

Does conflict experience affect participatory democracy after war? Evidence from Colombia

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Abstract

Broad political participation is widely accepted as a crucial element of transitions from armed conflict to peace. As such, reforms to increase access to participatory democracy are often written into peace accords. Yet despite this connection between peace and participation in policy, we know relatively little about how the two interact in practice. Who uses participatory institutions? Does civilians' experience during armed conflict affect how they participate after war ends? This article examines an unlikely case of post-conflict participation in Colombia to answer these questions: the activation and organization of local referenda *from below*—that is, by conflict-affected communities themselves—to contest the national government's mining and oil policy. Using an original dataset of 95 municipality-level attempts to organize these referenda (*consultas populares*), I find that both conflict intensity and insurgent group presence have significant and positive effects on *consulta* activation. The impact of insurgent group presence, however, is mediated by the timing of armed groups' consolidation of territorial control. I further explore this relationship through a qualitative case study. The results highlight the importance of considering the lingering impact that armed conflict may have on democratic participation beyond electoral politics. Even when communities explicitly avoid references to conflict or victim status in their discourse, experiences during armed conflict can still shape local dynamics of political participation during post-conflict transitions.

Keywords: political participation, democracy, post-conflict, Colombia, rebel governance

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Introduction

On 26 March 2017, over 6,000 residents of a small, agricultural municipality in the central Andean department of Tolima, Colombia took to the polls to cast their votes in a local referendum about a proposed gold mining project in their territory. With their vote—a near-unanimous ‘no’ against the development of the project—the people of Cajamarca blocked the activities of AngloGold Ashanti, one of the largest gold mining companies in the world (Muñoz & Peña Niño, 2019). The vote in Cajamarca was part of a wave of movements across the country that sought to activate a mechanism in the Colombian constitution known as a *consulta popular*² (hereafter referred to as *consultas*) to protect their lands from the perceived threat of extractive (mining, oil, or hydroelectric) projects. Between 2013 and 2018, nearly 10% of Colombia’s 1,123 municipalities registered mobilizations calling for the organization of *consultas* related to extractive projects, challenging the national government’s pro-extractive post-conflict development plan.

Within Colombia, these communities’ turn to institutional channels for participatory democracy constituted a notable shift in the repertoires of contention employed during conflicts over territory. Historically, community opposition and state response to disputes over land use has mirrored the contention of the country’s armed conflict; communities have blocked roads, staged demonstrations, and organized land invasions to hinder project development. The government, meanwhile, has responded with military and police force (CINEP/Programa por la Paz, 2013). By activating the *consulta*, opponents of extractive projects in communities like

² The *consulta popular* was introduced as one of many instruments of participatory democracy included in Colombia’s 1991 Constitution. The *consulta*—effectively a local referendum—can be organized to poll eligible voters in any jurisdiction on any “yes/no” policy question “of vital importance for the future of the municipality or the wellbeing of the local population” (see Dietz 2018, 101). Their activation requires a lengthy technical process of approvals by multiple levels of government, but if over 30% of the municipality’s electorate participate in the *consulta*, its result is legally binding.

Cajamarca turned *toward* the state and its mechanisms of participatory democracy to make their voices heard.

Beyond Colombia, the case of Cajamarca and municipalities offers lessons for post-conflict participation outside of the oft-studied realm of electoral politics. Political participation is widely accepted as a crucial element of conflict prevention and post-conflict transition (Bell & O'Rourke, 2007; Brinkerhoff, 2005; Jackson, 2005). This was understood as early as 1991 in Colombia, when delegates to the country's constitutional convention envisioned that *consultas* and other participatory reforms would serve to counterbalance Colombia's historically closed political system—one of the roots of the country's armed conflict. Yet participatory institutions on paper do not necessarily translate to their use in practice. The *consulta* remained dormant as a tool for participation until 2013, which coincided with the beginnings of the Colombian government's peace negotiations with the FARC.³ This change in the use of *consultas* during Colombia's transition from armed conflict with the FARC offers an opportunity to examine how experience during conflict may impact participatory democracy once violence abates.⁴ Does experience during conflict condition communities' post-conflict activation of participatory democracy?

This article answers this question through a mixed-methods study of 95 municipal-level attempts to organize *consultas* in Colombia during and after the 2012-2016 peace negotiations with the FARC. In doing so, it makes two main contributions to the fields of peacebuilding,

³ Colombia's Mission for Electoral Observation registered only 23 attempts by municipal governments to hold *consultas* between 1991 and 2013. These the question put to the vote in these *consultas* largely concerned administrative issues—changing the local market day or revising municipal borders.

⁴ The 2012-2016 peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC addressed only the conflict between those two parties. Other non-state armed groups remain active in Colombia, and violence remains high in parts of the country. That said, rates of violence did drop significantly during and directly following the peace negotiations, allowing for the designation of some parts of Colombia as “post-conflict” during this period (see, for example, International Crisis Group 2018).

democratization, and dynamics of conflict. First, this article answers Balcells and Justino's (2014) call to bridge micro and macro-level approaches to the study of political violence. I do this by putting into conversation two divergent literatures that focus either on individuals' exposure to violence or communities' interactions with rebel groups. Within the former category, studies of individuals' attitudes toward participation and politics (see Davenport et al., 2019) suggest that exposure to violence is positively correlated with individual-level participation in community groups and politics, the effects of which can last for generations (Balcells, 2012; Lupu & Peisakhin, 2017).

Recent studies on the micro-dynamics of conflict, meanwhile, suggest that the legacy of armed conflict may be decoupled from rates of conflict-related violence. Violence is only one way that armed groups interact with civilians, and the way they exert control and interact with local populations can vary (e.g. Arjona, 2016; Breslawski, 2020; Mampilly & Stewart, 2020). These variations, in turn, can have implications for post-conflict politics. Where interactions with armed groups catalyze the mobilization and organization of ordinary citizens post-conflict politics tend to look more democratic (Huang, 2016). Similarly, different forms of interaction can either strengthen or weaken preexisting political institutions and their ability to address citizens' needs (Vargas Castillo, 2019). The emphasis here is on the mode of engagement between armed groups and civilians rather than violence or control in and of itself. This article's finding that both violence and the *timing* of violence might help explain post-conflict participatory democracy represents a contribution to the study of rebel governance and its legacies after war.

Second, this study expands our understanding of post-conflict participation to include engagement with participatory democracy as well as formal electoral politics. Existing studies of

post-conflict participation have focused on reforms promoted by either national governments or external peacekeepers, such as combatant participation in post-conflict elections (Matanock, 2017) or representation in legislature or cabinet (Call, 2012). Instead, I focus on non-electoral, participatory mechanisms activated and implemented *from below*—that is, by conflict-affected communities themselves. As more communities turned to the *consulta* after 2013, Colombia’s national government actively discouraged and tried to block communities from using it (McNeish, 2017a). Movements to employ the *consulta* had to be initiated from the grassroots level, making them an unlikely, but powerful case of participation. Turning toward the *consulta* signaled those citizens believed in, or at least hoped for, the legitimacy and efficacy of participatory reforms. Understanding patterns of activation, therefore, can help us understand how democratization may be built from the ground up in areas affected by conflict.

The rest of the article proceeds as follows. First, I clarify this article’s understanding of post-conflict participation and justify its employment of the *consulta* as its subject of focus. Next, I evaluate the existing literature on the effects of armed conflict and post-conflict participation and formulate the hypotheses that I test in my statistical analysis. The following section presents my data and results from statistical models. I then explore possible causal mechanisms through a case study of the effort to organize a *consulta* in Cajamarca. I conclude by discussing how my findings may hold lessons beyond Colombia and offering suggestions for future directions of research.

Defining political participation

This study is interested first in the general question of whether experience during armed conflict affects post-conflict participatory mechanisms. While scholars agree that participation is

important for peacebuilding, participation can take many forms with different levels of accessibility for the average citizen. Some clarification around what I mean by ‘participation’, therefore, is useful. I employ a broad definition of political participation outlined by Conge et al. (1988, 247) as ‘individual or collective action at the national or local level that supports or opposes state structures, authorities, and/or decisions regarding allocation of public goods.’ This definition includes actions through institutional channels, such as voting, or extra-institutional channels, such as demonstrations or strikes. It excludes ‘community behavior’ that is not oriented toward the state, such as belonging to neighborhood associations.

I focus on a particularly unlikely form of political participation: what Mayka (2019) and Rodríguez-Franco (2017) have termed ‘civil society activation’ or ‘citizen activated institutions’. In this form of participation, citizens act through formal, state institutions, but institutional activation is initiated and shaped by the mobilization and coordination of civil society groups who pressure the government to recognize their actions. In the context of post-conflict transitions, civil society activation can complement top-down programs to promote participation. These actions, however, can be especially ‘high-risk’ (Loveman, 1998; Zulver, 2022), especially in contexts where social leaders and activists continue to be targeted for violence, like Colombia (International Crisis Group, 2020).

The *consultas* considered in this study fall into this category of participation. While the *consulta* as an instrument is a participatory institution sanctioned by the state, its use by civil society to contest extractive projects runs counter to national government policies and priorities. Beginning in the 1990s and continuing today, successive presidential administrations have promoted investment in mining and oil projects as a crucial driver of Colombia’s economic growth. The government has introduced tax breaks, auctions of extractive titles, and changes in

legal codes to reduce barriers to investment (McNeish, 2017b; Vasquez, 2014). Community opposition to extractive projects represents a thorn in the side of national government officials courting multinational companies. In this scenario, the impetus to implement the *consulta* in the cases considered here almost always comes from civil society.

Communities in all municipalities have the legal right to organize *consultas* per Colombia's constitution, but not all chose to when confronted with imminent threats to their territory from extractive projects, even as others demonstrated their utility in disputes over land use. Colombia's interrelated history of armed conflict and political exclusion offers one possible explanation for this variation. The following section explores how armed conflict may affect political access and participation after conflict recedes.

Theoretical framework

There are two strands of literature to which we can turn to understand how armed conflict can make citizens more or less likely to activate participatory mechanisms after conflict ends. One examines the effect of violence on individual actions and disposition toward participation. The other investigates the differential effects of armed groups' presence on local-level institutions and organizations. I evaluate each of these explanations in turn.

Violence and the individual

Few would argue that civil war and its attendant violence are positive experiences for those affected. Recent scholarship, however, has pointed toward a silver-lining of civil war: increased participation and altruism among individuals who experience violence first-hand. Studies ranging from surveys of child soldiers in Uganda (Blattman, 2009), households affected

by civil war in Sierra Leone (Bellows & Miguel 2009), and field experiments in rural Burundi (Voors et al., 2012) tend to converge in their findings. Wartime experience positively affects social and/or political behavior on an individual level after conflict.

Despite the apparent agreement⁵ around the positive correlation between exposure to violence and participation, the actual mechanism driving victims' engagement in post-conflict politics is less clear. Most scholars borrow from the discipline of psychology to hypothesize that conflict exposure leads to generalized preference change due to 'post-traumatic growth'. As Bauer et al. (2016, 23) summarize in their meta-analysis, 'psychologists have noted that some people respond to trauma by reflecting on and reevaluating their lives, especially in terms of what they regard as important and valuable such as family and relationships'. Trauma in the form of conflict-related violence, the argument follows, leads to pro-social behavior—of which political participation is one facet. Aggregated to the community level, increased pro-social behavior may change social norms and fortify institutions that promote social and political participation (Bellows & Miguel, 2009, 1147).

Applying these arguments to the case of *consulta* activation in Colombia, we would expect individuals living in areas that experienced greater conflict intensity to exhibit more pro-social tendencies. This increased pro-sociality could facilitate efforts to organize movements to activate *consultas*, as community members may be more willing to participate in organizing and/or take on leadership roles. Bauer et al. (2016) suggest that pro-social effects are stronger within culturally-defined in-groups than among out-groups. This assumption should only

⁵ There are some exceptions to this claim in the literature. Grossman et al.'s (2015) study of former combatants in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) indicates that individuals who experienced violence first hand were more likely to support hawkish politicians and harden attitudes toward rivals. This argument relates more to attitudes toward out-groups than general participation. Other studies have found differential effects in political attitudes among victims according to their gender (Hadzic & Tavits, 2019), but do not discount a general relationship between violence and pro-sociality.

strengthen our expectations regarding mobilization within a community (within an in-group) against mining or oil firms (outsiders).

Importantly, much of the existing literature suggests that the pro-social effect on *consulta* participation should hold regardless of the type of violence and/or identity of the perpetrators (Bauer et al., 2016). This allows me to employ a fairly blunt instrument to measure conflict intensity in my analysis. Some scholars may disagree with this framing. Balcells (2012, 313), for example, contends that victimization leads individuals to reject the political identities of perpetrators. Balcells' study, however, examines participation in formal voting and party preferences. In the context of non-electoral politics, party preferences likely play a smaller role. First, national party ideology tends to be significantly diluted at the local level. Second, when voting on issues that immediately threaten their land and livelihood, even individuals with strong political preferences in formal elections may see *consultas* as far removed from the preferences of party elites in Bogotá.

Hypothesis 1 (*conflict exposure and pro-sociality*): Municipalities that experienced greater conflict intensity will be more likely to register a movement to activate a *consulta*.

Armed groups and engagement

Theories of violence and pro-sociality capture only one element of life during armed conflict. Low rates of violence can belie the influence of non-state armed groups over a community (Kalyvas, 2006). Where armed groups compete against the state or each other for territory, violence may spike. When one group is able to consolidate power, violence tends to diminish. Instead, armed groups often turn to less-violent forms of governance or social control to keep populations in order. Scholarship on the formation and legacy of rebel governance

indicates the character of insurgent-civilian interactions under rebel governance has important impacts on the political and social life of communities both during (Gáfaró et al., 2014; Kaplan, 2017) and after (Huang, 2016; Martin et al., 2022; Vargas Castillo, 2019) conflict. Styles of wartime insurgent-civilian relationships varies across groups and territories (Arjona, 2016; Mampilly & Stewart, 2020). Fortunately, much of the existing theory on rebel governance is derived from case study work conducted in Colombia. This allows me to make some generalizations that are relevant to post-conflict *consultas*.

Previous work has found that guerrilla groups (namely the FARC) were more likely to ‘prop-up’ existing local government institutions (in contrast with right-wing paramilitary groups, which were more likely to dismantle them) and incorporate community members into local rule (Kaplan, 2017; Vargas Castillo, 2019, 47). The FARC was also less likely to harass local organizations, so long as those organizations aligned with the rebel group’s ideology (Arjona, 2016, 145). This has important implications for the types of civil society groups that led movements against mining in rural areas. From its origins, the FARC cultivated an ideology that espoused rural empowerment and its roots as a rural self-defense movement (Karl, 2017). The FARC’s leadership also explicitly opposed the development of corporate mining projects—both in line with its leftist ideology and likely in response to the state security presence that projects would bring. This alignment in interests and ideology suggests that civil society groups—such as community associations or environmental defense groups—may have been more likely to survive the conflict with their organizational capacity and leadership intact in areas controlled by the FARC. In fact, activists may have increased their leadership skills during this period, as they were forced to negotiate and plan their activities under the FARC’s armed presence (Jha & Wilkinson, 2012). Community members interested in organizing a *consulta* between 2013-2018

could then tap into these preexisting activist networks. It is important to note that the networks I refer to here are comprised of civilians and are distinct from the rebel group commanders and former combatants.⁶

Hypothesis 2 (*armed group presence*): Municipalities where the FARC had sustained/hegemonic control will be more likely to register a movement to organize a *consulta*.

Timing is everything

Building leadership skills and institutionalizing civil society organizations can take time that communities living in a dynamic security environment may not have. Vargas Castillo notes (2019, 134) that communities often experienced rule by multiple armed groups over the course of Colombia's decades long armed conflict. As a result, the sequence and length of exposure to different types of rebel government may matter. Indeed, one study of armed group presence and participation during war finds that longer periods of insurgent presence are associated with larger increases in participation and collective action (Gáfaró et al., 2014, 22). We may expect similar impacts for post-conflict participation; the longer the FARC has a sustained presence in a territory, the more time (select) civil society groups have to consolidate and build skills in a (relatively) favorable environment.

Hypothesis 3 (*temporality*): Municipalities where the FARC consolidated control earlier in the conflict will be more likely to register a movement to organize a *consulta*.

⁶ There is evidence that the FARC played a role in coordinating and/or supporting some civilian mobilizations in areas they controlled during the armed conflict. One example of this is the complicated relationship between social leaders and the FARC during the 1996 cocalero social movement in the Amazonian department of Putumayo (see Ramírez, 2011). Those involved in the *consulta* movements I study here, meanwhile, have been careful to make clear that they have no connection to the FARC or any other armed group (McNeish, 2017a)

Data

This article uses *consulta* activation as its primary measure of post-conflict participation. Proponents of civil society-activated participatory institutions recognize civil society mobilization as a necessary step for both demanding implementation and securing participation in these institutions. Following their arguments, this study operationalizes ‘activation’ by identifying municipalities where mobilizations specifically called for their local governments to hold a *consulta* related to an extractive project. The focus on extractive-related *consultas* ensures the mobilizations represent ‘unlikely’ cases of participation—that is, where participants’ (stated) goals challenge national government policies.⁷

To identify cases where these movements have taken place, I systematically searched both regional and national media reports for mentions of *consultas populares*. If a municipality was mentioned in the media as having any organized action demanding a *consulta* (e.g. community members have demanded a town hall to discuss organizing a vote), that municipality is counted as a positive case, even if I could not find evidence that the mayor or local council had taken institutional action. The logic behind including these municipalities as positive cases stems from multiple conversations with Colombian academics and activists. All agreed that, given the Colombian media’s tendency to underreport activities in rural territories, coverage in media reports can be interpreted as an indication that the movement is real and significant on the ground.

For my statistical analysis, I construct a dichotomous variable (*mobilized*) that codes whether or not a municipality has a movement for a *consulta*. Some municipalities registered two

⁷ Within the data I collected, all the pro-*consulta* movements included had an anti-mining stance. There were no movements in favor of developing large-scale mining projects.

separate initiatives⁸ to demand a *consulta*, but these municipalities are only counted once for the purposes of this analysis. The independent variables tested in this paper do not vary sufficiently over time between the two attempts. Therefore, including these attempts as separate cases would constitute double counting.


The *mobilized* variable includes cases of *consulta* activation where neither activists nor local authorities have taken the step to register with the local office of the National Registry—the first step toward triggering the deployment of government funds and electoral infrastructure for a vote.⁹ I include these cases because some municipalities have experienced numerous mobilizations and formal town hall meetings that facilitate informal participation around the *consulta* without yet triggering the formal mechanism. That said, filing a movement with the National Registry may constitute an important step toward increasing the quality and legitimacy of participation connected to the *consulta*. I also test my hypotheses using a second, more restricted, dichotomous dependent variable (*registered*) that captures whether a movement has formally filed with the local branch of the National Registry (1; or activated) or not (0; or dormant) based on documents published on the National Registry’s online archive. The number of positive cases under these criteria decreases from n=95 *mobilized* to n=37 *registered*.¹⁰ Cases are mapped in figure 1.

Figure 1. Map of attempts to organize *consultas* related to extractive projects

⁸ These attempts are classified as separate because they either used different pathways for activation (initiated by the mayor or through citizen petition) and/or the movement was led by different individuals. The names and ID numbers of the pro-*consulta* committee members are published on the National Registry website.

⁹ See online appendix 1 for an overview of the process required to organize a *consulta*.

¹⁰ Note: this variable is a conservative measure. Data collection identified news reports indicating that a movement had progressed beyond mobilization, but the case is only counted as *registered* if evidence could be located from government sources, as well. Models run using these cases do not differ significantly in significance or effect size.



Author's elaboration. ● (circles) Indicate *registered cases*. ▲ (triangles) Indicate cases that only *mobilized*.

The full universe of cases in the dataset follows Mahoney and Goertz's (2004) 'possibility principle' including all municipalities that are 'at risk' of holding a *consulta* related to extractives. I define 'at risk' as those municipalities where the national government has either already granted concessions for extractive projects or where the National Mining Agency and/or National Hydrocarbon Ministry has advertised territory as eligible for titling. I exclude municipalities where the area of land reserved for ethnic (indigenous or Afro-Colombian) communities exceeds 10% of the municipality. In accordance with international conventions, the Colombian legal code requires both private companies and the state to consult ethnic minority communities (often referred to as free, prior, and informed consultation) before developing projects that will affect their designated lands (see Rodríguez-Garavito, 2011). As these

communities have access to a designated tool for consultation, I assume that civil society groups will turn to this guaranteed pathway of participating rather than undertaking the more demanding process of mobilizing local government officials and eligible voters to hold a *consulta*. This assumption is supported by figure 1. Areas with high concentrations of ethnic communities, such as the Pacific coast and Amazon do not register any attempts to organize a *consulta*.

I measure both my dependent and independent variables on the municipality-level. This level of analysis distinguishes my study from previous work on post-conflict participation, which have approached participation from the individual level (i.e. Blattman, 2009) or village-level (i.e. Kaplan, 2017; Vargas Castillo, 2019) of analysis. The reason I focus on the municipality is three-fold. The first reason is administrative. The municipality-level is the smallest organizational level for which authorities can call for a *consulta*.¹¹ Thus, the ‘community’ that a *consulta* aims to poll is comprised of all towns, villages, and rural settlements within the municipal boundaries. The second reason is theoretical. Smaller communities within the municipality may have experienced slightly different levels of conflict (Arjona, 2016; Kalyvas, 2006) and feature their own internal politics that are not captured with municipality-level data. Nonetheless, to mobilize for a *consulta*, activists must coordinate across this spectrum of experiences. How residents of these smaller administrative units interact and coordinate between themselves determines the feasibility of *consulta* mobilization. The sum of this interaction and coordination is captured by my municipality-level measure. Finally, the municipality level is simply the smallest administrative unit for which data is consistently collected across Colombia. With all this in

¹¹ The *consulta* must be convened by the relevant executive authority for each administrative level (i.e. the mayor for a municipality-level *consulta*, the governor for a department-level *consulta*, and the president for a national-level *consulta*).

mind, I test whether my assumptions hold through a qualitative analysis of sub-municipality patterns of violence and mobilization in Cajamarca.

Independent variables

To test my first hypothesis—municipalities that experienced greater conflict intensity will be more likely to register a movement for a *consulta*—I use an indicator for conflict intensity created by the Conflict Analysis Resource Center (CERAC), a Colombian think-tank.¹² Between 2000 and 2012—generally the most violent years of Colombia’s armed conflict, CERAC collected data on both armed group presence and conflict-related events for all municipalities across Colombia. Municipalities are typologized on a 0-7 scale base on both the number of violent events and the persistence of conflict (permanent, interrupted, pacified, no conflict). Municipalities that scored a 7 on this scale represent those that were the most affected by armed conflict, while those that scored a 1 did not experience conflict from 2000-2012.

My second hypothesis predicts that municipalities that experienced sustained territorial control by the FARC will be more likely to register movements for a *consulta*. To measure territorial control, I build on Matanock and García-Sánchez’s (2018) work identifying armed group territorial control in selected Colombian municipalities for their survey experiment on counterinsurgent support. They draw on Kalyvas’s (2006) observation that ‘control produces different patterns of violence (we can observe)’ to identify armed group control through longitudinal information on violence in a particular time period. Spikes in violence by multiple actors indicates contestation over control, but declines in violence indicate consolidation by one group. Using semiparametric group-based modeling, they identify different trajectories of

¹² For an evaluation of the robustness of CERAC data, see Restrepo, Spagat, & Vargas (2003).

violence by different armed actors to identify the status of control in each municipality by the end of the period in question. I expand their dataset by replicating their analysis using violence data for the years 1993 to 2013 for all the municipalities in my sample.¹³ Data on violence comes from the Universidad de los Andes' CEDE municipal dataset, which includes panel data collected from primarily from state agencies. This variable indicates which armed group (or the State) had near total or sustained control of the municipality in the period that directly preceded the wave of *consulta* activations.

To capture the temporality of armed group control that is central to my third hypothesis, I created variables that disaggregate rates of violence by armed actor and time period as an indication of when armed groups attempted to consolidate control. The contemporary period of the Colombian armed conflict can be broken down into three periods (Prieto et al., 2014): the first period (1990-2002) marked a period of territorial expansion and consolidation by the FARC that ended with the failure of the El Caguán peace process in 2002. This period was followed (2002-2010) by eight years of Álvaro Uribe's presidency, which saw rapid improvements in the Colombian military force under his policy of Democratic Security. This period also featured the highest levels of paramilitary activity across the country. The second period ended in 2010 with the election of Juan Manuel Santos, who signed a final peace agreement with the FARC in 2016. I created variables that capture violence committed by the FARC and rightwing paramilitary groups by municipality during the first two time periods outlined above.

Control variables

¹³ I describe Matanock and García-Sánchez's procedure in detail the online appendix. Also see the online appendix for a list of municipalities included in their data.

In addition to controlling for various socio-economic conditions¹⁴, I include a number of other variables in my models to address possible selection effects on the independent and dependent variables. Some municipalities may have been targeted for violence during armed conflict for the same reason that they may also be more likely to mobilize for a *consulta* after conflict abates—the presence of natural resources. Many scholars have emphasized the connection between natural resource wealth and conflict (Collier & Hoeffler 2000; Gutiérrez Rodríguez 2018; Rettberg & Prieto 2018). Guerrilla groups, paramilitaries, and organized criminals all may seek control of areas where extractive exploitation is already underway to gain access to financial benefits from royalties or to engage in illegal extraction. State forces, meanwhile, have incentives to regain and maintain control of these areas to protect legal extractive operations. I construct a measure of municipality extractive royalties pre-*consulta* movement as a control for existing extractive projects with data from the Colombian government’s Planning Unit for Mining and Energy. I also include a dummy variable for whether a municipality is covered by a *convenios de fuerza*. These *convenios* are agreements signed between private companies and state agencies (army, air force, police) that provide enhanced security services for extractive sites in exchange for funding.¹⁵ Ostensibly, these agreements are intended to protect extractive installations from attacks by insurgents, but human rights groups contend that they are often used as a pretense to quell anti-extractive protests and target social leaders. This variable, therefore, helps to account for possible spuriousness where municipalities attract FARC presence and *independently* are more vocal opponents to extractive projects.

¹⁴ Basic needs index (2011), total population, municipality size (km²), rurality index.

¹⁵ See reporting by journalists from *Ruta del Conflicto* for more on these agreements.

I include distance from Bogotá, Colombia's capital as an additional control. State capacity across Colombia is uneven and has been for much of the country's history. The lack of state presence can contribute to armed groups' abilities to pursue and maintain territorial control. Importantly for this study, variations in state presence may also have implications data reliability. The further away municipalities are from Bogotá, the more likely that media coverage did not report on the presence of *consulta* movements.

Finally, I include a control variable to account for the continued threat of violence after the formal end of Colombia's armed conflict with the FARC in 2016. In many areas of the country, Colombia's 'post-conflict' has not been peaceful. Individuals mobilizing around environmental issues, in particular, have been explicitly targeted for violence by various actors; in 2019, the NGO Global Witness named Colombia the deadliest country in the world for land rights activists (Griffin, 2020). Leaders of pro-*consulta* movements across Colombia have reported receiving death threats aimed at stopping existing mobilizations and discouraging future ones (McNeish, 2017a). This study, however, is concerned with violence *during* conflict, rather than violence committed after. To control for post-conflict violence, I construct a dummy variable to capture whether the municipality registered at least one assassination of a social leader between 2016 and December 2018.

Empirical strategy and discussion

I test each hypothesis separately using logistic regression with robust standard errors clustered by province to control for regional effects. Continuous variables are standardized by dividing by two standard deviations of the reference group to facilitate comparison of

coefficients with dummy variables. I run two sets of models for each hypothesis—one using *mobilized* as the dependent variable and the other using the more restricted *registered* variable.

Table I. Average conflict intensity (2000-2012) and *consulta* activation

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	<i>Mobilized</i>		<i>Registered</i>	
	1	2	3	4
Conflict Intensity	0.242** (0.085)	0.240** (0.089)	0.389** (0.141)	0.392** (0.142)
Vanhanen Score		0.166 (0.375)		0.421 (0.564)
Centro Democrático in Power		0.092 (0.854)		-0.145 1.031
Unsatisfied Basic Needs Index (2011)	0.146 (0.411)	0.160 (0.400)	0.155 (0.365)	0.151 (0.335)
Rurality Index (2011)	-0.209 0.389	-0.179 (0.382)	-0.000 (0.578)	0.055 (0.453)
Total Population (2011)	-0.764 1.109	-0.693 1.083	-1.953 (1.454)	-1.711 (1.347)
Municipality Size (km ²)	1.078 0.502	1.099* (0.475)	1.512** (0.557)	1.490** (0.461)
Log Mining Royalties (2011-2017)	0.020 (0.016)	0.019 (0.015)	0.021 (0.020)	0.020 (0.019)
Linear Distance to Bogotá (km)	-1.592** (0.562)	-1.560** (0.556)	-2.184** (0.689)	-2.159** (0.646)
Social Leader Assassination	-0.924* (0.439)	-1.560* (0.408)	-1.337 (0.830)	-1.264 (0.777)
Constant	-3.409** (0.527)	-3.469** (0.853)	-5.128** (0.578)	-5.000** (1.139)
Observations	984	984	977	977

*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001. The table reports logit regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by province. Continuous variables are standardized by dividing by two standard deviations of the mean.

Focusing first on general exposure to armed conflict, the results reported in table I provide evidence supporting my first hypothesis; municipalities that experienced greater conflict intensity were more likely to both mobilize and register their movements calling for a *consulta*. Holding all other values at their means, municipalities that were most affected by conflict were 3.6 times more likely to mobilize and nearly 10 times more likely to register with the National Registry than those that experienced no conflict-related violence.¹⁶

¹⁶ I calculated substantive results using King et al.'s (2000) simulation-based method for predicted values and standard parameters.

The results remain significant when I add possible alternative explanations into models 2 and 4. As both the early stages and eventual completion of a *consulta* require movement leaders to gain approval from either the local mayor, municipal council, or both, it is possible that local political dynamics (Tarrow, 2011) may explain why some communities are able to activate the *consulta* while others are not. The inclusion of measures for political openness¹⁷ and a dummy variable for the mayor's political party¹⁸ do not affect either the coefficient size or the significance level of the coefficients for conflict exposure.

The correlation between movement registration and conflict exposure provides especially robust evidence that there is some connection between the two. While Colombia's history of armed conflict and state repression has made all forms of collective action high-risk, informal demonstrations, meetings, and town hall events related to *consulta* activation constitute relatively lower-risk forms of participation. While they may be recognized by other participants, movement leaders and individual attendees do not have to formally document their attendance. In contrast, registering with the National Registry requires either movement leaders to provide their names and identification numbers to government officials, or for mayors and municipal council members to formally support the motion for a vote. In a context where activists are targeted for violence and local politicians may be sanctioned by the national government for activating the *consulta*, registration represents a high level of commitment to participation.

As mentioned, data on conflict intensity measured in violence do not capture the full picture of civilians' experience during armed conflict. Therefore, I turn to assessing the impact of

¹⁷ The measure I use is the Vanhanen index score, which defines political openness as a combination of competitiveness and voter participation. I use data from the Universidad de los Andes for the 2011 mayoral elections.

¹⁸ This dummy variable captures whether the mayor in power at the time of mobilization represents the Centro Democrático (CD) political party, including as part of a coalition. The CD is one of Colombia's largest parties. Its national policy is explicitly in favor of increasing foreign direct investment in extractive projects.

armed group presence through 2013 on participation through *consultas*. The results of logistic regressions using both the *mobilized* (models 4a-6a) and *registered* (models 4b-6b) dependent variables suggest we should reject the hypothesis that FARC presence increases the odds of a community activating the *consulta*. As reported in Table II, the presence of the FARC in a municipality has no statistically significant effect on either dependent variable. Instead, when we consider the presence of both groups together in models 6a and 6b, paramilitary group control has a slightly positive effect on mobilization and registration.

Table II. Armed group control (ending in 2013) and *consulta* activation

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	<i>Mobilized</i>			<i>Registered</i>		
	4a	5a	6a	4b	5b	6b
FARC control	0.147 (0.317)		0.382 (0.297)	0.624 (0.397)		0.964* (0.441)
Paramilitary control		0.655 (0.404)	0.806* (0.397)		0.596 (0.443)	1.045* (0.493)
Constant	-2.740*** (0.413)	-2.794*** (0.392)	-2.947*** (0.451)	-4.111*** (0.343)	-3.972*** (0.347)	-4.419*** (0.359)
Observations	984	984	984	984	984	984

*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001. The table reports logit regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by province. Control variables include basic needs index, population, municipality size, royalties, distance to Bogotá, assassinations.


This result is surprising. In contrast to the FARC, paramilitary groups in Colombia tended to dismantle local leadership structures and target activists, preferring to replace local leaders with their own or external personnel (Arjona, 2016; Vargas Castillo, 2019). The theoretical framework I laid out earlier would suggest that these actions would hurt communities' ability to activate participatory democracy after war. Vargas (2019, 134-138) posits that caution should be taken when interpreting the legacy of paramilitary control over a municipality. He argues that sequence and length of exposure to groups matters; 'in most regions, guerrillas arrived first and exercised uncontested control during years, sometimes decades, before the insertion of paramilitary groups in these areas.' Therefore, areas under

control of paramilitaries in 2013 may have also experienced long periods of guerrilla influence. This may also explain why FARC control in 2013 has no effect on a municipality's likelihood of organizing a *consulta*. If guerrilla consolidation happened recently, civil society groups may not have had enough time to develop.

To account for overlaps in armed group presence, I turn to my third hypothesis: municipalities where the FARC consolidated control earlier in the conflict will be more likely to register a movement to organize a *consulta*. I analyze a sub-sample of my data by keeping only municipalities under guerrilla control in 2013. Following the same logic related to patterns of violence and consolidation of control, I use my time period variables to evaluate when violence by armed groups in municipalities peaked. My analysis assumes that if violence peaked in the earlier period (1993-2002), then the FARC's presence in a municipality was consolidated early. High rates of violence in the second period (2002-2010) indicates contestation and consolidation either continued or began in this later period, and thus the time of exposure to guerrilla presence was shorter. Plots of the coefficients for models including each independent variable on their own (models 8-9) and with control variables (models 10-12) are presented in figures 2 and 3.


Among the municipalities under guerrilla control in 2013, those that experienced guerrilla violence and consolidation of control between 1993 and 2002 were significantly more likely to both mobilize and register pro-*consulta* movements. Where municipalities experienced higher levels of violence by paramilitary groups in this period, communities were less likely to activate the *consulta*. Violence by either group between 2002-2010 has no effect on the likelihood of mobilization or registration. The introduction of control variables and robustness checks using various alternative measures of violence or more conservative estimates of guerrilla control (see online appendix) do not affect either the direction of effect or statistical significance.

Figure 2. Plot of coefficients logit models 8a-12a



DV=*mobilized*. Dots represent coefficients. Tails represent robust standard errors clustered by province. Control variables include basic needs index, population, municipality size, royalties, distance to Bogotá, assassinations.

Figure 3. Plot of coefficients logit models 8b-12b




DV=*registered*. Dots represent coefficients. Tails represent robust standard errors clustered by province. Control variables include basic needs index, population, municipality size, royalties, distance to Bogotá, assassinations.

The results indicate that temporality matters for the stickiness of guerrilla influence. Early contestation or violence by paramilitary groups could force civil society groups underground or fray the social fabric of affected communities (Idler, 2019). Even when guerrillas consolidate power later and introduce an environment relatively more favorable to groups that would support a *consulta*, they may struggle to overcome earlier targeting of their leaders or dismantlement of local institutions. Temporal effects are limited to municipalities under guerrilla control. When I repeat my analysis in municipalities under paramilitary and state control, respectively, in 2013, the timing of violence has no effect on participation through *consultas* (see online appendix).

This article's municipality-level approach has identified a positive relationship between conflict intensity, sustained guerrilla presence, and post-conflict participation through *consultas*. It is possible that conflict exposure increased the average pro-sociality of residents of the municipality, increasing the likelihood that movement leaders would be able to convince community members to participate in their mobilization. It is also possible that the relative space afforded to local leaders under guerrilla rule increased social learning and leadership potential of a select number of community members (Justino & Stojetz, 2018, 26), who were then more effective at leading pro-*consulta* movements. Both mechanisms may be at work at the same time or in different locations. This article returns to town of Cajamarca, Tolima as a case study to test these possible causal mechanisms. This section draws from various secondary sources and archival documentation of violent events in the municipality, as well as insights from interviews conducted with activists and academics in Colombia and online between 2019 and 2021.

The case of Cajamarca

Figure 4. Map of Cajamarca municipality



Cajamarca lies on the Western edge of the municipality of Tolima, in the center of the department's 'coffee belt.' The municipality is bisected by the Pan American highway, making it a strategic point of connection between the country's center and capital of Bogotá, the port of Buenaventura on the Pacific coast, and the south. While the areas to Cajamarca's south experienced high rates of violence during Colombia's armed conflict with the FARC, CERAC scores Cajamarca as a "4"—the country average—on its scale of conflict intensity. From the 1990s onwards, government documents indicate the presence of the FARC's 21st front in the municipality (Vicepresidencia de la República, 2002). Between 1998 and 2007, the FARC committed a series of selective assassinations and assembled roadblocks on the Pan American highway (CINEP, 2004a, 2008). Paramilitary groups also committed violence in the municipality, including a 2004 massacre of four *campesinos* and union members for 'supposed collaboration with the FARC (CINEP, 2004b, 487). Statements by local residents indicate that the FARC established the rules for residents, for example dictating under what circumstances civilians could travel after dark (CINEP, 2004b, 152).

As suggested by studies of micro-dynamics of conflict, experience of violence across the municipality was uneven. Nearly all the lethal events documented by observers and government officials occurred in the locality (*corregimiento*) of Anaime—a one and a half hour walk or 15-minute drive from the municipality’s main town (*cabecera municipal*). Photos from Anaime in January 2013 indicate that guerrilla influence was lasting, as walls of the town’s central square and principal streets are covered with pro-FARC graffiti (see figure 4 for example).

Figure 5. Pro-FARC graffiti in Anaime (2013)



Source: Google Street view. Tags read ‘FARC-EP’, ‘death to snitches’, and ‘get out Anglo-Gold Ashanti’ [sic].

Anaime played an outsized role in Cajamarca’s pro-*consulta* movement. This locality, rather than the *cabecera municipal*, was the home base for many of the local organizations involved in coordinating the *consulta*.

AngloGold Ashanti (AGA), a major South African mining company, obtained the rights to develop a new large-scale gold mine in Cajamarca in 2003. Residents of the municipality only learned of the project in 2007 when then-president Álvaro Uribe publicly unveiled the project plans, much to the dismay of many local *campesinos* who worried that the project would affect their land and water sources (Ruiz Ruiz et al., 2018, 371-387). *Campesinos* in Anaime were already organized in local agrarian organizations before the movement for a *consulta* to stop the AGA project began. For example, group of around a dozen *campesinos* founded AgroTU

Anaime in the mid-2000s to promote agrarian interests in the municipality. Other residents of Anaime were active union members (CINEP, 2004b). Residents of Anaime also participated in an ‘Agrarian strike’ in September 2007—a mass demonstration by *campesinos*, indigenous groups, and other communities in rural Colombia—to protest Colombia’s free trade agreement with the United States (CINEP, 2008). Among the demonstrators’ demands was a pause on all new mining licenses in Colombia (Agencia Prensa Rural, 2007).

Accounts of Cajamarca’s *consulta* often focus on the roles of external NGOs, activists, and university students from the department capital in organizing the movement (García & Dietz, 2020; McNeish, 2017a; Shenk, 2021), but local groups, including AgroTu Anaime, the Alianza de Mujeres Campesinas de Anaime, and COSAJUCA, played a central role as well. These groups coordinated with local politicians, organized demonstrations, and went door-to-door educating residents of the potential effects of the mining project (Muñoz & Peña Niño, 2019; interview by author, 2019). Despite the considerable difference in size between the *cabecera municipal* and Anaime, representation in the pro-*consulta* movement featured an almost even split between the two localities. The name of the pro-*consulta* committee—the Comité Ambiental y Campesino de Cajamarca y Anaime—reflects this.

It is important to emphasize that the pro-*consulta* movement was neither formed nor driven by the FARC front present in the municipality. Local activists were careful to make this distinction clear in their communications with community members. In fact, organizers reported that perceptions of their association with the guerilla group represented one of the biggest hurdles they had to overcome to secure community participation (interview by author, 2021). The agrarian associations in Anaime that provided a foundation for the pro-*consulta* movement, however, likely had to count on tacit approval from the FARC leaders in charge of the territory

when they formed. The same month of the 2007 Agrarian Strike, presumed FARC combatants assassinated two residents of Anaime, including the president of the local communal authority group (*junta de acción comunal*) (CINEP, 2008, 102). Other scholars have also found that armed group presence in the Colombian conflict encouraged local residents to increase participation, leadership, and decision-making in local productive organizations, such as agrarian associations (Gafaro et al., 2014). These organizations, in turn, may provide a training ground for leaders of later social movements, as the case of Anaime and Cajamarca's *consulta* shows.

Conclusion

The activation of the *consulta* in Colombia provides an opportunity to revisit and further develop existing theories on the connection between armed conflict and participation. Previous studies have pointed to links between exposure to violence and increased participation on the individual level, while others have probed the relationship between rebels' territorial control and post-conflict institutions. The aim of this study is to examine whether and how these two theories may interact or coexist to explain variation in non-electoral, post-conflict participation through *consultas*.

Statistical analysis of 95 attempts to hold extractive-related *consultas* provide some evidence in support of theories of conflict exposure and pro-sociality. Greater conflict intensive is correlated with *consulta* activation, but effect sizes are small, indicating, as one might expect, that exposure to conflict is one of many motivating and mitigating factors for participation. Who controls a municipality toward the end of conflict seems to have little effect on *consulta* activation. When we consider identity and timing together, however, a significant, positive relationship emerges between early FARC territorial consolidation and both

mobilization for a *consulta* and movement registration with government institutions. A deeper dive into the case of Cajamarca's pro-*consulta* movement indicates that leadership skills developed by members of productive associations in areas with a sustained presence of the FARC might provide an important foundation for later pro-*consulta* movements.

The results of this study have important implications for scholars of conflict and democratization. Themes of war and peace often take center stage in national-level electoral politics in the post-conflict period. The 2018 presidential election in Colombia, for example, centered in large part around how the winner would continue to implement the 2016 peace accord. Meanwhile, citizens' concerns on the local level may be more forward-looking rather than reference experiences during previous periods of violence. Of the 95 pro-*consulta* movements analyzed in this article, none made explicit references to members' status as victims in the reports I gathered, despite many being in areas hit hardest by conflict-related violence. Expanded participation in post-conflict electoral politics, therefore, is not equivalent to greater inclusion of citizens' interests. Participatory mechanisms can offer unique channels for communities to elevate their local concerns to national-level dialogues. Understanding where and how communities can access participatory institutions represents a crucial and understudied element of post-conflict democratization.

At the same time, this study highlights the importance of considering the legacy of armed conflict on community members, even when they do not explicitly invoke conflict experience in their demands. Future studies might expand this article's analysis beyond Colombia to include extractive-related *consultas* carried out in Peru and El Salvador or areas affected by criminal violence in Mexico. Outside of Latin America, scholars might consider local history of armed conflict and violence on citizen engagement in participatory planning projects in Indonesia or

water management in Bangladesh. How long does the impact of armed conflict and violence on participation persist? This article indicates that the legacy of armed conflict is far-reaching. Just how far it reaches is unclear.

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
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Online appendix:

A1: Administrative steps needed to organize a *consulta popular*.



A2. Constructing territorial control variables.¹⁹

To construct my variables for armed group territorial control, I replicate and expand the dataset constructed by Aila Matanock and Miguel García-Sánchez (2018). Those authors note that measuring territorial control from observable variables is difficult; raw indicators of violence are not sufficient, as violence often *decreases* when armed groups consolidate control over an area. What we can do, as scholars, is ‘use what we can observe (patterns of violence) to capture a phenomenon that has an unobservable dimension (armed actor control)’. Matanock and García-Sánchez do this by using Daniel Nagin’s technique for identifying patterns and trajectories from longitudinal data. Rather than using raw measures of violence, this technique identifies common patterns of the ebb and flow of violent actions by actor subgroup. They find, as do I when I repeat their analysis, ‘clear differences in patterns across the sample [violent events between 1993-2013 in Colombian municipalities] but similarities within subgroups [municipalities with different kinds of control].’

In-keeping with Matanock and García-Sánchez, contested, FARC-controlled, and paramilitary-controlled municipalities display identifiable patterns of violent events. ‘Contested municipalities feature high levels of violent events perpetrated by multiple armed actors... Municipalities controlled or under strong influence of guerrilla groups, on the other hand, feature a few violent events by paramilitary groups, for example, but then guerrilla-perpetrated violent events that then decrease over time as the guerrillas consolidate a hegemonic position’. In other words, municipalities that are under the consolidated control of a non-state armed actor feature initially high rates of violence by that actor, and then a decrease in violent events by that armed actor.

Using this knowledge, I plot and hand-coded armed actor presence in the 985 municipalities included in my dataset. I follow Matanock and García-Sánchez’s criteria: ‘For paramilitary groups, the single trajectory of paramilitary violence identified by the model as optimal during this period, aside from no activity, is decreasing and then stable. Thus, if the paramilitaries are active during this period, they are thought to come out on top of the guerrillas at the end given their level of activity compared to those of the guerrillas: in two of the intersections, paramilitary control resulted because the path of paramilitary actions (*Decreasing – stable*) was clearly above the guerrillas’ trajectories (*No action* and *Moderate –decreasing*); in the third (paramilitaries’ *Decreasing – stable* and guerrillas’ *High - decreasing* trajectories) is less clear, but our understanding, including from the qualitative benchmarking presented in the paper, is that, although guerrillas are active, the paramilitaries overpower them at the end of the period. For the guerrillas, however, when the paramilitary has no action in this period, and the guerrillas still maintain a *High-decreasing* trajectory, this should result in dominance by the guerrillas’. When patterns of violence are difficult to distinguish between guerrilla-favoring, paramilitary-favoring and state-favoring, I create two measures. One measure codes the municipality as in control of the armed group. The other, more conservative estimate codes the municipality as under State control.

Comparisons of my expanded dataset to that used by Matanock and García-Sánchez demonstrate significant overlap in our coding. T-tests comparing municipalities coded as guerrilla-controlled show that the datasets do not display statistically significant differences for

¹⁹ This section quotes, at length, portions of the online appendix to Matanock and García-Sánchez’s (2018) article on social support for counterinsurgency in Colombia.

either more or less conservative coding. Differences in coding for paramilitary control are also not statistically significant.

Distribution of municipalities in dataset (less conservative)

Guerrilla control	Paramilitary control	State control
29%	14.8%	56%

Distribution of municipalities in dataset (more conservative)

Guerrilla control	Paramilitary control	State control
22.4%	0.09%	76.7

Distribution of cases:

	No FARC hegemony	FARC hegemony	Total
No <i>consulta</i> mobilization	637	255	892
<i>Consulta</i> mobilization	61	31	92
Total	698	286	984

	No paramilitary hegemony	Paramilitary hegemony	Total
No <i>consulta</i> mobilization	769	123	892
<i>Consulta</i> mobilization	69	23	92
Total	838	146	984

List of Municipalities in Matanock & García-Sanchez data

Antioquia	Caucasia
Antioquia	Medellín
Antioquia	Itagui
Antioquia	Envigado
Antioquia	Turbo
Antioquia	Taraz
Atlántico	Barranquilla
Atlántico	Malambo
Bogotá D.C.	Bogotá, D.C.
Bolívar	Turbaco
Caldas	Manizales
Caquetá	Florencia
Casanare	Yopal
Cauca	Piendamó
Cauca	Rosas
Cesar	Aguachica
Cesar	Agustín Codazzi
Córdoba	Tierralta
Córdoba	Planeta Rica
Córdoba	Montería
Cundinamarca	Madrid
Cundinamarca	Cota
Cundinamarca	Villeta
Huila	Gigante
Huila	Hobo
Huila	Neiva
Magdalena	Ciénaga
Magdalena	Santa Marta
Meta	Fuente de Oro
Meta	Acacías
Meta	Villavicencio
Nariño	Buesaco
Nariño	San Andres de Tumaco
Norte de Santande	Cúcuta
Putumayo	Orito
Putumayo	Puerto Asís
Quindio	Quimbaya
Santander	Lebrija
Santander	Barrancabermeja
Valle del Cauca	Cali
Valle del Cauca	Cartago
Valle del Cauca	Andalucía
Valle del Cauca	Calima
Valle del Cauca	Jamundí
Valle del Cauca	Buenaventura

A3.1: Logistic regression of hypothesis 3—timing of armed group consolidation—in paramilitary controlled areas. Robust standard errors clustered by province in parentheses. (DV=*mobilized*).

	A1	A2	A3
FARC violent events (1993-2001)	0.15 (0.40)		0.31 (0.36)
Para violent events (1993-2001)	0.04 (0.38)		-0.03 (0.29)
FARC violent events (2002-2010)		-0.27 (0.65)	-0.30 (0.85)
Para violent events (2002-2010)		0.08 (0.24)	0.35 (0.47)
Vanhanen index			0.69 (0.66)
<i>Convenios de Fuerza</i>			-0.12 (0.91)
Mining Royalties	0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)
Linear Distance to Bogotá (km)	-2.77*** (0.735)	-2.71*** (0.74)	-2.81*** (0.91)
Basic needs index (2011)	0.14 (0.93)	0.27 (0.82)	0.58 (0.94)
Rurality index	-0.79 (0.77)	-0.76 (0.64)	-0.16 (0.66)
Total Population	-1.02 (1.48)	-0.82 (1.17)	3.93 (2.17)
Municipality size (km2)	1.74 (0.94)	1.93 (0.94)*	1.94 (1.30)
Constant	-2.78*** (0.80)	-2.33*** (0.84)	-2.18** (0.87)
Observations	146	146	94

A3.2: Logistic regression of hypothesis 3—timing of armed group consolidation—in state-controlled areas. Robust standard errors clustered by province in parentheses. (DV=*mobilized*)

	A5	A6	A7
FARC violent events (1993-2001)	0.89 (0.57)		1.04 (0.71)
Para violent events (1993-2001)	-0.23 (0.38)		-0.52 (1.05)
FARC violent events (2002-2010)		0.48 (0.44)	0.17 (1.52)
Para violent events (2002-2010)		0.31 (0.43)	0.21 (0.46)
Vanhanen index			-0.28 (0.33)
CD in power			0.50 (0.61)
<i>Convenios de Fuerza</i>			1.05 (0.55)
Social Leaders Killed			-0.05 (0.53)
Mining Royalties	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Linear Distance to Bogotá (km)	-0.89 (0.70)	-0.90 (0.71)	-0.86 (0.72)
Basic needs index (2011)	0.00 (0.68)	0.02 (0.70)	0.05 (0.72)
Rurality index	-0.16 (0.59)	-0.17 (0.59)	-0.07 (0.59)
Total Population	-4.65 (5.14)	-5.21 (5.71)	-4.92 (5.32)
Municipality size (km2)	-0.07 (0.75)	-0.19 (0.83)	-0.28 (1.23)
Constant	-3.10*** (0.37)	-3.09*** (0.38)	-3.59*** (0.80)
Observations	552	552	546

A4: Robustness checks

A4.1: Logistic regression of hypothesis 3 using more conservative measure of guerrilla territorial control (DV=*mobilized*)

	A5	A6	A7
FARC violent events (1993-2001)	2.81*** (0.64)		3.11*** (0.65)
Para violent events (1993-2001)	-4.01*** (0.94)		-4.13*** (0.91)
FARC violent events (2002-2010)		0.51* (0.25)	0.63* (0.30)
Para violent events (2002-2010)		-0.26 (0.43)	-1.30 (1.13)
Vanhanen index			0.36 (0.35)
CD in power			-1.62 (1.32)
<i>Convenios de Fuerza</i>			1.10 (0.64)
Social Leaders Killed			-1.69* (0.67)
Mining Royalties	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Linear Distance to Bogotá (km)	-2.85*** (0.94)	-2.59*** (0.98)	-3.32*** (1.04)
Basic needs index (2011)	0.38 (0.46)	0.07 (0.54)	0.05 (0.52)
Rurality index	-1.48 (0.61)*	-1.04 (0.60)	-1.61* (0.65)
Total Population	-1.65 (1.51)	-1.74 (1.45)	-0.96 (1.04)
Municipality size (km2)	0.89 (0.75)	0.49 (0.81)	0.96 (0.64)
Constant	-3.13*** (0.61)	-3.08*** (0.66)	-2.01 (1.34)
Observations	221	221	221

A4.2: Logistic regression of hypothesis 3 using different source of violence data (ViPPA data)²⁰ (DV=*mobilized*).

	A5	A6	A7
FARC violent events (1993-2001)	5.67* (2.70)		5.81 (3.47)
Para violent events (1993-2001)	-5.71* (2.64)		-7.86*** (2.73)
FARC violent events (2002-2010)		2.34 (2.27)	0.86 (2.86)
Para violent events (2002-2010)		-2.38 (2.29)	1.47 (1.71)
Vanhanen index			0.06 (0.37)
CD in power			-0.39 (1.02)
<i>Convenios de Fuerza</i>			0.56 (0.53)
Social Leaders Killed			-0.62 (0.75)
Mining Royalties	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Linear Distance to Bogotá (km)	-1.42* (0.65)	-1.45* (0.64)	-1.58* (0.79)
Basic needs index (2011)	-0.26 (0.47)	-0.24 (0.44)	-0.29 (0.42)
Rurality index	-0.58 (0.72)	-0.49 (0.71)	-0.54 (0.72)
Total Population	-6.68 (4.32)	-5.02 (3.49)	-7.51 (5.34)
Municipality size (km2)	1.7 (0.71)	1.10 (0.67)	1.38* (0.39)
Constant	-2.97*** (0.53)	-2.74*** (0.50)	-2.70*** (0.97)
Observations	286	286	285

²⁰ Osorio, Javier, Mohamed Mohamed, Viveca Pavon, and Susan Brewer-Osorio. 2019. "Mapping Violent Presence of Armed Actors in Colombia." *Advances in Cartography and GIScience of the ICA* 1:1–9. doi: [10.5194/ica-adv-1-16-2019](https://doi.org/10.5194/ica-adv-1-16-2019).

A4.3: Logistic regression of hypothesis 3 in municipalities with no previous extractive history. (DV=*mobilized*).

	A5	A6	A7
FARC violent events (1993-2001)	15.96*** (0.96)		15.85*** (2.57)
Para violent events (1993-2001)	-24.62*** (1.39)		-25.53*** (3.35)
FARC violent events (2002-2010)		1.69*** (0.54)	4.92 (2.51)
Para violent events (2002-2010)		0.35 (3.83)	0.97 (5.73)
Vanhanen index			-0.05 (0.69)
Linear Distance to Bogotá (km)	-0.78 (0.91)	-0.50 (1.04)	1.03 (1.15)
Basic needs index (2011)	-0.24 (0.67)	-0.26 (0.71)	-1.52 (1.38)
Rurality index	0.15 (0.84)	0.59 (1.05)	0.85 (1.39)
Total Population	-1.35 (7.07)	-13.00 (18.62)	-20.18 (19.85)
Municipality size (km2)	-0.01 (0.63)	-3.38 (2.18)	13.60 (12.18)
Constant	-4.00*** (0.56)	-3.71*** (0.93)	-2.99** (1.23)
Observations	129	129	82