critical view of the trade unions) meant that the involvement of workers in independent organizations in the workplace was not normally a first step toward recruitment into the group, but primarily a way to build the workers’ experience and self-confidence. Further, the analysis of white supremacy and white-skin privilege led STO to be even more leery of attempts to recruit workers of color (or “third-world workers” as they were commonly known in the 1970s), for fear that such efforts would undermine the autonomy of people of color to determine the course of their own struggles. In the end, few people joined STO directly from the shop floor, and of those who did, almost none maintained their membership for longer than a year or two. On the whole, STO was less interested in recruitment than in supporting the autonomy of the working class. Thus, the group attempted to intervene in struggles that it believed might eventually result in the creation of a revolutionary party in the United States, but it generally did not consider itself the organizational kernel around which that party would develop.

STO’s workplace efforts produced, at best, mixed results. By defining the terms of success so narrowly—excluding union reform, for example—the recipe for failure was perhaps self-imposed. Other leftist groups faced their own problems as the independent labor upsurge of the early 1970s waned dramatically by 1975, and the revolutionary momentum remaining from the late 1960s slowed at about the same time. In this context, the particulars of STO’s near-demise in 1974 seem predictable: a faction of the group left, disgruntled with the majority’s refusal to embrace a more orthodox approach to Leninism; another segment withdrew because it viewed STO as too orthodox and unwilling to fully integrate with workers’ struggles. In the aftermath of these two splits, much of the remaining membership abandoned STO out of simple demoralization, leaving a tiny core of perhaps a half-dozen committed members. This core, in attempting to regenerate the group, decided to de-emphasize (but not abandon totally) workplace
organizing. Following the momentum of broader movements, STO reconstituted itself largely on the terrain of anti-imperialist solidarity with national liberation struggles.

**Anti-Imperialist Solidarity**

STO’s rebuilding process preserved the core ideological commitments of the organization, but some strategic shifts manifested. First, the group extended its reach geographically, merging in 1976 with like-minded groups in Iowa and Missouri to become a regional organization and eventually growing to include perhaps sixty active members in nearly a dozen states coast to coast. Second, STO began to emphasize the importance of national liberation struggles. Solidarity with, most prominently, the Puerto Rican independence movement and the Iranian student movement in the United States became central components of the group’s practical work. The group’s shift from workplace organizing to anti-imperialist solidarity was partly reflective of the overall strength of various movements at different times: The surge in labor radicalism during the early 1970s receded around the time that several revolutionary nationalist movements were gaining momentum. Other factors included the practical reality of deindustrialization, which progressively limited the ability of STO to pursue a workplace-organizing strategy, and accidents of history, such as key encounters between STO members and activists involved in the Puerto Rican and Iranian revolutionary movements around 1975.

With the focus on factory work decentered, concrete solidarity with national liberation movements was one important way to maintain an active membership without getting sucked into a purely scholastic focus on internal theoretical development. During this period, STO developed particularly strong ties with the Puerto Rican independence movement and organized in solidarity with the Iranian student movement (in exile) against the Shah, with the Republic of New Afrika and other black nationalist groupings, and with the struggles for liberation in southern Africa, especially in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and South Africa/Azania. The relationship STO developed with the Puerto Rican movement was in many ways exemplary of the group’s theory and practice during the second half of the 1970s, especially in Chicago.

By the mid-1970s, the Puerto Rican independence movement was one of the largest and most vibrant radical movements in the Western Hemisphere. It responded militantly to a broad range of issues: the military occupation and environmental devastation of the island of Puerto Rico; the extreme economic exploitation and racist discrimination faced by the working class, both on the island and in the diaspora; and the forced sterilization imposed on huge numbers of Puerto Rican women. Among national liberation struggles, the Puerto Rican movement had one of the largest communities of adherents and supporters in the United States, as a result of massive working-class migration from the island.
during the 1950s. Because of the booming industrial economy of the 1960s, a significant segment of this diaspora eventually arrived in Chicago, and STO members early on were acquainted with various radical trends within the Puerto Rican community.

As early as 1966, the Puerto Rican community in Chicago rioted against police brutality and discrimination in housing and employment. The aftermath of this melee helped radicalize the Young Lords street gang, which later became the Young Lords Organization and eventually the Young Lords Party, with members in New York City and on the island itself. The influence of the Black Panther Party on the Young Lords was clear, and innovative forms of militant community organizing became the primary form of political engagement for a whole generation of Puerto Rican radicals in Chicago. Protests against police brutality continued, but they were joined with actions against slumlords and demonstrations against racism in the public schools. During the early 1970s, many of the core organizers in Chicago were linked to (but often not members of) the Partido Socialista Puertorriqueño (PSP), which was probably the largest of the new communist groups, and as a result they developed ties with like-minded activists in New York, Puerto Rico, and elsewhere.

By the mid-1970s, sections of the PSP had distanced themselves from the idea of armed struggle, and a new group based heavily in Chicago, the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (MLN), became STO’s primary point of contact with the independence movement. Around the same time, a clandestine group of Puerto Rican militants, the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (FALN), began an armed campaign within the United States on behalf of Puerto Rican independence. From 1974 until 1984, the FALN carried out more than one hundred bombings against U.S. control of Puerto Rico, primarily in New York and Chicago. From its beginning, the MLN was vocally supportive of the FALN and other clandestine Puerto Rican groups, and STO acted in solidarity with both groups as leading organizations of the Puerto Rican independence movement.

STO’s role in this situation was to provide material support and organizing assistance to the Puerto Rican movement. Thus, the group regularly sponsored speaking and fundraising tours for Puerto Rican radicals, from the island or from Chicago, through places like Kansas City, Denver, or Portland, which had no Puerto Rican communities but did have STO branches. STO also utilized its in-house printing press to help produce agitational material supporting Puerto Rican independence, including leaflets and pamphlets edited by the MLN or other similar groups. Emergency support was also a regular feature of STO’s solidarity efforts: When Puerto Rican militants were arrested or harassed, STO members were always on hand for support rallies. And with a large number of lawyers in the group’s membership, STO was often able to provide immediate legal assistance to those in need.

Most importantly, STO participated for several years in a coalition of solidarity groups operating in support of independence, alongside other anti-imperialist
groups like the Prairie Fire Organizing Committee (PFOC) and the May 19th Communist Organization.\textsuperscript{39} Despite many political disagreements, these groups were united in their support for armed struggle as a legitimate strategy for the independence movement. In this, they were opposed by most of the new communist movement, including much of the leadership of the PSP, which supported independence for Puerto Rico but considered armed struggle to be adventurist and premature.\textsuperscript{40} STO’s shift from workplace organizing to anti-imperialist solidarity was only cemented by the dismissive attitudes emerging from its former milieu.

Apart from the armed struggle issue, the other main dividing line within the solidarity movement was the knotty topic known as the “national question.” In the Puerto Rican context, the question was whether the diaspora population constituted part of the Puerto Rican nation, or whether it was instead a “national minority” in the United States. This latter perspective, common to much of the new communist movement as the 1970s progressed, derived from Josef Stalin’s famous analysis of nations and nationalism: “A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological makeup manifested in a common culture.” This conception, which gained prominence when Stalin came to power, was exceptionally rigid: “it is sufficient for a single one of these characteristics to be lacking and the nation ceases to be a nation.”\textsuperscript{41}

One unifying factor among almost all the groups participating in these debates, whether from within the new communist movement or from within the anti-imperialist Left, was the continued, largely unthinking reliance upon Stalin’s definition of the nation. For the Puerto Rican diaspora, the “territory” clause in particular was used to exclude this population from the nation. STO began its analysis of the national question, in typically anti-Stalinist fashion, by rejecting Stalin’s framework altogether. In its place, the group substituted the analysis developed by Lenin during the period immediately prior to the revolution of 1917.

In a classic example of the caricature of Leninist theory as Talmudic scholarship, STO engaged in a seemingly endless series of written debates with its opponents, each of which featured numerous lengthy quotations from obscure sections of Lenin’s \textit{Collected Works}.\textsuperscript{42} While most of the disputes focused on the question of black nationhood, the Puerto Rican example was more prominent in STO’s practical work.

The group’s increased focus on the national question during the mid-1970s represented a shift in its implementation of the white-skin privilege analysis, de-emphasizing “race” and highlighting “nation” as a key category. STO was one of many groups to develop a Marxist theoretical analysis to justify its emphasis on anti-imperialist solidarity. Updating Lenin’s famous dictum that imperialism was the highest stage of capitalist development, members of the group argued that anti-imperialism was a more productive framework for all the organization’s efforts than “anticapitalism” could hope to be. What STO meant by “anti-imperialism” was somewhat more complicated than simply opposing U.S.
intervention in the Third World. This was a result of what the group perceived as the objective reality of capitalism’s global development, including the heightened possibility of an impending “secular” crisis in the functioning of the law of value. According to this analysis, the anti-imperialist struggles then playing out worldwide seemed likely to grow in the coming era, but to be torn between revolutionary and reformist poles.\textsuperscript{43} The practical implication was an attempt to initiate an “anti-imperialist tendency” within the North American Left that could lend support to the most radical elements of the impending global upsurge in anti-imperialism.\textsuperscript{44}

In this context, STO’s efforts in support of the Iranian student movement in the United States represented another example of the group’s focus on anti-imperialist organizing, as well as its contradictions. By the middle of the 1970s, the struggle against the U.S.-backed dictatorship of the Shah had reached critical mass within Iran. In the United States, support for the coming revolution was strongest within the large Iranian student movement, which represented something of a throwback to the generalized student militancy of the late 1960s.\textsuperscript{45} STO developed a range of ties with various Iranian student organizations, each espousing a different variation on Marxist-Leninist ideology and strategy. From STO’s perspective, the value of this work lay as much in the potential to radicalize broader sections of the student Left in the United States as it did in the prospects for a revolution halfway around the world in Iran. As with its work around Puerto Rico, the main tasks STO took on in support of the Iranian student movement were related to propaganda: supporting speaking tours and printing leaflets and articles. By 1979, however, with the revolution imminent in Iran, a significant portion of the most active students returned to their home country to participate more directly in the struggle. STO’s work after this point was limited largely to publishing translated documents sent abroad by various Marxist-Leninist groups in Iran.\textsuperscript{46}

Meanwhile, the ongoing organizing in solidarity with the Puerto Rican independence movement eventually took a toll on STO as a group. The intense state repression visited upon both the above-ground and clandestine wings of the Puerto Rican movement resulted in permanent crisis, where there were always more responsibilities and work to be done than there were people or resources to draw on. Similarly, many tasks were considered so urgent that an emergency-response model came to characterize a wide cross-section of all the activities undertaken by the solidarity coalition within which STO operated. This approach left less time for STO or the other groups involved to plan and execute other vital work, whether theoretical or practical. As the 1970s came to a close, STO began to reconsider the possibilities of expanding its workplace organizing efforts again, and it became more involved in a variety of new social movements, especially the anti-nuclear and anti-fascist and anti-Klan struggles then gaining momentum on the Left. These movements, among many others, shared a high level of militancy, a commitment to novel forms of direct action, and a cross-class character that
differentiated them from previous generations of radical movements more clearly focused on traditional organizing within either the working-class or university settings. While the anti-Klan struggle emerged largely from within the same antiracist wing of the revolutionary Left inhabited by STO, it quickly expanded to include a wide variety of participants with little in common politically, apart from a fierce opposition to white supremacist paramilitary terror. Over time, however, STO’s ability to focus on these areas of work was compromised by its commitment to the ongoing responsibilities of solidarity work.

As the 1970s progressed, STO also became increasingly aware of the ideological differences that separated it from both the other solidarity organizations and the Puerto Rican movement itself. During this period, STO’s outlook had become more fervently anti-Stalinist. This political analysis led STO to insist on greater democracy within its organization—unlike groups such as the MLN, whose interpretation of democratic centralism was heavily centralist and light on the democracy. In principle, at least, STO’s internal structure was a more balanced mix of these two elements, insofar as political disagreement was highly prized, and the final authority for all strategic and ideological decisions rested with the annual general membership meeting. At the same time, this approach did not always translate easily into effective democratic practice. One former member, for instance, argues that among the leading members of STO, “there was a profound impact of the CP [Communist Party USA] on the organization, that wasn’t completely recognized, even by the people themselves. They had definitely made a break from Stalinism in a very profound way, but they were all kind of raised in a political culture, however, where certain things were very controlled, and they never completely let go of it. . . . There was a tendency of the informal leadership to circle the wagons and direct things.” Nonetheless, most former members agree that this same informal leadership also led the group’s effort to democratize the intellectual culture of the organization, often through formal classes on topics like political economy and dialectics.

At the same time, STO’s internal difficulties in dealing with the issue of democracy seem only to have enhanced its frustration with similar (or worse) behavior in other organizations. STO was loathe to publicly criticize the politics of the MLN or other national liberation groups with which it acted in solidarity, but the underlying disagreements are clear in a number of published documents aimed more directly at STO’s coalition partners. In 1979, for example, STO criticized the confusion of unconditional support for national liberation with an uncritical identification with positions taken by the national liberation leadership or elements of it. Unconditional support involves a conscious subordination of political differences for definite political reasons. The political leadership of national liberation movements must be followed on questions concerning the form and content of the movements they head,
not because this leadership is always right, but because it is the social force whose correct and incorrect positions “matter.” This has nothing to do with any attribution of infallibility and omniscience. We do liberation movements no favor by disguising disagreements, or, still worse, by evading questions which must be of concern to all revolutionaries.51

This represented a not-so-subtle attack on the solidarity politics of PFOC and May 19th, which STO considered overly subservient to the dictates of particular revolutionary nationalist organizations. In practice, however, STO would challenge liberation movements only within the internal structures of the coalitions within which it operated, and the group’s public stance was for the most part functionally identical to the one criticized above.

This contradiction within STO’s approach to solidarity work only compounded the growing sense of political divergence between the group and its allied organizations in the anti-imperialist Left. Eventually, the intense focus on anti-imperialist solidarity became untenable for STO, just as the workplace orientation had been several years previously. This time, the membership was not sharply divided over the question, although there were disagreements about which areas of work deserved increased emphasis afterwards. (A faction had left the group in 1978, partly due to disagreement with the prioritization of anti-imperialist work over workplace efforts, but even this splinter group continued to participate actively in the solidarity coalition with STO, PFOC, and other groups.) And again, anti-imperialist politics were never fully jettisoned, as until its demise STO continued, however periodically, to collaborate with the MLN. The framework, however, was fundamentally different by the 1980s.

The Legacy of STO

At the beginning of the 1980s, STO altered its strategy again, focusing on the new social movements: especially the antinuclear movement, antifascist and anti-Klan organizing, youth and student efforts, and reproductive-rights struggles. Within this context, the group consistently emphasized the importance of both anti-imperialism and an orientation toward the working class. The group also encouraged a strategic orientation toward what it called, following the Italian autonomists, “mass illegality.” For example, the group led an attempt to blockade the military base at Rock Island, Illinois, in 1985 to protest U.S. intervention in Central America.52 This was not a traditional civil disobedience action where arrests were expected and encouraged, but rather a militant effort to disrupt the functioning of a major symbol of U.S. imperialism, and get away with it. But these efforts proved to be too little, too late in terms of resuscitating the radical milieu within which STO had developed and, for a time, had thrived. Disillusionment caused by the Reagan Revolution quickened the decline of the 1970s movements, and within STO a new series of splits over strategic direction undermined
the group’s organizational viability. By the late 1980s, almost two decades after its founding, the group was defunct.

The STO was never very large, but its legacy has been both outsized and underappreciated. The group consistently attempted to create theoretical frameworks within which it could contextualize its work, while remaining engaged in a range of practical endeavors that could never become perfect reflections of some pure theoretical outlook. This dialectical tension, between the purity of theory and the messiness of action, paralleled STO’s conflicted relationship with the sometimes contradictory worlds of class-struggle workplace organizing and anti-imperialist solidarity with national liberation struggles. STO was never completely comfortable within either of the two main trends that defined much of 1970s radicalism, partly because its unorthodox brand of Leninism integrated significant insights from a wide variety of revolutionary traditions.

Its idiosyncrasies notwithstanding, STO’s experience was exemplary of the broader radical movements of the 1970s. The issues it confronted—from labor militancy to national liberation—were seen as pressing by a wide range of progressives, radicals, and revolutionaries as the 1960s faded from view. Additionally, in spite of its small size, STO was deeply engaged in an ongoing series of broader left campaigns, so that its perspectives and its work were widely known within radical circles across the United States. But this involvement was itself distinctive, given STO’s unorthodox approach to most questions of politics and strategy. This uniqueness has also carried over into the work done by former members in the years since the group’s demise: The journal *Race Traitor*, for instance, was co-founded by former member Noel Ignatiev and carried on STO’s analysis of white-skin privilege in a controversial (and less organizationally driven) fashion. Similarly, the writings and organizing around the issues of fascism, antifascism, and far-right movements in the United States and elsewhere by former members such as Don Hamerquist and Leonard Zeskind have contributed greatly to contemporary understandings of the far right. As a result, a comprehensive understanding of left politics since the 1970s requires an assessment of STO’s historical trajectory as part of understanding race- and class-based organizing. Unfortunately, previous scholarship on the group has been extremely sparse, effectively limited to brief references in a handful of books about broader topics. Expanding this scholarship is needed to flesh out the record of post-1960s U.S. radicalism.

STO’s relevance for the present and future persists. In positioning itself as a small cadre organization committed to participation in mass struggles, rather than a vanguard party or a collective of isolated individuals, STO defined the terms of its own existence. Even as it was pulled in multiple directions by the broader social movements of its era, the group managed to influence the trajectories of these very same movements, albeit in subtle ways. The hope that animated the Sojourner Truth Organization—the promise of autonomy; militant, mass direct action; and a society rid of white supremacy, patriarchy, and capitalism—still inspires radical movements today.
NOTES


2. The source of this term, in its usage by STO, is somewhat murky. W.E.B. Du Bois used the phrase “double consciousness” in his classic work *The Souls of Black Folk* (1903: rpt. New York: Signet Classic, 1995), 45, to describe the experience of black people living in a white supremacist society. Despite the group’s obvious debt to Du Bois, there is no clear evidence that his work represented the source of STO’s usage. Don Hamerquist, who first introduced the term within STO, recalls Lenin’s critique of trade-union consciousness as an important influence in how the organization used the term “dual consciousness” in its work. Hamerquist, e-mail to the author, October 26, 2009.


4. For a concise explanation of STO’s anti-Stalinism, see Don Hamerquist, “Discussion Points on the Party and Revolutionary Strategy,” in *Collective Works* 3 (June 1975): 8–10, in author’s possession. Thanks to Traci Harris for providing me a copy of this publication from the archive. (This document can also be viewed in the Max Elbaum Papers, New Communist Movement Collection, at the Southern California Library.) “The Leninist conception of the party must be recaptured from Stalinist distortion. . . . Party life must emphasize clear, sharp and critical debate over points of principle. . . . Fear of public differences and ‘factions’ is no part of Leninist theory or practice on the question of the party. . . . The so-called ‘party principle’ must be cleared of any implication that runs contrary to the central Marxist thesis that the emancipation of the working class is the task of the working class itself.”


6. The phrase “organic intellectuals,” usually associated with Antonio Gramsci and referring to the development and spread of knowledge by nonprofessionals and the working class, seems appropriate in describing STO in light of the ways in which many of the group’s leading members personally distanced themselves from the academy. None of STO’s three major theorists (Don Hamerquist, Noel Ignatiev, and Ken Lawrence) held college degrees while members of the group, although Ignatiev did receive a Ph.D. after leaving the group. It is true that the “second tier” of intellectuals (the range of members who contributed in varying ways to developing theory within the group but were not major theorists) in STO featured a number of attorneys and some people who obtained advanced degrees before joining the group, as well as a number who, like Ignatiev, returned to school and obtained advanced degrees after leaving STO. Author interviews with Hamerquist, Ignatiev, Lawrence, David Ranney, and Carole Travis, as well as Lawrence, e-mail to the author, November 13, 2009, support this assessment.

that white workers received in compensation for reinforcing white supremacy during the period after reconstruction.


13. This use of “workerism” must be distinguished from the term’s usage as (more or less) a synonym for syndicalism, a usage that was common within the new communist movement and STO in the early 1970s.


19. See the unsigned *Outline History of Sojourner Truth*, September 1972, in Detroit Revolutionary Movements Collection, Subseries F, box 15, Reuther Library, Wayne State University.


21. Kathy and Lynn, “Organizing in an Electrical Plant in Chicago,” *Collective Works* 1:1 (October 1974): 11–20. This piece pseudonymously refers to the “AC” plant and changes the names of STO members and ex-members then working there, in order to protect the then-ongoing organizing efforts. However, the description of the plant and STO’s efforts there clearly match the descriptions offered in my interviews in 2006 with several former STO members, especially John Strucker (February 5, 2006).
22. This information comes largely from my interviews in 2006 with John Strucker, Don Hamerquist (who worked there for a time), and Noel Ignatiev (who never worked there).

23. In some cases, both for STO and more broadly among radicals active in workplace organizing, the progression was in the opposite direction: campaigns first, publications second, although in most of STO’s major points of concentration, and certainly at Stewart-Warner, the publications came first. See Kathy and Lynn, “Organizing in an Electrical Plant in Chicago.”

24. In Talk Back 2:5 (February 25, 1974), in author’s possession. Sections of this issue, including documents from the “Filthy Billy” union election campaign, as well as other leaflets STO distributed on the shop floor are available through the digital archive of the Sojourner Truth Organization: http://www.sojournertruth.net/shopleaflets.pdf.

25. In at least one case, an STO member at Stewart-Warner helped initiate a campaign to unseat a particularly corrupt steward, only to be forced to abandon the effort when no other candidate was forthcoming from the department, despite his coworkers’ attempts to persuade him to run himself. See Kathy and Lynn, “Organizing in an Electrical Plant in Chicago.”


28. Ibid.


30. This information comes from my interviews with Noel Ignatiev, January 22, 2006; Don Hamerquist, September 14, 2006; and Carole Travis, June 6, 2006.


32. STO described these splits in the second version of its Outline History of Sojourner Truth, circa 1980, in author’s possession. Additional information comes from my interviews with Mel and Marcia Rothenberg (who left in the first split), October 12, 2006; Elias Zwierzynski, January 1, 2007; and Guillermo Brzostowski, October 10, 2008 (both of whom departed in the second split). Neither faction produced a lasting organizational alternative to STO, though several participants later ended up elsewhere in the new communist movement or in the mainstream labor movement.

33. By the turn of the decade, STO had an active presence in Chicago, Kansas City, Iowa City, Denver, Portland, Seattle, San Francisco, New Orleans, Jackson, Philadelphia, and New York City. This expansion was a result of at least three factors: the increasing popularity of anti-imperialist politics within the Left during the late 1970s, the broad distribution during the same period of Urgent Tasks, STO’s regularly published political journal, and, perhaps most importantly, strategic decisions by STO members (made autonomously, but in consultation with the organization’s leadership) to move from core cities like Chicago and Kansas City to new outposts like Denver, Portland, and others.

34. On deindustrialization, see David C. Ranney, Global Decisions, Local Collisions: Urban Life in the New World Order (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003). Ranney was a member of STO for several years in the mid-1970s.


38. For a partisan overview and chronology of the Puerto Rican armed-struggle movement during the 1970s, see the pamphlet co-published by STO, PFOC, and others, entitled Toward People’s War for Independence and Socialism in Puerto Rico: In Defense of Armed Struggle. Documents and Communiqués from the Revolutionary Public Independence Movement and the Armed Clandestine Movement (Chicago: STO, et al., 1978).

39. Both Prairie Fire and May 19th emerged from aboveground efforts supporting the Weather Underground during the mid-1970s. May 19th resulted from a split within Prairie Fire, and Chicago was one of few cities in the United States to house active branches of both organizations. See Berger, Outlaws of America, 225–243, for an overview of the activities and perspectives of PFOC and May 19th during this period.

40. See Urgent Tasks 1 (May 1977), in author’s possession, which contains a “pull-out” section focused on the battles within the Puerto Rican solidarity movement, which included much of the new communist movement as well as the anti-imperialist Left, over the legitimacy of armed struggle in the Puerto Rican context.


42. See Collins, “Who’s Being Dogmatic?”; and Hamerquist, White Supremacy and the Afro-American National Question (Chicago: STO, 1978), among others. The various Puerto Rican revolutionary organizations also developed their own analysis of the national question in the particular context of Puerto Rico and its diaspora population. Part of the reason STO developed strong ties with the MLN was their shared analysis of Puerto Ricans as a single, unified nation regardless of location. Jose Lopez, interview with author, October 18, 2008.


44. A later attempt to reflect on the problems of this analysis can be found in the organizationally signed editorial “A Revolutionary Left,” Urgent Tasks 13 (Spring 1982), available at http://www.sojournertruth.net/revleft.html (accessed February 18, 2009).


50. The dialectics classes in particular became widely known within the Left in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and on numerous occasions the course was offered by STO members to nonmembers active in antinuclear and environmental movements, among others. A sample curriculum was published as “How to Think: A Guide to the Study of Dialectical Materialism,” Urgent Tasks 7 (Winter 1980), available online at
http://www.sojournertext.net/htt.html (accessed February 18, 2009). Versions of this curriculum are used to this day by various radical groups in the United States. The small revolutionary organization Bring the Ruckus, for example, has developed an updated course modeled on the original STO version and has offered it to both members and non-members in several cities since 2008.


52. Author interviews with Kingsley Clarke, April 2, 2006; and Janeen Porter, September 18, 2006.
