TAKING CHARGE OF COURT-MARTIAL CHARGES: THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF THE COMMANDER IN THE AMERICAN MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM
ABSTRACT: The authors address the repeated efforts to remove the commander, a commissioned officer in command or an officer in charge, from the military justice system and adopt a system that mirrors the procedures used in foreign countries for preferring charges, referring them to trial, and selecting court members. They offer a number of arguments for retaining the commander’s role and offer a comparative analysis of the American military justice system and several other countries’ military justice systems. They urge Congress not to adopt the procedures used in foreign countries.

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absent clear evidence that doing so will greatly enhance American military justice. They conclude there are insufficient reasons to make dramatic changes to the American system; changes they believe would undermine the commander’s authority to enforce discipline and justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

If there is one aspect of the American military justice system that seems to draw the most criticism, it is the role of the commander. Although the commander has played an essential role in military justice since the beginning of the republic, reformers over the decades have banged the drum for change, which would either reduce or remove the commander’s prosecutorial discretion.

The proposals to limit or remove the commander’s powers to prefer court-martial charges or convene a court-martial generally fall into three categories. The first category of proposals recommends that the decision to charge an accused with a crime should be made by a commander outside the accused’s chain of command, but still

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1 See generally DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1-4, et. seq. (10th ed. 2018) (discussing the historical roots of the court-martial and the commander’s role).

2 See, e.g., Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Breaking The Chain Of Command Culture: A Call For An Independent And Impartial Investigative Body To Curb Sexual Assaults In The Military, 29 WIS. J. L. GENDER & SOCY 341, 371-75 (2014) (recommending that DOD strip military commanders of authority to dispose of sexual assault complaints; authority to handle cases should rest with independent and impartial body after military police conduct a comprehensive investigation); Don Christensen, Commanders Flunk on Military Justice Reforms, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 3, 2014, 8:34 AM), archived at https://perma.cc/Q8AS-MTH8 (criticizing the current military justice system and proposing reform); Edward F. Sherman, Military Justice Without Military Control, 82 YALE L.J. 1398, 1400 n.10 (1973) (noting that proposed legislative reforms had been introduced by Senators Bayh and Ervin and by Congressman Bennett that included limiting a commander’s role and limiting court-martial jurisdiction); Schiesser & Benson, A Proposal to Make Courts-Martial Courts: The Removal of Commanders from Military Justice, 7 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 559 (1976).
within the military command structure. These proposals, which are not entirely new, are grounded in the view that a commander may be biased in favor of an accused and decide, for improper reasons, not to charge said accused. Ironically, in the past, reformers pushed for changes in the military justice system because they believed the system was unfair; they argued that heavy-handed commanders were tipping the scales of justice to obtain convictions. The recent push for removing the commander seems to rest on the proposition

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3 See, e.g., Laura Basset, Senators Shoot Down Gillibrand’s Military Sexual Assault Reform Bill, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 11, 2013, 2:10 PM), archived at https://perma.cc/J8EH-GHUD. As discussed, infra, Senator Gillibrand introduced essentially the same bill in 2020 (discussing Senator Gillibrand’s sponsorship of the Military Justice Improvement Act (MJIA) which proposed that commanders would no longer have jurisdiction over specified offenses and the commander’s power to grant post-trial clemency would be limited. S. 967, 113th Cong. (2013). Her proposal ultimately failed in the Senate).


5 See Lindsay Hoyle, Command Responsibility – A Legal Obligation to Deter Sexual Violence in the Military, 37 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 353, 360 (2014) (noting that commanders are often biased in favor of an accused with whom they have a good working relationship). But the opposite is also true. Critics of the system argue commanders may be biased against a service member and treat that service member unfairly; it was that criticism which in part led to the adoption of the Uniform Code of Military Justice following World War II. See David A. Schlueter, The Court-Martial: An Historical Survey, 87 MIL. L. REV. 131, 158 (1980) (noting the perceived injustice toward service members in World War II); Frederick Bernays Weiner, The Seamy Side of the World War I Court-Martial Controversy, 123 MIL. L. REV. 109, 112 (1989) (noting prosecution of enlisted service members, in part, prompted the “Crowder-Ansell” dispute during World War I concerning court-martial practices and its underlying currents). Yet another related criticism is commanders may treat similarly situated service members differently. James W. Smith, A Few Good Scapegoats: The Abu Ghraib Courts-Martial and the Failure of the Military Justice System, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 671, 693 (2006) (using the term “different spans for different ranks” and arguing the military justice system failed by treating officers and enlisted members differently in Abu-Ghraib courts-martial).

6 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
that not enough alleged offenders are being prosecuted for sexual assault.

A second category of proposals recommends that civilian prosecutors handle prosecution of military offenses, which is the approach in certain other countries. The proponents of that approach argue that the change would be consistent with emerging international norms. The argument is if that approach works well in other countries, it would likely work well in the American military justice system.8

Finally, there have been proposals to transfer, in whole or in part, the commander’s prosecutorial powers to military lawyers.9 One of

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7 See generally Eugene R. Fidell, A World-Wide Perspective on Change in Military Justice, 48 A.F. L. Rev. 195, 197 (2000) (noting that changes in country after country are being made as to how military cases are prosecuted, and by whom and that American military justice “pays precious little attention to developments in other countries’ systems;” the author is a frequent advocate for reducing the role of the commander in the military justice system); Edward F. Sherman, Military Justice Without Military Control, 82 YALE L.J. 1398, 1400 (1973) (noting that in considering potential changes to the military justice system, other countries’ approaches are “especially relevant”).

8 See Editorial, No Hope for Justice, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 17, 2014, 4:00 AM), archived at https://perma.cc/844K-CY46 (discussing reasoning of supporters such as New York Senator Kirsten Gillibrand for removing sexual assault crimes in the U.S. military justice system from the chain of command, in the same manner as Canada, Israel and Germany have done); Remove Prosecution of Sexual Assault from Military Chain of Command, Nat’l Org. for Women, archived at https://perma.cc/8LMS-8ALW (discussing the need to remove sexual assault crimes from the chain of command in the U.S. military justice system and adopt a separate system like Britain, Canada, and Israel); Op-Ed., Gillibrand Should Keep Up the Pressure to End Sexual Assaults in The Military, THE BUFFALO NEWS (Mar. 13, 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/5998-3GXV (emphasizing that removal of sexual assaults from the chain of command has already occurred in Britain, Canada, and Israel, and should occur in the United States military justice system).

the arguments supporting that approach is that armed forces lawyers are in the best position to assess whether a particular charged offense warrants a court-martial and that, again, is the approach taken in certain other countries.

It is this third and final category of proposals that is the focus of this article. There are currently two proposed legislative provisions along these lines that would adversely affect the commander’s prosecutorial discretion and undermine the commander’s ability to enforce good order and discipline. The first proposed provision was included in Section 540F of the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act, where Congress mandated that the Department of Defense report to the congressional armed services committees. This would be based on the feasibility of creating a pilot program, which would remove a commander’s authority to prefer and refer to trial court-martial charges for serious offenses, and instead place that authority in the hands of senior armed forces lawyers.

https://perma.cc/B3C8-NEPR (recommending that prosecutorial discretion be placed in the hands of independent prosecutors).

10 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 9, at 175–76 (2014) (listing reasons for military attorneys to exert prosecutorial discretion instead of commanders).

11 See Sherman, supra note 2, at 1425 (arguing the American military justice system should follow the model used in the British or West German-Swedish military systems); see also No Hope for Justice, supra note 8 (discussing the reasoning of supporters such as New York Senator Kirsten Gillibrand for removing sexual assault crimes in the U.S. military justice system “from the chain of command to independent prosecutors,” in the same manner as used in Canada, Israel and Germany); Remove Prosecution of Sexual Assault from Military Chain of Command, Nat’l Org. for Women, supra note 8 (discussing the need to remove sexual assault crimes from the chain of command in the U.S. military justice system and adopt a separate system like Britain, Canada, and Israel); Gillibrand Should Keep Up the Pressure to End Sexual Assaults in The Military, supra note 8 (emphasizing that the removal of sexual assaults from the chain of command has already occurred in Britain, Canada, and Israel, and should also occur in the United States military justice system).

SEC. 540F. REPORT ON MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM INVOLVING ALTERNATIVE AUTHORITY FOR DETERMINING WHETHER TO PREFER OR REFER CHANGES FOR FELONY OFFENSES UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE.

(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 300 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report setting forth the results of a study, conducted for purposes of the report, on the feasibility and advisability of an alternative military justice system in which determinations as to whether to prefer or refer charges for trial by court-martial for any offense specified in paragraph (2) is made by a judge advocate in grade O-6 or higher who has significant experience in criminal litigation and is outside of the chain of command of the member subject to the charges rather than by a commanding officer of the member who is in the chain of command of the member.

(2) SPECIFIED OFFENSE.—An offense specified in this paragraph is any offense under chapter 47 of title 10, United States Code (the Uniform Code of Military Justice), for which the maximum punishment authorized includes confinement for more than one year.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The study required for purposes of the report under subsection (a) shall address the following:

(1) Relevant procedural, legal, and policy implications and considerations of the alternative military justice system described in subsection (a).

(2) An analysis of the following in connection with the implementation and maintenance of the alternative military justice system: (A) Legal personnel requirements. (B) Changes in force structure. (C) Amendments to law. (D) Impacts on the timeliness and efficiency of legal processes and court-martial adjudications. (E) Potential legal challenges to the system. (F) Potential changes in prosecution and conviction rates. (G) Potential impacts on the preservation of good order and discipline, including the ability of a commander to carry out nonjudicial punishment and other administrative actions. (H) Such other considerations as the Secretary considers appropriate.

(3) A comparative analysis of the military justice systems of relevant foreign allies with the current military justice system of the United States and the
The second proposal appears in the “Military Justice Improvement Act of 2020” (S. 1932), introduced by Senator Kirstin Gillibrand (D-N.Y.), and would dramatically reduce the commander’s authority and responsibility for preferring and referring felony-level offenses to trial by court-martial, and transfer that authority to senior judge advocates.¹³

This article argues that those proposals, and others like them, should be rejected for the following reasons:

- Commanders play a critical and necessary role in the American military justice system (See Sections II & IV, infra);
- Transferring prosecutorial discretion from commanders to judge advocates will undermine commanders’ authority to maintain good order and discipline (See Section V, infra);
- Transferring the decision to prosecute and refer charges to a court-martial will create unintended consequences (See Section VI, infra);
- Changing the American military justice system to emulate the systems of other countries is not warranted

alternative military justice system, including whether or not approaches of the military justice systems of such allies to determinations described in subsection (a) are appropriate for the military justice system of the United States.

(4) An assessment of the feasibility and advisability of conducting a pilot program to assess the feasibility and advisability of the alternative military justice system, and, if the pilot program is determined to be feasible and advisable— (A) an analysis of potential legal issues in connection with the pilot program, including potential issues for appeals; and (B) recommendations on the following: (i) The populations to be subject to the pilot program. (ii) The duration of the pilot program. (iii) Metrics to measure the effectiveness of the pilot program. (iv) The resources to be used to conduct the pilot program.

or advisable. Comparison of sexual assault prosecution rates of the United States military with four United States allies in 2013 and with three allies more recently does not necessitate adopting their systems of removal of command responsibility for prosecuting serious sex crimes (See Section VII, infra); 

- The proposed amendments will adversely affect the delicate balance between justice and discipline (See Section VIII, infra); 

- Recent studies of command decisions to prosecute sexual assaults demonstrates that the current system is working (See Section IX, infra); and 

- Congress should await implementation of the reforms outlined in the Military Justice Act of 2016 for oversight and accountability (See Section X, infra).

Finally, this article recommends Congress should reaffirm the role of the commander to enforce good order and discipline (See Section XI, infra).

II. THE COMMANDER’S CURRENT ROLE IN THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM

Before addressing the specific concerns about the proposals to reduce or remove the commander from the military justice system, it is important to first address the typical military chain of command and how the individuals in that chain can be involved in the processing of court-martial charges.

A. THE MILITARY CHAIN OF COMMAND

The chain of command of an accused in an Army infantry division, for example, begins with the immediate commander or unit commander usually at the level of a company commander (captain or O-3 rank in command of 200 personnel), followed by a battalion commander (lieutenant colonel or O-5 in command of 1,000 personnel), brigade commander (colonel or O-6 rank in command of
5,000 personnel) and then by a division commander, who is a general court-martial convening authority (major general or O-8 rank in command of 15,000 personnel).

Various command levels above the division level are also general courts-martial convening authorities, including the corps commander (lieutenant general O-9 rank in command of 45,000 personnel), major command commander (general O-10 in command of 90,000 personnel), then Secretary of the Army (civilian), Secretary of Defense (civilian), and President. Each higher level commander in the chain of command has authority to overrule a decision of a lower level of commander in the referral to trial of a court-martial offense.

B. PREFERENCE AND REFERRING COURT-MARTIAL CHARGES

Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Manual for Courts-Martial, commanders (usually the company commander in the Army, for example) are responsible for conducting a thorough and impartial inquiry into alleged offenses. In carrying out those duties, they review reports prepared by law enforcement personnel and regularly obtain legal advice from a judge advocate, who is assigned to the military organization, or otherwise charged with providing legal advice to the commanders.

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16 RCM 303.
17 See UCMJ art. 37 (2018) (including requirement that before convening a general court-martial the convening authority must consider the advice of the staff judge advocate). This is sometimes referred to as the “pretrial advice.” Schluter, supra note 1 at § 7-3(A) (10th ed. 2018)
The UCMJ\textsuperscript{18} includes punitive articles which proscribe both strictly military offenses,\textsuperscript{19} such as desertion\textsuperscript{20} and disobedience of an order\textsuperscript{21} as well as common law offenses, such as larceny.\textsuperscript{22} If it appears that a service member has violated a punitive article, the commander has broad discretion to decide how to dispose of an accused's misconduct. For example, the commander may simply counsel the service member or issue a written or oral reprimand,\textsuperscript{23} begin proceedings to administratively discharge the service member,\textsuperscript{24} or impose nonjudicial punishment.\textsuperscript{25} Under this third option, the commander decides whether the service member is guilty and, if so, adjudges the punishment.\textsuperscript{26} Finally, the commander may formally prefer court-martial charges against the service member.\textsuperscript{27}

Article 33, of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, requires the President to provide non-binding guidance for factors that commanders are to consider in disposing of charges.\textsuperscript{28} The President

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{UMCJ} UCMJ arts. 1-146 (2018).
\bibitem{SCHLUETER} See \textit{generally} DAVID A. SCHLUETER, CHARLES H. ROSE, VICTOR HANSEN, & CHRISTOPHER BEHAN, MILITARY CRIMES AND DEFENSES § 3.2 (3d ed. 2018) (discussing punitive articles in UCMJ).
\bibitem{UCMJ1} UCMJ art. 85 (2018).
\bibitem{UCMJ2} UCMJ art. 90 (2018).
\bibitem{UCMJ3} UCMJ art. 121 (2018).
\bibitem{SCHLUETER1} See \textit{SCHLUETER, supra} note 1 at § 1-8 (10th ed. 2018) (listing various options available to the military commander).
\bibitem{SCHLUETER2} See \textit{SCHLUETER, supra} note 1 at § 1-8(B) (10th ed. 2018) (discussing nonpunitive measures such as administrative discharge).
\bibitem{UCMJ4} UCMJ art. 15 (2018). Unless the service member is assigned to a vessel, the service member may demand a court-martial in lieu of the nonjudicial punishment. \textit{id}. The term “vessel” is defined in 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2012). “The word “vessel” includes every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.” 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2018).
\bibitem{RCM} See RCM 306(c)(2).
\bibitem{PREFER} Although technically, any person subject to the UCMJ may prefer charges against another; the preferral is almost always done by the service member's immediate commander.
\bibitem{UCMJ5} UCMJ art. 33 (2018).
\end{thebibliography}
has set out those factors in Appendix 2.1.2 of the Manual for Courts-Martial, which lists the following factors:

a. The mission-related responsibilities of the command;
b. Whether the offense occurred during wartime, combat, or contingency operations;
c. The effect of the offense on the morale, health, safety, welfare, and good order and discipline of the command;
d. The nature, seriousness, and circumstances of the offense and the accused’s culpability in connection with the offense;
e. In cases involving an individual who is a victim under Article 6b, the views of the victim as to disposition;
f. The extent of the harm caused to any victim of the offense;
g. The availability and willingness of the victim and other witnesses to testify;
h. Admissible evidence will likely be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction in a trial by court-martial;
i. Input, if any, from law enforcement agencies involved in or having an interest in the specific case;
j. The truth-seeking function of trial by court-martial;
k. The accused’s willingness to cooperate in the investigation or prosecution of others;
l. The accused’s criminal history or history of misconduct, whether military or civilian, if any;
m. The probable sentence or other consequences to the accused of a conviction; and
n. The impact and appropriateness of alternative disposition options—including nonjudicial punishment or administrative action—with respect to the accused’s
potential for continued service and the responsibilities of the command with respect to justice and good order and discipline.29

If, after considering those factors, a commander prefers court-martial charges, those charges are forwarded up the chain of command, described supra, for recommendations and actions. If the commander concludes that the charges are serious enough to justify a general court-martial, which are equivalent to a civilian felony trial, the commander orders an Article 32 hearing.30 At that hearing, which approximates a preliminary hearing in civilian criminal justice trials, the service member is entitled to be present, to have the assistance of defense counsel, to cross-examine witnesses, and to have witnesses produced.31

If a convening authority, a commander authorized by the UCMJ to “convene” a court-martial, decides to refer the charges to a court-martial, that officer selects the court members.32 The convening authority does not select the counsel or the military judge.33 A commander convenes a court-martial to hear a specific case.34

Specific provisions in the UCMJ prohibit a convening authority from unlawfully influencing the participants in the court-martial or

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29 Non-Binding Disposition Guidance § 2.1, MCM, App. 2.1-2.
33 SCHLUETER, supra note 1 at § 8-3(D) (10th ed. 2018) (discussing the process for selecting individuals to sit as court members).
34 See UCMJ arts. 22–24 (2018) (designating those with power to convene general, special, and summary courts-martial); RCM 504 (setting out procedure for convening courts-martial). The UCMJ provides that the President of the United States and a service Secretary may convene a general court-martial. UCMJ art. 24(a), (2012).
the outcome of the case. In many cases, the accused and the convening authority engage in plea bargaining and execute a pretrial agreement. Typically, those agreements require the accused to plead guilty in exchange for a capped maximum sentence.

Even though courts-martial are not part of the federal judiciary, the Supreme Court of the United States may ultimately review a military conviction.

III. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND OF PROPOSALS TO LIMIT THE COMMANDER’S ROLE IN THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM

As noted, supra, there are currently two pieces of legislation pending in Congress that would shift prosecutorial discretion from commanders to senior judge advocates, both attempting to emulate the systems used in other countries. Notably, not all cases would be affected by the shift in responsibilities from commanders to senior judge advocates. Only disposition of serious offenses would be

35 See UCMJ art. 37 (2018). Unlawful command influence has been the subject of considerable commentary and case law. See generally Martha Huntley Bower, Unlawful Command Influence: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 28 A.F. L. REV. 65 (1988) (discussing unlawful command influence); Anthony P. DeGiulio, Command Control: Lawful Versus Unlawful Application, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 72 (1972) (examining the disciplinary policies established by command directives, the rule which blocks the accused from serving as the convening authority, and command control over counsel and military judges); James D. Harty, Unlawful Command Influence and Modern Military Justice, 36 NAVAL L. REV. 231 (1986) (discussing corrective measures that must be taken when commanders commit unlawful command influence); Joseph Hely, Command Influence on Military Justice, 15 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 300 (1970) (discussing inherent tendency for command influence).

36 SCHLUETER, supra note 1, ch. 9 (10th ed. 2018).

37 Id.

38 UCMJ art. 67(h) (2018); 28 U.S.C. § 1259 (2018). See, e.g., Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2173 (2018) (holding that Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces). See generally Andrew Effron, Supreme Court of Review of Decisions by the Court of Military Appeals: The Legislative Background, ARMY LAW., Jan. 1985, at 59 (reviewing the Military Justice Act, which placed the Court of Military Appeals directly under the U.S. Supreme Court’s review).
affected. Offenses that are considered to be military in nature, and not common law offenses, would remain untouched.

While neither of the proposed legislative provisions outline any of the alleged problems that they are designed to address, attempts to remove commanders from the military justice system are not new. Similar legislation was proposed and rejected in 2013.\textsuperscript{39} Since that time, a series of advisory panels comprised of civilian, non-governmental experts have reviewed the role of the commander and rejected such a wide-sweeping change, because such change was not justified. Specifically, the Response Systems to Adult Sexual Assault Crimes Panel (RSP) (congressionally mandated to assess the impact of removing disposition authority from commanders) in June 2014 reported that:

Congress should not further limit the authority of convening authorities under the UCMJ to refer charges of sexual assault crimes to trial by court-martial . . . [and] [a]fter reviewing the practices of Allied militaries and available civilian statistics and hearing from many witnesses, the Panel determined the evidence [did] not support a conclusion that removing convening authority from senior commanders [would]

\textsuperscript{39} In 2013, Senator Gillibrand sponsored the Military Justice Improvement Act (MJIA) which proposed that commanders would no longer have jurisdiction over specified offenses and the commander’s power to grant post-trial clemency would be limited. S. 967, 113th Cong. (2013). As with the currently proposed legislation, her bill would have required that for offenses where the maximum punishment included confinement for more than one year (in effect a felony grade offense), the decision to file court-martial charges and refer charges to general or special courts-martial would be made by someone in the rank of at least O-6, with significant experience in trying courts-martial, and outside the chain of command. Id. That responsibility would be handled by officers established by the Chiefs of Staff of each Service. Id. Although Senator Gillibrand’s bill had bipartisan support, it eventually failed in the Senate by a close vote. See Basset, supra note 3.
reduce the incidence of sexual assault . . . or improve the quality of investigations or prosecutions . . . .”

And even before the extensive changes enacted in the Military Justice Acts of 2016 and 2018, the Panel warned that systematic changes “should be considered carefully in the context of the many changes” made to the “form and function of the military system.” 41 In 2015, the Military Justice Review Group focused on measures to improve the process rather than revisiting the issue after the RSP’s thorough review, and specifically recommended “[r]etaining the current procedures for the exercise of disposition discretion based upon the interlocking responsibilities of military commanders, [S]taff [J]udge [A] dvocates, and judge advocates.” 42 In 2019, the Defense Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces (DAC-IPAD) (tasked with reviewing specific case dispositions), based on a review of 164 military investigative cases, found that “commanders’ disposition of penetrative sexual assault complaints [were] reasonable in 95% of the cases.” 43 See Section IX, infra.

Furthermore, since 2013, extensive substantive changes to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) (e.g., the Military Justice Acts of 2016 and 2018) and Manual for Courts-Martial have been put in place, and those changes require time for implementation and reassessment of the military justice system before additional reforms should be made. Provisions are in place requiring that convening

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41 Id.
authorities’ decisions not to refer sexual assault cases must be reviewed (See Section X, infra.), while also substantially limiting their clemency authority. An appendix to the Manual for Courts-Martial now provides commanders with factors they should consider in all misconduct cases (e.g., “interests of justice,” “the views of the victim as to disposition,” “the harm caused to any victim of the offense,” and “good order and discipline”), inappropriate factors (e.g., “the accused’s race or religion” and “political pressure”), and special considerations (e.g., “whether the accused might face prosecution in another jurisdiction”). Pursuant to the Military Justice Act of 2016, convening authorities must have “periodic training regarding the purposes and administration” of the UCMJ. Additionally, judge advocates are to serve as Article 32, Preliminary Hearing Officers, whenever practicable.

IV. The UCMJ, the Manual for Courts-Martial, and Regulations Recognize the Critical Role of the Commander in the Military Justice System

A. In General

The UCMJ and the Manual for Courts-Martial entrust commanders at all levels in the chain of command with responsibility for the military justice system. In the Army regulation that defines and describes the nature of command responsibility, there is a not-so-subtle link between the UCMJ and the “purpose of military discipline” related to the “controls and obligations imposed on them

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45 UCMJ art. 137(d).
46 See RCM 405(d)(A).
47 UCMJ arts. 1-146a.
48 See generally MCM.
by virtue of their military Service.” 49 Furthermore, “[c]ommanders are responsible for everything their command does or fails to do.” 50 Congress, and not just the President, also weighs in on the scale and scope of this responsibility. Section 3583 of Title 10 of the United States Code, detailing the requirements for a commanding officer’s exemplary conduct, reads:

All commanding officers and others in authority in the Army are required ... [t]o show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination ... [t]o be vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons who are placed under their command, ... [t]o guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct, according to the laws and regulations of the Army, all persons who are guilty of them, ... [t]o take all necessary and proper measures, under the laws, regulations, and customs of the Army, and [t]o promote and safeguard the morale, the physical well-being, and the general welfare of the officers and enlisted persons under their command or charge. 51

The commander’s critical role in the system has been part of this country’s military justice system since the founding of the country. 52 “The purpose of military law is to promote justice, to assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby to strengthen the national security of the United

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49 See Army Regulation (AR) 600-20, Army Command Policy, para. 1-5c.(4)(b)).
50 Id. para. 2-1b.
52 See SCHLUETER, supra note 1 at §§ 1-4 to 1-6 (10th ed. 2018) (discussing history of the court-martial).
The commander’s critical role in the system has been part of this country’s military justice system since the founding of the country. Commanders must have substantial authority, especially in combat situations, because it may be necessary to order military personnel to accomplish hazardous missions. The burden must be on the proponent of any limitation of the commander’s authority to justify the limitation because limitations on the commander’s authority automatically detract from the effectiveness of units in combat.

Commanders for hundreds of years have praised the attributes of good order and discipline and its positive impact on combat effectiveness. General George Washington said, “[d]iscipline is the soul of an army. It makes small numbers formidable; procures success to the weak, and esteem to all.” More recently, General William Westmorland commented:

Discipline is an attitude of respect for authority which is developed by leadership, precept, and training. It is a state of mind which leads to a willingness to obey an order no matter how unpleasant or dangerous the task to be performed. Discipline conditions the soldier to perform his military duty even if it requires him to act in a way that is highly inconsistent with his basic instinct for self-preservation. Discipline markedly differentiates the soldier from his counterpart in civilian society. Unlike the order that

54 See SCHLUETER, supra note 1 at §§ 1-4 to 1-6 (10th ed. 2018) (discussing history of the court-martial and discussing role of commanders in the system throughout that history).
is sought in civilian society, military discipline is absolutely essential in the Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{56}

The Army Field Manual defined “disciplined soldiers” as “orderly, obedient, controlled, and dependable. They do their duty promptly and effectively in response to orders, or even in the absence of orders.”\textsuperscript{57} Lieutenant General A. S. Collins, Jr., said:

\begin{quote}
The essential characteristics of a good army are that it be well trained and well disciplined. These two characteristics are apparent in every unit achievement, whether in peace or war. Discipline derives and flows from training and serves to emphasize a fundamental point essential to a philosophy of training. That training is all encompassing. Training permeates everything a military organization does.\textsuperscript{58}
\end{quote}

Additionally, commanders should be held accountable for ensuring subordinates are disciplined for sexual assault offenses and shifting that responsibility outside the chain of command will reduce command emphasis on enforcing standards of good order and discipline.

\section*{B. Under the Current American Military Justice System, the Commander’s Prosecutorial Discretion is Broad}

Military courts have recognized that the commander is vested with broad discretion to decide how to best deal with discipline

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Army Field Manual 22-100, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, (July 31, 1990) 42.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
problems in his or her command.\textsuperscript{59} As noted \textit{supra}, the commander’s options range from no action, verbal counseling, administrative actions (such as a written letter of reprimand in the service member’s file), or an administrative discharge, and even punitive actions such as nonjudicial punishment or court-martial charges.\textsuperscript{60} Decisions on serious allegations are made after consulting with the Staff Judge Advocate or a military prosecutor, who are themselves members of the command.\textsuperscript{61} The Staff Judge Advocate is expected to provide sound legal advice based on the nature and extent of the alleged criminal activity, the availability and admissibility of evidence against the accused, the needs of the command, the time necessary to investigate and prosecute the case, and the likely outcome of a trial on the merits.\textsuperscript{62} Those are the types of decisions that local district attorneys and United States Attorneys make on a daily basis.\textsuperscript{63} However, in the military that decision is for the commander to make, and not the lawyer. That is because the commander, not the

\textsuperscript{59} See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 14 M.J. 361, 365 (C.M.A. 1983) (commenting on the authority to charge violations of the UCMJ, court indicated that the “convening authority ... is free to decide the number of offenses to charge....” The convening authority decides what charges, if any, of those preferred should be referred to trial); United States v. Hagen, 25 M.J. 78 (C.M.A. 1987) (courts are hesitant to review decisions whether to prosecute, and there is a strong presumption that convening authorities perform their function without bias).

\textsuperscript{60} See RCM 306.

\textsuperscript{61} See UCMJ art. 30.

\textsuperscript{62} See UCMJ art. 37 (before convening a general court-martial the convening authority must consider the advice of the staff judge advocate). This legal advice is generally referred to as the “pretrial advice.” SCHLUETER, \textit{supra} note 1 at § 7-3(A) (10th ed. 2018).

lawyer, is responsible for morale as well as good order and discipline within the command. 64

C. UNDER THE CURRENT AMERICAN MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM, IT IS CRITICAL THAT THE COMMANDER HAVE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN HIS OR HER LEGAL ADVISORS

Under the current system, Staff Judge Advocates serve as legal advisors for the commanders of major commands, and for the subordinate commands. It is critical the commanders trust and confide in those legal advisors on matters involving military justice, which in turn impact morale and good order and discipline. That trust and confidence inures to the overall benefit of the command when the command is deployed and commanders must count on their legal advisors in matters far beyond military justice, such as operational law, international agreements, and important military and civilian personnel matters.

The proposed amendments establish a legal office outside the chain of command that decides disposition of serious, non-military offenses and would eliminate a major connection between legal advisors and commanders. The commander’s legal advisor and the convening authority would have no reason to meet to discuss decisions about disposition of these offenses. The absence of these direct, professional contacts would undermine this critical relationship, not only in regard to military justice matters, but also

64 See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (“a commander is charged with maintaining morale, discipline, and readiness”); Groer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1976) (holding “nothing in the Constitution . . . disables a military commander from acting to avert what he perceives to be a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops on the base under his command.”); Relford v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 401 U.S. 355, 367 (1971) (holding it is “[t]he responsibility of the military commander for maintenance of order in his command and his authority to maintain that order.”).
with respect to the broader legal issues commanders face at military installations both in the United States and when deployed.

V. THE PROPOSED CHANGES WOULD UNDERMINE A COMMANDER’S RESPONSIBILITY TO MAINTAIN GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE

A. THE PURPOSE AND FUNCTION OF THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM—GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE

It is critical that Congress, in considering any amendments to the UCMJ, recall that the primary function and purpose of the military justice system is to enforce good order and discipline in the armed forces.65

Traditionally, those who view military justice as primarily a system of justice tend to see the commander’s role as a hindrance to justice, nothing more than a relic of the past.66 Those who view the system as primarily one for maintaining good order and discipline instead see the commander’s role as indispensable.67 In Curry v. Secretary of the Army,68 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that the role of the convening authority in taking various actions in a court-martial case was constitutional. The court stated:

The power of the convening authority to refer charges to the court-martial is justifiable on two grounds. First, prosecutorial discretion may be essential to efficient use of

65 See David A. Schlueter, The Military Justice Conundrum: Justice or Discipline?, 215 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (2013) (presenting historical and contemporary analysis of purpose and functions of military justice and concluding that primary purpose of military justice has always been, and should remain, enforcement of good order and discipline).
66 See supra note 2.
67 See Schlueter, supra note 65.
68 595 F.2d 873, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
limited supplies and manpower. The decision to employ resources in a court-martial proceeding is one particularly within the expertise of the convening authority who, as chief administrator as well as troop commander, can best weigh the benefits to be gained from such a proceeding against those that would accrue if men and supplies were used elsewhere. The balance struck is crucial in times of crisis when prudent management of scarce resources is at a premium. Second . . . maintenance of discipline and order is imperative to the successful functioning of the military. The commanding officer’s power to refer charges may be necessary to establish and to preserve both.

Most of the governing rules and regulations in the military justice system attempt to balance the need for justice and discipline.69 More recently, critics have accused commanders of failing to ensure prosecution of those accused of sexual assault. Despite the views of some commentators that the military justice system is primarily a system of justice, the system’s function and purpose have not changed since the original Articles of War were adopted in the 1700s.70 Establishment of the current system’s framework in 1950 occurred only after numerous congressional hearings and multiple studies, and that system has fared well. Notably, the United States Supreme Court recently stated in Ortiz v. United States71 that “[t]he procedural protections afforded to a service member are ‘virtually the same’ as those given in a civilian criminal proceeding, whether state or federal.”72

69 See, e.g., United States v. Littrice, 13 C.M.R. 43, 47 (C.M.A. 1953) (identifying “the necessity of maintaining a delicate balance between justice and discipline.”).
70 See Schlue, supra note 65.
72 Id. at 2174 (2018) (citing Schlue, supra note 1 at § 1–7, p. 50 (10th ed. 2018)).
Notwithstanding all of the reforms that have taken place since the founding of the nation, the American military justice system remains a system designed to enforce discipline and good order.  

Based on the low levels of prosecutions of sexual assault offenses in the nations of several allies that have implemented the proposed changes, the evidence does not support the theory that the change will increase the level of U.S. military sexual assault prosecutions. Because the United States military has an excellent reputation as a combat-effective organization, the proponent for change should have the burden of proving there is first of all a problem with military prosecutions of sexual assaults, and the proposed remedy has a reasonable probability of accomplishing the goal without creating new problems. The proposed changes would be a severe and unnecessary blow to the commander’s authority to enforce good order and discipline and, if the result is the same as in allied militaries, the change likely would result in fewer prosecutions of perpetrators of serious crimes, including sexual assaults.

B. COMPARISON TO CIVILIAN PROSECUTORIAL DECISIONS

The proposed amendments to Article 30, UCMJ, which would remove the commander as the decision maker in the military justice process, would undermine the commander’s broad prosecutorial discretion and would transfer the local commander’s decision to an unspecified command structure outside the commander’s chain of command, requiring the recommendations of a senior armed forces lawyer, an individual disconnected in time and space from the

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73 See id. at 2200 (“it is possible today to mistake a military tribunal for a regular court and thus to forget its fundamental nature as an instrument of military discipline”) (emphasis added); Schlueter, supra note 65.
command. Such a modification would be tantamount to informing a local district attorney that the decision to prosecute or not prosecute serious cases would be made in the state capital by the State Attorney General, or in the case of a federal criminal prosecution, in Washington D.C.—and that the decision would be binding on local authorities. Not only would that system undermine the effectiveness of the district attorney’s and United States Attorney’s offices, it would undermine the populace’s confidence in the ability of local authorities to take care of local crime. The same is true in the military, with commanders. Once members of a command discover that a person with no connection to the command is making the decision regarding court-martial charges, they will view the commander as powerless to deal with serious offenses in a quick and efficient manner.  

C. THE PROPOSED CHANGES WOULD RESULT IN ACADEMIC OR IVORY TOWER DECISIONS

Because a high-ranking lawyer outside the command would be making decisions concerning serious court-martial charges, some may view that exercise as primarily “academic,” being disconnected from the real-world problems of the command—a true “ivory tower” decision.

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74 See The Military Justice Improvement Act, S. 1932, 116th Cong. (2020) (requiring disposition of charges be referred to designated commissioned officers in grade O-6 or higher).


76 Ivory Tower Definition, Dictionary.com (2021), archived at https://perma.cc/YP9R-7YXJ (defining an ivory tower as “an attitude of aloofness from or disdain or disregard for worldly or practical affairs”).
The decision to prosecute almost always involves an armed forces prosecutor personally interviewing potential witnesses, reviewing the law enforcement reports, speaking personally to the commanders in the chain of command, and providing an informed “on the ground” assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the case against an accused. In deciding whether to prosecute an accused, the prosecutor must make an informed assessment of whether the available evidence supports the charges alleged. Experienced litigators know that a case which looks strong on paper can take on a different light after they personally interview witnesses face-to-face, go over their pretrial statements, assess their demeanor, and then decide whether they will be strong or weak witnesses. Depending on the location of any central legal center charged with deciding whether to go forward with charges, counsel in that office will miss that opportunity. Most of those critical elements in the decision-making process would be missing if the primary decision authority rests in a high-ranking military lawyer, separated from the real-world problems of that particular command. Electronic evidence, memos, and e-mails are not an adequate substitute for a decision made by the local commander after a careful assessment by the commander’s local legal advisor. Thus, there is a real danger that the senior armed forces lawyers would be making an ivory-tower assessment of the evidence.

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77 Schlueter, supra note 1 at § 6-1(A)(3) (10th ed. 2018) (discussing factors that commanders are to consider in preferring court-martial charges).
78 Id.
D. THE PROPOSED CHANGES WOULD UNDERMINE THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

Under the current system, as discussed supra, it is the unit or company commander who usually initiates the charging process by asking the prosecutor assigned to their unit to prepare a charge sheet, i.e., “preferring charges.” Usually, a decision is made after consulting the prosecutor assigned to that unit. Each commander in the chain of command is charged with considering the possible charges and providing another level of assessment before it reaches the desk of the commander who would be the convening authority on the case. The proposed changes to the system are clearly intended to disrupt the normal chain of command, and potentially create doubt in the minds of the service members whether the commander has any real disciplinary authority over them. One commentator has noted that removing the commander’s authority to prefer or refer charges would seriously undermine that commander’s authority within the unit; in future cases the members of the unit might question or doubt the commander’s ability to initiate disciplinary proceedings against them. At most the immediate commander would be able to make a

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79 Any person subject to the UCMJ may prefer charges. RCM 307(a). Charges are preferred through use of a charge sheet, DD Form 458. Charge sheets are typically prepared by the legal office after conferring with the accused’s commander; the commander then signs the charge sheet, and swears or affirms that he or she has personal knowledge of the charges, or has investigated them, and that they are true. RCM 307(a)(2).

80 SCHLEUTER, supra note 1 at § 6-1(A)(3) (10th ed. 2018) (noting that commanders usually seek advice from the military prosecutor).

81 See id. at § 6-2 (discussing forwarding of charges through summary court-martial convening authority and the special court-martial convening authority to the general court-martial convening authority).

non-binding recommendation to the referral authority about initiation and disposition of offenses.

Under the proposals, the decision to prosecute or not prosecute would be made completely out of the chain of command, and not by the very commanders and lawyers who are in the best position to make decisions that directly affect good order and discipline in that command. Thus, the proposals would undermine the authority of the commander to enforce discipline and justice in his or her unit.

E. FOR PURPOSES OF GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE, THERE IS NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMMON LAW OFFENSES AND MILITARY OFFENSES

In stripping the commander of the discretion to dispose of serious offenses, the proposed changes appear to distinguish what some refer to as “common-law” crimes from military crimes.83 For purposes of the military justice system, that distinction is meaningless. In Solorio v. United States,84 the Supreme Court concluded that a court-martial had jurisdiction to try a Coast Guard member who committed sexual misconduct offenses that occurred in the civilian community. Among other sources, the Supreme Court

266 (2013). See also LTC Kyle G. Phillips, Military Justice and the Role of the Convening Authority, U.S. Naval Institute, Vol. 146/5/1,407, May 2020, where the author writes:

The authority to administer discipline and hold people accountable is woven into the fabric of the military system. Training, unit culture, esprit de corps, and shared goals are essential for a healthy unit. The authority to discipline and hold people accountable under the law is the backbone of command authority. Stripping court-martial convening authority from command authority would have the effect of severing the spinal cord—the other movements of the “body” will be severely limited if not completely incapacitated.

Archived at https://perma.cc/73NV-R9FE.

83 See SCHLUETER ET AL., supra note 19 at § 3.2 (3d ed. 2018) (providing an overview of military crimes, including common law offenses and military-specific crimes).

quoted General George Washington’s General Order dated February 24, 1779 which states:

All improper treatment of an inhabitant by an officer or soldier being destructive of good order and discipline as well as subversive of the rights of society is as much a breach of military, as civil law and as punishable by the one as the other.85

This reasoning remains just as valid today as it did when General Washington wrote it over 240 years ago. Service members who commit common law crimes such as larceny (Art. 121), sexual assault (Art. 120), and murder (Art. 118), pose as much of a threat to good order and discipline as do the crimes of desertion (Art. 85), disobedience of an order (Art. 90), and conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman (Art. 133),86 and as such, are all proper objects for the military justice system.

F. THE PROBLEM OF MIXED OFFENSES

The proposed amendments create another issue when the accused has committed multiple offenses — some of which are in the excluded list of offenses (e.g., military offenses) and some of which are on the included list (e.g., common-law offenses). Under the proposals, who will make the ultimate decision to proceed with

85 Id. at 445 n.10 (citing 14 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 140-141 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1936)).
86 See e.g., United States v. Morgan; 40 C.M.R. 583, 586 (A.B.R. 1969) (“That a ‘barracks thief’ creates problems for a unit commander is . . . common knowledge within the military community.”). Most members of the military community, enlisted and officers, understand the real danger to discipline and morale in a unit where an accused has stolen a possession from a fellow service member in arms. It can undermine trust and confidence in the ranks — qualities that are indispensable for good order and discipline.
court-martial charges in these mixed cases? For example, an accused may be charged with sexual assault, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and disobedience of an order of a superior officer to avoid contact with the sexual assault victim. Is that a decision for the commander? Or the senior legal officer unconnected with the command? Under the current system, that decision is made efficiently by the local command without regard to whether the offense is military in nature or a civilian-type offense. Additionally, if the commander proceeds with offering the accused a summary court-martial or nonjudicial punishment for the “purely” military offenses, but the accused decides to demand trial by court-martial, who will refer that case? (See Section VII, infra.).

The proposed system creates a needless and complicated bifurcated system and an additional level of bureaucracy that in all likelihood will present unintended consequences.

G. **THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS THREATEN THE ABILITY TO HOLD THE COMMANDER RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OFFENSES OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMAND**

Furthermore, if commanders no longer have the necessary disciplinary role in preferring charges or referring them to trial for service members’ misconduct, it could be difficult to hold them personally responsible for the delicts of the service members under their command.

CEOs of large organizations know that responsibility for the organization must be accompanied by the authority to manage the organization. To an even greater extent, the same holds true in the military, because commanders make life and death decisions on the battlefield. They should be held accountable for their inability to enforce good order and discipline, prospects which are undermined by the proposed amendments.
H. THE AMENDMENTS APPARENTLY REINSTITUTE PROCEDURES LONG-SINCE ABANDONED FOR APPOINTING THE PARTICIPANTS TO A COURT-MARTIAL

In the early days of the UCMJ, if a convening authority referred court-martial charges to trial, that officer also appointed the members of the court-martial panel, the trial counsel, and the defense counsel. Over the years, the procedures changed. Now, the convening authority appoints only the panel members who will serve as the finders of fact at the court-martial. 87 They are the military’s counterpart to jurors for a state or federal criminal case. The military judge is assigned to the case by the independent Service’s trial judiciary command. 88 The defense counsel is assigned to represent an accused by an independent chain of command for defense counsel. 89 The trial counsel (prosecutor) is selected by the Staff Judge Advocate. 90

Thus, the proposed amendments appear to reinstate a system that has not existed in many years. It would apparently require the Service Chiefs of Staff, located in the Pentagon, to create an office to select not only the court-martial members, but also the military judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel. 91 That leaves a clear impression with the accused, and members of the public, that the system has reverted to the day when it appeared that the court-

87 UCMJ art. 25.
88 RCM 503(b)(1).
89 For example, in the Army defense counsel are appointed by the Chief, United States Army Trial Defense Service or his delegate. Army Regulations 27-10, para. 6-9.
90 See Army Regulations 27-10, para. 5-3 (detailing of trial counsel by Staff Judge Advocate or his delegate).
91 See The Military Justice Improvement Act, S. 1932, 116th Cong. (2020) (requiring “[e]ach Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces or Commandant” to “establish an office to . . . convene general and special courts-martial” and detail the members of courts-martial).
martial was stacked against the accused. In contrast to those proposals, no United States Attorney or district attorney in the civilian criminal justice systems has authority to select these trial participants for cases being tried by their offices.

This scheme of someone other than an officer in the service’s judiciary command making the appointment of a judge to a particular court-martial could be perceived as the command hand-picking a judge, and thus impacting the impartiality and independence of the military judge. It could certainly be attacked in the courts as depriving an accused of due process.92

VI. THE PROPOSED CHANGES WOULD CREATE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

A. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE: COMMANDER’S INABILITY TO IMPOSE NONJUDICIAL PUNISHMENT OR CONVENE SUMMARY COURT-MARTIAL

Under the proposed amendments to Article 30, a decision by a lawyer not connected to the command would undermine the commander’s ability to deal with the alleged offenses in some other forum. For example, the amendment indicates that a decision not to proceed with court-martial charges would not limit the ability of the commander to proceed with a summary court-martial 93 or

92 Cf. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 180 (1994) (“Article 26 places military judges under the authority of the appropriate Judge Advocate General rather than under the authority of the convening officer. . . . [W]e believe this structure helps protect [judicial] independence. . . . Judge Advocates General . . . have no interest in the outcome of a particular court-martial . . .”). The problem could arise where someone in the prosecutorial chain of command believed that a particular military judge was lenient on sentencing convicted service members and the appointing authority picked a judge who was more inclined to impose harsher punishments.

93 UCMJ art. 24.
nonjudicial punishment. But that creates potential problems with actual implementation. Article 15 provides that unless a service member is attached to a vessel, the service member can turn down the commander’s proposed Article 15 procedures and demand a court-martial. The same is true for a summary court-martial; the accused must consent, whether or not the accused is assigned or attached to a vessel. If the commander offers the accused an Article 15 for certain offenses, or prefers summary court-martial charges, the accused can refuse to proceed, and the centralized legal authority could choose to prohibit a court-martial for those offenses. Thus, the accused can effectively “check-mate” the commander from enforcing decisions to conduct a summary court-martial or impose nonjudicial punishment under Article 15.

B. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE: DECIDING WHETHER TO IMPOSE PRETRIAL CONFINEMENT

Under the current system, a commander may place an accused in pretrial confinement pending disposition of the charges. The system provides for both command review and judicial review of that decision by a military magistrate or judge. The current system is an integrated and coordinated decision by the chain of command, which in large part depends on the probable disposition of the charges. The proposed scheme—which takes the decision to refer a case to trial out of the chain of command—creates uncertainty as to whether that current system of dealing with pretrial confinement issues can be maintained because the immediate commander will no longer be the person who decides whether there is probable cause.
that the person being confined committed the offense.\textsuperscript{97} The function of deciding that sufficiency of the evidence will be transferred to the centralized legal authority, and having one Department of Defense (DOD) entity put the accused into pretrial confinement and another DOD entity refuse to initiate charges would be incongruous, inefficient, and reflect poorly on the immediate commander or the centralized legal authority or both.

C. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE: THE PROPOSED SCHEME COULD PRESENT SPEEDY TRIAL PROBLEMS

The military justice system currently recognizes several speedy trial protections—constitutional, statutory, and regulatory.\textsuperscript{98} Those protections are triggered by the preferral of court-martial charges and/or pretrial confinement of the accused. Under the current system commanders and legal advisors work together to ensure that the case moves in a timely and efficient manner. Vesting the decision to refer charges to a court-martial in a legal office, separated by time and distance, poses significant speedy trial concerns.

D. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE: THE PROPOSED SCHEME COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT PLEA BARGAINING

As in the civilian community, the military justice system depends heavily on the ability of a convening authority and an accused to

\textsuperscript{97} See generally, MCM; RCM 305(d);

When a person may be confined. No person may be ordered into pretrial confinement except for probable cause. Probable cause to order pretrial confinement exists when there is a reasonable belief that: (1) An offense triable by court-martial has been committed; (2) The person confined committed it; and (3) Confinement is required by the circumstances.

\textsuperscript{98} See SCHLUETER, supra note 1 at § 13-3(D) (10th ed. 2018) (discussing speedy trial rights available to a military accused under the Fifth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment, the UCMJ, and the Manual for Courts-Martial).
enter into a pretrial agreement.99 Those agreements typically require the accused to enter a plea of guilty in return for reduction of charges, dismissal of some of the charges, or a sentence limitation.100 The proposed amendments fail to address that critical feature of the system. If the centralized legal authority decides to proceed with court-martial charges, that decision is binding on any convening authority. Does that mean that a convening authority could not subsequently enter into plea bargaining with the accused which results in the dismissal of a serious charge? The answer to that question does not lie in drafting additional statutory language, nor in directing the President to solve the problem through a myriad of amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial or existing Service regulations—those measures would simply add a level of bureaucracy to a system that currently operates efficiently and fairly.

99 See generally Bradford D. Bigler, A New Paradigm for Plea Agreements Under the 2016 MJA, ARMY LAW. no. 6, 2019, at 48 (in-depth discussion of changes to plea bargaining after 2016 Military Justice Act; author compares the “legacy” system of plea bargaining to the new system; the author notes that if the accused pleads guilty to all charges and specifications, the judge sentences the accused at an Article 39(a) session); Joseph P. Della Maria, Jr., Negotiating and Drafting the Pretrial Agreement, 25 JAG J. 117 (1971); Gray, Negotiated Pleas in the Military, 37 Fed. B.J. 49 (1978); Bruce A. Haddenhorst & Maryalice David, Guilty Pleas: A Primer for Judge Advocates, 39 A.F. L. REV. 87 (1996); Carlton L. Jackson, Plea Bargaining in the Military: An Unintended Consequence of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 179 MIL. L. REV. 1 (2004); Donald F. Melborn, Jr., Negotiating Pleas in Naval Courts-Martial, 16 JAG J. 103 (1962); Brian B. McMenamin, Plea Bargaining in the Military, 10 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 93 (1971). For a sample pretrial agreement, see K. JANSEN ET AL., MILITARY CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FORMS, § 4-9 (3d ed. 2009).

100 See RCM 705.
E. INTENDED CONSEQUENCE: THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS MAY ADVERSELY AFFECT AGREEMENTS WITH LOCAL CIVILIAN PROSECUTORS

At many installations there are agreements with local prosecutors (state and federal) as to which office—military or civilian—will prosecute an accused. Those agreements are beneficial in promoting good community relations between the local command and the surrounding civilian community. The proposed amendments make no provision for such agreements. Is it intended that after the Judge Advocate General’s Corps Colonel (O-6) or Navy Captain (O-6) legal advisor decides to prosecute a case, the local agreements are no longer operative? Would the O-6 be bound by such agreements? Is the O-6 required to contact the local civilian prosecutor and decide on the next best steps? In either event, the local command would have no authority to resolve the issues, even though the decision could have an impact on local military-civilian relations.

See MCM, App. 4. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Departments of Justice and Transportation (Coast Guard) Relating to the Investigations and Prosecution of Crimes Over Which the Two Departments Have Concurrent Jurisdiction; see also Office of the District Attorney, 27th Judicial District of Texas, Bell County (“Through an agreement with the Commanding General for III Corps and Fort Hood, virtually all felony cases involving military defendants are deferred to the Army for prosecution by court martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. An aggressive liaison program between the III Corps Staff Judge Advocate’s office and the District Attorney’s Office insures that common problems are dealt with effectively.”), archived at https://perma.cc/BN89-KV93. Several cases illustrate the three jurisdictions that may choose to prosecute a case. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373 (1999) (army retiree, convicted of kidnapping a private from an Air Force base and murdering her, sentenced to death by a district court); United States v. Hennis, 79 M.J. 370 (CAAF 2020) (former Army member, convicted of murdering the wife and two daughters of an Air Force captain, sentenced to death by an Army court-martial); United States v. Gray, 51 M.J. 1 (CAAF 1999) (servicemember, convicted of two murders, sentenced to life in prison by a state court).
For example, in the current system if a commander elects not to refer sexual offenses to courts-martial, a superior convening authority may refer the offense to courts-martial. If the offense occurred on a military installation with exclusive federal jurisdiction, the United States Attorney may prosecute the case in a United States District Court. If the offense occurred elsewhere in the United States, a district attorney could prosecute the case. Thus, the commander’s decision not to prosecute does not end the case—there may still be prosecution in other venues.

VII. CONGRESS SHOULD NOT LOOK TO OTHER COUNTRIES’ SYSTEMS AS MODELS FOR AMERICAN MILITARY JUSTICE UNLESS THERE IS CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THOSE FOREIGN SYSTEMS ARE MORE EFFECTIVE

A. IN GENERAL

The proposed amendments seem to rest on the view that first, military commanders are not to be trusted in exercising prosecutorial discretion,

and second, that Congress should follow the lead of other countries and adopt procedures used in countries such as Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom. That argument is reminiscent of debates over whether other countries’ laws should serve as a model for American legal systems. In hearings on earlier similar legislative proposals, some commentators have urged Congress to go further and apply this approach to the prosecution of all cases by civilian prosecutors. The argument is that the United States’ military justice system is an “outlier” that is somehow deficient. Presumably justice systems used in other democratic

102 Cf. Don Christensen, A Comment on the Latest White Paper, Global Military Justice Reform (July 26, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/F8MG-LVNY (suggesting that commanders are not capable of making decisions about which cases should be tried by court-martial).
countries are designed to suit the political and military goals of those particular countries, and those democratic countries are profoundly different from the United States in numbers of military personnel, military budgets, and worldwide size and type of military operations. There may be aspects of those systems that could be effectively applied to the United States military. However, before changes from our allies are applied to the United States military they should at least meet a threshold showing that they are applied to prosecute enough cases to show they are indeed effective.

The American military justice system is similar to the civilian justice system. This procedural similarity makes the military justice system easier for civilians to understand, and the same rationale for decentralized decisions for most prosecutions has the same basis in both systems. Civilians recognize that a decentralized decision whereby local district attorneys and U.S. attorneys decide whether a person is charged is best for fairness because local circumstances are considered. There is no need to look to other countries for guidance on who should make the charging decision for the military any more than one should seek foreign guidance on whether authority to prosecute should be shifted to a centralized authority for civilians.

Dramatic changes should not be considered before the evidence establishes there is a problem in the military’s prosecution of sexual assault offenses. Any change that is made should not be made before there has been testing and analysis. Allied militaries in democracies that complete a handful of sexual assault prosecutions provide limited anecdotal evidence at best and do not support change for the vastly larger United States military.

103 Cf. Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2174 (2018) (“[t]he procedural protections afforded to a service member are ‘virtually the same’ as those given in a civilian criminal proceeding, whether state or federal.”) (citing SCHLUETER, supra note 1 at § 1–7, p. 50 (10th ed. 2018)).
United States commanders are professional, well trained and highly educated.\textsuperscript{104} Those who fail to perform are usually removed from command or denied valued promotions.\textsuperscript{105} Lawyers who advise them also are well trained and highly educated, and there are consequences if they fail to perform. Before Congress gives any serious consideration to adopting the procedures used in other countries, it should compare those systems in terms of size of the military force, the world-wide and geographical disbursement of military personnel, purpose of those military justice systems, the history and experience of those systems, and the country’s expectations for its commanders in enforcing good order and discipline.

Commentators have written that “[t]he [foremost] distinctive factor that separates the United States military from all other militaries is its ability to ‘command the commons.’”\textsuperscript{106} “America is

\textsuperscript{104} See generally Kimberly Jackson et. al., Raising the Flag: Implications of U.S. Military Approaches to General and Flag Officer Development, 30–44 (Rand Corporation, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/Y3FW-JHB (detailing military assignment history, professional military and civilian education, special training, and evaluation requirements of officers in the Armed Forces).

\textsuperscript{105} For example, in December 2020, 14 Army leaders at Fort Hood, Texas, including two major generals were suspended or relieved from command after an investigation determined that they had a command climate that “allowed sexual assault and harassment to proliferate, and that Army CID agents at the post were under-experienced and over-assigned.” Kyle Rempfer, Fourteen leaders relieved or suspended after scathing report on Fort Hood, ARMY TIMES (Dec. 8, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/KLR3-R7FB. See also Report of the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee, U.S. ARMY iii, 64, 75 (Nov. 6, 2020) (noting problems with the handling of victims, deficiencies in the Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Program, inexperienced investigators, and “a large number of sexual assault cases were lost or dismissed at court-martial partially due to investigations that are rote and lack essential evidence.”), archived at https://perma.cc/QEH3-DMNR.

\textsuperscript{106} CRAIG CARUANA, AMERICAN POWER: STILL THE BEST HOPE FOR PEACE 77 (2012).
the only country that can project military might globally.” 107 “The military justice system . . . goes wherever the troops go—to provide uniform treatment regardless of locale or circumstances.” 108 Given the global nature of America’s armed forces, commanders must have the ability to “expeditiously deal with misconduct to prevent degradation of the unit’s effectiveness and cohesion.” 109

Legal counsel to the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has stated that:

While many countries can afford for the center of their military justice systems to be located . . . far from the arenas of international armed conflict, we require a more flexible capability that can travel with the unit as it operates in any part of the world. 110 Any delay in “disciplinary action will invariably prejudice good order.” 111


109 Id.


111 In this same vein the late Judge Robinson O. Everett, former Chief Judge of the Court of Military Appeals, cogently pointed out: “[J]ustice delayed is justice defeated. . . . In military life, where to maintain discipline, the unpleasant consequences of offenses must be quick, certain and vivid—not something vague in the remote future.” Id. (quoting ROBINSON O. EVERETT, MILITARY JUSTICE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES (1956)).
Finally, as discussed in the following sections, it is important to point out that the American military justice system deals with different types of caseloads.\footnote{As noted by the legal counsel to the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Staff: “[T]he scope and scale of our allies’ caseloads are vastly different than ours. None of our allies handle the volume of cases that the U.S. military does. This is likely due to the greater size of our military forces in comparison.” See Report of the role of the Commander, supra note 110.}

Even assuming that there is some merit in adopting another country's approach to military justice, the burden is on the reformers to show that the American model is indeed lacking, and that adopting the other countries' models will not adversely impact good order and discipline.

B. \textbf{STATISTICAL COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THREE COUNTRIES WHERE ATTORNEYS REFER CASES TO COURTS-MARTIAL}


\begin{enumerate}
  \item A comparative analysis of the military justice systems of relevant foreign allies with the current military justice system of the United States and the alternative military
\end{enumerate}
justice system, including whether or not approaches of the military justice systems of such allies to determinations described in subsection (a) are appropriate for the military justice system of the United States.  

The SAG Report indicated that 7 of 15 relevant allies do not prosecute non-military offenses, such as sexual assault, by courts-martial during peace time that occur in their countries.  

The remaining 8 allies utilize lawyers to charge offenses and refer them to trial.  

The military forces of two allies (Ireland and New Zealand) have fewer than 10,000 personnel in their militaries.  

Five allied countries—Australia, Canada, Israel, Italy, and the United

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115 Id. at App. 16-17. As an example, Germany no longer has peacetime courts-martial. Criminal cases are tried in the civilian courts and charging decisions are made by regular civilian authorities. Venue for the trial of offenses by deployed personnel is centralized in the civilian court in Kempten, Bavaria. See Act for Venue for Armed Forces Under Special Deployment Abroad (Jan. 21, 2013). Additionally, Sweden no longer has courts-martial. Criminal offenses by military personnel are prosecuted by regular civilian authorities. See id.

116 Id.


118 The authors did not include Israeli statistics because the most recent information they found available about Israeli sexual assault courts-martial was from 2013. Statistics from the Israeli Forces should be considered because Israel is a democracy, an ally of the United States, and has a military that has an outstanding reputation for competence. In 2013, Israel used the centralized prosecution referral system that is outside the chain of command. In 2013, the Israeli active duty population was 176,500 or four times as large as the active duty population of Fort Hood. Yet in 2012, Fort Hood completed about the same number of military sex offense prosecutions as the entire Israeli Defense Force (Fort Hood tried 26 sex offense courts-martial in FY 2012; Israel averaged 23 indictments from 2008 to 2012). The 2013 study reported that “[t]he entire Australian military justice system prosecuted an average of three felony-level prosecutions the last two years; as compared to the U.S. military justice system that prosecutes approximately 400 times as many felony-level cases.” Schenck, L., Fact
Kingdom—have militaries with personnel strengths between about 60,000 and 150,000,\(^\text{119}\) and the effectiveness of their prosecution systems could therefore be compared to that of the United States. Any assessment should consider the rates of sexual assault prosecutions and convictions, where available, and compare those rates with the rates of United States sexual assault courts-martial prosecutions and convictions. It may not be possible to assess the statistics of some of the allies because some of these countries might not maintain statistics. Others might be unwilling to disclose statistics on prosecutions.

The SAG Report further states:

> The experience of other democratic countries that rely on courts-martial for the trial of serious offenses by military personnel with the charging power vested in a lawyer rather than a lay commander demonstrates that such a system can be put in place without compromising the effectiveness of the nation’s defense capability.\(^\text{120}\)

Notably, however, the SAG Report provides no measurement of the effect on defense capability of transferring authority from the commander to lawyers. The SAG Report does not give any examples where prosecutions of serious crimes were more effective than the current United States system where the convening authority refers cases to trial. The United States is known for its powerful and effective military,\(^\text{121}\) and it serves as the model for our allies to

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\(^{119}\) Id.

\(^{120}\) SAG Report supra note 113, at 13.

\(^{121}\) President Barack Obama said in his farewell to the U.S. Armed Forces:
emulate in many ways. None of our allies’ experiences have demonstrated that the dilution of the authority of the commander to enforce good order and discipline improved the effectiveness of their military.

The Department of Defense “uses the term ‘sexual assault’ to refer to a range of crimes, including rape, sexual assault, forcible sodomy, aggravated sexual contact, abusive sexual contact, and attempts to commit these offenses, as defined by the [UCMJ].” In FY 2018, convening authorities referred 66% (378) cases (penetrative and contact sexual assaults) to trial by general, special, and summary court-martial, and in FY 2017, 64% (441) were referred to court-martial. In FY 2018, convening authorities dismissed or resolved

America’s military remains by far the most capable fighting force on the face of the earth. Our Army, tested by years of combat, is the best-trained and best-equipped land force on the planet.

Our Navy is the largest and most lethal in the world, on track to surpass 300 ships. Our Air Force, with its precision and reach, is unmatched. Our Marine Corps is the world’s only truly expeditionary force. Our Coast Guard is the finest in the world. . . . [O]ur military stands apart as the most respected institution in our nation by a mile.

Mahita Gajanan, President Obama’s Farewell Address to the Armed Forces, TIME (Jan. 4, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/CJ22-W5E4. On February 5, 2020, President Donald Trump said in his State of the Union Address, “Our military is completely rebuilt, with its power being unmatched anywhere in the world — and it is not even close.” Jim Garamone, Trump Touts Military Rebuilding, Space Force, Strikes Against Terror, DOD NEWS (Feb. 5, 2020) archived at https://perma.cc/YM7B-XKEX. See also Global Firepower 2021, archived at https://perma.cc/EST8-JNNX (ranking the United States as the undisputed most powerful military, followed by Russia and China to complete the top three).


through alternate administrative means 34% (196) of preferred cases. Overall, 82% of referred cases in FY18 were referred to general court-martial, and in FY 2017, 77% were referred to general courts-martial. The more serious the sexual assault offense, the higher the level of court-martial. General courts-martial (GCM) have authority to sentence the accused to multiple years of confinement, whereas special courts-martial sentences to confinement are limited to one year and summary courts-martial sentences are limited to 30 days. The following table shows referral levels for penetrative and contact sexual offense cases completed in Fiscal Years 2015 through 2018.124

### Table 1

Referral Levels of Penetrative Offenses and Contact Offenses in United States Courts-Martial (2015-2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referral Level of Penetrative Offenses</th>
<th>FY 2015</th>
<th>FY 2016</th>
<th>FY 2017</th>
<th>FY 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Court-Martial</td>
<td>94% (376)</td>
<td>93% (350)</td>
<td>92% (300)</td>
<td>95% (272)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Levels of Court-Martial</td>
<td>6% (23)</td>
<td>7% (27)</td>
<td>8% (25)</td>
<td>5% (15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referral Level of Contact Offenses</th>
<th>FY 2015</th>
<th>FY 2016</th>
<th>FY 2017</th>
<th>FY 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Court-Martial</td>
<td>40% (64)</td>
<td>44% (51)</td>
<td>35% (40)</td>
<td>43% (39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Levels of Court-Martial</td>
<td>60% (96)</td>
<td>56% (66)</td>
<td>65% (76)</td>
<td>57% (52)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

124 *Id. at* 17.
The following table depicts the number of substantiated reports of sexual assault courts-martial cases tried to verdict, convictions of any offense, and confinement adjudged.

**Table 2**

**Substantiated Reports of Sexual Assault in United States Courts-Martial (2015-2019)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unrestricted Reports</td>
<td>4,584</td>
<td>4,591</td>
<td>5,110</td>
<td>5,805</td>
<td>5,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases Tried for any Offense</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convictions</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confinement Adjudged</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

129 See 2019 SAPR Report, supra note 122.
130 Restricted reports of sexual assault are confidential, protected communications. Unrestricted reports of sexual assault are referred for investigation to a military criminal investigative organization, and the command is notified of the alleged incident. 2019 SAPR Report, supra note 122, at 5, 11, 29.
A series of studies have compared the rates of sexual assault felony-level prosecutions in the Canadian, Australia, and United Kingdom with those in the United States Armed Forces.\(^{131}\)

1. **Canada**

One study concluded that more than twice as many United States personnel per capita were tried by courts-martial for sex offenses than for Canadian Forces, even though the United States sex offense report rate (assessed by military suspect) was 27% lower than the Canadian rate. In Fiscal Year 2012, a single United States military installation, Fort Hood, alone tried 3.7 times (26 Fort Hood versus 7 Canada) as many sex offenses by courts-martial as the entire Canadian military, and obtained ten times (21 Fort Hood versus 2 Canada) as many sex offense courts-martial convictions.

The Canadian Armed Forces currently have 71,500 regular force members.\(^{132}\) The United States Armed Forces have approximately 20 times more personnel than the Canadian Armed Forces. The number of Canadian courts-martial prosecutions with at least one sexual misconduct charge, and the number of convictions by reporting year are depicted in the following table.


\(^{132}\) National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, Government of Canada (Sep. 24, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/X7UZ-U5TV.
Table 3
Canadian Court-Martial Convictions
(2013-2019)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>'13-'14</th>
<th>'14-'15</th>
<th>'15-'16</th>
<th>'16-'17</th>
<th>'17-'18</th>
<th>'18-'19</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cases Tried</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convictions</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the 2018–2019 reporting period, Canada completed 20 courts-martial involving sexual misconduct charges, and 14 resulted in a finding of guilt on at least one charge. 133 Of the 20 personnel charged with sexual misconduct in 2018–2019, 6 were charged with sexual assault, and the other charges related to prostitution, child pornography, voyeurism, etc. None of the sexual assault charges resulted in a finding of guilty. 134

In the 2017–2018 reporting period, Canada also completed 20 courts-martial involving sexual misconduct with 15 of those resulting in a guilty finding for at least one charge. However, there were only 9 charges involving sexual assault, and the other charges were for non-assault sexual crimes. Three were convicted of sexual assault and received sentences including imprisonment ranging from 9 to 22 months. In the entire Canadian military justice system during the 2018–2019 reporting period, 43 sentences were pronounced by courts-martial; however, only three cases resulted in

134 Id.
sentences to any imprisonment (5 days, 5 months, and 10 months respectively). A Canadian survey revealed that in 2018, “the prevalence of sexual assault among women in the Regular Force was about four times that among men (4.3% versus 1.1%)” and totaled “approximately 900 Regular Force members . . . representing 1.6% of all Regular Force members.” In 2018, a U.S. study estimated 1.5% of U.S. military personnel indicated they were sexually assaulted. The Canadian study showing the number of sexual assaults committed by members of the Canadian armed forces may not be comparable to the latest U.S. study because of different survey methodology. For example, the response rate in the Canadian survey “among Regular Force members was 52%,” and the U.S. military personnel response rate was only 17%. A low response rate leads to the possibility of selection bias because victims of sexual assault are more likely to report in surveys that they have been sexually assaulted. Extrapolations from surveys with lower response rates are more likely to may be inflated because of this selection bias. Thus, we do not compare the total number of cases prosecuted divided by the total number of cases for Canada or the United States. We do have the total number of cases prosecuted and we divided that number by

136 Annex 1: 2018 Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of Active Duty Members Overview Report [hereinafter 2018 WGRA Report] (May 2019) at vi (“In 2018, 6.2% of DOD women (an estimated 12,927 Service members) and 0.7% of DOD men (an estimated 7,546 Service members) experienced a sexual assault in the past 12 months (Figure 1). This was a statistically significant increase, from 4.3% in 2016, for DOD women. There was no significant change from 2016 for DOD men.”), archived at https://perma.cc/R24S-4MN8. To determine the total DOD victims of sexual assault in the previous 12 months, add 12,927 women plus 7,546 men equals 20,473. The 2018 WGRA Report used a DOD population of 1,327,194. Id. at 19. Dividing the 1,327,194 total population by 20,473 estimated victims of sexual assault equals 1.5%.
137 Canadian Survey at 55.
the number of personnel in the Canadian military. There is no compelling evidence that U.S. military personnel commit more sexual assaults per capita than military personnel in any other country. In sum, during the last two years the Canadian prosecutor tried an average of 7.5 sexual assault cases each year and obtained an average of 1.5 convictions each year, which is a much lower rate per thousand than in the United States military justice system.

2. Australia

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) has 58,680 active duty personnel, and the United States Armed Forces is 23 times as large as the ADF. In the Australian military, the Director of Military Prosecutions (DMP), chooses the level of trial for each accused. Trials by a Defense Force Magistrate (DFM) or Restricted Court-Martial (RCM) have the power to impose a maximum sentence of six months’ imprisonment. An Australian general court-martial (GCM) may adjudge a sentence based on a particular offense of up to confinement for life. The 2019 DMP report notes that on December 3, 2018, a captain was convicted of one count of sexual intercourse without consent by a GCM and his sentence included 3 months imprisonment. The 2017 DMP report states there was one GCM during 2017 for a trial of an accused on a charge of sexual intercourse without consent, and that accused was acquitted. The 2016 DMP report states, “the majority of offences dealt with under the [Defence

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Force Discipline Act] are acts of indecency. The more serious offences are generally dealt with by the civilian authorities unless such offending occurs overseas, where the Australian courts have no jurisdiction.”

The following table depicts the Australian DMP referral decisions for all cases and provides the number of sexual offenses sent to the DMP for a referral decision.

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Table 4
Australian Referrals to Trial by Director of Military Prosecutions (DMP) (2016-2019)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calendar Year</th>
<th>2016(^{143})</th>
<th>2017(^{144})</th>
<th>2018(^{145})</th>
<th>2019(^{146})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Adverse Action</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referred to unit for Summary Disposal</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Force Magistrate</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restricted Court-Martial</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Court-Martial</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Offenses Including Sexual Assaults Referred to DMP for Referral Decision</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{143}\) Id. at 22-23, 25, Annex B.

\(^{144}\) Australian 2017 DMP Report, supra note 141, at 17, Annex B.

\(^{145}\) The DMP webpage does not include the 2018 DMP Report. For the statistics provided, see Annex N to Judge Advocate General, Department of Defense, Australian Government, Defence Force Discipline Act 1982: Report for the Period 1 January to 31 December 2018 (2019), archived at https://perma.cc/3DDT-PRRX.

\(^{146}\) Australian 2019 DMP Report, supra note 140, at 21-22, Annex A.
The Australian Inspector General Report states, “[s]uperior trials (courts martial and Defence Force magistrate trials) decreased by a further six per cent, a trend that has been observed over the past five financial years. In 2018-19 there were 30 superior trials recorded, compared to 32 trials recorded in 2017-18.”

In sum, only two Australian cases were tried at the general court-martial level from 2016 to 2019, and one of them resulted in an acquittal of the accused. Both of those general courts-martial were for penetrative sexual assaults. Australia should not be used for comparison with the United States as there were only two felony-level sexual assault prosecutions (trial by general court-martial) in the previous four years, and only one general court-martial sexual assault conviction.

3. United Kingdom

The United Kingdom’s full-time trained strength as of October 1, 2017 was 137,280. The United States Armed Forces has about 10 times more active duty personnel than the United Kingdom. Statistics from the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence indicate the

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148 Australian 2019 DMP Report, supra note 140, at 21–24 (stating one penetrative sexual assault was tried by general court-martial in December 2019 and resulted in a finding of guilty); Australian 2017 DMP Report, supra note 141, at 17, 22 (stating one allegation of sexual intercourse without consent was tried by general court-martial and resulted in an acquittal); Australian 2016 DMP Report, supra note 142, at 46 (did not describe any general courts-martial in 2017).
150 Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom), UK Armed Forces Monthly Service Personnel Statistics 1 October 2017 (Nov. 16 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/K785-V4VA. See also Strength of British Military Falls for Ninth Year, BBC News (Aug. 16, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/WLB4-VUDV (indicating the strength of the U.K. military was 133,460).
following numbers for military personnel prosecuted and convicted of sexual offenses and the most serious sexual offenses, rape or sexual assault, as depicted in the following table. According to United Kingdom statistics, if a defendant is charged with both rape and sexual assault, the defendant is counted as one person in each category. Thus, the number of persons prosecuted and convicted is somewhat lower than the numbers shown on the following table.

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rape and Sexual Assault Investigations¹⁵⁵</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosecutions for Rape or Sexual Assault Offenses</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convictions for Rape or Sexual Assault</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹⁵² Id.
¹⁵³ Id.
¹⁵⁵ Investigations do not include command referrals for prosecution.
From 2015 to 2018, 53 United Kingdom military personnel were prosecuted for rape, and only 8 were convicted of rape, a conviction rate of 15% (8/53). In 2018, the DAC-IPAD concluded that 431 personnel were charged with penetrative sexual assaults resulting in 81 convictions of a penetrative sexual assault offense, and 12 convictions of a non-penetrative sexual assault offenses for a conviction rate of 22% (93/431). Thus, the United Kingdom had a significantly lower conviction rate for penetrative sexual assault offenses than the United States.

4. General Observations

In 2019, the active duty military population of Fort Bragg, North Carolina was 52,280. In Fiscal Year 2019, Fort Bragg alone took the following actions at general courts-martial for soldiers charged with at least one sexual assault charge involving an adult victim: 25 arraigned; 22 tried to verdict; and 13 convicted of at least one sexual assault charge. In Fiscal Year 2019, Fort Bragg tried more sexual assault cases than the Canadian military in the most recent year (22 Fort Bragg versus 6 Canada) and obtained 13 convictions whereas the Canadian military did not obtain any sexual assault convictions. Australia had only two felony-level sexual assault prosecutions (trial by general court-martial) in the previous four years, and only one general court-martial sexual assault conviction.

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156 Sexual Offences in the Service Justice System: 2016, supra note 151 (information available in the Excel spreadsheet at Table 6); Sexual Offences in the Service Justice System: 2018, supra note 154 (information available in the Excel spreadsheet at Table 6).
158 Fort Bragg In-depth Overview, MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, archived at https://perma.cc/L9VM-5DKS.
159 Statistics received on August 14, 2020, from Clerk of Court, U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals.
160 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
United Kingdom personnel convicted of rape or sexual assault is the same (13) as the number of Fort Bragg personnel convicted of sexual assault in FY 2019 even though the population of the United Kingdom military (137,280) is 2.63 times the size of the active duty military population of Fort Bragg (52,280).

Comparisons of the rates of felony-level sexual assault prosecutions with Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom do not support removing commanders from the process for prosecuting military sexual offenses because they do not provide evidence of increased convictions for sexual assaults.

C. THE SAG REPORT ARGUMENTS TO ADOPT FOREIGN MODELS.

As stated previously, the SAG Report suggests that Congress emulate the practices used in other countries for determining which cases should be referred to trial or alternatively, that a pilot program could be used to test the viability of ending the commander’s responsibility for ensuring prosecution of serious common law offenses.161 As that group notes in its Report to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, several allies of the United States, including the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada have transferred responsibility for prosecution of sexual offenses from commanders to attorneys.162 The rate of prosecution per thousand of active duty personnel in the United Kingdom is about the same as in the United States Department of Defense, however, the United Kingdom conviction rate for rape is only 15%, while Canada and Australia have much lower rates of prosecution of felony-level sexual assaults. For example, Canadian military prosecutors did not obtain any courts-martial convictions of military personnel for sexual

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162 Id. at App. 16-17.
assault in the most recent year in which statistics are available.\textsuperscript{163} In 2019, Australia did not complete \textit{any} general courts-martial for \textit{any} offense.\textsuperscript{164} In the Australian Armed Forces, all offenses were disposed of at military proceedings where the maximum confinement was limited to six months, and the military personnel who committed serious criminal offenses were tried in civilian courts.

As the Appendix to the SAG Report reflects, the majority of allied forces have also transferred responsibility for criminal cases from the armed forces to civilian authorities. It is important to note, however, that relinquishing jurisdiction to the civilian courts for criminal trials of U.S. service members was tried for almost twenty years and failed. Specifically, with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in \textit{O'Callahan v. Parker}\textsuperscript{165} in 1969 until 1987, when the Court overturned \textit{O'Callahan} in \textit{Solorio v. United States},\textsuperscript{166} service members could be tried by courts-martial only for \textit{service-related} crimes. Thus, the burden fell on the civilian prosecutors to decide whether they wanted to try American service members for offenses where, for example, the offense was committed against civilians or occurred in the civilian community.\textsuperscript{167}

\textbf{VIII. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT THE DELICATE BALANCE BETWEEN JUSTICE AND DISCIPLINE}

There is a danger that in rushing to “fix” what some consider to be problems in the military justice system, the delicate balance between discipline and justice will be thrown off to the detriment of the victims of the alleged offenses, those accused of committing offenses, as well as the command structure overall.

\textsuperscript{163} Canadian 2018-2019 DMP Report, \textit{supra} note 133, at Annex A.
\textsuperscript{164} Australian 2019 DMP Report, \textit{supra} note 140, at 21-22, Annex A.
\textsuperscript{165} 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
\textsuperscript{166} 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
\textsuperscript{167} \textit{See supra} note 56.
The UCMJ was enacted in 1950 as a response to complaints and concerns about the operation of the existing Articles of War during World War II. In enacting the UCMJ, Congress struggled with the issue of balancing the need for command control and discipline against the view that the military justice system could be made fairer. The final product was considered a compromise. On one hand, there was concern about the ability of the commander to maintain discipline within the ranks. On the other hand, there was concern about protecting the rights of service members against the arbitrary actions of commanders. Although the commander remained an integral part of the military justice structure, the statute expanded due process protections to service members and created a civilian court to review courts-martial convictions. Since its enactment, the UCMJ has been amended numerous times, sometimes favoring the prosecution of offenses and at other times expanding the protections of the accused.

The proposed amendments clearly undermine the commander’s authority. Thus, whether intended or not, the change may tip the balance in favor of the accused, even though the apparent intent is to ensure that more cases go to trial. In so doing, it affects the very core of the military justice system—the role of the commander. And it adversely affects anyone associated with the alleged offenses in the command—witnesses, counsel, and even victims. Currently, the commander and his or her legal advisor carefully consider all of those interests in deciding whether to prosecute a case or choose some other route for dealing with the issue. Placing that decision in some distant office creates the possibility that those diverse interests are not adequately considered or balanced.

IX. RECENT STUDIES OF COMMAND DECISIONS TO PROSECUTE SEXUAL ASSAULTS DEMONSTRATE THAT THE CURRENT SYSTEM IS WORKING

In 2017, the DAC-IPAD formed a Case Review Working Group (CRWG) consisting of seven Committee members to review
individual cases involving sexual offenses.\textsuperscript{168} The CRWG reviewed 2,055 investigative case files for probable cause against the subject accused of committing the sexual offense, and found the following:

In about half of the cases reviewed by members that resulted in no action against the subject for the penetrative sexual offense, the reviewer determined that the victim’s statements to law enforcement authorities were insufficient to establish probable cause to believe that the subject committed the offense.\textsuperscript{169}

\* \* \*

The CRWG found the commander’s initial disposition decision to be reasonable in 155 of 164 cases (95\%). In 42 of the 164 cases (26\%), the command preferred charges for a penetrative sexual offense; in the remaining 122 cases (74\%), the command did not prefer charges against the subject for the penetrative sexual offense.\textsuperscript{170}

The committee concluded that the command reasonably decided to prefer charges in 40 of 42 cases (95\%) and not to prefer charges in 115 of 122 cases (94\%).\textsuperscript{171} The Committee noted that, “many of the


\textsuperscript{169} Id. at 22.

\textsuperscript{170} Id. at 20.

\textsuperscript{171} Id. at 20 n.33. The committee explained their determination not to prefer charges in 94\% of the cases was limited: The remaining 6\% of decisions not to prefer charges for a penetrative sexual assault were found by the majority of reviewers not to be supported by the evidence reviewed in the case file. The Committee members note that these do not necessarily constitute cases in which charges should have been
cases that cannot be prosecuted for evidentiary reasons—often involve[ed] excessive alcohol consumption” by the victim of the sexual offense.172

On November 2019, the DAC-IPAD issued a court-martial adjudication data report (Nov. 2019 DAC-IPAD Report) that included assessment of courts-martial dispositions of “charge sheets, Article 32 reports, and Results of Trial forms for disposition and adjudication outcomes,” 173 and on March 30, 2020, the DAC-IPAD issued its Fourth Annual Report. 174 The DAC-IPAD database includes records of filed sexual offense charges from 4,454 cases from FY 2012 to 2018.

The 2020 DAC-IPAD annual report assessed the disposition of cases in which Article 32 Preliminary Hearing Officers concluded there was not probable cause to believe the accused committed the charged offense, and the convening authority nevertheless referred the charge to court-martial:

In FY17, 32 cases were referred to court-martial after an Article 32 [P]reliminary [H]earing [O]fficer determined that there was no probable cause to believe a penetrative sexual offense occurred. Fifteen of the 32 referred cases (47%) preferred; rather, the reviewers felt they would need to consider more information before they could adequately evaluate whether the disposition decision was reasonable. Such additional information could include a review of the prosecution merits memorandum and perhaps interviews with the judge advocates and commander involved. However, the Committee felt that such an endeavor would be unnecessary, since review of the 164 cases from the random sample reveals no sign of systemic problems with the reasonableness of commanders’ decisions on whether to prefer charges in cases involving a penetrative sexual assault.

172 Id. at 31.
resulted in dismissal of the penetrative sexual offense(s). In 17 of the 32 cases (53%), the penetrative sexual offenses were tried by court-martial. Of those penetrative sexual offense cases that were tried by court-martial, more than three-fourths (76%) resulted in verdicts of not guilty. Notably, one of the guilty verdicts was overturned on appeal due to lack of evidence.

* * *

In FY18, 18 cases were referred to court-martial after an Article 32 Preliminary Hearing Officer determined that there was no probable cause to believe a penetrative sex offense occurred. Seven of the 18 referred cases (39%) resulted in dismissal of the penetrative sexual offense(s). In 11 of the 18 cases (61%), the penetrative sexual offenses were tried by court-martial. Of those penetrative sexual offense cases that were tried by court-martial, nearly three-fourths (73%) resulted in verdicts of not guilty.175

The Article 32 Preliminary Hearing Officer is a legal officer, and these dispositions show that in at least some cases convening authorities are more willing to refer sexual assault cases to trial than lawyers.

The CRWG plans to recommend additional efforts to improve the quality and efficiency of criminal investigations, which should result in additional prosecutions.176 In 2020, the Policy Working Group plans to analyze Article 32 preliminary hearings, including a comparison with federal pretrial processes and a review of the purposes and effectiveness of the Article 32 preliminary hearing.177

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175 Id. at 52, 54.
176 Id. at 22–26.
177 Id. at 56.
The Policy Working Group will examine disposition guidance for judge advocates and convening authorities, and the effectiveness of the Staff Judge Advocate’s pretrial advice.\textsuperscript{178}

\textbf{X. Congress Should Await Implementation of the Reforms Included in the Military Justice Act of 2016, which Provides for Oversight and Statistical Analysis}

The genesis of the proposed change to the Uniform Code of Military Justice is apparently a concern that commanders abuse their authority to decide who is prosecuted. Some observers allege that commanders are unwilling to send cases of sexual assault to court-martial notwithstanding strong evidence of guilt because of their close relationships with members of their command who may be accused of crimes or friends of the accused. The Department of Defense reduced the risk of this possibility by elevating any decision not to prosecute a sexual assault offense to the O-6 special court-martial convening authority level.

In the 2014 National Defense Authorization Act,\textsuperscript{179} Congress required an additional review of convening authorities’ decisions not to refer charges of certain sex-related offenses for trial by court-martial. This provision states:

\begin{quote}
In any case where a [S]taff [J]udge [A]dvocate, pursuant to section 834 of title 10, United States Code (article 34 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), recommends that charges of a sex-related offense be referred for trial by court-martial
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{178} 2020 DAC-IPAD Report, \textit{supra} note 168, at 56.
\end{flushright}
and the convening authority decides not to refer any charges to a court-martial, the convening authority shall forward the case file to the Secretary of the military department concerned for review as a superior authorized to exercise general court-martial convening authority.

In any case where a convening authority decides not to refer a charge of a sex-related offense to trial by court-martial, the Secretary of the military department concerned shall review the decision as a superior authority authorized to exercise general court-martial convening authority if the chief prosecutor of the Armed Force concerned, in response to a request by the detailed counsel for the Government, requests review of the decision by the Secretary.

In any case where a [S]taff [J]udge [A]dvocate, pursuant to section 834 of title 10, United States Code (article 34 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), recommends that charges of a sex-related offense should not be referred for trial by court-martial and the convening authority decides not to refer any charges to a court-martial, the convening authority shall forward the case file for review to the next superior commander authorized to exercise general court-martial convening authority.

This provision ensures that any decision not to refer a sexual assault to trial receives an additional review whenever the original convening authority decides not to refer the case to trial by court-martial. The reviewing convening authority has the authority to refer the case to a court-martial. It is implicit that the higher-level convening authorities that review a case have authority to hold any lower level convening authority accountable for showing poor judgment in referral decisions.
In the Military Justice Act of 2016, Congress also amended Article 146, UCMJ, and created a “Military Justice Review Panel.” That panel will conduct an in-depth review of the military justice system every eight years, after its initial review in 2020. This is an important step in ensuring that a designated body, apart from Congress, will conduct thorough reviews of the system and offer proposed changes to the Department of Defense.

In addition, Congress added provisions to create more transparency for assessing the American military justice system. The new Article 140a addresses the critical subject of determining trends and issues across all of the Services. The new article was based on an observation by the Response Systems to Adult Sexual Assault Crimes Panel that there is lack of uniform, offense-specific sentencing data from military courts which makes meaningful comparison and analysis of military and civilian courts “difficult, if not impossible.” Additionally, Article 140a requires the government to facilitate the public’s access to all courts-martial filings and records.

These additions to the UCMJ can be invaluable tools for reviewing and if necessary, reframing military justice procedures. Congress should await those reports before making dramatic changes to the military justice landscape that will radically change a system that currently operates fairly and efficiently.

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183 That means that courts-martial filings will be available to the public in a manner similar to what exists in the PACER system, which is used in the federal civilian court system.
XI. CONCLUSION: REAFFIRMING THE CRITICAL ROLE OF COMMANDERS

On August 17, 2018, Secretary of Defense James Mattis, a retired 4-star general, clearly connected military readiness and mission success with the commander’s responsibility to enforce discipline. He wrote:

It is incumbent on our leaders to ensure that American Forces are always the most disciplined on the battlefield. Whatever the domain might be. . . . We must. . . . remove the cancer of sexual misconduct from our ranks. . . . Enforcing standards is a critical component of making our force more lethal. Our leaders must uphold proven standards. They should know the difference between a mistake and a lack of discipline. If a subordinate makes a mistake, leaders should learn to coach them better. But we must not tolerate or ignore lapses in discipline for our enemies will benefit if we do not correct and appropriately punish substandard conduct. . . . The military justice system is a powerful tool that preserves good order and discipline while protecting the civil rights of Service members. It is a commander’s duty to use it. Military leaders must not interfere with individual cases, but fairness to the accused does not prevent military officers from appropriately condemning and eradicating malignant behavior from our ranks. Leaders must be willing to choose the harder right over the easier wrong. . . Discipline is a competitive edge we must seek and maintain each day if we are to keep America safe from its enemies. As General Washington learned first hand, discipline will make us stronger and more lethal. Therefore, let nothing prevent us
from becoming the most disciplined force this world has ever known.\footnote{U.S. Marine Corps, Secretary of Defense: Message to the force (Aug. 17, 2018), archived at \url{https://perma.cc/ND3G-5VHF}. See also David Vergun, \textit{DOD Taking Steps to Prevent Sexual Assault and Extremism}, DEPT. OF DEFENSE NEWS (Feb. 19, 2021) (Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III stated “Sexual assault and extremism will not be tolerated in the Defense Department” and he said a commission will assess additional actions to curb such conduct), archived at \url{https://perma.cc/PM3G-3BE5}.
}

The problem of sexual assault allegations over the last decade within the Department of Defense is cause for concern and requires additional action by the chain of command, including more training of personnel and prosecution of all cases whenever warranted. But the answer to the problem does not rest in removing or reducing the commander’s role. One feature of the military is that it responds and adapts, and is capable to issue orders to correct problems. It is very clear that the American military justice system has improved since its founding and will continue to make adjustments to ensure both discipline and justice.

We recommend that commanders continue to be responsible for discipline in their commands and that the proposed amendments to the UCMJ be rejected.

If Congress is to make any changes to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, it should be to first reaffirm the view that the primary purpose of the military justice system is to enforce good order and discipline, and second, retain the commander’s critical role in that system without limitation.

The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that the purpose of the military is to fight and win wars.\footnote{United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).} To that end, it is absolutely essential that commanders—who are ultimately responsible for accomplishing that mission—be vested with the authority and responsibility for maintaining good order and
discipline within their command. Accordingly, we recommend that the UCMJ be amended by adding the following section, 10 U.S.C. § 801a:

§801a. Art. 1a. Purpose of Military Law:

The purpose of military law is to assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, to provide due process of law, to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby to strengthen the national security of the United States.

That proposed language, which is a variation of similar language in the preamble to the Manual for Courts-Martial,\(^\text{186}\) reflects the long-standing and tested view that the military justice system is designed primarily to promote good order and discipline.

\(^{186}\) The Preamble to the Manual for Courts-Martial lists the due process language first, before the language concerning good order and discipline. In our view, the order of those purposes is critical. Listing the discipline purpose first more accurately reflects the function and purpose of the military justice system.
APPENDIX

FACT SHEETS ON MILITARY JUSTICE IN FOUR ALLIED FORCES

Lisa M. Schenck, Fact Sheet on Canadian Military Justice (Sept. 18, 2013)

Lisa M. Schenck, Fact Sheet on Australia Military Justice (Sept. 13, 2013)

Lisa M. Schenck, Fact Sheet on United Kingdom Military Justice (Corrected Copy) (Sept. 22, 2013)

Lisa M. Schenck, Fact Sheet on Israeli Military Justice (Sept. 9, 2013)
APPENDIX: FACT SHEET ON CANADIAN MILITARY JUSTICE

Lisa M. Schenck*

I. INTRODUCTION

During the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on June 4, 2013, some witnesses suggested that the Canadian military justice system might be a good model to mirror with a central prosecutor rather than command referred courts martial. This fact sheet provides an overview of the Canadian military justice system and compares Canada’s military prosecution statistics with those of the United States Department of Defense (DoD), with an emphasis on sexual assault prosecutions.

II. THE CANADIAN SYSTEM

a. The Canadian Forces (CF) active duty strength is approximately 70,000.1

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b. The Canadian military justice system is primarily based on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Code of Service Discipline (CSD) at Part III of the National Defence Act (NDA).  

c. The Canadian military justice system underwent modifications based on a Supreme Court of Canada decision. Specifically, in 1992, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the Canadian general court-martial structure violated judicial independence and impartiality standards mandated in Section 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Subsequent legislation dramatically reduced the role of the chain of command and convening authority in courts-
martial to protect the accused’s rights and eliminate the appearance of command influence.

d. The CSD is equivalent to the United States’ Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM). The CSD sets forth disciplinary jurisdiction, pretrial and trial procedures, offenses, punishments, and post-trial and appellate procedures. The Canadian military justice system provides for jurisdiction over offenses worldwide, and it applies to regular and reserve CF members as well as to civilians in limited circumstances. The CSD includes unique military offenses as well as violations of civil criminal statutes.4

e. The Canadian Forces National Investigative Service (NIS) “normally investigate[s] offences of a serious and sensitive nature.”5 A commanding officer, or delegee, or a Military Police officer or delegee, assigned to duties with the Canadian Forces NIS may charge a person, who is subject to Canadian military justice.6 The charge then goes to an initial referral authority (an officer in the chain of command), who serves the charge on the accused, registers the charge, refers the charge to a summary proceeding or sends the charge to a higher level for disposition, disposes of the charge by deciding not to proceed, or defers final action on the charge.7 The referral authority may, but is not required to, “forward the [charges and file] to the Director of Military Prosecutions together with any recommendation concerning the disposal of the charge that the

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5 Military Justice Summary Trial Level, supra note 3, at Ch. 3, Section 3, ¶¶ 48-50 (defining when the Canadian Forces National Investigative Service (NIS) investigates allegations).
6 Id. at ¶¶ 44-46 (citing Queen’s Regulations and Orders Sections 107.015, 107.02, and 107.02, Note).
7 Id. at Ch. 8, Section 4.
referral authority considers appropriate.”

Although a referral authority is not required “to obtain legal advice prior to considering an application for disposal of a charge, . . . legal advice is recommended.”

f. The Canadian Forces Provost Marshal reported sexual assault crime statistics, which include all incidents that came to the attention of the Military Police, whether the Military Police or a civilian law enforcement agency was the lead investigating agency as follows: 2007 – 176, 2008 – 166, 2009 – 166, and 2010 – 176. For disposition information the Provost Marshal Report states, “five CF members were sentenced to imprisonment for more serious criminal charges of ‘sexual interference,’ ‘sexual touching,’” and other non-sex offenses.

g. The Canadian military justice system consists of two levels of service tribunals. The “service tribunal” or “summary trial” is presided over by military commanders and is an expeditious means of resolving minor offenses at the unit level. Jurisdiction and punishments are very limited. A commanding officer presiding over a summary trial may impose: detention (to a maximum of 30 days); reduction in rank, but for one substantive rank only; reprimand; fine (to a maximum of 60% of member’s monthly basic pay); confinement

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8 Id. at Annex N, ¶¶ 25-26 (“The referral authority’s letter is intended to assist the Director of Military Prosecutions in putting the alleged offence into the specific military context from which it originates. The Director of Military Prosecutions requires this contextual analysis to assist in making a decision on whether to prefer the charge to court martial, refer the matter back to the unit for disposal by summary trial or not proceed with the charge at all. The letter represents the referral authority’s best opportunity to set out why he or she believes that the matter ought or ought not to be preferred.”).

9 Id. at Annex N, ¶ 24.


11 Id. at 20.
to ship or barracks (to a maximum of 21 days); extra work and drill (to a maximum of 14 days); stoppage of leave (to a maximum of 30 days); and caution. The unit legal advisor provides advice on disposition. “Should the presiding officer decide not to act on the advice of the unit legal advisor, then the presiding officer must state the decision and provide written reasons for that decision.” Findings of guilty and sentences awarded at a summary trial are subject to review by a superior officer independent of the command trying the case. Under some circumstances, the accused can elect trial by courts-martial in lieu of summary trial. (In 47.83% of cases involving the right to elect trial by courts-martial, only 2.35% of accused ultimately chose courts martial.) Summary trials are most similar to DoD’s nonjudicial dispositions under Article 15, UCMJ. Under the Canadian system, 84 charges of a sexual nature made against 51 accused were resolved utilizing summary trial. Jurisdiction for the most serious sex crimes is limited to courts-martial.

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13 Military Justice Summary Trial Level, supra note 3, at Ch. 8, Section 4, ¶ 54 (citing Queen’s Regulations and Orders Section 107.11(2)).

14 2010 Canadian JAG Report, supra note 3, at 15.

15 Id. at 13-14.

16 Id. at 15 n.30.

17 Military Justice Summary Trial Level, supra note 3, at Ch. 11, Sections 2 and 3, ¶¶ 31-63. “Offences of a ‘sexual nature’ heard at summary trial generally involve sexual harassment, inappropriate comments, inappropriate use of the internet and fraternization. Serious offences of a sexual nature such as sexual assault are dealt with at courts martial.” Annual Report of the Judge Advocate General to the Minister of
h. The second type of service tribunal is the court-martial. Military judges preside over courts-martial which function similar to Canadian civilian criminal courts. The accused is entitled to publicly-funded legal representation by Defence Counsel Services (DCS), or the accused may hire a civilian lawyer at his own expense. Legal officers from the Canadian Military Prosecution Service (CMPS) conduct the prosecutions. Rules of evidence apply to the proceedings, and courts-martial findings and sentences may be appealed to the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada, and then to the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC).

i. From Apr. 1, 2009 to Mar. 31, 2010, 1,998 Canadian service tribunals were held, of which 1,942 were summary trials and 56 were courts-martial. The total number of summary trials and courts-martial has been relatively constant over the last three years. Summary trials represented approximately 97% of all service tribunals.

j. There are currently two types of courts-martial. In a standing court-martial, a military judge decides the findings and the sentence. General courts-martial have a military judge and a panel or jury of five military members. The accused has the right to choose trial forum, either general court-martial or standing court-martial.

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10 2010 Canadian JAG Report, supra note 3, at 14.
11 Id. at 14.
12 Global Legal Research Center, Military Justice: Adjudication of Sexual Offenses: Australia, Canada, Germany, Israel, United Kingdom, The Law Library of Congress, July 2013, at 23 (citation omitted).
13 Id.
k. The Director of Military Prosecutions (DMP) has authority to determine which charges, if any, should be tried by courts-martial, or sent back for disposition at summary trial. The DMP has two deputies, eight prosecutors work at four regional offices for the DMP, and several reservists work in individual offices. The current DMP is a Navy Captain who was appointed to a four-year term on September 19, 2009. He is under the general supervision of the Judge Advocate General, and he is expected to exercise his duties and functions independently.

l. From Apr. 1, 2009 to Mar. 31, 2010, referral authorities submitted 78 referral applications for disposal of a charge or charges to the DMP. Charges were referred to courts-martial in 49 cases. In 8 of those cases, the DMP withdrew charges after they had been referred to trial, but before trial. In 17 cases, the DMP elected not to refer any charges to trial by court-martial. During the reporting period, a total of 181 charges were tried before 56 courts-martial.

m. From Apr. 1, 2009 to Mar. 31, 2010, there were 48 judge-alone courts-martial and 8 jury trials, resulting in 45 convictions and 11 acquittals. 37 cases were guilty pleas and 19 cases were not guilty pleas. Of those who pleaded not guilty, 59% were found guilty. Only 10 courts-martial cases resulted in any confinement and in 3 cases all confinement was suspended, in 4 cases the accused received 6 months or less confinement, and in the last 3 cases the accused received 9 months, 20 months, and 4 years of confinement.

n. The following table depicts the annual Canadian courts-martial for the last five years:

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23 Id. at 39-42.
24 Id. at 45-46.
25 Id. at 46-48, 56-76.
26 Id. at 46-48 (data for 2010); Annual Report of the Judge Advocate General to the Minister of National Defence on the Administration of Military Justice in the Canadian Forces, A
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standing Courts-Martial</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>55.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disciplinary Courts-Martial</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0\textsuperscript{27}</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Courts-Martial</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{27} On July 18, 2008, the Canadian government reduced the number of types of courts-martial from four to two, and eliminated disciplinary and special courts-martial. 2009 Canadian JAG Report, supra note 27, at 135.
confinement for sexual assault, and one received 3 months for sexual interference and other offenses.28

p. The following table depicts the Canadian sexual abuse investigations and courts-martial for 2009 to 2012:29

28 2010 Canadian JAG Report, supra note 3, at 46-48, 56-76. See also Global Legal Research Center, Military Justice: Adjudication of Sexual Offenses: Australia, Canada, Germany, Israel, United Kingdom, The Law Library of Congress, July 2013, at 27-28 (noting that on September 1, 2009, service tribunals received jurisdiction to dispose of sexual assault offenses because of the adverse impact on morale, discipline and military efficiency).

29 The Canadian Provost Marshal report did not include information about investigations in 2011 and 2012. See paragraph 2.1, supra (sex offenses investigated). The court-martial information is from four sources: (1) 2010 Canadian JAG Report, supra note 3, 46-48, 56-76, 89, 107; (2) 2009 Canadian JAG Report, supra note 27, at 93, 94, 97, 137; (3) 2012 Canadian Results and Decisions, supra note 27; (4) 2011 Canadian Results and Decisions, supra note 27. See also Global Legal Research Center, Military Justice: Adjudication of Sexual Offenses: Australia, Canada, Germany, Israel, United Kingdom, The Law Library of Congress, July 2013, at 27-28 (noting that on September 1, 2009, service tribunals received jurisdiction to dispose of sexual assault offenses because of the adverse impact on morale, discipline and military efficiency).
## Canadian Sexual Abuse Investigations and Courts-Martial

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Investigated Sex Offenses</strong></td>
<td>166</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rate Per Thousand Investigated</strong></td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>2.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Referred to Courts-Martial</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tried by Courts-Martial</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent Investigated Tried by Courts-Martial</strong></td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Convictions</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent Tried and Convicted</strong></td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Incarceration</strong></td>
<td>1 (7 days)</td>
<td>2 (20 months; 3 months)</td>
<td>3 (34 months; 9 months)</td>
<td>2 (6 months; 12 months)</td>
<td>2 (12 months)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III. Analysis

a. In FY 2012, the active duty strength of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) was 1,388,028 or 20 times as large as the Canadian active duty forces. The DoD completed 2,510 courts-martial, including 1,183 general courts-martial and 1,327 special courts-martial. Without including the 1,346 summary courts-martial tried in FY 2012, the DoD had 39 times as many courts-martial as Canada (2,510/65), and twice as many per capita as Canada.

b. In FY 2012, DoD investigated 2,661 instances of sexual abuse by military suspects for a rate per thousand of 1.92, and the Canadian rate of investigation of 2.44 is 27% higher than the U.S. rate per thousand of 1.92. In FY 2012, 302 DoD military personnel were tried by courts-martial, and 238 were convicted of sexual assault offenses for a conviction rate of 79% (238/302), as compared to an average of 3 Canadian sexual assault courts-martial convictions for 5 courts-martial tried over the previous four years for a conviction rate of 60% (3/5). The rate per thousand of DoD personnel tried by courts-martial for sexual assault offenses was .22 (302/1,388,000) and the rate per thousand of Canadian personnel was .07 (5/70,000). More than three times as many DoD personnel were tried by court-martial for sex offenses per capita as for Canadian Forces, even though Canadian active duty personnel were investigated at a 27% higher rate.

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32 Id. at 73.
c. As indicated previously, in Canada over the last two years only 3.5% (6/171) of those investigated faced the possibility of more than 30 days confinement for sexual abuse or assault. In the last two years, only two Canadian military personnel were sentenced to more than 10 days of confinement. 33 Numerous DoD military personnel received over five years confinement for sex crimes, and six DoD military personnel received 20 years confinement for sex crimes. 34

d. Some U.S. military installations have tried more courts-martial, obtained more convictions, tried more sexual assault cases, obtained more sexual assault convictions, and sent more sexual assault perpetrators to confinement than the entire Canadian Forces, even though they have substantially fewer assigned personnel than Canada.

e. As an example, the Army installation of Fort Hood, Texas has 45,414 active duty military personnel, 35 compared to Canada’s 70,000. In FY 2011, Fort Hood prosecuted 115 courts-martial (including 18 sex offenses), resulting in 112 convictions (including 13 sex offense convictions — the number of convictions would be higher, if cases were included where the accused was acquitted of a sex offense and convicted of a non-sex offense). 36

f. In FY 2012, Fort Hood prosecuted 121 courts-martial (including 26 sex offenses), resulting in 114 convictions (including 21 sex offense convictions). More importantly, in FY 2011, 10 Fort Hood military personnel were sentenced to more than one year of confinement for committing a sex offense; in FY 2012, 17 military personnel were

33 2010 Canadian JAG Report, supra note 3, at 46-48, 56-76.
36 Fort Hood prosecution statistics provided from Clerk of Court’s Office, Army Court of Criminal Appeals on July 15, 2013.
sentenced to more than one year of confinement. Whereas, in the entire Canadian active duty forces, only one person received over one year of imprisonment for a sex offense (one accused received 20 months in jail—and that sentence is under appeal). In sum, Fort Hood by itself in FY 2012, tried 3.7 times (26/7) as many offenses by courts-martial as the entire Canadian military and obtained ten times (21/2) as many sex offense courts-martial convictions.

If the goal is to establish a military justice system for the U.S. Armed Forces that: treats allegations of sexual assault as serious offenses; ensures efficient adjudication of allegations and convictions; and, provides deterrence through significant punishment of convicted offenders, then mirroring the Canadian system would not be an improvement. Using Fort Hood as an example, even though its active duty population is 35% lower than the Canadian armed forces, Fort Hood obtains ten times as many courts-martial convictions for serious sex offenses. Furthermore, numerous DoD military personnel were sentenced to over five years confinement for sex offenses.

37 2010 Canadian JAG Report, supra note 3, at 89.
APPENDIX: FACT SHEET ON AUSTRALIA MILITARY JUSTICE

Lisa M. Schenck*

I. INTRODUCTION

Some commentaries have suggested that the Australian military justice system may be a good model for the United States because of its centralization of military tribunal prosecutions under the authority of a military prosecutor, rather than military commanders. This fact sheet traces the recent changes in the Australian military justice system, describes the Australian rationale for centralizing the referral decision in the Director of Military Prosecutions (DMP), notes the problems resulting from the 2006 structural changes, describes the magnitude of Australian military justice prosecutions, briefly discusses the findings of the 1,567 page 2011 DLA Piper Review, and compares the disposition of U.S. courts-martial and Australian courts-martial with an emphasis throughout on disposition of sex offenses.

* Lisa M. Schenck, J.S.D. Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Professorial Lecturer in Law, Senior Advisor to the National Security Law LL.M. Program, The George Washington University Law School. This document reflects the personal opinion of the author and does not represent the views of George Washington University or the Law School. It is a fact sheet originally from 2013 discussing the courts-martial of sex crimes in Australia and is reproduced here with minor editorial changes.
II. The Australian System

a. Australian Armed Forces Strength. In May 2012, the Australian active duty strength was 56,856 including 7,903 (13.9%) women.¹

b. Authority for Australian Military Justice System. In addition to the Australian Constitution, the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) (DFDA) provides specific legal authority for the Australian military justice system along with implementing rules and regulations.² The DFDA provides for “the investigation of disciplinary offences, types of offences, available punishments, the creation of Service tribunals, trial procedures before those Service tribunals, and rights of review and appeal.”³ The Discipline Law Manual instructs Australian Defense Forces (ADF) members on the law.⁴

c. Rationale for Changing the Australian Military Justice System. In June 2005, the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade

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References Committee of the Senate delivered a report recommending change in the Australian military justice system.\(^5\) In 2006, the Australian Parliament changed the Australian military justice system to make it more like the systems in the United Kingdom and Canada.\(^6\) Those changes were based on decisions in 1997 and 2003 by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The ECHR required structural changes in the role of the convening officer in United Kingdom cases because the convening officer had a role in the prosecution of cases.

The [convening] officer . . . appointed the members of the court martial, who were subordinate in rank to him and fell within his chain of command. He also had the power to dissolve the court martial before or during the trial and acted as “confirming officer”, with the result that the court martial’s decision as to verdict and sentence was not effective until ratified by him.\(^7\)

The ECHR found United Kingdom courts-martial lacked independence and impartiality because of the convening officer’s roles in the process. In response, the United Kingdom eliminated the “convening officer” requirement and divided his main roles between “the higher authority, the prosecuting authority and the Court-Martial Administration Officer.”\(^8\) The goal was to increase the

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\(^8\) Morris, supra note 8, at ¶ 50.
“appearance of fairness” for the accused and not to enhance justice for victims or to increase prosecutions.\textsuperscript{9}

d. Changes to the Australian Military Justice System. In 2005, the Defence Legislation Amendment Act (No. 2) 2005 (Cth) provided for the offices of Director of Military Prosecutions (DMP), who decide which accused and offenses will be referred to trial, and the Registrar of Military Justice, who received some of the other powers of a convening authority.\textsuperscript{10} On October 1, 2007, the Australian Government replaced general and restricted courts-martial and trial by a Defense Force Magistrate (DFM) with trial by a military tribunal called the Australian Military Court (AMC).\textsuperscript{11} The Australian Parliament created the AMC to “satisfy the principles of impartiality, judicial independence and independence from the chain of command.”\textsuperscript{12} Key features to meet these goals are tenure for trial judges (10-year fixed term appointments), security of salary, and appointment and termination by the Governor-General.\textsuperscript{13} On August 26, 2009, the High Court of Australia invalidated the


\textsuperscript{13} Id. at 2.
provisions establishing the AMC because the legislation creating the AMC was unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{14} The Parliament responded by enacting the \textit{Military Justice (Interim Measures) Act (No. 1) 2009} and \textit{Military Justice (Interim Measures) Act (No. 2) 2009}, re-establishing the pre-2007 regime of Defence Force magistrates (DFM), restricted courts-martial, and general courts-martial.\textsuperscript{15}

e. \textbf{Levels of Australian military tribunals.} The DFM and restricted courts martial have the same jurisdiction and powers.\textsuperscript{16} They do not have authority to impose more than six months of imprisonment or restriction.\textsuperscript{17} A general court-martial may impose up to the maximum punishment for the offence as prescribed by statute.\textsuperscript{18} Generally, the accused has the right to make a forum election, either trial by DFM (judge alone trial) or court martial (jury trial).\textsuperscript{19} The president of a general court martial is a colonel or higher and has at least four additional members; the president of a restricted court martial is a lieutenant colonel or higher and has at least two other members.\textsuperscript{20}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} \textit{Id.}; DFDA, \textit{supra} note 3, Schedule 2, ¶ 67.
\item \textsuperscript{19} DFDA, \textit{supra} note 3, §§ 111B, 111C.
\item \textsuperscript{20} \textit{Id.} at §§ 114, 116.
\end{itemize}

Two Australian Defence databases include records of sex offense complaints in the ADF as shown in the following table:21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>**Australian Defence Force Investigative Service (ADFIS)**22</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Broderick Report</strong>23</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td>72</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On June 20, 2013, the Australian Minister of Defense indicated:

Of particular concern is research which indicates that approximately 80 percent of victims do not report their experience. The number of unacceptable behaviour complaints is also higher than one would want to see, increasing since 2009 in the ADF and Defence more

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21 2013 Report for Congress, supra note 3, at 18 (citations omitted).

generally. Complaints in the ADF increased from 624 in 2009 to 631 in 2012 and in the Australian Public Service in Defence increased from 124 in 2009 to 180 in 2012. Pathway to Change encourages a reporting culture; one in which people are not afraid to come forward and report unacceptable behaviour in the confidence that it will be dealt with.24

g. Absence of Military Prosecution of Serious Sex Crimes. The 1994 Report of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade on Sexual Harassment in the Australian Defense Force recommended that sex offenses be removed from the jurisdiction of Defence Forces and instead be referred to the civil police for investigation and civilian authorities for prosecution.25 The Committee concluded the Defence handling of the investigation and prosecution of sex offenses was inadequate, and civil authorities were better equipped to carry out such investigations and prosecutions.26


Currently, the only sex offenses likely to be prosecuted under the DFDA are indecency offenses in the second and third degree and indecency without consent. Sexual assault offenses are more serious and are referred to civil police and resolved in civilian courts. The 2012 Australian Human Rights Commission, Review into the Treatment of Women in the Australian Defence Force, Phase 2 explains:

In relation to offences that may also constitute a criminal offence under the ordinary criminal law of the Commonwealth, States and Territories, jurisdiction under the DFDA in Australia may be exercised only where proceedings under the DFDA can reasonably be regarded as substantially serving the purpose of maintaining or enforcing service discipline. It is a matter for the Director of Military Prosecutions to decide whether the maintenance of discipline requires that DFDA charges be laid in a particular case.

In addition, the DFDA specifically excludes military jurisdiction for dealing with a number of serious offences unless consent is provided by the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). These offences include murder and manslaughter and certain sexual offences, namely, sexual assault in the first, second and third degree, sexual intercourse without consent and sexual assault with a young person. [A] Defence Instruction . . . notes, however, that “due to the seriousness of these offences, it is unlikely the DPP

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would give the ADF consent to deal with these offences” and that, as a matter of policy, these sexual offences should be referred to civilian authorities in the first instance.

Since 1985, the Commonwealth DPP has consented on only two occasions to the DFDA prosecution of sexual assault offences which were alleged to have occurred in Australia. A number of other sexual offences contained in section 3 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) are also “imported” into the DFDA. Whilst prosecution under the DFDA for these offences does not require the consent of the Commonwealth DPP, the Defence Instruction . . . recommends the immediate referral of some of these offences to civilian authorities, where the offence occurs in Australia, because of their seriousness.28

h. Director of Military Prosecutions (DMP). The Australian Parliament created the Office of the DMP effective June 12, 2006.29 The Director is a Brigadier and DMP is has 14 positions for prosecutors.30 The DMP has three pertinent functions:

(a) to carry on prosecutions for service offences in proceedings before a court martial or a Defence Force magistrate, whether or not instituted by the Director of Military Prosecutions;

(b) to seek the consent of the Directors of Public Prosecutions as required by section 63; . . . and

28 Id. at 452 (internal footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
29 2011 DMP Report, supra note 11, at Ch. 1, ¶ 1.2 (citing Defence Force Discipline Act 1982, Section 188G).
30 Id. at Ch. 1, ¶ 1.5.
(e) to do anything incidental or conducive to the performance of any of the preceding functions.\footnote{Id. at Ch. 1, ¶ 1.3 (citing Defence Force Discipline Act 1982, Section 188GA (1)).}

i. **Australian Military Prosecution Statistics.**

(1) In 2008, the Director of Military Prosecutions referred 114 matters for trial, and 92 trials were conducted, including 64 guilty pleas and 28 contested cases.\footnote{2008 AMC Report, supra note 12, at 6.} There were 15 jury trials—two with 12-person juries and 13 with 6-person juries. No trials were conducted outside of Australia.\footnote{Id. at Ch. 1, ¶ 1.18.} Although two felony-level trials (Class 1 trials) were held, both cases resulted in acquittals.\footnote{Id. at Annex A-F.}

(2) From January 1, 2009 to August 26, 2009, there were 5 jury trials, 9 judge alone trials, and 19 sentencing hearings, and after *Lane v Morrison* invalidated the AMC system, there were 10 Defence Force Magistrate (DFM) hearings, 1 Restricted Courts Martial (RCM) and 5 General Courts-Martial (GCM) hearings.\footnote{2010 Annual Report of the Director of Military Prosecutions to Parliament, Ch. 1, ¶ 1.18, http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/senate_committees?url=fadt_ctte/annual/2010/report2/c01.pdf [2010 DMP Report].} The DMP did not prosecute 69 matters because they believed there “was no reasonable prospect of success or that to prosecute would not have enhanced or enforced discipline.”\footnote{Id. at Ch. 1, ¶ 1.18.} Forty five matters were referred back for summary disposal; 11 matters were referred to civilian Directors of Public Prosecution; and ODMP had 90 open matters at the end of the calendar year.\footnote{Id.}

(3) In 2011, the DMP listed five general courts martial and three involved sex offense cases: (1) The DMP obtained a conviction involving “an act of indecency.”; (2) a GCM of a lieutenant
commander resulted in guilty findings for seven counts of “indecent conduct upon an Able Seaman without her consent” and one count of “attempting to destroy service property.” The lieutenant commander-accused was sentenced to among other punishments 18 months imprisonment with 6 months suspended; and (3) Sailor W was acquitted at a GCM of one charge of sexual intercourse without consent.\textsuperscript{38} In the offense category table, DMP listed 13 counts of sexual assault and related offenses (7 pertained to the lieutenant commander) out of a total of 130 charged offenses.\textsuperscript{39}

(4) In 2012, the DMP prosecuted 13 charges of sexual assault and related offenses out of a total of 125 charges.\textsuperscript{40} The only GCM in 2012 was not related to a sex crime; the case involved larceny of housing allowance by fraud and resulted in a fine.\textsuperscript{41}

(5) The following table depicts the DMP prosecution actions in 2011 and 2012:

\begin{table}
\end{table}


\textsuperscript{39} Id. at Ch. 1, ¶ 1.17.

\textsuperscript{40} 2012 DMP Report, supra note 16, at Annex B.

\textsuperscript{41} 2012 DMP Report, supra note 16, at ¶¶ 36-38.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2011(^{42})</th>
<th>2012(^{43})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense Force Magistrate Hearings</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restricted Courts Martial</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Courts Martial</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Misdemeanor and Felony-Level Trials</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matters Not Proceeded</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32(^{44})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referred to Command for Summary Disposal</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referred to Directors of Public Prosecution</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cases NotProsecuted</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Matters</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{42}\) 2011 DMP Report, *supra* note 11, at Ch. 1, ¶ 1.9.


\(^{44}\) The DMP did not refer 32 matters to trial “due to the determination that there was no reasonable prospect of success, or that to prosecute would not have enhanced or enforced service discipline.” *Id.* at ¶ 20.
h. Perceptions Resulting from Lack of Military Justice Prosecution of Sex Crimes. In April 2011, after an Australian military sexual abuse scandal, Australian Minister for Defence Stephen Smith announced two important reviews of sexual abuse in the Australian military by the Australian Human Rights Commission, and the 2011 DLA Piper Review.\(^45\) The 2011 DLA Piper Review at 144 states:

The removal of the role of Defence in the investigation and prosecution of sex offences as recommended by that Committee was based on the Committee’s perception that sex offences were being badly handled by Defence. Defence met this criticism by requiring the immediate referral of complaints of sexual assault to the civil police. This “complied” with the Committee’s recommendation. . . . Further, not only does it seem that Defence hands over the management of the investigation of sex offences to the civil police, Defence also seems to withdraw from taking any part in the process.\(^46\)

At page 106, the 2011 DLA Piper Review states:

What the Review can say (based on the information before it) is that when considering past abuse in the ADF, the Review has found:

- high levels of under-reporting

\(^{46}\) 2011 DLA Piper Review, \textit{supra} note 27, at 144. \textit{See also} Appendix 34 for the Memorandum of Understanding between the Australian Directors of Public Prosecutions and Director of Military Prosecutions dated 22 May 2007 in relation to prosecution of sex offenses.
\[\text{a substantial number of people who have been dissatisfied and disillusioned with the ADF’s application of military justice processes and approach to complaint handling.}\]

\[\text{inconsistent (and in many cases, flawed) applications of the military justice procedures (see Chapter 7) in place at particular points in time.}\]

\[\text{low levels of prosecutions and/or inaction by civilian police or the ADF (including failure to take administrative or DFDA action) in failing to call perpetrators to account for unacceptable behavior (including serious instances of assault).}^{\text{47}}\]

The 2011 DLA Piper Review further states at 136, “The combined effect of unwillingness to report, ADF’s reliance upon civilian prosecutors to commence actions and the notoriously low rate of prosecutions or convictions for sex offences results in a very low number of convictions of members of the ADF who have committed a sexual assault.”^{\text{48}}

Australian Minister for Defence Stephen Smith noted that the “DLA Piper Review identified a range of allegations from 775 people which fell within the Review’s Terms of Reference, the overwhelming majority of which were said to be plausible allegations of abuse.”^{\text{49}} A task force was commissioned to address the

\[\begin{align*}
\text{\footnotesize 47} & \text{ 2011 DLA Piper Review, supra note 27, at 106.} \\
\text{\footnotesize 48} & \text{ 2011 DLA Piper Review, supra note 27, at 136. See also Global Legal Research Center, Military Justice: Adjudication of Sexual Offenses: Australia, Canada, Germany, Israel, United Kingdom, The Law Library of Congress, July 2013, at 18 (citations omitted) (noting the Values, Behavior and Resolution Branch of the Defence Report listed “sexual offence complaints” from 2008 to 2011 ranged from 42 to 87, and the initial reports of “sexual assaults and related offenses” from the Service Police Central Records Office of the Australian Defence Force Investigative Service from 2008 to 2011 ranged from 58 to 84).} \\
\text{\footnotesize 49} & \text{ 2013 Smith Press Release, supra note 25.}
\end{align*}\]
DLA Piper Review, and as of May 31, 2013, there were 2,410 complaints of sexual abuse or harassment, which included 1,535 new complaints.50

III. ANALYSIS

a. In FY 2012, the active duty strength of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) was 1,388,028 or 24 times as large as the Australian active duty forces total of 56,856.51 In 2009, 2011, and 2012, Australia averaged 47 military trials for all offenses; however, most of them were Defence Force Magistrate hearings with a maximum punishment of six months confinement or detention. In 2011 there were only 5 Australian general courts-martial (GCM), and in 2012, there was only 1 Australian GCM. In FY 2012, the DoD completed 2,510 courts-martial for all offenses, including 1,183 GCM and 1,327 special courts-martial. Without including the 1,346 summary courts-martial tried in FY 2012, the Australian military prosecution rate per thousand of .83 is less than half as high as the U.S. military prosecution rate per thousand of 1.81.

b. In FY 2012, 302 DoD military personnel were tried by courts-martial for sexual assault offenses, and 238 (79%) were convicted.52 The rate per thousand of DoD personnel tried by courts-martial for sexual assault offenses was .22 (302/1,388,000). The Australian Government rarely tries serious sex offenses. In the last two years, there were only three Australian general courts martial for sex crimes

50 Id.
with two convictions. A U.S. soldier who commits a serious sex crime is far more likely to receive a GCM and substantial confinement from a U.S. court-martial than an Australian soldier who commits the same offense. The entire Australian military justice system prosecuted an average of three felony-level prosecutions the last two years; as compared to the U.S. military justice system that prosecutes approximately 400 times as many felony-level cases.

c. The Australians followed the United Kingdom’s lead and changed to a system of centralized prosecutions handled by military lawyers in the aftermath of decisions by the European Court of Human Rights and a 2005 legislative committee review. Those appellate court decisions addressed protecting the rights of the accused. The 2011 DLA Piper Review found that once the military passed the investigation and prosecution of serious sex offenses to the civilian sector, the military often washed their hands of the matter and withdrew from the process. The 2011 DLA Piper Review collected 775 complaints; a 2012 follow-up review collected 1,535 new complaints of sexual abuse or harassment. With several thousand sex offense allegations currently under assessment and very rare prosecutions of serious sex offenses in Australian military tribunals, the Australian model does not seem to be a framework that the United States Armed Forces should adopt.
APPENDIX: FACT SHEET ON UNITED KINGDOM MILITARY JUSTICE

Lisa M. Schenck*  

I. INTRODUCTION  

During the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on June 4, 2013, some witnesses suggested that the UK military justice system may be a good model for centralization of courts-martial referrals under the authority of a central prosecutor, rather than military commanders.¹ This fact sheet traces the recent changes in the UK military justice system, describes the rationale for withdrawing the convening authority’s ability to refer criminal cases to trial and transferring that authority to a central prosecution office, describes the magnitude of UK military justice prosecutions, and compares the disposition of US courts-martial and UK courts-martial with an emphasis throughout on disposition of sex offenses.

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II. THE UNITED KINGDOM SYSTEM

a. UK Armed Forces Strength. On October 1, 2012, the UK active duty strength was 175,940 including 17,060 (9.7%) women.\(^2\)

b. European Court of Human Rights Calls for Systemic Changes. On February 25, 1997, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) required structural changes in the role of the convening officer in UK cases because the convening officer had a role in the prosecution of cases. The ECHR required structural changes in the role of the convening officer in United Kingdom cases because the convening officer had a role in the prosecution of cases.

The [convening] officer . . . appointed the members of the court martial, who were subordinate in rank to him and fell within his chain of command. He also had the power to dissolve the court martial before or during the trial and acted as “confirming officer”, with the result that the court martial’s decision as to verdict and sentence was not effective until ratified by him.\(^3\)

The ECHR found UK courts martial lacked independence and impartiality because of the convening officer’s roles in the process. In response, the UK eliminated the “convening officer” role in the process and divided his main roles between “the higher authority, the prosecuting authority and the Court Martial Administration Officer.”\(^4\) The UK Government’s goal was to increase the

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\(^4\) Morris, supra note 4, at ¶ 50.
“appearance of fairness” for the accused and not to enhance justice for victims or to increase prosecutions.\(^5\)

c. **Commanding Officer’s Authority.** UK commanding officers retain authority to dispose of minor offenses using minor administrative awards.\(^6\) Minor administrative awards are similar to nonjudicial punishment under Article 15, Uniform Code of Military Justice. Minor administrative awards permit imposition of extra work, muster parades, and extra duties. Procedures are simple and expeditious. In addition, minor criminal and military offenses may be investigated by the suspect’s commanding officer, and punishment imposed, in a process known as Summary Dealing which is most similar to a summary court-martial in the US Armed Forces under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The maximum punishment includes up to 90 days of detention; however, imposition of this punishment is limited to lower ranking personnel and specified offenses. The accused may elect to be tried by “court martial.” When an election for court martial has been made, the punishment is limited to the maximum available to the commanding officer.\(^7\) When a commanding officer learns of a possible serious offense, the commanding officer is required to ensure Service Police

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\(^{5}\) *See also* Michael D. Conway, *Thirty-Ninth Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture in Criminal Law*, 213 Mich. L. Rev. 212, 224 (Fall 2012), [https://www.jag.net.army.mil/DOCLIBS/MILITARYLAWREVIEW.NSF/201a66345129fe3d885256e3b0b00571830/256fb1b93504c34785257b0c08bb9bf/$FILE/By%20Major%20General%20Michael%20D.%20Conway.pdf](https://www.jag.net.army.mil/DOCLIBS/MILITARYLAWREVIEW.NSF/201a66345129fe3d885256e3b0b00571830/256fb1b93504c34785257b0c08bb9bf/$FILE/By%20Major%20General%20Michael%20D.%20Conway.pdf)

\(^{6}\) *Id.* at 223-224.

are aware of the allegation and circumstances “as soon as is reasonably practicable.”

d. Higher Authority. The UK term, “higher authority” means “any officer in the commanding officer’s disciplinary chain of command who is superior in that chain of command to the commanding officer.” The commanding officer of the accused refers the allegation to the higher authority for “the initial decision whether or not to bring a prosecution. . . who must decide whether [the] case . . . should be dealt with summarily, referred to the prosecuting authority, or dropped. Once the higher authority has taken this decision, he has no further involvement in the case.”

e. Prosecuting Authorities. A military prosecuting authority receives the case from the higher authority or the Service Police (who informs the commanding officer after the referral), and “the prosecuting authority has absolute discretion, applying similar criteria as those applied in civilian cases by the Crown Prosecution Service, to decide whether or not to prosecute, what type of court martial would be appropriate and precisely what charges should be brought. . . The prosecution is brought on behalf of the [UK] Attorney-General.” Prosecuting authorities prosecute traditional

9 Id. at c. 2, pt. 18, § 361 (defining the term “higher authority”).
10 Morris, supra note 4, at ¶ 20. See also Conway, supra note 6, at 220.
11 Armed Forces Act of 2006, supra note 8, at Ch. 52, Part 5, Section 118.
12 Morris, supra note 4, at ¶ 21. Major General Conway explained the current process as follows:

The most serious kinds of cases do not go to commanding officers for them to decide how they should be dealt with. They used to [go to the commanding officers] under the old system, but they go now to the police and then to the service prosecutors; and it’s impossible under this system for a commanding officer to dismiss a charge of, say, murder, as he could and in at least one case did before this Act came into force. Judge advocates
military offenses, such as desertion, and civil offenses, such as sexual assault and robbery, at courts martial. In October 2009, the Service Prosecuting Authority (SPA) was formed through the merger of the Army, Air Force and Navy Prosecuting Authorities. The current head of the SPA is a Senior Civil Servant who is also the Director of Service Prosecutions. The Deputy Director of Service Prosecutions is a Brigadier General.13

f. Service Civilian Court. Under limited circumstances, civilians who commit offenses outside the UK,14 may be tried by the service civilian court, which consists of a judge advocate sitting alone. If the offense is sufficiently serious, it can be referred to a court martial, or the defendant can elect trial by court martial in lieu of trial by the service civilian court. The maximum punishment includes imprisonment for up to 12 months (or 65 weeks for two or more offenses). The findings or sentence of the service civilian court may be appealed to a court martial, which makes a de novo determination of the findings and any sentence. The court martial jury for a civilian is composed of civilians.15

g. Court Martial. Beginning November 1, 2009, the court martial was established as a permanent standing court. The distinction sit in all trials, including at the Summary Appeal Court. The Court Martial Appeal Court that hears appeals from courts-martial is made up of civilian judges, and it can be seen, therefore, that there has been a massive change in our system since the days of convening officers and confirming officers and the like.

Conway, supra note 6, at 222.


14 The circumstances and requirements for jurisdiction over civilians are complex and beyond the scope of this fact sheet. See MSL, JSP 830, supra note 8, at Vol. 1, ¶¶ 17-35, pages 1-3-8 to 1-3-16.

between levels of courts martial was abolished. The court martial may try any offense against service law. A judge advocate presides over the court martial, and the jury or board is composed of officers and warrant officers. For sentencing, the judge advocate is included in the board. The maximum sentence includes imprisonment for life and dismissal, depending on the offense.

h. Sexual Assault. Jurisdiction over certain serious sexual assault offenses in Schedule 2 is limited to court martial — such offenses may not be summarily resolved and must be referred to Service Police for investigation. The Service Police are required to refer investigations that substantiate Schedule 2 offenses to the Service Prosecuting Authority for disposition. Schedule 2 includes most non-consensual sex offenses.

i. Victim Reports of Offenses. The House of Commons Defence Committee expressed frustration about the failure of victims to report sex offenses based on surveys showing sexual abuse “offences [were] a lot higher than the number of complaints would indicate.”

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16 Because of a decision of the European Court of Human Rights all judge advocates sitting on Service Civilian Courts and Courts Martial are civilian attorneys. Conway, supra note 6, at 221.
17 MSL, JSP 830, supra note 8, at Vol. 1, ¶ 23d, page 1-6-11.
19 MSL, JSP 830, supra note 8, at Vol. 1, § 6, ¶ 234l(2), 234l(5), page 1-6-60 (“(2) An offence under the Sexual Offences Act 1956, sections 1 to 7, 9 to 11, 16, 17, 19 to 24, 26 to 29 or 32; . . . (5) An offence under the Sexual Offences Act 1967, section 4 or 5;”); id. at Vol. 1, Ch. 6, Annex D, ¶ 1(12)(at), page 1-6-D-4 (“(at) Any offence under Part 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (c. 42) except one under section 3, 66, 67 or 71”).
The UK Service Complaints Commissioner for the Armed Forces’ press release for her annual report states, “After 5 years the Armed Forces complaints system is still inefficient and undermines confidence in the chain of command.”21

III. STATISTICS

a. Complaints. In 2012, the UK Service Complaints Commissioner (SCC) received 572 “potential Service complaints” of bullying, harassment, and discrimination.22 In 2012, the number of reports to the SCC increased by one third from 2011 and by nearly two thirds from 2010. The UK SCC did not explain why complaints increased so significantly. The SCC report notes, “there were still 582 Service complaints awaiting decision at Commanding Officer level. At the end of 2012 the Army had 430 cases which had been in the system for over 6 months.”

b. Military Sex Offense Investigations. The following complaints or allegations of rapes, sexual assaults, and other sex

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21 Id. at 67 (citing Press Release, Service Complaints Commissioner (SCC) for the Armed Forces, SCC No. 3/2013 (Mar. 21, 2013), http://armedforcescomplaints.independent.gov.uk/linkedfiles/afcindependent/scc-annualreport2012.pdf [SCC Press Release]). The Service Commissioner Press Release also states, “For the fifth year running, I find that the Armed Forces have failed to give Servicemen and Servicewomen an efficient, effective and fair system through which they can raise a complaint.” Id. at 2.

22 Id. at 3 is the source for the remainder of this paragraph. See also 2012 SCC Report at 8 (“Fear of adverse impact at work or on one’s career is given by over half as the reason for not making a complaint, as is a view that the chain of command would do nothing.”) http://armedforcescomplaints.independent.gov.uk/linkedfiles/afcindependent/426354_ssc_ar_2012.pdf.
offenses “within” the UK military services were investigated in the years 2005 to 2012:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Assault</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Sex Offenses</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Allegations reported by service personnel against service personnel were as follows: 2009 (2 rapes and 11 sexual assaults); 2010 (8 rapes and 44 sexual assaults); 2011 (14 rapes and 39 sexual assaults); and 2012 (13 rapes and 35 sexual assaults).

24 2013 Parliament Report, supra note 24, at 1254W.
d. UK action on 135 sexual assault cases received by service police from November 1, 2009, the date of the implementation of the Armed Forces Act 2006, to December 31, 2012, are as follows:

(1) 29 cases were not referred to the prosecuting authority; (a) 14 cases were not investigated because the complaint was not pursued; and (b) 15 cases were investigated, but not referred after the investigation.

(2) 106 cases were referred to the prosecuting authority: (a) 15 cases resulted in no action; (b) 49 cases resulted in a referral for a court martial or other disciplinary action, and of those 49 cases, 24 cases resulted in a court martial conviction or other disciplinary action, 10 cases did not result in a conviction or other adverse action, 15 cases resulted in a court martial or other disciplinary proceeding and conviction of a lesser offense, and (c) 23 cases are ongoing.

e. UK Courts Martial Results. The UK courts martial findings results for 2009-2011 are as follows:

25 2013 Library of Congress, supra note 21, at 65 (citing 2013 Parliament Report, supra note 24, at 1250W). Please note, differences may exist between the UK and US military justice systems’ required threshold for evidentiary sufficiency in order for investigators or military police to forward a sex crime case to the SPA and/or for the SPA to refer a case to trial.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UK Courts Martial Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Courts Martial Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilty Pleas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Guilty Pleas—Conviction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Guilty Pleas—Acquittal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. Military Serious Sex Offense Cases Referred to the SPA. The serious sex offense cases referred to the SPA are as follows: 2007—33 cases; 2008—35 cases; 2009—47 cases; 2010—69 cases; 2011—81 cases, and 2012—40 cases. The average number of serious sex offenses cases referred from 2007 to 2011 is 53.

g. UK Courts Martial. The number of UK courts martial for all offenses for the last five years is as follows:

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27 Id. at 17. See also 2013 Parliament Report, supra note 24, at 1254W (indicating in 2010, there were 9 sex offence cases directed for trial and 12 not directed for trial; in 2011, there were 7 sex offence cases directed for trial and 11 not directed for trial; in 2012, 14 cases were directed for trial and 8 were not directed for trial).

28 Ministry of Defence, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Personnel) Secretariat, Reference to FOI 06-06-2011-151146-007 (July 7, 2011), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/16889/Response_to_06062011151146007_CourtMartial_Figures.pdf [hereinafter 2011 MOD FOI]. In 2009, there were 1,227 cases referred to the SPA and 622 courts-martial; in 2010, there were 1,198 cases referred to the SPA and 579 courts-martial; and in 2011, there were 1,163 cases referred to the SPA and 585 courts-martial. 2011 SPA Annual Report, supra note 27, at 16-17.
UK Courts Martial

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Courts Martial</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>290</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discharges</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>unk</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsuspended</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>unk</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>151</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Custodial</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detention</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confinement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjudged</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex Offense</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>34 (9)</td>
<td>40 (7)</td>
<td>38 (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trials(^{30})</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex Offense</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convictions(^{31})</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{29}\) 2011 MOD FOI, supra note 29 (stating that statistics were not available due to a change in databases).

\(^{30}\) Id. (providing Air Force courts-martial for 2008-2010; and Army and Navy courts-martial for 2005-2011). The Air Force courts-martial were estimated to be 4 in 2005-2007 and 2011 based on the average of 6 in 2008, 5 in 2009, and 2 in 2010. Id. See 2013 Parliament Report, supra note 24, at 1254W (listing sex offenses referred to trial in parenthesis for 2010 (9 cases), 2011 (7 cases), and 2012 (14 cases). See also September 19, 2013 email from UK Brigadier (Ret.) Anthony Paphiti (He received the UK prosecution statistics for 2010 to August 2012 from the Service Prosecuting Authority, indicating 25 prosecutions and 10 convictions for January to August 2012. I have assumed the same rate of prosecutions and convictions for the remaining four months and extrapolated 38 prosecutions and 15 convictions for 2012). I am grateful for UK Brigadier (Ret.) Paphiti’s comments regarding a previous version of this fact sheet. I have asked for additional UK data regarding confinement imposed for sex crimes and for an explanation for the inconsistency between the courts-martial statistics referred to Parliament and the numbers from the Service Prosecuting Authority.

\(^{31}\) September 19, 2013 email from UK Brigadier (Ret.) Paphiti (indicating the conviction statistics for 2010 to 2012 were provided by the Service Prosecuting Authority).
The SPA defines the term “sex offense” more broadly than the DoD Report. Using statistical data of the UK Military Court Centres available for November 1, 2011 to August 31, 2013, the trials involving pornography offenses, lewd language, sexual exposure without touching, and sexual abuse and rape of child victims have been subtracted from the totals to conform with the DoD Report’s definition of sex offense. The following table reflects an analysis of the Military Court Centres’ data, which makes available all charges, convictions, and imprisonment adjudged for courts-martial for November 1, 2011 to August 1, 2013, to provide a pertinent comparison of US and UK sex crime courts-martial:
Sexual Assault and Rape Courts-Martial
(Military Court Centres)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2011 (2 months)</th>
<th>2012 (7 months)</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>Annual Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Assault</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convictions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imprisonment Adjudged</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Statistical data of the UK Military Court Centres is available for November 1, 2011 to August 31, 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/court-martial-results-from-the-military-court-centres. From November 1, 2011 to December 30, 2011, all cases involving adult sexual assault victims resulted in convictions. Id. The two rape convictions are listed at 17 and 77; and the three sexual assault convictions are listed at 5, 19, and 59. Of these five cases, two were not sentenced to imprisonment listed at 5 and 19. Id.

From January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2012, the six rape cases with adult victims are listed at: 218, 265, 266, 277, 370, and 568; and the 15 sexual assault cases with adult victims are listed at: 141, 172, 175, 183, 190, 213, 223, 278, 315, 316, 337, 366, 385, 441, and 475. Id. Of the 21 sex crimes trials, six were found not guilty of the sex crime, listed at: 141, 223, 265, 266, 277, and 370 and three were sentenced to imprisonment, listed at: 218, 366, and 568. Id.

From January 1, 2013 to August 1, 2013, the six rape cases with adult victims are listed at: 692, 711, 716, 786, 823, and 827; and the 14 sexual assault cases with adult victims are listed at: 641, 654, 674, 677, 701, 714, 755, 771, 782, 830, 833, 838, 875, and 880. Id. The six January 1, 2013 to August 1, 2013 cases with adult sex offense victims resulting in convictions are listed at: 674, 677, 823, 830, 838, and 875; and the single case with a sentence to imprisonment is listed at 823. Id.
IV. ANALYSIS

a. In FY 2012, the active duty strength of the US Department of Defense (DoD) was 1,388,028 or eight times as large as the UK active duty forces total of 175,940. From 2005 to 2010, the UK averaged 698 courts martial. In FY 2012, the DoD completed 2,510 courts-martial, including 1,183 general courts-martial and 1,327 special courts-martial. Without including the 1,346 summary courts-martial tried in FY 2012, the DoD had 3.6 times as many courts-martial as the UK, but the UK rate per thousand of 3.94 was more than twice as high as the US rate per thousand of 1.81.

b. In FY 2012, 1,714 investigations were referred by investigators to DoD commanders for consideration of disciplinary action against military subjects. 302 DoD military personnel were tried by courts-

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35 Precise statistical comparisons of the courts-martial trial and conviction rates between the UK and US militaries is impossible because of differences between the UK and US militaries. The UK sex crimes statistics may not include a crime that might meet DoD’s criteria for an attempted sexual assault. The timing of case counting may be different. A case may be counted when it is investigated, referred to trial, tried, or sentence adjudged. Care must be exercised to avoid double counting or overlooking cases. The percentages of males and females in each military are different: 9.7% of the UK active duty population are women, see note 3 supra and accompanying text, and 14.7% of the US active duty population are women, DoD Personnel and Procurement Statistics, https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/reports.do?category=reports&subCat=milActDutReg. The UK 2013 Parliament Report reflects cases referred to trial, while the DoD FY 2012 number reflects 302 cases tried to verdict and does not include all the cases referred to trial. The low number of sex crimes tried in the UK military should not be construed as criticism of their decision making because a variety of factors including a low number of sex crimes reported to the police may be the primary cause of the low levels of prosecution.


martial for sexual assault offenses, resulting in a prosecution rate of 18% (302 cases tried divided by 1,714 cases referred by investigators) and 79% (238 convicted divided by 302 tried) were convicted.\textsuperscript{38} The rate per thousand of DoD personnel tried by courts-martial for sexual assault offenses was .22 (302/1,388,000). The UK report with the highest number of courts martial indicates from 2005 to 2012, the UK tried an average of 37 sex offenses per year by courts-martial, and the UK annual prosecution rate per thousand is .21 (37/175,940). The DoD rate per thousand of prosecution of sex offenses is 3% higher than the UK rate per thousand. The 2013 Parliament Report (see supra note 31), however, indicates the number of sex offenses referred to trial as follows: 2010 – 9 cases; 2011 – 7 cases; and 2012 – 14 cases, or an average of 10 cases each year, resulting in a .057 (10/175,940) rate per thousand, whereas the DoD rate per thousand is at least 3.8 times higher than the UK rate per thousand. (The UK 2013 Parliament Report accounts for cases referred to trial, while the DoD number (302 cases) only includes cases tried to verdict and does not include all cases referred to trial.)

c. The most comparable UK metric to the DoD report is the UK’s annual average of 26 sexual assault and rape trials completed, as reported by the UK judiciary, because sex crimes not included in the DoD report are deducted, such as child sexual assaults, child rapes, and pornography offenses. Under this measure, the UK prosecution rate per thousand is .15 (26/175,940). The DoD rate per thousand of sex offense prosecutions of .22 (302/1,388,000) is 47% higher than the UK rate per thousand.

d. The average number of UK military sexual assaults investigated by the police each year from 2005 to 2012 was 67 and the average number of UK rapes investigated by the police from 2005 to

\textsuperscript{38} Id. at 73 (indicating 302 sex offenses were tried by court-martial resulting in 238 convictions).
2012 was 22. An average of 89 UK sexual assaults and rapes were investigated by the police each year from 2005 to 2012, and an average of 53 serious sex offenses cases (60% of investigated cases) were referred to the SPA from 2007 to 2010. The UK court martial prosecution rate is 70% (see supra note 31) (37 cases prosecuted by courts-martial divided by 53 cases referred by investigators to the SPA), or if determined based on the 2013 Parliament Report, possibly 19% (10 cases on average tried from 2010 to 2012 divided by 53 cases referred by investigators to the SPA). The US Department of Defense prosecution rate for sex offenses is 18%.

e. The UK changed to a system of centralized prosecutions handled by military lawyers in the aftermath of decisions by the European Court of Human Rights. Those appellate court decisions addressed protecting the rights of the accused. The modifications to the UK system were designed to protect the rights of the accused from any perception of an overbearing chain of command intent on achieving unjust convictions. The UK change in charging and referral authorities had nothing to do with increasing prosecution rates for crime in general or sex offenses in particular.

f. As an example, the Army installation of Fort Hood, Texas has 45,414 active duty military personnel, compared to UK’s 175,940. In FY 2011, Fort Hood prosecuted 18 sex offenses at general and special courts-martial, resulting in 13 sex offense convictions—the number of convictions would be higher, if cases were included where the accused was acquitted of a sex offense and convicted of a non-sex offense). In FY 2012, Fort Hood prosecuted 26 sex offenses at general and special courts-martial, resulting in 21 sex offense

39 See Table UK Investigations of Military Sex Crimes on page 5, supra.
41 Fort Hood prosecution statistics provided from Clerk of Court’s Office, Army Court of Criminal Appeals on July 15, 2013.
convictions. More importantly, in FY 2011, ten Fort Hood military personnel were sentenced to more than one year of confinement; in FY 2012, 17 military personnel were sentenced to more than one year of confinement. However, UK’s annual average of four military personnel sentenced to imprisonment for sexual assault and rape of adult victims, as reported by the UK judiciary, is strikingly lower than Fort Hood’s confinement adjudged. In sum, assuming the report to Parliament is correct, Fort Hood by itself in FY 2012 tried more sex offenses by courts-martial than the entire UK military—with an active duty population 3.9 times larger than Fort Hood’s—and obtained more sex offense convictions. However, if 26 is the accurate UK courts-martial number, Fort Hood has a higher prosecution rate per thousand than the UK, but about the same number of courts-martial per year. If the goal is to prosecute more sex crimes—the UK model may not work well for the US Armed Forces.
APPENDIX: FACT SHEET ON ISRAELI MILITARY JUSTICE

Lisa M. Schenck*

I. INTRODUCTION

During the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on June 4, 2013, witnesses suggested that the United States military mirror the Israeli military justice system and eliminate military commanders’ jurisdiction over serious crimes such as sexual assault.¹ One senator noted that in the last 5 years the Israeli Military Advocate General (MAG) officers have prosecuted several high profile cases, and that concurrently, reports of sexual assault and harassment offenses have increased by 80%.² In the Israeli Military

Justice System, MAGs have always prosecuted courts-martial and oversee disciplinary hearings conducted by commanders.\(^3\)

II. THE ISRAELI SYSTEM

a. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) active duty strength is approximately 176,500 and reserve personnel is approximately 445,000.\(^4\) Women comprise 33\% of the IDF (approximately 58,833 service members), including 51\% of IDF officers, 15\% of technical personnel, and 3\% of IDF combat soldiers.\(^5\) By contrast, approximately 15\% of active DoD personnel (214,098 service members) are women.\(^6\)

b. Military service in Israel is compulsory, involves a large portion of the population, and the Military Justice Law (MJL), 5715-1955 provides the legal framework.\(^7\) The MJL is a “separate and complete code, the need for which arises out of the uniqueness of military service.”\(^8\)

c. The MJL divides powers between the military judicial system and the MAG’s office.\(^9\) MAGs operate independently within the military. MAGs are legal advisors to IDF commanders and conduct

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\(^7\) Finkelstein, supra note 4, at 137-38.

\(^8\) Id. at 139.

\(^9\) Id. at 138.
courts-martial. When acting in their advisory capacity, MAGs do not fall within that commander’s chain of command. The commander cannot determine the MAG’s salary or impact the MAG’s promotion opportunities.

d. A MAG acts not only as legal counsel to the military commanders but also enforces penal laws; a MAG may file a charge sheet, order a preliminary investigation, and arraign soldiers for both military offenses and offenses committed under the penal laws of the State of Israel. A MAG is, however, subordinate to the Attorney General in terms of arraignment. MAGs also supervise disciplinary proceedings in which the commander decides guilt or innocence and imposes a sentence. MAGs review disciplinary hearing documentation and may “amend the judgment, quash it, or return it to the disciplinary officer.”

e. IDF commanders also have some legal powers. Each jurisdictional district (Northern Command, Central Command, Southern Command and Field Corps HQ, the Home Front Command, the Air Force, the Navy, and the General Staff) is headed by a district chief “who may intervene and influence legal processes

10 Professor Amos Guiora telephone call with Julie Dickerson on 16 July 2013, is the source for the information in the remainder of this paragraph [hereinafter Guiora Phone Call].
11 See Finkelstein, supra note 4, at 140-41.
12 HCJ 4723/96, Aviit Atiyah v. Attorney General, 51(3) P.D. 714 (holding the MAG must accept the Attorney General’s interpretation of legal provisions and that the Attorney General may intervene in “special interest” matters that which exceed the realm of military law, acceptable norms, or general policy).
13 Amendments to disciplinary law went into effect in January 2009 that broadened the power of non-commissioned and commissioned officers, enabling them to submit certain complaints. Additionally, “the degree of punishment for specific offenses and the ranks of officers entitled to preside over a variety of cases were revised.” Legal Supervision of Disciplinary Hearings, IDF MAG Corps, http://www.law.idf.il/647-2351-en/Patzar.aspx.
14 See Finkelstein, supra note 4, at 143.
15 Legal Supervision of Disciplinary Hearings, supra note 14.
in the military.” The district chief may (1) order the Chief Military Prosecutor to file an appeal against a court-martial judgment, (2) with the consent of a military advocate, order the quashing of a charge sheet, and (3) confirm or mitigate any court-martial imposed sentence.

f. Military Justice Law (MJL) provides for adjudication by military courts – which may impose long-term penalties – or disciplinary proceedings – which are conducted by commanders and serve to provide discipline in the field through lighter sentences. The MJL establishes courts-martial (courts of first instance) and the Military Court of Appeals. The Military Court system has five courts of first instance: a District Court Martial, a Naval Court Martial, a Special Court Martial, a Field Court Martial, and a Traffic Court Martial; special courts exist for cases relating to officers with the rank of lieutenant colonel and above and death penalty cases. Courts of first instance and disciplinary proceedings may be appealed to the Military Court of Appeals and next to the Supreme Court, though an appeal to the Supreme Court rarely occurs. Similarly, a MAG’s decision can be petitioned in the High Court of Justice. An initial court-martial panel usually consists of three

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16 See Finkelstein, supra note 4, at 145.
17 Id. at 148-49.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 45.
22 Only 6 cases have been granted leave to appeal since 1986 when the MJL was amended to provide an option to appeal by leave. See Finkelstein, supra note 4, at 164.
judges. All judges have equal votes, but they serve different functions. One judge is a lawyer who instructs the others in the law, and the remaining judges are field commanders who represent the voice of the “non-lawyer” or the soldiers on the ground.

g. The IDF Military Police comprise an independent unit not subordinate to military commands. They carry out criminal investigations and transfer evidence to the MAGs who then evaluate the evidence gathered and decide whether to submit an indictment.

h. Victims of sexual assault or harassment can choose to report either within the unit or outside the unit. If a victim reports within the unit, commanders must inform the MAG of the complainant’s allegations. The decision “whether to adjudicate sex offenses in disciplinary proceedings can only be made by the military advocate [MAG] and not by commanders [and] . . . complainants are also entitled to file a civil complaint against their alleged perpetrators.” “Lighter” sex offenses can be adjudicated in disciplinary proceedings by adjudication officers (AOs) who have “either a legal education or special training in handling sexual harassment cases at the IDF School of Military Justice.” The MAG selects the AOs from a comprehensive database for each proceeding.

24 See Finkelstein, supra note 4, at 164.
25 Guiora Phone Call, supra note 11.
26 Id.
28 IDF Spokesman, telephone call with Julie Dickerson, 8 July 2013.
29 Guiora Phone Call, supra note 11. Complaints of sexual harassment and non-violent sex crimes are also sent to the military police and MAG officers. Id.
30 2013 Congress Report, supra note 19, at 50.
31 Id. at 43.
32 Id.
III. Analysis of Increases in Reports of Sexual Harassment in Israel

a. There is not necessarily any reason to believe there is less sexual abuse in the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) than in the Department of Defense. “A 2003 study by the [IDF] itself found that 80 percent of women conscripts were exposed to sexual harassment in the course of their service.”\(^33\) In a different study, the “Advisor to the Chief of Staff on Women’s Affairs for the IDF . . . found that one in seven female soldiers had been the victims of sexual harassment.”\(^34\) Without knowing the details of the surveys’ methodologies, such as manner of questioning, content of questions, sample size, etc., it is impossible to assess the reliability of these extrapolations.

b. The IDF Women’s Affairs Office reported that in 2007-2009 four categories of complaints were received in that office: 56% were physical harassment; 28% were verbal harassment; 13% were peeping; and 3% or 15 were rape.\(^35\) In 2012, 3% of that year’s 500 reports were, “instances of rape, attempted rape, or sodomy, and half of the cases were of a physical nature. This is a small decrease from

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2011.” Reports of verbal abuse, peeping, and physical harassment, investigations of physical harassment (but not non-touching harassment), and indictments are depicted in the following table.

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Military Sex Offense Reports and Indictments in Israel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>Average</th>
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<td>445</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigations</td>
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\[c.\] At the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, a senator accurately explained that Israel, the UK, Australia and Germany have taken the serious crimes out of the chain of command. However, the rationale for that change was inaccurately described as follows:

[not all] commanders are objective. Not every single commander necessarily wants women in the force. Not every single commander believes what a sexual assault is. Not every single commander can distinguish between a slap on the ass and a rape because they merge all of these crimes together. So my point to you is[,] this has been done before by our allies to great effect, and in fact, in Israel, in the last 5
years because they have prosecuted high-level cases, you know what has increased by 80 percent? Reporting. 38

First, in the United Kingdom the transfer of authority from the convening authority to military lawyers was designed to protect the rights of the accused and ensure the structural independence of courts-martial. 39 The transfer was not made to enhance justice for victims, increase prosecutions of sex crimes, or done because convening authorities did not understand which crimes were serious offenses or practiced gender-based prejudice. 40 Second, Israel’s recent increase in reports of physical harassment, verbal harassment, and peeping, was not due to reducing the authority of commanders or convening authorities. In Israel, the fundamentals of the current system establishing the authority of the MAG were created by the Military Justice Law (MJL), which came into force on January 1, 1956. 41

The prosecution of some high profile, non-military sex crimes may have caused more victims to come forward and report offenses; however, the numbers of reported sex offenses has varied previously. 42 The year 2011 was the five-year-high for reporting sexual harassment with 583 reports, and that same year was the five-year-low for military sex offense indictments with only 14 military

38 Senate Armed Services Committee Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 49.
40 Id.
41 See Finkelstein, supra note 4, at 138.
42 Id.
indictments. More importantly, the reported serious sex crimes that have the highest priority for deterrence and punishment have not increased over those same five years, as in 2008, there were 28 indictments of sex crimes, and in 2012, there were 27 indictments of sex crimes. For 2011 and 2012, there were 15 reports of the most serious sex offenses of rape, attempted rape, or sodomy.

The IDF Manpower Directorate review, however, indicates that the rise in complaints could be a result of: (1) a rise in sexual harassment and assault incidents, (2) a rise in awareness about sexual harassment and assault after an IDF campaign focusing on the issue, or (3) IDF instructions to commanders and soldiers to immediately report sexual harassment and assault. Amos Guiora, a University of Utah law professor and former IDF MAG, attributes some of the increased reporting to “recent high profile prosecutions” along with the balance of judicial power that Israel established between MAGs and commanders.43

43 Barkan, supra note 3. See also Alex Seitz-wald, Answer to military’s sexual assault problem may be overseas, Salon (June 5, 2013, 2:31 PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/06/05/answer_to_militarys_sexual_assault_problem_may_be_overseas/ (noting the IDF has increased its attention on sexual assault).

44 Id. See also Emily L. Hauser, Opening Up About Sexual Assault in Israel, The Daily Beast (June 29, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/06/20/opening-up-about-sexual-assault-in-israel.html (noting that indictments for sex crimes in Israel’s military doubled in 2012, potentially in relation to several high profile cases that brought attention to the issue); Emily L. Hauser, Opening up About Sexual Assault in Israel, The Daily Beast (June 20, 2013) (indicating a rise in reports of sex crimes in Israel attributed to high-profile civilian defendants and stating “Former President Moshe Katsav is currently serving a seven-year prison term for raping, sexually abusing and harassing three women; ex-Justice Minister Haim Ramon was convicted of sexual harassment; influential media figure Emmanuel Rosen was recently accused by 10 female colleagues of obsessive harassment and date rape”), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/06/20/opening-up-about-sexual-assault-in-israel.html; Cohen, supra note 38 (describing a high profile military case publicized in September 2012 as follows, “[A]t the Israel Air Force’s preparatory school
IV. ANALYSIS OF U.S. AND ISRAELI PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS SEX OFFENSES

a. In FY 2012, the active duty strength of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) was 1,388,028 or 7.86 times as large as the Israeli active duty forces. In FY 2012, 302 DoD military personnel were tried by courts-martial for sexual assault offenses, and 238 (79%) were convicted. Without data reflecting how many indictments in 2011 or 2012 led to Israeli convictions, it is difficult to make an accurate comparison. However, even if all of the Israeli indictments in 2012 were convictions, the rate per thousand of DoD personnel convicted by courts-martial for sexual assault offenses was .17 (238/1,388,000) compared to the .15 (27/176,500), who were indicted in Israel in 2012.

b. The Israeli active duty population is 176,500 or 4 times as large as the active duty population of Fort Hood. Yet Fort Hood completed about the same number of military sex offense prosecutions as the entire Israeli Defense Force (Fort Hood tried 26 sex offense courts-martial in FY 2012; Israel averaged 23 indictments from 2008 to 2012 with 27 indictments in FY 2012—statistics on completed trials in

('Hatechni') in Be’er Sheva, [t]hree instructors at the school were arrested on charges of rape, consensual but prohibited sexual relations with a minor and sexual abuse. The victims were all female cadets at the school. In the end, two instructors were indicted on charges of having committed sexual offenses against female cadets during the time they served as instructors at the school. In a plea bargain, one of the instructors was sentenced to ten months in prison and the other was sentenced to six months of community service in a military context.”). However, the case cited in Cohen’s article was publicized too recently to cause the spike in reports of sexual harassment.


Israel are not available). If the goal is to prosecute more sex offenses, the Israeli system seems not to be the model for DoD to emulate.